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Title: An-arrgh-chy Author: Peter T. Leeson Date: 2007 Language: en Topics: pirates, piracy, proto-anarchism, not anarchist Source: https://www.peterleeson.com/An-arrgh-chy.pdf Notes: This article investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and organization of pirates. To effectively organize their banditry, pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation, minimize crew conflict,and maximize piratical profit. Pirates devised two institutions for this purpose. First, I analyze the system of piratical checks and balances crews used to constrain captain predation. Second, I examine how pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and create piratical law and order. Pirate governance created sufficient order and cooperation to make pirates one of the most sophisticated and successful criminal organizations in history.
Nature, we see, teaches the most Illiterate the necessary Prudence for
their Preservation . . . these Men whom we term, and not without Reason,
the Scandal of human Nature, who were abandoned to all Vice, and lived
by Rapine; when they judged it for their Interest . . . were strictly
just. . . among themselves. (Captain Charles Johnson 1726â28, 527)
Pirates are known for raucousness, recklessness, and chaotic
rapine.Pirate reality, however, is quite another picture. Real-life
pirates were highly organized criminals. Unlike the swashbuckling
psychopaths of fiction, historical pirates displayed sophisticated
organization and coordination.
Pirates could not use government to enforce or otherwise support
cooperative arrangements between them. Despite this, they successfully
cooperated with hundreds of other rogues. Amidst ubiquitous potential
for conflict, they rarely fought, stole from, or deceived one another.
In fact, piratical harmony was as common as harmony among their lawful
contemporaries who relied on government for social cooperation. How did
âthese men whom we term . . . the Scandal of human Nature, who were
abandoned to all Vice, and lived by Rapineâ ( Johnson [1726â28]1999,
527)[1] accomplish this impressive level of order?
Becker (1968) was the first to apply the logic of rational-choice
decision making to criminals. Following him, a number of others extended
this logic to decision making in the context of organized outlaws.
Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995) provide the best and most comprehensive
collection of essays that consider the economics of criminal
organization. In addition, a large literature discusses the economic
impact of organized crime, activities of criminal organizations, optimal
strategies for preventing organized crime, and reasons for its emergence
(see also,e.g., Anderson 1979; Reuter 1983, 1987; Jennings 1984;
Arlacchi 1986; Jankowski 1991; Dick 1995; Konrad and Skaperdas 1998;
Garoupa 2000; Skaperdas 2001; Chang, Lu, and Chen 2005).
Unlike these topics, the internal governance institutions of violent
criminal organizations have received relatively little attention.[2] The
difficulty of âgetting insideâ criminal organizations is largely
responsible for this. Levitt and Venkateshâs important work on street
gangs (Levittand Venkatesh 2000; Venkatesh and Levitt 2000) is an
exception to this rule, as are Gambettaâs (1993) and Reuterâs (1983)
superb studies of the Mafia. However, Levitt and Venkatesh focus on the
financial organization of gangs rather than on their governance
structures. Gambettaâs and Reuterâs studies are primarily concerned with
the Mafiaâs provision of protection to outsiders and the organization of
the illegal markets it serves.
This article investigates the internal governance institutions of
violent criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and
organization of pirates.[3] These âmost treacherous roguesâ terrorized
the Caribbean, Atlantic Ocean, and Indian Ocean during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. Pirates formed a loose confederation of
maritime bandits outside the law of any government.
To effectively organize their banditry, pirates required mechanisms to
prevent internal predation, minimize crew conflict, and maximize
piratical profit. I argue that pirates devised two institutions for this
purpose. First, I analyze the system of piratical checks and balances
that crews used to constrain captain predation. Second, I examine how
pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and create
piratical law and order. Pirates adopted both of these institutions
before seventeenth- and eighteenth-century governments.
Their governance institutions were self-enforcing by necessity.
Appealing to the formal enforcement mechanisms of the state is not an
option for criminal organizations, including pirates. Although the
maritime nature of piratical expeditions makes certain aspects of their
internal organization and governance specific to pirates, my analysis
highlights important problems that any form of organized criminal
enterprise faces, as well as the institutional solutions such
organizations employ to overcome these problems.
The literature that addresses the economics of organized crime focuses
on the criminal organization as a supplier of some service, usually
protection, to other actors inside and outside the criminal world.
Schelling (1971), for instance, who was among the first to conduct this
re-search, identifies the provision of enforcement services to other
agents and, in line with this function, a monopoly on coercion as the
distinguishing features of organized crime.
While this definition is perhaps appropriate for the Mafia, it neglects
equally important organized criminal activities that do not provide
useful services to others and do not involve a monopoly on coercion. An
army of thieves, for instance, that coordinates its activities, requires
internal mechanisms of governance, and combines in a long-term
arrangement for concerted plunder is as much a criminal organization as
the Mafia.Pirates were clearly organized criminals and yet were not
primarily in the business of providing services to anyone other than
their members.[4] Nor did they have a monopoly on force. Because of
this, unlike most discussions of criminal organization, mine takes a
broader view of organized crime. This view encompasses any long-term
arrangement between multiple criminals that requires coordination and
involves agreements that, owing to their illicit status, cannot be
enforced by the state.[5] The emphasis of my analysis therefore shifts
from the organization of criminal markets (the focus of existing
research on the economics of organized crime) to the internal predation
problem that criminal organizations face and the institutions that
emerge in response to it.
To examine these features for pirates, I draw on a series of historical
documents that provide a firsthand glimpse into their organization. The
first of these is Captain Charles Johnsonâs General History of the
Pyrates(1726â28), which contains reports on a number of historyâs most
in-famous pirates related by a pirate contemporary.[6] I also draw on
Alexander Exquemelinâs (1678) invaluable account of the
seventeenth-century buccaneers. Exquemelin was a surgeon who sailed with
the buccaneers and provides a detailed, firsthand account of their
raids,system of rules, and social organization. The buccaneer William
Dam-pier (1697â1707) also published a journal relating to his maritime
exploits, which I make use of as well.
Buccaneers differ from âpureâ pirates in that they frequently plundered
ships with government sanction. However, many other times they plundered
without official permission, as full-blown pirates. These proto-pirates,
many of whom turned to pure piracy when governments stopped issuing
licenses for plunder, influenced and anticipated the organization of
pure pirates in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
Buccaneer records are therefore important for understanding the
institutions and organization of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
pirates.
In addition to these sources, correspondence from colonial governors
relating to piracy and records from the trials of various pirates, such
as testimony from individuals taken prisoner by pirate ships and the
testimony of pirates themselves, form an important part of the
historical record this article relies on.[7] Finally, a few pirate
captives, such as William Snelgrave (1734), whose captors ultimately
released them, published longer works describing their harrowing
captivity by pirate crews.[8] I also draw on these accounts, which
provide important firsthand records describing piratical governance and
organization.[8]
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pirates occupied the waterways that
formed major trading routes.[9] These included the waters surrounding
the Bahamas that stood between ships traveling from Central America to
Spain; the waters connecting Europe and the North American seacoast;
those between Cuba and Haiti, which separated ships traveling from
Europe and the west coast of Africa to Jamaica; and the waters around
Madagascar traveled by ships sailing to and from India (Cord-ingly 2006,
88). These areas encompass major portions of the Atlantic and Indian
Oceans, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico. The trade routes connecting
the Caribbean, North Americaâs Atlantic seacoast,and Madagascar
consequently formed a loop called the âpirate roundâthat many pirates
traveled in search of prey.The âgolden ageâ of piracy, when pirates were
at their strongest, ex-tended from 1690 to 1730 (Konstam 2002, 94).[10]
The years from 1716 to 1722 mark the height of the golden age. âThis was
at a Time that the Pyrates had obtained such an Acquisition of Strength,
that they were in no Concern about preserving themselves from the
Justice of Lawsâ( Johnson 1726â28, 87). The pirates of this era include
many well-known sea robbers, such as Blackbeard, whose real name was
Edward Teach, Bartholomew Roberts, and others.
Pirates were a diverse lot.[11] A sample of 700 pirates active in the
Caribbean between 1715 and 1725, for example, reveals that 35 percent
were English, 25 percent were American, 20 percent were West Indian, 10
percent were Scottish, 8 percent were Welsh, and 2 percent were Swedish,
Dutch, French, and Spanish (Konstam 2002, 9). Others came from Portugal,
Scandinavia, Greece, and East India (Marx 1996b, 103). Pirate crews were
also racially diverse. Based on data available from 23 pirate crews
active between 1682 and 1726, the racial composition of ships varied
between 13 and 98 percent black. If this sample is representative, 25â30
percent of the average pirate crew was of African descent (Kinkor 2001,
200â201). The pirate population is difficult to precisely measure but by
all accounts was considerable.[12] According to the reports of
contemporaries and estimates of pirate historians, in any one year
between 1716 and 1722 the loop that formed the pirate round contained
between 1,000 and 2,000 sea bandits (see, e.g., Johnson 1726â28,132;
Pringle 1953, 185; Rediker 1987, 256; Marx 1996b, 102, 111; Konstam
2002, 6).[13] The buccaneering community of the seventeenth century must
have been even larger than this since, as I discuss below,some firsthand
observers report single expeditions of 2,000 men (Exquemelin [1678]
2000, 171).
Contrary to most peopleâs images of pirate crews, they were quite large.
On the basis of figures from 37 pirate ships between 1716 and1726, it
appears that the average crew had about 80 members (Rediker 1987, 256;
see also Deposition of Simon Calderon 1682, Public Record Office,
Colonial Office Papers 1:50, no. 139). A number of pirate crews were
closer to 120, and crews of 150â200 were not uncommon (see, e.g.,
Snelgrave [1734] 1971, 199; Examination of John Brown, May 6, 1717,
Suffolk Court Files, no. 11945, paper 5; Deposition of Theophilus
Turner, June 8, 1699, Public Record Office, Colonial Office Papers
5:714, no. 70 VI; Examination of John Dann, August 3, 1696, London,
Public Record Office, Colonial Office Papers 323:2, no. 25; Deposition
of Adam Baldridge, May 5, 1699, Public Record Office, Colonial Office
Papers 5:1042, no. 30 II; Johnson 1726â28, 442; Cordingly 2006, 165).
Several pirate crews were bigger than this. For example, Blackbeardâs
crew aboard the Queen Anneâs Revenge was 300 men strong (Public Record
Office, Colonial Office Papers 152/12, no. 67, iii; quoted in
Cordingly2006, 165â66; see also Marx 1996b, 112). Even a sixth-rate
Royal Navyship in the early eighteenth century carried more crew members
than the average pirate vessel (about 150). But compared to the average
200-ton merchant ship, which carried only 13â17 men, pirate ships were
extremely large (Rediker 1987, 107). Furthermore, some pirate crews were
too large to fit in one ship. In this case they formed pirate squadrons.
Captain Bartholomew Roberts, for example, commanded a squadron of four
ships that carried 508 men (Cordingly 2006, 111).
In addition to this, multiple pirate ships sometimes joined for
concerted plundering expeditions. The most impressive fleets of sea
bandits belong to the buccaneers. Alexander Exquemelin, for example,
records that Captain Morgan commanded a fleet of 37 ships and 2,000 men
sufficient to attack coastal communities on the Spanish Main (1678,171).
Elsewhere, he refers to a group of buccaneers who âhad a force of at
least twenty vessels in quest of plunderâ (69; see also 85, 105, 93).
Similarly, William Dampier ([1697â1707] 2005, 62) records a pirating
expedition that boasted 10 ships and 960 men.[14] Though their fleets
were not as massive, eighteenth-century pirates also âcheerfully joined
their Brethren in Iniquityâ to engage in multi crew pirating expeditions
(Snelgrave 1734, 198).
Although some pirates came from the Royal Navy, most sailors who entered
piracy came from the merchant marine. Merchant ships were organized
hierarchically.[15] On top was the captain, below him were his officers,
and far below these were ordinary seamen. This hierarchy em-powered
captains with autocratic authority over their crews. The captainâs
authority gave him control over all aspects of life aboard his
ship,including provision of victuals, wage payment, labor assignment,
and,of course, crew member discipline.
Merchant ship autocracy reflected an efficient institutional response to
the specific economic situation these ships confronted and, in
particular, the ownership structure of merchant vessels. Merchant ships
were owned by groups of typically a dozen or more landed merchants who
purchased shares in various trading vessels and financed their
voyages.[16] In addition to supplying the capital required for shipsâ
construction and continued maintenance, owners outfitted their vessels,
supplied them with provisions, advanced sailor wages, and, most
important, solicited customers (who were other landed merchants) and
negotiated terms of delivery and freight.Merchant ship owners were
absentee owners of their vessels; they did not sail on their ships.[17]
They were landlubbers. Most merchant shipowners did not desire to take
their chances with brutal life at sea, and in any event could earn more
by specializing in their area of expertiseâinvestment and commercial
organizationâhiring seamen to sail their ships instead.[18] Because they
were absentee owners, merchant ship owners confronted a principal-agent
problem with respect to the crews they hired. Once a ship left port it
could be gone for months.[19] At sea, the ownersâ ship was beyond their
watchful eyes or reach. Thus, ship owners could not directly monitor
their sailors. This situation invited various kinds of sailor
opportunism. Opportunism included negligence in caring for the ship,
carelessness that dam-aged cargo, liberality with provisions,
embezzlement of freight or advances required to finance the vesselâs
voyage, and outright theft of the vessel itself.
To prevent this, ship owners appointed captains to their vessels to
monitor crews in their stead. Centralizing power in a captainâs hands to
direct sailors��� tasks, control the distribution of victuals and
payment,and discipline and punish crew members allowed merchant ship
owners to minimize sailor opportunism. As noted above, merchant ships
tended to be quite small. Consequently, captains could cheaply monitor
sailorsâ behavior to prevent activities (or inactivities) that were
costly to shipowners and secure sailorsâ full effort.[20] Admiralty law
facilitated captainsâ ability to do this by granting them authority to
control their crewsâ behavior through corporal punishment.The law
empowered captains to beat crew members with the infamous(and ominous)
cat-o-nine-tails, imprison them, and administer other forms of harsh
physical âcorrectionâ to sailors who disobeyed orders,shirked in their
duties, and so forth. It also permitted captains to dock sailorsâ wages
for damaging or stealing cargo and insubordination.To align
owner-captain interests, owners used two devices. First, they hired
captains who held small shares in the vessels they were commanding or,
barring this, gave small shares to their captains who did not. Merchant
ship captains continued to draw regular fixed wages like the other
sailors on their vessels.[21] But unlike regular sailors, captains
became partial residual claimants of the ships they controlled, aligning
their interests with those of the absentee owners.[22] Second, whenever
possible, absentee owners appointed captains with familial connections
to one of the members of their group (Davis 1962, 128). This ensured
that captains did not behave opportunistically at the absentee ownersâ
expense since, if they did, they were more likely to face
punishment.[23]
The reason merchant ship owners required autocratic captains to
effectively serve their interests is straight forward. A captain who did
not have total authority over his crew could not successfully monitor
and control sailorsâ behavior. Reducing the captainâs power over
victuals,payments, labor assignment, or discipline, and vesting it in
some other sailorâs hands instead, would have concomitantly reduced the
captainâs power to make sailors behave in the absentee ownersâ interest.
Similarly, if merchant ship owners did not appoint their captains as the
permanent commanders of their voyages, but instead permitted a shipâs
sailors to popularly depose the captain and elect another member of the
crew to this office at their will, the captainâs capacity as acting
manager of the shipâs absentee owners would cease to exist. To see
this,simply imagine what kind of captain merchant sailors would elect if
given the power to democratically select him. Sailorsâ interests were
best served by a lax, liberal captain who let them do as they
pleasedâexactly the opposite sort of captain that best served the
ownersâ interests.
Merchant ship autocracy was therefore essential to overcoming the
owner-crew principal-agent problem and thus to merchant ship
profitability.Merchant ship autocracy worked quite well in this respect.
Although some sailors still managed to steal from the ships they sailed
on, disobey command, and, as I discuss below, in several cases mutiny
and abscond with the ownersâ ship, these were relatively unimportant
exceptions to the general rule whereby merchant sailors, under the
authority of autocratic captains, served their absentee ownersâ
interests.
Although merchant ship autocracy largely overcame the principal-agent
problem that absentee owners confronted with respect to their crews,in
doing so it created potential for a different kind of problem: captain
predation. The trouble was that a captain endowed with the authority
required to manage his crew on the ship ownersâ behalf could also easily
turn this authority against his seamen for personal benefit. As British
marine commander William Betagh characterized the problem, âunlimited
power, bad views, ill nature and ill principles all concurringâ âin a
shipâs commander,â âhe is past all restraintâ (1728, 41).
Betaghâs opinion of some captainsâ âill natureâ notwithstanding,
merchant captains were not necessarily bad men. But they were rational
economic actors and thus responded to the incentives their institutional
environment created. Endowed with autocratic authority over their crews,
some merchant captains used the power their employers and Admiralty law
gave them to prey on their sailors. As a result of merchant shipsâ
autocratic organization, captains âhad absolute authority over the
mates, the carpenters and boatswain, and the seamen.â They had the power
to âmake life tolerable or unbearable as they wishedâ (Davis
1962,131â32). Unfortunately for seamen, more than a few captains opted
for the latter.
As Marcus Rediker points out, according to several pirates, merchant
captain mistreatment of ordinary seamen was largely responsible for
driving sailors from this profession into the arms of sea bandits. The
pirate John Archerâs last words before being put to death testify to
this.As he lamented, âI could wish that Masters of Vessels would not use
their Men with so much Severity, as many of them do, which exposes us to
great Temptationsâ ( Johnson 1726â28, 351). In 1726 the pirate William
Fly pleaded similarly while awaiting his death sentence: âOur Captain
and his Mate used us Barbarously. We poor Men canât have Justice done
us. There is nothing said to our Commanders, let them never so much
abuse us, and use us like Dogsâ (quoted in Rediker 1981,218).
Captain predation took a number of forms, each the result of abusing the
autocratic power captains had at their disposal. Predatory captains cut
sailorsâ victual rations to keep costs down or to leave more for them
and their fellow officers to consume. As one sailor testified, for
example, although the members of his crew âwere at short allowance and
wanted bread,â the officers âwere allowed . . . their full allowance of
provisions and liquors as if there had been no want of scarcity of any
thing onboardâ (Babb v. Chalkley1701, High Court of Admiralty Papers,
24/127;quoted in Rediker 1987, 247). Predatory captains also
fraudulently docked sailorsâ wages or paid sailors in debased colonial
currency (Morris 1965, 237; Rediker 1987). They might also voyage to a
location where the crew had not contracted to sail (Gifford 1993, 144).
To keep their hungry and uncomfortable men in check, abusive captains
could and did use all manner of objects aboard their ships as weapons to
punish insolent crew members. They hit sailors in the head with tackle
or other hard objects on board, crushing their faces, and used other
barbaric tactics to discipline seamen (Jones v. Newcomin1735,High Court
of Admiralty Papers, 24/138; quoted in Rediker 1987, 216).
As merchant ship captain Nathaniel Uring described how he dealt with a
âseditious Fellowâ on his ship, for instance, âI gave him two or three
such Strokes with a Stick I had prepared for that purpose . . . the
Bloodrunning about his Ears, he prayâd for Godâs sake that I not kill
himâ([1726] 1928, 176â77).
Besides preventing dissension, captains also used their kingly power to
settle personal scores with crew members. Admiralty law considered
interfering with captain punishment mutinous and thus prohibited crew
members from doing so (Morris 1965, 264â65). Since captains effectively
defined when punishment was legitimate, they were free to abuse sea-men
at will. As one seaman warned a newcomer, âThere is no justice or
injustice on board ship, my lad. There are only two things: duty and
mutinyâmind that. All that you are ordered to do is duty. All that you
refuse to do is mutinyâ (quoted in Rediker 1987, 211).[24]
While the historical record contains plenty of charges of captain
predation, it is important to avoid overstating the extent of this
abuse.[25] Although merchant captains had ample latitude to prey on
their crews,this was not without limit. Several factors, economic and
legal, con-strained captain predation to some extent.[26]
But none was able to prevent it entirely. English law, for
example,created several legal protections that were supposed to insulate
sailors from captain predation. To a certain extent these protections
were successful. Merchant seamen could and did take predatory captains
to court for their actions, many times successfully.
However, as is often the case with the law, many other times it
failed.Part of the difficulty here stemmed from the well-known
uncertainties of the sea and the fact that, once they were afloat in the
briny deep,there were rarely impartial spectators to be had to verify a
sailorâs word against a captainâs. Did a captain dock a sailorâs pay
because the sailor damaged freight, as he was entitled to under the law?
Or was the captain simply self-dealing? Had a captain exceeded the
powers of corporal punishment afforded him under the law? Or was his
discipline justified?In many cases it was difficult to say.
Further, the law itself regarding these matters could be unclear. Some
sailors successfully sued their captains for merely pinching
provisions.In other cases far more abusive captain conduct was supported
by the law. In one case, for example, a captain beat his sailor with a
one-and-a-half inch rope for cursing. The court found he âhad Lawful
provocation to Correct the Complainant and had not Exceeded the bounds
of Humanityâ and dismissed the sailorâs claim (Broughton v. Atkins,
Massachusetts Vice-Admiralty Records, box II, fol. 25, 1727; quoted in
Morris1965, 264).
Reputation could also be effective in constraining captain
predation.Although the sailor population in the mid-eighteenth century
approached 80,000 (Gifford 1993, 147), there were fewer than 10,000
captains. The relatively small population of captains facilitated
information sharing about captain behavior. Since merchant ships had to
voluntarily attract sailors, this helped to dampen the predatory
inclinations of some merchant captains.
Nevertheless, some captain-sailor relations were anonymous and
non-repeated. For example, when in 1722 merchant ship captains Isham
Randolph, Constantine Cane, and William Halladay petitioned the colonial
governor of Virginia for greater authority to discipline their
sailors(who they complained were insolent for want of âfear of
correctionâ),they wrote that âit is frequently the misfortune of Masters
of Ships at their fitting out in England, to be obliged to ship men for
foreign Voyages of whose disposition and character they have no
knowledgeâ(quoted in Morris 1965, 271). Their letter suggests that the
market for merchant sailors was, at least in some cases, largely
anonymous. This implies not only that captains did not know the identity
of sailors they employed, but also that sailors in some cases did not
know the captains who employed them.
A number of sailors were the âfair weatherâ sort, drifting between
employment at land and at sea, as job and pay prospects permitted.
Others went to sea in between their regular work and thus had only
sporadic interaction with a few members of the maritime community
separated by lengthy periods. These features of the merchant sailor
labor market made information sharing more difficult and rendered
reputation a less effective constraint on captain abuse.
In assessing reputationâs ability to check merchant captainsâ predatory
inclinations, it is also important to remember that seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century merchant shipping took place in the context of
European mercantilism. Although some of Englandâs mercantilist policies,
such as bounties for shipbuilding, contributed to competition between
merchant ships, others, such as the colonial law that forbade merchant
ship captains from hiring away sailors who had already agreed to sail
for another captain and the law that restricted foreign merchant
captains from competing with English ones, retarded merchant ship
competition and thus reputationâs ability to check captain predation.
Another potential check on captain predation was the threat of mutiny.
However, like other forms of revolution, mutiny was a risky and costly
method of checking an authorityâs abuse. Crew members faced a collective
action problem that often prevented them from overthrowing predatory
captains.
Even on a merchant ship where every crew member agreed that the captain
should be removed, sailors confronted the standard collective action
problems of small-scale revolution. If crew members could co-ordinate
their hatred and jointly revolt against a captain, in many cases they
might have succeeded. However, since merchant ship crews were quite
small, it was important to have all the sailors, or at least a
significant majority, willing to fight. A successful mutiny might
require not only the commitment of the common seamen but the commitment
of the captainâs officers as well. Acquiring certainty on the part of
each sailor that if he rebelled against his captain, his fellow sailors
would as well,was problematic. If one or several crew members âchickened
outâ at the last minute, the revolting sailor(s) might be defeated and,
worse yet, face captain retribution.
Captain retribution involved using any of the powers at the captainâs
disposal to punish the mutineers. This ranged from imprisonment to
extreme corporal punishment, further cutting the mutineersâ rations or
pay, or assigning them the most dangerous tasks on the ship (see,e.g.,
Uring 1726). Unless each sailor was assured that his fellow seamen had
the courage and wherewithal to follow through on revolt, he was
unwilling to rebel against his predatory captain.
This is not to say that merchant sailors never mutinied. Indeed, they
did, but quite rarely. In the half century between 1700 and 1750, there
were fewer than 60 documented mutinies on English and American merchant
ships, about 1.18 per year (Rediker 1987, 227â28). It is possible that
many more mutinies went undocumented. But even if we quadruple this
number, which seems quite unreasonable, the number of merchant ship
mutinies is tiny compared to the number of merchant ship voyages over
this period. Further, this includes all attempted mutinies, not only the
successful ones, which were even more rare. According to Rediker, only
half of those documented between 1700 and1750 were successful (228).[27]
Thus, it appears that the collective action problem mutiny posed for
merchant sailors was quite severe. Maritime revolution, then, was not a
reliable method of reining in predatory merchant ship captains.
Why didnât those on the receiving end of captain predationâthe common
seamenâsimply pool their resources, purchase their own merchant ship,
and sail it themselves? Several factors appear to have prevented this
possibility. Although a merchant ship officer might, after several
years, save enough to purchase a small share in a merchant vessel,âOnly
if a seaman could raise the money to buy, not a tiny fraction but a
substantial shareâa half or moreâwould such a financial gesture by
itself be sufficient to attract co-ownersâ (Davis 1962, 127).
Merchant shipping was not as simple as carrying goods from point A to
point B. It crucially depended on connections with landed merchants,both
at home and abroad, who were willing to take the risk of doing business
with a particular group of ship owners, trade with these owners on
credit, and so on. Landed merchants had established reputations along
these lines, making it possible for them to secure investors and
customers.
Salty sea folk, in contrast, did not. The common seventeenth- or
eighteenth-century seaman occupied one of the lowest stations in the
economic food chain. He was âfrom the lowest ranks of society . . . from
young men who were dissatisfied with, or could obtain no employment in,
the lowest of shore occupationsâ (Davis 1962, 114). He had neither
business experience nor connections. Needless to say, merchants were not
lining up to put their valuable cargo under the care of sailor-owned and
operated ships.
Even if several seamen had sufficient faith in one anotherâs abilities
to make a go of the seafaring portion of merchant shipping and,
furthermore, were willing to risk dumping several yearsâ savings into
buying a ship owned together with other sailors, they would have had no
reason to think that any of their co-owners commanded the business
knowledge or connections required to make such a venture profitable. Nor
would they have been able to attract the capital required to withstand
even one unsuccessful voyage that resulted from shipwreck, pirate
attack, or any of the other uncertainties of merchant shipping.[28] Just
as specialization required merchants to devote their time to organizing
the commercial aspects of merchant voyages, leaving the sailing to the
sailors,so too did specialization require seamen to focus on the sailing
aspects of merchant voyages, leaving the commercial organization to the
merchants.
Like merchant ship organization, the particular economic situation
pi-rate ships confronted crucially shaped their organization. Most
notably,pirates did not confront the owner-crew principal-agent problem
that merchant ships did. The reason for this is simple enough: pirates
did not acquire their ships legitimately. They stole them.[29]
Pirate ships therefore had no absentee owners. On a pirate ship, the
principals were the agents. As one historian described it, in this sense
a pirate ship was like a âsea-going stock companyâ (Pringle 1953, 106).
As a result, pirates did not require captains to align the crewâs
interests with those of the shipâs absentee owners. This feature of
piracy largely explains the stark contrast between merchant and pirate
ship organization.
However, the absence of the owner-crew principal-agent problem on pirate
ships does not mean that pirates did not need captains. They certainly
did. Many important piratical decisions, such as how to engage a
potential target, how to pursue when âchasingâ a target or being chased
by authorities, and how to react if attacked, required snap decision
making. There was no time for disagreement or debate in such cases,and
conflicting voices would have made it impossible to undertake the most
essential tasks. Furthermore, pirate ships, like all ships, needed some
method of maintaining order, distributing victuals and payments,and
administering discipline to unruly crew members.
The office of captain overcame such difficulties by vesting autocratic
control over these matters in the hands of an authority. In this
sense,although pirate ships differed from merchant ships in requiring
captains to solve an owner-sailor principal-agent problem, pirate ships
were similar to merchant ships in requiring some kind of authority for
their undertakingâs success. Although a pirate shipâs activityâviolent
plunderâwas wholly different from a merchant shipâs, both kinds of
vessels shared the need to create internal order to achieve their ends.
The need for captains posed a dilemma for pirates. On the one hand,a
captain who wielded unquestioned authority in certain decisions was
critical for success. On the other hand, what was to prevent a captain
with this power from behaving toward his pirate crew in the same manner
that predatory merchant ship captains behaved toward their crews? Since
pirates did not have absentee owners but instead jointly owned the
stolen ships they sailed on, although they required captains, unlike
merchant ships, they did not require autocratic captains. Thus, in sharp
contrast to the situation on merchant ships, pirates could and did
democratically elect their captains without problem. Since the pirates
sailing a particular ship were both the principals and the agents,
democracy did not threaten to lead to captains who served the agents at
the principalsâ expense. On the contrary, pirate democracy ensured that
pirates got precisely the kind of captain they desired. Because pirates
could popularly depose any captain who did not suit them and elect
another in his place, pirate captainsâ ability to prey on crew members
was greatly constrained compared to that of merchant ship captains.
Similarly, because pirates were both principals and agents of their
ships, they could divide authority on their vessels to further check
captainsâ ability to abuse crew members without loss. Unlike merchant
ships,which could not afford a separation of power since this would have
diminished the ability of the absentee ownersâ acting agent (the
captain)to make the crew act in the ownersâ interests, pirate ships
could and did adopt a system of democratic checks and balances.
Because of the threat of captain predation, pirates âwere adamant in
wanting to limit the captainâs power to abuse and cheat themâ
(Rogo-zinski 2000, 174). To do this they instituted a democratic system
of divided power, or piratical checks and balances, aboard their ships.
As the pirate Walter Kennedy testified at his trial, âMost of them
having suffered formerly from the ill-treatment of Officers, provided
thus care-fully against any such Evil now they had the choice in
themselves . . .for the due Execution thereof they constituted other
Officers besides the Captain; so very industrious were they to avoid
putting too much Power into the hands of one Manâ (Hayward [1735] 1874,
1:42).
The primary âother officerâ pirates âconstitutedâ for this purpose was
the quartermaster. The way this office worked is straightforward.
Captains retained absolute authority in times of battle, enabling
pirates to realize the benefits of autocratic control required for
success in conflict.However, pirate crews transferred power to allocate
provisions, select and distribute loot (there was rarely room aboard
pirate ships to take all they seized from a prize), and adjudicate crew
member conflicts/administer discipline to the quartermaster, whom they
democratically elected:
For the Punishment of small Offences . . . there is a principal Officer
among the Pyrates, called the Quarter-Master, of the Menâs own choosing,
who claims all Authority this Way, (excepting in Time of Battle:) If
they disobey his Command, are quarrelsome and mutinous with one another,
misuse Prisoners,plunder beyond his Order, and in particular, if they be
negligent of their Arms, which he musters at Discretion, he punishes at
his own dare without incurring the Lash from all the Shipâs Company: In
short, this Officer is Trustee for the whole,is the first on board any
Prize, separating for the Companyâs Use, what he pleases, and returning
what he thinks fit to the Owners, excepting Gold and Silver, which they
have voted not returnable. ( Johnson 1726â28, 213).
William Snelgrave, who observed the piratesâ system of checks and
balances firsthand, characterized the relationship between captain and
quartermaster similarly: âthe Captain of a Pirate Ship, is chiefly
chosen to fight the Vessels they may meet with. Besides him, they chose
another principle Officer, whom they call Quarter-master, who has the
general Inspection of all Affairs, and often controls the Captainâs
Ordersâ(1734, 199â200). This separation of power removed captainsâ
control over activities they traditionally used to prey on crew members,
while empowering them sufficiently to direct plundering expeditions.
The institutional separation of powers aboard pirate ships predated its
adoption by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century governments. France, for
example, did not experience such a separation until 1789. Nor did the
United States. The first specter of separated powers in Spain did not
appear until 1812. In contrast, pirates had divided,
democraticâgovernmentâ aboard their ships at least a century before
this. Arguably, piratical checks and balances predated even Englandâs
adoption of similar institutions. England did not experience a
separation of powers until the Glorious Revolution of 1688. However, the
buccaneers, who used a similar, if not as thoroughgoing, system of
democratically divided power as their pure pirate successors, had in
place at least partial democratic checks and balances in the early 1680s
(Rogozinski 2000).
Piratical checks and balances proved quite successful. According to
Johnson, owing to the institution of the quartermaster, aboard pirate
ships âthe Captain can undertake nothing which the Quarter-Master does
not approve. We may say, the Quarter-Master is an humble Imitation of
the Roman Tribune of the People; he speaks for, and looks after the
Interest of the Crewâ (1726â28, 423). As noted previously, the only
exception to this was âin Chase, or in Battleâ when crews desired
autocratic authority and thus, âby their own Laws,â âthe Captainâs Power
is uncontrollableâ (139, 214).[30]
In addition to this separation of powers, pirates imposed a further
check to balance captainsâ authority. They converted the office to a
democratically elected one, âthe Rank of Captain being obtained by the
Suffrage of the Majorityâ (Johnson 1726â28, 214). The combination of
separated powers and democratic elections for captains ensured that
pirates âonly permit him to be Captain, on Condition, that they may be
Captain over himâ (213).
Crews could vote captains out of office for any number of reasons.
Predation was one, but so was cowardice, poor judgment, and any other
behavior a crew did not feel was in its best interest. In this way
pirates could be sure that captainship âfalls on one superior for
Knowledge and Boldness, Pistol Proof, (as they call it)â ( Johnson
1726â28, 214). The historical record contains numerous examples of
pirate crews deposing unwanted captains by majority vote or otherwise
removing them from power through popular consensus. Captain Charles
Vaneâs pirate crew, for example, popularly deposed him for cowardice:
âthe Captainâs Behavior was obliged to stand the Test of a Vote, and a
Resolution passed against his Honour and Dignity . . . deposing him from
the Commandâ ( Johnson 1726â28, 139). Similarly, Captain Christopher
Moodyâs pirate crew grew dissatisfied with his behavior and âat last
forced him, with twelve othersâ who supported him âinto an open Boat . .
. and . . . they were never heard of afterwardsâ (Snelgrave1734,
198).[31]
Crews sometimes elected quartermasters who displayed particular valor or
keen decision making to replace less capable or honorable captains. For
example, when one pirate crew âwent to Voting for a new Captain . . .
the Quarter-Master, who had behaved so well in the last Affair . . . was
chosenâ ( Johnson 1726â28, 479). This helped create competition among
pirate officers that tended to check their abuses and encouraged them to
serve the interests of their crews.[32]
Pirates took seriously the limitations they imposed on captainsâ
authority through their system of checks and balances. A speech made by
one of the pirates aboard Captain Bartholomew Robertsâ ship testifies to
this. As he told his crew, âshould a Captain be so sawcy as to exceed
Prescription at any time, why down with him! it will be a Caution after
he is dead to his Successors, of what fatal Consequence any sort of
assuming may beâ ( Johnson 1726â28, 194â95). This pirate was
exaggeratingâbut only slightly. Crews quickly and readily deposed old
captains and elected new ones when the former overstepped the limited
power crews gave them.
The seriousness with which pirates sought to limit their captainsâ power
is reflected in other ways as well. For instance, in contrast to
merchant vessels, on pirate ships, captains were unable to secure
special privileges for themselves at their crewsâ expense. Their
lodging, provisions, and even pay were nearly the same as that of
ordinary crew members. As Johnson described it, aboard pirate ships
âevery Man, as the Humour takes him . . . [may] intrude [the captainâs]
Apartment, swear at him, seize a part of his Victuals and Drink, if they
like it, without his offering to find Fault or contest itâ (1726â28,
213â14). In other cases,âthe Captain himself not being allowed a Bedâ
had to sleep with the rest of the crew in far less comfortable
conditions (Snelgrave 1734, 217). Or, as one pirate fellow-traveler
marveled, âeven their Captain, or any other Officer, is allowed no more
than another Man; nay, the Captain cannot [even] keep his own Cabin to
himself â (Downing [1737] 1924,99; quoted in Rogozinski 2000, 175).
One pirate captive records an event in which the captains of a pirate
fleet borrowed fancy clothes that were part of the loot their crews
acquired in taking a recent prize. These captains hoped that their
stolen finery would attract local women on the nearby shore. Although
the captains intended only to borrow the clothes, the crews became
out-raged at their captains whom they saw as transgressing the limits of
their narrowly circumscribed power. As the observer described it, âThe
Pirate Captains having taken these Cloaths without leave from the
Quarter-master, it gave great Offence to all the Crew; who alledgâd, âIf
they suffered such things, the Captains would for the future assume a
Power,to take whatever they liked for themselvesââ (Snelgrave 1734,
257).[33]
One can also get an idea of the effectiveness of piratical checks and
balances by considering the remarks of one contemporary that point to
the rarity of pirate captain predation. Perplexed by an anomalous pirate
captain who abused his crew, he puzzled, âThe captain is very severe to
his people, by reason of his commission, and caries a very different
form from what other Pirates use to do . . . often calling for his
pistols and threatening any that durst speak to the contrary of what he
desireth, to knock out their brainsâ (quoted in Rogozinski 2000, 139;
see also Deposition of Benjamin Franks, October 20, 1697, Public Record
Office, Colonial Office Papers, 323:2, no. 124).[34]
This success helps explain why, counter intuitively, âthe People
[pirates overtook] were generally glad of an opportunity of entering
with themâ(Snelgrave 1734, 203). Indeed, pirates frequently
âstrengthenâd them-selves with a great many fresh Hands, who most of
them enterâd voluntarilyâ ( Johnson 1726â28, 170; see also 228;
Deposition of Jeremiah Tay, July 6, 1694, Suffolk Court Files, no. 3033,
paper 6; Colonial Office Papers, May 31, 1718, fol. 18).[35]
Piratesâ system of checks and balances effectively prevented captains
from preying on their crews. However, a significant problem remained.In
vesting many of the powers captains typically held in quartermasters
instead, what was to prevent quartermasters from abusing their authority
to privately benefit at crewsâ expense?
As discussed above, quartermasters had numerous roles aboard pirate
ships. They were in charge of the distribution of booty and provisions,
conflict resolution, and crew member punishment. This gave them ample
latitude to prey on crews. I have already discussed one check on
quartermaster predation, which also checked captain predationâdemocratic
elections. As with their captains, pirate crews elected quarter-masters
and could depose them if they overstepped their authority.
But what precisely did this include? Were, for instance, quartermasters
free to divide booty and provisions as they saw fit? Could they punish
crew members at their discretion? Furthermore, according to what âlawsâ
were they supposed to adjudicate disputes between those onboard?
After all, not only were pirates afraid of captain predation; they
opposed any situation that threatened to jeopardize their ability to
cooperate for organized banditry, including the institution of the
quartermaster. To solve this problem, pirate crews forged written
constitutions that specified their laws and punishments for breaking
these laws and more specifically limited the actions that
quarter-masters might take in carrying out their duties.
Pirate constitutions originated with âarticles of agreementâ followed on
buccaneer ships in the seventeenth century. The buccaneers called their
articles a chasse-partie. These articles specified the division of booty
among the officers and crew along with other terms of the buccaneersâ
organization. All sea bandits followed the basic rule of âno prey, no
pay.âUnless a pirating expedition was successful, no man received any
payment.
Exquemelin (1678, 71â72) describes the chasse-partie that governed his
crewâs expedition in detail:
The buccaneers resolve by common vote where they shall cruise. They also
draw up an agreement or chasse partie, in which is specified what the
captain shall have for himself and for the use of his vessel. Usually
they agree on the following terms. Providing they capture a prize, first
of all these amounts would be deducted from the whole capital. The
hunterâs pay would generally be 200 pieces of eight. The carpenter, for
his work in repairing and fitting out the ship, would be paid 100or 150
pieces of eight. The surgeon would receive 200 or 250for his medical
supplies, according to the size of the ship.
Then came the agreed awards for the wounded, who might have lost a limb
or suffered injuries. They would be compensated as follows: for the loss
of a right arm, 600 pieces of eight or six slaves; for a left arm 500
pieces of eight or five slaves.The loss of a right leg also brought 500
pieces of eight or five slaves in compensation; a left leg 400 or four
slaves; an eye,100 or one slave, and the same award was made for the
loss of a finger. If a man lost the use of an arm, he would get as much
as if it had been cut off, and a severe internal injury which meant the
victim had to have a pipe inserted in his body would receive 500 pieces
of eight or five slaves in recompense.
These amounts having first been withdrawn from the capital,the rest of
the prize would be divided into as many portions as men on the ship. The
captain draws four or five menâs portions for the use of the ship,
perhaps even more, and two portions for himself. The rest of the men
share uniformly, and the boys get half a manâs share.
. . . When a ship is robbed, nobody must plunder and keep his loot to
himself. Everything takenâmoney, jewels, precious stones and goodsâmust
be shared among them all, without any man enjoying a penny more than his
fair share. To prevent deceit, before the booty is distributed everyone
has to swear an oath on the Bible that he has not kept for himself so
much as the value of a sixpence, whether in silk, linen, wool,
gold,silver, jewels, clothes or shot, from all the capture. And should
any man be found to have made a false oath, he would be banished from
the rovers, never more be allowed in their company.
Over time, the buccaneers institutionalized their articles of agreement
and social organization. The result was a system of customary law and
metarules called the âCustom of the Coast,â or the âJamaica
Discipline.âEighteenth-century pirates built on this institutional
framework in developing their own constitutions. Pirates created them
âfor the better Conservation of their Society, and doing Justice to one
anotherâ ( Johnson 1726â28, 210). The basic elements of pirate
constitutions displayed remarkable similarity across crews (Rediker
1987, 261). In describing the articles on Captain Robertsâ ship, for
instance, Johnson refers toâthe Laws of this Company . . . principle
Customs, and Government,of this roguish Commonwealth; which are pretty
near the same with all Pyratesâ (1726â28, 213).
Frequent intercrew interactions led to information sharing that
facilitated constitutional commonality.[36] More than 70 percent of
Anglo-American pirates active between 1716 and 1726, for example, can be
connected back to one of three pirate captains: Benjamin Hornigold,
George Lowther, or Edward Low (Rediker 1987, 267). Thus, a significant
proportion of all pirates during this period were associated with one
another in some way, via traveling on the same ship, in concert with
other ships, and so forth.
Articles of agreement required unanimous consent. Consequently,pirates
democratically formed them in advance of launching pirating expeditions.
âAll [pirates] swore to âem,â sometimes on a Bible or, for one pirate
crew, âupon a Hatchet for want of a Bible.â The crew forged its articles
alongside the election of a captain, quartermaster, and occasionally
other smaller officers. Pirates sought agreement on their articles ex
ante âto prevent Disputes and Ranglings afterwardsâ ( Johnson 1726â28,
342). In the event a pirate disagreed with their conditions, he was free
to search elsewhere for more satisfactory terms.[37]
When multiple pirate ships joined together for an expedition, they
created similar articles establishing the terms of their partnership.
Upon encountering one another at Grand Cayman, for example, Captain
George Lowther and Edward Lowâs pirate crews forged such an agreement.
Lowther âoffering himself as an Ally; Low accepted of the Terms, and so
the Treaty was presently signâd without Plenipoâs or any other
Formalitiesâ (1726â28, 319).
Likewise, crews that objected to the proposed articles or some other
element of an intended multi ship expedition were free to depart
peace-ably. In one such case, for example, âa Spirit of Discordâ emerged
be-tween three pirate crews sailing in consort âupon which . . . [they]
immediately parted, each steering a different Courseâ ( Johnson 1726â28,
175).
Charles Johnsonâs records contain several examples of pirate
constitutions, through which, as one court remarked, these rogues were
âwickedly united, and articled togetherâ ( Johnson 1726â28, 253).
Consider,for instance, the articles aboard Captain Robertsâ pirate ship,
as relayed by Captain Johnson (211â12):
I. Every Man has a Vote in the Affairs of Moment; has equal Title to the
fresh Provisions, or strong Liquors, at any Time seized, and may use
them at Pleasure, unless a Scarcity make it necessary, for the Good of
all, to vote a Retrenchment.
II. Every Man to be called fairly in Turn, by List, on board of Prizes,
because, (over and above their proper Share) they were on these
Occasions allowed a Shift of Cloaths: But if they defrauded the Company
to the Value of a Dollar, in Plate, Jewels, or Money, Marooning was
their Punishment. If the Robbery was only betwixt one another, they
contented themselves with slitting the Ears and Nose of him that was
Guilty, and set him on Shore, not in an uninhabited Place, but
somewhere,where he was sure to encounter Hardships.
III. No person to Game at Cards or Dice for Money.
IV. The Lights and Candles to be put out at eight a-Clock at Night: If
any of the Crew, after that Hour, still remained inclined for Drinking,
they were to do it on the open Deck.
V. To keep their Piece, Pistols, and Cutlash clean, and fit for Service.
VI. No Boy or Woman to be allowed amongst them. If any Man were found
seducing any of the latter Sex, and carryâd her to Sea, disguised, he
was to suffer Death.
VII. To Desert the Ship, or their Quarters in Battle, was punished with
Death or Marooning.
VIII. No striking one another on board, but every Manâs Quarrels to be
ended on Shore, at Sword and Pistol.
IX. No Man to talk of breaking up their Way of Living, till each shared
a 1000 l. If in order to this, any Man should lose a Limb, or become a
Cripple in their Service, he was to have 800 Dollars, out of the public
Stock, and for lesser Hurts,proportionately.
X. The Captain and Quarter-Master to receive two Shares of a Prize; the
Master, Boatswain, and Gunner, one Share and a half, and other Officers
one and a Quarter [everyone else to receive one share].
XI. The Musicians to have Rest on the Sabbath Day, but the other six
Days and Nights, none without special Favour.
Several important features stand out from these examples of pirate
articles. First, they created a democratic form of governance and
explicitly laid out the terms of pirate compensation. This was to
clarify the status of property rights aboard pirate ships and to prevent
officers,such as the captain or quartermaster, from preying on crew
members.In particular, making the terms of compensation explicit helped
to circumscribe the quartermasterâs authority in dividing booty.
When booty was indivisible or there was question as to its value and
thus how many shares it counted for in payment, pirates sold or
auctioned the troublesome items and distributed the divisible proceeds
accordingly (Snelgrave 1734; Rogozinski 2000, 169). This practice
prevented conflict between crew members. More important, it constrained
the discretion of the quartermaster, who might otherwise be in a
position to circumvent the terms of compensation when loot was
indivisible or of ambiguous value.
Second, pirate articles prohibited activities that generated significant
negative externalities and threatened the success of criminal
organization aboard their ships. Thus, pirate articles required crew
members to keep their weapons in good working order; on Robertsâ ship
limited drunken raucousness to allow nonparticipant pirates to get
sufficient sleep, and to âgive a Check to their Debauchesâ ( Johnson
1726â28,211); prohibited onboard fighting that might jeopardize the
entire crewâs ability to function; and prohibited activities, such as
gambling,that were likely to lead to onboard brawls. On similar grounds,
crewsâ articles often prohibited women (and young boys), who it was
thought would invite conflict or tension among crew members aboard their
ships.âThis being a good political Rule to prevent disturbances amongst
them,it is strictly observedâ (Snelgrave 1734, 256â57; see also Johnson
1726â28, 212).
In the same way, some pirate ships forbade activities such as firing
oneâs guns or smoking in areas of the ship that carried highly flammable
goods, such as gunpowder. According to the articles aboard John
Phillipsâ Revenge, for example, âThat Man that shall snap his Arms, or
smoak Tobacco in the Hold without a Cap to his Pipe, or carry a Candle
lighted without a Lanthorn, shall suffer the same Punishment as in the
former Articleâ ( Johnson 1726â28, 342â43).
Third, pirate constitutions contained articles that provided incentives
for crew member productivity and prevented shirking. One manifestation
of this was their creation of social insurance for pirates injured
during battle. As in the examples from Exquemelin and Roberts above,
articles specified in detail what a lost arm was worth, a lost leg, and
soon. They even went as far as to assign different insurance values
de-pending on whether it was, for instance, the right or left appendage
that was mutilated or lost, according to the importance pirates assigned
to these body parts.
Another manifestation of these incentive provisions was the use of
bonuses for crew members who displayed particular courage in battle,were
the first to spot potential targets, and so forth. Because pirate crews
were large, quartermasters could not easily monitor individual piratesâ
effort. As I discuss below, this is why pirates used profit sharing
rather than fixed wages for payment.
The problem with a share system is that it can create incentives for
free riding. Further, one team memberâs laziness directly reduces the
income of the others. To deal with this, pirates, like privateers and
whalers, who also used a share system, created bonuses. According to the
rule aboard Exquemelinâs buccaneering vessel, for instance, âThose who
behaved courageously and performed any deed of extraordinary valour, or
captured a ship, should be rewarded out of the common plunderâ (1678,
156). Or, as Johnson records, âIt must be observed,they [pirates] keep a
good Look-out; for, according to their Articles, he who first espies a
Sail, if she proves a Prize, is entitled the best Pair of Pistols on
board, over and above his Dividendâ (1726â28, 191).
Finally, pirate articles stipulated punishments for failure to adhere to
their rules. As discussed above, for more minor infractions, crews
typically delegated punishment power to the shipâs democratically
elected quartermaster. As Johnson described it, the quartermaster âacts
as a Sort of civil Magistrate on board a Pyrate Shipâ (1726â28,
213).[38] In the case of more severe infractions, crew members voted on
punishments. In both cases pirate crews tended to follow the punishments
for various infractions identified in their articles. By specifying
punishments in their articles, crews were able to limit the scope of
quartermastersâ discretion in administering discipline, checking
quartermastersâ power for abuse.
Punishments for article violations varied from physical torture, such as
âslitting the Ears and Nose of him that was Guilty,â to marooningâa
practice Captain Johnson described as the âbarbarous Custom of put-ting
the Offender on Shore, on some desolate or uninhabited Cape or Island,
with a Gun, a few Shot, a Bottle of Water, and a Bottle of Powder,to
subsist with or starveâ (1726â28, 211).[39] On Captain Phillipsâ ship,
for example, article violations were punished with âMosesâs Law (that
is, 40 Stripes lacking one) on the bare backâ (342â43).
In this sense, âPirates exercised greater cruelty in maintaining
discipline among themselves than in their treatment of prisonersâ
(Rankin1969, 37). Pirates considered theft aboard their ships especially
heinous.Their articles reflected this and frequently punished theft with
torture,marooning, or death. To help keep themselves honest, some crews
used random searches to hunt for anyone who might be holding back
loot(Exquemelin 1678, 205â6).[40] To ensure that the quartermaster did
not hide booty from the crew, some pirates prohibited their valuable
plunder from being kept under lock and key. As pirate Peter Hooff
described the situation on Captain Sam Bellamyâs Whydah, for instance,
the âmoney was kept in Chests between Decks without any Guard, but none
was to take any without the Quarter Masters leaveâ (quoted in Rediker
2004,67; see also Marx 1996a, 44).
Since pirate articles tended to be short and simple, they could not
cover all possible contingencies that might affect a crew. In this sense
they were always incomplete. To deal with this, when a significant issue
emerged, the crew gathered to act as a kind of judiciary to interpret or
apply the shipâs articles to situations not clearly stipulated in the
articles themselves: âIn Case any Doubt should arise concerning the
Construction of these Laws, and it should remain a Dispute whether the
Party had infringed them or no, a Jury was appointed to explain them,
and bring in a Verdict upon the Case in Doubtâ ( Johnson 1726â28, 213).
Through this âjudicial reviewâ process, pirate crews were able to
further limit quartermastersâ discretionary authority, restraining the
potential for quartermaster abuse.
The historical record points to the effectiveness of pirate
constitutions in this capacity, evidenced by the rarity of accounts of
quartermaster abuse. Equally important, in the infrequent event that
abuse did occur,the evidence indicates that crews successfully removed
abusive quarter-masters from power. For example, in 1691 quartermaster
Samuel Burgess cheated his crew in the division of food. In response,
his crew marooned him (Rogozinski 2000, 177).
The evidence also suggests that piratical articles were successful in
preventing internal conflict and creating order aboard pirate ships.
Pirates, it appears, strictly adhered to their articles. According to
one historian, pirates were more orderly, peaceful, and well organized
among themselves than many of the colonies, merchant ships, or vessels
of the Royal Navy (Pringle 1953; Rogozinski 2000). As an astonished
pirate observer put it, âAt sea, they perform their duties with a great
deal of order, better even than on the Ships of the Dutch East India
Company; the pirates take a great deal of pride in doing things
rightâ(de Bucquoy 1744, 116; translated and quoted in Rogozinski 2000,
viii).
Though it is strange to think about such order prevailing among pirates,
the peculiarity fades when one recognizes that their organized criminal
enterpriseâs success depended on it. The remark of one perceptive
eighteenth-century observer indicates precisely this. As he put it,
âgreat robbers as they are to all besides, [pirates] are precisely just
among themselves; without which they could no more Subsist than a
Structure without a Foundationâ (Slush 1709, viii; quoted in
Rediker1987, 287).
The fact that pirate crews unanimously consented to the articles that
governed them, ex ante, also plays an important role in explaining their
success. Pirates recognized that âit was every oneâs Interest to observe
them, if they were minded to keep up so abominable a Combinationâ(
Johnson 1726â28, 210). Since pirates agreed to these rules before
sailing, rules were largely self-enforcing once in place.
In light of the sharp contrast between merchant and pirate ship
organization, an important question arises concerning the efficiency of
pirate institutions. After all, merchant ships were legitimate vessels
and there-fore had the governmentâs formal enforcement power at their
disposal.This gave them a wider range of organizational options than
pirates,who were criminals and therefore did not have the government
backing that afforded the same organizational choices. One possibility,
then, is that pirate organization merely reflects this smaller menu of
opportunities. Perhaps if pirates could have relied on government
enforcement,they too would have opted for merchant shipâlike
institutions.
Alternatively, pirate ship organization was an efficient institutional
response to the unique economic situation pirates faced, quite apart
from their inability to rely on government. Although pirates faced a
constraint that merchant ships did notâinability to rely on
governmentâas discussed above, merchant ships faced a constraint that
pirate ships did notâthe need to solve an owner-crew principal-agent
problem.Given the very different economic situations pirate and merchant
ships confronted in this regard, it would not be surprising if the
efficient mode of organizing these ships was different as wellâthis
difference being driven by the economic differences between the two
rather than by their different legal status.
As a first cut at this issue we can look to the success of piratical
expeditions. If pirates seized only small prizes, or no prizes at all,
clearly their organization was not an effective one. On the other hand,
if pirates succeeded in taking very valuable prizes, our confidence in
piratesâ organizational efficiency should grow.
The evidence suggests that if piratesâ inability to organize
autocratically was inhibiting piratical efficiency, it could not have
been doing so greatly. Although we do not have data that would allow us
to compute anything like the average pirateâs wage, what evidence is
available suggests that incredibly large pirate prizes were not unheard
of.
Of course, this evidence must be interpreted with caution. These
seizures were recorded precisely because of their spectacular size. More
common were undoubtedly more modest prizes. Nevertheless, the examples
we have are enough to point to the significant success of piratical
plunder in some cases and the opportunity piracy offered sailors for
becoming incredibly wealthy.â
At a time when Anglo-American seamen on a trading voyage to Madagascar
were collecting less than twelve pounds sterling a year . . . the
deep-water pirates could realize a hundred or even a thousand times
moreâ (Marx 1996c, 141). In 1695, for example, Henry Everyâs pirate
fleet captured a prize carrying more than ÂŁ600,000 in precious metals
and jewels. The resulting share-out earned each member of his crew
ÂŁ1,000 (Konstam 2007, 98), the equivalent of nearly 40 yearsâ income for
an able merchant seaman at the time. In the early eighteenth century,
Captain John Bowenâs pirate crew plundered a prize âwhich yielded them
500l. per Man.â Several years later Captain Thomas Whiteâs crew retired
to Madagascar after a marauding expedition, each pirate having earned
ÂŁ1,200 from the cruise ( Johnson 1726â28, 480, 485). In 1720,Captain
Christopher Condentâs crew seized a prize that earned each pirate
ÂŁ3,000. Similarly, in 1721, Captain John Taylor and Oliver LaBoucheâs
pirate consort earned an astonishing ÂŁ4,000 for each crew member from a
single attack (Marx 1996c, 161, 163). Even the small pirate crew
captained by John Evans in 1722 took enough booty to split ânine
thousand Pounds among thirty Personsââor ÂŁ300 a pirateâin less than six
months âon the accountâ ( Johnson 1726â28, 340).
To put these earnings in perspective, compare them to the able merchant
seamanâs wage over the same period. Between 1689 and 1740 this varied
from 25 to 55 shillings per month, a meager ÂŁ15 to ÂŁ33 per year(Davis
1962, 136â37).
In the absence of data for a larger number of pirate hauls, it is not
possible to say whether the average seventeenth- or eighteenth-century
pirate consistently earned more than the average seventeenth- or
eighteenth-century merchant sailor. It is certainly possible that this
was the case, however. As one pirate testified at his trial, for
instance, âit is a common thing for us [pirates] when at Sea to acquire
vast quantities,both of the Metal that goes before me [silver, referring
to the silver oar of the Admiralty court], and of Goldâ (quoted in
Hayward 1735, I:45).
This pirateâs remark may very well reflect his desire to impress the
court more than it reflects piracyâs profitability. Still, what the
evidence on piratical plunder does clearly point to is the tremendous
potentialâupsideâ of piratical employment. Unlike employment as a
merchant sailor, which guaranteed a low, if regular, income, a single
successful pirating expedition could make a sailor wealthy enough to
retire. This is no doubt largely the reason why, as one
eighteenth-century colonial governor remarked, âso many are willing to
join them [pirates] when takenâ (Colonial Office Papers, May 31, 1718,
fol. 18; quoted in Rediker1987, 260).
If pirates did in fact earn substantially more than their legitimate
counterparts, this raises the question of why more merchant sailors did
not join the ranks of the pirates, eliminating any difference between
pirate and merchant sailor wages. Bearing in mind again that we cannot
know for certain whether or not the average pirate earned more than the
average merchant sailor, there are two reasons sailors did not flock in
greater numbers to life beneath the black flag even if this were the
case.
The first was simply the risk of being caught. Piracy was a capital
offense. In the eighteenth century, if a sailor was found guilty of
piracy,he was hanged. Although pirates largely escaped the arm of the
law in the seventeenth century, by the third decade of the eighteenth
century Englandâs renewed campaign against sea banditry was successfully
capturing and hanging pirates regularly, rendering piracy an
exceptionally dangerous employment.
Second, a merchant sailor who entered piracy had to be willing to
plunder other ships, murder innocents, and brutally torture
resisters.Although many sailors were surely drawn to the idea of piracy
by the prospect of riches, in light of the brutal features of piratical
employment,it is not surprising that many sailors were unwilling to
become sea marauders despite the potentially superior pay.
Piratesâ plunderous success does not necessarily point to their
organizationâs efficiency, however. Pirates may have been quite
successful de-spite their institutions rather than because of them.
Ideally, to assess pirate organizationâs efficiency we would want to see
how marine vessels that engaged in the same economic activity as
pirates, violently taking prizesâbut did so legitimately and thus
enjoyed government enforcementâwere organized. If we could identify such
vessels and they exhibited some of pirate shipsâ important institutional
features, we could more confidently conclude that pirate organization
reflected an efficient response to the economic activity pirates were
engaged in, not merely the fact that they did not enjoy government
support.
Fortunately, such vessels exist and indeed operated contemporaneously
with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pirate ships. These vessels are
privateers. Privateers were private warships licensed by governments to
harass the merchant ships of enemy nations. Privateers shared a
predetermined portion of the proceeds from this activity with the
commissioning government.[41] Their licenses, sometimes called âletters
of marque,â granted them official permission to plunder enemy merchant
ships and established their legitimacy under the law.[42] Thus, the
institutions and arrangements that privateers used to regulate their
ships were legal agreements, enforceable by the commissioning
government.
Privateers, like merchant ships, were owned by absentee
merchants.Consequently, privateers did not have elected captains or a
system of separated powers, as pirate ships did. Owing to the absentee
ownership structure privateers shared with merchant ships, the
principal-agent problem privateers confronted was similar to the one
merchant ships faced. A privateer captain who could be popularly deposed
or did not wield absolute authority over his crew would undermine the
vesselâs profitability for its owners. Given the chance, crew members
would elect lax, liberal, and corrupt captains who would allow sailors
to relax when they desired, have free reign with provisions, lie to the
vesselâs owners about what plunder they had taken so the crew could hold
back a greater share for itself, and so forth. Thus, a variant on the
same principal-agent problem merchant ships confronted, which required
autocratic captains for its solution, also plagued privateers to a large
extent, necessitating autocratic captains on these vessels as well.[43]
Despite this important difference, privateers and pirate ships shared
several significant economic features. Most notably, both engaged in
plunder. Because of this, privateers, like pirate ships, carried large
crews,sometimes of 100 men or more. This was so that they could overcome
the smaller merchant ships they preyed on. Similarly to pirate
vessels,the size of privateers made it difficult for captains to monitor
sailorsâ effort on these ships. This led privateers to use a pirate-like
share system of payment instead of the fixed wages merchant ships used
owing to their dramatically smaller size.[44]
Privateersâ use of the share system is important because we know that
since they enjoyed the full benefit of government enforcement, the
absence of such enforcement could not be the reason privateers adopted
this compensation scheme. This suggests that the share systemâs
efficiency for pirates was rooted in a specific economic situation
pirates confronted (large crews engaged in plunder), shared by
privateers, not in an inability to rely on state enforcement.
Privateers also used constitutions similar to those on pirate ships.
Woodes Rogers, for instance, records his crewâs adoption of a
âConstitution,â as he called it, for the privateering expedition he
commanded between 1708 and 1711 (Rogers [1712] 2004, 7). Several of this
constitutionâs articles resemble those in pirate constitutions. Article
1, for example, specifies the division of plunder between crew members.
Article 3 states âthat if any Person on board . . . do conceal any
Plunder exceeding one Piece of Eight in value, 24 hours after the
Capture of any Prize, he shall be severely punishâd, and lose his Shares
of the Plunder.â Article 6 stipulates âthat a Reward of twenty Pieces of
Eight shall be given to him that first sees a Prize of good Value, or
exceeding50 Tuns in Burden.â Like pirate articles, which required
unanimous consent, this privateering constitution, Rogers tells us, was
similarly signed by every member of the crew âwithout any Compulsionâ
(23).
Since Rogersâ expedition enjoyed the full protection of government
enforcement, this constitution could not have been adopted because the
vessels did not have state backing. Instead, such privateer
constitutions must have been efficient for reasons unrelated to this.
Commonobstacles faced by both pirates and privateers suggest what these
reasons are.
First and foremost, both pirates and privateers were in the business of
sea banditry. Because the goods they dealt with and carried were always
stolen, property rights to these goods could be somewhat unclear.For
instance, if upon boarding a vessel a pirate or privateer came upon some
valuable, was it his to keep? Or was this part of the common loot to be
divided among the crew? Once the stolen booty was transferred to the
pirate or privateer ship, was it fair game? After all, no one on the
pirate or privateer ship could claim to legitimately own it. To clarify
the status of property rights on their ships, both privateers and
pirates used constitutions to make explicit crew member property rights
to plunder.
Contrast this situation with the status of property rights on merchant
vessels. On these ships, property rights were totally clear. The cargo
they carried clearly belonged to the shipsâ owners (or their customers)
and not the crew. Explicating the property rights over the goods
merchant ships carried was therefore unnecessary, and for this reason,
merchant ships did not do so.
Similarly, since both pirates and privateers used a share system to
compensate crew members, the laziness of one crew member directly
affected the payment of the others. To attenuate this problem and elicit
full crew member effort, both privateers and pirates constitutionally
codified bonuses on their ships. Contrast this situation again with the
one on merchant ships, which used fixed wages. Here, each sailorâs
income was independent of his fellow crew membersâ behavior. Thus,
bonuses were unnecessary. [45] The similarities between certain aspects
of pirate and privateer institutions, as well as the differences between
their shared institutions and those of merchant ships, suggests two
important items. First, the institutional differences between pirate and
merchant ships were driven at least in part by the different economic
situations they confronted, not the difference in their ability to rely
on government support. Second, at least some major features of pirate
organization were efficient in-dependent of piratesâ inability to rely
on government. Their efficiency derived from the particular economic
situation pirate ships faced, which they shared partially with
privateers.
On the other side of this, at least one important part of the economic
situation pirates and privateers faced was very different: the ownership
structure of their ships. In terms of this feature, privateers and
merchant ships were similar, whereas pirate ships, which had no absentee
owners,were very different. This explains why privateers and merchant
ships both used autocratic captains, which they required to solve the
owner-crew principal-agent problem they consequently faced. In contrast,
since on pirate ships the principals were the agents, pirates could use
a democratic system of separated power to constrain captain predation.
A crucial feature of pirate organizationâs efficiency was its ability,
or inability, to facilitate crew cooperation. Since pirates lived and
worked together in close quarters among fellow criminals for extended
periods of time, their ability to cooperate for coordinated plunder was
a critical determinant of their enterpriseâs success.Merchant ships
secured crew cooperation through the command of their autocratic
captains. Indeed, as discussed above, merchant ships could not do
without autocracy for this purpose. In contrast, pirate ships did not
have the state backing required for autocratic organization.Although the
evidence considered above suggests that pirates cooperated successfully
under democratic organization, this fact raises the question of piratesâ
organizational efficiency.Perhaps pirates could have secured even more
cooperation had they been able to organize autocratically as merchant
ships did and would have sought to secure cooperation this way if they
could. Alternatively,piratesâ organization may have been superior in
creating crew cooperation, in which case pirates used it (at least
partly) for this reason, not because autocratically organizing their
ships was not an option.[46] To get at this issue we need to examine the
comparative ability of autocratic and democratic ship organization to
facilitate crew cooperation.
Since the difficulty of achieving crew cooperation likely varied
ac-cording to the activities different kinds of vessels were engaged in,
it is important to consider how autocratic versus democratic ship
organization affected crew cooperation on vessels engaged in the same
activity.Comparing cooperation on pirate and merchant ships, then, is
not helpful. Further, since all pirate ships were organized
democratically and all merchant ships were organized autocratically, we
cannot gain insight into this question by looking only at pirate ships
or only at merchant ships.[47]
Fortunately, a different kind of ship we have not yet considered
provides an excellent case for examining this issue: explorer vessels.
Explorer vessels are useful here for two reasons. First, between the
sixteenth and twentieth centuries, explorer ships embarked on long,
often grueling, voyages to uncharted waters. Their crews spent years
together at sea under conditions in which cooperation was at a premium.
Second, there is significant variation in the modes of organization
explorers employed for this purpose. Some pursued more autocratic
organization,as merchant ships did. Others pursued more democratic
organization,as pirate ships did, and with differing success.
Unlike merchant, privateer, or pirate voyages, most explorer voyages did
not seek profits. Their purpose was to discover (and sometimes claim)
unknown parts of the world and then to report their findings to curious
landlubbers.[48] This is significant because in contrast to the vessel
types considered thus far, economic concerns did not play a significant
role in determining explorer organization.
Instead, the party organizing an exploratory expedition determined the
shipâs institutional organization. When government chiefly financed and
organized an expedition, the explorerâs institutions tended to reflect
the autocratic institutions of the governmentâs navy. The resulting
organization was similar to that on merchant ships. When an adventurer
himself chiefly organized and raised the finances for an expedition, the
shipâs institutions tended to be more democratic.
I consider five explorer voyages between the sixteenth and twentieth
centuries. Government directly or indirectly organized three of
these,which displayed autocratic organization: Ferdinand Magellanâs
three-year voyage around the world between 1519 and 1522, James Cookâs
three-year voyage in search of âthe Discovery of the Southern
Continentâbetween 1768 and 1771,[49] and Robert F. Scottâs Antarctic
expedition in the Discovery between 1901 and 1904. Private adventurers
organized the remaining two explorer voyages, which displayed more
democratic organization: Roald Amundsenâs search for the Northwest
Passage in the Gjøa between 1903 and 1906 and Ernest Shackletonâs
Antarctic expedition in the Endurance between 1914 and 1916.
Magellanâs voyage consisted of five ships carrying 270 men in total.The
Spanish government organized his expedition hierarchically, consisting
of lieutenants, masters, captains for each ship, and, at the
apex,Magellan himself, âcaptain-generalâ of the voyage. The Crown
appointed Magellan to this position and issued a long and detailed list
of regulations (74 in all) governing the terms of the exploration and
how it should proceed. Chief among these were the governmentâs strict
instructions to the crew âto defer to the opinion and order of
Magellanâ(Guillemard 1890, 127â28) and Magellanâs âpower of deciding and
executing short and summary justice by sea or land in case of suits or
disputes arising in the fleetâ (Stanley 1874, xxxi).
As one of Magellanâs crew members put it, âthe captain ordered that his
regulations . . . be strictly observedâ (Pigafetta [1525] 1994, 39).
These regulations dictated the sail of the fleetâs ships, the crew
membersâ duties, and even crew membersâ ability to trade with and accept
gifts from the exotic foreigners they encountered on their journey (72).
Although there was a division of labor on Magellanâs voyage, there was
no division of power. Ultimately, the captain-generalâs orders directed
his subordinate officers, who in turn directed the crew. There was one
instance of limited democracy on Magellanâs journey, which occurred when
Magellan unexpectedly died. The crew âmade and elected two commandersâ
to operate in the absence of their captain-general (Pigafetta 1525, 88).
However, this seems to be the only democratic moment in the voyage,
which was otherwise governed autocratically.
The effectiveness of Magellanâs autocratic organization was mixed.On the
one hand, considerable crew member turmoil plagued his expedition,
culminating in a violent mutiny of three of Magellanâs five ships
against the captain-general, ostensibly because he had put the crew on
short rations. Magellan emerged victorious out of the violent mix up and
punished the mutineers, some by execution, others by imprisonment. Later
in the voyage, one entire ship deserted Magellanâs fleet.
However, it is important to be careful in interpreting this conflict as
a sign of total failure. The magnitude of the venture must be kept in
mind, and, ultimately, the voyage did return to Spain. This constituted
the first circumnavigation of the globe, albeit one that claimed the
lives of 252 of the 270 sailors who undertook it.
The British government organized Captain James Cookâs expedition.In
command of His Majestys Bark Endeavour, Cookâs captainship combined the
powers of commander and ultimate disciplinarian along the lines observed
in the merchant and navy marine. Indeed, Cookâs regulations of his crew
drew explicitly on those in operation in the navy at the time. As he
instructed his crew, for example, âif by neglect [any sailor] looseth
any of his Arms or working tools, or suffers them to be stole [by
natives where the ship stops], the full Value thereof will be chargeâd
against his pay according to the Custom of the Navy in such cases, and
he shall receive further punishment as the nature of the offence may
deserveâ (Cook, April 17, 1769 [2000, 40]).
This regulation was one of five âRules to be observâd by every person in
or belonging to His Majestys Bark the Endeavor, for the better
establishing a regular and uniform Trade for Provisions &c with the
Inhabitants of Georges Islandâ (April 17, 1769, 39â40).
As on Magellanâs fleet, Cook also made use of a division of
labor,sometimes delegating punishment duties to his officers. But
ultimately Cook dictated and enforced corporal punishment. As his
journal entry dated November 30, 1768, records, for instance, âPunished
Rob Anderson Seaman and Will Judge Marine with twelve lashes each, the
former for leaving his duty a Shore and attempting to desert the Ship,
and the latter for using abusive language to the Officer of the
Watch,and John Readon Boatswains Mate with twelve lashes for not doing
his duty in punishing the above two Menâ (22). Similarly, elsewhere Cook
records, âPunished Rich Hutchins Seaman with 12 lashes for disobeying
command,â highlighting both the hierarchy of the shipâs organization and
Captain Cookâs authority to administer punishments (April 16,1769, 44).
Cook successfully accomplished his voyage; but his journal suggests that
crew cooperation and harmony were strained. Here, Cook records instances
of disgruntled sailors, insolence, theft, and even intracrew murder
(see, e.g., the entries for April 13, 1769, 38; June 21, 1769, 60; June
4, 1769, 55; June 19, 1769, 58; and March 26, 1769, 35). The Royal
Society and Royal Geographic Society organized Robert Scottâs early
twentieth-century Antarctic exploration and appointed Scott captain of
the expedition. Like Cook, Scott was a navy officer. In addition to
several non naval mariners, a number of other navy seamen manned Scottâs
Discovery, which observed the traditional naval hierarchy.For instance,
Scott imprisoned the cook and later chained him to the deck for
insubordination (Huntford 1999, 146).
Like Cookâs expedition, Scottâs also suffered from sailor discontent.As
one of his sailors remarked, Scottâs autocratic method of governing the
ship âis causing a lot of discontent on the mess deck,â that is, among
the non officer crew. Another noted how the crewâs men had becomeâshort
tempered and low spiritedâ (quoted in Huntford 1999, 151). The
Discoveryâs troubles peaked when it became lodged in ice in the Ross
Sea. In an embarrassing finale to the debacle, the Royal Navy had to
rescue it.
Roald Amundsenâs organization aboard the Gjøa provides an interesting
contrast to Scottâs. Amundsenâs voyage took place only a few years after
Scottâs and sought to explore the Arctic. In contrast to the voyages
discussed above, Amundsen organized his exploration on his own be-half.
He was therefore not obliged to organize the Gjøa according to the navy
pattern. On the contrary, he chose to organize his ship in a highly
democratic, decentralized fashion, not unlike pirate organization.As
Amundsen described his vesselâs organization, âWe have established a
little republic on board Gjøa. . . . After my own experience, I decided
as far as possible to use a system of freedom on boardâlet everybody
have the feeling of being independent within his own sphere. In that
way, there arises . . . a spontaneous and voluntary discipline, which is
worth far more than compulsion . . . . The will to do work is many times
greater and thereby the work itself â (quoted in Huntford 1999,84).
As one sailor aboard the Gjøa commented, âNo orders were given,but
everyone seemed to know exactly what to doâ (quoted in Huntford1999,
84). Unlike Scottâs voyage, Amundsenâs proved exceedingly smooth. The
crew was happy and the expedition successful.
When one of Scottâs former sailors aboard the Discovery, Ernest
Shackleton, decided to explore the Antarctic himself, he also employed a
more democratic organization for his vessel, the Endurance. Shackleton
did not allow his crew to elect any of the shipâs officers; but he did
appoint his second in command, Frank Wild, to act as an arbitrator for
the shipâs men, removing himself from this authority. Shackleton set
routines for his men and generally directed their activities. However,
he assigned his men to the unpleasant and more pleasant tasks on the
ship in shifts, regardless of their status, rather than basing their
assignments on rank.
As one of his crew members observed, âWhen Shackleton took over control
of the ship, the ship officers had to climb down a peg or two.âAccording
to him, âThe shipâs officers became units with no more authority than
the rest of the crowd, and their position on the floe was the sameâ
(quoted in Morrell and Capparell 2002, 89, 134). Officers and
nonofficers received identical victuals and were treated equally in all
other affairs.
Shackletonâs quasi-democratic organization aboard the Endurance created
good order and cooperation among the crew. As Thomas Orde-Lees, a crew
member of the Endurance, commented, for example, âWe seem to be a
wonderfully happy family but I think Sir Ernest is the real secret of
our unanimity.â Similarly, as another sailor recorded, âWe are now six
months out from England and during the whole of this time we have all
pulled well together and with an almost complete lack of frictionâ
(quoted in Morrell and Capparell 2002, 99).
The evidence from the five explorers considered here suggests that
democratic or self-governing vessel organization, such as the kind
pirates used, facilitated crew cooperation at least as successfully as
autocratic vessel organization, and probably more so. Magellan, Cook,
and Scott each seemed to face greater problems maintaining accord on
their ships than Amundsen or Shackleton. Since pirates did not require
autocratic organization to overcome the owner-crew principal-agent
problem that merchant ships confronted, this suggests that even if
pirates had government enforcement at their disposal, they would likely
have opted for a democratic organization, such as the one they used.
Although it is of course not possible to establish this definitively, it
does not seem likely, then, that autocratic organization was in fact
superior in this regard and that pirates would have used it if only they
enjoyed government support.
The case of explorers also sheds light on the issue of captain
predation. In contrast to merchant ships, there does not appear to have
been a problem of captain predation on democratic or autocratic explorer
vessels. Only on Magellanâs voyage is there evidence that the crew
suspected captain self-dealing, and here the charge seems to be
unfounded (see, e.g., Guillemard 1890).
An important economic difference between merchant ships, on the one
hand, and even autocratically organized explorer vessels, on the other,
suggests itself as the likely reason for this. With the exception of
Magellan, none of the explorer captains considered above stood to
directly profit from cutting crew member rations, shorting crew members
their pay, and so forth. These explorer captains were not residual
claimants of their voyages, as merchant ship captains were.
Explorer captains gained very little if upon their vesselsâ return they
had succeeded in defrauding the crew out of victuals or wages.[50] The
expeditionâs costs were borne largely by external financiers who did not
âinvestâ in the expedition for profit. Further, the explorer captains
them-selves did not aim at turning a profit on the exploratory voyage
itself. They therefore had little incentive to prey on their crew
members.
Magellan is somewhat of an exception in this regard in that, under the
terms of his agreement with the Spanish Crown, he was to receive 20
percent of any net proceeds his expedition directly generated. Thus,he
could have tried to generate larger gains for himself by, for
instance,illegitimately cutting crew member rations, which, as noted
above, some crew members (wrongly) accused him of. However, Magellanâs
payoff of preying on his crew in this way paled in comparison to his
payoff of making the exploration a successful one.
According to his agreement with Spain, if Magellan succeeded in
discovering any new isles or countries, he was perpetually entitled to
one-twentieth of all revenue they generated for Spain. Further, if his
exploration succeeded in forging a route to the Spice Islands, he would
be allowed to send 1,000 ducatsâ worth of goods on every Spanish armada
sent to trade with the islands. However, to reap these much greater
financial rewards, Magellan had to keep his crew intact sufficiently to
weather the long and onerous voyage. Since cheating crew members would
have seriously threatened this already difficult task, it was not in
Magellanâs greater financial interest to do so.
This absence of predatory incentives for captains on explorers stands in
stark contrast to the situation on merchant ships in which every
voyageâs purpose was to make money, and absentee owners and share-holder
captains often stood to directly profit from predation. Thus, while
autocratic organization opened the door for captain abuse on merchant
ships, it did not seem to do so significantly on explorer ships.
Over the last decade or so there has been a resurgence of piracy off the
horn of Africa and in the Straits of Malacca (see, e.g., Gottschalkand
Flanagan 2000; Burnett 2002; Langewiesche 2004). Like seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century pirates, the modern variety choose to plunder ships
in waters in which government enforcement is weak, such as those around
Somalia and Indonesia, and commercial vessels are abundant.
Beyond this, however, modern pirates share little in common with their
predecessors. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pirates lived together
for long periods of time at sea. Although they retired to land between
expeditions, they spent much of their time together prowling the
expanses of the ocean in search of prey. Because of this, their ships
formed miniature âfloating societies.â Like all societies, piratesâ
floating ones also required social rules and governance institutions if
pirates were to maintain their âabominable combination.â
In contrast, modern pirates spend almost no time together on their
ships. Their âraidsâ take one of two forms. The first and most common
method constitutes little more than maritime muggery. Pirate âcrewsâof
two to six hop in small speedboats with guns; pull alongside legitimate
ships, usually in territorial waters close to the coast; and threaten
their prey at gunpoint to give up their watches, jewelry, and whatever
money the boat may be carrying. They then return to their villages on
the coast,where they live among non pirates and resume regular
employment.
These pirates do not live, sleep, and interact together on their ships
for months, weeks, or even days on end. They therefore do not constitute
a society and face few, if any, of the problems of social cooperation
and order their forefathers did.
The second and far less common method of modern piracy is some-what
different. Crews again are smallâbetween five and 15 menâand spend very
little time together at sea. But professional land-based criminals hire
these modern pirates to steal boats, which they then convert into
âphantom shipsâ and resell. They pay these modern pirates lump sums and
contract them on a case-by-case basis. Like the maritime muggers,
pirates-for-hire rely predominantly on hijacking methods to steal ships,
though for larger vessels they have been known to plant
âinsidersââsailors who pretend to be legitimate sailors seeking
employment on the ship in questionâwho later hijack the target from the
inside.
Since modern pirates sail in very small groups and spend very little
time together at sea, they do not exhibit any discernible organizational
structure, as seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pirates clearly
did.Unlike older pirates, privateers, merchantmen, or explorers, the
âin-and-outâ character of modern pirates, coupled with the fact that
crews are so small, means that they do not require rules for creating
order,rationing provisions, or assigning tasks. Modern pirates do not
even require captains in the usual sense. There is, of course, someone
who steers the motorboat and acts as a leader among the six or so
pirates; but he is not a captain in the way that eighteenth-century
pirate, privateer, or merchant captains were.
Even organizational problems related to the distribution of plunder are
largely absent for modern pirates. The sea muggers need to divide what
they steal. But nothing structured is required since, unlike
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pirates, modern sea robbers do not
sail for extended periods with growing piles of booty. Their trips are
evening cruises. When they end, the pirates return to their day
jobs.Modern pirates-for-hire do not even confront a distribution of
booty problem to this extent. The landed thieves who employ them pay
them wages. Once the pirates have taken a prize, they hand it over to
their employer. Sadly, then, modern pirates are far less interesting
from an economic or organizational point of view than their
predecessors.
The institutions of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pirates, in
contrast, provide an important glimpse into the typically invisible
governance mechanisms that support cooperation inside criminal
organizations. My analysis of the law, economics, and organization of
pirates leads to three conclusions.
First, ordinary âfoot soldiersâ inside criminal organizations may face a
problem of leader predation similar to the problem citizens under
governments face with respect to political rulers. Importantly,
organized criminalsâ inability to rely on state-created institutions to
overcome this problem does not prevent them from developing private,
self-enforcing institutions for this purpose instead. âKings were not
needed to invent the pirate system of governanceâ (Rogozinski 2000,
184). It is unlikely that they are needed to invent systems of
governance in other criminal organizations either.
Second, the institutions that constituted the piratesâ system of
governanceâdemocratic checks, the separation of power, and
constitutionsâare remarkably similar to those governments employ to
constrain ruler predation in the âlegitimate world.â Government does not
have a monopoly on these institutions of governance any more than it has
a monopoly on the ability to generate cooperation and order. The success
of pirate âan-arrgh-chyâ highlights both of these facts.
In the same way that merchant ship autocracy reflected an efficient
institutional response to the particular economic situation that
merchant ships faced, pirate organization reflected an efficient
institutional response to the particular, and rather different, economic
situation that pirate ships faced. The efficiency of piratical
institutions, it seems, resulted at least in part from this economic
difference between pirate and merchant ships, not from the formerâs
inability to rely on government support for autocratic organization.
Finally, organized criminals are as interested in creating order among
themselves as noncriminals. They, too, have an incentive to develop
solutions to obstacles that otherwise prevent them from cooperating for
mutual gain. The fact that they direct their cooperation at someone
elseâs loss does not alter this. Thus, while Captain Charles Johnson
described the piratesâ criminal organization as âthat abominable
Societyâ(1726â28, 114), it is important to acknowledge that, however
abominable, it was nevertheless a society.
[1] All page references to Johnson refer to the 1999 reprint. Page
references to other early sources also refer to reprint editions if
available.
[2] Anderson (1979), Reuter (1983), and Gambetta (1993) are the closest
exceptions in this regard. Their excellent work considers some internal
governance aspects of the Mafiabut tends to focus primarily on the
Mafiaâs relationship to protection and other markets.Important research
by Polo (1995) examines governance institutions of criminal
organizations, but does so theoretically.
[3] This article is also closely connected to the literature that
examines the private emergence of law and governance institutions. See,
e.g., Friedman (1979), Benson (1988, 1989,1990), Anderson and McChesney
(2002), Anderson and Hill (2004), Anderson, Benson,and Flanagan (2006),
and Leeson (2007a, 2007b, forthcoming).
[4] However, pirates did trade with European colonists.
[5] My definition of a criminal organization is therefore similar to
Poloâs as âone that cannot rely on the external enforcement of the
judicial institutions and whose behaviour and possibilities are not
constrained by the lawâ (1995, 87).
[6] âCaptain Johnsonâ is a pen name used by the author of A General
History of the Pyrates. His true identity remains unknown. In 1932, John
R. Moore claimed that Johnson was in fact Daniel Defoe. In the late
1980s, however, this view was overturned (see Furbank and Owens 1988),
and today many pirate historians do not believe that Defoe is the author
of this important book (see, e.g., Rediker 2004; Cordingly 2006; Woodard
2007; for the opposing view, see Rogozinski 2000). Whatever Johnsonâs
true identity, it is agreed thathe âhad extensive first-hand knowledge
of piracyâ (Konstam 2007, 12). While it is widely acknowledged that
Johnsonâs work contains some errors and apocryphal accounts (such as the
community of Libertalia), âJohnson is widely regarded as a highly
reliable source for factual informationâ on pirates (Rediker 2004, 180)
and remains a definitive source historians rely on in constructing their
accounts of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century piracy. As eminent
pirate historian David Cordingly puts it, this book âis the prime source
for the lives of many pirates of what is often called the Golden Age of
Piracyâ (2006, xx).
[7] Jameson (1923) has edited an excellent collection of such records.
Unless otherwise noted, all depositions and examinations quoted here are
contained in his collection.8Importantly, drawing on the historical
episode of pirates helps overcome the problem of âgetting insideâ
criminal organizations, noted above. Records from individuals who had
direct experiences with pirates, as well as those that shed light on
piratical governance mechanisms from pirates themselves, allow me to
view piratesâ criminal organization âfrom the inside.â
[8] Additionally, this article relies on and is greatly indebted to a
voluminous modern literature covering all aspects of piracy, including
those considered here, written by con-temporary historians. Some of the
best discussions belong to Gosse (1946), Pringle (1953),Rankin (1969),
Rediker (1981, 1987), Cordingly (1996, 2006), Rogozinski (2000),
andKonstam (2002).
[9] The ânest of roguesâ terminology in this sectionâs heading comes
from Governor William Spotswood, who, in a letter to the British Lords
of the Admiralty, complained of the growing pirate problem in New
Providence ( July 3, 1716 [1882, 2:168]).
[10] The dates given by historians to mark the golden age of piracy
vary. Cordingly (2006)provides a slightly larger range, from about 1650
to 1725. Still others, such as Rankin(1969), date the great age of
piracy as encompassing the years between 1630 and 1720.The further back
in this range one goes, the more one is dealing with buccaneers as
opposed to pure pirates.
[11] Pirates also exhibited some diversity in social standing. Although
most pirates were uneducated and came from the lower classes of society,
a few, such as Dr. John Hincher,were well educated and came from higher
stations in life (Cordingly 2006).
[12] Pure pirates should be distinguished from buccaneers, privateers,
and corsairs. Pure pirates were total outlaws and attacked merchant
ships indiscriminately for their own gain.Privateers and corsairs, in
contrast, were both state-sanctioned sea robbers. Governments licensed
the former to attack enemy ships in times of war. Governments licensed
the latter to attack the ships of other nations on the basis of
religion. âBuccaneering was a peculiar blend of piracy and privateering
in which the two elements were often indistinguishableâ(Marx 1996a, 38).
Oftentimes, buccaneers plundered with official sanction, making them
more like privateers than pirates. Many other times, however, they did
not. In these cases they were acting as pure pirates.
[13] These numbers are especially large when one puts them in historical
perspective. The Royal Navy, e.g., averaged only 13,000 men in any one
year between 1716 and 1726, making the pirate population in a good year
more than 15 percent of the navy population(Rediker 1987, 256). In 1680,
the total population of the American colonies was less than152,000
(Hughes and Cain 1994, 20). In fact, as late as 1790, when the first
U.S. census was taken, only 24 places in the country had populations
greater than 2,500 (Hughes and Cain 1994, 28).
[14] In the South China Sea, Cheng I commanded a pirate confederacy that
boasted an astonishing 150,000 members (Konstam 2002, 174). Chinese
pirates sometimes sailed together in fleets of several hundred ships.
[15] Navy ships were also organized hierarchically. Their captains were
commissioned by the Admiralty (typically on the recommendation of
superior commissioned officers) and had command over crew activities,
power to physically punish sailors (or to direct/authorize lower-ranking
officers to do so), etc. Captains of larger naval ships did not,
however,have control over victuals, which were instead controlled by a
warrant officer called theâpurser.â The purserâs logs, which documented
victuals distributed, were often approved by the captain.
[16] Ownership groups were sizable because of the need to diversify the
risk of merchant shipping. Each merchant purchased a small share in many
ships rather than being the sole owner of one.
[17] Because most merchant ships were owned by groups of investors, even
in cases in which a merchant captained his vessel himself, there
remained absentee owners, his co-investors.
[18] Absentee ownership was further assured by the fact that the members
of merchant vessel ownership groups engaged in many more commercial
activities besides their concern in a particular merchant ship. These
other commercial activities often required merchants to be on land to
tend to their affairs rather than at sea.
[19] Although merchant ships engaged in coastal trade were at sea for
shorter periods,merchant ships engaged in long-distance trade could be
gone for periods of nine months or more.
[20] In addition to using autocratic captains to cope with this
principal-agent problem,merchant ships also held back a portion (or
sometimes all) of sailorsâ wages until a voyage was complete.
[21] A few merchant ships engaged in part-time fishing used a share
system of payment similar to the one privateers, whalers, and pirates
used. However, the overwhelming majority of merchant ships used a fixed
wage system. In vessels engaged in coastal shipping,sailors were paid
lump-sum wages. In vessels engaged in long-distance shipping, sailors
were paid monthly wages.
[22] The owner-sailor principal-agent problem could not have been
overcome by converting every crew memberâs fixed wage to a
profit-sharing scheme. Even under profit sharing, sailors would still
have an incentive to consume cargo, liberal provisions, etc.,and then
blame the loss on the uncertainties of the sea, such as pirates or
wrecks. Although this opportunism would reduce each sailorâs share of
the voyageâs net proceeds, since the cost of such behavior is borne
partially by the absentee owners, sailors have an incentive to act
opportunistically. Further, converting sailor wages to shares would not
have deterred the crew from the most costly kind of
opportunismâabsconding with the ship and its freight. Because the
benefit of such theft would exceed the crewâs fraction of a successful
voyageâs proceeds, which are shared with the absentee owners under a
profit-sharing scheme, without an authority to monitor and control their
behavior, crews would still have an incentive to steal the ships they
sailed on. This is why both privateers and whaling ships, e.g., which
used a pirate-like profit-sharing system but also had absentee
owners,still required and used autocratic captains. On the efficiency of
the fixed wage system for the merchant marine and efficiency of the
share system for privateers and whalers, which also applies to pirates,
see Gifford (1993).
[23] A third device owners used for this purpose, though of declining
importance overtime, was that of the supercargoâan agent hired by the
shipâs owners who sailed on the ship and managed commercial aspects of
the voyage, such as buying and selling cargo at port, and sometimes
deciding what ports the ship should stop at, when the captain could not
be trusted in these capacities (Davis 1962).
[24] This quotation is from a late eighteenth-century sailor but
captures the situation in the earlier part of the century as well.
[25] It is also important to note that captain predation
notwithstanding, a merchant sailorâs life was not a singularly cruel and
oppressed one. As Earle (1998) points out, e.g., sailor society on
merchant ships was in many ways a microcosm of landed life in
seventeenth-and eighteenth-century England. Rodger (1996, 2006) makes a
similar point regarding life aboard naval vessels. My discussion here is
not intended to suggest that life was exclusively or exceptionally poor
aboard merchant (or navy) ships. My argument is only to point out that
the necessarily autocratic organization of merchant ships created scope
for merchant captain predation, which a number of captains seized on.
[26] A check on the extent of captain predation not discussed here was
captainsâ ability to complete their voyages. If a predatory captain, for
instance, maimed or otherwise severely injured too many crew members
through overzealous discipline, he might not have enough healthy crew
members to complete the voyage. This surely constrained captain abuse to
some extent, though it did not provide an incentive to reduce abuse to
zero nor to refrain from other kinds of predatory behavior discussed
above.
[27] Notably, however, several pirate crews had their genesis in
successful mutiny. According to Rediker (1987, 228), one-third of
successful mutinous crews (i.e., those that succeeded in taking control
of the ship) in the first half of the eighteenth century entered piracy.
[28] In addition to this, there is considerable doubt that many common
seamen, even after years of toil, were in a position to own any part of
a merchant vessel. One of the few,preserved, near-complete bills of
merchant vessel sale before England required ship registration in 1786
corroborates this. Among the 338 owners of 53 ships it lists, only 28
noncaptain mariners, or about 8 percent of the total, owned any share of
a merchant vessel (Davis 1962, 100).
[29] There is at least one eighteenth-century pirate, however, Stede
Bonnet, who actually purchased the first ship he went on the account
with.
[30] Of course, even piratesâ democratic system of checks and balances
could not prevent all instances of captain predation. For instance,
since he controlled battle-related decisions,a pirate captain could
still put a crew member he disliked in harmâs way.
[31] In some cases, crews also physically punished their captains for
behavior they deemed inconsistent with their interests. For example,
Oliver La Bouche was deprived of his captain position and flogged for
attempting to desert his crew (de Bucquoy 1744, 103; translated and
quoted in Rogozinski 2000, 177). Occasionally, crews also deserted
predatory captains(Council of the Leeward Islands, May 18, 1699, Public
Record Office, Colonial Office Papers, 152:3, no. 21).
[32] This competition likely explains the rarity of cases of
captain-quartermaster collusion against crews.
[33] This decentralization of authority and elimination of captain
privilege aboard pirate ships were radical departures from conditions in
the legitimate maritime world. Observers were therefore shocked at the
incredible absence of hierarchy aboard pirate ships. Commenting on their
democratic form of governance, e.g., the Dutch governor of Mauritius
marveled, âEvery man had as much say as the captainâ (quoted in Ritchie
1986, 124).
[34] The captain referred to here is William Kidd, a
privateer-turned-pirate, who was ultimately executed for his crimes.
Notably, Kiddâs privateer ship was financed by absentee owners.
[35] Many individuals ostensibly forced to join pirate crews in fact
joined voluntarily. Officially, they asked to be âforcedâ and
occasionally put up a show to their comrades to this effect so that in
the event their pirate crew was ever captured, they could claim that
they were compelled as a defense (Pringle 1953; see also Rankin 1969).
[36] A letter from colonial governor Alexander Spotswood to the Board of
Trade highlights the effectiveness of piratesâ information-sharing
network. Spotswood, who having âbeen markt as the principle object of
their vengeance, for cutting off their arch pirate Thatch [a.k.a.
Blackbeard]â complained of finding a place to escape to âwhere neither
Master nor Sailors know me, & so may possibly escape the knowledge of ye
piratesâ (Colonial Office Papers, June 16, 1724, 5/1319: fols. 190â92;
quoted in Rediker 1987, 254, 134).
[37] Pirate ships often required crew members to agree to stay on until
a certain sum was earned or an expedition completed. However, if a ship
became too crowded or some other compelling reason came along for a crew
to split, it did so. In this case, new articles were drawn up and
pirates had the option to sign on with the new crew or stay with the
old. There do not appear to be any cases of pirate constitutions being
altered or amended mid cruise. The status of forced men on pirate ships
seems to have varied. Some appear to have been compelled to sign the
shipâs articles. Others were not compelled to do so but did not have a
vote in the companyâs affairs until they signed (Rediker 2004, 79â81).
[38] When this failed, the quartermaster refereed a duel between the
parties, which would take place on land so as not to destroy the ship.
âThe Quarter-Master of the Ship, when the Parties will not come to any
Reconciliation, accompanies them on Shore with what Assistance he thinks
proper, and turns the Disputants Back to Back, at so many paces
Distance: At the Word of Command, they turn and fire immediately . . . .
If both miss,they come to their Cutlashes, and then he is declared
Victor who draws the first bloodâ( Johnson 1726â28, 212; see also 339).
[39] Marooning was sometimes coupled with ostracism in the event that
the transgressor managed to survive. See, e.g., Exquemelin (1678, 72).
[40] Oath taking was commonly used among pirates as well as a method of
staking oneâs reputation to help enforce piratical articles and custom.
See, e.g., Exquemelin (1678, 68,71â72, 100, 104, 156, 161).
[41] However, in England, the Prize Act of 1708 entitled privateers to
the full value of prizes they took.
[42] There were two kinds of privateers. The first were âfull-timeâ
privateers, which sailed exclusively for the purpose of prize taking.
The second kind were merchant ships with permission to take prizes they
might happen upon and profitably seize in the course of their shipping
activity (Rodger 2006, 156). My discussion is concerned with the
former,since the latter were in the business of merchant shipping rather
than the business of prize taking.
[43] Some privateer captains, such as Woodes Rogers, consulted a council
of their fellow officers in making decisions. But democratic voice did
not extend to the crew. It should be noted, however, that late
seventeenth-century and early eighteenth-century sea raiders who blurred
the distinction between pirates and privateers by sailing sometimes with
a commission and many other times without typically employed piratical
governance institutions.
[44] Privateers were not the only legitimate vessels that used the
piratesâ share system. Whaling vessels did as well. Although whaling
vessels were smaller than pirate ships or privateers, they were
typically larger than merchant ships, again making it more difficult to
monitor sailor effort. This necessitated share payment, called a âlay,â
instead of fixed monthly or lump-sum wages (Davis, Gallman, and Gleiter
1998). Navy ships also relied partially on a share system to compensate
sailors. Although in peacetime sailors received fixed monthly wages, in
wartime they received both monthly wages and a share of their prizesâ
proceeds, as well as âhead moneyâ for each of the enemy sailors these
prizes carried.Since naval vessels were very large, incentive-based pay
helped to overcome the difficulty of monitoring individual sailors.
Additionally, navy vessel pay scales (including prize shares)were
steeply skewed according to rank. To elicit crew membersâ full effort,
navy vessels thus combined incentive pay in the context of a tournament
system. See, e.g., Benjamin and Thornberg (2007).
[45] Ship captains sometimes received bonuses, however. âPrimage and
average,â for ex-ample, were paid to ship captains and constituted
bonuses of a sort, though these were paid by the freighter rather than
by the owners.
[46] As for the organizational features discussed above, here too it is
important to emphasize that if pirate organization was in fact superior
in creating crew cooperation, this would not mean that merchant ship
organization was inefficient for merchant ships. Merchant ships faced a
different economic situation than pirates, most important, the
owner-crew principal-agent problem. Constrained by the need to solve
this problem, merchant ships could secure crew cooperation only through
autocracy. Thus, even if it came at the price of less crew harmony, for
merchant ships, autocratic organization was still superior to democratic
organization, which would have rendered merchant shipping unprofitable
for owners.
[47] The Barbary pirates, who were really corsairs, did not organize
democratically. How-ever, this article is not concerned with them.
[48] Although some explorer voyages, such as Magellanâs, certainly had
as their ultimate goal discovery for the purpose of profit, the
exploratory expedition itself was almost always a ânonprofitâ voyage. In
Magellanâs case the attitude seemed to be, if the exploratory voyage
itself makes money, all the better. But pure exploration for the purpose
of future gain was the voyageâs primary aim, even if, e.g., the
exploratory voyage itself did cover its own costs.
[49] The other duty the Admiralty instructed Cook to accomplish was to
charter King Georgeâs Island.
[50] Although he may not benefit monetarily, a predatory captain might
still have some incentive to pinch provisions to make more available to
himself, however.