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Title: Tyranny Shaken in the Caribbean
Author: Anonymous
Date: April, 1959
Language: en
Topics: Cuba, Revolution 1959, Authoritarian Left, editorial, revolution, the state
Source: Scanned from VIEWS & COMMENTS, No. 34, April, 1959
Notes: VIEWS & COMMENTS, No. 34, April, 1959, A Libertarian League Publication, whole issue of VIEWS & COMMENTS, No. 34, April, 1959 is at http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/libertarian-league-publisher-views-comments-number-34

Anonymous

Tyranny Shaken in the Caribbean

The overthrow of the odious dictator, Fulgencio Batista, by a few

thousand armed irregulars and the not-too-passive resistance of the

whole Cuban people, has thrilled all lovers of Liberty and has given new

hope to the millions still writhing under the heels of tyranny in many

countries. It has given new hope to the people of Santo Domingo and

Hungary, of Nicaragua and Korea, to the tormented masses of Russia and

of South Africa. Every tyrant that falls renews the hope for a better

ultimate tomorrow.

In its subservience to the North American sugar interests and also to

the foreign gambling racketeers, in the venality within its ranks, and

in the excessive brutality of its police forces, the Batista

dictatorship was excelled only by that of the Trujillo family in the

Dominican Republic. Batista was the first ruler of Cuba to violate the

extra-territoriality of the Diplomatic Corps and the traditional

inviolability of the University of Havana. The opposition in Cuba

consisted of the near-totality of the population.

Foremost in the struggle against Batista from the beginning was the

Federation of University Students (FEU), five successive presidents of

which were murdered by Batista's police. In all, several thousand

students were killed, and they, on their part, had maintained a running

battle with reprisals against the uniformed thugs, bombings and

sabotage, culminating in an attack on the Presidential Palace (March 13,

1957), in which Batista himself narrowly escaped the justice of the

enraged youth of Havana.

Fidel Castro's 26th of July Movement was not based directly on either

the workers' or the peasants' or the student-intellectual movements as

such. Although its origin goes further back, its effective action

started with the landing of 82 men in the southeastern province of

Oriente, December 2, 1956. Nearly all of this original invasion force

were killed almost immediately. The survivors fortified themselves in

the roughest mountain terrain of the Sierra Maestra where hundreds

flocked to join them. The permanent armed resistance of this small

guerrilla army in the hills inspired the masses more than had the

numerous sporadic demonstrations and outbreaks in the large cities. The

romantic appeal was tremendous. Rebellious acts elsewhere in the island

were many times erroneously credited to the 26th of July Movement. The

popular imagination was fired with the vision of the bearded rebel on

horseback. To a considerable extent the red and black banner of Fidel

Castro came to symbolize the whole struggle against Batista.

Every revolutionary movement against tyranny has, by its very nature,

some social content, and that of Fidel Castro has been no exception.

However the 26th of July Movement has only advocated consistently one

thing—the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista. Little indication was given as

to what should be done the day after victory. No bold program of social

transformation was presented, simply a vague promise of "democracy."

There were occasional general references to agrarian reform and more

rural schools but nothing very concrete even in the way of promises.

In the flush of victory, Fidel announced that United States interests

would be protected and encouraged, while his brother Raul declared that

the foreigners' strangle-hold on Cuba's sugar mills and plantations must

be broken through expropriation. This lack of a consistent, positive

program attracted political opportunists of all shades. Catholic Action

and the Communist Party were both active and influential in the 26th of

July ranks during the months in the mountains, and presumably still are,

in spite of Castro's anti-communist statements.

In the course of the struggle, Fidel Castro has given evidence of a

totalitarian orientation. His prima donna attitude is well known. Until

the signing of the Pact of Caracas, he openly refused to cooperate with

other revolutionary opposition forces on anything resembling a basis of

equality.

The Revolutionary Directorate, composed of students (FEU), intellectual

and other elements, had stepped up its fight in the urban centers and

had managed to establish a "second front" with its own guerrilla forces

in the Sierra del Escambray of Central Cuba. It was primarily these

people of the Escambray and the "Autenticos" who later took the city of

Santa Clara, precipitating the final military phase of the revolution.

The anti-Batista labor elements, grouped largely around the "Autenticos"

Party of ex-President Carlos Prio Socarras and the Libertarian

Association, found grounds for cooperation with the Revolutionary

Directorate. Fidel Castro however, rejected all proposals aimed at

coordinated action unless he were first recognized as the supreme leader

of the revolution. A general strike that might very well have overthrown

Batista months ago was aborted and failed miserably due to this lack of

coordination.

A military stalemate had been reached. Batista had been well armed by

the U.S. and Great Britain. The growing ranks of the revolution lacked

the armament for a military victory and the program for a political

victory. At this point, Romulo Betancourt, "democratic-socialist"

President-elect of Venezuela, called a unity conference of

representatives of the various anti-Batista organizations. Out of this

conference came the Pact of Caracas, in which, by way of "compromise,"

Castro's candidate for the provisional presidency—Urrutia—was accepted

by all of the groups in the interest of unity.

This Pact was the condition for unlimited Venezuelan support, and

armament from Venezuela flowed into Cuba in large amounts. The big push

was prepared, strategically well-timed to coincide with the eve of the

sugar harvest. Santa Clara was occupied and the revolution had cut the

island in the middle. With the harvest due and un-postponable, the

economic and military position of the Government had become untenable.

The rats started to abandon the ship; Batista took off for Trujillo-land

to join Peron and Perez Jimenez, his bags bulging with currency. The

Cuban workers came out on general strike and the mopping-up was then a

matter of hours.

Immediately the dictatorship of Batista had fallen, steps were taken by

Castro and Urrutia to assure the greatest possible concentration of

power in the hands of the 26th of July Movement. The commitments and

assurances given the other groups in the Pact of Caracas were broken.

The Urrutia Government was obviously not going to be a "Government of

the Revolution;" it was already a government of the 26th of July

Movement. Elections were scheduled for 18 months in the future, in order

to give time for the consolidation of this "provisional" government.

The top leadership in all of the labor organizations was replaced by

followers of Fidel Castro. In many cases the old leaders had been

supporters of Batista, but in others they had not been. Castro's

appointees are mostly individuals who have been completely unknown as

active unionists.

It was announced that all civilians holding arms were to surrender them

to the newly constituted authorities. The People in Arms who had won the

revolution were to be disarmed by the new Man on Horseback.

Following the "liberation," our comrades of the Libertarian Association

of Cuba resumed publication of their paper, El Libertario, which had

been suppressed years before. They had participated actively in the

revolution in close cooperation with the Revolutionary Directorate and

in a bloc with the labor elements of the "Autenticos" Party. Some of

them had fought in the 26th of July ranks and others in the Sierra del

Escambray and in the mountains of Pinar del Rio. In the first issue of

El Libertario, they called for the democratization of the labor unions

with no governmental interference, raising also the demand that there be

no disarmament of the people.

It is too soon to draw any balance sheet of the Cuban Revolution. If no

concessions are made to the masses in the form of genuine deep-running

social changes, then it may well be that we have only witnessed its

first stage. As matters stand today, there is definite danger of a new

dictatorship with Fidel Castro, the revolutionary hero of today, firmly

in the saddle. Such a dictatorship, based on amass party of yes-men,

might in the long run prove even more dangerous than the one that

preceded it.

In any case, in our enthusiasm over the fall of the tyrant Batista, we

must never lose sight of the full reality. This has been a partial

victory—a great victory—but still a partial one. The Cuban Revolution,

although it is a people's revolution, has not yet become a social

revolution, and while the social sores that gave rise to Batista still

fester, one cannot consider the disease afflicting the island to have

been cured.

In the broader, ultimate sense, no revolutionary government could

achieve the necessary social transformation that would solve the

problems facing Cuba. This can only be accomplished by the people

themselves, participating actively and directly in the reorganization of

all of society. Without the elimination of the whole statist principle

and the exploitation of man by man, any number of social reforms can be

but palliatives and not cures.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The Cuban Revolution has already set into motion a number of forces

heretofore relatively quiescent, aimed at the elimination of other

dictatorial regimes in the Caribbean area. For decades the Trujillos and

the Somozas have ruled Santo Domingo and Nicaragua as their own private

estates. Dynasties have been established under which the aging or dying

dictator bequeaths the power to another member of his family. All

internal opposition has been ruthlessly suppressed.

Fidel Castro in Cuba and Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela, apparently with

the support of Figueres in Costa Rica, have declared their intention of

intervening against the remaining dictatorships in the Caribbean. At the

present moment an international armed force is being readied to attack

Trujillo under the banner of the 27th of February organization of

Dominicans in exile. Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans and others are

already being recruited for this purpose.

As enemies of tyranny, these revolutionary legionnaires merit our

fullest support, along with the warning that they beware the ambitions

of their leaders. It appears possible that for Fidel Castro, active

support of a revolutionary war against Trujillo may provide him with the

opportunity to further consolidate himself at home and build anew modern

Cuban army that can then serve to keep him in power.

In recent decades, it has been axiomatic to say that the days of the

barricades and of guerrilla warfare are over, that the modern

instruments of suppression and repression invalidate all past experience

in these fields. It would be childish not to recognize that tanks and

airplanes and atomic bombs have altered the "science" of revolution. But

many of the old methods can be brought up to date.

The Hungarian Workers' Revolution of 1956 and the Cuban Revolution of

1958 have both demonstrated that a people in arms is perfectly capable

of overcoming the armed might of a modern state. Herein lies great

future hope for the oppressed on both sides of the "iron curtain."

Fidel Castro recently requested the United States to withdraw from Cuba,

the Military Mission attached to the U.S. Embassy there. He said that

since his few guerrillas had licked the much larger American-trained

Cuban army, it was obvious that the U.S. Military Mission was useless.

**Related

Anarchists Confront the Marxist State in Cuba by Quincy B. Thorn Fifth

Estate #394, Summer 2015

https://www.fifthestate.org/archive/394-summer-2015/anarchists-confront-the-marxist-state-in-cuba/