💾 Archived View for library.inu.red › file › noam-chomsky-east-timor-questions-answers.gmi captured on 2023-01-29 at 12:57:01. Gemini links have been rewritten to link to archived content
➡️ Next capture (2024-06-20)
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Title: East Timor Questions & Answers Author: Noam Chomsky Date: October 1999 Language: en Topics: Timor Leste Source: Retrieved on 19th June 2021 from https://chomsky.info/199910__02/ Notes: Published in Z Magazine.
In the aftermath of World War II, U.S. policy toward the Asian colonies
of the European powers followed a simple rule: where the nationalists in
a territory were leftist (as in Vietnam), Washington would support the
re-imposition of European colonial rule, while in those places where the
nationalist movement was safely non-leftist (India, for example),
Washington would support their independence as a way to remove them from
the exclusive jurisdiction of a rival power. At first, Indonesian
nationalists were not deemed sufficiently pliable, so U.S.-armed British
troops (assisted by Japanese soldiers) went into action against the
Indonesians to pave the way for the return of Dutch troops, also armed
by the United States. In 1948, however, moderate Indonesian nationalists
under Sukarno crushed a left-wing coup attempt, and Washington then
decided that the Dutch should be encouraged to settle with Sukarno,
accepting Indonesian independence.
It wasn’t long, however, before the United States concluded that Sukarno
was a dangerous neutralist, and under the Eisenhower administration
Washington attempted to subvert Indonesia’s fragile democratic
government. These efforts—the largest U.S. covert operation since World
War II—were unsuccessful, so the United States shifted its strategy to
building up the Indonesian military as a counter-weight to the
mass-based Indonesian Communist Party. In 1965, this approach bore fruit
when a military coup, accompanied by the slaughter of somewhere between
half a million and a million communists, suspected leftists, and
ordinary peasants, deposed Sukarno and installed General Suharto in his
place. Washington cheered the coup, rushed weapons to Jakarta, and even
provided a list of Communist Party members to the army, which then
rounded up and slaughtered them. According to a CIA study, “in terms of
numbers killed” the 1965–66 massacres in Indonesia “rank as one of the
worst mass murders of the 20^(th) century.” The United States
established close military, economic, and political ties with the
Suharto regime.
From the 17^(th) century, the Netherlands and Portuguese fought over
Timor, a small Southeast Asian island slightly larger than the state of
Maryland located 1,000 miles south of the Philippines and about 400
miles northwest of Australia. Ultimately the two colonial powers divided
the island, with the western half going to the Netherlands and becoming
part of the Dutch East Indies and the eastern half going to Portugal.
When the Dutch East Indies became independent following World War II,
under the name Indonesia, west Timor was part of the new nation. East
Timor, however, remained under Portuguese rule until the mid-1970s, when
Portugal finally moved to dismantle its colonial empire. East Timor
differs from Indonesia in terms of religion, language, and several
hundred years of colonial history.
As long as Portugal controlled East Timor, Indonesia did not consider
attacking it, but once Lisbon declared its intention to withdraw, the
Suharto regime saw an opportunity to add to its territory and resources.
East Timor seemed like an easy target, given that in 1975 Indonesia had
a population of 136 million compared to East Timor’s 700,000 people.
Indonesia first tried to block Timorese independence by backing a coup
in the territory, but when this failed it launched a full-scale invasion
of East Timor in December 1975, using the pretext that it was
maintaining order.
A standard propaganda line out of Jakarta—often repeated by the western
media—is that the fighting in East Timor represents a “civil war.” In
fact, there had been a very brief civil war before the Indonesians
invaded. For the last 25 years, however, it has been as much a civil war
as the Nazi conquests in Europe.
1975 invasion?
On the eve of the invasion, U.S. President Gerald Ford and his Secretary
of State, Henry Kissinger, were in Jakarta meeting with Suharto.
Kissinger later claimed that East Timor wasn’t even discussed, but this
claim has been exposed as a lie.
In fact, Washington gave Suharto a green light to invade. Ninety percent
of the weaponry used by the Indonesian forces in their invasion was from
the United States (despite a U.S. law that bans the use of its military
aid for offensive purposes) and the flow of arms, including
counterinsurgency equipment, was secretly increased (a point that should
be borne in mind in interpreting what is going on today).
The United States also lent diplomatic support to the invaders. In the
United Nations, U.S. ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan successfully
worked, as he boasted in his memoirs, to make sure that the
international organization was ineffective in challenging Jakarta’s
aggression. Under the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the self-proclaimed
champion of human rights, there was a further increase in U.S. military
aid to Indonesia. Since 1975, the United States has sold Jakarta over $1
billion worth of military equipment.
The Indonesian invasion and subsequent ruthless pacification campaign
led to the deaths—by massacre, forced starvation, and disease—of some
200,000 East Timorese, more than a quarter of the territory’s people,
making it one of the greatest bloodlettings in modern history compared
to total population. In addition, Indonesian forces have engaged in
torture, rape, and forced relocation on a massive scale.
invasion?
On the one hand, the Indonesian aggression so clearly violated
international law and the right of self-determination that the United
Nations Security Council condemned the invasion, calling on Indonesia to
withdraw its armed forces from East Timor, and the General Assembly
rejected Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor as its 27^(th) province,
demanding that the people of East Timor be allowed to determine their
own fate. With a single exception, Australia, no country has legally
recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.
On the other hand, for many countries considerations of morality and
decency were outweighed by the profits to be had from close economic
ties with Indonesia and its huge population (“When I think of
Indonesia—a country on the equator with 180 million people, a median age
of 18, and a Muslim ban on alcohol—I feel like I know what heaven looks
like,” gushed the president of Coca-Cola in 1992), by the prospects of
selling arms to the Indonesian armed forces, and by the geopolitical
advantages of allying with the largest nation in Southeast Asia, instead
of one of the smallest. Washington’s support for Jakarta has already
been noted. Australia has provided military aid to Indonesia and
formally recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, hoping to
divide up East Timor’s offshore oil resources. Britain recently was
Indonesia’s largest arms supplier, and Japan its largest source of
economic aid and foreign investment. Canada has provided Jakarta with
both economic and military aid, while the Netherlands and Germany have
also been major weapons suppliers.
The people of East Timor have waged a truly inspiring and courageous
struggle. They have undertaken guerrilla warfare against overwhelming
odds, organized non-violent protests, and carried out passive
resistance. Students, the Catholic church, and many others have been
involved in the struggle in one way or another: whether taking up arms,
providing food for guerrillas, participating in demonstrations, or
hiding organizers. Remarkably, despite the horrendous repression, and
despite Jakarta’s importation of large numbers of Indonesian settlers
into the territory, the East Timorese have retained their passionate
commitment to self-determination and freedom.
years?
For a while, only a few lone voices spoke up. Arnold Kohen, for example,
has been at the center of East Timor activism since the beginning. There
were small groups in Australia and in England trying to draw attention
to the issue. Through the 1980s, the numbers and activism increased.
There was a considerable upsurge following the Dili massacre in
1991—when Indonesian troops attacked a peaceful funeral procession,
slaughtering more than 270—the massacre was publicized by U.S.
free-lance journalists Amy Goodman and Alan Nairn (who were nearly
killed by Indonesian troops) and a British TV photojournalist who
secretly filmed the atrocities. Church and human rights groups became
active, and Charlie Scheiner formed the East Timor Action Network.
By the mid-1990s there were substantial organizations in many countries,
and they were beginning to have an impact. The issue was finally being
covered in the mainstream media, if not always accurately. Intensely
lobbied by East Timor activists, the U.S. Congress was increasingly
placing restrictions on U.S. military aid to Indonesia, often evaded,
however, by the Administration. In 1996, Jose Ramos Horta, East Timor’s
chief foreign representative, and Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo,
East Timor’s spiritual leader, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize,
focusing further attention on the situation.
results?
Mass demonstrations in Indonesia, financial crisis, and massive
corruption combined in 1998 to force Suharto from office. His successor,
B. J. Habibie agreed to call elections for Indonesia and to hold a
referendum on the future of East Timor. The Indonesian election was won
by Megawati Sukarno- putri, the main opposition leader, but even if she
is allowed to become president in November it is doubtful that she will
move to dismantle the national security apparatus, which dominates the
state.
In the negotiations over the terms of the referendum on the future of
East Timor, the international community essentially accepted Indonesia’s
ground rules. The referendum would be run by Indonesia, the occupying
power. The UN was permitted to send a few hundred unarmed monitors, but
they had no means of stopping the paramilitary forces (“militias”) that
had been organized by the Indonesian army and were carrying out
large-scale terror under its direction and with its direct involvement,
particularly by its special forces (Kopassus), trained by the United
States and Australia, and noted for their extreme violence and
brutality. Rather than pressing for a more substantial UN presence, the
Clinton administration actually delayed the dispatch of the monitors.
The referendum was postponed several times by the UN because of the
ongoing terror, which was clearly intended by the army to intimidate the
population into voting for incorporation within Indonesia. On August 30,
1999, in an astonishing display of courage, virtually the entire
population of East Timor went to the polls, about four out of five
voting for independence.
Having failed to cow the Timorese people into accepting Indonesian rule,
the army and its militias then proceeded to unleash a ferocious attack
on the civilian population, displacing hundreds of thousands, killing an
unknown number, but certainly thousands, burning, and looting.
after the referendum?
For the Indonesian army the motives are probably to demonstrate to
people within Indonesia who may raise their heads that the cost will be
extremely severe. The army demonstrated this same point during the
massacres of 1965–66 when Suharto came to power, intimidating the
country for years, and many times subsequently—and always with
enthusiastic support from the United States and the West generally.
There are now secessionist movements in several parts of Indonesia
(though, while the East Timorese independence movement is commonly
called “separatist,” that makes as much sense as calling the French
resistance to the Nazi occupation “separatist”), and the army presumably
fears that independence for East Timor may encourage other breakaway
movements.
Other motives probably include undermining civilian authority in Jakarta
and placing the military in the dominant position in the post-Suharto
succession. Pure revenge is also a likely motive: the East Timorese have
resisted with enormous courage and integrity for 25 years and so they
are being punished by massacre and destruction. It is also worth bearing
in mind that the military, and the Suharto family, have taken over most
of the resources of East Timor, and do not want to relinquish them. And
in the background is the important question of the oil wealth of the
Timor Gap, and who will control it.
It is a little misleading to speak of the role of the UN. The UN is
nearly powerless as an abstract entity or even as a representative of
the world’s nations. It can act, instead, only insofar as it is given
authorization by the great powers, which means primarily the United
States.
The UN has no standing peacekeeping force and thus is dependent on
finding countries willing to contribute troops for any particular
mission. The organization suffers as well from an extreme shortage of
funds because of the continual U.S. refusal to pay its dues. Any
peacekeepers sent to East Timor will probably not be a UN force because
the U.S. Congress has required that there be a 15-day delay before the
U.S. government can approve any UN peacekeeping operation and has
forbidden Washington from paying its authorized share of the costs of
any such operation.
U.S. influence is greatest in the Security Council, but some organs of
the UN, such as the General Assembly or bodies dealing with economic and
social issues have had a Third World majority ever since the era of
decolonization. Accordingly, U.S. policy has been to undermine and
marginalize the UN. The United Nations should have an important role in
world affairs, but U.S. policy, and the policies of other leading
states, severely limits the international organization. From the point
of view of U.S. policymakers, however, there is one crucial role played
by the UN: it serves as a convenient scapegoat when something goes
wrong. For example, the current catastrophe in East Timor is directly
attributable to the refusal of the United States and other Western
powers to deter the atrocities there over a period of a quarter century,
yet the UN will probably take the blame.
referendum?
U.S. motives now are the same as always: to pursue those policies that
will enhance the power and economic returns of U.S. corporate and
political elites with as few dangers of disrupting existing relations of
power as possible, and especially as few disturbing effects in the form
of enlarging public awareness and dissidence.
The United States has a long history of cozying up to ruthless
dictators, being indifferent to if not enthusiastic about their
atrocities, and disengaging only when Washington concludes that the
dictator has provoked so much instability and dissidence that U.S.
interests are threatened. Thus, President Jimmy Carter backed the Shah
of Iran until it seemed as if the army would fall apart in trying to
suppress mass demonstrations; President Reagan embraced Marcos in the
Philippines until splits in the armed forces and huge numbers of people
in the streets put U.S. interests at risk. So in Indonesia, the United
States supported Suharto until a popular explosion seemed to imperil
U.S. economic and geopolitical interests.
The United States supported Indonesian policy in East Timor—with
weapons, training, and diplomatic support—as long as doing so seemed to
further U.S. interests. As long as East Timor could be kept off the
front page, Washington was happy to give Jakarta a free hand. But news
of the latest atrocities could not be suppressed. Some courageous
journalists and independent observers, some UN workers who refused to
abandon the Timorese, and networks of activists have all spread the
word. This has raised the costs to the U.S. government of continuing to
tolerate Indonesian terrorism in East Timor. Washington still hopes,
however, to protect its economic stake in Indonesia and maintain close
ties with that country’s military.
Timor?
The United States and its major allies have tremendous leverage over the
Indonesian government. Indonesia doesn’t have much of a military
industry, and relies heavily on its suppliers: the United States,
Britain, Australia, and others. Indonesian troops receive training and
participate in joint exercises with U.S. troops, the most recent just a
week before the August 30, 1999 referendum. Indonesia’s economy is also
totally dependent on financial aid from the United States and other rich
nations and from the International Monetary Fund whose policies are
controlled by these same rich nations. Without funds from these sources,
Indonesia will find foreign investment drying up and domestic capital
flight as well. In short, Indonesia cannot act without the approval of
Washington and the leading Western nations.
The same sort of pressure that seems in the past few days to have forced
Jakarta to accept international peacekeeping troops could have been
used—and could still be used—to compel the Indonesians to call off the
slaughter and destruction in East Timor, something that would have a far
more critical and immediate effect on the lives of East Timorese than
the dispatch of peacekeepers. Peacekeepers, if they get there in time,
can play a useful role in facilitating the distribution of humanitarian
aid and in restraining any of the militias that refuse an Indonesian
order to disband.
Of course, the same pressure that got Jakarta to buckle today could have
been employed immediately to stop the atrocities. It could have been
used six months ago to force Indonesia to disband the militias and call
off its terror forces. And it could have been used at any point over the
past quarter century to get Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor. And
it could have been used in December 1975 to forestall the Indonesia
invasion in the first place.
The United States government does not act out of humanitarian concern.
U.S. political and economic elites pursue their own interests and are
willing to tolerate—and even welcome—incredible brutality in the
furtherance of those interests.
Sometimes, however, U.S. elites can be pressured into following a
positive course of action if the social costs of their not doing so can
be significantly raised. The U.S. government didn’t wind down the
Vietnam War because a burst of humanitarianism entered the calculation
of policymakers. Rather, it ended the war because the resistance of the
Vietnamese and the social disruptions at home made the costs of
continuing the war too high.
The U.S. government will do something positive—more accurately, it will
stop doing something horribly negative—with regard to East Timor only if
public pressure raises the social costs of continuing to abet the
massacre.
The strategy, then, for those who wish to change U.S. policy on East
Timor is the same as for those who want to change U.S. policy more
generally. U.S. elites respond not to moral persuasion but, instead, to
a calculus of interests. When one wants to influence their choices,
therefore, it is necessary to create conditions that change the calculus
they confront. The only way to do that is to raise consciousness of true
conditions and organize dissent that threatens things they hold dear. If
pursuing or permitting genocidal activity in Timor strengthens elite
positions and enriches their coffers, and if there is no offsetting cost
to the behavior, it will continue. If popular activism threatens
business as usual, if it threatens to grow, and not only address Timor,
but the basic institutions behind events like these—that is a real and
dangerous cost that elites very well understand.
So what does a morally concerned person do? Try to become knowledgeable,
try to educate others, try to facilitate efforts to make dissent
visible—whether financially, via donations to worthy projects and
institutions, or with one’s time and labors given to organizing. It is
the same answer for Timor as for Kosovo as for the Gulf War as for
Nicaragua as for Vietnam. It is the same answer for foreign policy
pursuits as it is for trying to win strikes against corporations,
reverse NAFTA, and preserve affirmative action (or win it in the first
place). To impact elites it is necessary to raise social costs so high
that elites have no choice but to relent.