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Title: Empire in Central Asia
Author: Terry Clancy
Date: March 2002
Language: en
Topics: imperialism, Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, US foreign interventions
Source: Retrieved on 16th December 2021 from http://struggle.ws/issues/war/afghan/pamwt/wt2/pipelines.html
Notes:  Terry Clancy lives in Ireland and writes for the Free Earth website. He is a member of the Anarchist Federation.

Terry Clancy

Empire in Central Asia

In the early 1990’s the last 19^(th) Century European empire crumbled.

The longest lasting, although ironically originally one of the weakest.

Just as other powers moved into the vacuum left by the relative

weakening of the old West European ones, so too today this is happening

with the decline of the Russian Empire.

The weakening of Russian power in what was it’s southern colonial empire

is opening up the way for other imperialisms. Central Asia and the

Caucasus, or the Caspian Region as it is also known, is a largely

forgotten corner of the world, but with all the ingredients of a new

Middle East, it may not be for much longer. Imperialist competition in

the region is centred around the exploitation of it’s considerable

resources of oil and gas, principally centred on the different costs and

benefits accruing to different factions of the ruling class from various

pipeline projects.

Firstly I’m going to look at those, before turning to look at the

interests and goals of three different players in the carve up of

Central Asia: Iran, the United States and Russia (others include Turkey,

the E.U. and China but restrictions of time and space work against a

full exploration).

Pipelines

The principal energy resources in the Caspian Region are to be found in

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. All three states are

essentially landlocked, the Caspian sea being an inland sea with no

connection to the oceans. As a result, a major aspect of the

international competition over the exploitation of these resources is

the struggle over which route to take to the sea and the global market.

There are a number of options, each with their own advocates and each

reflecting rival agendas.

The Northern Route (via Russia): The Northern route would consist of an

upgrading of the existing Kazak and Russian pipeline systems, plus a new

one linking Baku in Azerbaijan with the Russian port of Novorossisk on

the Black Sea. Obviously this is the option favoured by the Russian

rulers, as it maintains their dominance of Central Asia and provides a

source of revenue to them.

The Southern Route (via Iran): From a purely practical point of view

this is the most sensible option, with the shortest distance as it is

able to plug into the Iranian pipeline system and it provides access to

the growing South Asian market. Opposed by the United States, both

because of that state’s hostility to Iran and because it doesn’t

represent a diversification of energy sources — which is a U.S. goal we

will be returning to. Nonetheless this is the only one of the new routes

which is actually up and running.

The Eastern Route (via China): The longest and most expensive route but

favoured by the Chinese government, and being developed by them, it also

allows them to exploit the resources in their western provinces.

The Western Route (via Turkey): This is favoured by Turkey, the United

States and Israel. There are three options here; firstly a pipeline to

the port of Suspa in Georgia and then through the Bosporus straits to

Europe. The Turkish claim is that the straits will not be able to handle

the increased amount of shipping and propose instead a pipeline from

Azerbaijan to Ceyhan on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. The high costs of

this proposal have promoted an alternative American plan to bypass the

Bosporus straits with a pipeline going through Bulgaria and Greece.

The South Eastern Route (via Afghanistan): This is the reason why in

years past Taliban hierarchs popped up in Texas and other unlikely

places. It has been argued that this proposal was a reason behind both

Osama Bin Laden’s war on the U.S. and the U.S. action in Afghanistan.

With the fall of the Taliban this route has again entered the running.

Note that it avoids Iran while delivering to the South Asian market,

which is much more promising than the European one.

Readers, not even with long memories, will notice the amount of armed

conflicts which have been found along these routes in recent years.

Russia, China and Turkey have been engaged in suppressing revolt along

their favoured routes, as well as of course the American intervention in

Afghanistan, and the Afghan civil war prior to that.

The Afghan Pipeline

The Californian based UNOCAL energy corporation began it’s efforts to

establish pipelines transporting oil and gas through Afghanistan in

October 1995, the original idea was that of it’s Argentinean competitor

Bridas. Lack of financing, the decline in world oil prices in 1998, the

continuing civil strife in Afghanistan and the early phase of the

U.S.-Bin Laden conflict, all these came together and blocked the Afghan

pipeline project. However, the victory of American arms has changed the

situation.

U.S. based business magazine Forbes reports that with “the collapse of

the Taliban, oil executives are suddenly talking again about building

it.”

“It is absolutely essential that the U.S. make the pipeline the

centerpiece of rebuilding Afghanistan,’ says S. Rob Sobhani, a professor

of foreign relations at Georgetown University and the head of Caspian

Energy Consulting.”

“The State Department thinks it’s a great idea, too. Routing the gas

through Iran would be avoided, and Central Asian republics wouldn’t have

to ship through Russian pipelines” [1]

Furthermore on the 9^(th) of February the Irish Times carried an agency

story outlining a pipeline co-operation deal between the Pakistani

military dictatorship and the new Afghan government:

“Pakistani President, Gen Pervez Musharraf, and the Afghan interim

leader, Mr Hamid Karzai, agreed yesterday that their two countries

should develop “mutual brotherly relations” and co-operate “in all

spheres of activity” — including a proposed gas pipeline from Central

Asia to Pakistan via Afghanistan.” [2]

God told me to do it — The Iranian Challenge

“Iran’s interests are briefly to getting the Caspian and Central Asian

oil to the Gulf and establish close political and economic ties with the

region. First, Iran has a desperate need for foreign exchange and would

benefit from oil and gas transit fees.

Second, with oil and gas transit, Iran would be in a better position to

develop trade with the region. Central Asia could eventually become an

important market for Iranian manufactured goods. In turn the combination

of oil and gas transit and trade could establish Iran as regional power

in Central Asia.

Third, with oil transiting from Central Asia to Iranian Gulf ports, Iran

would strengthen its position in the Gulf, essentially in relation to

Saudi-Arabia, potentially also in relation to Iraq. Emerging as a

Central Asian power would also reinforce Iran’s position in relation to

the Gulf neighbours.” [3]

American opposition to the Iranian route is based on a number of

factors. Principally and most importantly; the Iranian revolution of

1979 was a challenge and remains such from the point of view that it is

the so-called ‘Threat of a Good Example’. What this means is essentially

it is an ever present reminder that it is possible to break out of

neo-colonial domination, or at least try to, such states must be

isolated, obstructed, and attacked whenever possible. [4]

This is in the long term collective interests of the American ruling

class for the simple reason that if it tolerated Iran, given the popular

alienation from the ruling authorities in the Middle East, and given the

region’s long history of nationalist and quasi-nationalist revolt, it

would only be an encouragement for others to follow the Iranian example.

Such a course would, in the long run, be possibly fatal for the profits

of the American banks and arms companies who do so much business with

the Arab elite. Nationalist regimes would be more concerned with

developing a native industrial base.

Also, in the particular case of the Middle East, loss of American

influence would also mean a loss of some American influence over Japan

and Europe (the places which actually are dependant on Middle Eastern

oil — unlike the U.S.). Thus in the last twenty odd years Iran has been

both directly attacked by the United States and as well as by Iraq with

U.S. support.

The problem is that it is in the short term, individual interests of

U.S. companies (not to mention French ones, Japanese etc..) to trade

with Iran and indeed use the opportunity offered by the Iranian route to

export Central Asian energy resources to South Asia. Furthermore it is

in the interests of the governments of the Central Asian republics to do

so. The Iranian option simply makes the best economic sense, all the

more so because it already exists. Unless an alternative is developed,

market forces will compel companies to develop the resources of Central

Asia via Iran. Thus it is imperative for the U.S. Government to

facilitate an alternative pipeline to the Indian and Pakistani markets.

Fortunately for them they have just radically altered the political

landscape of Afghanistan. For the civil war in Afghanistan was a major

barrier to constructing the only possible pipeline which could deliver

straight to the South Asian market while avoiding Iran.

However as we have seen, the potential for proxy war very much remains

in Afghanistan, as does the potential for limited insurgency by Taliban

remnants. The potential for the former is underscored by the opportunity

presented to the rulers of Iran by the oil and gas of the Caspian

region. Not to mention the threat presented to them by what would amount

to, if reported American plans for Iraq go ahead and are successful, an

American encirclement, with a client regime to the east in Afghanistan

and to the west in Iraq.

So we have seen Iran exploiting the power vacuum in post-Taliban

Afghanistan and possible American missile strikes on Iran’s Afghan

proxies. Expect in the very least to hear much more ranting like “The

Axis of Evil” and “The Great Satan”.

The Democracy of the Oil Barons — the American Expansion.

“when the Afghan conflict is over we will not leave Central Asia. We

have long term plans and interests in this region.” [5]

— U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Elizabeth Jones.

The central objectives of American Imperialism in this region include:

diversify global energy production and thereby reduce the power of oil

states.

corporations.

The document “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central

Asia” outlines these goals and was published by the Strategic Studies

Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Some extracts from it serve to

illustrate the U.S. interests and activities in the area:

“The 1998 National Security Strategy states why this region is important

to the United States. It has estimated reserves of 160 billion barrels

of oil, comparably large natural gas reserves, and will play an

increasingly important role in satisfying the world’s future energy

demands.”

“U.S. officials publicly maintain that this region’s energy sources

could be a back up to the unstable Persian Gulf and allow us and our

allies to reduce our dependence on its energy supplies. In pursuit of

this goal we have worked to establish governments with open markets,

i.e., openness to U.S. firms (and not only those associated with energy)

and democracy.

We have also moved to check any possibility of their one-sided military

dependence upon Russia. The determination to prevent either Moscow or

Tehran from dominating the area, either in energy, or through

penetration and control of their defence structures goes back at least

to 1994.”

A few pages later and the rhetoric of promoting democracy is admitted to

be rhetoric:

“In practise, energy and security have dominated the agenda as the means

to achieve this broader Westernisation to the point that evidently

little pressure is being directed towards democratisation of local

governments.”

In fact foreign imperialism, be it Russian or American, is marching hand

in hand with local despotism, as is always the case. The document then

turns to the military aspects of these policies:

“the oil producing states are now members of the PfP [Partnership for

“Peace” — N.A.T.O. front organisation — FE], and Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,

and Georgia overtly seek NATO’s direct participation in the area, the

U.S. or Western contest with Russia and Iran has assumed a more openly

military aspect.”

“This stimulates an equal and opposing reaction. Armenian officials

proclaim the vital importance of joint exercises with Russia to defend

Armenia’s security and talk of an ‘axis’ with Russia and Iran.

Consequently and due to the spiralling strategic stakes in the

Transcaspian, NATO’s collective engagement, as well as the specifically

U.S. engagement, with the region is likely to grow.”

“In September 1995, U.S. experts on Central Asia met at NATO

headquarters and cited the extensive U.S. interests in Caspian energy

deposits as a reason why Washington might have to extend its Persian

Gulf security guarantees to this region. [6]

U.S. involvement has only taken off since then. While U.S. officials

intone visions of a win-win situation for everyone, where everyone has

shared interests in developing these energy markets, they have really

aimed to deny and break Russia’s monopoly over the energy producing

states.”

“Russia could sabotage many if not all of the forthcoming energy

projects by relatively simple and tested means and there is not much we

could do absent a strong and lasting regional commitment. Therefore, for

a win-win situation to come about, some external factor must be

permanently engaged and willing to commit even military forces, if need

be, to ensure stability and peace.

This does not necessarily mean a unilateral commitment, but more likely

a multilateral one, e.g., under the U.N.‘s auspices but actually under

U.S. leadership. Without such a permanent presence, and it is highly

unlikely that the United States can afford or will choose to make such a

presence felt, other than through economic investment, Russia will be

able to exclude all other rivals and regain hegemony over the area.” [7]

Well that was published in June 2000, a year and a half later and the

United States does have military bases in Central Asia, and has just

moved into Georgia in the Caucasus — also on a potential pipeline route

(The Western, via Turkey one). September 11^(th) has spectacularly

increased the potency of the American military by effectively defusing

the American public’s long standing opposition to foreign military

adventures.

Yes the last two decades has seen lots of those, but always in forms

calculated to minimise a public opinion backlash at home. Some examples,

covert action (Nicaragua), military support to proxies (El Salvador,

Columbia), overwhelming force in ideal territory (Iraq), air war

(Serbia) or simply actions against opponents without the slightest

chance of putting up effective resistance (Granada). We should not doubt

that American militarism has moved up a gear or two.

A House Divided

These areas were incorporated into the Russian Empire in the 19^(th)

Century, with the intent of protecting trade routes and using them as a

bargaining chip with the British Empire. Under both Tsarism and

Bolshevism a classically colonial pattern of development was put into

place. While Azerbaijan was an oil producer [8] the Central Asian

republics were generally under a mono-culture/cash crop system of cotton

production, and in both cases had unequal trade relations with the

metropolis. The exception is the northern part of Kazakhstan, adjoining

Russia, which was industrialised, with a workforce largely of Slavic

origins.

This colonial dependence persisted following the break up of the

“Soviet” Union, while Kazakhstan’s trade with Russia accounts for 42.5%

of the G.D.P. of that country — trade with Kazakhstan is a mere 1.7% of

that of Russia. Kazakhstan is actually dependant on Russia for it’s

energy supplies, as all the infrastructure was developed in the “Soviet”

period running north-south, rather than west-east from Kazakhstan’s oil

fields to it’s urban centres. [9]

The fact that exports must go through Russia provides a further

stranglehold. As with economy so with security and a number of these

states — Armenia and Tajikistan in particular, have been forced to lean

on Russia for military support, for the lack of an alternative power.

However Kremlin influence is not what it once was, due to the Russian

economic situation, and because of, the, generally speaking,

post-independence eagerness for real independence on the part of local

elites. There is insufficient capital in Russia for investments in and

loans to the new States on a level with that of outside interests. Thus

there are now American, Chinese, Turkish, South Korean, European,

Iranian interests in the region. The arrival of multinational

corporations is actually to the Russian benefit as these provide the

investments necessary to develop the exploitation of resources, which

can then provide revenues to the Russian “elite” due to their control of

the export routes. Plus that control can be used as leverage for Russian

companies to muscle their way into the energy consortiums developing the

region.

Since the U.S. turned against the Taliban there has been a community of

interest between the two powers in regard to the destruction of the

Taliban. The Russian esablishment has long feared the ‘Talibanisation’

of Central Asia as it’s border with Kazakhstan is porous, there are

considerable ethnic Russian populations in these states, as well as

Muslim minorities in Russia itself.

Nevertheless Putin’s U.S. friendly policy is not without it’s detractors

in Moscow. On February 21^(st) a group of former military chieftains,

including a former defence minister, launched a literary attack on the

Russian president, claiming that:

“With your blessing, the United States has received military bases in

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Stan, and, maybe, Kazakhstan.

“In the long run, these bases are for dealing a strike against Russia,

not Bin Laden ...We would not be surprised if tomorrow they call you the

best American, European or NATO official.” [10]

Since the break up of the “Soviet” Union there have been a number of

Russian military interventions in the region. The Russian army has

popped up in Georgia and Armenia and still has a presence in Tajikistan,

but have been removed from Turkmenistan and Kyrgyz Stan. Furthermore in

the early 1990’s Russia backed Armenia in it’s dispute with Turkish

backed Azerbaijan. Not to forget the long running conflict in Chechnya

(it self on the Russian favoured pipeline route from Azerbaijan).

The American military presence is something of a new development. The

interests of the Russian ‘elite’ in the area are in maintaining it’s

influence over economic development, so it can have it’s cut. Along with

this, in the future Russian energy needs are likely to expand and so the

Caspian region, as it stands now, could provide a cheap source.

They have formed a body for maintaining co-operative relations with

China, which like the U.S. is a new player in the region, called the

Shanghai Co-Operation Council and have forged a relationship with Iran,

particularly in regard to disputes over territorial rights in the

Caspian sea, the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, and in supporting the

Northern Alliance against the Taliban. This has lead “Some observers to

warn” of a “growing similarity of interests among Russia, Iran and China

in countering the West and attempting to increase their own

influence”.[11]

Those are the words of a briefing paper produced by American civil

servants for Congressmen. However the Russian establishment is divided.

According to New Delhi based research group the Institute for Defence

Study and Analysis:

“It is believed that a difference of opinion exists in present day

Russia regarding its future course in response to the US geo-political

challenge. The “imperialists” and the “traditionalists” would like

Russia to dig in its heels in defence of its historical positions in the

region.

The “pragmatists” or the “realists”, who include Russia’s major oil and

gas companies, would like to adjust to the changing geo-political

realities in return for a share in the region’s lucrative oil and gas

deals. It appears that the country’s policy-making establishment, in the

pursuit of perceived national interests, is constantly synthesising the

differing views among the Russian political class and strategic

community.

Despite its current weakness, Russia still has the requisite force

projection capability in the region. Moreover, the proposed pipeline

by-passing Russia is likely to pass through conflict-ridden areas in the

former Soviet republics where Russia has established itself in the role

of a peace-keeper.

There are also reports that Russia has of late stepped up support to the

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which is behind the Kurdish insurgency in

eastern Turkey from where the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline would pass.

Russian geo-politicians feels that as a consequence of its victory in

the Cold War, the USA has driven to the minimum Russian influence in the

Baltic and Black Seas.

It has forced Russia out of the zone of the warm seasthe Indian

Oceanwith the loss of Central Asia and Transcaucasus. Making use of the

CARs’[Central Asian Republics] desire to assert their independence from

Moscow, it is seeking to irrevocably change the geo-political equations

in the region. It seems to them that Russia can protect its vital

interests in Central Asia in partnership with Iran and China against

Western machinations and designs.” [12]

Conclusion

Just as within Afghanistan rival warlords compete for control over road

tolls, smuggling, and heroin production, so to on a world level is the

same process at work, on a larger scale. State power is the

representative of economic power, and rival states carve up resources

and markets in perpetual competition, in doing so representing the long

term collective interests of their national ruling class (rather than

short term interests of individual corporations).

While the buying of influence and individuals moving from political

office to the corporate boardroom (and back again) may show us aspects

of this process at work it is not it’s source. Rather the source is the

division of society into classes, with a ruling class based on control

over production. The state is the mechanism by which the ruling class

advances it’s interests both at home and overseas. At home against it’s

subjects, overseas against rival rulers.

It has been amply shown how imperialist competition fuelled the Northern

Alliance-Taliban war, and this is true of the earlier Afghan conflicts

also [13]. The Afghanistan situation then is not one of a “failed state”

but one of successful states (Russia, Iran, Pakistan, the United States)

and rather being an aberration is the by-product of the competition

between hierarchies intrinsic to the world capitalist system.

[1]

www.forbes.com

[2] ‘Irish Times’ 09/02/02

[3] ‘Oil in the Caspian Region and Central Asia — the Political Risk of

the Great Game Continued’ By Øystein Noreng

www.caucasus.dk

[4] This phraseThreat of a Good Example was coined in the 80s to

describe the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua. I do not use it as a

gesture of “anti-imperialist” support to the murderous (and Imperialist)

regime in Iran, but rather in recognition that it’s existence as a state

born from the downfall of a American backed government is an example to

people who would like to do the same to other American clients in the

region and expel Western influence altogether. I think this is the case

irrespective of sectarian disputes within Islam and that it shapes the

American Imperialist attitude to Iran.

[5] Quoted in The Guardian 12/02/02

[6] “Persian Gulf security guarantees” would presumably, given the

situation in the Persian Gulf, involve a great deal of American military

intervention and a permanent military presence plus an attempt to

exclude/contain all other powers.

[7] ‘U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia’

carlisle-www.army.mil

[8] Abridged History of Central Asia by William M. Brinton

www.asian-history.com

[9] Quoted in ‘The Guardian’ 22/02/02

[10] ‘CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Central Asia’s New States and

Implications for U.S. Interests’

cnie.org

[11] ‘Russian Policy Towards Central Asia, part 2’

www.idsa-india.org

[12] See the Human Rights Watch report ‘Afghanistan The Crisis of

Impunity’ for the Northern Alliance-Taliban war —

www.hrw.org

or ‘Silent Soldier: The Man behind the Afghan Jehad’ for the Pakistani

involvement in the ‘Soviet’-Islamist conflict of the 1980’s —

www.afghanbooks.com

[13] Missing footnote.