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Title: On Practice Author: Mao Zedong Language: en
Doing
July 1937
dogmatists and who for a long period rejected the experience of the
Chinese revolution, denying the truth that "Marxism is not a dogma but a
guide to action" and overawing people with words and phrases from
Marxist works, torn out of context. There were also a number of comrades
who were empiricists and who for a long period restricted themselves to
their own fragmentary experience and did not understand the importance
of theory for revolutionary practice or see the revolution as a whole,
but worked blindly though industriously. The erroneous ideas of these
two types of comrades, and particularly of the dogmatists, caused
enormous losses to the Chinese revolution during 1931-34, and yet the
dogmatists cloaking themselves as Marxists, confused a great many
comrades. "On Practice" was written in order to expose the subjectivist
errors of dogmatism and empiricism in the Party, and especially the
error of dogmatism, from the standpoint of the Marxist theory of
knowledge. It was entitled "On Practice" because its stress was on
exposing the dogmatist kind of subjectivism, which belittles practice.
The ideas contained in this essay were presented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung
in a lecture at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in
Yenan.]
Before Marx, materialism examined the problem of knowledge apart from
the social nature of man and apart from his historical development, and
was therefore incapable of understanding the dependence of knowledge on
social practice, that is, the dependence of knowledge on production and
the class struggle.
Above all, Marxists regard man's activity in production as the most
fundamental practical activity, the determinant of all his other
activities. Man's knowledge depends mainly on his activity in material
production, through which he comes gradually to understand the
phenomena, the properties and the laws of nature, and the relations
between himself and nature; and through his activity in production he
also gradually comes to understand, in varying degrees, certain
relations that exist between man and man. None of this knowledge can be
acquired apart from activity in production. In a classless society every
person, as a member of society, joins in common effort with the other
members, enters into definite relations of production with them and
engages in production to meet man's material needs. In all class
societies, the members of the different social classes also enter, in
different ways, into definite relations of production and engage in
production to meet their material needs. This is the primary source from
which human knowledge develops.
Man's social practice is not confined to activity in production, but
takes many other forms--class struggle, political life, scientific and
artistic pursuits; in short, as a social being, man participates in all
spheres of the practical life of society. Thus man, in varying degrees,
comes to know the different relations between man and man, not only
through his material life but also through his political and cultural
life (both of which are intimately bound up with material life). Of
these other types of social practice, class struggle in particular, in
all its various forms, exerts a profound influence on the development of
man's knowledge. In class society everyone lives as a member of a
particular class, and every kind of thinking, without exception, is
stamped with the brand of a class.
Marxists hold that in human society activity in production develops step
by step from a lower to a higher level and that consequently man's
knowledge, whether of nature or of society, also develops step by step
from a lower to a higher level, that is, from the shallower to the
deeper, from the one-sided to the many-sided. For a very long period in
history, men were necessarily confined to a one-sided understanding of
the history of society because, for one thing, the bias of the
exploiting classes always distorted history and, for another, the small
scale of production limited man's outlook. It was not until the modern
proletariat emerged along with immense forces of production (large-scale
industry) that man was able to acquire a comprehensive, historical
understanding of the development of society and turn this knowledge into
a science, the science of Marxism.
Marxists hold that man's social practice alone is the criterion of the
truth of his knowledge of the external world. What actually happens is
that man's knowledge is verified only when he achieves the anticipated
results in the process of social practice (material production, class
struggle or scientific experiment). If a man wants to succeed in his
work, that is, to achieve the anticipated results, he must bring his
ideas into correspondence with the laws of the objective external world;
if they do not correspond, he will fail in his practice. After he fails,
he draws his lessons, corrects his ideas to make them correspond to the
laws of the external world, and can thus turn failure into success; this
is what is meant by "failure is the mother of success" and "a fall into
the pit, a gain in your wit". The dialectical-materialist theory of
knowledge places practice in the primary position, holding that human
knowledge can in no way be separated from practice and repudiating all
the erroneous theories which deny the importance of practice or separate
knowledge from practice. Thus Lenin said, "Practice is higher than
(theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of
universality, but also of immediate actuality." [1] The Marxist
philosophy of dialectical materialism has two outstanding
characteristics. One is its class nature: it openly avows that
dialectical materialism is in the service of the proletariat. The other
is its practicality: it emphasizes the dependence of theory on practice,
emphasizes that theory is based on practice and in turn serves practice.
The truth of any knowledge or theory is determined not by subjective
feelings, but by objective results in social practice. Only social
practice can be the criterion of truth. The standpoint of practice is
the primary and basic standpoint in the dialectical materialist theory
of knowledge. [2]
But how then does human knowledge arise from practice and in turn serve
practice? This will become clear if we look at the process of
development of knowledge.
In the process of practice, man at first sees only the phenomenal side,
the separate aspects, the external relations of things. For instance,
some people from outside come to Yenan on a tour of observation. In the
first day or two, they see its topography, streets and houses; they meet
many people, attend banquets, evening parties and mass meetings, hear
talk of various kinds and read various documents, all these being the
phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of things.
This is called the perceptual stage of cognition, namely, the stage of
sense perceptions and impressions. That is, these particular things in
Yenan act on the sense organs of the members of the observation group,
evoke sense perceptions and give rise in their brains to many
impressions together with a rough sketch of the external relations among
these impressions: this is the first stage of cognition. At this stage,
man cannot as yet form concepts, which are deeper, or draw logical
conclusions.
As social practice continues, things that give rise to man's sense
perceptions and impressions in the course of his practice are repeated
many times; then a sudden change (leap) takes place in the brain in the
process of cognition, and concepts are formed. Concepts are no longer
the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of
things; they grasp the essence, the totality and the internal relations
of things. Between concepts and sense perceptions there is not only a
quantitative but also a qualitative difference. Proceeding further, by
means of judgement and inference one is able to draw logical
conclusions. The expression in San Kuo Yen Yi, [3] "knit the brows and a
stratagem comes to mind", or in everyday language, "let me think it
over", refers to man's use of concepts in the brain to form judgements
and inferences. This is the second stage of cognition. When the members
of the observation group have collected various data and, what is more,
have "thought them over", they are able to arrive at the judgement that
"the Communist Party's policy of the National United Front Against Japan
is thorough, sincere and genuine". Having made this judgement, they can,
if they too are genuine about uniting to save the nation, go a step
further and draw the following conclusion, "The National United Front
Against Japan can succeed." This stage of conception, judgement and
inference is the more important stage in the entire process of knowing a
thing; it is the stage of rational knowledge. The real task of knowing
is, through perception, to arrive at thought, to arrive step by step at
the comprehension of the internal contradictions of objective things, of
their laws and of the internal relations between one process and
another, that is, to arrive at logical knowledge. To repeat, logical
knowledge differs from perceptual knowledge in that perceptual knowledge
pertains to the separate aspects, the phenomena and the external
relations of things, whereas logical knowledge takes a big stride
forward to reach the totality, the essence and the internal relations of
things and discloses the inner contradictions in the surrounding world.
Therefore, logical knowledge is capable of grasping the development of
the surrounding world in its totality, in the internal relations of all
its aspects.
This dialectical-materialist theory of the process of development of
knowledge, basing itself on practice and proceeding from the shallower
to the deeper, was never worked out by anybody before the rise of
Marxism. Marxist materialism solved this problem correctly for the first
time, pointing out both materialistically and dialectically the
deepening movement of cognition, the movement by which man in society
progresses from perceptual knowledge to logical knowledge in his
complex, constantly recurring practice of production and class struggle.
Lenin said, "The abstraction of matter, of a law of nature, the
abstraction of value, etc., in short, all scientific (correct, serious,
not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and
completely." [4] Marxism-Leninism holds that each of the two stages in
the process of cognition has its own characteristics, with knowledge
manifesting itself as perceptual at the lower stage and logical at the
higher stage, but that both are stages in an integrated process of
cognition. The perceptual and the rational are qualitatively different,
but are not divorced from each other; they are unified on the basis of
practice. Our practice proves that what is perceived cannot at once be
comprehended and that only what is comprehended can be more deeply
perceived. Perception only solves the problem of phenomena; theory alone
can solve the problem of essence. The solving of both these problems is
not separable in the slightest degree from practice. Whoever wants to
know a thing has no way of doing so except by coming into contact with
it, that is, by living (practicing) in its environment. In feudal
society it was impossible to know the laws of capitalist society in
advance because capitalism had not yet emerged, the relevant practice
was lacking. Marxism could be the product only of capitalist society.
Marx, in the era of laissez-faire capitalism, could not concretely know
certain laws peculiar to the era of imperialism beforehand, because
imperialism, the last stage of capitalism, had not yet emerged and the
relevant practice was lacking; only Lenin and Stalin could undertake
this task. Leaving aside their genius, the reason why Marx, Engels,
Lenin and Stalin could work out their theories was mainly that they
personally took part in the practice of the class struggle and the
scientific experimentation of their time; lacking this condition, no
genius could have succeeded. The saying, "without stepping outside his
gate the scholar knows all the wide world's affairs", was mere empty
talk in past times when technology was undeveloped. Even though this
saying can be valid in the present age of developed technology, the
people with real personal knowledge are those engaged in practice the
wide world over. And it is only when these people have come to "know"
through their practice and when their knowledge has reached him through
writing and technical media that the "scholar" can indirectly "know all
the wide world's affairs". If you want to know a certain thing or a
certain class of things directly, you must personally participate in the
practical struggle to change reality, to change that thing or class of
things, for only thus can you come into contact with them as phenomena;
only through personal participation in the practical struggle to change
reality can you uncover the essence of that thing or class of things and
comprehend them. This is the path to knowledge which every man actually
travels, though some people, deliberately distorting matters, argue to
the contrary. The most ridiculous person in the world is the "know all"
who picks up a smattering of hearsay knowledge and proclaims himself
"the world's Number One authority"; this merely shows that he has not
taken a proper measure of himself. Knowledge is a matter of science, and
no dishonesty or conceit whatsoever is permissible. What is required is
definitely the reverse--honesty and modesty. If you want knowledge, you
must take part in the practice of changing reality. If you want to know
the taste of a pear, you must change the pear by eating it yourself. If
you want to know the structure and properties of the atom, you must make
physical and chemical experiments to change the state of the atom. If
you want to know the theory and methods of revolution, you must take
part in revolution. All genuine knowledge originates in direct
experience. But one cannot have direct experience of everything; as a
matter of fact, most of our knowledge comes from indirect experience,
for example, all knowledge from past times and foreign lands. To our
ancestors and to foreigners, such knowledge was--or is--a matter of
direct experience, and this knowledge is reliable if in the course of
their direct experience the requirement of "scientific abstraction",
spoken of by Lenin, was--or is--fulfilled and objective reality
scientifically reflected, otherwise it is not reliable. Hence a man's
knowledge consists only of two parts, that which comes from direct
experience and that which comes from indirect experience. Moreover, what
is indirect experience for me is direct experience for other people.
Consequently, considered as a whole, knowledge of any kind is
inseparable from direct experience. All knowledge originates in
perception of the objective external world through man's physical sense
organs. Anyone who denies such perception, denies direct experience, or
denies personal participation in the practice that changes reality, is
not a materialist. That is why the "know-all" is ridiculous. There is an
old Chinese saying, "How can you catch tiger cubs without entering the
tiger's lair?" This saying holds true for man's practice and it also
holds true for the theory of knowledge. There can be no knowledge apart
from practice.
To make clear the dialectical-materialist movement of cognition arising
on the basis of the practice which changes reality--to make clear the
gradually deepening movement of cognition--a few additional concrete
examples are given below.
In its knowledge of capitalist society, the proletariat was only in the
perceptual stage of cognition in the first period of its practice, the
period of machine-smashing and spontaneous struggle; it knew only some
of the aspects and the external relations of the phenomena of
capitalism. The proletariat was then still a "class-in-itself". But when
it reached the second period of its practice, the period of conscious
and organized economic and political struggles, the proletariat was able
to comprehend the essence of capitalist society, the relations of
exploitation between social classes and its own historical task; and it
was able to do so because of its own practice and because of its
experience of prolonged struggle, which Marx and Engels scientifically
summed up in all its variety to create the theory of Marxism for the
education of the proletariat. It was then that the proletariat became a
"class-for-itself".
Similarly with the Chinese people's knowledge of imperialism. The first
stage was one of superficial, perceptual knowledge, as shown in the
indiscriminate anti-foreign struggles of the Movement of the Taiping
Heavenly Kingdom, the Yi Ho Tuan Movement, and so on. It was only in the
second stage that the Chinese people reached the stage of rational
knowledge, saw the internal and external contradictions of imperialism
and saw the essential truth that imperialism had allied itself with
China's comprador and feudal classes to oppress and exploit the great
masses of the Chinese people. This knowledge began about the time of the
May 4th Movement of 1919.
Next, let us consider war. If those who lead a war lack experience of
war, then at the initial stage they will not understand the profound
laws pertaining to the directing of a specific war (such as our Agrarian
Revolutionary War of the past decade). At the initial stage they will
merely experience a good deal of fighting and, what is more, suffer many
defeats. But this experience (the experience of battles won and
especially of battles lost) enables them to comprehend the inner thread
of the whole war, namely, the laws of that specific war, to understand
its strategy and tactics, and consequently to direct the war with
confidence. If, at such a moment, the command is turned over to an
inexperienced person, then he too will have to suffer a number of
defeats (gain experience) before he can comprehend the true laws of the
war.
"I am not sure I can handle it." We often hear this remark when a
comrade hesitates to accept an assignment. Why is he unsure of himself?
Because he has no systematic understanding of the content and
circumstances of the assignment, or because he has had little or no
contact with such work, and so the laws governing it are beyond him.
After a detailed analysis of the nature and circumstances of the
assignment, he will feel more sure of himself and do it willingly. If he
spends some time at the job and gains experience and if he is a person
who is willing to look into matters with an open mind and not one who
approaches problems subjectively, one-sidedly and superficially, then he
can draw conclusions for himself as to how to go about the job and do it
with much more courage. Only those who are subjective, one-sided and
superficial in their approach to problems will smugly issue orders or
directives the moment they arrive on the scene, without considering the
circumstances, without viewing things in their totality (their history
and their present state as a whole) and without getting to the essence
of things (their nature and the internal relations between one thing and
another). Such people are bound to trip and fall.
Thus it can be seen that the first step in the process of cognition is
contact with the objects of the external world; this belongs to the
stage of perception. The second step is to synthesize the data of
perception by arranging and reconstructing them; this belongs to the
stage of conception, judgement and inference. It is only when the data
of perception are very rich (not fragmentary) and correspond to reality
(are not illusory) that they can be the basis for forming correct
concepts and theories.
Here two important points must be emphasized. The first, which has been
stated before but should be repeated here, is the dependence of rational
knowledge upon perceptual knowledge. Anyone who thinks that rational
knowledge need not be derived from perceptual knowledge is an idealist.
In the history of philosophy there is the "rationalist" school that
admits the reality only of reason and not of experience, believing that
reason alone is reliable while perceptual experience is not; this school
errs by turning things upside down. The rational is reliable precisely
because it has its source in sense perceptions, other wise it would be
like water without a source, a tree without roots, subjective,
self-engendered and unreliable. As to the sequence in the process of
cognition, perceptual experience comes first; we stress the significance
of social practice in the process of cognition precisely because social
practice alone can give rise to human knowledge and it alone can start
man on the acquisition of perceptual experience from the objective
world. For a person who shuts his eyes, stops his ears and totally cuts
himself off from the objective world there can be no such thing as
knowledge. Knowledge begins with experience--this is the materialism of
the theory of knowledge.
The second point is that knowledge needs to be deepened, that the
perceptual stage of knowledge needs to be developed to the rational
stage--this is the dialectics of the theory of knowledge. [5] To think
that knowledge can stop at the lower, perceptual stage and that
perceptual knowledge alone is reliable while rational knowledge is not,
would be to repeat the historical error of "empiricism". This theory
errs in failing to understand that, although the data of perception
reflect certain realities in the objective world (I am not speaking here
of idealist empiricism which confines experience to so-called
introspection), they are merely one-sided and superficial, reflecting
things incompletely and not reflecting their essence. Fully to reflect a
thing in its totality, to reflect its essence, to reflect its inherent
laws, it is necessary through the exercise of thought to reconstruct the
rich data of sense perception, discarding the dross and selecting the
essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, proceeding from
the one to the other and from the outside to the inside, in order to
form a system of concepts and theories--it is necessary to make a leap
from perceptual to rational knowledge. Such reconstructed knowledge is
not more empty or more unreliable; on the contrary, whatever has been
scientifically reconstructed in the process of cognition, on the basis
of practice, reflects objective reality, as Lenin said, more deeply,
more truly, more fully. As against this, vulgar "practical men" respect
experience but despise theory, and therefore cannot have a comprehensive
view of an entire objective process, lack clear direction and long-range
perspective, and are complacent over occasional successes and glimpses
of the truth. If such persons direct a revolution, they will lead it up
a blind alley.
Rational knowledge depends upon perceptual knowledge and perceptual
knowledge remains to be developed into rational knowledge-- this is the
dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge. In philosophy, neither
"rationalism" nor "empiricism" understands the historical or the
dialectical nature of knowledge, and although each of these schools
contains one aspect of the truth (here I am referring to materialist,
not to idealist, rationalism and empiricism), both are wrong on the
theory of knowledge as a whole. The dialectical-materialist movement of
knowledge from the perceptual to the rational holds true for a minor
process of cognition (for instance, knowing a single thing or task) as
well as for a major process of cognition (for instance, knowing a whole
society or a revolution).
But the movement of knowledge does not end here. If the
dialectical-materialist movement of knowledge were to stop at rational
knowledge, only half the problem would be dealt with. And as far as
Marxist philosophy is concerned, only the less important half at that.
Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in
understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to
explain it, but in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to
change the world. From the Marxist viewpoint, theory is important, and
its importance is fully expressed in Lenin's statement, "Without
revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." [6] But
Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because
it can guide action. If we have a correct theory but merely prate about
it, pigeonhole it and do not put it into practice, then that theory,
however good, is of no significance. Knowledge begins with practice, and
theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and must then return
to practice. The active function of knowledge manifests itself not only
in the active leap from perceptual to rational knowledge, but--and this
is more important--it must manifest itself in the leap from rational
knowledge to revolutionary practice. The knowledge which grasps the laws
of the world, must be redirected to the practice of changing the world,
must be applied anew in the practice of production, in the practice of
revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle and in
the practice of scientific experiment. This is the process of testing
and developing theory, the continuation of the whole process of
cognition. The problem of whether theory corresponds to objective
reality is not, and cannot be, completely solved in the movement of
knowledge from the perceptual to the rational, mentioned above. The only
way to solve this problem completely is to redirect rational knowledge
to social practice, apply theory to practice and see whether it can
achieve the objectives one has in mind. Many theories of natural science
are held to be true not only because they were so considered when
natural scientists originated them, but because they have been verified
in subsequent scientific practice. Similarly, Marxism-Leninism is held
to be true not only because it was so considered when it was
scientifically formulated by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin but because
it has been verified in the subsequent practice of revolutionary class
struggle and revolutionary national struggle. Dialectical materialism is
universally true because it is impossible for anyone to escape from its
domain in his practice. The history of human knowledge tells us that the
truth of many theories is incomplete and that this incompleteness is
remedied through the test of practice. Many theories are erroneous and
it is through the test of practice that their errors are corrected. That
is why practice is the criterion of truth and why "the standpoint of
life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of
knowledge". [7] Stalin has well said, "Theory becomes purposeless if it
is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in
the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory." [8]
When we get to this point, is the movement of knowledge completed? Our
answer is: it is and yet it is not. When men in society throw themselves
into the practice of changing a certain objective process (whether
natural or social) at a certain stage of its development, they can, as a
result of the reflection of the objective process in their brains and
the exercise of their subjective activity, advance their knowledge from
the perceptual to the rational, and create ideas, theories, plans or
programmes which correspond in general to the laws of that objective
process. They then apply these ideas, theories, plans or programmes in
practice in the same objective process. And if they can realize the aims
they have in mind, that is, if in that same process of practice they can
translate, or on the whole translate, those previously formulated ideas,
theories, plans or programmes into fact, then the movement of knowledge
may be considered completed with regard to this particular process. In
the process of changing nature, take for example the fulfilment of an
engineering plan, the verification of a scientific hypothesis, the
manufacture of an implement or the reaping of a crop; or in the process
of changing society, take for example the victory of a strike, victory
in a war or the fulfilment of an educational plan. All these may be
considered the realization of aims one has in mind. But generally
speaking, whether in the practice of changing nature or of changing
society, men's original ideas, theories, plans or programmes are seldom
realized without any alteration.
This is because people engaged in changing reality are usually subject
to numerous limitations; they are limited not only by existing
scientific and technological conditions but also by the development of
the objective process itself and the degree to which this process has
become manifest (the aspects and the essence of the objective process
have not yet been fully revealed). In such a situation, ideas, theories,
plans or programmes are usually altered partially and sometimes even
wholly, because of the discovery of unforeseen circumstances in the
course of practice. That is to say, it does happen that the original
ideas, theories, plans or programmes fail to correspond with reality
either in whole or in part and are wholly or partially incorrect. In
many instances, failures have to be repeated many times before errors In
knowledge can be corrected and correspondence with the laws of the
objective process achieved, and consequently before the subjective can
be transformed into the objective, or in other words, before the
anticipated results can be achieved in practice. But when that point is
reached, no matter how, the movement of human knowledge regarding a
certain objective process at a certain stage of its development may be
considered completed.
However, so far as the progression of the process is concerned, the
movement of human knowledge is not completed. Every process, whether in
the realm of nature or of society, progresses and develops by reason of
its internal contradiction and struggle, and the movement of human
knowledge should also progress and develop along with it. As far as
social movements are concerned, true revolutionary leaders must not only
be good at correcting their ideas, theories, plans or programmes when
errors are discovered, as has been indicated above; but when a certain
objective process has already progressed and changed from one stage of
development to another, they must also be good at making themselves and
all their fellow-revolutionaries progress and change in their subjective
knowledge along with it, that IS to say, they must ensure that the
proposed new revolutionary tasks and new working programmes correspond
to the new changes in the situation. In a revolutionary period the
situation changes very rapidly; if the knowledge of revolutionaries does
not change rapidly in accordance with the changed situation, they will
be unable to lead the revolution to victory.
It often happens, however, that thinking lags behind reality; this is
because man's cognition is limited by numerous social conditions. We are
opposed to die-herds in the revolutionary ranks whose thinking fails to
advance with changing objective circumstances and has manifested itself
historically as Right opportunism. These people fail to see that the
struggle of opposites has already pushed the objective process forward
while their knowledge has stopped at the old stage. This is
characteristic of the thinking of all die-herds. Their thinking is
divorced from social practice, and they cannot march ahead to guide the
chariot of society; they simply trail behind, grumbling that it goes too
fast and trying to drag it back or turn it in the opposite direction.
We are also opposed to "Left" phrase-mongering. The thinking of
"Leftists" outstrips a given stage of development of the objective
process; some regard their fantasies as truth, while others strain to
realize in the present an ideal which can only be realized in the
future. They alienate themselves from the current practice of the
majority of the people and from the realities of the day, and show
themselves adventurist in their actions.
Idealism and mechanical materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are
all characterized by the breach between the subjective and the
objective, by the separation of knowledge from practice. The
Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by
scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong
ideologies. Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process
of development of the universe, the development of each particular
process is relative, and that hence, in the endless flow of absolute
truth, man's knowledge of a particular process at any given stage of
development is only relative truth. The sum total of innumerable
relative truths constitutes absolute truth. [9] The development of an
objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is the
development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical
movements of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in
human knowledge. In social practice, the process of coming into being,
developing and passing away is infinite, and so is the process of coming
into being, developing and passing away in human knowledge. As man's
practice which changes objective reality in accordance with given ideas,
theories, plans or programmes, advances further and further, his
knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper. The
movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and
so is man's cognition of truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in
no way exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge
of truth in the course of practice. Our conclusion is the concrete,
historical unity of the subjective and the objective, of theory and
practice, of knowing ant doing, and we are opposed to all erroneous
ideologies, whether "Left" or Right, which depart from concrete history.
In the present epoch of the development of society, the responsibility
of correctly knowing and changing the world has been placed by history
upon the shoulders of the proletariat and its party. This process, the
practice of changing the world, which is determined in accordance with
scientific knowledge, has already reached a historic moment in the world
and in China, a great moment unprecedented in human history, that is,
the moment for completely banishing darkness from the world and from
China and for changing the world into a world of light such as never
previously existed. The struggle of the proletariat and the
revolutionary people to change the world comprises the fulfilment of the
following tasks: to change the objective world and, at the same time,
their own subjective world--to change their cognitive ability and change
the relations between the subjective and the objective world. Such a
change has already come about in one part of the globe, in the Soviet
Union. There the people are pushing forward this process of change. The
people of China and the rest of the world either are going through, or
will go through, such a process. And the objective world which is to be
changed also includes all the opponents of change, who, in order to be
changed, must go through a stage of compulsion before they can enter the
stage of voluntary, conscious change. The epoch of world communism will
be reached when all mankind voluntarily and consciously changes itself
and the world.
Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify
and develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively
develop it into rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge
and actively guide revolutionary practice to change both the subjective
and the objective world. Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again
knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each
cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level.
Such is the whole of the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge,
and such is the dialectical-materialist theory of the unity of knowing
and doing.
1. V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's The Science of Logic". Collected
Works, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 205.
2. See Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach". Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,
Selected Works, in two volumes, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1958, Vol. II,
p. 403, and V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, ring. ed.,
FLPH, Moscow, 1952, pp. 136-4.
3. San Kuo Yen Yi (Tales of the Three Kingdoms) is a famous Chinese
historical nova by Lo Kuan-chung (late 14th and early 15th century).
4. V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's The Science of Logic", Collected
Works, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1958, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 161.
5. "In order to understand, it is necessary empirically to begin
understanding, study, to rise from empiricism to the universal." (Ibid.,
p. 197.)
6. V. I. Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?", Collected Works, Eng. ed., FLPH,
Moscow, 1961, Vol. V, p. 369.
7. V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Eng. ed., FLPH,
Moscow, p. 141.
8. J. V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism", Problems of Leninism,
Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, p. 31.
9. See V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Eng. ed., FLPH,
Moscow, pp. 129-36.