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Title: Stirner and Nietzsche Author: Albert Lévy Date: 1904 Language: en Topics: Max Stirner, Nietzsche Source: Retrieved on November 13th, 2009 from http://www.marxists.org/subject/anarchism/levy/stirner-nietzsche.htm Notes: Originally published as in French: Stirner et Nietzsche. Paris, Societé Nouvelle de Librairie et d’Édition, 1904;
In the second half of the nineteenth century there was a reaction
against individualism. The most widespread moral theories, for example
those of August Comte in France, John Stuart Mill in England, and
Schopenhauer in Germany, had the common characteristic of preaching
altruism. Was it that the philosophers wanted to maintain Christian
morality at a moment when they renounced belief, or did they think
themselves obliged, as Nietzsche maintained, to show themselves to be
more disinterested than the Christians themselves? Whatever the case,
they condemned egoism and the isolation of the individual. In the same
way, in politics the national and social ties that united individuals
were insisted upon and solidarity was preached.
But in Germany around 1890 people began to talk about two philosophers
who admitted neither moral altruism nor social solidarity. Stirner, who
in his lifetime had enjoyed but an ephemeral glory, had been revived by
a fanatical disciple, J.H. Mackay, who saw in the author of “The Ego and
Its Own” the theoretician of contemporary anarchism. In addition,
Nietzsche, so long “untimely” made an impression on public opinion at
the very moment when illness definitively triumphed over his reason, and
little by little he became one of the favorites of the European fashion
that he had so harshly judged.
It was natural that the names of these two philosophers whose ideas were
so contrary to contemporary thought should be linked together. People
became used to viewing Stirner as a precursor of Nietzsche. But there is
room to question whether this habit is justified. In the first case, is
it true that Stirner influenced Nietzsche? And then, is it correct to
consider their philosophies as two analogous systems animated by the
same sprit? Is there really reason to connect Nietzsche to Stirner and
to speak of an individualist, anarchist, or immoralist current?
We don’t encounter Stirner’s name either in the works or correspondence
of Nietzsche. Mme. Forster-Nietzsche, in the meticulous biography she
dedicated to her brother, doesn’t speak of the author of “The Ego and
Its Own.” In any event, the work was almost completely forgotten up
until the time J.H. Mackay set out to celebrate it. J.H. Mackay himself
tells us that he only read Stirner’s name and the title of his book for
the first time in 1888: this is the very year that Nietzsche descended
into madness. In 1888 Mackay found Stirner’s name in Lange’s “History of
Materialism,” which he read at the British Museum in London. A year then
passed before he again encountered this name, which he had carefully
noted. Until that date, Stirner was thus truly dead: he is indebted to
Mackay for his resurrection.
It is nevertheless certain that Nietzsche recommended the reading of
Stirner to one of his students in Basle. In consulting the register of
the Basle library it’s true that we don’t find Stirner’s book in the
list of books borrowed in Nietzsche’s name. But we see that the book was
borrowed three times between 1870 — 1880. In 1872 by the privat-dozent
Schwarzkopf (Syrus Archimedes), in 1874 by the student Baumgartner, and
in 1879 by professor Hans Heussler. M. Baumgartner though, son of Mme
Baumgartner-Kochlin, who translated the “Untimely Meditations” into
French, was Nietzsche’s favorite student: in his correspondence the
philosopher calls him his “erzschuler.” M. Baumgartner, who is today
professor at the University of Basle, says that it was on Nietzsche’s
advice that he read Stirner, but he his certain that he never loaned the
book to his teacher.
The question then is finding out where Nietzsche encountered the name of
Stirner. It’s possible that the name was spoken in front of him at
Richard Wagner’s house. Wagner had perhaps heard mention of Stirner at
the time of the revolution of 1848, perhaps from his friend Bakunin. It
is also possible that Nietzsche read Stirner’s name in a chapter of
Eduard von Hartmann. The latter affirms, in fact, that Nietzsche must
have been struck by the analysis of Stirner’s ideas that are found in
the second volume of “Philosophy of the Unconscious.” Nietzsche
criticizes at length the chapter of this book where Hartmann spoke of
Stirner, particularly in the ninth paragraph of the second “Untimely
Meditation.“Nietzsche forcefully attacks the evolutionist theories of
Hartmann, borrowing his quotations especially from the pages where the
author of the “Philosophy of the Unconscious” speaks of humanity’s third
period. It is precisely at the entrance to this third period that
Hartmann marked Stirner’s place. But it seems that what Hartmann says
about Stirner didn’t encourage Nietzsche to study “The Ego and Its Own”
with sympathy, for Nietzsche combats precisely the theories of
“Philosophy of the Unconscious” because they seem those most apt to
strengthen that egoism which, according to Stirner, characterizes the
mature age both of humanity and of the individual. Nietzsche opposes the
enthusiasm of youth to this egoist maturity. It would be quite
surprising if Nietzsche, who didn’t take Hartmann’s “parody” seriously,
would have decided at that date to study the works of Stirner, where he
would have found theories even more paradoxical in his eyes than those
of “Philosophy of the Unconscious.” In any event, Hartmann’s argument
doesn’t prove that Stirner directly influenced Nietzsche.
The most likely hypothesis is obviously that presented by Professor
Joel. It is probable that Nietzsche remarked, like Mackay, Stirner’s
name in Lange’s “History of Materialism.” Nietzsche read this book very
carefully, as is shown by his correspondence with Baron Gersdorff and
Erwin Rohde. And in fact, on February 16 Nietzsche wrote to Baron
Gersdorff: “I am again obliged to praise the merits of a man who I
already spoke to you about in a previous letter. If you want to really
know the contemporary materialist movement, the natural sciences with
their Darwinian theories, their cosmic systems, their dark room so full
of life, etc, I see nothing more remarkable to recommend to you than
Friederich-Albert Lange’s “History of Materialism” (Iserlohn, 1866), a
book which gives infinitely more than the title promised, and which we
can browse through over and again as a real treasure. Given the
direction of your studies I see nothing better to recommend to you. I
have promised myself to get to know this man, and I want to send him my
work on Democritus as testimony of gratitude.”
Lange only dedicates a dozen lines to Stirner, but one can’t help but
believe that they strike the reader, since they were the determining
factor in the conversion of J.H. Mackay, who has since become Stirner’s
fanatical disciple. There is, in this brief analysis, a portion which
must have fixed Nietzsche’s attention. Lange declares, in fact, that
Stirner might remind us of Schopenhauer. “The man who, in German
literature, preached the most absolute egoism in the most absolute and
logical fashion, Max Stirner, stands in opposition to Feuerbach. In his
famous work “The Ego and Its Own” (1845) Max Stirner went so far as to
reject any moral idea. Anything which, in one way or another, either as
a simple idea or as an external force, places itself above the
individual and his whims is rejected by Stirner as an odious limitation
of the self. It is a pity that this book, the most exaggerated one we
know of, was not complemented by a second, positive part. This task
would have been easier than that of finding a positive complement to
Schelling’s philosophy for, in order to escape from the limited self I
can, in turn, create a space for idealism as the expression of my will
and idea. In fact, Stirner grants the will so much value that it appears
to us as the fundamental force of the human being. It reminds us of
Schopenhauer. It is in this way that every coin has two sides. In any
event, Stirner was not sufficiently influential that we should occupy
ourselves with him any further.”
Let us compare these texts to the passages where Nietzsche speaks about
“The History of Materialism.” In September 1866 the philosopher writes
to Baron Gersdorff, “What Schopenhauer is for us has again been proved
to me with precision by another excellent and instructive work of its
kind “The History of Materialism and a Critique of Its Value in the
Present period” by F.A. Lange, 1866. We are dealing here with a Kantian
and an extremely enlightened naturalist. The following three
propositions sum up his conclusion:
world, are only the images of an unknown object
external objects. We only ever have before us the product of the two
We thus not only don’t know the true essence of things, the thing in
itself, but the very idea of that thing in itself is nothing more or
less than the final consequence of an antithesis relative to our
organization, and about which we don’t know if it has a meaning outside
of our experience. Consequently, Lange feels that we should allow
philosophers complete freedom, on the condition that they edify us. Art
is free, even in the realm of concepts. Who would want to refute a
phrase of Beethoven’s or condemn an error in the Madonna of Raphael? You
see that even in placing oneself at this point of view, even in
admitting the strictest criticism, our Schopenhauer remains with us.
Even more, we can almost say that he is even more ours. If philosophy is
an art, all that is left to Haym is to hide himself before Schopenhauer;
if philosophy must edify I know no philosopher who edifies more than our
Schopenhauer.”
We see that from Lange’s book Nietzsche particularly retained the idea
that philosophy is as free as art. Everyone thus has the right to admit
the metaphysics that best responds to his sentiments: we can be
Schopenhauerian in the same way that we are Wagnerian. Thus, if he was
struck by the few lines that Lange dedicates to Stirner it is doubtless
because Lange interpreted Stirner’s theories in a way favorable to his
thesis. In fact, Lange believes that Stirner wants to efface the borders
that till now have limited individuality in order to allow everyone the
right to choose his ideal as he wishes. This is an error: every ideal,
whether it is chosen by the will, proposed by the intelligence, or
imposed by an external power, in Stirner’s eyes is nothing but an idée
fixe. It is remarkable that Lange speaks less of the negative portion of
Stirner’s system than of the positive one that he could have added.
Stirner, though, doesn’t admit a positive portion in the sense that the
historian of materialism intends it. And in fact Lange demands a
positive portion in order “to go outside the self,” but Stirner doesn’t
want us to do so. In supporting a theory of knowledge Lange seeks to
plead the cause of metaphysical speculation; Stirner sees in every
metaphysics a kind of madness. Lange attempts to save the essence of
religion by insisting on the educational virtue of faith; Stirner
considers disinterested education a dupery. As Nolen said in his
introduction to the French translation of the “History of Materialism:”
“No one has better understood than Lange that weakening the sense of the
ideal means strengthening that of egoism.” This is precisely what
Stirner also understood; but while Lange wants to strengthen the sense
of the ideal in order to weaken that of egoism, Steiner, on the
contrary, in order to strengthen the egoistic sense, wants to weaken the
sense of the ideal.
Nietzsche thus doubtless saw, via Lange’s analysis, a Stirner who was
quite different from what in reality was the author of “The Ego and its
Own.” He considered that work as a kind of introduction to the
philosophy of Schopenhauer, and this is what explains the apparently
paradoxical fact that Nietzsche spoke of Stirner during his first
period, when he was a fervent disciple of Schopenhauer, while he no
longer speaks of him during his second period, the critical period, when
he in a sense was closer to the ideas of “The Ego...”
In Erwin Rohde’s letters to Nietzsche there is a passage that appears to
confirm this interpretation. On November 4, 1886 Rohde wrote to
Nietzsche: “This winter you must be swimming in music. As much as
possible I want to try to do the same in our Abdere, for though I don’t
understand anything, it always serves to purify the soul of the dust of
the working day, and particularly to calm the restive will. They will
doubtless not allow us to intoxicate ourselves with the Wagnerian
philter in Hamburg. Since I am only one of the profane, I risk approving
that music only within myself, but it makes such an impression on me
that I feel like I’m strolling in moonlight in a garden of magical
perfumes: no sounds of vulgar reality penetrate there. And so it is with
absolute indifference that I see the so wise Messrs Schaul, etc.
demonstrate that this music is unhealthy, lascivious and who knows what
else. As for me, to use your perfect expression, it sweeps me away and
that is enough. In any case, I increasingly understand the wisdom of the
old sophist who, despite all the objections of the healthy people of his
time, affirmed that man was the measure of all things. Lange’s book —
which I will soon return to you — contributed in no small amount in
confirming this idea for me. During the course of my trip it constantly
kept me within the sphere of elevated ideas. Without any doubt, Lange is
right in taking as seriously as he does the discovery we owe to Kant of
the subjective character of the forms of perception. And if he’s right,
is it not perfectly reasonable that each of us chooses for himself a
conception of the world that suffices for him, that is, that satisfies
the moral need that is, properly speaking, his essence?
“A philosophy then that insists on the profoundly, fiercely serious
character of the object that remains absolutely unknown to us, answers
to my inner tendencies, and it is thus that I tried so hard to convince
myself that every speculation was just a vain fantasy. Schopenhauer’s
doctrine has maintained its value for me, which also confirms the fact
that the will is stronger, more basic than the intelligence, which
weighs all sides of every argument.”
Since Rohde adds that his friend is cordially in agreement with him on
these important points, we have the right to say that Nietzsche saw in
the theories laid out by Lange a justification for his instinctive
sympathy for Schopenhauer’s doctrine. All of German philosophy, from
Kant to Schopenhauer, seemed to give new strength to two propositions he
had always admitted:
Nietzsche both knew via the Greek Sophists
for a dsicple of Schopenhauer
In summary, it doesn’t appear that Stirner had a decisive influence on
Nietzsche. He perhaps contributed to keeping Nietzsche for a time within
the realm of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics. He was doubtless little by
little forgotten afterwards.