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Title: Chapter 2 - The Cybernetics Hypothesis
Author: Tiqqun
Language: en

Tiqqun

Chapter 2 - The Cybernetics Hypothesis

“Synthetic life is certainly one of the possible products of the

evolution of techno-bureaucratic control, in the same way as the return

of the whole planet to the inorganic level, is -rather ironically —

another of the results of that same revolution, which has to do with the

technology of control.”

James R Beniger, The Control Revolution, 1986.

Even if the origins of the Internet device are today well known, it is

not uncalled for to highlight once again their political meaning. The

Internet is a war machine invented to be like the highway system, which

was also designed by the American Army as a decentralized internal

mobilization tool. The American military wanted a device which would

preserve the command structure in case of a nuclear attack. The response

would consist in an electronic network capable of automatically retaking

control over information itself if nearly the whole of the

communications links were destroyed, thus permitting the surviving

authorities to remain in communication with one another and make

decisions. With such a device, military authority could be maintained in

the face of the worst catastrophes. The Internet is thus the result of a

nomadic transformation of military strategy. With that kind of a plan at

its roots, one might doubt the supposedly anti-authoritarian

characteristics of this device. As is the Internet, which derives from

it, cybernetics is an art of war, the objective of which is to save the

head of the social body in case of catastrophe. What stands out

historically and politically during the period between the great wars,

and which the cybernetic hypothesis was a response to, was the

metaphysical problem of creating order out of disorder. The whole of the

great scientific edifice, in terms of what it had to do with the

determinist concepts of Newton’s mechanical physics, fell apart in the

first half of the century. The sciences, at that time, were like plots

of territory torn between the neo-positivist restoration and the

probabilist revolution, and slowly inching its way towards a historical

compromise so that the law could be re-established after the chaos, the

certain re-established after the probable. Cybernetics passed through

this whole movement — which began in Vienna at the turn of the century,

and was transported to England and the United States in the 1930s and

1940s, and constructed a Second Empire of Reason where the idea of the

Subject, up to that time considered indispensable, was absent. As a kind

of knowledge, it brought together an ensemble of heterogeneous

discourses all dealing with the practical problems of mastering

uncertainty. Discourses fundamentally expressing, in the various domains

of their application, the desire for a restoration of one order, and

furthermore the maintenance thereof.

Underlying the founding of Cybernetics was a context of total war. It

would be in vain to look for some malicious purpose or the traces of a

plot: one simply finds a handful of ordinary men mobilized by America

during the Second world war. Norbert Wiener, an American savant of

Russian origin, was charged with developing, with the aid of a few

colleagues, a machine for predicting and monitoring the positions of

enemy planes so as to more effectively destroy them. It was at the time

only possible at the time to predict with certitude certain correlations

between certain airplane positions and certain airplane

behaviors/movements. The elaboration of the “Predictor,” the prediction

machine ordered from Wiener, thus required a specific method of airplane

position handling and a comprehension of how the weapon interacts with

its target. The whole history of cybernetics has aimed to do away with

the impossibility of determining at the same time the position and

behavior of bodies. Wiener’s innovation was to express the problem of

uncertainty as an information problem, within a temporal series where

certain data is already known, and others not, and to consider the

object and the subject of knowledge as a whole, as a “system.” The

solution consisted in constantly introducing into the play of the

initial data the gap seen between the desired behavior and the effective

behavior, so that they coincide when the gap closes, like the mechanism

of a thermostat. The discovery goes considerably beyond the frontiers of

the experimental sciences: controlling a system would in the end require

a circulation of information to be instituted, called feed-back, or

retro-action. The wide implications of these results for the natural and

social sciences was exposed in 1948 in Paris in a work presented under

the foreboding name of Cybernetics, which for Wiener meant the doctrine

of “control and communication between animal and machine.”

Cybernetics thus emerged as a simple, inoffensive theory of information,

a theory for handling information with no precise origin, always

potentially present in the environment around any situation. It claims

that the control of a system is obtained by establishing an optimum

degree of communication between the parties to it. This objective calls

above all for the continuous extortion of information — a process of the

separation of beings from their qualities, of the production of

differences. In other words, as it were, mastery of a uncertainty would

arise from the proper representation and memorization of the past. The

spectacular image, binary mathematical encoding — invented by Claude

Shannon in Mathematical Theory of Communication in the very same year

that the cybernetic hypothesis was first expressed — on the one hand

they’ve invented memory machines that do not alter information, and put

incredible effort into miniaturizing them (this is the determinant

strategy behind today’s nanotechnology) and on the other they conspire

to create such conditions on the collective level. Thus put into form,

information would then be directed towards the world of beings,

connecting them to one another in the same way as commodity circulation

guarantees they will be put into equivalence. Retro-action, key to the

system’s regulation, now calls for communication in the strict sense.

Cybernetics is the project of recreating the world within an infinite

feedback loop involving these two moments: representation separating,

communication connecting, the first bringing death, the second mimicking

life.

The cybernetic discourse begins by dismissing as a false problem the

controversies of the 19th century that counterposed mechanist visions to

vitalist or organicist visions of the world. It postulates a functional

analogy between living organisms and machines, assimilated into the idea

of “systems.” Thus the cybernetic hypothesis justifies two kinds of

scientific and social experiments. The first essentially aimed to turn

living beings into machines, to master, program, and determine mankind

and life, society and its “future.” This gave fuel for a return of

eugenics as bionic fantasy. It seeks, scientifically, the end of

History; initially here we are dealing with the terrain of control. The

second aims to imitate the living with machines, first of all as

individuals, which has now led to the development of robots and

artificial intelligence; then as collectives — and this has given rise

to the new intense circulation of information and the setting up of

“networks.” Here we’re dealing rather with the terrain of communication.

However much they may be socially comprised of highly diversified

populations — biologists, doctors, computer scientists, neurologists,

engineers, consultants, police, ad-men, etc. — the two currents among

the cyberneticians are perfectly in harmony concerning their common

fantasy of a Universal Automaton, analogous to Hobbes’ vision of the

State in Leviathan, “the artificial man (or animal).”

The unity of cybernetic progress arises from a particular method; it has

imposed itself as the world-wide method of universal enrollment,

simultaneously a rage to experiment, and a proliferating

oversimplification. It corresponds to the explosion of applied

mathematics that arose subsequent to the despair caused by the Austrian

Kurt Godel when he demonstrated that all attempts to give a logical

foundation to mathematics and unify the sciences was doomed to

“incompleteness.” With the help of Heisenberg, more than a century of

positivist justifications had just collapsed. It was Von Neumann that

expressed to the greatest extreme this abrupt feeling that the

foundations had been annihilated. He interpreted the logical crisis of

mathematics as the mark of the unavoidable imperfection of all human

creations. And consequently he laid out a logic that could only come

from a robot! From being a pure mathematician, he made himself an agent

of scientific crossbreeding, of a general mathematization that would

allow a reconstruction from below, in practice, of the lost unity of the

sciences of which cybernetics was to be the most stable theoretical

expression. Not a demonstration, not a speech, not a book, and no place

has not since then been animated by the universal language of

explanatory diagrams, the visual form of reasoning. Cybernetics

transports the rationalization process common to bureaucracy and to

capitalism up onto the plane of total templating (modeling). Herbert

Simon, the prophet of Artificial Intelligence, took up the Von Neumann

program again in the 1960s, to build a thinking automaton. It was to be

a machine equipped with a program, called expert system, which was to be

capable of handling information so as to resolve the problems that every

particular domain of technique had to deal with, and by association, to

be able to solve all the practical problems encountered by humanity! The

General Problem Solver (GPS), created in 1972, was the model that this

universal technique that gathered together all the others, the model of

all models, the most applied intellectualism, the practical realization

of the preferred adage of the little masters without mastery, according

to which “there are no problems, there are only solutions.”

The cybernetic hypothesis progresses indistinctly as theory and

technology, the one always certifying the other. In 1943, Wiener met

John Von Neumann, who was in charge of building machines fast and

powerful enough to carry out the Manhattan Project that 15,000 scholars

and engineers, and 300,000 technicians and workers were working on,

under the direction of the physicist Robert Oppenheimer: the modern

computer and the atomic bomb, were thus born together. From the

perspective of contemporary imagining, the “communications utopia” is

thus the complementary myth to the myth of the invention of nuclear

power and weaponry: it is always a question of doing away with

being-together (the ensemble of beings) either by an excess of life or

an excess of death, either by terrestrial fusion or by cosmic suicide.

Cybernetics presents itself as the response most suited to deal with the

Great Fear of the destruction of the world and of the human species. And

Von Neumann was its double agent, the “inside outsider” par excellence.

The analogy between his descriptive categories for his machines, living

organisms, and Wiener’s categories sealed the alliance between

cybernetics and computer science. A few years would pass before

molecular biology, when decoding DNA, would in turn use that theory of

information to explain man as an individual and as a species, giving an

unequalled technical power to the experimental genetic manipulation of

human beings.

The way that the systems metaphor evolved towards the network metaphor

in social discourse between the 1950s and 1980s points towards the other

fundamental analogy constituting the cybernetic hypothesis. It also

indicates a profound transformation of the latter. Because if PEOPLE

talked about “systems,” among cyberneticians it would be by comparison

with the nervous system, and if PEOPLE talk today about the cognitive

“network” sciences, THEY are thinking about the neuronal network.

Cybernetics is the assimilation of the totality of the phenomena that

exist into brain phenomena. By posing the mind as the alpha and omega of

the world, cybernetics has guaranteed itself a place as the avant-garde

of all avant-gardes, the one that they will now all forever be running

after. It effectively implements, at the start, the identity between

life, thought, and language. This radical Monism is based on an analogy

between the notions of information and energy. Wiener introduced it by

grafting onto his discourse the discourse of 19th century

thermodynamics; the operation consisted in comparing the effect of time

on an energy system with the effect of time on an information system. A

system, to the extent that it is a system, is never pure and perfect:

there is a degradation of its energy to the extent that it undergoes

exchanges, in the same way as information degrades as it is circulated

around. This is what Clausius called entropy. Entropy, considered as a

natural law, is the cybernetician’s Hell. It explains the decomposition

of life, disequilibrium in economy, the dissolution of social bonds,

decadence... Initially, speculatively, cybernetics claimed that it had

thus opened up a common ground on which it would be possible to carry

out the unification of the natural and human sciences.

What would end up being called the “second cybernetics” was the superior

project of a vast experimentation on human societies:

anthropotechnology. The cybernetician’s mission is to fight the general

entropy threatening living beings, machines, and societies; that is, to

create the experimental conditions for a permanent revitalization,

endlessly restoring the integrity of the whole. “The important thing

isn’t that mankind is present, but that it exists as a living support

for technical ideas,” says Raymond Ruyer, the humanist commentator. With

the elaboration and development of cybernetics, the ideal of the

experimental sciences, already at the origins of political economy via

Newtonian physics, would once again lend a strong arm to capitalism.

Since then, the laboratory the cybernetic hypothesis carries out its

experiments in has been called “contemporary society.” After the end of

the 1960s, thanks to the techniques that it taught, this ‘second

cybernetics’ is no longer a mere laboratory hypothesis, but a social

experiment. It aims to construct what Giorgio Cesarano calls a

stabilized animal society, in which “[concerning termites, ants, and

bees] the natural presupposition is that they operate automatically, and

that the individual is negated, so the animal society as a whole

(termite colony, anthill, or beehive) is conceived of as a kind of

plural individual, the unity of which determines and is determined by

the distribution of roles and functions — all within the framework of an

‘organic composite’ where one would be hard pressed to not see a

biological model for the teleology of Capital.”