đŸ Archived View for library.inu.red âș file âș marcin-skladanowski-lukasz-borzecki-radical-russianness⊠captured on 2023-01-29 at 12:51:00. Gemini links have been rewritten to link to archived content
âĄïž Next capture (2024-06-20)
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Title: Radical Russianness Author: Marcin Skladanowski, Lukasz Borzecki Language: en Source: Journal for the Study of Radicalism Volume 14, Number 2, Fall 2020 Michigan State University Press
One of the main factors of Russian political and intellectual life is
anti-Occidentalism. Its significance has become more visible in the West
since the beginning of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2014.
It should be noted, however, that contemporary Russian
anti-Occidentalism cannot be considered a result of this conflict or the
support shown by Western countries to Ukraine. Anti-Occidentalism is
deeply rooted in Russiaâs political, national, and religious traditions.
The conflict in Ukraine has only revealed its scale and consequences.
There is a long-standing tradition of anti-Occidentalism in Russia, both
in the imperial and Soviet period of its history. One can distinguish
short and relatively unimportant periods of Russian cooperation with the
Westâfor example, in the twentieth century, Provisional Governments of
the Russian Republic under Prince Lâvov and Kerenskiy between the
February and the October Revolution 1917 and Boris Yeltsinâs presidency
in the 1990s. However, these two periods have been considered in later
Russian political and cultural thought not only as failed attempts to
westernize Russia, but also as political [End Page 65] errors which led
the countryâs defeat in the First World War or provoked one of the most
chaotic periods in Russian political and social life known as âthe bad
ninetiesâ (likhiye devanostye). Moreover, according to Zoe Knox, the
failure of Yeltsinâs westernizing reforms encouraged alternative
political and social visions that had developed in Russian tradition.1
Aleksandr Duginâs anti-Occidentalism is not an isolated phenomenon. He
belongs to the Izborsk Club, established in 2012, whose head is another
extreme-right Russian intellectual, Aleksandr Prokhanov. According to
its members, this club was supposed to be a conservative think tank with
the aim to oppose Western influences in Russia and to fight the
pro-Western tendencies within Russia, whose supporters are referred to
as âthe Fifth Column.â2 It seems that Duginâs anti-Occidentalism is
sincere, contrary to the anti-Western rhetoric presented by the
representatives of the Russian Federation authorities, whose children
are educated at Western universities and whose wealth is deposited in
Western banks or invested in property in Western countries. Dugin
perceives the West as Russiaâs existential enemy. He considers Russiaâs
existence and development dependent on its strict isolation from the
West or, in his more radical statements, on the destruction or fall of
the West.
The controversial character of Duginâs thought makes it an interesting
subject for numerous scholars who specialize in contemporary political
science and international relations. The analysis of the roots and
meaning of Duginâs thought as well as its connections to extreme-right
Western movements has been undertaken in insightful ways by such
renowned scholars as MarlĂšne Laruelle, Mark Sedgwick, Andreas Umland,
Anton Shekhovtsov, and Dmitry Shlapentokh. Although acknowledging their
input in the reflection on Russian extreme-right and neoimperialism, we
claim in this article that the analysis of Duginâs views solely from a
perspective characteristic of political science, albeit valuable, is
insufficient to reveal its true significance. A similar situation, in a
wider context, can be observed in the case of the contemporary
anti-Western and isolationist ideology that is promoted by the Russian
Federation under the conditions of the conflict with the West. This
conflict, although political, military, and economic nature, reveals
other roots of hostility toward the West and its characteristic values,
principles of community and individual life, as well as the relation of
an individual toward the community that are present in Russian
intellectual and religious traditions. An additional research [End Page
66] perspective should also be added, which is indispensable both with
respect to Dugin himself as well as the anti-Western ideology currently
promoted by the Russian Federation, namely the religious and
historiosophic context. This context is permanent in Rusâ and Russian
tradition, and it has survived, despite pressure to modernize the
country, especially during Peter the Greatâs reforms and in the Soviet
period, to become a significant feature of modern national propaganda.3
This propaganda is addressed mostly to the citizens of the Russian
Federation, but it also affects all the members of âthe Rusâ worldâ
(Russkiy mir, more frequently translated as âRussian worldâ), which
includes Russian-speaking citizens of other states, in particular former
Soviet republics. This phenomenon is noteworthy because, according to
the statements of President Putin4 and other representatives of the
Russian establishment, the elites of the Russian Orthodox Church5 and in
particular Russian conservative circles and organizations (such as the
âIzborsk Club,â the âRusskiy Mir Foundationâ), these citizens are
expected to be loyal to Russia and will be protected by Russia.6
The efficiency of government-inspired anti-Western propaganda aimed at
Russian citizens is somewhat questionable. This doubtful efficiency is
indicated by the fact that as a result of a deteriorating economic
situation, since March 2018, when Vladimir Putin triumphantly won the
presidential election, the centers for public opinion research report a
significant fall in the popularity of Putinâs policies and Putin
himself.7 There has even been reported a significant increase in
positive opinions about the West,8 which is portrayed in propaganda
language as conducting an anti-Russian policy that aims to subjugate
Russia. Under such circumstances, one could expect further ideological
pressure on the part of Russian authorities combined with preannounced
actions intended to deny the Russians access to independent sources of
information.9
This social, political, and ideological context makes the reflection on
Duginâs anti-Occidentalism noteworthy, not only in order to learn about
the opinions of a representative of extremely conservative intellectual
circles but also in order to recognize religious and intellectual
resources that can still be used by Russian authorities in their
ideological battle. This article, therefore, aims to demonstrate the
permanent elements of Russian religious historiosophy, which have been
reinterpreted and radicalized by Dugin. Its objective is to show Dugin
as an intellectual immersed in religiously inspired [End Page 67] Rusâ
and Russian historiosophic tradition who also reinterprets this
tradition in a creative way. In this light, Dugin is perceived not only
as an ultra-right intellectual and political activist, who he most
definitely is to a certain extent and who is presented as such in the
political science literature, but also as an intellectual that remains
deeply rooted in the Rusâ spiritual tradition and who in his radical,
albeit logical way, extrapolates the content of said tradition.
We have decided that the resource basis for this article will be Duginâs
more recent works, which were composed after Vladimir Putinâs âMunich
speechâ in 2007, in the conditions of the increasing conflict with the
West that first led to the war in Georgia and, further, to the
annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol and the conflict in Donbass. This
choice is methodologically significant because, in his earlier works,
which are often referred to by the abovementioned researchers, Dugin
does not hide his ties with Western intellectual tradition, which he
partly accepts (especially Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, or Ayn Rand)
and partly rejects (in particular, the entire tradition of Western
anthropology, both Christian and secular, as well as the resulting
liberal and personalistic social thought). Recent years have seen the
evolution of Duginâs ideas. Increasingly anti-Western rhetoric has led
him to employ Rusâ religious tradition (at times in a heavily
secularized form) and historiosophy rather than Western resources to
support his claims. In such a way, Duginâs anti-Occidentalism becomes
more coherent. One can even claim that, despite all the reservations
that his opinions must raise and the fact that these opinions are often
unacceptable from the Western perspective, Duginâs thought can be
perceived as a logical consequence of the development of Rusâ Orthodoxy
in its social and political dimension.
For the present article, the main religious and historiosophic issues
have been extrapolated from Duginâs more recent works in such a way as
to demonstrate how Dugin interprets and reinterprets this aspect of
Russian intellectual and spiritual tradition. The extrapolation of these
elements and determined the way Dugin employs them in his geopolitical
and historiosophic vision leads us to indicate how important the
arguments belonging to the domain of religion and historiosophy for his
thought are, especially for his anti-Western and isolationist concepts.
[End Page 68]
Although Aleksandr Duginâs ideas are obviously complex and therefore
cannot be limited to one particular field of knowledge, it is possible
to recognize a general feature of his thought, which can be described as
the total rejection of the West. Its totality covers every aspect of
social and individual life. It is manifest in Duginâs evaluation of the
Western culture, anthropological views and ethics, religious beliefs as
well as the social and economic order. According to Dugin, the whole
ideology of the West comes down to secularism, materialism, atheism, and
pragmatism.10 He repeatedly describes the Western world as corrupt and
rotten. This is why the Western idea of democracy is being called âthe
kingdom of Antichrist,â11 and political and economic liberalism is
considered âabsolute evil.â12 Duginâs criticism is directed in
particular at the United States, which he openly calls âa country of
absolute evilâ and âthe center of the axis of evil.â13 This kind of
language, hardly acceptable in modern academic debates, connects Duginâs
ideas with a long-standing Russian intellectual tradition and only
within this tradition it can be rightly understood. At the same time,
however, such language is only possible within Russian anthropological
tradition, in which there is no room for the understanding of personal
dignity and rights, characteristic of the West, according to which a
community performs a subservient role with respect to an individual. In
Russian tradition, a person gains their true value only when serving a
communityâsociety, Church, and state.14
Dugin himself associates his thought with that aspect of Russian
tradition which has emphasized Russiaâs particular cultural and
political mission in the world. Two important elements of this tradition
from the prerevolutionary period of Russian history deserve to be
mentioned, as they are significant for Duginâs ideas.
First, we must recall the so-called Old Believersâ (starovery) schism
that arose as a consequence of the rejection of Patriarch Nikonâs
reforms by some groups within Russian Orthodoxy in the seventeenth
century.15 Although in the minority and persecuted both by the official
Church and the state, the [End Page 69] Old Believersâ religious and
eschatological concepts have greatly influenced Russian intellectual
life.16 In their beliefs, Russia (Holy Rusâ)17 had a particular, sacred
mission in the world as the only truly Christian (i.e., Orthodox) Empire
after the fall of Constantinople, which, according to them, was caused
by its union with the âschismaticâ West. Moscow, as the Third and Last
Rome, was believed to be the capital of Godâs Kingdom on Earth, a sign
of the eschatological, final war between good and evil.18 Strong
opposition against any attempt to modernize Russian religious and social
life should, therefore, be considered the fulfillment of Russiaâs
eschatological mission in the world. By contrast, Western culture, with
its forms of religious life, values, and social order, had to be
repulsed as fundamentally incompatible with Russiaâs God-given mission.
The second element that has influenced Duginâs thought is an
anti-Occidental movement related to the period of Russiaâs religious and
national revival in the nineteenth century. That period in Russian
intellectual tradition was marked by first attempts, after the
westernizing reforms of Peter the Great, to substitute Western values
and forms of political and religious life, which were considered foreign
to Russian tradition, with traditionally Russian ones.19 The idea became
more evident after the victory over Napoleon that strengthened the
conviction of Russiaâs particular cultural and religious mission.20 Two
important features, namely anti-intellectualism and the turn toward the
East, which marked the period of religious and national revival, have
also influenced Duginâs thought. Russian anti-intellectualism should
rather be understood as the rejection of Western ways of reasoning.21
This idea is important for Dugin to justify his opposition to some key
Western anthropological concepts such as human rights, the dignity of an
individual, or the subsidiary role of a community in relation to its
members.22 The turn toward the East aimed to find alternative sources of
Russian culture and social organization. Although the nineteenth-century
intellectual revival was primarily related to the renewal of Russian
Orthodox theology and the beginning of the Slavophile movement,23 it
tended to show that Russian social tradition had been shaped not only by
Christianity, but also by the persistent impact of Asian cultures, in
particular in the area of social life.24 Dugin uses this tendency to
root his anthropological views in Eastern concepts of a human being and
social structure, even though he does not distance himself entirely from
Western anthropology based on the notion of a person.25 [End Page 70]
Duginâs rejection of Western anthropology, with its links to the Western
Christian vision of a human being, can be perceived as a logical
consequence of the abovementioned elements of Russian intellectual
tradition. Dugin, however, does not limit himself to simple negation. He
proposes a different anthropological vision, which can be described as
âanti-Occidental anthropologyâ due to its developing in clear contrast
to such essential anthropological and ethical concepts as âindividual
human beingâ or âhuman rights.â
The basis for Duginâs polemically oriented anthropology is his openness
to cultural and religious pluralism26 even though he describes himself
as an Orthodox Christian and as a person deeply rooted in Russian
culture. In his opinion, this does not contradict the possibility of
recognizing various anthropological solutions as legitimate, each one in
its own cultural and religious milieu. Dugin does not support any
coexistence of different anthropologies in a specific culture but gives
each culture the right to have its anthropology, which should be
considered as equally important and true.27 By binding anthropology to a
specific culture, Dugin rejects the possibility that a single and
universally obliging vision of a human being exists.28 This conviction
has an important consequence: a specific anthropology can be discussed
only within its cultural milieu. From this viewpoint, any attempt to
assess different visions of individual and social life only from the
Western perspective should be rejected as unjustified and wrongful or
simply as an attempt to impose Western values and ideas on non-Western
cultures.29 Duginâs anthropological proposal can, therefore, be
criticized only from within Russian intellectual and religious
tradition. Moreover, despite its extremes, it is deeply rooted in this
tradition. The main features of Duginâs anthropology are radical
anti-individualism and its geographic and cultural contextualization.
Duginâs anti-individualism can be understood as a radicalized synthesis
of both Orthodox communitarian anthropology and Communist (Soviet)
collectivism.30 According to Svetlana Neretina, limiting individual
freedom in Russian public life is connected with the emphasis on
national tradition.31 âMan is the measure of all thingsââthis statement
by the ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras of Abdera, which can be
considered the foundation of Western anthropocentrism, is according to
Dugin âa worldwide heresy.â32 The concept of dignity that every [End
Page 71] single human being possesses is the basis of Western egoism and
lust for power. It also justifies the disrespect the West demonstrates
for other cultures and civilizations. Dugin, on the other hand, thinks
that âa true human beingâ is the whole human species.33 He proposes the
concept of âpolitical anthropologyâ in which only âthe Empireâ is a
holder of human rights and dignity: âThe Empire is a great human
being.â34 The real value of each person depends on their adherence to
the Empire. Hence, the political system of the Empire determines
individual lives and personal features of its members. Dugin believes
that the political system of the Empire has an intellectual, conceptual,
educational, and coercive potential that can freely shape its
citizens.35 This context allows us to perceive Duginâs anthropology as a
form of âposthumanism.â36
The second feature of Duginâs anthropology is strictly related to his
Eurasianism, according to which Russia should discover its origins and
its true identity in Asian cultures.37 The âRussian civilizationâ is a
coherent but versatile whole with roots in both Byzantine Orthodoxy and
Asian traditions.38 Other civilizations have different sources of their
social life, ethical systems, and their sets of values.39 If Dugin
fiercely opposes the cultural dominance of the West, which includes the
imposition of Western values and social principles on other, non-Western
cultures, he has to admit the possibility that different, but equally
correct, anthropologies have been developed in different cultural
contexts. Every anthropology has its civilizational milieu and it is
acceptable only within that environment. The Western concept of a human
being is understandable only within the Western social and religious
tradition. Outside this cultural environment (e.g., in Russia), this
concept and related values and norms are not only incomprehensible but
also constitute a culturally alien element that should be removed
because it is a threat to national or religious identity. This is the
reason for Dugin emphasizing the unity of anthropology and territory,
which is vital for the internal and sociocultural integrity of Russia.
All different peoples that have formed todayâs population of the Russian
Federation were always strongly dependent on their territory. It was not
only a social structure, but also axiology, or even the concept of a
human being itself that were shaped by Russian territory.40 In Duginâs
view, other social structures, axiologies, or concepts of a human being
do not correspond to this Russian Eurasian heritage.
Dugin, however, goes even further. He considers the Western concept of a
human being, based on the dignity of a person and the understanding of
human [End Page 72] rights as individual rights as inadequate or
âculturally alienâ to Russia.41 In Duginâs thought, there can easily be
seen the total rejection of Western values such as democracy, individual
freedom, or a free-market economy.42 These values, which he considers
âso-called values,â are a means of destruction of these societies on
which they are imposedâhence, Duginâs idea of the social, cultural, and
moral degradation of the West. This idea also has a religious dimension
because it is connected with the rejection of Western Christianity,
especially Protestantism, as a kind of incarnation of Western spirit and
values.43
The way in which Dugin interprets Rusâ religious historiosophy and uses
it to justify his geopolitical concepts is influenced by the definition
of his religiosity. His religious declarations are rather unclear. He
declares himself to be an Orthodox Christian,44 a member of a
Yedinovertsy community that gathers in the suburban Church of the
Archangel Michael near Moscow. In Duginâs case, belonging to the
Yedinovertsy group does not only mean conservatism and traditionalism in
doctrinal or liturgic issues. In his works, he refers to the eschatology
of the Old Believers.45 As a consequence, he rejects any form of
religious progress,46 which also became the reason for the schism
(raskol) in the Russian Church and resulted in the Old Believers
rejecting the official Church.47 Although officially the Russian
Orthodox Church has not announced its position on the matter, numerous
Orthodox intellectuals and theologians distance themselves from Duginâs
position.48
One should note, however, that in recent years Dugin has ceased to
spread ideas unacceptable to Orthodox theologians such as the occultist
explication of political and cultural processes, emphasizing Eastern
anthropological concepts that question the existence of the human soul
and a Christian conviction that every individual is destined for
salvation, or severe criticism of Russian Orthodoxy after the reforms of
Patriarch Nikon. Still, at the beginning of the twenty-first century,
these ideas used to brand Dugin a heretic in the Orthodox circles.49 To
make this picture even more complex, Dugin, although rejecting atheism,
does not consider monotheism necessary and, therefore, questions the
universal character of Christianity, which distances him from Orthodoxy
on doctrinal grounds.50
Although Dugin has never explicitly rejected those of his earlier
concepts that oppose Orthodox doctrine, since the first decade of the
twenty-first century [End Page 73] he has made an effort to present his
views to the Russian Orthodox Church in a less confrontational manner.51
In such a way, Dugin has increasingly become a significant figure in the
conservative current of official Russian Orthodoxy. At the same time,
Dugin is a member of the âIzborsk Clubâ alongside such influential
Russian Orthodox hierarchs as Metropolitan Tikhon (Shevkunov), who is
also part of the close circles of Vladimir Putin. Duginâs Christianity
has a rather relative and selective character and serves him as an
intellectual foundation for his a priori formulated concepts. As a proof
can serve Duginâs support for a special role of the Russian Orthodox
Church in the Commonwealth of Independent States. This Church, with
connections to Moscow, is to be a uniting factor in the post-Soviet
space around Russia.52
Such a religious perspective, alongside the abovementioned historical
roots of Duginâs concepts in Rusâ Orthodox historiosophy (including the
schismatic ideas of the Old Believers), as well as in collectivist
anthropology characteristic of almost the entire Russian intellectual
tradition, which derives from Orthodoxy transformed under the Asian
influences, assumes the form of the following three religious and
historiosophic concepts. Dugin brings out the ideas commonly known in
Rusâ tradition: Manichaeism, âGod-bearingâ (bogonosnostâ), and
eschatologism. Although they were always anti-Western in nature, Dugin
emphasizes this aspect in them, which overshadows their primary
religious and soteriological significance.
Manichaeism, which interprets the world as the space of constant battle
between good and evil, although rejected as a heterodox idea by main
Christian churches, has permanently marked Christianity as well as
social and political structures that Christianity created.53
Referring the notion of âManichaeismâ to Russian intellectual tradition
may raise objections with some scholars, because they might consider it
as taking this concept out of its proper context of interpretation.
Nonetheless, in Russian research on the culture of the Rusâ and Russia,
the term âManichaeismâ (and âGnosticismâ) has been accepted to describe
particular features of this culture.54 Such an understanding of
âManichaeismâ could also be referred to as âradical dualism,â bearing in
mind that the term âManichaeismâ contains an added [End Page 74] layer:
Russian dualism has always possessed a certain mystical aspect,
occultist and apocalyptic at times. It expresses throwing an individual
and the entire nation into an eternal battle between the forces of good
and evil. In the Rusâ and Russiaâs history, it has been connected mostly
with the self-definition of the Moscow rulers in opposition to European
states and the Byzantine Empire, as well as with the creation of Rusâ
Orthodoxy separate from the Byzantine Empire.
Explaining the world in terms of a battle between good and evil, where
the Rusâ is always on the side of good, has become a permanent feature
of Russian historiosophy and has managed to survive despite political
and social transformations.55 This kind of explanation of historical
events and processes can easily be found in Russian religious tradition,
especially in Old Believersâ apocalyptic expectations.56 Even in
mainstream Russian Orthodoxy, before the reforms of Peter the Great, who
subordinated the Church to the state by abolishing the Patriarchate in
order to westernize the Russian Empire, this Manichaean attitude toward
the world had been widespread.57 The non-Orthodox world that surrounded
Muscovy and then Russia, the only Orthodox state after the fall of
Constantinople, was perceived as the kingdom of evil fighting against
the kingdom of good, which was ruled by an Orthodox monarch and that
professed Orthodox Christian faith.58 This idea can be considered the
source of the concept of Moscow as the Third (and Last) Rome.59
Superficial attempts to modernize the Russian state, Church, and
society, which began with Peter the Greatâs reforms, did not remove
Manichaean anti-Occidentalism.60 It was revived in particular during the
reign of Nikolay I. The reactionary policy of authorities was
accompanied by an intellectual and spiritual awakening of Russian
Orthodoxy connected with the activity of Aleksey Khomyakov, among
others, which is often referred to as âthe patristic turnâ or the
patristic awakening of Russian theology.61 This turn meant the rejection
of scholastic theology, which, in its Orthodox version, was also adopted
in Russian schools and academia in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. The scholastic style of theological thinking began to be
considered tainted because of its origins in the West and was therefore
inappropriate for spiritual Orthodoxy.62 The patristic turn, which,
according to Khomyakov, meant the rediscovery of the rich thought of
Greek Fathers of the Church, led to the [End Page 75] rejection of the
Western Christian way of thinking and speaking about God, state, and the
human person.63 It is not a coincidence that the same Khomyakov is
considered one of the main figures in the Slavophile movement, which in
the nineteenth century aimed to unite all Slavs within the Russian
Empire, the only Slavic state at the time and the anchor of Orthodoxy.64
In the course of the nineteenth-century Russian intellectual revival,
such a Manichean attitude toward the world lost its predominantly
religious sense.65 Both the Slavophile movement and early Eurasianism,
which discovered the Asian sources of Russian culture, have shaped the
Manichaeism of contemporary Russian neoconservatism. Its essence is the
rejection of any form of Western cultural influence because the West is
suspected of trying to destroy Russia or at least wanting to subdue
it.66
Further secularization of the same concept can be observed in the Soviet
Union67âespecially after the defeat of Trotskyâs idea of a permanent
proletarian revolution, transgressing the borders of states and nations,
and the victory of Stalinâs geopolitical and ideological concept, which
aimed to build an ideal communist state.68 The âIron Curtainâ which
separated Eastern bloc countries from Western democracies after the
Second World War, although having a distinct political and military
character, was also based on Manichaean secular ideology, according to
which the West was a place of moral decadence, the fall of humanity,
enslavement, and injustice.69 The East, on the other hand, lay the
foundations for the development of humanity, the liberation of the
oppressed, and permanent social, cultural, scientific, and technological
progress.70
These versatile forms of Rusâ and Russian Manichaean anti-Occidentalism,
albeit mixed and occasionally taken out of their proper historical,
political, and religious contexts, are reflected in Duginâs thought.
They can be observed in his main geopolitical premises. Dugin expresses
these views within his concept of the ancient fight between âthe Landâ
and âthe Sea.â71 The Russian Federation (and all its predecessors: the
Rusâ, Muscovy, the Russian Empire, and the Soviet Union) belongs to the
former. The Land denotes those cultures and countries that are attached
to their traditions, deeply skeptical about social and religious
progress, and want to maintain traditional social order based on the
subordination of an individual to the community. This attitude
characterized ancient Greek and [End Page 76] Roman societies. At the
other end, there is the Sea, whose historical incarnation can be found
in ancient Carthage. This group includes Western countries with their
leaderâthe United States. In contrast to the Land, the Sea is
characterized by striving for progress and world expansion and
individualism as the principle of social organization.72 This
theoretical model, one of the most well-known aspects of Duginâs
geopolitical thought, can be interpreted as a new version of
long-standing Russian Manicheanism because of its ethical dimension. It
is not limited to theoretical description but also involves an ethical
assessment.
This thought has been repeatedly raised by Dugin in a number of works.
According to Dugin, the battle between the Land and the Sea is a fight
to the death in which Russia defends itself against the aggression of
the West.73 The United States and its allies represent pure evil.74
These are the reasons why he believes that the fight against the West
should be led by Russia.75 This fight should have the nature of a
worldwide crusade76 to destroy the United States and its allies as well
as to finally uproot liberalism as an ideology that has shaped the West
and is hostile to the traditional values defended by Russia.77 This
battle also must include the disclosure and elimination from Russian
public life all the circles and pressure groups who aim at the
integration of Russia and the West and who find Western democratic
values acceptable. Dugin calls these circles âthe Fifth Column.â78 It is
in his complete rejection of the West, the deprecation of Western values
and lifestyles (at least for propaganda purposes), and his picturing
Western countries as constantly threatening not only Russian borders and
development but also Russiaâs very existence, that we can see Duginâs
synthesis of Rusâ Manichaeism, religious and secular, that aims to
isolate Russian society from Western cultural influences.
A religious and historiosophic concept that stems directly from Rusâ
Manichaean anti-Occidentalism is âGod-bearing.â
âGod-bearingâ means that the Rusâ (Muscovy, Russia) was specially chosen
by God to ensure its standing as true Christianity in opposition to the
[End Page 77] West, which is overwhelmed by errors and heresy.79 This
idea was heard first after the fall of Constantinople, which came to be
associated with the negotiations between the Empire and the pope, that
is, the Catholic West. This exclusivist, strictly religious concept was
quickly followed by its political, secular counterpart in the concept of
Moscow as the Third Rome.80 In this approach, choosing Moscow and
subsequently all of Muscovy was not limited to the doctrinal truth but
was supposed to manifest itself in state and social structures
sanctioned by God, including the sanctified power of the tsar, which was
strictly connected with his role as a protector and defender of true
Christianity.81
âGod-bearingâ also has another meaning being the consequence of the
former. If the Rusâ âbears Godâ in its religious, political, and social
structures, including the traditional life paradigms and systems of
values, every attempt to change these structures opposes Godâs will and
the Rusâ mission, which was entrusted to it by God.82 One of the periods
of such in which there was a partial rejection of this mission was the
attempt to modernize Russia undertaken by Peter the Great, which was
stopped to a great extent by the reactionary and orthodox policy of
Nikolay I.83 Dugin and other supporters of the concept of âGod-bearingâ
believe that questioning tradition, especially by accepting Western
paradigms of social and political life, will lead to a deep crisis of
the Russian state and people, because they would no longer be rooted in
Godâs mission.84
The most dramatic manifestation of such a crisis was the Bolshevik
Revolution, a result of a failed attempt to westernize Russia,
undertaken after the February Revolution of 1917. (It is a paradox that
certain traces of the âGod-bearingâ concept can be found in Soviet
ideology, especially in the attempts, which lasted almost until the end
of the USSR, to prove the superiority of communist ideals over the
fallen, immersed in the consumerism and egoism of the West85). On the
other hand, in more recent times, a similar situation occurred during
the social crisis of the 1990s.86 It is worth noting that Vladimir Putin
and his government propaganda refer to this crisis regularly in order to
warn the Russians against copying Western paradigms of social life,
including the values characteristic of democratic societies.87
Over the centuries of Russiaâs history, the concept of âGod-bearingâ
justified a strong connection between state and the Orthodox Church; a
relationship that was much stronger than one would assume based on the
[End Page 78] Byzantine theory of symphonia,88 which points to the
necessary cooperation between the two for the good of Christian
people.89 This element has regained its importance after the fall of the
Soviet Union. Even those participants of Russian politics whose ties
with the Church are rather loose appeal to Rusâ Orthodox tradition in
order to oppose the West.90 Likewise, the Russian Orthodox Church, in
particular under the leadership of Patriarch Kirill, makes this concept
its foundation so that it can portray itself as a guarantor of Russian
identity and a protector of tradition, which is under attack from the
fallen liberal Western culture.91
The consequences of the âGod-bearingâ concept, having become
significantly more secular in Russian intellectual tradition and having
transgressed Church circles, can be observed in Duginâs work.92 He
perceives the Rusâ as âsacredâ land, which is under Godâs protection.
This land prays for the intercession of Mary, Mother of God
(Bogoroditsa). Dugin notices this holiness in an astounding way in Rusâ
geography. He believes that the oldest Rusâ icons, connected with the
Rusâ towns, form a giant cross on the country map, thus sanctifying the
land and its people.93 The holiness of Rusâ land is not, however,
subject to theological interpretation but forms the foundation for
Duginâs anti-Western rhetoric, in particular at the axiological level.94
Dugin starts with the statement that Orthodox Russia has been constantly
attacked by the West, which has been controlled by evil.95 This opinion
forms the foundation of Duginâs belief about Russiaâs axiological
difference from the non-Orthodox West.96 This is why Duginâs
isolationism in its axiological layer is limited to the rejection of the
values and lifestyles proposed by Western culture. Dugin does notice,
however, such significant similarities between Russian culture and
values and Asian civilizations that he perceives Asia, and even Eurasian
integration (not only political, economic, or military, but also
cultural), as a suitable path of development for Russia. One can observe
in this aspect one of the numerous inconsistencies in Duginâs thought.
In the context of Russiaâs Eurasian future, he considers isolationism
and nationalism to be dangerous,97 although in various statements, in
particular with respect to the conflict in Ukraine, he presents
decidedly xenophobic and nationalist views.98 This discrepancy can be
explained by Duginâs anti-Occidentalism. [End Page 79] Both his
nationalism and his opposition to it are acceptable as long as, in a
given context, they inspire the actions aimed against the West.
Duginâs striving to separate Russia at the axiological level is closely
linked to the radical devaluing of Western culture with a particular
emphasis on those values considered desirable by Western democratic
societies. According to Dugin, the West has been deformed by liberalism,
whose very essence is nihilism, aggression, and racism. Nihilism is
supposed to manifest itself in the rejection of tradition, traditional
values, and in questioning the role of cultural and religious
heritage.99 Aggression is a result of Social Darwinism, which can trace
its roots to extreme individualism and the negation of community and the
common good.100 Racism, on the other hand, manifests itself in the
contempt toward other than Western cultures and civilizations as well as
in attempts to impose on them Western paradigms of social and political
life, which are meant to be universal.101 These ideas become even more
radical statements that are considered inappropriate in Western academic
debate although they are acceptable in Russian extreme-right circles.
The examples of such radical statements include Dugin calling Eastern
European states, which chose the path of integration with the West after
the fall of the Soviet Union, âthe cesspit of Western Europe.â102 On the
other hand, he describes the fight for every personâs right to express
their identity and shape their lives as âthe artificial ideology of
human rights,â103 expressing particular hostility toward the LGBT
movement. Dugin perceives the manifestations for the equality of LGBT
people as a symbol of the moral decay of the West and believes that
Russia should fight against it.104
As mentioned above, the Russian concept of âGod-bearingâ is the source
of appreciation for tradition as well as questioning the idea of social,
political, or religious progress. In Duginâs interpretation, this
traditionalism is strengthened by the negative assessment of Western
culture and the effects its influences have on Russian society. This
makes Dugin emphasize the fact that Russiaâs historic mission is to
strongly oppose any historical, social, and political processes that
would question Russian tradition.105 Russian society is a model example
of a traditional society for Dugin.106 The appreciation for tradition
should, on the other hand, become a factor in creating a barrier between
Russia and the West and, at the same time, a bridge between Russia and
Asian cultures. In this context, Dugin proposes two rules of
Eurasianism: first, the present is not better than the past and, second,
the West is not better than the East.107 [End Page 80]
According to Dugin, the value of tradition is so great that wars in its
defense should be fought.108 The acknowledgment that wars waged by
Russia have their positive aspect leads to the last element of Rusâ
Orthodox historiosophy, which has been transformed in Duginâs thought.
While enlisting these elements of Rusâ historiosophy, which have
influenced Russian culture, views regarding individual and social life,
as well as the concept of a state being in opposition to the West, one
cannot ignore eschatologism.
Christianity is eschatological: it proclaims the impermanent character
of all human-made structures and institutions, and the final fulfillment
of a person in the afterlife. Nonetheless, Rusâ eschatologism, whose
particular form can be found in the position of the Old Believers, is
unique and it can manifest itself in three main concepts.
First, awaiting happiness in the future, after the end of the world,
leads to the appreciation of an attitude that is a combination of
humility, submissiveness, and acceptance of oneâs fate, including the
earthly injustice and misery109 (which is why the Russian term
smirieniye has a wider meaning than the Western concept of âhumilityâ).
Patriarch Kirill issues an appeal to the Russians to adopt such an
attitude as Russia faces an economic struggle.110 Such a position, in
contrast to Western egoism, is also emphasized by Vladimir Putin, who
speaks about the particular nature of the Russian people who are not
focused on the fight for oneâs wealth and well-being but who think
primarily about the well-being of a community.111
Second, the interpretation of human history and the history of an
individual as a path toward eternity, through misery and persecution
that must be accepted but that are still hard to endure, has led to the
creation of faith in a hero, Godâs anointed, who was granted people by
God in order to relieve them of their earthly misery. On the religious
level, this idea was manifested in the particular cult of saints
represented in Rusâ icons,112 especially in the cult of Mother of God,
the Protector of the Rusâ. On the social and political level, [End Page
81] in the long Russian tradition, such a hero was the tsar himself,113
in contrast to evil boyars and government officials. In the Soviet era,
this feature of Rusâ historiosophy was transformed, in its more secular
form, into the cult of personality, which mainly referred to Lenin and
Stalin.114 To a lesser extent, and in a less obvious form, it also
included other leaders of the Communist Party as well as new Soviet
âsaints,â that is, the heroes of the Revolution, Civil War, and the
Great Patriotic War, or the udarniks.115
Third, directing human life eschatologically, according to a common
Christian conviction, is connected with the belief in the final defeat
and annihilation of all the evil that a person has to experience in the
world. Eschatologism enhances the aforementioned dichotomy of good and
evil, which serves to interpret the world. In this light, Orthodox Rusâ
is not only a sacred land surrounded by non-Orthodox, evil, and
God-opposing states and nations. It is also an eschatological land
destined to win and triumph at the end of the world and the Judgment
Day.116 This religious concept has social and political repercussions.
The Rusâ is supposed to continue to exist unchanged at all costs in
order to participate in the final triumph.117 This is why war in defense
of the tradition, old sanctified customs, and established sociopolitical
order becomes a vital necessity for the Rusâ. Wars waged by contemporary
Russia are often portrayed using precisely this pattern: as a striving
to retain Russian identity, to oppose Western aggression, and to defend
tradition.118 Thus, war becomes Russiaâs mission, the source of its
glory to such an extent that the related cruelty and its destructive
character are missing from the official language when it is discussed.
Duginâs most radical, aggressive, and difficult to understand postulates
are, to a large extent, his interpretation of Rusâ eschatologism, which
makes all human misery, injustice, and violence relative by referring it
to human fate in the afterlife as well as the fate of the entire
God-chosen nation. Dugin himself seems to support such a claim when he
appeals to the Old Believersâ eschatological expectations. Old
Believers, who suffered persecutions both from Russian authorities and
the official Church, awaited the forthcoming end of times that could
justify their endurance of constant suffering.119 According to Dugin,
such historiosophy of raskol made the Old Believers an extremely
persistent group [End Page 82] despite their persecutions,120 and as a
result, an inspiration for contemporary Russia in its confrontation with
the West, perceived by Dugin as a source from which absolute evil,
namely liberalism, spreads. The West perceived in such a way so that it
is supposed to fight against God and tradition in the name of
liberalism.121 The awareness regarding oneâs final fate and the
necessity of staying true to oneâs roots justify, therefore, the
rejection of the Western concept of progress, including the rationalist
and liberal distortions characteristic of Western, non-Orthodox
Christianity that justify this concept.122
Such a position leads Dugin to the formulation of precise, far-reaching
demands for the Russian government and society. He believes that
historical processes are reversible.123 This also means that the world
dominance of Western liberal culture, including its influence on Russian
culture, cannot be considered a permanent and unsurmountable phenomenon.
On the contrary, the mission of the East, comprising Russia and its
Asian allies, is the return to its roots,124 which can be accomplished
by the rejection of all Western influences.
This is, however, where Duginâs anti-Occidentalism assumes its most
severe form. Dugin is convinced that this Russian return to its roots
and the rejection of the West can, and should, be accomplished through
war. He believes that war is a permanent element of Russiaâs historic
mission, Russian culture, and national identity. He even thinks that
âthe Russians live by war.â125 War is a common, perfectly justifiable
means to regain proper Russian identity, which has been deformed by
Western influences. None of warâs cruelties, casualties, and
destruction, which are its unavoidable consequences, can change its
positive nature, as long as it is a war waged to rebuild the great
sacred Russian empire.126 Although the wars waged by the West are
described by Dugin as unjust, aggressive, and bloody, Russian wars have
a âholyâ cause. At this point, one should note Duginâs diaries written
during the initial phase of Russian aggression toward Ukraine.127
This extremely bloody aspect of Duginâs radical ideas, deeply rooted in
Rusâ eschatological historiosophy, could be considered isolated
radicalism if it was not for the fact that it can be heard, albeit in
various versions, in Russian public life. The anti-Western rhetoric of
President Putin and his circle seems just a propaganda maneuver
addressed to the Russians themselves and intended to account for their
deteriorating economic situation. Nonetheless, such rhetoric would be
considered absurd and unacceptable by the Russians [End Page 83]
themselves if it was not deeply rooted in Russian religious culture.
Dugin, in a radical and exaggerated form, expresses ideas that have been
present in Russian Orthodox tradition for centuries and that are the
reason for Russian society being so fundamentally different from Western
democratic societies, and Russian Orthodoxy from Western Christianity,
including non-Russian Orthodox Churches found in Western countries.
In the conditions of the contemporary political and economic
confrontation between Russia and the West, Russian anti-Occidentalism
has been strongly emphasized. It is also becoming an element of official
Russian propaganda even though, in reality, the actions of Russian
Federation authorities in international politics are not motivated by
ideological issues but more by political pragmatism. Nonetheless,
anti-Western tendencies, although they should be neither overestimated
nor used to paint a stereotypical picture of Russia, are deeply rooted
in Russian historiosophic tradition, mostly connected to Rusâ and
Russian Orthodoxy. This is used by Aleksandr Dugin, who reinterprets
this tradition in order to justify his own historiosophic and
geopolitical views by showing them as a continuation in the development
of Russian religious and political thought. The comparison of the main
elements in religiously rooted Rusâ and Russian historiosophy with their
interpretation by Dugin leads to two main conclusions.
First, the thought of Dugin himself cannot be interpreted properly
without taking into consideration the Rusâ spiritual tradition. Even his
most radical and outrageous statements addressed at Western
civilization, Western patterns of social life, and their related values
assume their characteristic internal logic inside this tradition, which
forms their context of interpretation. In light of that, the present
article has demonstrated that the historiosophic and religious context
is indispensable for interpreting Duginâs political, ethical, and social
ideas. This statement also refers to numerous representatives of
contemporary Russian neoconservatism and neoimperialism, even if they do
not refer directly to Orthodoxy as the foundation for their views.
Second, even if describing Russian intellectual or religious tradition
as anti-Western is considered an unfair simplification, given the
radicalized [End Page 84] mirror of Duginâs thought, anti-Occidentalism
is seen as a significant and permanent element of this tradition, which
influences the shape of Russian culture and identity.
The picture of Duginâs anti-Occidentalism presented in this article, in
which a significant place is occupied by his reinterpretation of Rusâ
religious historiosophy, does not allow us to underestimate the current
anti-Western course of Russiaâs politics. On the one hand, there are
true anti-Occidentalists in Russia who believe in what they preach. Even
if these figures, such as Dugin, are considered controversial and
politically marginal, their voices are heard, and it might be in the
interest of authorities to promote, at least to some extent, such views.
On the other hand, what we find far more significant is that the
attempts to impose an anti-Western ideology on the Russians in the
conditions of a developing social and economic crisis would be
unreliable and doomed to fail if such an ideology had not been already
deeply rooted in Russian tradition, primarily inspired by religion. This
is what Duginâs reinterpretation of significant motifs of Rusâ religious
historiosophy shows. Although this interpretation is not devoid of
inconsistencies resulting from confusing the contexts or extrapolating
individual ideas that are a part of this historiosophy from their
context of interpretation, it is still founded on concepts present in
the Rusâ spiritual and intellectual tradition. Rusâ Manichaeism, the
feeling of âGod-bearing,â and eschatological tension have in their
various ways, either religious or secular, shaped Russiaâs spiritual
image, making it impossible for Russia to ever join the Western cultural
circle, despite significant ties between Russian and European cultures.
Beneath the difficult-to-accept extremes of Duginâs concepts, there
might be some hidden truth about the insurmountable difference between
Russia and the West, which, under certain circumstances, becomes a
catalyst of conflict. [End Page 85]
The work was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland, under
Grant [2016/21/B/HS1/00815].
1. Zoe Knox, Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia
after Communism (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2005), 24.
2. Izborsk Club, âO klube,â https://izborsk-club.ru/about (accessed 5
June 2019).
3. See, e.g., Igor Torbakov, After Empire: Nationalist Imagination and
Symbolic Politics in Russia and Eurasia in the Twentieth and
Twenty-First Century (Stuttgart, Germany: Ibidem, 2018), 328â30.
4. See, e.g., âPutin budet zashchishchatâ ârusskiy mirâ vsey moshchâyu,â
Pravda.ru,
https://www.pravda.ru/news/politics/authority/31-10-2018/1398064-0/
(accessed 5 June 2019); âPutin opredelil ponyatiye âRusskiy mir,ââ
EurAsia Daily,
https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2018/10/31/putin-opredelil-ponyatie-russkiy-mir
(accessed 5 June 2019).
5. See, e.g., âPatriarkh Kirill: Russkiy mirâtsivilizatsionnoye, a ne
politicheskoye ponyatiye,â Pravmir.ru,
https://www.pravmir.ru/patriarh-kirill-russkiy-mir-tsivilizatsionnoe-a-nepoliticheskoe-ponyatie/
(accessed 5 June 2019).
6. Russkaya doktrina: Gosudarstvennaya ideologiya epokhi Putina, ed.
Andrey Kobyakov and Valeriy V. Averâyanov (Moscow: Institut russkoy
tsivilizatsii, 2016), 334â42, 368â69; âRusskiy mir: smysl i stategii,â
Ros-Mir.ru, http://ros-mir.ru/node/966 (accessed 5 June 2019).
7. See, e.g., Sergey Goryashko and Elizaveta Fokht, âPensionnaya reforma
obrushila reyting Vladimira Putina. V chem ochibsya Kreml,ââ BBC.com,
https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-44582082 (accessed 5 June 2019).
8. See, e.g., ââLevadaâ: Simpatiya rossiyan k SChA i Evrosoyuzu rezko
vyrosla na fone nedovolâstva pravitelâstvom,â Business-gazeta.ru,
https://www.business-gazeta.ru/news/390758 (accessed 5 June 2019).
9. See, e.g., Ilâya Klishin, âKremlâ protiv interneta: podgotovka k
proshloy voyne,â Carnegie. ru, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/63383
(accessed 5 June 2019).
10. Aleksandr Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ: Vvedeniye v chetvertuyu
politicheskuyu teoriyu (Moscow: Akademicheskiy proyekt, 2014), 462.
11. Ibid., 105.
12. Ibid., 100.
13. Aleksandr Dugin, Russkaya voyna (Moscow: Algoritm, 2015), 92; Dugin,
Chetvertyy putâ, 633.
14. Kobyakov et al., Russkaya doktrina, 61â63.
15. John Strickland, The Making of Holy Russia: The Orthodox Church and
Russian Nationalism before the Revolution (Jordanville, NY: Holy Trinity
Publications, 2013), xivâxv; Aleksandr Dugin, Noomakhiyaâvoyny uma:
Tsivilizatsii granits (Moscow: Akademicheskiy proyekt, 204), 58.
16. Dmitriy Urushev, Russkoye staroobryadchestvo: Traditsii, istoriya,
kulâtura (Moscow: Proyekt 7 Aprelya, 2016), 11â16; Nikolay Berdyayev,
âRusskaya ideya,â in Samopoznaniye, ed. Nikolay Berdyayev (Moscow:
Eksmo, and Kharâkov: Folio, 2006), 21â22.
17. In academic discussions, the notion of âRussiaâ is frequently used
in a general sense, encompassing all Russian history since 988, that is
since the baptism of Prince Vladimir of Kiev. That event is commonly
considered the beginning of Russiaâs statehood as well as the main
religious (confessional) decision that oriented Russia toward
Constantinople and Eastern Christianity. In Russian religious and
historiosophic thought, however, there is an important difference
between âthe Rusââ and Russia. âThe Rusââ describes all ethnically and
culturally Russian lands (RussiaââGreater Rusâ,â UkraineââSmaller Rusâ,â
BelarusââWhite Rusââ). This notion has maintained its meaning in Russian
Orthodoxy, which attributes a kind of sacrality (âHoly Rusâ,â Svyataya
Rusâ) to it, whereas since the religious and political reforms ordered
by Peter the Great the notion of âRussiaâ (Rossiya) has been formed in
relation to a certain political reality. Nonetheless, the idea of âthe
Rusââ (or even âHoly Rusââ) has kept its importance in Russian
intellectual life. It should be mentioned in this context that the
expression âHoly Russia,â which can be found in some Western literature
regarding Russian religious or spiritual life, is incorrect because of
the confusion of two different notions: âthe Rusââ and âRussia.â
18. Anton Kartashev, Ocherki po istorii Russkoy Tserkvi, vol. 2 (Minsk,
Belarus: Belorusskiy ekzarkhat, 2007), 175â76.
19. Larisa Belenchuk, Prosveshcheniye Rossii: Vzglyad zapadnikov i
slavyanofilov (Moscow: Pravoslavnyy Svyato-Tikhonovskiy gumanitarnyy
universitet, 2015), 19â38; Lee Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian
History: Church, State, and the Quest for Order and Justice (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2010), 121â23.
20. Barbara Alpern Engel and Janet Martin, Russia in World History
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 69â70.
21. Boris Tarasov, âFedor Tyutchev o naznachenii cheloveka i smysle
zhyzni,â in Fedor Tyutchev, Rossiya i Zapad, ed. Boris Tarasov (Moscow:
Kulâturnaya revolutsiya, 2007), 17â18. This well-known, but perhaps
overused, expression can be found in Fyodor Tyutchevâs famous poem:
âRussia cannot be understood with the mind aloneâ (Umom Rossiyu ne
ponyatâ). Tyutchevâs intention was, however, not to reject reason as
such, but rather to show the limits of human understanding. See, e.g.,
Berdyayev, âRusskaya ideya,â in Samopoznaniye, 13â14; Aleksandr Shmeman,
Osnovy russkoy kulâtury (Moscow: Izdatelâstvo Svyato-Tikhonovskogo
gumanitarnogo universiteta, 2017), 94.
22. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 141â42.
23. Vasiliy Zenâkovskiy, Istoriya russkoy filosofii, vol. 1
(Rostov-on-Don, Russia: Feniks, 1999), 217â24; Sergey Nikolâskiy and
Viktor Filimonov, Russkoye mirovozzreniye, vol. 1 (Moscow:
Progress-Traditsiya, 2008), 66â70.
24. See, e.g., Nikolay Berdyayev, âYevraziytsy,â in Nikolay Trubetskoy,
Naslediye Chingiskhana, (Moscow: Eksmo, 2007), 12â15.
25. Aleksandr Dugin, V poiskakh temnogo Logosa: Filosofsko-bogoslovskiye
ocherki (Moscow: Akademicheskiy proyekt, 2014), 110â16.
26. Aleksandr Dugin, Novaya formula Putina: Osnovy eticheskoy politiki
(Moscow: Algoritm, 2014), 108.
27. Ibid., 147â50.
28. Aleksandr Dugin, Russkiy logosâRusskiy khaos: Sotsiologiya russkogo
obshchestva (Moscow: Akademicheskiy proyekt, 2015), 5; Dugin, Novaya
formula Putina, 162.
29. Aleksandr Dugin, âAfter Tskhinvali: Interests and Values.â Russian
Politics and Law 47, no. 3 (2009): 66â68.
30. Dugin, V poiskakh temnogo Logosa, 124â27.
31. Svetlana Neretina, âSvoboda voli kak problemnyy uzel Rossii,â in
Puti Rossii. Novyy staryy poryadokâvechnoye vozvrashcheniye?, ed. M. G.
Pugacheva and A. F. Filippov (Moscow: Novoye Literaturnoye Obozreniye,
2016), 151.
32. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 101.
33. Ibid., 224â27; Aleksandr Dugin, Etnosotsiologiya (Moscow:
Akademicheskiy proyekt, 2014), 28.
34. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 142.
35. Ibid., 166.
36. Ibid., 168â70.
37. See, e.g., Vladimer Papava, âThe Euriasianism of Russian
Anti-Westernism and the Concept of âCentral Caucaso-Asiaâ,â Russian
Politics and Law 51, no. 6 (2013): 45â86.
38. Aleksandr Dugin, Geopolitika Rossii (Moscow: Akademicheskiy proyekt,
2014), 159â60.
39. Dugin, âAfter Tskhinvali: Interests and Values,â 64â65.
40. Dugin, Novaya formula Putina, 110.
41. Aleksandr Dugin, Yevraziyskiy revansh Rossii (Moscow: Algoritm,
2014), 39.
42. Dugin, Novaya formula Putina, 50â52.
43. Aleksandr Dugin, Voobrazheniye: Filosofiya, sotsiologiya, struktury
(Moscow: Akademicheskiy proyekt, 2015), 285â86; Dugin, Russkaya voyna,
95â97.
44. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 85; Dugin, Russkaya voyna, 97â98.
45. Dugin, Noomakhiyaâvoyny uma: Tsivilizatsii granits, 60â61; Aleksandr
Trifonov and Aleksandr Dugin, âRusskaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkovâ ne
vozroditsya bez Staroobryadchestva. Tak schitayet Aleksandr Dugin,â
Religare.ru, http://www.religare.ru/2_32309.html (accessed 5 November
2018); Anton Shekhovtsov, âThe Palingenetic Thrust of Russian
Neo-Eurasianism: Ideas of Rebirth in Aleksandr Duginâs Worldview,â
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 9, no. 4 (2008): 500.
46. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 444â45.
47. Kirill Tovbin, âAntipetrovskiy kontrsekulyarizm russkikh
staroverov,â Vestnik TOGU 34, no. 3 (2014): 222â24.
48. See, e.g., Eduard Zibnitskiy, âNeo-Yevraziystvo i vera ottsov,â
Pravoslaviye.ru, https://pravoslavie.ru/39.html (accessed 5 November
2018); Alexander Höllwerth, Das sakrale eurasische Imperium des
Aleksandr Dugin: Eine Diskursanalyse zum postsowjetischen russischen
Rechtsextremismus (Stuttgart, Germany: Ibidem, 2007), 167.
49. See, e.g., Aleksandr Lyulâka, âStrannoye Yedinoveriye. Aleksandr
Dugin: Yedinoveriye po-yevraziyski,â Apokrisis,
http://apokrisis.ru/eresi/duginizm/90-strannoe-edinoverie-3-aleksandr-dugin-edinoverie-po-evrazijski
(accessed 1 October 2019).
50. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 37.
51. See, e.g., Aleksandr Dugin, âKontseptsiya svyatorusskogo
Pravoslaviya v yedinovercheskoy traditsii,â Patriarshiy tsentr,
http://www.oldrpc.ru/articles/list.php?ELEMENT_ID=695 (accessed 1
October 2019).
52. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 620.
53. Ioann Meyendorff, RimâKonstantinopolââMoskva: Istoricheskiye i
bogoslovskiye issledovaniya (Moscow: Pravoslavnyy Svyato-Tikhonovskiy
gumanitarnyy universitet, 2006), 236.
54. Leonid V. Polyakov, âEkzistentsialânaya drama russkoy
kulâturologii,â Politiya, no. 3 (2001): 177.
55. Igorâ Yakovenko and Aleksandr Muzykantskiy, Manikhieystvo i
gnostitsizm: kulâturnyye kody russkoy tsivilizatsii (Moscow: Russkiy
putâ, 2010), 61â62.
56. Thomas Robbins, âReligious Mass Suicide Before Jonestown: The
Russian Old Believers,â Sociological Analysis 47, no. 1 (1986): 7â8;
Georgiy Florovskiy, Puti russkogo bogosloviya (Minsk, Belarus:
Belorusskaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkovâ, 2006), 70â73.
57. Igorâ Yakovenko, âManikheyskaya komponenta russkoy kulâtury: Istoki
i obuslovlennostâ,â Obshchestvennyye nauki i sovremennostâ, no. 3
(2007): 58â59.
58. Kartashev, Ocherki po istorii Russkoy Tserkvi, 1: 384â87; Sergei
Magaril, âThe Mythology of the âThird Romeâ in Russian Educated
Society,â Russian Politics and Law 50, no. 5 (2012): 8â12.
59. Shireen T. Hunter, God on Our Side: Religion in International
Affairs (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 102; Zenâkovskiy,
Istoriya russkoy filosofii, 1: 51â55.
60. Berdyayev, âRusskaya ideya,â in Samopoznaniye, 26â27.
61. Sergey Khoruzhiy, âSovremennyye problem pravoslavnogo
mirosozertsaniya,â 44â46, Pravoslaviye i sovremennost,â
https://www.eparhia-saratov.ru/Content/Books/91/problems.pdf (accessed 5
June 2019); Joseph L. Wieczynski, âKhomyakovâs Critique of Western
Christianity,â Church History 38, no. 3 (1969): 298â99.
62. Florovskiy, Puti russkogo bogosloviya, 283â85; Aleksandr Buzdalov,
âPleneniye skholastikoy i osvobozhdeniye sofistikoy,â Azbuka very,
https://azbyka.ru/otechnik/Makarij_Bulgakov/plenenie-skholastikoj-i-osvobozhdenie-sofistikoj/
(accessed 5 November 2018).
63. Nikolay Berdyayev, âAleksey Stepanovich Khomyakov,â in Filosofskiye
i bogoslovskiye proizvedeniya, ed. Aleksey Khomyakov (Moscow: Knizhnyy
Klub Knigovek, 2013), 548â50.
64. Florovskiy, Puti russkogo bogosloviya, 267â68; Mikhail Gromov,
âSlavyanofilâstvo kak mirovozzreniye, ideologiya i filosofiya,â in A. S.
Knomyakov: myslitielâ, poet, publitsist, vol. 1, ed. Boris Tarasov
(Moscow: Yazyki slavyanskikh kulâtur, 2007), 129â36.
65. Vasiliy Kholodnyy, Ideya sobornosti i slavyanofilâstva: Problema
sobornoy fenomenologii (Moscow: Koffi, 1994), 3; Yelena Silânova, âIdeya
sobornosti i problema sotsialânoy integratsii v uchenii slavyanofilov,â
Filozofiya i obshchestvo, no. 4 (2006): 119â21.
66. See, e.g., Sergey Glazâyev, âUgroza voyn i otvet Rossii,â in Rossiya
v globalânoy politike: Novyye pravila igry bez pravil, ed. Fedor
Lukâyanov (Moscow: Eksmo, 2015), 93â107; Emil Pain, âThe imperial
syndrome and its influence on Russian nationalism,â in The New Russian
Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000â2015, ed.
PĂ„l KolstĂž and Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University
Press, 2016), 50â52.
67. Nikolay Berdyayev, Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma (Moscow:
Nauka, 1990), 149â50.
68. Aleksandr Dugin, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya (Moscow: Akademicheskiy
proyekt, 2014), 274â75.
69. Yakovenko and Muzykantskiy, Manikhieystvo i gnostitsizm, 16â19.
70. Shekhovtsov, âThe Palingenetic Thrust of Russian Neo-Eurasianism,â
499â500; Dmitry Shlapentokh, âDugin Eurasianism: A Window on the Minds
of the Russian Elite or an Intellectual Ploy?,â Studies in East European
Thought 59, no. 3 (2007): 230.
71. Dugin, Geopolitika Rossii, 420â22; Aleksandr Dugin, Geopolitika
(Moscow: Akademicheskiy proyekt, 2015), 49.
72. Dugin, Russkaya voyna, 121â24.
73. Ibid., 103, 144; Dugin, Yevraziyskiy revansh Rossii, 20.
74. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 653; Dugin, Russkaya voyna, 92.
75. Dugin, Novaya formula Putina, 108.
76. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 101.
77. Dugin, Russkaya voyna, 90.
78. Dugin, Novaya formula Putina, 210.
79. Konstantin Averin and Tatâyana Pavlova, Bytâ ili ne bytâ russkim?
(Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2012); Viktor Aksyuchits, âRusskaya
ideya,â Pravoslaviye.ru, https://pravoslavie.ru/32.html (accessed 5
November 2018), 67â69.
80. Viktor Gidirinskiy, Russkaya ideya kak filosofsko-istoricheskiy i
religioznyy fenomen (Moscow: Pravoslavnyy Svyato-Tikhonovskiy
gumanitarnyy universitet, 2012): 71â72.
81. Zenâkovskiy, Istoriya russkoy filosofii, 1: 52â53; Vyacheslav
Viktorov, âBytâ i oshchushchatâ sebya russkim,â in Vopros natsionalânoy
identichnosti v kontekste globalizatsii, ed. Aleksandr Chumakov (Moscow:
Prospekt, 2015), 31.
82. Berdyayev, âRusskaya ideya,â in Samopoznaniye, 19â20; Aksyuchits,
âRusskaya ideya.â
83. Viktorov, âBytâ i oshchushchatâ sebya russkim,â in Vopros
natsionalânoy identichnosti, 32; Sean Cannady and Paul Kubicek,
âNationalism and Legitimation for Authoritarianism: A Comparison of
Nicholas I and Vladimir Putin,â Journal of Eurasian Studies 5, no. 1
(2014): 3â4.
84. See, e.g., Dugin, Novaya formula Putina, 123â24; Vladimir
Vigilyanskiy, âRusskaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov.â
85. See, e.g., Sergey Kara-Murza, Rossiya i Zapad: Paradigmy
tsivilizatsiy (Moscow: Akademicheskiy proyekt, Kulâtura, 2003), 11â14;
Torbakov, After Empire, 331â32.
86. Andrei P. Tsygankov, The Dark Double: US Media, Russia, and the
Politics of Values (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 36â37.
87. See, e.g., RIA Novosti, âPutin vystupayet protiv popytok uravnyatâ
traditsionnyye i odnopolovyye braki,â RIA.ru,
https://ria.ru/20130919/964434704.html (accessed 5 June 2019); Natalâya
Raybman, âPutin: Bez traditsionnykh tsennostey obshchestvo
degradiruyet,â Vedomosti.ru,
https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2013/12/19/putin-bez-tradicionnyh-cennostej-obschestvo-degradiruet
(accessed 5 June 2019).
88. Meyendorff, RimâKonstantinopolââMoskva, 246â47.
89. See, e.g., Irina Papkova, The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 6â7; Knox, Russian Society and
the Orthodox Church, 111â13; Vasiliy Zenâkovskiy, âTserkovâ i
gosudarstvo. Tserkovâ i vlastâ,â in Sergey Samygin, Konstantin Vodenko,
and Viktor Nechipurenko, Religiya i politika (Rostov-on-Don: Feniks,
2016), 224.
90. Significant is the ideological evolution of Gennadiy Zyuganov, the
leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), e.g.,
Gennadiy Zyuganov, âZashchitim nashi natsionalânyye tsennosti i
svyatyni!,â KPRF.ru, https://kprf.ru/rus_soc/108469.html (accessed 5
November 2018); Russkaya narodnaya liniya, âGennadiy Zyuganov ob
otnoshenii kommunistov k Tserkviâ, Ruskline.ru,
http://ruskline.ru/news_rl/2018/10/20/gennadij_zyuganov_ob_otnoshenii_kommunistov_k_cerkvi/
(accessed 5 June 2019).
91. See, e.g., âPredstaviteli Patriarshey komissii po voprosam semâi,
zashchity materinstva i detstva prinyali uchastiye v XII Vsemirnom
kongresse semey,â Patriarchia.ru,
http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5269978.html (accessed 5 June 2019);
âPatriarkh: vazhno sdelatâ vse vozmoshnoye dla zashchity traditsionnykh
tsennostey,â RIA Novosti.ru, https://ria.ru/20180125/1513322300.html
(accessed 5 June 2019); Geraldine Fagan, Believing in RussiaâReligious
Policy after Communism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014): 135.
92. See, e.g., Höllwerth, Das sakrale eurasische Imperium des Aleksandr
Dugin, 463â67.
93. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 391.
94. See, e.g., Aleksandr Dugin, âPoslednyaya bitva Svyatoy Rusi,â
4pera.ru, http://4pera.ru/news/tribune/poslednyaya_bitva_svyatoy_rusi/
(accessed 5 June 2019).
95. Dugin, Russkaya voyna, 95â97.
96. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 524.
97. Dugin, Yevraziyskiy revansh Rossii, 55; Dmitry Shlapentokh,
âAlexander Duginâs Views on the Middle East,â Space and Polity 12, no. 2
(2008): 252â53.
98. See, e.g., Aleksandr Dugin, Ukrainaâmoya voyna: Geopoliticheskiy
dnevnik (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2015), esp. 14, 24, 272â76; Dugin,
Geopolitika Rossii, 475.
99. Dugin, Novaya formula Putina, 50â54; Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 86â87.
100. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 294.
101. Dugin, Etnosotsiologiya, 225.
102. Dugin, Novaya formula Putina, 158.
103. Dugin, Etnosotsiologiya, 455.
104. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 81.
105. Dugin, Russkaya voyna, 53.
106. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 516.
107. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 464.
108. Dugin, Novaya formula Putina, 64.
109. See, e.g., Shmeman, Osnovy russkoy kulâtury, 93; Berdyayev,
âRusskaya ideya,â in Samopoznaniye, 16â18; Natalia Dinello, âRussian
Religious Rejections of Money and Homo Economicus: The
Self-Identifications of the âPioneers of a Money Economyâ in Post-Soviet
Russia,â Sociology of Religion 59, no. 1 (1998): 46.
110. See, e.g., Patriarchia.ru, âPatriarkh Kirill: V smirenii
otkryvayetsya sila chelovecheskogo dukkha,â Pravoslavie.ru,
https://pravoslavie.ru/111042.html (accessed 5 June 2019).
111. See, e.g., Regnum.ru, âVladimir Putin: Dlya russkikh na miru i
smertâ krasna,â Regnum. ru, https://regnum.ru/news/1792501.html
(accessed 5 June 2019).
112. Strickland, The Making of Holy Russia, 27â32.
113. Ibid., 37â38.
114. Trepanier, Political Symbols, 140; Neil Robinson, Ideology and the
Collapse of the Soviet System: A Critical History of Soviet Ideological
Discourse (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1995), 70â72.
115. Aleksandr Malinkin, âKulât geroicheskogo v nagradakh SSSR,â
Magazines.russ.ru, http://magazines.russ.ru/oz/2002/8/2002_08_48-pr.html
(accessed 5 June 2019).
116. Meyendorff, RimâKonstantinopolââMoskva, 249â50.
117. Strickland, The Making of Holy Russia, 5â7, 13â16.
118. Gidirinskiy, Russkaya ideya, 131â32.
119. Dugin, Russkiy logosâRusskiy khaos, 172; Aleksandr Dugin, âRusskaya
veshch,â arctogaia. com, http://arctogaia.com/public/rv/4.shtml
(accessed 5 June 2019).
120. Dugin, Russkiy logosâRusskiy khaos, 320, 390.
121. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 100.
122. Ibid., 38.
123. Ibid., 308â10.
124. Ibid., 379.
125. Dugin, Russkaya voyna, 10â12.
126. Dugin, Chetvertyy putâ, 426, 617.
127. Aleksandr Dugin, Ukraina: moya voyna. Geopoliticheskiy dnevnik
(Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2015).