💾 Archived View for library.inu.red › file › the-guru-anarchy-s-cossacks.gmi captured on 2023-01-29 at 14:17:18. Gemini links have been rewritten to link to archived content
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Title: Anarchy’s Cossacks Author: The Guru Date: 2011 Language: en Topics: Makhnovists, Ukraine, Russian Revolution Source: Retrieved on 19th January 2022 from https://www.banquetdesgeneraux.com/article2.html Notes: This article was published in the Comrade’s Guide, along with a set of variant rules, including two cards, to the Triumph of Chaos Player’s Guide.
The Russian Civil War saw the emergence of a large number of spontaneous
insurrectional movements affiliated to neither of the two major
protagonists. Notwithstanding that some of these rebellions ended up
being subordinated to one or the other, out of political opportunism or
survival instinct, most of them rose with equal hatred against the
Whites’ backward feudalism and the Reds’ Commissar Dictatorship. They
shared the common characteristic of putting forward a rather indefinite
political programme and squandering vital resources and energy in
conflict among themselves, proving incapable of co-ordinating efforts
with other insurrectional forces. Prone to quick decline, they failed to
achieve any impact proportionate to their number. One remarkable
exception was the Makhnovist insurrection, the “Makhnovshchina”,
inspired by its eponymous emblematic guide, Nestor Makhno. This movement
distinguished itself from other insurrectional movements through its
clear and unyielding political programme, remarkable level of
organization, outstanding military performance, noteworthy impact on the
course of the Civil War, and, finally, relative durability. The
Makhnovist movement flourished in South Eastern Ukraine, a region with a
tradition of peasant independence and rebellion, at a time of disruption
and instability caused by a semi-permanent state of war. The
Nationalists, with their ambiguous social programme, had failed to
gather the support of the poor peasantry. The wrongs of foreign
occupation and puppet regimes created the conditions for a strong
partisan movement. The exactions of the Bolshevik food detachments that
robbed the peasants of their grain and livestock, and the Cheka’s
brutality caused huge resentment in the countryside and prevented the
Bolsheviks from winning over Makhno’s supporters. The Makhnovists
adhered to the principles of Revolutionary Communism. Their
irreconcilable rupture with the Leninist position came when the
Bolsheviks seized command of the State and took a complete u-turn in
their political programme, going from their claim of “All power to the
Soviets! “(Councils) to the transformation of the latter into servile
executants of the Kremlin’s will. The Makhnovists defended the
independence of the Soviet, source of all political life, against all
unwanted authority. Their centralized organs of government acted not as
supreme enlighteners of the masses, but rather as their emanation, with
a role of co-ordination and convergence. Refusing the premise of the
masses’ immaturity, on which the Bolsheviks based their Party
dictatorship’s legitimacy, they implemented Communist principles
immediately and abolished private property and money while rejecting to
resort to coercion, censorship or forceful requisition as a means of
political consolidation. While the Bolsheviks considered the peasantry
as a backward mass impregnated with reactionary prejudices, the
Makhnovist movement was driven by a vigorous, down-to–earth, peasant
spirit, and regarded the urban proletariat with distrust; an element
that would ultimately hinder its expansion.
Nestor Ivanovich Makhno came from a poor peasant family from Huliai-Pole
in the province of Ekaterinoslav. After a childhood of toil, he joined
the local Communist Libertarian Group, was incarcerated in August 1908
and sentenced to life imprisonment. The February Revolution opened the
doors of his prison, and Makhno returned to Huliai-Pole. Back in
Huliai-Pole he helped organise a peasants’ union, and was elected to the
head of each of its constituent comities. The peasant union expropriated
land from local landowners and distributed it to the poorest. In January
1918 Makhno gathered an armed force of 900 men and joined the Red
detachments fighting the forces of the newly constituted Ukrainian
nationalist Rada. One month later and with a force of up to 1,500 he
engaged the invading Central Powers’ troops in a series of harassing,
skirmishing actions. His group dispersed after the betrayal of his
Jewish company, Makhno started a peregrination through the country and
ended up in Moscow, where he had an interview with Lenin. When he
returned to Huliai-Pole, the Brest-Litovsk treaty had been signed,
ending the hostilities between the Central Powers and the Bolsheviks.
Signs bearing the inscription “Deutsche Vaterland” –German Homeland”
stood on the Ukrainian borders, and a puppet governor, Skoropadsky, had
replaced the Rada’s authority. Along with some comrades destined to
eminent roles in the future Makhnovist Army, Makhno organized several
armed insurrections and initiated guerrilla warfare against the Varta,
Skoropadsky’s militia, and the Central Powers’ garrisons. Makhno’s
partisan forces featured a brilliant innovation, the tatchanka, a horse
cart used as an infantry transport and/or a machine gun platform. It was
soon to be adopted by all other armies battling in Ukraine, even though
none would integrate it into their combat apparatus with comparable
expertise. The Armistice was signed less than 3 months later and the
Central Powers retired from the Makhnovist area of operations, with the
Nationalist militias in their wake. The Makhnovist nucleus had grown to
a several thousand-strong army of battle-hardened volunteers. It had
centralized headquarters and an efficient logistics and intelligence
network rooted in the unconditional support of the local peasantry. The
Makhnovists combined expert deception tactics with concentrated mobile
firepower provided by tatchanki units and the tremendous shock power of
their cavalry, very probably the best of the whole conflict. To
supplement their sabre, the Makhnovist Insurgents used sawn-off barrel
guns on horseback, and their mounted troops could travel 60–100 km a
day. The lack of armament manufactures constituted the only handicap of
the Insurgent Army. It had to rely exclusively on captured equipment for
a precarious supply of weapons and ammunition, resulting in a permanent
underutilization of its military potential. In 1919, the Makhnovists’
enemies too had changed. No longer foreign troops demoralized by a long
war ending in defeat, a new foe loomed on the horizon: the White
officers’ regiments and the Cossack troops of general Denikin. In
January, the Makhnovist Insurgent Army held more than 550 km of front.
15,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 40 MGs manned the south front, facing
Mai-Maievsky’s troops. 10,000 men manned the northern front, facing the
Petliurians, and another 2,000 manned the western front, against German
colonists’ detachments and other Nationalists. Not counting the
autonomous partisan detachments, a total of 29,000 men were engaged on
the frontline and 20,000 waited in reserve, lacking firearms.
Under the military pressure of their common arch-nemesis and in spite of
their mutual ideological mistrust, Makhnovists and Bolsheviks concluded
a military alliance. The Insurgent forces were nominally subordinated to
the Red Army, but maintained their specific internal structure, based on
voluntary commitment, self-discipline and election of all commanders.
Still unaware of the Bolshevik regime’s true nature and hoping that
their disagreements “could be confined to the realm of ideas”, the
Makhnovists identified the struggle against the Tsarist forces, whom
they knew only too well, as an absolute priority. They considered unity
of command of the anti-White forces as a positive measure, especially if
it allowed them to obtain much needed military equipment, which the
Bolsheviks promised to supply according to their needs. The Kremlin
authorities, with little more than token forces in the area, could
hardly turn back such an opportunity of seizing the operations’
supervision. More important still, the treaty guaranteed free
circulation for their political commissars — extremely unwelcome in
other circumstances-. They immediately carried out intelligence
operations and insidious propaganda campaigns, as a preparation for
future action against the Insurgents. Indeed, Trotsky loathed the
Makhnovists’ successes. The fast pace of their growing influence and
their organizational achievements showed no sign of slackening. He knew
they could constitute a dangerous pole of attraction for revolutionary
militants, as many Bolshevik field commanders in contact with them
hardly contained their admiration. Numerous written documents have
clearly demonstrated that Trotsky only accepted this momentary
partnership to use, or if possible, exhaust, the Makhnovists in the
pursuit of Moscow’s war goals, and from the very beginning was waiting
only for the propitious moment to backstab them. Shortly afterwards,
Moscow stopped all deliveries to the Makhnovists, after supplying them
with 100,000 rifle rounds, many of them defective, and 3,000 Italian
rifles, each with a mere 12 rounds of an otherwise unobtainable calibre.
In February-March 1919, Makhnovist forces amounted to 30,000 men, with
70,000 unarmed in reserve, whom Moscow refused to arm. Makhno complained
vehemently. The Insurgents had fulfilled their part of the deal: they
had sent two of their regiments to aid the Reds in the Crimea against
the German colonists detachments, and according to Bolshevik demands,
had attacked in the direction of Taganrog, enjoying limited success but
unable to exploit it due to severe ammunition shortages. But thousands
of Makhnovist volunteers were being sent back because there was nothing
to equip them with, while inert Red formations of doubtful loyalty
received full allotment. To make things worse, the Cheka’s interference
in the midst of Makhnovist territory was growing bolder every day and
the Makhnovist movement was targeted by a slanderous press campaign,
commandeered by Trotsky to counter its expanding popularity.
Antonov-Ovseenko, commander of the Ukrainian front also protested
vigorously. He acknowledged the Makhnovists’ political integrity and
outstanding military merits and backed Makhno’s claims. He would soon be
removed, and replaced by Vatsetis. Kamenev, sent over to assess the
situation, was impressed by Makhno and pleaded for conciliation. Trotsky
refused. No need to say, the relationship between Reds and Blacks became
increasingly tense. Grigoriev, until then allied to the Bolsheviks,
turned against them in May 1919. A former Tsarist officer, he had risen
to become a demagogue and freelance warlord who enjoyed support from the
poor peasantry. He was also a competent general, had 30.000 rifles and
an unusual quantity of heavy equipment at his disposal. He controlled a
large portion of territory, to the west of the Makhnovist operating
grounds. Above all, the Kremlin feared an alliance between Makhno and
Grigoriev, which could prove fatal for the Bolshevik influence in the
southern half of Ukraine. All Red reinforcements scheduled for the
Southern front against Denikin were diverted to counter Grigoriev. Much
to Makhno’s alarm, some of the Reds’ best troops were even withdrawn
from the frontline. Many of them would end up siding with Grigoriev.
Denikin’s grand offensive consequently met a very thinly held front in
the Bolshevik sector. Skhuro’s Cossacks breached the Red defence line,
and outflanked the Makhnovists position. Deprived of supply while
confronting, for the first time, large numbers of tanks and armoured
cars, the Insurgents faced a very precarious situation. Trotsky
completely disregarded the breakthrough’s gravity and his whole
attention remained focussed on his intention to liquidate the
Makhnovshchina, incidentally the only force now left standing against
the Whites in Southern Ukraine. In the midst of military disaster,
instructions to the front commanders merely advocated political
intriguing against the Makhnovists in view of a forthcoming eradication
campaign. Aware of the Makhnovists’ intention to summon a fourth
Regional Peasant Congress, Trotsky outlawed it and issued a full
declaration of war against the Makhnovshchina. Red forces, in full rout,
were, of course, in no position to threaten the Insurgent Army, but
Mai-Maievsky’s White troops would terminally force the Makhnovists to
give ground. Makhno, still giving priority to checking Denikin’s
advance, deemed the moment rather inappropriate for a collapse of the
anti-White coalition. He offered the resignation of his whole General
Staff, including himself, in a desperate appeasement gesture, and, with
the Cheka already indulging in arbitrary arrests and executions,
multiplied written protests in vain. Then of course, the front
collapsed, and the whole of Eastern Ukraine fell into the White
Generals’ hands. Ekaterinoslav and Kharkiv were taken in June 1919. The
Red Army had long left the scene and the Makhnovist Insurgent Army was
thrown into a headlong retreat, accompanied by hordes of refugees
fleeing White brutality. Makhno and his Staff, gradually reinforced by
isolated elements that made their way through the enemy lines, reached
the territory under Grigoriev’s control. With both now opposed to Reds
and Whites alike, an alliance was envisaged. But the Makhnovists got
confirmation of their suspicions concerning Grigoriev’s direct
implication in anti-Semitic crimes and secret negotiations with the
Whites. At the end of July, during a large meeting attended by 20,000
followers from each side, Grigoriev was denounced as a pogromist and
shot on the spot. Some of his soldiers were integrated into the
Makhnovist forces, soon to be discharged due to their ineradicable
anti-Semitic prejudice. Others bore a strong grudge against Makhno and
joined the Makhnovshchina’s enemies. At the end of August, Makhno’s
contingent of 3,000 infantry and 700 cavalry regrouped with the
insurgent troops recalled from the Red Army, along with several Brigades
of Red infantry who had arrested their officers and commissars and
defected to the Anarchists. The Army was reformed and totalled more than
20,000 men. The flight of the Red Army’s last elements from Southern
Ukraine had left three adversaries face to face: the Nationalists, the
Makhnovists and the Whites. Denikin, overconfident, decided to attack
both Makhno and Petliura. With the bulk of his forces engaged towards
Kursk in the race to Moscow, Denikin fielded a mere 15,000 men for this
campaign, but the army was well-armed, well-supplied and included
excellent formations. The Nationalists of Petliura sought to avoid
combat, still hoping to reach an agreement on Ukraine’s status. All
White forces ended up converging towards the Makhnovist sector. Fighting
was vicious, both sides displaying extraordinary bravery and ruthless
ferocity. Initially, the Insurgents gained significant advantage over
their foes, but the Makhnovist Army was plagued by crippling ammunition
shortages, and the Whites benefited from a steady flow of modern war
material. At the beginning of September, Makhno brought all
counterattacks to a halt, and facing a new large-scale enemy offensive,
ordered retreat. For two weeks, step by step, the Makhnovists gave
ground. Burdened by more than 8,000 wounded or sick, they reached the
area of Uman, under Nationalist control. The Whites manoeuvred and
barred all avenues of escape. Trapped in a stranglehold, the exhausted,
out-of-supplies Insurgent Army was less than 8,000 strong. The retreat
had brought the Makhnovists more than 600 km away from their base of
Huliai-Pole. They were now left with no other option than to stand and
fight to the last man. Makhno carefully picked the stage of the decisive
battle: the Insurgents encamped in the hilly surroundings of the village
of Peregonovka, near Uman. The Whites had received orders to carry out
the complete annihilation of the Makhnovist rebellion. They obtained
guarantees of Nationalist neutrality and on the morning of the 26^(th)
of September 1919, launched an all-out attack, spearheaded by two elite
all-officers cavalry regiments. After bitter fighting, the Insurgents
fell back towards the village and prepared to die bravely, shooting
their last cartridges. When all seemed lost, the White assault suddenly
stopped. Then word spread among the Insurgents: “Makhno has drawn the
sabre!” At the head of his “Black Sotnia” -200 men picked from among the
very best — Makhno burst from behind a hill into the enemy’s flank, with
the black flag held on high. With unstoppable fury, he plunged into the
bulk of the dismayed assailers, causing indescribable panic. The
cornered Insurgents rallied and charged in his wake, picking up whatever
weapons and ammunition the enemy had abandoned in its flight as they
went. At the end of the day, victory was complete. The Makhnovists had
captured an abundant bounty, including 100 MGs and 23 artillery pieces.
Hundreds of White soldiers surrendered. Makhno, heedless of the state of
exhaustion of his 7,000 remaining men, relentlessly pursued the
scattered enemy army. In ten days, the Makhnovist vanguards, with Makhno
in the lead, had covered at full gallop the 600 km back to Huliai-Pole.
Soon the Makhnovists were back in control of the whole of Eastern
Ukraine, abandoned 4 months earlier. They had even reached Taganrog, the
base of Denikin’s headquarters, causing considerable alarm. In October
1919, the army was back to 28,000 armed men, 200 MGs and 50 artillery
pieces. The rather unknown battle of Peregonovka, which understandably
neither the Reds nor the Whites made much publicity about, had an
immense impact on the course of the Russian Civil War. It occurred with
Denikin’s troops within 200 km of Moscow, and White generals competing
for the honour to enter the capital. The Red army was battered, and
Lenin was preparing for exile. As Bruce Lincoln wrote, “…Makhno’s
revolutionary Partisan Army wrought havoc in their rear. Early in
October, Makhno took Berdiansk, an important port on the Sea of Azov,
where he destroyed vital reserves of some sixty thousand shells just as
Denikin launched his final assault on Orel. Within a fortnight, his fast
moving columns cut the supply lines that connected Denikin’s advancing
columns with the Black Sea ports upon which they depended for weapons,
ammunition, and supplies and seized a half-dozen other critical points,
including the key centre of Yekaterinoslav. (…) Reluctantly, Denikin
withdrew key units from his front and sent them to parry Makhno’s
attacks only to realize, too late, how costly that decision had been.
Makhno’s peasant partisans, he confessed later, ‘destroyed our rear and
the front at the most critical period’. (…) There is no doubt, a Le
temps correspondent reported from Moscow, ‘that Denikin’s defeat is
explained more by the uprisings of peasants who brandished Makhno’s flag
than by the success of Trotsky’s regular army”.” In Ukraine, the
Bolshevik troops had observed the fighting from a good distance. They
were now quick to step into the void left by the Whites’ hasty
departure, and settled in like conquerors, brutally dispersing the
anarchist councils set up by the Makhnovists during their advance. With
half their numbers down with typhoid fever, including Makhno now in a
deep coma, the Insurgents made the fatal mistake of not opposing the
rapacious Cheka’s implantation. They retired to the area surrounding
Huliai-Pole and engaged in guerrilla warfare against both the Reds and
the Whites through the winter 1919 and the spring of 1920. The
Bolsheviks, in spite of the sheer weight of their numbers, were unable
to gain the upper hand against the elusive Anarchist partisans.
Defections to the Makhnovists were endemic and the Reds had to resort to
non-Russian speaking contingents, less prone to political contamination,
and very tight commissar guardianship. During summer, Makhno’s
spectacular incursions inflicted further humiliation upon the Reds:
4,000 selected men on horse or tatchanka conducted a first 20-day raid,
1,200 km deep, followed by a second, 30 day raid, 1,500 km deep. The
outcome was awesome: Red losses totalled 13,400 prisoners in addition to
26,000 to 30,000 killed, wounded or missing, among which there were
2,000 Bolshevik dignitaries who had been shot on the spot. The Reds
could only take revenge for their military setbacks on the local
population suspected of Makhnovist sympathies. These brilliant
performances caught the attention of Baron Wrangel, now in command of a
White army mounting its last desperate offensive. Hoping to come to some
sort of arrangement on the basis of their common hostility towards
Bolshevism, he sent his emissaries with offers of generous logistic
support. Makhno had them executed before they could deliver their
message. With huge resources mobilized on the Polish front, the
Bolsheviks were unable to undertake decisive action against either the
Makhnovists or the Whites. The advantages of an opportunistic alliance
with Makhno were too obvious to be ignored, and in September 1920
Bolsheviks and Anarchists signed a military treaty against Wrangel. How
did the Insurgents accept such an unnatural partnership with the Reds,
with memories of their betrayal, massacres and devastation still fresh
in all minds? Among the Makhnovist leaders, only a small majority were
in favour of a coalition. Makhno himself hesitated. They had obtained
written guarantees for their autonomy and promises of freedom for their
numerous comrades languishing in the Cheka’s prisons. As a token of
apparent good will, the Bolshevik press, by now accustomed to the
exercise, had done a complete U-turn, and Makhno the bloodthirsty
brigand was once again hailed as a Hero of the Revolution. In addition,
the Makhnovists would be able to fight to free their original lands,
currently under White domination. In October 1920, the 6,000 strong
Insurgent contingent attacked and liberated a vast territory, smashing
Wrangel’s best regiments in the process. Red infantry followed
cautiously in its wake. Outflanked by Makhno’s breakthrough, the White
army yielded against concentric pressure and was put to flight. Driven
back to his Crimean sanctuary, Wrangel concentrated his remaining forces
on the isthmus of Perekop, a natural fortress, and entrenched. On the
night of the 7^(th) of November 1920, an elite Makhnovist detachment of
700 cavalry and 1,000 infantry manning 190 MGs, spearheaded the surprise
crossing of the Sivash marsh and contributed crucial firepower to ward
off enemy counterattacks. This breach in the defence perimeter made the
White position untenable, and Wrangel ordered evacuation. Denied
permission to rest, the whole of the Makhnovist forces carried on
vanguard operations until the very last day of the campaign. The
Makhnovist forces played a key role in the final destruction of the last
White stronghold. They were used as a battering ram from the opening
stages of the campaign until its very last act. This fact is distinctly
acknowledged in a few very specific contemporary sources, namely reports
of Red commanders present on the field. Makhnovist casualties amounted
to 20% of initial strength (against 4% for the Reds). Later, Soviet
historiography would all but obliterate their participation in the
campaign. With the elimination of the last White bastion, the
Makhnovists had outlived their usefulness. On the 26^(th) of November,
the Bolsheviks backstabbed the Makhnovists and launched a series of
simultaneous attacks against all remaining Insurgent forces. The Cheka
embarked on an extermination campaign to uproot the Anarchist
insurrection. Thousands of people, on the grounds of simple suspicion,
were arrested and promptly executed. 1,000 Insurgents of the Crimean
contingent were caught by surprise and shot on the spot. The surviving
4,000 found themselves isolated, with more than 100,000 Bolshevik
soldiers barring the way across the narrow isthmus into Ukraine. Makhno,
recovering from serious wounds in Huliai-Pole, was also encircled by a
horde of Red troops. But, in spite of the Red High Command’s efforts to
quarantine the Anarchists, two months of fighting side by side had
instilled sympathy and admiration for the Makhnovshchina among many Red
units. Makhno and his personal guard escaped with the complicity of a
Bolshevik commander. Similarly, in the Crimea, Red soldiers refused to
turn their guns against their former comrades, and the whole Makhnovist
contingent was let through to Ukraine. This wave of insubordination
infuriated Trotsky, all the more because the core of Makhnovist
combatants had escaped his deadly trap. He ordered the Cheka to
expurgate the Red forces of their insubordinate elements. The Red Army
newspaper declared that 2,300 executions had taken place in two weeks.
It is an interesting number to compare with the 8,000 total losses
suffered during the whole final campaign against Wrangel. Makhno
reassembled the remnants of his army. Ironically, the bulk of his forces
was now made up from thousands of Red Army defectors, disgusted by their
hierarchy’s foul methods. The Kremlin sent new troops, including
Budienny’s Konarmiia, to sweep into the Makhnovist region and hunt down
the Insurgents. The praised Cossacks, much to Budienny’s consternation,
dared not approach Makhno’s cavalry, with the notable exception of the
1^(st) Brigade, which defected to the Anarchists with every man, horse
and gun. Nonetheless, the Insurgents were doomed. With more than 150,000
Red soldiers on their heels, they manoeuvred across Southern Ukraine,
slowly worn down by incessant combat. Their force had dwindled from
15,000 in December, to 5–6,000 in January and to a nucleus of 2,500 in
March-April 1921. For five months more, operating in small detachments
they fought a strenuous guerrilla war against the Red Army. On the
28^(th) of August 1921 Makhno, his wife and the fifty last survivors of
his personal guard crossed the river Dniester into Romania. The
Makhnovist armed insurrection had breathed its last. In 1924, He arrived
in Paris via Poland and Germany, and spent the rest of his life in
poverty, dying in July 1934.
The Makhnovshchina’s case is an interesting example of written history’s
subordination to political imperatives. The Makhnovist Insurgency, in
spite of its undeniable importance in terms of political innovation and
geographical amplitude, or rather, because of it, has long lingered in
History’s no man’s land. Its adherence to the principles of Communism
and insolent success in their immediate implementation were a thorn in
the side of the Bolsheviks. Soviet historiography endeavoured to
discredit the movement’s history through successive rewritings and
grotesque falsifications. It attributed to Makhno a psychotic and
treacherous nature, and to the Makhnovshchina, a radical anti-Semitic
character and systematic terrorist practices against the local
population. It made them appear as either lawless bandits motivated by
lust for blood and loot or active agents of the White
counter-revolution, therefore emptying the Makhnovist movement of any
specific political content liable to generate sympathy. However,
Bolshevik sources contemporary to, or immediately subsequent to the
events distinguish themselves from later official history. They are
equally devoted to the political denigration of the Makhnovshchina, in
order to justify its eradication and the inelegant methods employed. But
these early, and ignored, reports generally limit their attacks to
accusations of ideological deviance and other abstract allegations. The
Makhnovists superior martial qualities, in terms of leadership, tactics
and individual combativeness are fully acknowledged. More importantly,
accusations of banditry and anti-Semitism, destined to have a
flourishing future, are categorically rejected, with supporting
evidence, as counter-productive nonsense. It is true that too many
direct eyewitnesses of the events were still alive for excessive
liberties to be taken with the truth. Usually useful as a counterweight
point of view, little was to be expected from the adversaries of
Communism for lifting the veil of lies on this episode. The Whites too
had fought Makhno, so their propaganda too strove at denying the
Makhnovist insurrection any legitimacy. Furthermore, their survival
relied on western governments’ military support and, after the war, on
their charity. White pogroms and other massacres shocked the public
opinion of most of the “liberal” democracies, and the Whites did their
best to blame their atrocities on the Makhnovists and other Green bands.
Thereafter, Western moral posture against Communism has been comfortable
in designating the brutal horrors of Bolshevism as the only possible
outcome of any communist aspiration. The Makhnovist “alternate”
experience, founded on theoretical communist principles, constituted an
embarrassing counter-example, and Makhno’s opinion of Western bourgeois
democracies invited no publicity. The Bolsheviks’ most slanderous
version of the Makhnovshchina phenomenon therefore met an unusually
unreserved acceptance among mainstream Western historians and achieved
considerable penetration in their perception of that historic episode.
The thesis of Makhnovist anti-Semitism and banditry were, and are still,
widely accredited. The Makhnovist Insurgency’s military and political
achievements have thus been systematically underrated, distorted, and
gradually obliterated from History. Blatant inaccuracies have by now
settled in among western historians, as recently published material
tends to prove, in spite of the fact that some seriously documented work
on the question has already surfaced. As an example, excellent
“generalist” historians such as Bruce Lincoln rely strongly on Soviet
official military history from the 1950’s for documentation, and
therefore, among other things, completely overlook the Makhnovist key
contribution to the final campaign against Wrangel. They simply vanished
from his orders of battle, including at the Sivash crossing, and are
endorsed with the initiative of the alliance’s breach, however senseless
that might be. Interestingly enough, Soviet historiography from which
all denigrating anti-Makhno stereotypes originate, has since 1989, under
the impulse of the Glasnost, set about a profound revision of the
regime’s historical past and (posthumously) rehabilitated the movement.
In the West, a handful of new-school historians has unearthed the Soviet
early sources and some scarce, but fundamental, original Makhnovist
documents that had escaped the Bolshevik autos-da-fé. Even if initially
only marginally noticed, they have presented a perception of the
Makhnovist insurrection based on rigorous and detailed historical
research rather than propagandistic fabrications. Under this new light
shed on the question, the thesis of banditry and brutality against the
local population evaporate. The die-hard accusations of anti-Semitism
fall into ridicule when facing the established fact that many of the
most prominent leaders among the Makhnovists were Jewish and that
thousands more participated in the regional assemblies set up by the
Insurgents or fought among their ranks. Firm evidence further ascertains
the uncompromising attitude of the Makhnovists towards anti-Semitism:
the death penalty was invariably applied to anyone guilty of such
wrongdoing. Concerning the Makhnovists’ alleged unreliability and the
swinging nature of their allegiance, the accusation is disproved by the
accurate and factual reconstitution of their tumultuous relationship
with the Bolsheviks. Once again evidenced by the reports of the very
Bolshevik officials involved in the dealings, it clearly appears that
the Makhnovists opposed the deceitful schemes of Bolshevik realpolitik
with a scrupulous, maybe naïve, and certainly fatal, observance of their
mutual agreements’ terms.