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Title: Beyond Civilized and Primitive Author: Ran Prieur Date: 2008 Language: en Topics: coercion, hierarchy, post-civ, primitivism Source: Retrieved on 1 Jan 2014 from http://ranprieur.com/essays/beyondciv.html Notes: version 1.3, revised 15 November 2012
Western industrial society tells a story about itself that goes like
this: âA long time ago, our ancestors were âprimitiveâ. They lived in
caves, were stupid, hit each other with clubs, and had short, stressful
lives in which they were constantly on the verge of starving or being
eaten by saber-toothed cats. Then we invented âcivilizationâ, in which
we started growing food, being nice to each other, getting smarter,
inventing marvelous technologies, and everywhere replacing chaos with
order. Itâs getting better all the time and will continue forever.â
Western industrial society is now in decline, and in declining societies
itâs normal for people to feel that their whole existence is empty and
meaningless, that the system is rotten to its roots and should all be
torn up and thrown out. Itâs also normal for people to frame this
rejection in whatever terms their society has given them. So we reason:
âThis world is hell, this world is civilization, so civilization is
hell, so maybe primitive life was heaven. Maybe the whole story is
upside-down!â
We examine the dominant story and find that although it contains some
truth, it depends on assumptions and distortions and omissions, and it
was not designed to reveal truth, but to influence the values and
behaviors of the people who heard it. Seeking balance, we create a
perfect mirror image:
âA long time ago, our ancestors were âprimitiveâ. They were just as
smart as we would be if we didnât watch television, and they lived in
cozy hand-made shelters, were generally peaceful and egalitarian, and
had long healthy lives in which food was plentiful because they kept
their populations well below the carrying capacity of their landbase.
Then someone invented âcivilizationâ, in which we monopolized the land
and grew our population by eating grain. Grain is high in calories but
low in other nutrients, so we got sick, and we also began starving when
the population outgrew the landbase, so the farmers conquered land from
neighboring foragers and enslaved them to cut down more forests and grow
more grain, and to build sterile monuments while the elite developed
technologies of repression and disconnection and gluttonous consumption,
and everywhere life was replaced with control. Itâs been getting worse
and worse, and soon we will abandon it and live the way we did before.â
Again, this story contains truth, but it depends on assumptions and
distortions and omissions, and it is designed to influence the values
and behaviors of the people who hear it. Certainly itâs extremely
compelling. As a guiding ideology, as a utopian vision, primitivism can
destroy Marxism or libertarianism because it digs deeper and overthrows
their foundations. It defeats the old religions on evidence. And best of
all, it presents a utopia that is not in the realm of imagination or
metaphysics, but has actually happened. We can look at archaeology and
anthropology and history and say: âHereâs a forager-hunter society where
people were strong and long-lived. Hereâs a tribe where the âworkâ is so
enjoyable that they donât even have the concept of âfreeloadingâ. Here
are European explorers writing that certain tribes showed no trace of
violence or meanness.â
But this strength is also a weakness, because reality cuts both ways. As
soon as you say, âWe should live like these actual people,â every
competing ideologue will jump up with examples of those people living
dreadfully: âHereâs a tribe with murderous warfare, and one with ritual
abuse, and one with chronic disease from malnutrition, and one where
people are just mean and unhappy, and here are a bunch of species
extinctions right when primitive humans appeared.â
Most primitivists accept this evidence, and have worked out several ways
to deal with it. One move is to postulate something that has not been
observed, but if it were, would make the facts fit your theory.
Specifically, they say âThe nasty tribes must have all been corrupted by
exposure to civilization.â Another move is to defend absolutely
everything on the grounds of cultural relativism: âWho are we to say
itâs wrong to hit another person in the head with an axe?â Another move
is to say, âOkay, some of that stuff is bad, but if you add up all the
bad and good, primitive life is still preferable to civilization.â
This is hardly inspiring, and it still has to be constantly defended,
and not from a strong position, because we know very little about
prehistoric life. We know what tools people used, and what they ate, but
we donât know how many tribes were peaceful or warlike, how many were
permissive or repressive, how many were egalitarian or authoritarian,
and we have no idea what was going on in their heads. One of the
assumptions I mentioned above, made by both primitivism and the dominant
story, is that stone age people were the same as tribal forager-hunters
observed in historical times. After all, we call them both âprimitiveâ.
But in terms of culture, and even consciousness, they might be
profoundly different.
A more reasonable move is to abandon primitive life as an ideal, or a
goal, and instead just set it up as a perspective: âHey, if I stand
here, I can see that my own world, which I thought was normal, is
totally insane!â Or we can set it up as a source of learning: âLook at
this one thing these people did, so letâs see if we can do it too.â Then
it doesnât matter how many flaws they had. And once we give up the
framework that shows a right way and a wrong way, and a clear line
between them, we can use perspectives and ideas from people formerly on
the âwrongâ side: âAncient Greeks went barefoot everywhere and treated
their slaves with more humanity than Wal-Mart treats its workers.
Medieval serfs worked fewer hours than modern Americans, and thought it
was degrading to work for wages. Slum-dwellers in Mumbai spend less time
and effort getting around on foot than Americans spend getting around in
cars. The online file sharing community is building a gift economy.â
Identifying with stone age people is like taking a big stretch. Then if
we relax, we find that a lot of smaller stretches are effortless, that
we can easily take all kinds of perspectives outside the assumptions of
our little bubble. We could even re-invent âprimitivismâ to ignore stone
age people and include only recent tribes who we have good information
about, and who still stack up pretty well against our own society. We
could call this historical primitivism, and a few primitivists have
taken this position. The reason most donât is, first, our lack of
knowledge about prehistory forms a convenient blank screen on which
anyone can project visions to back up their ideology. And second, stone
age primitivism comes with an extremely powerful idea, which I call the
timeline argument.
The timeline argument convinces us that a better way of life is the
human default, that all the things we hate are like scratches in the
sand that will be washed away when the tide comes in. Often itâs phrased
as 99%; of human history has been that, and only 1%; has been this.â
Sometimes itâs illustrated with a basketball court metaphor: Itâs 94
feet long, and if you call each foot ten thousand years, then we had
fire and stone tools for 93 feet, agriculture for one foot, and
industrial society for around a quarter of an inch.
The key word in this argument is âweâ. Where do you draw the line
between âusâ and ânot usâ? Why not go back a billion years, and say that
âweâ were cell colonies in the primordial oceans? Call a billion years a
football field, and the age of agriculture can dance on the head of a
pin! This would seem to be a much stronger argument, and yet Iâve never
seen a primitivist draw the line even as far back as Homo habilis two
million years ago â or as recently as Homo sapiens sapiens 130,000 years
ago. Why not?
This is a difficult and important question, and it took me days to
puzzle it out. I think weâve been confusing two separate issues. One is
a fact, that the present way we live is a deviation from the way of
other biological life. If this is our point, then a million year
timeline is much too short â we should go back at least a thousand times
farther!
The other issue is a question: Who are we? When you get below the level
of culture, down to the level of biology or spirit, what is normal for
us to do? What is possible? What is right?
If youâre talking about who we are, then the million year timeline is
much too long. The mistake happens like this: âWe are human, and we can
plausibly call Homo erectus human. Therefore our nature is to live like
Homo erectus, and the way we live now is not our tendency, not our
normal behavior, but some kind of bizarre accident. What a relief! We
can just bring down civilization, and weâll naturally go back to living
like Homo erectus, but since we donât know exactly how they lived, weâll
assume itâs like the best recent forager-hunter tribes.â
Now, Iâm not disputing that many societies have lived close to the Earth
with a quality of life that we canât imagine. Richard Sorenson mentions
several, and explores one in depth, in his essay on Preconquest
Consciousness.[1] What Iâm disputing is: 1) that we have any evidence
that prehistoric people had that consciousness; 2) that that
consciousness is our default state; 3) that it is simple for us to get
back there; and 4) that large-scale technologically complex societies
are a deviation from who we are.
Who we are is changing all the time, and new genetic research has
revealed shockingly fast change in just the last few thousand years,
including malaria resistance, adult milk digestion, and blue eyes.
According to anthropologist John Hawks, âWe are more different
genetically from people living 5000 years ago than they were from
Neanderthals.â[2]
Now, you could argue that some of these changes are not really who we
are, because they were caused by civilization: without domesticating
cows and goats, we would not have evolved milk digestion. By the same
logic, without inventing clothing, we would not have evolved hairless
bodies. Without crawling onto dry land, we would not have evolved legs.
My point is, there is no place you can stick a pin and say âthis is our
natureâ, because our nature is not a location â it is a journey. We
crawled onto dry land; we became warm-blooded and grew hair; we moved
from the forests to the plains; we walked upright; we tamed fire and
began cooking food; we invented symbolic language; our brains got
bigger; our tools got more complex; we invented grain agriculture and
empires and airplanes and ice cream and nuclear weapons.
This isnât quite fair, because all of us adopted fire, but not all of us
adopted grain agriculture, and riding in airplanes is much easier to
reverse than walking upright. Itâs more likely that some of our
descendants will be using fire and stone tools, than that some of them
will be using Prozac and silicon microprocessors. But I still donât
think, as some primitivists do, that civilization is a dead end, or an
unlikely accident.
If civilization is a fluke, we would expect to see it begin only once,
and spread from there. But instead we see grain farming and explosions
of human social complexity in several places at about the same time:
along the Tigris and Euphrates, and also in Africa, India, and China.
You could still argue that those changes spread by travel, that there
was one accident and then some far-flung colonies â unless we found an
early civilization so remote that travel was out of the question.
That civilization has been found. Archaeologists call it the Norte
Chico, in present-day Peru. From 3000â1800 BC, they built at least 25
cities, and they had giant stone monuments earlier than anyone except
the Mesopotamians. Even more shocking, their system was not based on
grain! All previous models of civilization have put grain agriculture at
the very root: once you had grain farming, you had a denser, more
settled population, which led to a more complex society, and also you
had a storable commodity that enabled hierarchy.
The Norte Chicans ate only small amounts of grain, but they did have a
storable commodity that enabled hierarchy, something that allowed small
differences in wealth to feed back into large differences, and
ultimately entrenched elites commanding slaves to build monolithic
architcture. It was cotton! So we have people on opposite sides of the
world, in different geographies, using different materials, falling into
the same pattern, but that pattern is not about food. It seems to be
about economics, or more precisely, about human cognition. After
thousands of generations of slow change, human intelligence reached a
tipping point that permitted large complex societies to appear in
radically different circumstances.
Now itâs tempting to call âcivilizationâ the new human default, but of
course, in many places, these societies did not appear. Also, they all
collapsed! And then new ones appeared, and those collapsed. I donât
think it even makes sense to talk about a human default, any more than
it makes sense to talk about a default state for the weather. But the
range in which we move has widened.
My information on the Norte Chico comes from Charles C. Mannâs book
1491, a survey of recent findings about the Americas before the European
conquest. Mann is neither a primitivist nor an advocate for western
civilization, but an advocate for, well, far western civilization, which
was a lot more like western civilization than we thought. At its peak,
the Inca empire was the largest in the world, with exploited colonies,
massive forced resettling of workers, and bloody power struggles among
the elite just like in Europe and Asia. The Maya deforested the Yucatan
and depleted its topsoil only a few centuries after the Romans did the
same thing around the Mediterranean. Aztec âhuman sacrificeâ was
surprisingly similar to English âpublic executionâ that was happening at
exactly the same time. Even North America had a city, Cahokia, that in
1250 was roughly the size of London. In 1523, Giovanni da Verrazzano
recorded that the whole Atlantic coast from the Carolinas up was
âdensely populatedâ. In the 1540âs, De Soto passed through what is now
eastern Arkansas and found it âthickly set with great townsâ. Of course,
that population density is possible only with intensive agriculture.
Mann writes, âA traveler in 1669 reported that six square miles of maize
typically encircled Haudenosaunee villages.â
By the time the conquest really got going, all these societies had been
wiped out by smallpox and other diseases introduced by the first
Europeans. Explorers and conquerors found small tribes of
forager-hunters in an untamed wilderness, and assumed it had been that
way forever. In a blow to both primitivism and âprogressâ, it turns out
that most of these people were not living in the timeless ways of their
ancestors â the âIndiansâ of American myth were post-crash societies!
The incredible biological abundance of North America was also a
post-crash phenomenon. Weâve heard about the flocks of passenger pigeons
darkening the sky for days, the tens of millions of bison trampling the
great plains, the rivers so thick with spawning salmon that you could
barely row a boat, the seashores teeming with life, the deep forests on
which a squirrel could go from the Atlantic to the Mississippi without
touching the ground. We donât know what North America would have looked
like with no humans at all, but we do know it didnât look like that
under the Indians. Bone excavations show that passenger pigeons were not
even common in the 1400âs. Indians specifically targeted pregnant deer,
and wild turkeys before they laid eggs, to eliminate competition for
maize and tree nuts. They routinely burned forests to keep them
convenient for human use. And they kept salmon and shellfish populations
down by eating them, and thereby suppressed populations of other
creatures that ate them. When human populations crashed, nonhuman
populations exploded.
This fact drives a wedge between two value systems that are supposed to
be synonymous: love of nature and love of primitive humans. We seem to
have only two options. One is to say that native North Americans went
too far â of course they werenât nearly as bad as Europeans, but we need
to return to even lower levels of population and domestication. I
respect this position morally, but strategically itâs absurd. How can
the future inhabitants of North America be held to a way of life that
the original inhabitants abandoned at least a thousand years ago?
The other option is to say that native North Americans did not go too
far. The subtext is usually something like this: âMoralistic ecologists
think itâs wrong that my society holds nature down and milks it for its
own benefit, but if the Native Americans did it, it must be okay!â This
conclusion is nearly universal in popular writing. Plenty of respectable
authors would never be caught idealizing simple foragers, but when they
find out these âprimitivesâ hunted competitors and cleared forests to
plant grain, out comes the âwise Indianâ card.
There is a third option, but it requires abandoning the whole
civilized-primitive framework. Suppose we say, âWe can regrow the
spectacular fecundity that North America had in the 1700âs, not as a
temporary stage between the fall of one Earth-monopolizing society and
the rise of another, but as a permanent condition â and we will protect
this condition not by duplicating any way our ancestors lived, but by
inventing new ways. And these new ways will coexist with large complex
societies, rather than depending on their destruction.â
I admit this is a utopian pipe dream, something to aim for but not to
bet on. To grow biological abundance for its own sake, and not for human
utility, is still a fringe position. But my deeper point is that the
civilized-primitive framework forces us to divide things a certain way:
On one side are complexity, change, invention, unstable âgrowthâ,
taking, control, and the future. On the other side are simplicity,
stasis, tradition, stability, giving, freedom, and the past. Once we
abandon that framework, which is itself an artifact of western
industrial society, we can integrate evidence that the framework
excludes, and we can try to match things up differently.
The combination that Iâm suggesting is: complexity, change, invention,
stability, giving, freedom, and both the past and the future. This isnât
the only combination that could be suggested, and I doubt itâs the
easiest to put into practice, but itâs surprisingly noncontroversial. Al
Gore would probably agree with every point. The catch is that Gore is
playing to a public consciousness in which âfreedomâ means a nice paint
job on control, and in which no one has any idea whatâs really necessary
for stability.
Americans think freedom means no restraint. So Iâm free to start a big
company and rule ten thousand wage laborers, and if they donât like it
theyâre free to go on strike, and Iâm free to hire thugs to crack their
heads, and theyâre free to quit, and Iâm free to buy politicans to cut
off support for the unemployed, so now theyâre free to either starve and
die, or accept the job on my terms and use their freedom of speech to
impotently complain.
A better definition of freedom is no coercion. I define ârestraintâ as
preventing someone from doing something, and âcoercionâ as forcing
someone to do something, usually by punishing them for not doing it.
Primitive societies tend to be very good at avoiding coercion. In The
Continuum Concept, Jean Liedloff writes that among the Yequana, it is
forbidden to even ask another person to do something. It seems strange
to us, but to have a society where no one is forced to do what they
donât want to do, you actually need a lot of restraints.
So thereâs one place where we can learn more from looking backward than
looking forward. But there is more than one way for coercion to appear â
itâs like a disease with multiple vectors. Primitive cultures have
extraordinary resistance to the way coercion must have appeared over and
over in their history â among a group of people who all know each other,
an arrogant charismatic leader arises. But they have little or no
resistance to another way itâs been appearing more and more often over
the last few thousand years: as a hidden partner with seductive new
physical and social tools.
To understand whatâs necessary for both freedom and stability, we need
to go deep into a close ally of the critique of civilization: the
critique of technology. Now, as soon as you say youâre against
technology, some nit-picker points out that even a stone axe is a
technology. We know what we mean, but we have trouble putting it into
words. Our first instinct is to try to draw a line, and say that
technologies on one side are bad, and on the other side are good. And at
this point, primitivism comes into the picture as a convenience.
It reminds me of the debate over abortion, which is ultimately about
drawing a line between when the potential child is part of the motherâs
body, and when itâs a separate person with full rights. Drawing the line
at the first breath would make the most sense on biblical grounds, but
no one wants to do that, and almost no one wants to draw it at passage
through the birth canal. But if you go farther back than that, you get
an unbroken grey area all the way to conception! Fundamentalists love to
draw the line at conception, not only because it gives them more control
over women, but because they hate grey areas.
In the same way, primitivism enters the debate over good technology with
a sharply drawn line a long way back. We donât have to wrestle with how
to manufacture bicycles without exploitation, or how to make cities
sustainable, or what uses are appropriate for water wheels, or how to
avoid the atrocities of ancient empires, if we just draw the line
between settled grain farmers and nomadic forager-hunters.
To be fair to primitivists, they still have to wrestle with the grey
areas from foraging to horticulture to agriculture, and from camps to
villages to towns, and with arguments that we should go back even
farther. The real fundamentalists on this issue are the techno-utopians.
They say âtechnology is neutral,â which really means âThou shalt not
ascribe built-in negative effects to any technology,â but of course they
ascribe built-in positive effects to technologies all the time. So it
ends up being not a statement of fact but a command to action: âAny
technology you can think of, do it!â This is like solving the abortion
debate by legalizing murder.
We must apply intelligent selection to technology, but we arenât really
worried that the neighboring village will reinvent metalworking and
massacre our children with swords. We just want bulldozers to stop
turning grassy fields into dreadful suburbs, and we want urban spaces to
be made for people not cars, and we want to turn off the TV, and take
down the surveillance cameras, and do meaningful work instead of sitting
in windowless office dungeons rearranging abstractions to pay off loans
incurred getting our spirits broken.
We like hot baths and sailing ships and recorded music and the internet,
but we worry that we canât have them without exterminating half the
species on Earth, or exploiting Asian sweatshop workers, or dumping so
many toxins that we all get cancer, or overextending our system so far
that it crashes and we get eaten by roving gangs.
But notice: primitive people donât think this way! Of course, if you put
them on an assembly line or on the side of a freeway or in a modern war,
they would know they were in hell. But if you offered them an LED
lantern made on an assembly line, or a truck ride to their hunting
ground, or a gun, most of them would accept it without hesitation.
Primitive people tend to adopt any tool they find useful â not because
theyâre wise, but because theyâre ignorant, because their cultures have
not evolved defenses against tools that will lead them astray.
I think the root of civilization, and a major source of human evil, is
simply that we became clever enough to extend our power beyond our
empathy. Itâs like the famous Twilight Zone episode where thereâs a box
with a button, and if you push it, you get a million dollars and someone
you donât know dies. We have countless âboxesâ that do basically the
same thing. Some of them are physical, like cruise missiles or
ocean-killing fertilizers, or even junk food where your mouth gets a
million dollars and your heart dies. Others are social, like subsidies
that make junk food affordable, or the corporation, which by definition
does any harm it can get away with that will bring profit to the
shareholders. Iâm guessing it all started when our mental and physical
tools combined to enable positive feedback in personal wealth. Anyway,
as soon as you have something that does more harm than good, but that
appears to the decision makers to do more good than harm, the decision
makers will decide to do more and more of it, and before long you have a
whole society built around obvious benefits that do hidden harm.
The kicker is, once we gain from extending our power beyond our seeing
and feeling, we have an incentive to repress our seeing and feeling. If
child slaves are making your clothing, and you want to keep getting
clothing, you either have to not know about them, or know about them and
feel good about it. You have to make yourself ignorant or evil.
But gradually weâre learning. Every time it comes out that some product
is made with more than the usual amount of exploitation, a few people
stop buying it. Every day, someone is in a supermarket deciding whether
to spend extra money to buy shade-grown coffee or fair trade chocolate.
Itâs not making a big difference, but all mass changes have to start
with a few people, and my point is that we are stretching the human
conscience farther than itâs ever gone, making sacrifices to help
forests we will never see and people we will never meet. This is not
simple-minded or âidealisticâ, but rational, sophisticated behavior. You
find it not at the trailing edge of civilization but at the leading
edge, among educated urbanites.
There are also growing movements to reduce energy consumption, to eat
locally-produced food, to give up high-paying jobs for better quality of
life, and to trade industrial-scale for human-scale tools. I would
prefer not to own a car, but my motivation is not to save the world â
itâs that cars are expensive and I hate driving. Iâll use a chainsaw
when I have a huge amount of wood to cut, but generally I avoid power
tools because they make me feel dependent on an industrial system that
gives me no participation in power, and I feel stronger working with my
own muscles.
When I look at the discourse around this kind of choice, itâs positively
satanic. People whose position is basically âThundersaw cut fast, me
feel like godâ present themselves as agents of enlightenment and
progress, while people with intelligent reasons for doing something
completely new â choosing weaker, slower tools when high-energy tools
are available â are seen as lizard-brained throwbacks. Whatâs even worse
is when they see themselves that way.
This movement is often called âvoluntary simplicityâ, but we should
distinguish between technological simplicity and mental simplicity.
Primitive people, even when they have complex cultures, use simple tools
for a simple reason â those are the only tools they have. In so-called
âcivilizationâ, weâve just been using more and more complex technologies
for simple-minded reasons â they give us brute power and shallow
pleasures. But as we learn to be more sophisticated in our thinking
about technology, we will be able to use complex tools for complex
reasons â or simple tools for complex reasons.
Primitivists, understandably, are impatient. They want us to go back to
using simple tools and they donât care why we do it. Itâs like our whole
species is an addict, and seductive advanced technologies are the drug,
and primitivism is the urge to throw our whole supply of drugs in the
garbage. Any experienced addict will tell you that doesnât work. The
next day you dig it out of the garbage or the next week you buy more.
Of course there are arguments that this will be impossible. One goes
like this: âFor civilization, you need agriculture, and for agriculture,
you need topsoil. But the topsoil is gone! Agriculture survives only by
dumping synthetic fertilizers on dead soil, and those fertilizers depend
on oil, and the easily extracted oil is also gone. If the industrial
system crashes just a little, weâll have no oil, no fertilizer, no
agriculture, and therefore no choice but foraging and hunting.â
Agriculture, whether or not itâs a good idea, is in no danger. The
movement to switch the whole planet to synthetic fertilizers on dead
soil (ironically called âthe Green Revolutionâ) had not even started yet
when another movement started to switch back: organic farming. Present
organic farmers are still using oil to run tractors and haul supplies
in, but in terms of getting the soil to produce a crop, organic farming
is agriculture without oil, and itâs the fastest growing segment of the
food economy. It is being held back by cultural intertia, by the
political power of industrial agribusiness, and by cheap oil. It is not
being held back by any lack of land suitable for conversion to organic
methods. No one says, âWe bought this old farm, but since the soil is
dead, weâre just going to leave it as a wasteland, and go hunt elk.â
People find a way to bring the soil back.
Another argument is that âhumanity has learned its lesson.â I think this
is on the right track, but too optimistic about how much weâve learned,
and about what kind of learning is necessary. Mere rebellion is as old
as the first slave revolt in Ur, and you can find intellectual critiques
of civilization in the Old Testament: From Ecclesiastes 5:11, âWhen
goods increase, they are increased that eat them: and what good is there
to the owners thereof?â And from Isaiah 5:8, âWoe unto those who join
house to house, and field to field, until there is no place.â If this
level of learning were enough, we would have found utopia thousands of
years ago. Instead, people whose understanding was roughly the same as
ours, and whose courage was greater, kept making the same mistakes.
In Against His-story, Against Leviathan, Fredy Perlman set out to
document the whole history of resistance to civilization, and
inadvertently undermined his conclusion, that this Leviathan will be the
last, by showing again and again that resistance movements become the
new dominators. The ancient Persian empire started when Cyrus was
inspired by Zoroastrianism to sweep away the machinery of previous
empires. The Roman empire started as a peopleâs movement to eradicate
the Etruscans. The modern nation-state began with the Moravians forming
a defensive alliance against the Franks, who fell into warlike habits
themselves after centuries of resisting the Romans. And we all know what
happened with Christianity.
I fear itâs going to happen again. Now, the simple desire to go
primitive is harmless and beneficial â I wish luck and success to anyone
who tries it, and I hope we always have some tribal forager-hunters
around, just to keep the human potential stretched. And I enjoy
occasional minor disasters like blackouts and snowstorms, which serve to
strip away illusions and remind people that theyâre alive. I loved the
idea in Fight Club (the movie) of destroying the bank records to
equalize wealth. Thatâs right in line with the ancient Jubilee
tradition, where debts were canceled every few decades to stabilize the
economy.[3]
But to cause a global hard crash (if itâs even possible) would be a
terrible mistake, and the root of it is old-fashioned authoritarian
thinking: that if you force someone to do something, itâs the same as if
they do it on their own. In fact itâs exactly the opposite. The more we
are forced to abandon this system, the less we will learn, and the more
aggressively we will fight to rebuild something like it. And the more we
choose to abandon it, the more we will learn, and the less likely we
will make the same mistakes.
Of course we will not have another society based on oil, and per-capita
energy consumption will drop, but itâs unlikely that energy or
complexity will fall to preindustrial levels. Hydroelectric and atomic
fission plants are in no immediate danger, and every year there are new
innovations in energy from sun, wind, waves, and biofuels. Alternative
energy would be growing much faster with good funding, and in any case
itâs not necessary to convert the whole global infrastructure in the
next twenty years. Even in a general collapse, if just one region has a
surplus of sustainable energy, they can use it to colonize and
re-âdevelopâ the collapsed areas at their own pace. Probably this will
be happening all over.
I donât think thereâs any escape from complex high-energy societies, so
instead of focusing on avoiding them, we should focus on making them
tolerable. This means, first, that our system is enjoyable for its
participants â that the activities necessary to keep it going are
experienced by the people who do them as meaningful and freely chosen.
Second, our system must be ethical toward the world around it. My
standards here are high â the totality of biological life on Earth must
be better off with us than without us. And third, our system must not be
inherently unstable. It might be destroyed by an asteroid or an ice age,
but it must not destabilize itself internally, by having an economy that
has to grow or die, or by depleting nonrenewable resources, or by having
any trend at all that ratchets, that easily goes one way but canât go
the other way without a catastrophe.
These three standards seem to be separate. When Orwell wrote that the
future is âa boot stamping on a human face â foreverâ, he was imagining
a system thatâs internally stable but not enjoyable. Techno-utopians
fantasize about a system that expands into space and lasts billions of
years while crushing any trace of biological wildness. And some
paranoids fear âecofascismâ, a system that is stable and serves nature,
but that represses most humans.
I think all these visions are impossible, for a reason that is
overlooked in our machine-worshipping culture: that collapse often
happens for psychological reasons. Erich Fromm said it best, in âWhat
Does It Mean to Be Human?â
Even if the social order can do everything to man â starve him, torture
him, imprison him, or over feed him â this cannot be done without
certain consequences which follow from the very conditions of human
existence. Man, if utterly deprived of all stimuli and pleasure, will be
incapable of performing work, certainly any skilled work. If he is not
that utterly destitute, he will tend to rebel if you make him a slave;
he will tend to be violent if life is too boring; he will tend to lose
all creativity if you make him into a machine. Man in this respect is
not different from animals or from inanimate matter. You can get certain
animals into the zoo, but they will not reproduce, and others will
become violent although they are not violent in freedom... If man were
infinitely malleable, there would have been no revolutions.
In 1491, Mann writes that on Pizarroâs march to conquer the Incas, he
was actively helped by local populations who were sick of the empireâs
oppression. Fredy Perlmanâs book goes through the whole history of
western civilization arguing for the human dissatisfaction factor in
every failed society. And itâs clear to me and many other Americans that
our empire is falling because nobody believes in it â not the soldiers,
who quickly learn that war is bullshit, not the corporate executives,
who at best are focused on short term profits and at worst are just
thieves, not the politicians, who are cynically doing whatever it takes
to maximize campaign contributions, and not the people who actually do
the work, most of whom are just going through the motions.
Also, America (with other nations close behind) is getting more tightly
controlled, and thus more unbearable for its participants. This is a
general problem of top-down systems: for both technical and
psychological reasons, itâs easy to add control mechanisms and hard to
remove them, easy to squeeze tighter and hard to let go. As the
controllers get more selfish and insulated, and the controlled get more
frustrated and depressed, and more energy is wasted on forcing people to
do what they wouldnât do without force, the whole system seizes up, and
can only be renewed by a surge of transforming energy from below. This
transformation could be peaceful, but often the ruling interests block
it until it builds up such pressure that it explodes violently.
The same way the ruling interests become corrupt through an exploitative
relationship with the people, we all become corrupt when we participate
in a society that exploits the life around it. When we talk about
ânatureâ, we donât mean wheat fields or zoo animals â we mean plants
that scatter seeds to the wind and animals that roam at will. We mean
raw aliveness, and we canât repress it outside ourselves without also
repressing it inside ourselves. The spirit that guides our shoe when it
crushes grass coming through cracks in the driveway, also guides us to
crush feelings and perceptions coming through cracks in our paved minds,
and we need these feelings and perceptions to make good decisions, to be
sane.
If primitive life seems better to us, itâs because itâs easier for
smaller and simpler societies to avoid falling into domination. In the
best tribes, the âchiefâ just tells people to do what they want to do
anyway, and a good chief will channel this energy into a harmonious
whole. But the bigger a system gets, and the longer a big system lasts,
the more challenging it is to maintain a bottom-up energy structure.
I have a wild speculation about the origin of complex societies. The
Great Pyramid of Giza is superior in every way to the two pyramids next
to it â yet the Great Pyramid was the first of the three to be built.
Itâs like Egyptian civilization appeared out of nowhere at full
strength, and immediately began declining. My thought is: the first
pyramid was not built by slaves. It was built by an explosion of human
enthusiasm channeled into a massive cooperative effort. But then, as
weâve seen in pretty much every large system in history, this pattern of
human action hardened, leaders became rulers, inspired actions became
chores, and workers became slaves.
To achieve stability, and freedom, and ecological responsibility, we
must learn to halt the slide from life into control, to maintain the
bottom-up energy structure permanently, even in large complex systems. I
donât know how weâre going to do this. Itâs even hard for individuals to
do it â look at all the creative people who make one masterpiece and
spend the rest of their life making crappy derivative works. The best
plan I can think of is to build our system out of cells of less than 150
people,[4] roughly the number at which cooperation tends to give way to
hierarchy, and even then to expect cells to go bad, and have built-in
pathways for dead cells to be broken down and new ones to form and
individuals to move from cell to cell. Basically, weâd be making a big
system thatâs like a living body, where all past big systems have been
animated corpses.
Assuming that our descendants do achieve stability, what technological
level will they be at? I want to leave this one wide open. Itâs possible
in theory for us to go even farther âbackâ than the stone age. I call
this the Land Dolphins scenario â that we somehow transform ourselves
into super-intelligent creatures who donât use any physical tools at
all. At the other extreme, Iâm not ruling out space colonies, although
the worst mistake we could make would be expanding into space before we
have learned stability on our home planet. I think physical travel to
other solar systems is out of the question â long before mechanistic
technology gets that far, we will have moved to new paradigms that offer
much easier ways to get to new worlds.
The âsingularityâ theory is also off the mark. Techies think machines
will surpass humans, because they think weâre nothing but machines
ourselves, so all we need to do is make better machines, which according
to the myth of âprogressâ is inevitable. I think if we do get a
technological transcendence, itâs going to involve machines changing
humans. My favorite scenario is time-contracted virtual reality: suppose
you can go into an artificial world, have the experience of spending a
week there, and come back and only a day has passed, or an hour, or a
minute. If we can do that, all bets are off!
The biggest weakness in my vision is that innovation can go with
stability, that we can continue exploring and trying new things without
repeatedly destabilizing ourselves by extending our power beyond our
understanding. Maybe weâre just going to keep making mistakes and
falling down forever, and in that case the best we can do is minimize
the severity of the falls. I think weâre doing a pretty good job so far
in the present collapse. Even in America, we might escape with no more
than a long depression, a mild fall in population, and a much-needed
shakeout of technology and economics. Life will get more painful but
also more meaningful, as billions of human-hours shift from processing
paperwork and watching TV to intensive learning of new skills to keep
ourselves alive. These skills will run the whole range, from tracking
deer to growing potatoes to fixing bicycles to building solar-powered
wi-fi networks â to new things we wonât even imagine until we have our
backs to the wall.
Humans are the most mentally adaptable species on Earth, and not bad at
physical adaptation. Our species can easily survive the worst-case
scenarios for climate change and industrial collapse. If we go extinct,
it will be through self-transformation. We might use biotech to
genetically change ourselves into something thatâs not robust, or use
information technology to get so good at entertaining ourselves that
weâre no longer interested in reproduction. Or we might spin off many
cultures and subspecies that go extinct, while a few survive.
I think we can see the future in popular fiction, but not the fiction we
think. Most science fiction is either stuck in the recent past, in the
industrial ageâs boundless optimism about machines, or it looks at the
present by exploring the unintended consequences of high tech. Cyberpunk
is better â if you put a 1950âs version of the year 2000 through a
cyberpunk filter, you would be close to the real 2000. The key insight
of cyberpunk is that more technology doesnât make things cleaner â it
makes things dirtier.
Fantasy, while seeming to look at the past, might be seeing the future:
elves and wizards could represent the increasing diversity of
post-humans, and âmagicâ is what we in the industrial age dimly perceive
as the world outside our objective materialist philosophy. I think
steampunk does the best of all, if you factor out the Victorian
frippery. Like cyberpunk, it shows a human-made world thatâs as messy
and alive as nature, but the technological system is a crazy hybrid of
everything from âstone ageâ to âspace ageâ â rejecting the idea that we
are locked into ages.
Primitive people see time as a circle. Civilized people see it as a
line. We are about to see it as an open plain where we can wander at
will. History is broken. Go! Â
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