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Title: What is terrorism? Author: Mare Almani Language: en Source: Retrieved on March 30, 2010 from http://www.non-fides.fr/?What-is-terrorism
In May 1898, king Umberto I, worried about the news reaching him from
Milan where a general strike had broken out, entrusted general Bava
Beccaris with the task of repressing the revolt. The order is given to
the soldiers to shoot at sight, and Bava Beccaris opens fire on the town
with canon shot. The balance is 80 dead and 450 wounded. Proud of having
done his duty, the general telegraphs the king that Milan is now
âpacifiedâ. The head of the government, the marquis Di Rudini, prohibits
over one hundred opposition newspapers, the Bourses de Travail,
socialist circles, Mutual Societies, and also at least 70 diocesain
committees and 2,500 parish committees. Moreover, the universities of
Rome, Naples, Padova and Bologne are closed, while thousands of arrests
are made. Umberto I immediately sends a telegramme of congratulations to
Bava Beccaris and decorates him with the cross of the Military Order of
Savoy âfor precious services rendered to the institutions and
civilisationâ. Two years later, on July 29 1800, the anarchist Gaetano
Bresci relieves king Umberto I of the weight of his responsibilities by
killing him in Monza. The King and the anarchist. Two assassins, their
hands stained with blood, thatâs undeniable. Yet, can one put them on
the same level?I donât think so, any more than one can consider the
motivations and consequences of their acts in the same way. And so,
because they canât be united in a common execration, which of the two
committed an act of terrorism? The king who had the crowd massacred, or
the anarchist that slayed the king?
To ask oneself what is terrorism is one of those questions that it would
seem pointless to ask, because it is destined to get a univoque answer.
In reality â when it is formulated rigorously â it doesnât fail to give
rise to surprising reactions. The answers are actually different and
contradictory. âTerrorism is the violence of those that fight the
Stateâ, some say, âTerrorism is the violence of the Stateâ, others
answer, âbut no, terrorism is any act of political violence, no matter
where it comes fromâ, the last point out. And all the debates that open
up in the face of the distinctions that can then be made on the subject:
for example, terrorism is only violence against people or can also be
against things? Must it necessarily have a political motivation or is it
only characterised by the panic is seminates? The multiplicity of
meanings assigned to this term is suspect. The sensation here is not of
finding oneself in the presence of the usual malcomprehensions linked to
the incapacity of words to express a reality whose complexity goes
beyond the symbols that would like to represent it. On the contrary, one
gets the impression that one is face to face with deliberate confusion,
a relativism of interpretations created artificially with the intention
of emptying ideas of their meaning, or neutralising practical strength,
banalising the whole question by reducing all reflection that one might
carry out on the subject to chatter.
All the same, this nine-letter word must have an origin, a history, from
which it would be possible to deduct a meaning capable of dissipating at
least a good part of the ambiguities that its use generates today. And
that is in fact so.
The first definition that is given of this term by most dictionaries is
of an historical character: âthe government of terror in Franceâ. One
thereby discovers the precise origin of the word. Terrorism corresponds
to the period of the French Revolution that goes from April 1793 to July
1794, when the Committe of public health led by Robespierre and
Saint-Just ordered a huge number of capital executions. The terror was
therefore represented by the guillotine whose blade cut the head off
thousands of people who, one presumes, constituted a threat for the
security of the new State in formation. Starting off from this base, the
same dictionaries add by extension a more general definition of
terrorism: âall methods of government based on terrorâ.
At the present time this interpretation of the concept of terrorism is
extremely clear. First of all, it highlights the narrow line that exists
between terrorism and the State. Terrorism is born with the State, is
exercised by the State, is precisely a âmethod of governmentâ that the
State uses against its enemies to guarantee its own conservation. âThe
guillotine â said Victor Hugo â is the concretisation of lawâ. Only the
State can promulgate laws. And law, far from being the expression of
this social contract garantor of harmonious cohabitation among humans,
represents the barbed wire with which power protects its
privileges.Whoever dares to go beyond it will have to pass through the
hands of the hangman. In fact, before the month of April 1793, some
so-called common law criminals and some insurgents had already climbed
the scaffold.
Whatever one might think, the guillotine is not actually an invention of
monsieur Guillotin. In France this instrument of capital execution
already had a history, but nobody had talked about Terror yet.It is only
when the authority of the State, then in the hands of the jacobins, is
threatened by a revolutionary wave, when it is no longer a question of
simple outlaws or isolated insurgents, but a huge social movement
capable of overthrowing it, only then does repressive violence come to
be called terrorâ.
But, apart from its institutional character, another characteristic
distinguishes terrorism: anyone can become a victim of it. During the
period of the Terror there were no fewer than 4,000 executions in Paris
alone. Louis Blanc found the identity of 2,750 guillotined people,
discovering that only 650 of them belonged to the wealthy classes. That
means that the State machine of the guillotine did not make many
distinctions, decapitating anyone it considered a nuisance or suspect.
It was not only noblemen, military men and priests that lost their heads
these days â as the most conservative and traditional propaganda would
have it â but above all simple artisans, peasants, poor people.
Terrorism is such because it strikes blindly, hence the feeling of
collective panic it inspires. The indiscriminate use of the guillotine,
systemised thanks to the simplification of judicial procedures consented
by the law of Prairial, created the ineluctable effect of chain
operations, annuling the individual differences between all the
decapitated. This practise of amalgam has a precise political sense:
regrouping into one single seance the people suspected of âcrimesâ of a
nature or identity that were completely different. Terror aims at
eliminating individual differences to create popular consensus, and to
destroy âthe abjection of the personal meâ (Robespierre), given that
there must only exist one single entity into which to melt individuals:
the State. Terrorism is therefore born as an institutional and
indiscriminate instrument. These two aspects also retentissent in
current expressions, as for example âterrorising bombardmentsâ. Not only
does bombardment take place during wars carried out by States, it
seminates death and desolation among the whole population. One could say
the same thing concerning the psychological terrorism considered âa form
of intimidation or blackmailâ in order to manipulate public opinion,
effectuated above all through the means of communication, by the
exaggeration of the dangers of certain situations or even inventing
them, in order to induce the masses to behave in a certain way in
political, social and economic projects. One can see clearly how only
those who hold power are able to manipulate the great means of
communication and, through them, the âmassesâ, in order to reach their
aim.
Terrorism is therefore the blind violence of the State, as the origin of
the term shows clearly. But language is never a neutral expression. Far
from being merely descriptive, language is above all a code. The meaning
of words always points to the side on which the balance of power is
leaning. He who holds power also possesses the meaning of words. That
explains how it is that, over time, the concept of terrorism has taken
on a new meaning that completely contradicts its historical origins but
corresponds to the needs of power. Today, this concept is defined âa
method of political struggle based on intimidatory violence (murder,
sabotage, explosive attacks, etc.) generally used by revolutionary
groups or subversives (left or right)â. As we can see, this
interpretation, which began to spread at the end of the 19^(th) century,
is in complete opposition to what has been said until now.In the initial
acceptation of the word, it is the State that has recourse to terrorism
against its enemies; in the second, it is its enemies that use terrorism
against the State.The upturning of meaning could not be more explicit.
The usefulness of such an operation for the Reason of State is only too
clthe Terror in France was the work of a state born from the
Revolution.To justifythe present meaning of the concept of terrorism,
the dominant ideology has had to intervertire its subjects and attribute
to the Revolution the responsibility that in reality belongs to the
State. Ainsi, we are taught today that Terror is the work of the
Revolution which, in this far off historical context, took the form of
the State. Terror is therefore synonymous with revolutionary violence.
An acrobatic jump in logic that continues to enchant the parterres of
spectators the world over, who donât seem to realise de lâarnaque more
than obvious.
In reality, one cannot attribute Terror to the Revolution, the insurgent
people, because it is only when the Revolution becomes a state that the
Terror has appeared. It is an enormous ideological lie and a gross
historical error to make Terror the very expression of âmassacranteâ
revolutionary violence, that in the streets, ythe days on the
barricades, of popular vengeance. Before April 17 1793 (day of the
foundatio of the revolutionarytribunal), the violence exercised against
power, even that which was particularly cruel, had never recouvert the
name of terrorism. Neither the bloody Jacqueries of the XIV century, nor
the excesses that deroule during the Great Revolution (such as for
example the demonstratio of the women of Marseille who carried a la
ronde, on top of a pike, the visceres of Major De Beausset to the sound
of âwhoâs for tripe?â) were ever considered as acts of terrorism.This
term indicates only the repressive violence of the State apparutus at
the moment in which it has to defend itself â for the first time in
history â from a revolutionary assault. En somme, the historic aspect of
the term shows how terrorism is violence of power that defends itself
from the Revolution, not Revolution attacking power.
What a social monstruosity, what chef dâoeuvre of Machiavelism is this
revolutionary government! For any being that reasons, government and
revolution are incompatible.
Jean Varlet, Gare lâexplosion, 15 vendemaire an III.
It should be said a ce propos that the persistence of this ambiguity has
been encouraged for a long time by the revolutionaries themselves, who
have accepted this qualificativ de bon gres, without realising that in
so doing they were helping the propaganda of the very State that they
wanted to strike. And if the concept of terrorism can legitimately find
its place in an authoritarian concept of revolution (as Lenin and Stalin
demonstrated in Russia), it is absolutely devoid of sense, not to say
abhorrant, in an anti-authoritarian perspective of liberation. It is not
by chance thast it is precisely the anarchists to have in first revu the
improper use of this term, perhaps pushed by events. In 1921 the tragic
attentat took place against the cinema-theatre Diana in Milan, causing
the death and wounding of numerous spectators, although it had the
objective the town prefect who was responsible for the imprisonment of
some well-known anarchists. In spite of the authorsâ intentions, it was
an act of terrorism. As one can imagine, this act has led to many
arguments within the anarchist movement. Ainsi, in the face of the
condemnation of the gesture by many anarchists, both the revue
Anarchisme of Pisa, undoubtedly the most widely distributed publication
of autonomous anarchism in Italy, continued to defend âthis cardinal
anarchist truth, of knowing the impossibility of separating terrorism
from insurrectionalismâ, it began on the other hand to esquisser the
first critical reflections on the concept of terrorism: âwhy name and
tax with âcatastrophic terrorâ â which is the propre of the State â the
act of individual revolt? The State is terrorist, the revolutionary who
insurges, never!â Half a century later, within a context of strong
social tension, this critique was to be taken up again and developed by
those who did not intend to accept the accusation of terrorism launched
by the state against its enemies.
Words have always been subject to an evolution in meaning. It is not
surprising that the meaning of the term terrorism has also been
modified. It is all the same unacceptable that it contradict each one of
its original characteristics, which are those of the institutional and
indiscriminate aspectof violence. This violence can be exercised against
people or against things, it can be physical or psychological, but in
order to be able to speak of terrorism, there must be at least one of
these two characteristics remains. For example, one has rightly spoken
of terrorism to indicate actions carried out by death squads of the
Spanish State against the militants of ETA. These actions were directed
against a precise objective, but it was all the same a question of a
form of institutional violence against a threat considered as
revolutionary. In the same way terrorism can not always be carried out
by institutions. But in order for us to consider it such, its
manifestations must then strike in an indiscriminate way. A bomb in a
station or an open supermarket or on a crowded beach can rightly be
defined terrorist. Even when it is fruit of the delirium of a âmadmanâ
or when it is claimed by a revolutionary orga nisation, the result of
such an action is to seminate panic in the population.
When on the other hand violence is neither institutional nor
indiscriminate, it is a non-sense to speak of terrorism. An individual
that exterminates his family in prey of a crisis of madness is not a
terrorist. Any more than a revolutionary or a subversive organisation
that choses its objectives with care. Of course there is violence,
revolutionary violence, but not terrorism. It is aimed neither a
defending the State nor at seminating terror in the population. If,
during such attacks, the media talk of âcollective psychosisâ or âwhole
nations trembling in fearâ, it is merely in reference to the old lie
that wants to identify a whole country with its representatives, in
order to better justify the pursuit of the private interests of some in
the name and at the cost of the social interests of all the others. If
someone were to start to kill politicians, industrialists and
magistrates, that would merely seminate terror among politicians,
industrialists and magistrates. Nobody else would be materially touched.
But if someone were to put a bomb in a train, anyone could be a victim,
without exclusion: the politician just like the enemy of politics, the
industrialist just like the worker, the magistrate just like the repris
de justice. In the first case we are faced with an example of
revolutionary violence, in the second it is a question of terrorism on
the other hand. And in spite of all objections, critiques and
perplexities that the first form of violence can raise, one certainly
cannot compare it to the second.
That said, we come back to the initial question. Between the king who
has the crowd massacred and the anarchist that shoots the king, who is
the terrorist?
Mare Almani