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Title: The fall of Rojava
Author: Jim Kovpak
Date: 26 October 2019
Language: en
Topics: Rojava, Syrian civil war, analysis
Source: Retrieved on 20th February 2022 from https://www.nihilist.li/2019/10/26/the-fall-of-rojava-hard-lessons-learned/

Jim Kovpak

The fall of Rojava

The Turkish invasion of the Autonomous Administration of North and East

Syria (NES), often referred to by some as «Rojava,» has provoked a major

backlash worldwide not only from leftist admirers of the People’s

Protection Units and Women’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ), but also by

many mainstream Western liberals and even some conservatives for their

heroic campaign against the Islamic State. The initially mostly-Kurdish

fighters began their struggle against the genocidal, fascist

self-proclaimed «Caliphate» in the most dire circumstances, when it

seemed like the besieged town of Kobane would fall to IS and experience

the same barbarism seen in other Iraqi and Syrian cities that had fallen

under its control. Despite a lack of heavy weapons and adequate

supplies, the male and female fighters managed to turn the tide with the

help of US-led coalition airstrikes. Cementing their alliance with the

US, the YPG/YPJ forged a coalition from the regions various ethnic and

religious groups that would become known as the Syrian Democratic Forces

(SDF), and with coalition help the Islamic State was stripped of its

last territory in Syria, including its «capital» Raqqa which fell in

2017.

Anarchists in particular became enamored with the group based on its

stated politics and the association of Kurdish political leader and PKK

(Kurdish Workers’ Party) founder Abdullah Ocalan, who developed the

ideology of Democratic Confederalism with heavy inspiration from the

late American leftist thinker Murray Bookchin. So inspiring was the

struggle that some of these leftists joined the ranks of foreign

fighters fighting in the ranks of the YPG/YPJ; some of those would even

die fighting against IS.

Unfortunately, the left in general has had a poor understanding of the

Syrian conflict, which is arguably one of the worst humanitarian

disasters facing the world today, and what is happening now to the Kurds

and their allies is the inevitable result of a series of political and

ideological failings both inside and outside of Syria. And though it

might seem callous or cold, if we want to avoid this kind of

bloodletting in the future, if we want to turn back the tide of global

fascist reaction, and if we want to abolish capitalism and replace it

with a just and sustainable system, we must make a sober assessment of

what happened in Syria.

First, it is important to say what the PYD (Democratic Union Party)

accomplished.

1. The achievements in terms of women’s equality are indisputable. Women

fighting on the frontlines actually has a longer history in Kurdish

society than Westerners realize, but thanks to their Women’s Protection

Units (YPJ), the phenomenon became more visible. Mobilizing both men and

women is not only an ideological imperative related to equality and

personal freedom- it is also a crucial practical measure in

revolutionary struggle. That aside, the PYD also advanced women’s rights

in a number of crucial but often less visible (at least to the outside

world) ways.

2. Despite having an ideology quite at odds with American neoliberal

capitalism, they managed to forge a strong alliance with the US and its

allies. Despite betrayal by the incompetent Trump administration, they

won great respect from members of the US military, from the Marines and

special operations forces who directly assisted them, to the generals in

the Pentagon and former Secretary of Defense James Mattis. In fact,

Mattis, the former Marine General still called by his call sign «Chaos,»

suggested in an opinion article that his resignation in late 2018 was

strongly influenced by Trump’s announcement that he planned or order US

forces out of Syria. The broad spectrum backlash we see now is thanks to

the PYD’s securing of an alliance with the US and other NATO allies.

3. The Syrian war has largely been a total failure when it comes to

leftist internationalism, but international solidarity on display in

«Rojava» was significant. What is more, the PYD and those foreigners who

volunteered to fight with its military forces came back and spread an

anti-Assad message that was desperately needed to counteract the

shameful and reactionary behavior of large portions of the left who

supported the Assad regime in the name of «anti-imperialism.» Although

these factions would attack the Kurds as tools of Western imperialism,

much of the left saw the dynamism of the PYD and its Western supporters,

compared it to the authoritarianism and play acting of the pro-Assad

left, and rejected the latter.

4. The idea that «Rojava» was an experiment in «stateless,» direct

democracy is largely the product of PYD propaganda. In reality the group

was far more centralized and authoritarian than admirers realized, and

it nurtured a considerable personality cult around PKK founder Abdullah

Ocalan (whom they call Apo). Despite this, the group did manage to at

least set up a useful theoretical framework for such a democratic

society, which deserves to be studied. Much of the difference between

theory and practice when it comes to governance in the territory can be

explained by the war and the surrounding international situation, and

how these issues were dealt with (right or wrong) are of crucial

importance to revolutionaries. Plus, the fact that the PYD came to

dominate politics in the region, for better or worse, is a tribute to

its skills in political organizing, something that cannot be ignored.

Having laid out these accomplishments, it’s important to study the

mistakes made by the PYD and the international left that supported them.

5. One of the first mistakes of the international left was either

ignoring the Syrian revolution, or worse, actively embracing the

criminal regime of Bashar al Assad. Those who did the latter entered

into a de facto alliance with a literally fascist regime that is the

sweetheart of the global far-right, and despite ideological differences

both sides repeated the same propaganda often from the same sources.

Although the PYD had already started establishing control over territory

in 2012, many Western leftists did not take notice until several years

after 2014, when the group first became heavily engaged by IS at Kobane.

Few seemed to do the necessary work to look back on the start of the

revolution in order to get a full understanding of what was happening.

This has led to some embarrassing situations, such as leftists calling

for a No Fly Zone to protect the Kurds now, while attacking the same

idea as «warmongering» or «starting World War III» when it was suggested

earlier in the war to protect civilians from the Assad regime and

Russia’s indiscriminate bombing. Today innocent civilians in the

Kurdish-controlled territory are suffering the results of the world

ignoring the same scenes when they were happening for years in Ghouta,

Deraa, Aleppo, and Idlib. We must never again allow such hypocrisy.

6. Early in the war, Assad felt most threatened by the democratic,

non-sectarian uprisings, and he and his allies set out to divide the

opposition along ethnic and sectarian lines. With respect to Kurds, this

was accomplished by pulling out most regime security forces, giving the

PYD and its allies de facto control over their territory. More

crucially, the regime continued payments to the territories which helped

alleviate the burdens of maintaining society. This support is one major

reason why Rojava cannot be seen as a stateless or autonomous society,

as it had significant dependence on the regime. This situation led to

political clashes with non-Kurdish opposiiton, especially Sunni Arabs,

who saw the PYD as being allied with the regime. Limited military

cooperation with the regime and a disdain for taking offensive actions

against it also eroded trust and led many to believe it was a regime

ally. This perception was also perpetuated by the treatment of some Free

Syrian Army units which had allied themselves with the YPG/YPJ but later

fell out of favor with the group. In the PYD’s defense, it is very

possible that the group’s latter approach to the regime might have had

more to do with US policy than its own desires. The US was for the most

part adamant about groups receiving military aid fighting only IS and

not the regime, as the Obama admin never had much faith in the

revolution from the beginning and by 2013 the consensus in DC was that

Assad would have to stay.

7. Unfortunately due to its conflict with some elements of the FSA, and

despite its continuing alliance with some FSA or former FSA units, PYD

propaganda often cast all other FSA groups as jihadists, allied with

jihadists, or few in number and without influence relative to jihadist

factions. This narrative blended perfectly with the propaganda of the

regime and Russia; even though it was not explicitly pro-Assad as in the

case of the latter, it did still implicitly supported the regime’s

narrative about its opponents. Moreover, the blanket jihadist label was

an Islamophobic, racist trope which was largely responsible for the

shameful lack of solidarity between leftists and the revolution at

large.

Conclusions

Although the conflict between the SDF and Turkey has only just begun and

there is no reason to expect it to end soon, there are several lessons

we may take based largely on the points listed above (although they are

by no means exhaustive). These lessons may apply to situations in many

countries but for the sake of this publication, Ukraine will be used as

an example where applicable. It is appropriate not only because Ukraine

and the Syrian opposition share a common enemy -Moscow-, but also

because Western failures in Syria emboldened Putin to intervene in

Ukraine in 2014.

First, it is necessary for anti-authoritarian revolutionary left

movements to study and mimic the grassroots political organizing

techniques of the PYD. Even if the organization of military units and

training is impossible, political organizing ensures that when the time

comes, militants will have a not only a pool of willing recruits, but

even more important for an insurgency, a sympathetic population.

Second, the role of women in all aspects of the revolution and

revolutionary organizing cannot be overstressed. In Ukraine

participation of women during Maidan, in the volunteer movement, and in

the Ukrainian Armed Forces represents a positive step in this direction.

All these examples help normalize the image of women taking an active

role in revolutionary activity and resistance.

Third, revolutionary movements, especially during an armed insurgency,

must think carefully about who their allies are. Any revolutionary group

must acknowledge that it will have to work with groups that do not

necessarily share their ideology to a high degree, if at all. It is

necessary to look critically at the principles of one’s group and work

out a set of strict guidelines of what groups one can work with as well

as a set of «red lines,» i.e. which groups cannot be allies under any

circumstances. Also, though international support from governments is

often necessary, it is important not to become dependent on such

support. The failure of the Syrian revolution as a whole was largely

thanks to various outside actors with contradictory goals backing their

own factions.

Fourth, it is paramount to reach a wide global audience in order to

secure international support. It is very significant that a relatively

small population of Syrian Kurds, without a state of their own, managed

to secure such international sympathy across a wide section of the

political spectrum, whereas Ukraine, a large independent UN-member

nation state, seems to get only a fraction of the sympathy and almost

none of it from the left. Future Ukrainian leftist revolutionaries must

portray Ukraine’s struggle against Russia accurately as an

anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, anti-fascist struggle. Ukraine must

become a symbol of a global struggle of the oppressed against the

oppressors, and vice versa. In this way, Russia’s larger, better-funded,

and more experience propaganda machine can be countered via a more

compelling narrative on an international scale. At the same time, it is

important to be truthful when promoting a narrative and also to make

sure that narrative is not in any way inadvertently reinforcing an

opponent’s propaganda.

Fifth, it is important for future revolutionary groups not to accept

rapid concessions in exchange for what seem like quick gains. By making

a deal with the Assad regime, the PYD won breathing space and de facto

autonomy in its regional enclave, but at the expense of long-term

security. For if it were not Turkey invading their territory today, it

would have been the Assad regime with Russia and Iran’s backing. Indeed

we are likely to see that happen in the future as Turkey’s campaign

unfolds, and any NES territory not occupied by Turkey or their allied

forces will most likely be turned over to the regime. Governments of all

kinds have proven adept at containing revolutionaries or insurgent

groups in small enclaves almost indefinitely. Although this often gives

such groups enough autonomy in their own communities to alleviate some

of the grievances that led them to rebel in the first place, their

isolation typically leads to lower living standards and thus limited

appeal to citizens living in the rest of the country.

Lastly, the whole tragedy of the Syrian revolution clearly demonstrates

the dangers of the nation-state system and how important it is for a

movement to understand how to navigate it, even if that movement, like

the Democratic Confederalists of the PYD, claims to reject it. The Assad

regime managed to survive because it was, after all a recognized

UN-member state, whereas none of the opposition, whether Arab or Kurd,

was granted that legitimacy. States prefer to work with other states,

and they prefer a «legitimate» tyrant who claims to provide «stability»

to an unknown situation. Without that recognized state status, both the

Kurdish-led opposition and the opposition in Idlib were forced to rely

on American and Turkish protection, respectively. In order to avoid this

state of affairs, a revolutionary movement, regardless of its politics,

should seek to seize state power or at the very least secure a power

sharing agreement in the recognized government. Naturally, there are

dangers associated with such goals, but any movement that lacks the

appearance of state legitimacy can be branded a «terrorist» organization

and is thus fair game for military action from the existing state or

from abroad.

For all its flaws, the so-called «Rojava Revolution» was arguably the

most significant anti-capitalist movement of the 21^(st) century.

Although it made some of the same mistakes as 20^(th) century socialist

movements, it also avoided many of them and clearly tried to chart a new

revolutionary path worthy of observation. Furthermore, the Democratic

Confederalist ideology of Abdullah Ocalan provides a very accurate

analysis of the problems of the nation-state system and at the very

least provides a foundation for addressing them. Tragically, the

movement failed to fully realize the type of democracy it preached, nor

was it able to form lasting bonds with the Syrian anarchists and other

leftists whose own experimental self-governing bodies known as the Local

Coordinating Councils (LCCs), received far less attention from the

global left. Their sacrifice has so much to teach us, as does the Syrian

Revolution as a whole. Most of the left, owing to ignorance or outdated,

moribund, reactionary ideology, took the wrong position on Syria, and we

are all paying a terrible price for that today. Apart from the vast

human cost of the war and the disruption it caused, it has directly led

to the rise of far-right reactionary politics around the world and a new

era of atrocities is on the horizon as dictators now know what they can

expect to get away with under the cover of «national sovereignty» or

fighting «terrorism.» If we learn nothing from the death and suffering

of the Syrian people, we cannot call ourselves internationalists and we

are not worthy of a better world.