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Title: Roy Bhaskar obituary
Author: David Graeber
Date: 4th December 2014
Language: en
Topics: obituary, philosophy
Source: Retrieved on 3rd September 2020 from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/04/roy-bhaskar

David Graeber

Roy Bhaskar obituary

Roy Bhaskar, who has died aged 70 of heart failure, turned to philosophy

only after becoming an economics lecturer at Oxford University in the

late 1960s. Feeling that economic science had virtually nothing useful

to say about real-world issues of global wealth and poverty, he embarked

on research that led to the foundation of the philosophical school known

as critical realism.

The Oxford curriculum for PPE – philosophy, politics and economics –

provided a training for would-be politicians and civil servants who were

more likely to contain or even reinforce society’s problems than resolve

them. Roy wanted to provide the tools for understanding society’s

problems in a deeper, structural sense that might allow ways to put them

right.

Before long, he concluded that the problem ran deeper: western science

and social theory itself were based on a series of intellectual

mistakes, which created false dichotomies such as those between

individualism and collectivism, and scientific analysis and moral

criticism. The most important of these he called “the epistemic

fallacy”, arising from the conventional study of how we can know things,

or epistemology. Almost invariably, philosophers have treated the

questions “does the world exist?” and “can we prove the world exists?”

as the same. But it is perfectly possible that the world might exist and

we could not prove it, let alone be able to obtain absolute knowledge of

everything in it.

In this way, Roy argued, the two camps into which the left has been

divided – positivists, who assume that since the world does exist, we

must, someday, be able to have exact and predictive knowledge of it, and

postmodernists, who believe that since we cannot have such knowledge, we

cannot speak of “reality” at all – are just rehearsing different

versions of the same fundamental error. In fact, real things are

precisely those whose properties will never be exhausted by any

description we can make of them. We can have comprehensive knowledge

only of things that we have made up.

Roy’s approach adopted a version of Kant’s transcendental method of

argument, which asks “what would have to be the case in order for what

we know to be true?” For science, he argued that two key questions must

be asked simultaneously: first, why are scientific experiments possible,

and second, why are scientific experiments necessary, in order to obtain

verifiable knowledge of what scientists call natural laws. Why is it

possible to contrive a situation where you can predict exactly what will

happen, when, say, water is heated to a certain temperature in a

controlled environment, but also, why is it that one can never make

similar predictions in natural settings – no matter how much scientific

knowledge we acquire, we still cannot dependably predict the weather.

Why, in other words, does it take so much work to create a situation

where one does know precisely what will happen?

His conclusion was that the world must consist of independently existing

structures and mechanisms, which are perfectly real, but they must also

be, as he put it “stratified”. Reality consists of “emergent levels” –

chemistry emerges from physics, in that chemical laws include physical

ones, but cannot be reduced to them; biology emerges from chemistry, and

so forth. At each level, there is something more, a kind of leap to a

new level of complexity, even, as Roy put it, of freedom. A tree, he

argued, is more free than a rock, just as a human is freer than a tree.

What a scientific experiment does, then, is strip away everything but

one mechanism at one emergent level of reality. To do so takes enormous

work. But in real-world situations, like the weather, there are always

all sorts of different mechanisms from different emergent levels

operating at the same, and the way they interact will always be

inherently unpredictable.

The resulting books, A Realist Theory of Science (1975) and The

Possibility of Naturalism (1979), made Roy one of the most influential

voices in the philosophy of science.

He later applied this approach to a critique of the “new realism” of

Tony Blair. Vaunted as a belated adjustment to the facts of political

life, Roy said that it fails to recognise the underlying structures and

generative mechanisms, such as property ownership and the exploitation

of labour, that produce observable phenomena and events such as low pay

and intolerable working conditions. In other words, New Labour was based

on realism of the most superficial sort. He presented these and other

political implications of his work at the Philosophy Working Group of

the Chesterfield Socialist conferences, associated with Tony Benn and

Ralph Miliband, in the late 80s. This work was eventually published as

Reclaiming Reality (2011).

Roy was a political revolutionary. The unifying purpose of his work was

to establish that the pursuit of philosophical knowledge necessarily

implied social transformation; the struggle for freedom and the quest

for knowledge were ultimately the same.

His way of engaging with the world was wide-eyed, playful, impractical,

always evolving and learning. He continually announced new

breakthroughs. In the 90s, he announced that the Hegelian dialectic – an

assertion, its contradiction, and the resolution of the two – was but an

odd and idiosyncratic version of a universal principle that formed the

basis of all human thought and learning. This launched the second phase

of his philosophy, culminating in the ambitiously titled Plato Etc: The

Problems of Philosophy and Their Resolution (1994), inspired by Alfred

North Whitehead’s famous claim that “all of philosophy is but a footnote

to Plato”.

Roy came to realise that Whitehead was speaking of only western

philosophy; respect for the full range of human thought required

engagement with eastern philosophy too. This had to mean taking

spiritual ideas seriously – a domain of human experience that the left

had abandoned to the fundamentalist right. In a number of books, notably

The Philosophy of MetaReality: Creativity, Love and Freedom (2012), he

argued that spiritual experiences should be considered a constant

feature of everyday life; that every successful act of communication is,

in effect, an example of the spiritual principle of nonduality, where

both parties become, momentarily, the same person.

These developments created heated contention among critical realists,

but Roy maintained his cheerful generosity of spirit, playing an active

role in the Centre for Critical Realism and the International Centre for

Critical Realism, always brimming with projects, visions, and ideas.

Born in Teddington, west London, to an Indian father, Raju Nath Bhaskar,

a GP, and an English mother, Kumla (nee Marjorie Skill), an industrial

administrator, Roy was educated at St Paul’s school, London, and gained

a PPE degree at Balliol College, Oxford (1966). Another critic of the

PPE course and student activist was Hilary Wainwright: in 1971 they

married, and they collaborated intellectually and politically for the

rest of Roy’s life.

Roy fought against the grain of conventional academic philosophy

throughout his career. Following his time as an economics lecturer at

Pembroke College, Oxford, he held philosophy posts at Linacre College,

Oxford; Edinburgh University; the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study

in the Social Sciences, Uppsala; and the University of Tromsø, Norway.

After losing a foot in 2008 to Charcot’s disease, he made use of a

wheelchair, and survived on only a partial salary as a world scholar at

the Institute of Education in London. Nonetheless, he remained a figure

of unparalleled energy and invention, and of almost preternatural

kindness and good humour.

His recent partner was his carer Rebecca Long. She survives him, as do

Hilary and his brother, Krish.