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PacBell FAX on several BUSTS !
August 3, 1987
MR. SPILLER
Frank:
I've attached a summary of some recent events that are alarming.
I believe this information should be shared with Mr. Kaplan? I've sent
a copy to Roland.
(signature)
W. M. Kern
COPY FOR: ROLAND DONALDSON
UNAUTHORIZED REMOTE COMPUTER ACCESS
San Francisco, July 29, 1987
Case Nos.: 86-883, 87-497
T. M. CASSANI, Director-Electronic Operations:
Electronic Operations recently investigated two cases involving a
number of sophisticated hackers who were adept at illegally
compromising public and private sector computers. Included among
the victims of these hackers was Pacific Bell, as well as other
local exchange carriers and long distance providers.
Below is a synopsis of the two cases (87-497 and 86-883), each
of which demonstrate weaknesses in Pacific Bell's remote access
dial-up systems.
Case No. 87-497
On May 14, 1987, Electronic Operations received a court order
directing Pacific Bell to place traps on the telephone numbers
assigned to a company known as "Santa Cruz Operations". The
court order was issued in order to identify the telephone number
being used by an individual who was illegally entering Santa
Cruz Operations' computer and stealing information.
On May 28, 1987, a telephone number was identified five separate
times making illegal entry into Santa Cruz Operations' computer.
The originating telephone number was 805-495-6191, which is
listed to Bonnie Vitello, 1378 E. Hillcrest Drive, Apt. 404,
Thousand Oaks, California.
On June 3, 1987, a search warrant was served at 1378 E. Hillcrest
Drive, Apt 404, Thousand Oaks, California. The residents of the
apartment, who were not at home, were identified as Bonnie
Vitello, a programmer for General Telephone, and Kevin Mitnick, a
known computer hacker. Found inside the apartment were three
computers, numerous floppy disks and a number of General
Telephone computer manuals.
Kevin Mitnick was arrested several years ago for hacking Pacific
Bell, UCLA and Hughes Aircraft Company computers. Mitnick was a
minor at the time of his arrest. Kevin Mitnick was recently
arrested for compromising the data base of Santa Cruz Operations.
The floppy disks that were seized pursuant to the search
warrant revealed Mitnick's involvment in compromising the
Pacific Bell UNIX operation systems and other data bases. The
disks documented the following:
o Mitnick's compromise of all Southern California SCC/ESAC
computers. On file were the names, log-ins, passwords, and
home telephone numbers for Northern and Southern ESAC
employees.
o The dial-up numbers and circuit identification documents
for SCC computers and Data Kits.
o The commands for testing and seizing trunk testing lines
and channels.
o The commands and log-ins for COSMOS wire centers for
Northern and Southern California.
o The commands for line monitoring and the seizure of dial
tone.
o References to the impersonation of Southern California
Security Agents and ESAC employees to obtain information.
o The commands for placing terminating and originating
traps.
o The addresses of Pacific Bell locations and the
Electronic Door Lock access codes for the following
Southern California central offices ELSG12, LSAN06, LSAN12,
LSAN15, LSAN23, LSAN56, AVLN11, HLWD01, HWTH01, IGWD01,
LOMT11, AND SNPD01.
o Inter-company Electronic Mail detailing new
login/password procedures and safeguards.
o The work sheet of an UNIX encryption reader hacker file.
If successful, this program could break into any UNIX system
at will.
Case No. 86-883
On November 14, 1986, Electronic Operations received a search
warrant directing Pacific Bell to trap calls being made to the
Stanford University computer. The Stanford Computer was being
illegally accessed and was then being used to access other large
computer systems throughout the country.
The calls to the Stanford Computer were routed through several
different common carriers and through numerous states. Through a
combination of traps, traces and sifting through information
posted on the Stanford computer, several suspects were identified
throughout the United States.
The group of computer hackers who illegally accessedd the Stanford
computer system were known as "The Legion of Doom". Subsequent
investigation indicated that the Legion of Doom was responsible
for:
o The use of Stanford University high-speed mainframes to
attack and hack ESAC/SCC mini compuuters with an UNIX
password hacker file. Password files were then stored on
the Stanford systems for other members of the Legion of Doom
to use. Login and passwords for every local exchange
carrier as well as AT&T SCC/ESAC mini computers were on file.
o The Legion of Doom used the Stanford computers to enter
and attack other institutions and private contractors'
computers. Some of the contractors' computers were used for
national defense research.
On July 21, 1987, eight search warrants were served in three
states at homes where members of the Legion of Doom reside.
Three of the searches were conducted in California. Steve
Dougherty, Senior Investigator-Electronic Operations, accompanied
Secret Service agents at the service of a search warrant at 2605
Trousdale Drive, Burlingame, California, which was the residence
of Stan Cisnero, a sixteen-year-old member of the Legion of Doom.
Dougherty interviewed Cisnero, who had used the pseudonym
"O'Ryan Quest", when accessing computers. During the interview,
Cisnero admitted the following:
o The entering of central offices, (Burlingame, San Mateo,
San Bruno, Millbrae) disguised as a Federal Express
deliveryman. The entries were done to case out the CO's
for the purpose of finding computer terminals with
telephones, the locations of switches and bays, the names of
Comtechs, and materials related to the operations of the
central office. Cisnero also claimed to have been in the
AT&T Administration office on Folsom Street, San Francisco.
o Cisnero's telephone service had been disconnected twice
for nonpayment, and twice he had his service restored by
impersonating a service representative.
o Learning to test circuits and trunks with his computer by
using ROTL and CAROT test procedures.
o Members of the Legion of Doom often accessed test trunks
to monitor each other's liness for fun.
o On several occasions Cisnero would post the telephone
number of a public coin phone for access to his BBS, Digital
IDS. He would then access teh Millbrae COSMOS wire center
and add call forwarding to the coin phone. He would
activate the call forwarding to his home telephone number,
securing the identity of his location.
o Cisnero would impersonate an employee who had
authorization to use a Data Kit and have it turned on for
him. When he was done, he would call back and have the Data
Kit turned off.
o Cisnero also would use his knowledge to disconnect and
busyout the telephone services of individuals he did not
like. Further, he would add several custom calling features
to their lines to create larger bills.
o It was very easy to use the test trunks with his computer
to seize another person's dial tone and make calls appear
on their bills. Cisnero did not admit charging 976 calls
to anyone, but he knew of others who did.
o When the Legion of Doom attacked a computer system, they
gave themselves five minutes to complete the hacking. If
they were not successful in five minutes, they would attempt
another system. The Legion of Doom was able to crack a
computer in under five minutes approximately 90% of the
time.
o Cisnero would impersonate employees to get non-published
telephone listings. Cisnero received the non-published
listing for Apple Computer Founder, Steve Wozniak, and
members of The Beastie Boys rock group.
o Cisnero told Dougherty of one New York member of the Legion
of Doom, "Bill from Arnoc", who has been placing his own traps
in New York. Bill from Arnoc helped Cisnero place traps in
Pacific Bell.
The review of the evidence seized at Cisnero's residence tends to
corroborate all Cisnero's statements.
CONCLUSIONS
There are some important conclusions that can be drawn from the
above two cases regarding future computer system concerns.
o The number of individuals capable of entering Pacific Bell
operating systems is growing.
o Computer Hackers are becoming more sophisticated in their
attacks.
o Dial-up ports will always be a target for computer entry by a
hacker.
o Even dial-up ports with remote callbacks and manually controlled
modems can be compromised.
o A hacker can place a central office off-line by overloading
a SCC mini computer by improperly placing traps or by putting
traps on several DID multi-trunk groups such as MCI or
Sprint groups.
o Terrorist or Organized Crime organizations could use this
underground computer technology against Pacific Bell or to
their own advantage.
o Pacific Bell proprietary data bases such as PTT ESAC or
PB2 ESAC could be compromised.
o The integrity of accurate customer billing statements have
been compromised through access to the CEBS (Computerized
Electronic Billing System) and will remain questionable. A
customer can dispute large direct-dialed calls and claim his
telephone was accessed by a computer hacker.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The information gained as a result of the above investigations
should be shared with those individuals responsible for the
integrity of our computer systems. Further, an ongoing business
partnership between security and the individuals responsible for
the integrity of our computer systems should be initiated and
maintained to ensure prompt, effective resolution of future
computer related security issues.
(signature)
JOHN E. VENN
Manager-Electronic Operations