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Title: An-arrgh-chy
Author: Peter T. Leeson
Date: 2007
Language: en
Topics: pirates, piracy, proto-anarchism, not anarchist
Source: https://www.peterleeson.com/An-arrgh-chy.pdf
Notes: This article investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and organization of pirates. To effectively organize their banditry, pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation, minimize crew conflict,and maximize piratical profit. Pirates devised two institutions for this purpose. First, I analyze the system of piratical checks and balances crews used to constrain captain predation. Second, I examine how pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and create piratical law and order. Pirate governance created sufficient order and cooperation to make pirates one of the most sophisticated and successful criminal organizations in history.

Peter T. Leeson

An-arrgh-chy

Nature, we see, teaches the most Illiterate the necessary Prudence for

their Preservation . . . these Men whom we term, and not without Reason,

the Scandal of human Nature, who were abandoned to all Vice, and lived

by Rapine; when they judged it for their Interest . . . were strictly

just. . . among themselves. (Captain Charles Johnson 1726–28, 527)

I. Introduction

Pirates are known for raucousness, recklessness, and chaotic

rapine.Pirate reality, however, is quite another picture. Real-life

pirates were highly organized criminals. Unlike the swashbuckling

psychopaths of fiction, historical pirates displayed sophisticated

organization and coordination.

Pirates could not use government to enforce or otherwise support

cooperative arrangements between them. Despite this, they successfully

cooperated with hundreds of other rogues. Amidst ubiquitous potential

for conflict, they rarely fought, stole from, or deceived one another.

In fact, piratical harmony was as common as harmony among their lawful

contemporaries who relied on government for social cooperation. How did

“these men whom we term . . . the Scandal of human Nature, who were

abandoned to all Vice, and lived by Rapine” ( Johnson [1726–28]1999,

527)[1] accomplish this impressive level of order?

Becker (1968) was the first to apply the logic of rational-choice

decision making to criminals. Following him, a number of others extended

this logic to decision making in the context of organized outlaws.

Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995) provide the best and most comprehensive

collection of essays that consider the economics of criminal

organization. In addition, a large literature discusses the economic

impact of organized crime, activities of criminal organizations, optimal

strategies for preventing organized crime, and reasons for its emergence

(see also,e.g., Anderson 1979; Reuter 1983, 1987; Jennings 1984;

Arlacchi 1986; Jankowski 1991; Dick 1995; Konrad and Skaperdas 1998;

Garoupa 2000; Skaperdas 2001; Chang, Lu, and Chen 2005).

Unlike these topics, the internal governance institutions of violent

criminal organizations have received relatively little attention.[2] The

difficulty of “getting inside” criminal organizations is largely

responsible for this. Levitt and Venkatesh’s important work on street

gangs (Levittand Venkatesh 2000; Venkatesh and Levitt 2000) is an

exception to this rule, as are Gambetta’s (1993) and Reuter’s (1983)

superb studies of the Mafia. However, Levitt and Venkatesh focus on the

financial organization of gangs rather than on their governance

structures. Gambetta’s and Reuter’s studies are primarily concerned with

the Mafia’s provision of protection to outsiders and the organization of

the illegal markets it serves.

This article investigates the internal governance institutions of

violent criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and

organization of pirates.[3] These “most treacherous rogues” terrorized

the Caribbean, Atlantic Ocean, and Indian Ocean during the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries. Pirates formed a loose confederation of

maritime bandits outside the law of any government.

To effectively organize their banditry, pirates required mechanisms to

prevent internal predation, minimize crew conflict, and maximize

piratical profit. I argue that pirates devised two institutions for this

purpose. First, I analyze the system of piratical checks and balances

that crews used to constrain captain predation. Second, I examine how

pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and create

piratical law and order. Pirates adopted both of these institutions

before seventeenth- and eighteenth-century governments.

Their governance institutions were self-enforcing by necessity.

Appealing to the formal enforcement mechanisms of the state is not an

option for criminal organizations, including pirates. Although the

maritime nature of piratical expeditions makes certain aspects of their

internal organization and governance specific to pirates, my analysis

highlights important problems that any form of organized criminal

enterprise faces, as well as the institutional solutions such

organizations employ to overcome these problems.

The literature that addresses the economics of organized crime focuses

on the criminal organization as a supplier of some service, usually

protection, to other actors inside and outside the criminal world.

Schelling (1971), for instance, who was among the first to conduct this

re-search, identifies the provision of enforcement services to other

agents and, in line with this function, a monopoly on coercion as the

distinguishing features of organized crime.

While this definition is perhaps appropriate for the Mafia, it neglects

equally important organized criminal activities that do not provide

useful services to others and do not involve a monopoly on coercion. An

army of thieves, for instance, that coordinates its activities, requires

internal mechanisms of governance, and combines in a long-term

arrangement for concerted plunder is as much a criminal organization as

the Mafia.Pirates were clearly organized criminals and yet were not

primarily in the business of providing services to anyone other than

their members.[4] Nor did they have a monopoly on force. Because of

this, unlike most discussions of criminal organization, mine takes a

broader view of organized crime. This view encompasses any long-term

arrangement between multiple criminals that requires coordination and

involves agreements that, owing to their illicit status, cannot be

enforced by the state.[5] The emphasis of my analysis therefore shifts

from the organization of criminal markets (the focus of existing

research on the economics of organized crime) to the internal predation

problem that criminal organizations face and the institutions that

emerge in response to it.

To examine these features for pirates, I draw on a series of historical

documents that provide a firsthand glimpse into their organization. The

first of these is Captain Charles Johnson’s General History of the

Pyrates(1726–28), which contains reports on a number of history’s most

in-famous pirates related by a pirate contemporary.[6] I also draw on

Alexander Exquemelin’s (1678) invaluable account of the

seventeenth-century buccaneers. Exquemelin was a surgeon who sailed with

the buccaneers and provides a detailed, firsthand account of their

raids,system of rules, and social organization. The buccaneer William

Dam-pier (1697–1707) also published a journal relating to his maritime

exploits, which I make use of as well.

Buccaneers differ from “pure” pirates in that they frequently plundered

ships with government sanction. However, many other times they plundered

without official permission, as full-blown pirates. These proto-pirates,

many of whom turned to pure piracy when governments stopped issuing

licenses for plunder, influenced and anticipated the organization of

pure pirates in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

Buccaneer records are therefore important for understanding the

institutions and organization of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century

pirates.

In addition to these sources, correspondence from colonial governors

relating to piracy and records from the trials of various pirates, such

as testimony from individuals taken prisoner by pirate ships and the

testimony of pirates themselves, form an important part of the

historical record this article relies on.[7] Finally, a few pirate

captives, such as William Snelgrave (1734), whose captors ultimately

released them, published longer works describing their harrowing

captivity by pirate crews.[8] I also draw on these accounts, which

provide important firsthand records describing piratical governance and

organization.[8]

II. A “Nest of Rogues

Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pirates occupied the waterways that

formed major trading routes.[9] These included the waters surrounding

the Bahamas that stood between ships traveling from Central America to

Spain; the waters connecting Europe and the North American seacoast;

those between Cuba and Haiti, which separated ships traveling from

Europe and the west coast of Africa to Jamaica; and the waters around

Madagascar traveled by ships sailing to and from India (Cord-ingly 2006,

88). These areas encompass major portions of the Atlantic and Indian

Oceans, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico. The trade routes connecting

the Caribbean, North America’s Atlantic seacoast,and Madagascar

consequently formed a loop called the “pirate round”that many pirates

traveled in search of prey.The “golden age” of piracy, when pirates were

at their strongest, ex-tended from 1690 to 1730 (Konstam 2002, 94).[10]

The years from 1716 to 1722 mark the height of the golden age. “This was

at a Time that the Pyrates had obtained such an Acquisition of Strength,

that they were in no Concern about preserving themselves from the

Justice of Laws”( Johnson 1726–28, 87). The pirates of this era include

many well-known sea robbers, such as Blackbeard, whose real name was

Edward Teach, Bartholomew Roberts, and others.

Pirates were a diverse lot.[11] A sample of 700 pirates active in the

Caribbean between 1715 and 1725, for example, reveals that 35 percent

were English, 25 percent were American, 20 percent were West Indian, 10

percent were Scottish, 8 percent were Welsh, and 2 percent were Swedish,

Dutch, French, and Spanish (Konstam 2002, 9). Others came from Portugal,

Scandinavia, Greece, and East India (Marx 1996b, 103). Pirate crews were

also racially diverse. Based on data available from 23 pirate crews

active between 1682 and 1726, the racial composition of ships varied

between 13 and 98 percent black. If this sample is representative, 25–30

percent of the average pirate crew was of African descent (Kinkor 2001,

200–201). The pirate population is difficult to precisely measure but by

all accounts was considerable.[12] According to the reports of

contemporaries and estimates of pirate historians, in any one year

between 1716 and 1722 the loop that formed the pirate round contained

between 1,000 and 2,000 sea bandits (see, e.g., Johnson 1726–28,132;

Pringle 1953, 185; Rediker 1987, 256; Marx 1996b, 102, 111; Konstam

2002, 6).[13] The buccaneering community of the seventeenth century must

have been even larger than this since, as I discuss below,some firsthand

observers report single expeditions of 2,000 men (Exquemelin [1678]

2000, 171).

Contrary to most people’s images of pirate crews, they were quite large.

On the basis of figures from 37 pirate ships between 1716 and1726, it

appears that the average crew had about 80 members (Rediker 1987, 256;

see also Deposition of Simon Calderon 1682, Public Record Office,

Colonial Office Papers 1:50, no. 139). A number of pirate crews were

closer to 120, and crews of 150–200 were not uncommon (see, e.g.,

Snelgrave [1734] 1971, 199; Examination of John Brown, May 6, 1717,

Suffolk Court Files, no. 11945, paper 5; Deposition of Theophilus

Turner, June 8, 1699, Public Record Office, Colonial Office Papers

5:714, no. 70 VI; Examination of John Dann, August 3, 1696, London,

Public Record Office, Colonial Office Papers 323:2, no. 25; Deposition

of Adam Baldridge, May 5, 1699, Public Record Office, Colonial Office

Papers 5:1042, no. 30 II; Johnson 1726–28, 442; Cordingly 2006, 165).

Several pirate crews were bigger than this. For example, Blackbeard’s

crew aboard the Queen Anne’s Revenge was 300 men strong (Public Record

Office, Colonial Office Papers 152/12, no. 67, iii; quoted in

Cordingly2006, 165–66; see also Marx 1996b, 112). Even a sixth-rate

Royal Navyship in the early eighteenth century carried more crew members

than the average pirate vessel (about 150). But compared to the average

200-ton merchant ship, which carried only 13–17 men, pirate ships were

extremely large (Rediker 1987, 107). Furthermore, some pirate crews were

too large to fit in one ship. In this case they formed pirate squadrons.

Captain Bartholomew Roberts, for example, commanded a squadron of four

ships that carried 508 men (Cordingly 2006, 111).

In addition to this, multiple pirate ships sometimes joined for

concerted plundering expeditions. The most impressive fleets of sea

bandits belong to the buccaneers. Alexander Exquemelin, for example,

records that Captain Morgan commanded a fleet of 37 ships and 2,000 men

sufficient to attack coastal communities on the Spanish Main (1678,171).

Elsewhere, he refers to a group of buccaneers who “had a force of at

least twenty vessels in quest of plunder” (69; see also 85, 105, 93).

Similarly, William Dampier ([1697–1707] 2005, 62) records a pirating

expedition that boasted 10 ships and 960 men.[14] Though their fleets

were not as massive, eighteenth-century pirates also “cheerfully joined

their Brethren in Iniquity” to engage in multi crew pirating expeditions

(Snelgrave 1734, 198).

III. Merchant Ship Organization

A. Efficient Autocracy

Although some pirates came from the Royal Navy, most sailors who entered

piracy came from the merchant marine. Merchant ships were organized

hierarchically.[15] On top was the captain, below him were his officers,

and far below these were ordinary seamen. This hierarchy em-powered

captains with autocratic authority over their crews. The captain’s

authority gave him control over all aspects of life aboard his

ship,including provision of victuals, wage payment, labor assignment,

and,of course, crew member discipline.

Merchant ship autocracy reflected an efficient institutional response to

the specific economic situation these ships confronted and, in

particular, the ownership structure of merchant vessels. Merchant ships

were owned by groups of typically a dozen or more landed merchants who

purchased shares in various trading vessels and financed their

voyages.[16] In addition to supplying the capital required for ships’

construction and continued maintenance, owners outfitted their vessels,

supplied them with provisions, advanced sailor wages, and, most

important, solicited customers (who were other landed merchants) and

negotiated terms of delivery and freight.Merchant ship owners were

absentee owners of their vessels; they did not sail on their ships.[17]

They were landlubbers. Most merchant shipowners did not desire to take

their chances with brutal life at sea, and in any event could earn more

by specializing in their area of expertise—investment and commercial

organization—hiring seamen to sail their ships instead.[18] Because they

were absentee owners, merchant ship owners confronted a principal-agent

problem with respect to the crews they hired. Once a ship left port it

could be gone for months.[19] At sea, the owners’ ship was beyond their

watchful eyes or reach. Thus, ship owners could not directly monitor

their sailors. This situation invited various kinds of sailor

opportunism. Opportunism included negligence in caring for the ship,

carelessness that dam-aged cargo, liberality with provisions,

embezzlement of freight or advances required to finance the vessel’s

voyage, and outright theft of the vessel itself.

To prevent this, ship owners appointed captains to their vessels to

monitor crews in their stead. Centralizing power in a captain’s hands to

direct sailors��� tasks, control the distribution of victuals and

payment,and discipline and punish crew members allowed merchant ship

owners to minimize sailor opportunism. As noted above, merchant ships

tended to be quite small. Consequently, captains could cheaply monitor

sailors’ behavior to prevent activities (or inactivities) that were

costly to shipowners and secure sailors’ full effort.[20] Admiralty law

facilitated captains’ ability to do this by granting them authority to

control their crews’ behavior through corporal punishment.The law

empowered captains to beat crew members with the infamous(and ominous)

cat-o-nine-tails, imprison them, and administer other forms of harsh

physical “correction” to sailors who disobeyed orders,shirked in their

duties, and so forth. It also permitted captains to dock sailors’ wages

for damaging or stealing cargo and insubordination.To align

owner-captain interests, owners used two devices. First, they hired

captains who held small shares in the vessels they were commanding or,

barring this, gave small shares to their captains who did not. Merchant

ship captains continued to draw regular fixed wages like the other

sailors on their vessels.[21] But unlike regular sailors, captains

became partial residual claimants of the ships they controlled, aligning

their interests with those of the absentee owners.[22] Second, whenever

possible, absentee owners appointed captains with familial connections

to one of the members of their group (Davis 1962, 128). This ensured

that captains did not behave opportunistically at the absentee owners’

expense since, if they did, they were more likely to face

punishment.[23]

The reason merchant ship owners required autocratic captains to

effectively serve their interests is straight forward. A captain who did

not have total authority over his crew could not successfully monitor

and control sailors’ behavior. Reducing the captain’s power over

victuals,payments, labor assignment, or discipline, and vesting it in

some other sailor’s hands instead, would have concomitantly reduced the

captain’s power to make sailors behave in the absentee owners’ interest.

Similarly, if merchant ship owners did not appoint their captains as the

permanent commanders of their voyages, but instead permitted a ship’s

sailors to popularly depose the captain and elect another member of the

crew to this office at their will, the captain’s capacity as acting

manager of the ship’s absentee owners would cease to exist. To see

this,simply imagine what kind of captain merchant sailors would elect if

given the power to democratically select him. Sailors’ interests were

best served by a lax, liberal captain who let them do as they

pleased—exactly the opposite sort of captain that best served the

owners’ interests.

Merchant ship autocracy was therefore essential to overcoming the

owner-crew principal-agent problem and thus to merchant ship

profitability.Merchant ship autocracy worked quite well in this respect.

Although some sailors still managed to steal from the ships they sailed

on, disobey command, and, as I discuss below, in several cases mutiny

and abscond with the owners’ ship, these were relatively unimportant

exceptions to the general rule whereby merchant sailors, under the

authority of autocratic captains, served their absentee owners’

interests.

B. The Problem of Captain Predation

Although merchant ship autocracy largely overcame the principal-agent

problem that absentee owners confronted with respect to their crews,in

doing so it created potential for a different kind of problem: captain

predation. The trouble was that a captain endowed with the authority

required to manage his crew on the ship owners’ behalf could also easily

turn this authority against his seamen for personal benefit. As British

marine commander William Betagh characterized the problem, “unlimited

power, bad views, ill nature and ill principles all concurring” “in a

ship’s commander,” “he is past all restraint” (1728, 41).

Betagh’s opinion of some captains’ “ill nature” notwithstanding,

merchant captains were not necessarily bad men. But they were rational

economic actors and thus responded to the incentives their institutional

environment created. Endowed with autocratic authority over their crews,

some merchant captains used the power their employers and Admiralty law

gave them to prey on their sailors. As a result of merchant ships’

autocratic organization, captains “had absolute authority over the

mates, the carpenters and boatswain, and the seamen.” They had the power

to “make life tolerable or unbearable as they wished” (Davis

1962,131–32). Unfortunately for seamen, more than a few captains opted

for the latter.

As Marcus Rediker points out, according to several pirates, merchant

captain mistreatment of ordinary seamen was largely responsible for

driving sailors from this profession into the arms of sea bandits. The

pirate John Archer’s last words before being put to death testify to

this.As he lamented, “I could wish that Masters of Vessels would not use

their Men with so much Severity, as many of them do, which exposes us to

great Temptations” ( Johnson 1726–28, 351). In 1726 the pirate William

Fly pleaded similarly while awaiting his death sentence: “Our Captain

and his Mate used us Barbarously. We poor Men can’t have Justice done

us. There is nothing said to our Commanders, let them never so much

abuse us, and use us like Dogs” (quoted in Rediker 1981,218).

Captain predation took a number of forms, each the result of abusing the

autocratic power captains had at their disposal. Predatory captains cut

sailors’ victual rations to keep costs down or to leave more for them

and their fellow officers to consume. As one sailor testified, for

example, although the members of his crew “were at short allowance and

wanted bread,” the officers “were allowed . . . their full allowance of

provisions and liquors as if there had been no want of scarcity of any

thing onboard” (Babb v. Chalkley1701, High Court of Admiralty Papers,

24/127;quoted in Rediker 1987, 247). Predatory captains also

fraudulently docked sailors’ wages or paid sailors in debased colonial

currency (Morris 1965, 237; Rediker 1987). They might also voyage to a

location where the crew had not contracted to sail (Gifford 1993, 144).

To keep their hungry and uncomfortable men in check, abusive captains

could and did use all manner of objects aboard their ships as weapons to

punish insolent crew members. They hit sailors in the head with tackle

or other hard objects on board, crushing their faces, and used other

barbaric tactics to discipline seamen (Jones v. Newcomin1735,High Court

of Admiralty Papers, 24/138; quoted in Rediker 1987, 216).

As merchant ship captain Nathaniel Uring described how he dealt with a

“seditious Fellow” on his ship, for instance, “I gave him two or three

such Strokes with a Stick I had prepared for that purpose . . . the

Bloodrunning about his Ears, he pray’d for God’s sake that I not kill

him”([1726] 1928, 176–77).

Besides preventing dissension, captains also used their kingly power to

settle personal scores with crew members. Admiralty law considered

interfering with captain punishment mutinous and thus prohibited crew

members from doing so (Morris 1965, 264–65). Since captains effectively

defined when punishment was legitimate, they were free to abuse sea-men

at will. As one seaman warned a newcomer, “There is no justice or

injustice on board ship, my lad. There are only two things: duty and

mutiny—mind that. All that you are ordered to do is duty. All that you

refuse to do is mutiny” (quoted in Rediker 1987, 211).[24]

While the historical record contains plenty of charges of captain

predation, it is important to avoid overstating the extent of this

abuse.[25] Although merchant captains had ample latitude to prey on

their crews,this was not without limit. Several factors, economic and

legal, con-strained captain predation to some extent.[26]

But none was able to prevent it entirely. English law, for

example,created several legal protections that were supposed to insulate

sailors from captain predation. To a certain extent these protections

were successful. Merchant seamen could and did take predatory captains

to court for their actions, many times successfully.

However, as is often the case with the law, many other times it

failed.Part of the difficulty here stemmed from the well-known

uncertainties of the sea and the fact that, once they were afloat in the

briny deep,there were rarely impartial spectators to be had to verify a

sailor’s word against a captain’s. Did a captain dock a sailor’s pay

because the sailor damaged freight, as he was entitled to under the law?

Or was the captain simply self-dealing? Had a captain exceeded the

powers of corporal punishment afforded him under the law? Or was his

discipline justified?In many cases it was difficult to say.

Further, the law itself regarding these matters could be unclear. Some

sailors successfully sued their captains for merely pinching

provisions.In other cases far more abusive captain conduct was supported

by the law. In one case, for example, a captain beat his sailor with a

one-and-a-half inch rope for cursing. The court found he “had Lawful

provocation to Correct the Complainant and had not Exceeded the bounds

of Humanity” and dismissed the sailor’s claim (Broughton v. Atkins,

Massachusetts Vice-Admiralty Records, box II, fol. 25, 1727; quoted in

Morris1965, 264).

Reputation could also be effective in constraining captain

predation.Although the sailor population in the mid-eighteenth century

approached 80,000 (Gifford 1993, 147), there were fewer than 10,000

captains. The relatively small population of captains facilitated

information sharing about captain behavior. Since merchant ships had to

voluntarily attract sailors, this helped to dampen the predatory

inclinations of some merchant captains.

Nevertheless, some captain-sailor relations were anonymous and

non-repeated. For example, when in 1722 merchant ship captains Isham

Randolph, Constantine Cane, and William Halladay petitioned the colonial

governor of Virginia for greater authority to discipline their

sailors(who they complained were insolent for want of “fear of

correction”),they wrote that “it is frequently the misfortune of Masters

of Ships at their fitting out in England, to be obliged to ship men for

foreign Voyages of whose disposition and character they have no

knowledge”(quoted in Morris 1965, 271). Their letter suggests that the

market for merchant sailors was, at least in some cases, largely

anonymous. This implies not only that captains did not know the identity

of sailors they employed, but also that sailors in some cases did not

know the captains who employed them.

A number of sailors were the “fair weather” sort, drifting between

employment at land and at sea, as job and pay prospects permitted.

Others went to sea in between their regular work and thus had only

sporadic interaction with a few members of the maritime community

separated by lengthy periods. These features of the merchant sailor

labor market made information sharing more difficult and rendered

reputation a less effective constraint on captain abuse.

In assessing reputation’s ability to check merchant captains’ predatory

inclinations, it is also important to remember that seventeenth- and

eighteenth-century merchant shipping took place in the context of

European mercantilism. Although some of England’s mercantilist policies,

such as bounties for shipbuilding, contributed to competition between

merchant ships, others, such as the colonial law that forbade merchant

ship captains from hiring away sailors who had already agreed to sail

for another captain and the law that restricted foreign merchant

captains from competing with English ones, retarded merchant ship

competition and thus reputation’s ability to check captain predation.

Another potential check on captain predation was the threat of mutiny.

However, like other forms of revolution, mutiny was a risky and costly

method of checking an authority’s abuse. Crew members faced a collective

action problem that often prevented them from overthrowing predatory

captains.

Even on a merchant ship where every crew member agreed that the captain

should be removed, sailors confronted the standard collective action

problems of small-scale revolution. If crew members could co-ordinate

their hatred and jointly revolt against a captain, in many cases they

might have succeeded. However, since merchant ship crews were quite

small, it was important to have all the sailors, or at least a

significant majority, willing to fight. A successful mutiny might

require not only the commitment of the common seamen but the commitment

of the captain’s officers as well. Acquiring certainty on the part of

each sailor that if he rebelled against his captain, his fellow sailors

would as well,was problematic. If one or several crew members “chickened

out” at the last minute, the revolting sailor(s) might be defeated and,

worse yet, face captain retribution.

Captain retribution involved using any of the powers at the captain’s

disposal to punish the mutineers. This ranged from imprisonment to

extreme corporal punishment, further cutting the mutineers’ rations or

pay, or assigning them the most dangerous tasks on the ship (see,e.g.,

Uring 1726). Unless each sailor was assured that his fellow seamen had

the courage and wherewithal to follow through on revolt, he was

unwilling to rebel against his predatory captain.

This is not to say that merchant sailors never mutinied. Indeed, they

did, but quite rarely. In the half century between 1700 and 1750, there

were fewer than 60 documented mutinies on English and American merchant

ships, about 1.18 per year (Rediker 1987, 227–28). It is possible that

many more mutinies went undocumented. But even if we quadruple this

number, which seems quite unreasonable, the number of merchant ship

mutinies is tiny compared to the number of merchant ship voyages over

this period. Further, this includes all attempted mutinies, not only the

successful ones, which were even more rare. According to Rediker, only

half of those documented between 1700 and1750 were successful (228).[27]

Thus, it appears that the collective action problem mutiny posed for

merchant sailors was quite severe. Maritime revolution, then, was not a

reliable method of reining in predatory merchant ship captains.

Why didn’t those on the receiving end of captain predation—the common

seamen—simply pool their resources, purchase their own merchant ship,

and sail it themselves? Several factors appear to have prevented this

possibility. Although a merchant ship officer might, after several

years, save enough to purchase a small share in a merchant vessel,“Only

if a seaman could raise the money to buy, not a tiny fraction but a

substantial share—a half or more—would such a financial gesture by

itself be sufficient to attract co-owners” (Davis 1962, 127).

Merchant shipping was not as simple as carrying goods from point A to

point B. It crucially depended on connections with landed merchants,both

at home and abroad, who were willing to take the risk of doing business

with a particular group of ship owners, trade with these owners on

credit, and so on. Landed merchants had established reputations along

these lines, making it possible for them to secure investors and

customers.

Salty sea folk, in contrast, did not. The common seventeenth- or

eighteenth-century seaman occupied one of the lowest stations in the

economic food chain. He was “from the lowest ranks of society . . . from

young men who were dissatisfied with, or could obtain no employment in,

the lowest of shore occupations” (Davis 1962, 114). He had neither

business experience nor connections. Needless to say, merchants were not

lining up to put their valuable cargo under the care of sailor-owned and

operated ships.

Even if several seamen had sufficient faith in one another’s abilities

to make a go of the seafaring portion of merchant shipping and,

furthermore, were willing to risk dumping several years’ savings into

buying a ship owned together with other sailors, they would have had no

reason to think that any of their co-owners commanded the business

knowledge or connections required to make such a venture profitable. Nor

would they have been able to attract the capital required to withstand

even one unsuccessful voyage that resulted from shipwreck, pirate

attack, or any of the other uncertainties of merchant shipping.[28] Just

as specialization required merchants to devote their time to organizing

the commercial aspects of merchant voyages, leaving the sailing to the

sailors,so too did specialization require seamen to focus on the sailing

aspects of merchant voyages, leaving the commercial organization to the

merchants.

IV. Pirate Ship Organization

Like merchant ship organization, the particular economic situation

pi-rate ships confronted crucially shaped their organization. Most

notably,pirates did not confront the owner-crew principal-agent problem

that merchant ships did. The reason for this is simple enough: pirates

did not acquire their ships legitimately. They stole them.[29]

Pirate ships therefore had no absentee owners. On a pirate ship, the

principals were the agents. As one historian described it, in this sense

a pirate ship was like a “sea-going stock company” (Pringle 1953, 106).

As a result, pirates did not require captains to align the crew’s

interests with those of the ship’s absentee owners. This feature of

piracy largely explains the stark contrast between merchant and pirate

ship organization.

However, the absence of the owner-crew principal-agent problem on pirate

ships does not mean that pirates did not need captains. They certainly

did. Many important piratical decisions, such as how to engage a

potential target, how to pursue when “chasing” a target or being chased

by authorities, and how to react if attacked, required snap decision

making. There was no time for disagreement or debate in such cases,and

conflicting voices would have made it impossible to undertake the most

essential tasks. Furthermore, pirate ships, like all ships, needed some

method of maintaining order, distributing victuals and payments,and

administering discipline to unruly crew members.

The office of captain overcame such difficulties by vesting autocratic

control over these matters in the hands of an authority. In this

sense,although pirate ships differed from merchant ships in requiring

captains to solve an owner-sailor principal-agent problem, pirate ships

were similar to merchant ships in requiring some kind of authority for

their undertaking’s success. Although a pirate ship’s activity—violent

plunder—was wholly different from a merchant ship’s, both kinds of

vessels shared the need to create internal order to achieve their ends.

The need for captains posed a dilemma for pirates. On the one hand,a

captain who wielded unquestioned authority in certain decisions was

critical for success. On the other hand, what was to prevent a captain

with this power from behaving toward his pirate crew in the same manner

that predatory merchant ship captains behaved toward their crews? Since

pirates did not have absentee owners but instead jointly owned the

stolen ships they sailed on, although they required captains, unlike

merchant ships, they did not require autocratic captains. Thus, in sharp

contrast to the situation on merchant ships, pirates could and did

democratically elect their captains without problem. Since the pirates

sailing a particular ship were both the principals and the agents,

democracy did not threaten to lead to captains who served the agents at

the principals’ expense. On the contrary, pirate democracy ensured that

pirates got precisely the kind of captain they desired. Because pirates

could popularly depose any captain who did not suit them and elect

another in his place, pirate captains’ ability to prey on crew members

was greatly constrained compared to that of merchant ship captains.

Similarly, because pirates were both principals and agents of their

ships, they could divide authority on their vessels to further check

captains’ ability to abuse crew members without loss. Unlike merchant

ships,which could not afford a separation of power since this would have

diminished the ability of the absentee owners’ acting agent (the

captain)to make the crew act in the owners’ interests, pirate ships

could and did adopt a system of democratic checks and balances.

A. Piratical Checks and Balances

Because of the threat of captain predation, pirates “were adamant in

wanting to limit the captain’s power to abuse and cheat them”

(Rogo-zinski 2000, 174). To do this they instituted a democratic system

of divided power, or piratical checks and balances, aboard their ships.

As the pirate Walter Kennedy testified at his trial, “Most of them

having suffered formerly from the ill-treatment of Officers, provided

thus care-fully against any such Evil now they had the choice in

themselves . . .for the due Execution thereof they constituted other

Officers besides the Captain; so very industrious were they to avoid

putting too much Power into the hands of one Man” (Hayward [1735] 1874,

1:42).

The primary “other officer” pirates “constituted” for this purpose was

the quartermaster. The way this office worked is straightforward.

Captains retained absolute authority in times of battle, enabling

pirates to realize the benefits of autocratic control required for

success in conflict.However, pirate crews transferred power to allocate

provisions, select and distribute loot (there was rarely room aboard

pirate ships to take all they seized from a prize), and adjudicate crew

member conflicts/administer discipline to the quartermaster, whom they

democratically elected:

For the Punishment of small Offences . . . there is a principal Officer

among the Pyrates, called the Quarter-Master, of the Men’s own choosing,

who claims all Authority this Way, (excepting in Time of Battle:) If

they disobey his Command, are quarrelsome and mutinous with one another,

misuse Prisoners,plunder beyond his Order, and in particular, if they be

negligent of their Arms, which he musters at Discretion, he punishes at

his own dare without incurring the Lash from all the Ship’s Company: In

short, this Officer is Trustee for the whole,is the first on board any

Prize, separating for the Company’s Use, what he pleases, and returning

what he thinks fit to the Owners, excepting Gold and Silver, which they

have voted not returnable. ( Johnson 1726–28, 213).

William Snelgrave, who observed the pirates’ system of checks and

balances firsthand, characterized the relationship between captain and

quartermaster similarly: “the Captain of a Pirate Ship, is chiefly

chosen to fight the Vessels they may meet with. Besides him, they chose

another principle Officer, whom they call Quarter-master, who has the

general Inspection of all Affairs, and often controls the Captain’s

Orders”(1734, 199–200). This separation of power removed captains’

control over activities they traditionally used to prey on crew members,

while empowering them sufficiently to direct plundering expeditions.

The institutional separation of powers aboard pirate ships predated its

adoption by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century governments. France, for

example, did not experience such a separation until 1789. Nor did the

United States. The first specter of separated powers in Spain did not

appear until 1812. In contrast, pirates had divided,

democratic“government” aboard their ships at least a century before

this. Arguably, piratical checks and balances predated even England’s

adoption of similar institutions. England did not experience a

separation of powers until the Glorious Revolution of 1688. However, the

buccaneers, who used a similar, if not as thoroughgoing, system of

democratically divided power as their pure pirate successors, had in

place at least partial democratic checks and balances in the early 1680s

(Rogozinski 2000).

Piratical checks and balances proved quite successful. According to

Johnson, owing to the institution of the quartermaster, aboard pirate

ships “the Captain can undertake nothing which the Quarter-Master does

not approve. We may say, the Quarter-Master is an humble Imitation of

the Roman Tribune of the People; he speaks for, and looks after the

Interest of the Crew” (1726–28, 423). As noted previously, the only

exception to this was “in Chase, or in Battle” when crews desired

autocratic authority and thus, “by their own Laws,” “the Captain’s Power

is uncontrollable” (139, 214).[30]

In addition to this separation of powers, pirates imposed a further

check to balance captains’ authority. They converted the office to a

democratically elected one, “the Rank of Captain being obtained by the

Suffrage of the Majority” (Johnson 1726–28, 214). The combination of

separated powers and democratic elections for captains ensured that

pirates “only permit him to be Captain, on Condition, that they may be

Captain over him” (213).

Crews could vote captains out of office for any number of reasons.

Predation was one, but so was cowardice, poor judgment, and any other

behavior a crew did not feel was in its best interest. In this way

pirates could be sure that captainship “falls on one superior for

Knowledge and Boldness, Pistol Proof, (as they call it)” ( Johnson

1726–28, 214). The historical record contains numerous examples of

pirate crews deposing unwanted captains by majority vote or otherwise

removing them from power through popular consensus. Captain Charles

Vane’s pirate crew, for example, popularly deposed him for cowardice:

“the Captain’s Behavior was obliged to stand the Test of a Vote, and a

Resolution passed against his Honour and Dignity . . . deposing him from

the Command” ( Johnson 1726–28, 139). Similarly, Captain Christopher

Moody’s pirate crew grew dissatisfied with his behavior and “at last

forced him, with twelve others” who supported him “into an open Boat . .

. and . . . they were never heard of afterwards” (Snelgrave1734,

198).[31]

Crews sometimes elected quartermasters who displayed particular valor or

keen decision making to replace less capable or honorable captains. For

example, when one pirate crew “went to Voting for a new Captain . . .

the Quarter-Master, who had behaved so well in the last Affair . . . was

chosen” ( Johnson 1726–28, 479). This helped create competition among

pirate officers that tended to check their abuses and encouraged them to

serve the interests of their crews.[32]

Pirates took seriously the limitations they imposed on captains’

authority through their system of checks and balances. A speech made by

one of the pirates aboard Captain Bartholomew Roberts’ ship testifies to

this. As he told his crew, “should a Captain be so sawcy as to exceed

Prescription at any time, why down with him! it will be a Caution after

he is dead to his Successors, of what fatal Consequence any sort of

assuming may be” ( Johnson 1726–28, 194–95). This pirate was

exaggerating—but only slightly. Crews quickly and readily deposed old

captains and elected new ones when the former overstepped the limited

power crews gave them.

The seriousness with which pirates sought to limit their captains’ power

is reflected in other ways as well. For instance, in contrast to

merchant vessels, on pirate ships, captains were unable to secure

special privileges for themselves at their crews’ expense. Their

lodging, provisions, and even pay were nearly the same as that of

ordinary crew members. As Johnson described it, aboard pirate ships

“every Man, as the Humour takes him . . . [may] intrude [the captain’s]

Apartment, swear at him, seize a part of his Victuals and Drink, if they

like it, without his offering to find Fault or contest it” (1726–28,

213–14). In other cases,“the Captain himself not being allowed a Bed”

had to sleep with the rest of the crew in far less comfortable

conditions (Snelgrave 1734, 217). Or, as one pirate fellow-traveler

marveled, “even their Captain, or any other Officer, is allowed no more

than another Man; nay, the Captain cannot [even] keep his own Cabin to

himself ” (Downing [1737] 1924,99; quoted in Rogozinski 2000, 175).

One pirate captive records an event in which the captains of a pirate

fleet borrowed fancy clothes that were part of the loot their crews

acquired in taking a recent prize. These captains hoped that their

stolen finery would attract local women on the nearby shore. Although

the captains intended only to borrow the clothes, the crews became

out-raged at their captains whom they saw as transgressing the limits of

their narrowly circumscribed power. As the observer described it, “The

Pirate Captains having taken these Cloaths without leave from the

Quarter-master, it gave great Offence to all the Crew; who alledg’d, ‘If

they suffered such things, the Captains would for the future assume a

Power,to take whatever they liked for themselves’” (Snelgrave 1734,

257).[33]

One can also get an idea of the effectiveness of piratical checks and

balances by considering the remarks of one contemporary that point to

the rarity of pirate captain predation. Perplexed by an anomalous pirate

captain who abused his crew, he puzzled, “The captain is very severe to

his people, by reason of his commission, and caries a very different

form from what other Pirates use to do . . . often calling for his

pistols and threatening any that durst speak to the contrary of what he

desireth, to knock out their brains” (quoted in Rogozinski 2000, 139;

see also Deposition of Benjamin Franks, October 20, 1697, Public Record

Office, Colonial Office Papers, 323:2, no. 124).[34]

This success helps explain why, counter intuitively, “the People

[pirates overtook] were generally glad of an opportunity of entering

with them”(Snelgrave 1734, 203). Indeed, pirates frequently

“strengthen’d them-selves with a great many fresh Hands, who most of

them enter’d voluntarily” ( Johnson 1726–28, 170; see also 228;

Deposition of Jeremiah Tay, July 6, 1694, Suffolk Court Files, no. 3033,

paper 6; Colonial Office Papers, May 31, 1718, fol. 18).[35]

B. Pirate Constitutions

Pirates’ system of checks and balances effectively prevented captains

from preying on their crews. However, a significant problem remained.In

vesting many of the powers captains typically held in quartermasters

instead, what was to prevent quartermasters from abusing their authority

to privately benefit at crews’ expense?

As discussed above, quartermasters had numerous roles aboard pirate

ships. They were in charge of the distribution of booty and provisions,

conflict resolution, and crew member punishment. This gave them ample

latitude to prey on crews. I have already discussed one check on

quartermaster predation, which also checked captain predation—democratic

elections. As with their captains, pirate crews elected quarter-masters

and could depose them if they overstepped their authority.

But what precisely did this include? Were, for instance, quartermasters

free to divide booty and provisions as they saw fit? Could they punish

crew members at their discretion? Furthermore, according to what “laws”

were they supposed to adjudicate disputes between those onboard?

After all, not only were pirates afraid of captain predation; they

opposed any situation that threatened to jeopardize their ability to

cooperate for organized banditry, including the institution of the

quartermaster. To solve this problem, pirate crews forged written

constitutions that specified their laws and punishments for breaking

these laws and more specifically limited the actions that

quarter-masters might take in carrying out their duties.

Pirate constitutions originated with “articles of agreement” followed on

buccaneer ships in the seventeenth century. The buccaneers called their

articles a chasse-partie. These articles specified the division of booty

among the officers and crew along with other terms of the buccaneers’

organization. All sea bandits followed the basic rule of “no prey, no

pay.”Unless a pirating expedition was successful, no man received any

payment.

Exquemelin (1678, 71–72) describes the chasse-partie that governed his

crew’s expedition in detail:

The buccaneers resolve by common vote where they shall cruise. They also

draw up an agreement or chasse partie, in which is specified what the

captain shall have for himself and for the use of his vessel. Usually

they agree on the following terms. Providing they capture a prize, first

of all these amounts would be deducted from the whole capital. The

hunter’s pay would generally be 200 pieces of eight. The carpenter, for

his work in repairing and fitting out the ship, would be paid 100or 150

pieces of eight. The surgeon would receive 200 or 250for his medical

supplies, according to the size of the ship.

Then came the agreed awards for the wounded, who might have lost a limb

or suffered injuries. They would be compensated as follows: for the loss

of a right arm, 600 pieces of eight or six slaves; for a left arm 500

pieces of eight or five slaves.The loss of a right leg also brought 500

pieces of eight or five slaves in compensation; a left leg 400 or four

slaves; an eye,100 or one slave, and the same award was made for the

loss of a finger. If a man lost the use of an arm, he would get as much

as if it had been cut off, and a severe internal injury which meant the

victim had to have a pipe inserted in his body would receive 500 pieces

of eight or five slaves in recompense.

These amounts having first been withdrawn from the capital,the rest of

the prize would be divided into as many portions as men on the ship. The

captain draws four or five men’s portions for the use of the ship,

perhaps even more, and two portions for himself. The rest of the men

share uniformly, and the boys get half a man’s share.

. . . When a ship is robbed, nobody must plunder and keep his loot to

himself. Everything taken—money, jewels, precious stones and goods—must

be shared among them all, without any man enjoying a penny more than his

fair share. To prevent deceit, before the booty is distributed everyone

has to swear an oath on the Bible that he has not kept for himself so

much as the value of a sixpence, whether in silk, linen, wool,

gold,silver, jewels, clothes or shot, from all the capture. And should

any man be found to have made a false oath, he would be banished from

the rovers, never more be allowed in their company.

Over time, the buccaneers institutionalized their articles of agreement

and social organization. The result was a system of customary law and

metarules called the “Custom of the Coast,” or the “Jamaica

Discipline.”Eighteenth-century pirates built on this institutional

framework in developing their own constitutions. Pirates created them

“for the better Conservation of their Society, and doing Justice to one

another” ( Johnson 1726–28, 210). The basic elements of pirate

constitutions displayed remarkable similarity across crews (Rediker

1987, 261). In describing the articles on Captain Roberts’ ship, for

instance, Johnson refers to“the Laws of this Company . . . principle

Customs, and Government,of this roguish Commonwealth; which are pretty

near the same with all Pyrates” (1726–28, 213).

Frequent intercrew interactions led to information sharing that

facilitated constitutional commonality.[36] More than 70 percent of

Anglo-American pirates active between 1716 and 1726, for example, can be

connected back to one of three pirate captains: Benjamin Hornigold,

George Lowther, or Edward Low (Rediker 1987, 267). Thus, a significant

proportion of all pirates during this period were associated with one

another in some way, via traveling on the same ship, in concert with

other ships, and so forth.

Articles of agreement required unanimous consent. Consequently,pirates

democratically formed them in advance of launching pirating expeditions.

“All [pirates] swore to ’em,” sometimes on a Bible or, for one pirate

crew, “upon a Hatchet for want of a Bible.” The crew forged its articles

alongside the election of a captain, quartermaster, and occasionally

other smaller officers. Pirates sought agreement on their articles ex

ante “to prevent Disputes and Ranglings afterwards” ( Johnson 1726–28,

342). In the event a pirate disagreed with their conditions, he was free

to search elsewhere for more satisfactory terms.[37]

When multiple pirate ships joined together for an expedition, they

created similar articles establishing the terms of their partnership.

Upon encountering one another at Grand Cayman, for example, Captain

George Lowther and Edward Low’s pirate crews forged such an agreement.

Lowther “offering himself as an Ally; Low accepted of the Terms, and so

the Treaty was presently sign’d without Plenipo’s or any other

Formalities” (1726–28, 319).

Likewise, crews that objected to the proposed articles or some other

element of an intended multi ship expedition were free to depart

peace-ably. In one such case, for example, “a Spirit of Discord” emerged

be-tween three pirate crews sailing in consort “upon which . . . [they]

immediately parted, each steering a different Course” ( Johnson 1726–28,

175).

Charles Johnson’s records contain several examples of pirate

constitutions, through which, as one court remarked, these rogues were

“wickedly united, and articled together” ( Johnson 1726–28, 253).

Consider,for instance, the articles aboard Captain Roberts’ pirate ship,

as relayed by Captain Johnson (211–12):

I. Every Man has a Vote in the Affairs of Moment; has equal Title to the

fresh Provisions, or strong Liquors, at any Time seized, and may use

them at Pleasure, unless a Scarcity make it necessary, for the Good of

all, to vote a Retrenchment.

II. Every Man to be called fairly in Turn, by List, on board of Prizes,

because, (over and above their proper Share) they were on these

Occasions allowed a Shift of Cloaths: But if they defrauded the Company

to the Value of a Dollar, in Plate, Jewels, or Money, Marooning was

their Punishment. If the Robbery was only betwixt one another, they

contented themselves with slitting the Ears and Nose of him that was

Guilty, and set him on Shore, not in an uninhabited Place, but

somewhere,where he was sure to encounter Hardships.

III. No person to Game at Cards or Dice for Money.

IV. The Lights and Candles to be put out at eight a-Clock at Night: If

any of the Crew, after that Hour, still remained inclined for Drinking,

they were to do it on the open Deck.

V. To keep their Piece, Pistols, and Cutlash clean, and fit for Service.

VI. No Boy or Woman to be allowed amongst them. If any Man were found

seducing any of the latter Sex, and carry’d her to Sea, disguised, he

was to suffer Death.

VII. To Desert the Ship, or their Quarters in Battle, was punished with

Death or Marooning.

VIII. No striking one another on board, but every Man’s Quarrels to be

ended on Shore, at Sword and Pistol.

IX. No Man to talk of breaking up their Way of Living, till each shared

a 1000 l. If in order to this, any Man should lose a Limb, or become a

Cripple in their Service, he was to have 800 Dollars, out of the public

Stock, and for lesser Hurts,proportionately.

X. The Captain and Quarter-Master to receive two Shares of a Prize; the

Master, Boatswain, and Gunner, one Share and a half, and other Officers

one and a Quarter [everyone else to receive one share].

XI. The Musicians to have Rest on the Sabbath Day, but the other six

Days and Nights, none without special Favour.

Several important features stand out from these examples of pirate

articles. First, they created a democratic form of governance and

explicitly laid out the terms of pirate compensation. This was to

clarify the status of property rights aboard pirate ships and to prevent

officers,such as the captain or quartermaster, from preying on crew

members.In particular, making the terms of compensation explicit helped

to circumscribe the quartermaster’s authority in dividing booty.

When booty was indivisible or there was question as to its value and

thus how many shares it counted for in payment, pirates sold or

auctioned the troublesome items and distributed the divisible proceeds

accordingly (Snelgrave 1734; Rogozinski 2000, 169). This practice

prevented conflict between crew members. More important, it constrained

the discretion of the quartermaster, who might otherwise be in a

position to circumvent the terms of compensation when loot was

indivisible or of ambiguous value.

Second, pirate articles prohibited activities that generated significant

negative externalities and threatened the success of criminal

organization aboard their ships. Thus, pirate articles required crew

members to keep their weapons in good working order; on Roberts’ ship

limited drunken raucousness to allow nonparticipant pirates to get

sufficient sleep, and to “give a Check to their Debauches” ( Johnson

1726–28,211); prohibited onboard fighting that might jeopardize the

entire crew’s ability to function; and prohibited activities, such as

gambling,that were likely to lead to onboard brawls. On similar grounds,

crews’ articles often prohibited women (and young boys), who it was

thought would invite conflict or tension among crew members aboard their

ships.“This being a good political Rule to prevent disturbances amongst

them,it is strictly observed” (Snelgrave 1734, 256–57; see also Johnson

1726–28, 212).

In the same way, some pirate ships forbade activities such as firing

one’s guns or smoking in areas of the ship that carried highly flammable

goods, such as gunpowder. According to the articles aboard John

Phillips’ Revenge, for example, “That Man that shall snap his Arms, or

smoak Tobacco in the Hold without a Cap to his Pipe, or carry a Candle

lighted without a Lanthorn, shall suffer the same Punishment as in the

former Article” ( Johnson 1726–28, 342–43).

Third, pirate constitutions contained articles that provided incentives

for crew member productivity and prevented shirking. One manifestation

of this was their creation of social insurance for pirates injured

during battle. As in the examples from Exquemelin and Roberts above,

articles specified in detail what a lost arm was worth, a lost leg, and

soon. They even went as far as to assign different insurance values

de-pending on whether it was, for instance, the right or left appendage

that was mutilated or lost, according to the importance pirates assigned

to these body parts.

Another manifestation of these incentive provisions was the use of

bonuses for crew members who displayed particular courage in battle,were

the first to spot potential targets, and so forth. Because pirate crews

were large, quartermasters could not easily monitor individual pirates’

effort. As I discuss below, this is why pirates used profit sharing

rather than fixed wages for payment.

The problem with a share system is that it can create incentives for

free riding. Further, one team member’s laziness directly reduces the

income of the others. To deal with this, pirates, like privateers and

whalers, who also used a share system, created bonuses. According to the

rule aboard Exquemelin’s buccaneering vessel, for instance, “Those who

behaved courageously and performed any deed of extraordinary valour, or

captured a ship, should be rewarded out of the common plunder” (1678,

156). Or, as Johnson records, “It must be observed,they [pirates] keep a

good Look-out; for, according to their Articles, he who first espies a

Sail, if she proves a Prize, is entitled the best Pair of Pistols on

board, over and above his Dividend” (1726–28, 191).

Finally, pirate articles stipulated punishments for failure to adhere to

their rules. As discussed above, for more minor infractions, crews

typically delegated punishment power to the ship’s democratically

elected quartermaster. As Johnson described it, the quartermaster “acts

as a Sort of civil Magistrate on board a Pyrate Ship” (1726–28,

213).[38] In the case of more severe infractions, crew members voted on

punishments. In both cases pirate crews tended to follow the punishments

for various infractions identified in their articles. By specifying

punishments in their articles, crews were able to limit the scope of

quartermasters’ discretion in administering discipline, checking

quartermasters’ power for abuse.

Punishments for article violations varied from physical torture, such as

“slitting the Ears and Nose of him that was Guilty,” to marooning—a

practice Captain Johnson described as the “barbarous Custom of put-ting

the Offender on Shore, on some desolate or uninhabited Cape or Island,

with a Gun, a few Shot, a Bottle of Water, and a Bottle of Powder,to

subsist with or starve” (1726–28, 211).[39] On Captain Phillips’ ship,

for example, article violations were punished with “Moses’s Law (that

is, 40 Stripes lacking one) on the bare back” (342–43).

In this sense, “Pirates exercised greater cruelty in maintaining

discipline among themselves than in their treatment of prisoners”

(Rankin1969, 37). Pirates considered theft aboard their ships especially

heinous.Their articles reflected this and frequently punished theft with

torture,marooning, or death. To help keep themselves honest, some crews

used random searches to hunt for anyone who might be holding back

loot(Exquemelin 1678, 205–6).[40] To ensure that the quartermaster did

not hide booty from the crew, some pirates prohibited their valuable

plunder from being kept under lock and key. As pirate Peter Hooff

described the situation on Captain Sam Bellamy’s Whydah, for instance,

the “money was kept in Chests between Decks without any Guard, but none

was to take any without the Quarter Masters leave” (quoted in Rediker

2004,67; see also Marx 1996a, 44).

Since pirate articles tended to be short and simple, they could not

cover all possible contingencies that might affect a crew. In this sense

they were always incomplete. To deal with this, when a significant issue

emerged, the crew gathered to act as a kind of judiciary to interpret or

apply the ship’s articles to situations not clearly stipulated in the

articles themselves: “In Case any Doubt should arise concerning the

Construction of these Laws, and it should remain a Dispute whether the

Party had infringed them or no, a Jury was appointed to explain them,

and bring in a Verdict upon the Case in Doubt” ( Johnson 1726–28, 213).

Through this “judicial review” process, pirate crews were able to

further limit quartermasters’ discretionary authority, restraining the

potential for quartermaster abuse.

The historical record points to the effectiveness of pirate

constitutions in this capacity, evidenced by the rarity of accounts of

quartermaster abuse. Equally important, in the infrequent event that

abuse did occur,the evidence indicates that crews successfully removed

abusive quarter-masters from power. For example, in 1691 quartermaster

Samuel Burgess cheated his crew in the division of food. In response,

his crew marooned him (Rogozinski 2000, 177).

The evidence also suggests that piratical articles were successful in

preventing internal conflict and creating order aboard pirate ships.

Pirates, it appears, strictly adhered to their articles. According to

one historian, pirates were more orderly, peaceful, and well organized

among themselves than many of the colonies, merchant ships, or vessels

of the Royal Navy (Pringle 1953; Rogozinski 2000). As an astonished

pirate observer put it, “At sea, they perform their duties with a great

deal of order, better even than on the Ships of the Dutch East India

Company; the pirates take a great deal of pride in doing things

right”(de Bucquoy 1744, 116; translated and quoted in Rogozinski 2000,

viii).

Though it is strange to think about such order prevailing among pirates,

the peculiarity fades when one recognizes that their organized criminal

enterprise’s success depended on it. The remark of one perceptive

eighteenth-century observer indicates precisely this. As he put it,

“great robbers as they are to all besides, [pirates] are precisely just

among themselves; without which they could no more Subsist than a

Structure without a Foundation” (Slush 1709, viii; quoted in

Rediker1987, 287).

The fact that pirate crews unanimously consented to the articles that

governed them, ex ante, also plays an important role in explaining their

success. Pirates recognized that “it was every one’s Interest to observe

them, if they were minded to keep up so abominable a Combination”(

Johnson 1726–28, 210). Since pirates agreed to these rules before

sailing, rules were largely self-enforcing once in place.

V. Was Pirate Organization Efficient?

In light of the sharp contrast between merchant and pirate ship

organization, an important question arises concerning the efficiency of

pirate institutions. After all, merchant ships were legitimate vessels

and there-fore had the government’s formal enforcement power at their

disposal.This gave them a wider range of organizational options than

pirates,who were criminals and therefore did not have the government

backing that afforded the same organizational choices. One possibility,

then, is that pirate organization merely reflects this smaller menu of

opportunities. Perhaps if pirates could have relied on government

enforcement,they too would have opted for merchant ship–like

institutions.

Alternatively, pirate ship organization was an efficient institutional

response to the unique economic situation pirates faced, quite apart

from their inability to rely on government. Although pirates faced a

constraint that merchant ships did not—inability to rely on

government—as discussed above, merchant ships faced a constraint that

pirate ships did not—the need to solve an owner-crew principal-agent

problem.Given the very different economic situations pirate and merchant

ships confronted in this regard, it would not be surprising if the

efficient mode of organizing these ships was different as well—this

difference being driven by the economic differences between the two

rather than by their different legal status.

A. Pirate Booty

As a first cut at this issue we can look to the success of piratical

expeditions. If pirates seized only small prizes, or no prizes at all,

clearly their organization was not an effective one. On the other hand,

if pirates succeeded in taking very valuable prizes, our confidence in

pirates’ organizational efficiency should grow.

The evidence suggests that if pirates’ inability to organize

autocratically was inhibiting piratical efficiency, it could not have

been doing so greatly. Although we do not have data that would allow us

to compute anything like the average pirate’s wage, what evidence is

available suggests that incredibly large pirate prizes were not unheard

of.

Of course, this evidence must be interpreted with caution. These

seizures were recorded precisely because of their spectacular size. More

common were undoubtedly more modest prizes. Nevertheless, the examples

we have are enough to point to the significant success of piratical

plunder in some cases and the opportunity piracy offered sailors for

becoming incredibly wealthy.“

At a time when Anglo-American seamen on a trading voyage to Madagascar

were collecting less than twelve pounds sterling a year . . . the

deep-water pirates could realize a hundred or even a thousand times

more” (Marx 1996c, 141). In 1695, for example, Henry Every’s pirate

fleet captured a prize carrying more than ÂŁ600,000 in precious metals

and jewels. The resulting share-out earned each member of his crew

£1,000 (Konstam 2007, 98), the equivalent of nearly 40 years’ income for

an able merchant seaman at the time. In the early eighteenth century,

Captain John Bowen’s pirate crew plundered a prize “which yielded them

500l. per Man.” Several years later Captain Thomas White’s crew retired

to Madagascar after a marauding expedition, each pirate having earned

£1,200 from the cruise ( Johnson 1726–28, 480, 485). In 1720,Captain

Christopher Condent’s crew seized a prize that earned each pirate

£3,000. Similarly, in 1721, Captain John Taylor and Oliver LaBouche’s

pirate consort earned an astonishing ÂŁ4,000 for each crew member from a

single attack (Marx 1996c, 161, 163). Even the small pirate crew

captained by John Evans in 1722 took enough booty to split “nine

thousand Pounds among thirty Persons”—or £300 a pirate—in less than six

months “on the account” ( Johnson 1726–28, 340).

To put these earnings in perspective, compare them to the able merchant

seaman’s wage over the same period. Between 1689 and 1740 this varied

from 25 to 55 shillings per month, a meager ÂŁ15 to ÂŁ33 per year(Davis

1962, 136–37).

In the absence of data for a larger number of pirate hauls, it is not

possible to say whether the average seventeenth- or eighteenth-century

pirate consistently earned more than the average seventeenth- or

eighteenth-century merchant sailor. It is certainly possible that this

was the case, however. As one pirate testified at his trial, for

instance, “it is a common thing for us [pirates] when at Sea to acquire

vast quantities,both of the Metal that goes before me [silver, referring

to the silver oar of the Admiralty court], and of Gold” (quoted in

Hayward 1735, I:45).

This pirate’s remark may very well reflect his desire to impress the

court more than it reflects piracy’s profitability. Still, what the

evidence on piratical plunder does clearly point to is the tremendous

potential“upside” of piratical employment. Unlike employment as a

merchant sailor, which guaranteed a low, if regular, income, a single

successful pirating expedition could make a sailor wealthy enough to

retire. This is no doubt largely the reason why, as one

eighteenth-century colonial governor remarked, “so many are willing to

join them [pirates] when taken” (Colonial Office Papers, May 31, 1718,

fol. 18; quoted in Rediker1987, 260).

If pirates did in fact earn substantially more than their legitimate

counterparts, this raises the question of why more merchant sailors did

not join the ranks of the pirates, eliminating any difference between

pirate and merchant sailor wages. Bearing in mind again that we cannot

know for certain whether or not the average pirate earned more than the

average merchant sailor, there are two reasons sailors did not flock in

greater numbers to life beneath the black flag even if this were the

case.

The first was simply the risk of being caught. Piracy was a capital

offense. In the eighteenth century, if a sailor was found guilty of

piracy,he was hanged. Although pirates largely escaped the arm of the

law in the seventeenth century, by the third decade of the eighteenth

century England’s renewed campaign against sea banditry was successfully

capturing and hanging pirates regularly, rendering piracy an

exceptionally dangerous employment.

Second, a merchant sailor who entered piracy had to be willing to

plunder other ships, murder innocents, and brutally torture

resisters.Although many sailors were surely drawn to the idea of piracy

by the prospect of riches, in light of the brutal features of piratical

employment,it is not surprising that many sailors were unwilling to

become sea marauders despite the potentially superior pay.

B. A Comparison to Privateer Organization

Pirates’ plunderous success does not necessarily point to their

organization’s efficiency, however. Pirates may have been quite

successful de-spite their institutions rather than because of them.

Ideally, to assess pirate organization’s efficiency we would want to see

how marine vessels that engaged in the same economic activity as

pirates, violently taking prizes—but did so legitimately and thus

enjoyed government enforcement—were organized. If we could identify such

vessels and they exhibited some of pirate ships’ important institutional

features, we could more confidently conclude that pirate organization

reflected an efficient response to the economic activity pirates were

engaged in, not merely the fact that they did not enjoy government

support.

Fortunately, such vessels exist and indeed operated contemporaneously

with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pirate ships. These vessels are

privateers. Privateers were private warships licensed by governments to

harass the merchant ships of enemy nations. Privateers shared a

predetermined portion of the proceeds from this activity with the

commissioning government.[41] Their licenses, sometimes called “letters

of marque,” granted them official permission to plunder enemy merchant

ships and established their legitimacy under the law.[42] Thus, the

institutions and arrangements that privateers used to regulate their

ships were legal agreements, enforceable by the commissioning

government.

Privateers, like merchant ships, were owned by absentee

merchants.Consequently, privateers did not have elected captains or a

system of separated powers, as pirate ships did. Owing to the absentee

ownership structure privateers shared with merchant ships, the

principal-agent problem privateers confronted was similar to the one

merchant ships faced. A privateer captain who could be popularly deposed

or did not wield absolute authority over his crew would undermine the

vessel’s profitability for its owners. Given the chance, crew members

would elect lax, liberal, and corrupt captains who would allow sailors

to relax when they desired, have free reign with provisions, lie to the

vessel’s owners about what plunder they had taken so the crew could hold

back a greater share for itself, and so forth. Thus, a variant on the

same principal-agent problem merchant ships confronted, which required

autocratic captains for its solution, also plagued privateers to a large

extent, necessitating autocratic captains on these vessels as well.[43]

Despite this important difference, privateers and pirate ships shared

several significant economic features. Most notably, both engaged in

plunder. Because of this, privateers, like pirate ships, carried large

crews,sometimes of 100 men or more. This was so that they could overcome

the smaller merchant ships they preyed on. Similarly to pirate

vessels,the size of privateers made it difficult for captains to monitor

sailors’ effort on these ships. This led privateers to use a pirate-like

share system of payment instead of the fixed wages merchant ships used

owing to their dramatically smaller size.[44]

Privateers’ use of the share system is important because we know that

since they enjoyed the full benefit of government enforcement, the

absence of such enforcement could not be the reason privateers adopted

this compensation scheme. This suggests that the share system’s

efficiency for pirates was rooted in a specific economic situation

pirates confronted (large crews engaged in plunder), shared by

privateers, not in an inability to rely on state enforcement.

Privateers also used constitutions similar to those on pirate ships.

Woodes Rogers, for instance, records his crew’s adoption of a

“Constitution,” as he called it, for the privateering expedition he

commanded between 1708 and 1711 (Rogers [1712] 2004, 7). Several of this

constitution’s articles resemble those in pirate constitutions. Article

1, for example, specifies the division of plunder between crew members.

Article 3 states “that if any Person on board . . . do conceal any

Plunder exceeding one Piece of Eight in value, 24 hours after the

Capture of any Prize, he shall be severely punish’d, and lose his Shares

of the Plunder.” Article 6 stipulates “that a Reward of twenty Pieces of

Eight shall be given to him that first sees a Prize of good Value, or

exceeding50 Tuns in Burden.” Like pirate articles, which required

unanimous consent, this privateering constitution, Rogers tells us, was

similarly signed by every member of the crew “without any Compulsion”

(23).

Since Rogers’ expedition enjoyed the full protection of government

enforcement, this constitution could not have been adopted because the

vessels did not have state backing. Instead, such privateer

constitutions must have been efficient for reasons unrelated to this.

Commonobstacles faced by both pirates and privateers suggest what these

reasons are.

First and foremost, both pirates and privateers were in the business of

sea banditry. Because the goods they dealt with and carried were always

stolen, property rights to these goods could be somewhat unclear.For

instance, if upon boarding a vessel a pirate or privateer came upon some

valuable, was it his to keep? Or was this part of the common loot to be

divided among the crew? Once the stolen booty was transferred to the

pirate or privateer ship, was it fair game? After all, no one on the

pirate or privateer ship could claim to legitimately own it. To clarify

the status of property rights on their ships, both privateers and

pirates used constitutions to make explicit crew member property rights

to plunder.

Contrast this situation with the status of property rights on merchant

vessels. On these ships, property rights were totally clear. The cargo

they carried clearly belonged to the ships’ owners (or their customers)

and not the crew. Explicating the property rights over the goods

merchant ships carried was therefore unnecessary, and for this reason,

merchant ships did not do so.

Similarly, since both pirates and privateers used a share system to

compensate crew members, the laziness of one crew member directly

affected the payment of the others. To attenuate this problem and elicit

full crew member effort, both privateers and pirates constitutionally

codified bonuses on their ships. Contrast this situation again with the

one on merchant ships, which used fixed wages. Here, each sailor’s

income was independent of his fellow crew members’ behavior. Thus,

bonuses were unnecessary. [45] The similarities between certain aspects

of pirate and privateer institutions, as well as the differences between

their shared institutions and those of merchant ships, suggests two

important items. First, the institutional differences between pirate and

merchant ships were driven at least in part by the different economic

situations they confronted, not the difference in their ability to rely

on government support. Second, at least some major features of pirate

organization were efficient in-dependent of pirates’ inability to rely

on government. Their efficiency derived from the particular economic

situation pirate ships faced, which they shared partially with

privateers.

On the other side of this, at least one important part of the economic

situation pirates and privateers faced was very different: the ownership

structure of their ships. In terms of this feature, privateers and

merchant ships were similar, whereas pirate ships, which had no absentee

owners,were very different. This explains why privateers and merchant

ships both used autocratic captains, which they required to solve the

owner-crew principal-agent problem they consequently faced. In contrast,

since on pirate ships the principals were the agents, pirates could use

a democratic system of separated power to constrain captain predation.

C. A Comparison to Explorer Organization

A crucial feature of pirate organization’s efficiency was its ability,

or inability, to facilitate crew cooperation. Since pirates lived and

worked together in close quarters among fellow criminals for extended

periods of time, their ability to cooperate for coordinated plunder was

a critical determinant of their enterprise’s success.Merchant ships

secured crew cooperation through the command of their autocratic

captains. Indeed, as discussed above, merchant ships could not do

without autocracy for this purpose. In contrast, pirate ships did not

have the state backing required for autocratic organization.Although the

evidence considered above suggests that pirates cooperated successfully

under democratic organization, this fact raises the question of pirates’

organizational efficiency.Perhaps pirates could have secured even more

cooperation had they been able to organize autocratically as merchant

ships did and would have sought to secure cooperation this way if they

could. Alternatively,pirates’ organization may have been superior in

creating crew cooperation, in which case pirates used it (at least

partly) for this reason, not because autocratically organizing their

ships was not an option.[46] To get at this issue we need to examine the

comparative ability of autocratic and democratic ship organization to

facilitate crew cooperation.

Since the difficulty of achieving crew cooperation likely varied

ac-cording to the activities different kinds of vessels were engaged in,

it is important to consider how autocratic versus democratic ship

organization affected crew cooperation on vessels engaged in the same

activity.Comparing cooperation on pirate and merchant ships, then, is

not helpful. Further, since all pirate ships were organized

democratically and all merchant ships were organized autocratically, we

cannot gain insight into this question by looking only at pirate ships

or only at merchant ships.[47]

Fortunately, a different kind of ship we have not yet considered

provides an excellent case for examining this issue: explorer vessels.

Explorer vessels are useful here for two reasons. First, between the

sixteenth and twentieth centuries, explorer ships embarked on long,

often grueling, voyages to uncharted waters. Their crews spent years

together at sea under conditions in which cooperation was at a premium.

Second, there is significant variation in the modes of organization

explorers employed for this purpose. Some pursued more autocratic

organization,as merchant ships did. Others pursued more democratic

organization,as pirate ships did, and with differing success.

Unlike merchant, privateer, or pirate voyages, most explorer voyages did

not seek profits. Their purpose was to discover (and sometimes claim)

unknown parts of the world and then to report their findings to curious

landlubbers.[48] This is significant because in contrast to the vessel

types considered thus far, economic concerns did not play a significant

role in determining explorer organization.

Instead, the party organizing an exploratory expedition determined the

ship’s institutional organization. When government chiefly financed and

organized an expedition, the explorer’s institutions tended to reflect

the autocratic institutions of the government’s navy. The resulting

organization was similar to that on merchant ships. When an adventurer

himself chiefly organized and raised the finances for an expedition, the

ship’s institutions tended to be more democratic.

I consider five explorer voyages between the sixteenth and twentieth

centuries. Government directly or indirectly organized three of

these,which displayed autocratic organization: Ferdinand Magellan’s

three-year voyage around the world between 1519 and 1522, James Cook’s

three-year voyage in search of “the Discovery of the Southern

Continent”between 1768 and 1771,[49] and Robert F. Scott’s Antarctic

expedition in the Discovery between 1901 and 1904. Private adventurers

organized the remaining two explorer voyages, which displayed more

democratic organization: Roald Amundsen’s search for the Northwest

Passage in the Gjøa between 1903 and 1906 and Ernest Shackleton’s

Antarctic expedition in the Endurance between 1914 and 1916.

Magellan’s voyage consisted of five ships carrying 270 men in total.The

Spanish government organized his expedition hierarchically, consisting

of lieutenants, masters, captains for each ship, and, at the

apex,Magellan himself, “captain-general” of the voyage. The Crown

appointed Magellan to this position and issued a long and detailed list

of regulations (74 in all) governing the terms of the exploration and

how it should proceed. Chief among these were the government’s strict

instructions to the crew “to defer to the opinion and order of

Magellan”(Guillemard 1890, 127–28) and Magellan’s “power of deciding and

executing short and summary justice by sea or land in case of suits or

disputes arising in the fleet” (Stanley 1874, xxxi).

As one of Magellan’s crew members put it, “the captain ordered that his

regulations . . . be strictly observed” (Pigafetta [1525] 1994, 39).

These regulations dictated the sail of the fleet’s ships, the crew

members’ duties, and even crew members’ ability to trade with and accept

gifts from the exotic foreigners they encountered on their journey (72).

Although there was a division of labor on Magellan’s voyage, there was

no division of power. Ultimately, the captain-general’s orders directed

his subordinate officers, who in turn directed the crew. There was one

instance of limited democracy on Magellan’s journey, which occurred when

Magellan unexpectedly died. The crew “made and elected two commanders”

to operate in the absence of their captain-general (Pigafetta 1525, 88).

However, this seems to be the only democratic moment in the voyage,

which was otherwise governed autocratically.

The effectiveness of Magellan’s autocratic organization was mixed.On the

one hand, considerable crew member turmoil plagued his expedition,

culminating in a violent mutiny of three of Magellan’s five ships

against the captain-general, ostensibly because he had put the crew on

short rations. Magellan emerged victorious out of the violent mix up and

punished the mutineers, some by execution, others by imprisonment. Later

in the voyage, one entire ship deserted Magellan’s fleet.

However, it is important to be careful in interpreting this conflict as

a sign of total failure. The magnitude of the venture must be kept in

mind, and, ultimately, the voyage did return to Spain. This constituted

the first circumnavigation of the globe, albeit one that claimed the

lives of 252 of the 270 sailors who undertook it.

The British government organized Captain James Cook’s expedition.In

command of His Majestys Bark Endeavour, Cook’s captainship combined the

powers of commander and ultimate disciplinarian along the lines observed

in the merchant and navy marine. Indeed, Cook’s regulations of his crew

drew explicitly on those in operation in the navy at the time. As he

instructed his crew, for example, “if by neglect [any sailor] looseth

any of his Arms or working tools, or suffers them to be stole [by

natives where the ship stops], the full Value thereof will be charge’d

against his pay according to the Custom of the Navy in such cases, and

he shall receive further punishment as the nature of the offence may

deserve” (Cook, April 17, 1769 [2000, 40]).

This regulation was one of five “Rules to be observ’d by every person in

or belonging to His Majestys Bark the Endeavor, for the better

establishing a regular and uniform Trade for Provisions &c with the

Inhabitants of Georges Island” (April 17, 1769, 39–40).

As on Magellan’s fleet, Cook also made use of a division of

labor,sometimes delegating punishment duties to his officers. But

ultimately Cook dictated and enforced corporal punishment. As his

journal entry dated November 30, 1768, records, for instance, “Punished

Rob Anderson Seaman and Will Judge Marine with twelve lashes each, the

former for leaving his duty a Shore and attempting to desert the Ship,

and the latter for using abusive language to the Officer of the

Watch,and John Readon Boatswains Mate with twelve lashes for not doing

his duty in punishing the above two Men” (22). Similarly, elsewhere Cook

records, “Punished Rich Hutchins Seaman with 12 lashes for disobeying

command,” highlighting both the hierarchy of the ship’s organization and

Captain Cook’s authority to administer punishments (April 16,1769, 44).

Cook successfully accomplished his voyage; but his journal suggests that

crew cooperation and harmony were strained. Here, Cook records instances

of disgruntled sailors, insolence, theft, and even intracrew murder

(see, e.g., the entries for April 13, 1769, 38; June 21, 1769, 60; June

4, 1769, 55; June 19, 1769, 58; and March 26, 1769, 35). The Royal

Society and Royal Geographic Society organized Robert Scott’s early

twentieth-century Antarctic exploration and appointed Scott captain of

the expedition. Like Cook, Scott was a navy officer. In addition to

several non naval mariners, a number of other navy seamen manned Scott’s

Discovery, which observed the traditional naval hierarchy.For instance,

Scott imprisoned the cook and later chained him to the deck for

insubordination (Huntford 1999, 146).

Like Cook’s expedition, Scott’s also suffered from sailor discontent.As

one of his sailors remarked, Scott’s autocratic method of governing the

ship “is causing a lot of discontent on the mess deck,” that is, among

the non officer crew. Another noted how the crew’s men had become“short

tempered and low spirited” (quoted in Huntford 1999, 151). The

Discovery’s troubles peaked when it became lodged in ice in the Ross

Sea. In an embarrassing finale to the debacle, the Royal Navy had to

rescue it.

Roald Amundsen’s organization aboard the Gjøa provides an interesting

contrast to Scott’s. Amundsen’s voyage took place only a few years after

Scott’s and sought to explore the Arctic. In contrast to the voyages

discussed above, Amundsen organized his exploration on his own be-half.

He was therefore not obliged to organize the Gjøa according to the navy

pattern. On the contrary, he chose to organize his ship in a highly

democratic, decentralized fashion, not unlike pirate organization.As

Amundsen described his vessel’s organization, “We have established a

little republic on board Gjøa. . . . After my own experience, I decided

as far as possible to use a system of freedom on board—let everybody

have the feeling of being independent within his own sphere. In that

way, there arises . . . a spontaneous and voluntary discipline, which is

worth far more than compulsion . . . . The will to do work is many times

greater and thereby the work itself ” (quoted in Huntford 1999,84).

As one sailor aboard the Gjøa commented, “No orders were given,but

everyone seemed to know exactly what to do” (quoted in Huntford1999,

84). Unlike Scott’s voyage, Amundsen’s proved exceedingly smooth. The

crew was happy and the expedition successful.

When one of Scott’s former sailors aboard the Discovery, Ernest

Shackleton, decided to explore the Antarctic himself, he also employed a

more democratic organization for his vessel, the Endurance. Shackleton

did not allow his crew to elect any of the ship’s officers; but he did

appoint his second in command, Frank Wild, to act as an arbitrator for

the ship’s men, removing himself from this authority. Shackleton set

routines for his men and generally directed their activities. However,

he assigned his men to the unpleasant and more pleasant tasks on the

ship in shifts, regardless of their status, rather than basing their

assignments on rank.

As one of his crew members observed, “When Shackleton took over control

of the ship, the ship officers had to climb down a peg or two.”According

to him, “The ship’s officers became units with no more authority than

the rest of the crowd, and their position on the floe was the same”

(quoted in Morrell and Capparell 2002, 89, 134). Officers and

nonofficers received identical victuals and were treated equally in all

other affairs.

Shackleton’s quasi-democratic organization aboard the Endurance created

good order and cooperation among the crew. As Thomas Orde-Lees, a crew

member of the Endurance, commented, for example, “We seem to be a

wonderfully happy family but I think Sir Ernest is the real secret of

our unanimity.” Similarly, as another sailor recorded, “We are now six

months out from England and during the whole of this time we have all

pulled well together and with an almost complete lack of friction”

(quoted in Morrell and Capparell 2002, 99).

The evidence from the five explorers considered here suggests that

democratic or self-governing vessel organization, such as the kind

pirates used, facilitated crew cooperation at least as successfully as

autocratic vessel organization, and probably more so. Magellan, Cook,

and Scott each seemed to face greater problems maintaining accord on

their ships than Amundsen or Shackleton. Since pirates did not require

autocratic organization to overcome the owner-crew principal-agent

problem that merchant ships confronted, this suggests that even if

pirates had government enforcement at their disposal, they would likely

have opted for a democratic organization, such as the one they used.

Although it is of course not possible to establish this definitively, it

does not seem likely, then, that autocratic organization was in fact

superior in this regard and that pirates would have used it if only they

enjoyed government support.

The case of explorers also sheds light on the issue of captain

predation. In contrast to merchant ships, there does not appear to have

been a problem of captain predation on democratic or autocratic explorer

vessels. Only on Magellan’s voyage is there evidence that the crew

suspected captain self-dealing, and here the charge seems to be

unfounded (see, e.g., Guillemard 1890).

An important economic difference between merchant ships, on the one

hand, and even autocratically organized explorer vessels, on the other,

suggests itself as the likely reason for this. With the exception of

Magellan, none of the explorer captains considered above stood to

directly profit from cutting crew member rations, shorting crew members

their pay, and so forth. These explorer captains were not residual

claimants of their voyages, as merchant ship captains were.

Explorer captains gained very little if upon their vessels’ return they

had succeeded in defrauding the crew out of victuals or wages.[50] The

expedition’s costs were borne largely by external financiers who did not

“invest” in the expedition for profit. Further, the explorer captains

them-selves did not aim at turning a profit on the exploratory voyage

itself. They therefore had little incentive to prey on their crew

members.

Magellan is somewhat of an exception in this regard in that, under the

terms of his agreement with the Spanish Crown, he was to receive 20

percent of any net proceeds his expedition directly generated. Thus,he

could have tried to generate larger gains for himself by, for

instance,illegitimately cutting crew member rations, which, as noted

above, some crew members (wrongly) accused him of. However, Magellan’s

payoff of preying on his crew in this way paled in comparison to his

payoff of making the exploration a successful one.

According to his agreement with Spain, if Magellan succeeded in

discovering any new isles or countries, he was perpetually entitled to

one-twentieth of all revenue they generated for Spain. Further, if his

exploration succeeded in forging a route to the Spice Islands, he would

be allowed to send 1,000 ducats’ worth of goods on every Spanish armada

sent to trade with the islands. However, to reap these much greater

financial rewards, Magellan had to keep his crew intact sufficiently to

weather the long and onerous voyage. Since cheating crew members would

have seriously threatened this already difficult task, it was not in

Magellan’s greater financial interest to do so.

This absence of predatory incentives for captains on explorers stands in

stark contrast to the situation on merchant ships in which every

voyage’s purpose was to make money, and absentee owners and share-holder

captains often stood to directly profit from predation. Thus, while

autocratic organization opened the door for captain abuse on merchant

ships, it did not seem to do so significantly on explorer ships.

VI. Conclusion

Over the last decade or so there has been a resurgence of piracy off the

horn of Africa and in the Straits of Malacca (see, e.g., Gottschalkand

Flanagan 2000; Burnett 2002; Langewiesche 2004). Like seventeenth- and

eighteenth-century pirates, the modern variety choose to plunder ships

in waters in which government enforcement is weak, such as those around

Somalia and Indonesia, and commercial vessels are abundant.

Beyond this, however, modern pirates share little in common with their

predecessors. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pirates lived together

for long periods of time at sea. Although they retired to land between

expeditions, they spent much of their time together prowling the

expanses of the ocean in search of prey. Because of this, their ships

formed miniature “floating societies.” Like all societies, pirates’

floating ones also required social rules and governance institutions if

pirates were to maintain their “abominable combination.”

In contrast, modern pirates spend almost no time together on their

ships. Their “raids” take one of two forms. The first and most common

method constitutes little more than maritime muggery. Pirate “crews”of

two to six hop in small speedboats with guns; pull alongside legitimate

ships, usually in territorial waters close to the coast; and threaten

their prey at gunpoint to give up their watches, jewelry, and whatever

money the boat may be carrying. They then return to their villages on

the coast,where they live among non pirates and resume regular

employment.

These pirates do not live, sleep, and interact together on their ships

for months, weeks, or even days on end. They therefore do not constitute

a society and face few, if any, of the problems of social cooperation

and order their forefathers did.

The second and far less common method of modern piracy is some-what

different. Crews again are small—between five and 15 men—and spend very

little time together at sea. But professional land-based criminals hire

these modern pirates to steal boats, which they then convert into

“phantom ships” and resell. They pay these modern pirates lump sums and

contract them on a case-by-case basis. Like the maritime muggers,

pirates-for-hire rely predominantly on hijacking methods to steal ships,

though for larger vessels they have been known to plant

“insiders”—sailors who pretend to be legitimate sailors seeking

employment on the ship in question—who later hijack the target from the

inside.

Since modern pirates sail in very small groups and spend very little

time together at sea, they do not exhibit any discernible organizational

structure, as seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pirates clearly

did.Unlike older pirates, privateers, merchantmen, or explorers, the

“in-and-out” character of modern pirates, coupled with the fact that

crews are so small, means that they do not require rules for creating

order,rationing provisions, or assigning tasks. Modern pirates do not

even require captains in the usual sense. There is, of course, someone

who steers the motorboat and acts as a leader among the six or so

pirates; but he is not a captain in the way that eighteenth-century

pirate, privateer, or merchant captains were.

Even organizational problems related to the distribution of plunder are

largely absent for modern pirates. The sea muggers need to divide what

they steal. But nothing structured is required since, unlike

seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pirates, modern sea robbers do not

sail for extended periods with growing piles of booty. Their trips are

evening cruises. When they end, the pirates return to their day

jobs.Modern pirates-for-hire do not even confront a distribution of

booty problem to this extent. The landed thieves who employ them pay

them wages. Once the pirates have taken a prize, they hand it over to

their employer. Sadly, then, modern pirates are far less interesting

from an economic or organizational point of view than their

predecessors.

The institutions of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pirates, in

contrast, provide an important glimpse into the typically invisible

governance mechanisms that support cooperation inside criminal

organizations. My analysis of the law, economics, and organization of

pirates leads to three conclusions.

First, ordinary “foot soldiers” inside criminal organizations may face a

problem of leader predation similar to the problem citizens under

governments face with respect to political rulers. Importantly,

organized criminals’ inability to rely on state-created institutions to

overcome this problem does not prevent them from developing private,

self-enforcing institutions for this purpose instead. “Kings were not

needed to invent the pirate system of governance” (Rogozinski 2000,

184). It is unlikely that they are needed to invent systems of

governance in other criminal organizations either.

Second, the institutions that constituted the pirates’ system of

governance—democratic checks, the separation of power, and

constitutions—are remarkably similar to those governments employ to

constrain ruler predation in the “legitimate world.” Government does not

have a monopoly on these institutions of governance any more than it has

a monopoly on the ability to generate cooperation and order. The success

of pirate “an-arrgh-chy” highlights both of these facts.

In the same way that merchant ship autocracy reflected an efficient

institutional response to the particular economic situation that

merchant ships faced, pirate organization reflected an efficient

institutional response to the particular, and rather different, economic

situation that pirate ships faced. The efficiency of piratical

institutions, it seems, resulted at least in part from this economic

difference between pirate and merchant ships, not from the former’s

inability to rely on government support for autocratic organization.

Finally, organized criminals are as interested in creating order among

themselves as noncriminals. They, too, have an incentive to develop

solutions to obstacles that otherwise prevent them from cooperating for

mutual gain. The fact that they direct their cooperation at someone

else’s loss does not alter this. Thus, while Captain Charles Johnson

described the pirates’ criminal organization as “that abominable

Society”(1726–28, 114), it is important to acknowledge that, however

abominable, it was nevertheless a society.

[1] All page references to Johnson refer to the 1999 reprint. Page

references to other early sources also refer to reprint editions if

available.

[2] Anderson (1979), Reuter (1983), and Gambetta (1993) are the closest

exceptions in this regard. Their excellent work considers some internal

governance aspects of the Mafiabut tends to focus primarily on the

Mafia’s relationship to protection and other markets.Important research

by Polo (1995) examines governance institutions of criminal

organizations, but does so theoretically.

[3] This article is also closely connected to the literature that

examines the private emergence of law and governance institutions. See,

e.g., Friedman (1979), Benson (1988, 1989,1990), Anderson and McChesney

(2002), Anderson and Hill (2004), Anderson, Benson,and Flanagan (2006),

and Leeson (2007a, 2007b, forthcoming).

[4] However, pirates did trade with European colonists.

[5] My definition of a criminal organization is therefore similar to

Polo’s as “one that cannot rely on the external enforcement of the

judicial institutions and whose behaviour and possibilities are not

constrained by the law” (1995, 87).

[6] “Captain Johnson” is a pen name used by the author of A General

History of the Pyrates. His true identity remains unknown. In 1932, John

R. Moore claimed that Johnson was in fact Daniel Defoe. In the late

1980s, however, this view was overturned (see Furbank and Owens 1988),

and today many pirate historians do not believe that Defoe is the author

of this important book (see, e.g., Rediker 2004; Cordingly 2006; Woodard

2007; for the opposing view, see Rogozinski 2000). Whatever Johnson’s

true identity, it is agreed thathe “had extensive first-hand knowledge

of piracy” (Konstam 2007, 12). While it is widely acknowledged that

Johnson’s work contains some errors and apocryphal accounts (such as the

community of Libertalia), “Johnson is widely regarded as a highly

reliable source for factual information” on pirates (Rediker 2004, 180)

and remains a definitive source historians rely on in constructing their

accounts of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century piracy. As eminent

pirate historian David Cordingly puts it, this book “is the prime source

for the lives of many pirates of what is often called the Golden Age of

Piracy” (2006, xx).

[7] Jameson (1923) has edited an excellent collection of such records.

Unless otherwise noted, all depositions and examinations quoted here are

contained in his collection.8Importantly, drawing on the historical

episode of pirates helps overcome the problem of “getting inside”

criminal organizations, noted above. Records from individuals who had

direct experiences with pirates, as well as those that shed light on

piratical governance mechanisms from pirates themselves, allow me to

view pirates’ criminal organization “from the inside.”

[8] Additionally, this article relies on and is greatly indebted to a

voluminous modern literature covering all aspects of piracy, including

those considered here, written by con-temporary historians. Some of the

best discussions belong to Gosse (1946), Pringle (1953),Rankin (1969),

Rediker (1981, 1987), Cordingly (1996, 2006), Rogozinski (2000),

andKonstam (2002).

[9] The “nest of rogues” terminology in this section’s heading comes

from Governor William Spotswood, who, in a letter to the British Lords

of the Admiralty, complained of the growing pirate problem in New

Providence ( July 3, 1716 [1882, 2:168]).

[10] The dates given by historians to mark the golden age of piracy

vary. Cordingly (2006)provides a slightly larger range, from about 1650

to 1725. Still others, such as Rankin(1969), date the great age of

piracy as encompassing the years between 1630 and 1720.The further back

in this range one goes, the more one is dealing with buccaneers as

opposed to pure pirates.

[11] Pirates also exhibited some diversity in social standing. Although

most pirates were uneducated and came from the lower classes of society,

a few, such as Dr. John Hincher,were well educated and came from higher

stations in life (Cordingly 2006).

[12] Pure pirates should be distinguished from buccaneers, privateers,

and corsairs. Pure pirates were total outlaws and attacked merchant

ships indiscriminately for their own gain.Privateers and corsairs, in

contrast, were both state-sanctioned sea robbers. Governments licensed

the former to attack enemy ships in times of war. Governments licensed

the latter to attack the ships of other nations on the basis of

religion. “Buccaneering was a peculiar blend of piracy and privateering

in which the two elements were often indistinguishable”(Marx 1996a, 38).

Oftentimes, buccaneers plundered with official sanction, making them

more like privateers than pirates. Many other times, however, they did

not. In these cases they were acting as pure pirates.

[13] These numbers are especially large when one puts them in historical

perspective. The Royal Navy, e.g., averaged only 13,000 men in any one

year between 1716 and 1726, making the pirate population in a good year

more than 15 percent of the navy population(Rediker 1987, 256). In 1680,

the total population of the American colonies was less than152,000

(Hughes and Cain 1994, 20). In fact, as late as 1790, when the first

U.S. census was taken, only 24 places in the country had populations

greater than 2,500 (Hughes and Cain 1994, 28).

[14] In the South China Sea, Cheng I commanded a pirate confederacy that

boasted an astonishing 150,000 members (Konstam 2002, 174). Chinese

pirates sometimes sailed together in fleets of several hundred ships.

[15] Navy ships were also organized hierarchically. Their captains were

commissioned by the Admiralty (typically on the recommendation of

superior commissioned officers) and had command over crew activities,

power to physically punish sailors (or to direct/authorize lower-ranking

officers to do so), etc. Captains of larger naval ships did not,

however,have control over victuals, which were instead controlled by a

warrant officer called the“purser.” The purser’s logs, which documented

victuals distributed, were often approved by the captain.

[16] Ownership groups were sizable because of the need to diversify the

risk of merchant shipping. Each merchant purchased a small share in many

ships rather than being the sole owner of one.

[17] Because most merchant ships were owned by groups of investors, even

in cases in which a merchant captained his vessel himself, there

remained absentee owners, his co-investors.

[18] Absentee ownership was further assured by the fact that the members

of merchant vessel ownership groups engaged in many more commercial

activities besides their concern in a particular merchant ship. These

other commercial activities often required merchants to be on land to

tend to their affairs rather than at sea.

[19] Although merchant ships engaged in coastal trade were at sea for

shorter periods,merchant ships engaged in long-distance trade could be

gone for periods of nine months or more.

[20] In addition to using autocratic captains to cope with this

principal-agent problem,merchant ships also held back a portion (or

sometimes all) of sailors’ wages until a voyage was complete.

[21] A few merchant ships engaged in part-time fishing used a share

system of payment similar to the one privateers, whalers, and pirates

used. However, the overwhelming majority of merchant ships used a fixed

wage system. In vessels engaged in coastal shipping,sailors were paid

lump-sum wages. In vessels engaged in long-distance shipping, sailors

were paid monthly wages.

[22] The owner-sailor principal-agent problem could not have been

overcome by converting every crew member’s fixed wage to a

profit-sharing scheme. Even under profit sharing, sailors would still

have an incentive to consume cargo, liberal provisions, etc.,and then

blame the loss on the uncertainties of the sea, such as pirates or

wrecks. Although this opportunism would reduce each sailor’s share of

the voyage’s net proceeds, since the cost of such behavior is borne

partially by the absentee owners, sailors have an incentive to act

opportunistically. Further, converting sailor wages to shares would not

have deterred the crew from the most costly kind of

opportunism—absconding with the ship and its freight. Because the

benefit of such theft would exceed the crew’s fraction of a successful

voyage’s proceeds, which are shared with the absentee owners under a

profit-sharing scheme, without an authority to monitor and control their

behavior, crews would still have an incentive to steal the ships they

sailed on. This is why both privateers and whaling ships, e.g., which

used a pirate-like profit-sharing system but also had absentee

owners,still required and used autocratic captains. On the efficiency of

the fixed wage system for the merchant marine and efficiency of the

share system for privateers and whalers, which also applies to pirates,

see Gifford (1993).

[23] A third device owners used for this purpose, though of declining

importance overtime, was that of the supercargo—an agent hired by the

ship’s owners who sailed on the ship and managed commercial aspects of

the voyage, such as buying and selling cargo at port, and sometimes

deciding what ports the ship should stop at, when the captain could not

be trusted in these capacities (Davis 1962).

[24] This quotation is from a late eighteenth-century sailor but

captures the situation in the earlier part of the century as well.

[25] It is also important to note that captain predation

notwithstanding, a merchant sailor’s life was not a singularly cruel and

oppressed one. As Earle (1998) points out, e.g., sailor society on

merchant ships was in many ways a microcosm of landed life in

seventeenth-and eighteenth-century England. Rodger (1996, 2006) makes a

similar point regarding life aboard naval vessels. My discussion here is

not intended to suggest that life was exclusively or exceptionally poor

aboard merchant (or navy) ships. My argument is only to point out that

the necessarily autocratic organization of merchant ships created scope

for merchant captain predation, which a number of captains seized on.

[26] A check on the extent of captain predation not discussed here was

captains’ ability to complete their voyages. If a predatory captain, for

instance, maimed or otherwise severely injured too many crew members

through overzealous discipline, he might not have enough healthy crew

members to complete the voyage. This surely constrained captain abuse to

some extent, though it did not provide an incentive to reduce abuse to

zero nor to refrain from other kinds of predatory behavior discussed

above.

[27] Notably, however, several pirate crews had their genesis in

successful mutiny. According to Rediker (1987, 228), one-third of

successful mutinous crews (i.e., those that succeeded in taking control

of the ship) in the first half of the eighteenth century entered piracy.

[28] In addition to this, there is considerable doubt that many common

seamen, even after years of toil, were in a position to own any part of

a merchant vessel. One of the few,preserved, near-complete bills of

merchant vessel sale before England required ship registration in 1786

corroborates this. Among the 338 owners of 53 ships it lists, only 28

noncaptain mariners, or about 8 percent of the total, owned any share of

a merchant vessel (Davis 1962, 100).

[29] There is at least one eighteenth-century pirate, however, Stede

Bonnet, who actually purchased the first ship he went on the account

with.

[30] Of course, even pirates’ democratic system of checks and balances

could not prevent all instances of captain predation. For instance,

since he controlled battle-related decisions,a pirate captain could

still put a crew member he disliked in harm’s way.

[31] In some cases, crews also physically punished their captains for

behavior they deemed inconsistent with their interests. For example,

Oliver La Bouche was deprived of his captain position and flogged for

attempting to desert his crew (de Bucquoy 1744, 103; translated and

quoted in Rogozinski 2000, 177). Occasionally, crews also deserted

predatory captains(Council of the Leeward Islands, May 18, 1699, Public

Record Office, Colonial Office Papers, 152:3, no. 21).

[32] This competition likely explains the rarity of cases of

captain-quartermaster collusion against crews.

[33] This decentralization of authority and elimination of captain

privilege aboard pirate ships were radical departures from conditions in

the legitimate maritime world. Observers were therefore shocked at the

incredible absence of hierarchy aboard pirate ships. Commenting on their

democratic form of governance, e.g., the Dutch governor of Mauritius

marveled, “Every man had as much say as the captain” (quoted in Ritchie

1986, 124).

[34] The captain referred to here is William Kidd, a

privateer-turned-pirate, who was ultimately executed for his crimes.

Notably, Kidd’s privateer ship was financed by absentee owners.

[35] Many individuals ostensibly forced to join pirate crews in fact

joined voluntarily. Officially, they asked to be “forced” and

occasionally put up a show to their comrades to this effect so that in

the event their pirate crew was ever captured, they could claim that

they were compelled as a defense (Pringle 1953; see also Rankin 1969).

[36] A letter from colonial governor Alexander Spotswood to the Board of

Trade highlights the effectiveness of pirates’ information-sharing

network. Spotswood, who having “been markt as the principle object of

their vengeance, for cutting off their arch pirate Thatch [a.k.a.

Blackbeard]” complained of finding a place to escape to “where neither

Master nor Sailors know me, & so may possibly escape the knowledge of ye

pirates” (Colonial Office Papers, June 16, 1724, 5/1319: fols. 190–92;

quoted in Rediker 1987, 254, 134).

[37] Pirate ships often required crew members to agree to stay on until

a certain sum was earned or an expedition completed. However, if a ship

became too crowded or some other compelling reason came along for a crew

to split, it did so. In this case, new articles were drawn up and

pirates had the option to sign on with the new crew or stay with the

old. There do not appear to be any cases of pirate constitutions being

altered or amended mid cruise. The status of forced men on pirate ships

seems to have varied. Some appear to have been compelled to sign the

ship’s articles. Others were not compelled to do so but did not have a

vote in the company’s affairs until they signed (Rediker 2004, 79–81).

[38] When this failed, the quartermaster refereed a duel between the

parties, which would take place on land so as not to destroy the ship.

“The Quarter-Master of the Ship, when the Parties will not come to any

Reconciliation, accompanies them on Shore with what Assistance he thinks

proper, and turns the Disputants Back to Back, at so many paces

Distance: At the Word of Command, they turn and fire immediately . . . .

If both miss,they come to their Cutlashes, and then he is declared

Victor who draws the first blood”( Johnson 1726–28, 212; see also 339).

[39] Marooning was sometimes coupled with ostracism in the event that

the transgressor managed to survive. See, e.g., Exquemelin (1678, 72).

[40] Oath taking was commonly used among pirates as well as a method of

staking one’s reputation to help enforce piratical articles and custom.

See, e.g., Exquemelin (1678, 68,71–72, 100, 104, 156, 161).

[41] However, in England, the Prize Act of 1708 entitled privateers to

the full value of prizes they took.

[42] There were two kinds of privateers. The first were “full-time”

privateers, which sailed exclusively for the purpose of prize taking.

The second kind were merchant ships with permission to take prizes they

might happen upon and profitably seize in the course of their shipping

activity (Rodger 2006, 156). My discussion is concerned with the

former,since the latter were in the business of merchant shipping rather

than the business of prize taking.

[43] Some privateer captains, such as Woodes Rogers, consulted a council

of their fellow officers in making decisions. But democratic voice did

not extend to the crew. It should be noted, however, that late

seventeenth-century and early eighteenth-century sea raiders who blurred

the distinction between pirates and privateers by sailing sometimes with

a commission and many other times without typically employed piratical

governance institutions.

[44] Privateers were not the only legitimate vessels that used the

pirates’ share system. Whaling vessels did as well. Although whaling

vessels were smaller than pirate ships or privateers, they were

typically larger than merchant ships, again making it more difficult to

monitor sailor effort. This necessitated share payment, called a “lay,”

instead of fixed monthly or lump-sum wages (Davis, Gallman, and Gleiter

1998). Navy ships also relied partially on a share system to compensate

sailors. Although in peacetime sailors received fixed monthly wages, in

wartime they received both monthly wages and a share of their prizes’

proceeds, as well as “head money” for each of the enemy sailors these

prizes carried.Since naval vessels were very large, incentive-based pay

helped to overcome the difficulty of monitoring individual sailors.

Additionally, navy vessel pay scales (including prize shares)were

steeply skewed according to rank. To elicit crew members’ full effort,

navy vessels thus combined incentive pay in the context of a tournament

system. See, e.g., Benjamin and Thornberg (2007).

[45] Ship captains sometimes received bonuses, however. “Primage and

average,” for ex-ample, were paid to ship captains and constituted

bonuses of a sort, though these were paid by the freighter rather than

by the owners.

[46] As for the organizational features discussed above, here too it is

important to emphasize that if pirate organization was in fact superior

in creating crew cooperation, this would not mean that merchant ship

organization was inefficient for merchant ships. Merchant ships faced a

different economic situation than pirates, most important, the

owner-crew principal-agent problem. Constrained by the need to solve

this problem, merchant ships could secure crew cooperation only through

autocracy. Thus, even if it came at the price of less crew harmony, for

merchant ships, autocratic organization was still superior to democratic

organization, which would have rendered merchant shipping unprofitable

for owners.

[47] The Barbary pirates, who were really corsairs, did not organize

democratically. How-ever, this article is not concerned with them.

[48] Although some explorer voyages, such as Magellan’s, certainly had

as their ultimate goal discovery for the purpose of profit, the

exploratory expedition itself was almost always a “nonprofit” voyage. In

Magellan’s case the attitude seemed to be, if the exploratory voyage

itself makes money, all the better. But pure exploration for the purpose

of future gain was the voyage’s primary aim, even if, e.g., the

exploratory voyage itself did cover its own costs.

[49] The other duty the Admiralty instructed Cook to accomplish was to

charter King George’s Island.

[50] Although he may not benefit monetarily, a predatory captain might

still have some incentive to pinch provisions to make more available to

himself, however.