đŸ Archived View for library.inu.red âș file âș the-origin-of-the-state.gmi captured on 2023-01-29 at 14:21:51. Gemini links have been rewritten to link to archived content
âĄïž Next capture (2024-06-20)
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Title: The Origin of the State Author: Harold Barclay Date: 2006, Spring/Summer Language: en Topics: the state, AJODA, AJODA #61 Source: From AJODA #61 Notes: Chapter 3 of "The State" abridged. AJODA #61, Spring/Summer, 2006, vol. 24, no. 1
The seeds of the state have been sown in every human society. Yet only a
very few of these seeds have ever come to fruition. Most states have
been created by being imposed on a people or as a defensive mechanism to
allow for better interaction with an already existent state. It is the
purpose of this chapter to investigate how the state emerges primarily
as a pristine or autochthonous entity. First let us consider some of
these seeds of statism as they appear in what have been called
egalitarian and rank type societies and why they do not mature.
It is important to recognise that any social phenomenon is an emergent
from the interaction of a variety of factors. Monocausality is an error
and at best a simplistic attempt at explanation. Most of the theories of
state origin, some of which will be dealt with below, have sought to
reduce the explanation of the state to a single cause, which means they
have overlooked the significance of other things.
Ronald Cohen has written: âthere is no clear cut or simple set of causal
statements that explains the phenomenon of state formation ... The
formation of states is a funnel-like progression of interactions in
which a variety of pre-state systems responding to different
determinants of change are forced by otherwise irresolvable conflicts to
choose additional and more complex levels of political hierarchy.â Once
this is achieved there occurs a convergence of forms towards the early
state (142). Pre-state systems are placed on the track towards the state
if they have already an existent hierarchy and there are attempts by
some elite to achieve and maintain power and domination. When such an
attempt is successful one has a state or, put another way, the state is
born when an elite can claim for itself a monopoly on the use of
violence and can institute legal sanctions. The hierarchy is built upon
a number of factors. The significant elements in state development are,
then:
A hunting-gathering band of a few dozen members could never constitute a
state simply because it lacks the necessary manpower and resources.
However, earliest Sumerian city-states survived with a few thousand
inhabitants. Each was able to do so because it was about the same size
as all the other states and they were all eventually consolidated into a
single Sumerian state under Sargon I. The Athenian city-state as well
had but several thousand inhabitants, but initially it too competed with
entities of about the same size. Soon it was forced to form coalitions
to deal with external conflicts and, finally, like the Sumerian
city-states, it disappeared in an empire.
In modern times it has already been noted that there are a great number
of what may be called micro-states. A few of these, too, have less than
thirty thousand inhabitants.
To be viable a state must have a certain minimal size and that depends
upon the particular social milieu within which it is located. In
Medieval Europe a state with a million inhabitants would have been quite
effective, other considerations being equal. Today this would be
questionable.
Geographic size may be less important than population, although clearly
the importance and viability of sovereign states with a bare few square
miles are questionable. At the same time the substantial city-state of
Singapore with three million people and 239 square miles seems to
maneuver reasonably well in the halls of power.
It is apparent, however, that the larger the territory one has, the more
self-sustaining the economy can be and the potential for resources is
likewise greater.
Carniero has argued that population growth is a major impetus for state
creation. A people may reside in an area exploiting its agricultural
potential, resulting in population increase and demands or pressures for
more arable lands. Eventually this provokes aggression and conquest of
other areas and peoples and, in order to achieve success in such an
enterprise, necessitates armies which are organised by states.
Population and conquest are here seen as the two motivations for state
creation. But they are in fact only two pieces of a much more complex
puzzle. The state does not rise like a phoenix out of an enlarged and
predatory population alone. Most of the factors mentioned later in this
chapter are ignored.
Researchers believe that humans no doubt understood the process of plant
and animal reproduction and growth thousands of years before actually
domesticating such things as wheat, barley, pulses and sheep. As hunter-
gatherers they were free of the more arduous tasks which would be
associated with cultivation. But population increases would eventually
challenge their sources of food. In addition climatic changes occurring
at the end of the last Ice Age may have threatened traditionally
exploited wild plants and game. Horticulture would have been a
reasonable resolution of the situation. There is, however, no reason to
believe that in every case there should soon arise an absolute limit to
available arable land and a necessity to expand by military aggression.
States in Egypt and Sumer did not arise because of pressure for arable
land. Early horticultural societies would also have still no little
dependence upon gathering and hunting to supplement their supplies.
Finally, a sometimes fashionable explanation for the spread of
inventions and peoples has been migration. Rather than conquest a people
might merely move to a more profitable location: no need for conquest or
the state.
All states with few exceptions have arisen out of sedentary
popula-tions. This is clearly so with both the earliest states of the
Old and the New World: Sumeria, Egypt, India, China, Mexico and Peru.
The only exceptions to this rule have been those states created by
pastoral nomads, such as the Huns and the Mongols and early Turks. These
were all, however, secondary states created on the model of already
existing states and in response to them. But as far as sedentarism is
concerned it is necessary to point out that once these nomads adopted
the state they became sedentary. In addition it must be borne in mind
that the nomadism of pastoralists is not the nomadism of
hunter-gatherers. No hunting-gathering nomad group could ever produce a
state, if only because it lacks the adequate resources and
infrastructure. Pastoralists, on the other hand, possess great wealth in
their herds and in their ancillary, often predatory, activities. They
possess, as has been said, a walking larder.
Ibn Khaldun developed a theory of state development based on the
proposition that pastoral nomads invade and take over an already
decaying city to establish their own new state. But, observe that both
the sedentary community and the state already exist independent of any
nomads.
Why is sedentarism fundamental to state development? States require some
concentration of population wherein there is some specialisation of
labour; they require centres for administration and extensive
horticulture or agriculture. (Pastoralists engage in a bit of
indifferent cultivation, but nearly all of them are dependent upon
sedentary farmers for part of their food.)
The most concentrated type of sedentary life is that of the city. In
almost all cases, where you find the city you will find the state.
Polynesian states and the earliest Mayans do not seem to have had true
cities, but cities seem to be integral elements of states and they are
clear signs of civilisation. Not only are they administrative centres,
they are industrial and craft centres and important sites for trade.
Perhaps a majority of cities have arisen as market places; others have
appeared as objects of religious pilgrimage or as capitals of states or
military centres. Perhaps sedentarism, and particularly urban life, is
so universal in state development because it provides the sense of
permanence and stability so important in the wielding of power.
A third minimal requirement for the creation of a state is the
cultivation of domesticated plants and primary dependence upon them as a
source of food. Again, all of the pristine centres of the state were
characterised by the maintenance of large cultivated areas. Initially
this was by digging stick and hoe involving large gardens: technically,
horticulture. In the Ancient Near East the use of domesticated draft
animalsâoxen and later donkeys, mules and camelsâalong with the plough
and wheeled vehicles arose almost coterminously with the state. The
employment of such power, plus the extensive cultivation of fields,
distinguishes agriculture from horticulture. In Mexico and Peru the
early states remained dependent upon the latter engaging in very
intensive gardening. They also contrasted with the Old World in paying
little attention to animal husbandry. In Peru they kept llamas as pack
animals and for their wool, while in the Eastern Hemisphere a host of
animals were eventually domesticated for meat, milk, wool and draught.
Horses and mules pulled chariots which were the formidable tanks of the
ancient Eastern states.
In the East as well pastoralism became an important adjunct
specialisation, exploiting the vast non-arable and arid lands. It would
appear that with irrigation systems it is not that they demand a
centralised, hierarchical control in the form of state management. It is
that they require coordination of some kindâa coordination which can be
achieved through a variety of different means, but that coordination is
most commonly a matter of very local control.
There are several reasons why a complex horticulture or agriculture is
fundamental to state development. Early gardening was not much more
productive or efficient than gathering and hunting, but as people became
more dependent upon domesticated plants and animals, yields increased
because of the effort in improving seed and agricultural techniques. Not
only did this allow for much larger populations, but it also permitted a
few individuals to become specialists in given tasks and not be engaged
in the production of their food. What is more, it laid the groundwork
for a tiny minority to become a leisure class of administrators and
aristocrats.
A dependence upon domesticated plants and animals as well as irrigation
greatly enhanced land and livestock values. Particularly once kinship
was no longer the basis for having rights to land, some individuals were
able to acquire more land than others.
Some became Big Men through their ability to manipulate others, through
supernatural powers, through force or their ability to gather a body of
clients in large part by making the less successful indebted to them.
The Big Men became then the landlords; agriculture reinforced hierarchy.
Agriculture also produced peasantsâthe largest single segment of
humanity for the last five thousand years. Although the peasant life is
not totally depressing, everyone will agree that it has been
characterised by poverty, disease and insecurity.
Work as a pejorative was invented with peasantry. Not only does the
peasant work long hours, but the labour is back breaking and mostly
drudgery.
The peasant is continually harassed by his lord. Thousands of years of
subservience have sought to train a body of duly obedient servants,
necessary ingredients for any state. It has been hypothesised that the
slave mentality is further maintained by the fact that the more
intelligent and those who do not fully learn subservience in the peasant
community are siphoned off by migration to the towns, where any
rebellious spirit can be sublimated by other challenges.
There are three different kinds of economic exchange: reciprocity,
redistribution and the market. Reciprocity is universal in human
societies and the oldest method of exchange. It is a kind of gift-giving
in which one provides a product or a service for another on the, usually
implicit, understanding that there will be a return of something of
equivalent value in the future by the recipient. Reciprocity may be
immediate or delayed. It is quite likely that the immediate reciprocity
is widespread among mammal species. For instance horses and apes groom
one another. Humans, too, resort to reciprocity of this type, but with
their greater mental capability they can readily remember various
details which allows them to indulge in delayed reciprocity. George
recalls that two years ago Stanley contributed $100 to the marriage of
Georgeâs daughter, Now Stanley requires repairs on his house and George
is obligated to contribute to the repairs in an equivalent fashion. Even
in present day market-dominated society reciprocity survives. Last year
my sister sent me a Christmas gift and so I will duly send her one again
this year in anticipation that she will do the same. Among other things
reciprocity stresses that there are no free gifts. It is also a method
of exchange between equalsâone does not require some kind of
hierarchical arrangement.
Redistribution does require hierarchy, at least in some minimal form. It
requires several individuals to assemble some kind of wealth in one
location and one person is assigned the responsibility for
redistributing this wealth. Again, as with reciprocity, there is the
appearance of gift giving, especially in its simplest expression.
With the Near Eastern archaic states such as Egypt, the pattern of
redistribution was more complex. Peasants were expected to deposit part
of their crop in a local storehouse. In Egypt a great number of
storehouses were created by the state throughout the country and what
was not consumed in a locality was sent on to central depositories at
the royal court. While in New Guinea and in the Northwest Coast [of
North America] the redistribution serviced a general populace, in the
Near East it benefited primarily aristocrats, priests and the military,
functioning as a means of collecting tribute for their benefit. There,
as well, it was the chief type of economic exchange.
For the past several hundred years redistribution has declined in favour
of market arrangements. Nevertheless, redistribution persists as the
means by which the state acquires its operating funds, in the form of
taxation. Modern states extract part of the wealth of every citizen and
redistribute it. Part goes to support an enormous bureaucracy, part for
a military establishment; another part provides subsidies to wealthy
corporations, while, especially in the so-called welfare state, no small
amount is diverted to health, welfare and education of the common folk.
Thus, we have three different kinds of redistribution systems. One is
essentially an elaborate feasting and is extremely close to reciprocity.
A second provides for centralised storehouses and siphons the wealth off
to a dominant minority, the wealth having been appropriated from the
labour of the poor. In the third the state collects taxes from the rich
and the poor and recirculates the money to various groups. Until a
century ago most of it went to the military and administrative branches
of the government, including large sums to a royal family. In recent
times more has been returned to the lower echelons, because, one might
suggest, governments have learned that it is easier and less expensive
in keeping the peace if one can ensure a few crumbs to the hoi polloi.
Robert Carniero finds the origin of the state in population expansion
and conquest. Others have singled out conquest alone as the source of
the state. Oppenheimer saw in the expansion of one group to conquer
another the creation of an apparatus aimed at maintaining domination.
But the several examples he presents are of social entities which were
already states when they commenced expansion. This cuts to the heart of
the problem with this monocausal explanation.
All animals engage from time to time in intra-species fights. Yet the
deliberate attempt to kill an opponent is more characteristic of humans.
Among other animals one or both combatants may be killed by accident,
not so much by design or intent, although in cases of overcrowding
fights do lead to killing. Ordinarily among animals a losing combatant
runs away or performs an instinctive ritual of submission which triggers
an inhibiting reaction in the victor so that he no longer continues his
aggressive behaviour.
Humans apparently lack any genetically programmed inhibitors that
restrain a combatant from killing his opponent. What is controlled by
instinctive ritual among animals is restrained by cultural regulation
among humans. âThou shalt not killâ is a commandment with some degree of
validity in every human community. It is not always effective; so it is
argued warfare is a natural part of human behaviour.
A war aims at conquest, a warring party seeks to capture and control the
lands, wealth and people of another group. The intentions of the feud or
raid are much more modestâto even a score, to steal livestock, to abduct
women, or, on rare occasions to acquire territory. There are no motives
to subdue an opponent or absorb his group. In the feud once a member of
one side has been killed or maimed a revenge attack can be expected in
which a member of the guilty party will be killed or maimed. On the
achievement of this mission the aggressors return home to await
retaliation or a proposal for mediation.
The organisation of warfare is vastly more complex than other forms of
group hostility. Wars are fought with armies and similar military
forces. There are large numbers of men organised according to a chain of
command and a division of labour. There are no democratic armies, since
there are always some individuals who give orders to others who are
expected to obey without question. Occasionally, an army falls into
disarray because those at the top cannot agree, but armies are clearly
distinguished by the fact that not only do those at the bottom do all
the dirty work and face all the danger, but they take all the orders and
give none at all. In addition, in a military force the chain of command
is quite explicit and obvious to everyone. It is never ambiguous.
In feuding and raiding groups there is invariably no chain of command
or, if it does exist, it is a reflection of pre-established relations
among the combatants. There may be deference to a senior kinsman or one
who has a reputation as a great warrior. Fighting is often quite
individualistic with participants each âdoing his own thing.â
Not only are there commanders and the commanded in warfare, but some of
the latter may be assigned to actual fighting, others to providing
supplies to the fighters, some to repair materiel, yet others to
gathering intelligence, to reconnaissance or to tending the wounded. And
in each of these categories there is invariably a further refinement in
the division of labour.
Warfare requires at least a few semi or full professionals and, for
those who are neither, some kind of minimal training is involved.
Warfare depends as well on tactics, that is, the organisation and plans
for battle, the deployment of troops and the arrangement of the most
efficient way in which to achieve a precise goal. Feuds and raids have
no professionals and tactics are minimal.
Because warfare entails the mobilisation of substantial numbers of men
and supplies, it demands a complex and large organisation which can
mount and maintain it. War technology is very expensive even in ancient
times where it took substantial wealth to maintain war horses and their
gear or chariots and their teams. This is why it is that true warfare
seems only to appear with the advent of the stateâa substantial
predatory structure with the power to command adequate resources.
Further, as we have already said, an army is based on unquestioned
obedience to command. Such a condition can be associated with a kinship
relation or with state management. Thus one may say that army discipline
means that some kind of state structure has already been instituted
since it has nothing to do with kinship. Warfare is also the health of
the state as Randolph Bourne said. As all states compete with one
another, victory in the competition depends ultimately upon war and the
threat of war. Those who advocate a conquest or militarist explanation
for state origin are not entirely wrong. Rather than saying warfare and
conquest precede the state, I would suggest that the two work in tandem,
both evolving together and feeding each other. One thing is certain, and
that is in the game of statecraft and international politics no state
can expect to achieve importance and prestige unless it does have a good
army and pursues the road to dominance.
The seeds for an army and any consequent warfare are to be found in the
body of clients that some Big Man at the centre of a complex
redistribution system can cajole, deceive and manipulate.
The state is a very jealous god. It cannot tolerate competition. Before
the appearance of the state the glue which held society together was
kinship. The family and secondary kin groupings were paramount demanding
prior obligations over all else. As the elements of state formation
achieved increasing pre-eminence, the role of kinship was eclipsed. As
Maine argued, with the state, place of residence overrode kinship ties.
Within a few millennia prior to the emergence of the state in the Near
East, or at a time coterminous with that development, numerous
fundamental innovations had occurred. Not only had there been the
domestication of numerous plants and animals, but animals were employed
for draught purposes; yoking and harnessing devices, copper and other
metallurgies, pottery, irrigation, the plough, the looms, more
sophisticated methods for measurement, writing, among other inventions,
all appeared. Manufacturing and using such items required some training.
This in turn provoked the rise of specialisation in labour which was
also made possible because agriculture had become sufficiently efficient
that it could support a minority of the population as nonfood producers.
Populations increased and there was a greater movement and mixing of
different peoples. Consequently, there came to exist a rather
heterogeneous population that was not related by kinship, residing in
congested areas like cities. The different occupational specialists had
their own interests: conflicts among groups arose which could not be
settled by ordinary kinship mechanisms since so many of those involved
were unrelated.
Into this situation the state appears to make residence the basis for
control. Some Big Man, some preeminent, ranking person with adequate
resources and clientele marches onto the scene.
It has also been proposed that some people may become so tired from
internal fighting that they acquiesce to the rule of a noted and
respected mediator, although I have not found any specific case of this
in the literature except the one given by Southall in which a non-Alur
people invited Alur chiefs to come to judge and rule them. These Alur
(who live in East Africa) presumably had ârain- making and conflict
resolving powersâ (Southall).
One of the main arguments for the state has been an âintegrativeâ one
which largely follows the view that the state is necessary to maintain
order in a highly heterogeneous, densely populated situation. But this
theory overlooks at least two important points. It ignores the
possibility of alternative approaches. For example, all kinds of
voluntary organisations exist composed of a variety of different peoples
and they all manage to avoid descending into chaos and violence.[1] Even
the inculcation of ethical standards acts as a strong restraining force.
The vast majority of people do not kill and maim because of the presence
of the police, but because they have been trained that killing is a
âmortal sinâ.
The second problem with the integration theory is that it overlooks the
ulterior motives of the would-be heads of state. Obviously there are
many individuals who are members of parliaments, governors of states,
etc., who honestly believe they have a genuine concern for the public
welfare. They believe they can use the state to achieve the good life.
Consequently some improvements may occur. But in the end their sincere,
yet naive, efforts are overridden by obligations to defend the state and
enforce the law. Other politicians are clearly more crass, believing
that the welfare of General Motors is the public welfare or, like George
W. Bush, that the welfare of the oil industry is the public welfare.
Ultimately, for all, domination is the name of the game, and in
dominating one can produce some degree of integration and order.
Deceptive tricks are important techniques by which the state is enabled
to maintain control with a minimum of effort. In its attempt to draw the
allegiance of its subjects, the state will try to make it appear that it
is a family or larger kinship group to which all belong. Kinship terms
are frequently applied to rulers: the king is the father or grandfather,
the queen is the mother and fellow citizens are brethren. The state also
assumes the traditional functions of the family and clan. In modern
times it has taken over the education of the young, the welfare of the
needy, the protection of the homestead; it determines the limits to
disciplining family members and attempts to manage life in the bedroom.
Once, not long ago, the elderly and retired were supported by their kin
group; now they depend upon old age pensions from the government.
Increasingly the state has encroached upon and usurped the traditional
role of the family and clan. In so doing it promotes a dependence upon
the state. Indeed, the old dependence upon the family and other kin
groups is transferred to the state. But the state is no loving mother.
The more astute heads of state have calculated that it is cheaper in the
long run to give the appearance of concern and direct some of the wealth
to the common people and avoid otherwise discomforting altercations and
revolts.
In many Asian and African states today the kinship network remains a
determined competitor to the state. It challenges the stateâs claim to a
monopoly of the use of violence by carrying on blood feuds; those who
break the clanâs code of honour are killed. But all states are having
increasing access to highly sophisticated surveillance devices,
transportation and armaments and so seek to suppress such activities.
They may, however, be able to employ the kin group as a proper
instrument of the state. The state arises when the kin groups yield to
it.
Practically any society engages in some sort of trading activity. It is
part of the life of hunting-gathering peoples, whether Inuit in the far
North or Australian Aboriginals and Bushmen in the South. And it may be
even more important to horticultural and agricultural folk. In earlier
societies trading was limited almost exclusively to luxury items. The
necessities of life were all locally provided and only materials which
were unavailable in the homeland were sought after. Even in Medieval
times trade was limited to such things as spices, furs, precious metals,
silk, quality horses and the like. Only modern states have come to trade
in every conceivable item, and this may reach what appear to be
ridiculous degrees, as when Canada exports lumber, pigs and cattle to
the United Slates and the United States exports lumber, pigs and cattle
to Canada.
Trading does not occur purely for the purpose of acquiring some goods,
it is also an opportunity for making marital arrangements, for
establishing diplomatic ties, for mutual planning for war against
another group or for consolidating peace. Above all, it is a time for
the exchange of ideas. New tools, techniques, medicines, religions, and
a host of other practices and ideas, are spread in the trading context.
The merchant trader has been a major vehicle for the spread of Islam
into the African interior.
Trading entails points of tradeâlocations where goods are traditionally
brought for exchange. These may be redistribution centres under the
control of a Big Man, so that as chief trader he is able to enhance his
wealth and power. They may also be market centres which eventually come
to replace the redistribution system. Trading activity in such
situations provokes a mixing of different peoples. To simplify relations
a lingua franca is introduced as is a common âcurrencyâ of some kind.
The increasing complexity of trading activity and the greater the value
of what is traded promote increasing hierarchical differences. Some
individuals are already advantaged and in the competition of trade are
able to garner to themselves further advantage so as to become bigger
men standing at the threshold of state creation.
Mention has already been made of stateless societies on the borders of
giant states themselves engendering a state as a consequence of their
proximity to those states and their trading activity with them.
For hundreds of years the Badawin, among other desert nomads, operated a
lucrative protection racket controlling trade routes and centres in the
Sahara. This created a rather odd quasi-state condition in which the
Badawin extracted tribute by force from the caravans and towns, leaving
them otherwise to conduct their own affairs. The Badawin themselves
maintained a political organisation in which the Big Menâthe
shaykhsâwere first among equals unable to command as monarchs and forced
to achieve their ends by influence, manipulation, cajoling and oratory.
The focus of the concept of property is on prior rights to exploit some
thing; it is not on the thing directly. If a piece of land or an
automobile is the property of Wycliffe, this means Wycliffe may use the
property as he pleases within the limits set by law, while Tom, Dick and
Harry may not use it without Wycliffeâs permission. Wycliffe may drive
his car only on any legal road; he may paint it green with black dots;
he may even give it no oil so that the engine burns out. But he cannot
drive it down the wrong side of the street or use it to run down
pedestrians or smash other vehicles. The idea of property reaches far
back into antiquity. There does not appear to have been any primitive
communism as dreamed by Marxists, although some very basic items may
have been thought of as the property of a group, such as land and water.
In a hunting-gathering society the territory within which it moves in
search of food might be seen as the collective property of the local
band. Tools, animals, houses were all individually owned; even among
some there was private property of songs or fishing sites.
That some become large landlords and others very small ones or persons
driven into landlessness results from a competition in which all do not
start out on an equal playing field. It has not been uncommon for
individuals to lose their property by the use of overt force by another.
Some own land which is less productive; others are less astute and
crafty in their business dealings, as others are superior con men. Many
a person has lost the homestead through indebtedness and such
indebtedness did not arise through laziness or drunkenness as so many
conservatives would have it. A few do lose out because of their personal
inadequacies. Some landholders are able to ingratiate themselves, or
otherwise find favour with those having greater wealth and power, and
extend their holdings. After all, one of the features of the Big Man is
the ability to extend largess to his friends and flunkies, thus
reinforcing the ties and securing their future support.
In the above discussion I have concentrated upon land because this is
the most valuable resource in any agrarian society. Property in other
resources has also been important. European colonialism instilled in
many peoples new conceptions of property. The North American fur trade
taught countless Indians that their trap lines were valuable assets to
be protected from outside intruders. Amongst pastoralists livestock is
individual property with which one can amass a fortune or descend into
abject poverty.
Pure luck may determine whether one man is wiped out by epidemic disease
while another is able to keep a healthy herd. One loses stock to
rustlers, while another is unharmedâhe may even be the rustler. Land
holdings with copper, gold or timber reserves afford yet further devices
for acquiring wealth and power. Clearly property is a most important
road to power, possibly the most important road. It is crucial for the
elaboration of a redistribution system. Marxist theory identifies
property accumulation with the evolution of the state, but since a most
central part of the theory concerns class conflict I will reserve
discussion of it for the following section on hierarchy.
Redistribution, the division of labour, trading and private property all
produce social difference of a more fixed sort. Yet social differences
are features of all societies. Australian Aboriginal society granted
higher status to the elders of the band; women were inferior to men. A
good hunter gained higher repute. Granted this is a simple kind of
differentiation, but it lays the basis for more elaborate forms. The
differences amongst Australians or most any hunter-gatherer people were
considered so minimal that such societies were called egalitarian and
compared to most other societies they appeared so.
Rank societies, according to Fried, are those âin which positions of
valued status are somehow limited so that not all those of sufficient
talent to occupy such statuses actually achieve them. Such a society may
or may not be stratified. That is, a society may sharply limit positions
of prestige without affecting the access of its entire membership to the
basic resources upon which life dependsâ (Morton Fried, Evolution of
Political Society, p 10).
The political role of redistributors varies considerably. At one pole we
have the examples of the Yurok and Northwest Coast Indians who were
subjected to diffuse and religious sanctions; their Big Men lacked
authority to impose regulations. At the other extreme were some African
and Polynesian redistributors who were petty kings, some with great
authority... But it is important to bear in mind that it is primarily
through the evolution of a redistribution system that a ranking system
becomes established. The redistribution may begin as a feast and the
guests eventually become clients or dependents of the host, obligated to
him as a feast sponsor. These obligations are reciprocated by the
provision of goods and services to the feasting enterprise, which then
becomes larger and more elaborate. The Big Men invent titles for
themselves, assume a central role as mediators of disputes, assert
supernatural claims, and as a result of their influence and growing
status become central figures in trading activities. They are the
holders of rank in the community. The redistribution system shifts from
elaborate feasting in which there was once an equal distribution of
goods to one favouring those with rank. Now the society may be said to
be at the threshold of a stratified state, that is, provided that the
other factors we have discussed above, along with ideology, have also
moved to favour greater stratification as well.
For Fried a âstratified society is one in which members of the same sex
and equivalent age status do not have equal access to the basic
resources that sustain lifeâ (p 186).
I believe stratified societies with only the rarest exceptions would
have a state structure. This would be only reasonable and predictable.
Once one has an aristocracy all the trappings of government are going to
be established by that stratum in order to protect its position and
interests. An aristocracy would already have an adequate infrastructure
and sufficient resources well in place so that the creation of a state
would be like placing the capping stone on a structure. For Marx it is
with the appearance of individual private property during âbarbarianâ
times that we have the commencement of a movement towards the state. For
property accumulation means the rise of a propertied class which in turn
exploits the non-propertied and makes them ever more dependent and
depressed. In order to protect their interests the propertied create a
state and it has served the wealthy throughout history, whether these
were large landowners or, in modern times, capitalists. Competing
economic classes produce conflict within the society eventually
resulting in an open clash of interests. The English Revolution of
mid-seventeenth century was a conflict between an old land-owning class'
and a rising bourgeoisie which eventuated in the triumph of capitalism.
This conflict in turn has generated yet another dialectic process
pitting capitalists against the proletariat which it is believed will
eventually produce a new synthesis in communism.[2]
The Marxists Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst have claimed that with âthe
primitive and advanced communist modes of productionâ there is no state
because there are no social classes. Such a view ignores the
bureaucratic managerial elite as a social class, thus unveiling one of
the weaknesses of Marxist analysis. That is, the bureaucrats as
non-property holders are not seen as a class and so are unworthy of
further consideration. Yet they are, nevertheless, a potent social force
which perpetuates the division of society into the powerful and
powerless. Such observations are not intended to demonstrate the falsity
of a class theory of state origin. Rather it is intended to question the
absoluteness and dogmatism with which this theory is sometimes
enunciated. Modern world events have demonstrated that a dominant ruling
group or âclassâ need not be the capitalists or anyone cornering the
wealth of society. The technocratic-bureaucratic-military element
prevails in much of the world and is fierce competition in the rest.
Neither government nor social class (however it might be composed) can
be developed to any extent without the other; they must develop in
tandem.
Presumably stages in an âevolutionary sequenceâ should be somehow
preparatory for the stages to come. Here the ultimate goal of the
process is the achievement of the state, so that the character of any
tribal level or stage should be less egalitarian than the band and
indicative of more social differences. But such is not the case. Among
the cognitive groups mentioned above most of the Polynesians âsuch as
Hawaiians and Tongansâand all of the Amhara and Scots are or were part
and parcel of already existing states. For the remaining so-called
tribal peoples the egalitarianism of the band is no less in the tribe.
The chiefdom has already been mentioned. Here I would only like to note
that as a category it includes an enormous variety of quite different
social organisations. In large part this difficulty arises from the fact
that the definition of chiefdom centres on redistribution which itself
is more of an umbrella term, an issue discussed in the section on
Redistribution. The chiefdom category is made to include Northwest Coast
hunter-gatherers carrying on potlatches, New Guinean Big Men sponsoring
feasts, and the kings of simple states like ancient Hawaii or the many
such entities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Obviously an enormous gulf
separates the administration of the king of Bunyoro from the role of a
Kwakiutl potlatch sponsor. Be that as it may, redistribution is a major
vehicle in pushing a society towards the state. Friedâs sequence
proceeding from egalitarian to rank and to stratified society derives in
a much modified fashion from Morgan, but has fewer pitfalls since it
focuses directly on the question of status and at the same time
simplifies the sequence of changes. What I suggest is that any
stratified society will have the characteristic features delineated in
this chapter and it would, therefore, be a state. Further, any society
characterised by an elaborate redistribution system in which wealth is
siphoned off to a dominant power elite would be a stratified state
society.
An ideology is, more broadly, any set of beliefs, explicit or implicit,
which acts as a guide for daily living and an explanation of the world.
The point is that a society, especially one which is highly specialised
and multicultural, may have several, often competing, ideologies. The
most popular one is that associated with the dominant group and it will
be the one that is preached in its schools, most of its religious
edifices and elsewhere.
In materialist theory, which seems so popular today, ideology is a pure
epiphenomenon of the basic economic- technological aspects of society;
it is a by-product which allows of no causal significance itself. Max
Weber, among others, well demonstrated that ideology was indeed a potent
force in all social affairs and one to be reckoned with in its own
right. Thus, he showed that capitalism was not purely the natural result
of ongoing economic processes, but was assisted in its flowering by the
presence of a way of thinking, an outlook on life, that he called the
Protestant ethic, and is now more commonly referred to by the more
secular term, the work ethic.
Essential to the existence of any state is an ideology of
superiority/inferiority, of ruler and ruled; that it is only right and
proper that persons holding certain offices should be above others and
enjoy the legitimate right to compel others to obey them. In societies
characterised by the presence of ranks this kind of ideology is not
fully developed. There may be a recognition that some individuals are
better or superior, but not sufficiently so to be a ruler commanding
obedience.
One of the reasons Christianity and Islam have been so successful is
because their monotheism appeals to the rulers of states, since the
notion of one god reinforces that of a single supreme ruler.
Almost all ideologies are founded in religious belief if they are not
complete religious systems themselves. Such beliefs are expressed and
reaffirmed by ritual practices. A.M. Hocart stressed the role of ritual
in state formation. He goes on to say
that to our intellectuals only economic interests can create anything as
solid as the state. Yet if they would only look about them they would
everywhere see communities banded together by interest in a common
ritual; they would even find that ritual enthusiasm builds more solidly
than economic ambitions because ritual involves a rule of life, whereas
economics are a rule of gain, and so divide rather than unite (35).
The history of early states clearly demonstrates the immense importance
of religious ideology. Pharaoh was a god-king and the temple, the
priests, the ritual and myth were integral to the maintenance of the
entire state apparatus. Similarly in Sumer, and later Babylon, the
temple and the priest provided the ideology identifying the state with
divinity. Throughout history little has changed. Even in the United
States, presumably a secular state which keeps the church allegedly
divorced from the state, religious ideology is invoked to provide the
underpinning for the whole structure. God is continually called upon in
the halls of Congress; god and mammon are made one in the currency; god
and nation are made one in a pledge of allegiance.
While the old Soviet Union and its Communist satellites did not invoke
the name of god, they all gave a strong religious ritual bent to their
so-called communism. Marx and Engels works were treated like bibles;
their enormous portraits like holy icons; their persons like prophets;
there were hymns and grand processions. They did not have god, but they
had the dialectic.
Everywhere it appears the state must justify itself by reliance upon
some extra-human, superhuman power. The ideology gives legitimacy to the
state.
Before concluding this chapter it is necessary to explain why writing
has not been included in the list of essentials for state development.
It is indeed difficult to imagine how a state could survive for long
without some techniques for recording necessary information. And so it
is true that the great majority of states did have access to a writing
system, but there are enough which did not to justify excluding it from
the list. The Peruvian states, the majority of those in pre-colonial
Sub-Saharan Africa, and those in ancient Polynesia all lacked writing.
The state is an emergent out of the interacting preparatory factors
discussed in this chapter. Using another metaphor one may say that all
these factors converge in slightly different ways so that a given
society slides down a slippery slope to the state condition. There is a
multilineal evolution wherein in one case there is an intensive
elaboration of the redistribution system or, in another, more emphasis
on the military and so on, there are different emphases and different
styles and impetuses. Population, sedentarism, agriculture, a complex
division of labour, a redistribution system and private property
constitute a kind of platform upon which hierarchy and an ideology of
superiority/ inferiority are built. It might be possible that a society
with only a weakly developed hierarchic social order and ideology of
superiority/inferiority could avoid the descent into statehood. This is
even more likely where private property is not of major importance.
Examples of such a phenomenon are most likely to be found in the
acephalous societies of pre-colonial Africa. The moment of state
creation occurs when all the factors, however achieved, fall into place.
This is so for pristine and secondary states. The latter, despite having
the state imposed upon them, would still have had to develop those
preparatory characteristics in some minimal fashion in order to maintain
a state.
No state would ever develop if there were no drive on the part of at
least some individuals to acquire power over others and at the same time
a conditioning of a great majority of the populace to submit to the
power of the few.
[1] It has been said that if private enterprise cannot properly provide
a managed health care, then the state must provide it. But these are not
the only alternatives. Individuals can organise their own co-operative
health service independent of state or capital
[2] The dialectic is no universal social process. First, there is no
reason to believe that every cultural system must resolve its conflicts.
Cultures may well persist by riding on their internal conflicts and
achieving a kind of dynamic equilibrium through the balanced opposition
of the conflicting forces. Even granting eventual resolution of a
conflict does not mean it will be a synthesis. The dialectic allows for
a variety of explanations because it is so ambiguous. It seems perfectly
legitimate to argue that capitalism as an ideology is one thesis which
generates an opposing thesis of socialism and the synthesis of the two
is fascism (where capitalist private property is retained and socialist
governmental contro instituted). Finally, in the case of the Marxian
dialectic are we to assume that once communism has been achieved there
will be no more conflict and so no need for a dialectic process?