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Title: Power, Authority and Domination
Author: Amedeo Bertolo
Date: 1983
Language: en
Topics: power, authority, domination, definitions
Source: Retrieved on 17th May 2021 from https://autonomies.org/2020/10/amedeo-bertolo-authority-power-and-domination/
Notes: This text was originally presented at the seminar “Il Potere e la sua negazione”, Saignelégier (Switzerland), 8–10 of July, 1983, and latter published in Volontà, nº 2, 1983. References in square brackets are to works in the Bilbiography and in round brackets to works cited in the Endnotes

Amedeo Bertolo

Power, Authority and Domination

In the course of my studies of techno-bureaucracy, self-management and

utopia (6), (7), (8), I found myself up against the problem of defining

“power”. On different occasions I defined it more or less explicitly, to

suit the needs of the particular situation but these definitions were

always partial and provisional, serving only to avoid possible

misunderstanding in a discussion of other ideas. The basic problem

remained and, for me, it became ever more pressing as my thinking went

both deeper and wider (or at least so I was convinced).

The problem is, in fact, the need, if not necessarily to resolve, at

least to focus clearly on a conceptual “knot” of extreme complexity –

and not merely to agree on the words – a knot which is central to

anarchist thought. Paradoxically, anarchism, which can be considered the

most radical critique of domination to date both in theory and practice,

has not yet produced a theory of power that is more subtle and highly

developed than the apologies of domination.

There has been no further reflection to do justice to the brilliant

“insights” of the “founding fathers” of anarchism. Those insights are

still rich in promise and our anarchism, mine included, is built around

them but, from the scientific point of view, they have remained little

more than insights and, more than a century later, are running a serious

risk of becoming mere stereotyped formulae, beliefs or taboos, thereby

losing a large part of their value as fundamental hypotheses for the

interpretation and transformation of reality. These insights have become

petrified and the relative vagueness, of both concept and terminology,

however inevitable and perhaps necessary it may have been in the early

stages of reflection, become an obstacle to further thought and action;

the source of both unjustifiable “orthodoxies” and of equally

unjustifiable “heresies” of both “traditional” immobility and of

“innovative” absurdities, of both discussions that are purely semantic

and socially impotent.

Anarchists may find a certain consolation in the knowledge that orthodox

science, in the last century, has thrown little light on that “whole”

(made up of relationships, behavior, social structures …) that goes

under the name of “power” (or authority or domination). While power is

not only a central element in the anarchist critique of existing

reality, but also an undeniably central element to every system of

social and political thought,[1] the concept of power is, at present,

one of the most controversial and at the same time one of the least

debated, being virtually excluded from the field of application of those

analytic subtleties of which academics are so proud. Although it can be

said that the analysis of power is sophisticated, this is more in the

rather negative sense of falsification than in the positive one of

refinement.

Even a quick reading of the literature on the subject will bring into

evidence not only the considerable terminological confusion (Weber’s

term Herrschaft is translated into Italian both as potere [power] and

autoritĂ  [authority]), but also an equal conceptual vagueness. As far as

the interpretation and justification of the functions and genesis of

power are concerned, academics seem to have more or less come to a halt

at Hobbes and Locke, or even Plato and Aristotle.

This is, however, small consolation. The ruling science can well permit

itself the luxury of being unconvincing on the level of pure logic,

since it is supported by the force of both reality and of the

unconscious imaginary which both shapes and is shaped by it.

Furthermore, a certain level of confusion is useful to it as it renders

the identification of social domination in theory and its destruction in

practice difficult, if not impossible. Anarchist thought, on the other

hand, must aim at the highest level of clarity if it wishes, as indeed

it does, to be a subversive science, that is, an instrument for the

understanding and subverting of the existing reality.

This essay puts forward certain definitions which the author feels could

be of great use, not only in the debate among anarchists but also in the

confrontation between anarchists and non-anarchists, which otherwise

threaten to remain forever a dialogue of the deaf. It will be obvious

that the work of definition is aimed not so much at the terms, as at the

contents of these terms. In the same way the written (and verbal) symbol

“house” may represent the concept of “a man-made shelter”, the content

underlying this concept may vary from the hut to the skyscraper. In this

present essay I will limit myself to the definition of wide categories

of contents (and of concepts) which will be useful for an initial,

provisional reply to the following question: to what extent is that

which is known as power made up of universal social functions and to

what extent does it include functions which belong specifically to a

relationship of domination?

It is normal usage, not only among academics, to begin a discussion on

semantics with 1) a consideration of the etymological aspects and/or 2)

of the historical ones. In the case under discussion neither would be of

any particular value. The etymology of the terms that interest us here

stretches too far back into the past to be more than linguistic

archaeology and, moreover, two of the three terms under consideration

originally had meanings that were virtually indistinguishable. And as

for the historical use of the terms, this reveals a level of polyvalence

and interchangeability over time that renders any such analysis

irrelevant to our purposes.[2]

To put it briefly, the examination of the origins and use of the words

that interest us here, over time and in differing socio-economic

contexts, only tells us that, if we imagine a spectrum of meanings

stretching from a positive to a negative pole with reference to the

values of freedom and equality, the term authority comes in a midway

position of neutrality, the term domination is generally placed towards

the negative pole and the term power covers the entire spectrum thanks

to its particular double meaning of “power to do” and of “power to make

someone else do”.

An examination of the use of the three terms on the part of anarchists

is of equally limited value (definitely more useful is an examination of

the underlying concepts): whether we consider the “classic” writings or

contemporary ones, whether in reflections or in propaganda, we usually

find power/authority/domination used as synonyms (and thus with negative

connotations).

It is true that we can probably identify a certain distinction, more or

less explicit, between power and authority, but this is not unequivocal.

For Proudhon, for example, power is a collective force whereas authority

is alienation (monopolistic appropriation) of this collective force (28)

(although he also uses the term “political power” to define this

expropriation of social might). For Proudhon, therefore, authority could

be seen as a negative term while power is, or could be termed, neutral.

Bakunin, on the other hand, recognised the existence of a “neutral”

authority.[3] And – moving from the classics to our contemporaries –

Giovanni Baldelli gives a decidedly positive meaning to the word

“authority” (5), which he generally uses in the sense of moral and

intellectual influence. The examination of the use of the three words

today, both in common parlance and in scientific terminology, has a

little (although not much) more meaning.

In everyday language, the two adjectives “authoritative” and

“authoritarian” demonstrate the use, both positive and negative, of the

noun “authority” from which they come, a noun which can indicate a role

of political power or a particular competency or moral excellence. And,

still in everyday language, the term power is applied to a whole range

of situations from the ability to be or do, to the structure of social

hierarchy. Only the word “domination” is almost unequivocally used in

the sense of the power to impose (de jure or de facto) one’s will on

others by means of physical or psychological coercion. This lesser

ambiguity of the term domination (and of the relative verbs and

adjectives) in comparison with those of authority and power also extends

to the terminology of the social sciences. Perhaps because of the

self-same negative emotional value that is so widespread in current

usage, the term is rarely used or else is used with an explicit and

negative moral value judgement.[4] As far as definitions of power and

authority are concerned, they can be found to suit all tastes. What, for

some, is called authority, for others is influence or prestige, or – in

another sense – that which some call authority is, for others, power, or

rather legitimate or formal power … [5]

It is for these reasons that I feel that it is necessary to attempt, yet

again, to define these terms; and our first step must be the

identification of the underlying concepts, even if this naturally

presents certain lexical difficulties. At times I will try to overcome

these by an “intuitive” use of certain terms (depending on the

particular context), at other times by paraphrasing, whether elegantly

or no, and again at other times by anticipating the definitions to be

presented at a later point. I will also resort to the frequent use of

“banalities”, that is, of concepts which are taken for granted by

anarchists or which are widely known and accepted in the field of

non-anarchist scientific and philosophical thought; from an unusual

combination of different banalities we may discover something new.

Let us begin in an (apparently) roundabout way. The freedom of the

individual, understood as the possibility of choice between alternative

actions, is not, has never been and could never be unlimited. It

operates in the presence of limits and restrictions arising from both

nature and culture. Any choice can only exist between certain determined

possibilities. Even those fanatics of freedom that anarchists are agree

on this (with the possible exception – more apparent than real – of some

frantic individualists). But this definition is nevertheless incomplete

and immediately sends us back to a higher level of freedom,

paradoxically via the attribution of determining restrictions to the

behaviour of the individual.

I am not concerned, here, with the limits (whether external or internal)

imposed by nature because these in fact limit the choice of

possibilities rather than determine behaviour and are, therefore,

irrelevant to the present discussion. For example, physiology and

anatomy certainly limit the frequency and the modes of sexual coupling

but the factors which, within those limits, lead to specific models of

erotic behaviour are entirely cultural. And yet another example: in the

game of chess, the chessboard can be seen to represent the natural

limits (in fact the sixty-four squares are obviously an artificial

limit, being part of the rules, but let us imagine that they are imposed

by nature); the rules of the game represent the cultural limits (the

bishop can only move diagonally, etc.); the moves of the players

represent the freedom of choice between determined possibilities.

The aspect that interests me here is, to be precise, these determining

factors imposed by culture. Those two elements that, together, play such

a considerable, if varying, role in the behaviour of animals, instinct

and environment, do not have an analogous influence on the behaviour of

that strange animal that is man. Man is not governed by instincts in the

pure sense (that is, as precise and specific, genetically determined

behavioural reactions to given environmental stimuli) but only shows

traces or residues of instincts which have little or no social

significance. Such are for example, the instinct of a new-born baby to

suck or the pseudo-instincts such as the sexual “instinct” which, in

reality, is a need which can be satisfied in ways (that is behavior or

an overall series of actions) that are not necessarily determined. And,

furthermore, man’s “environment” is considerably more cultural than

natural, not only in the sense that he has transformed and is

transforming nature but also in the sense that man’s environment

consists, above all, of relationships with other men and even his

relationships with the world of “things” undergo a symbolic mediation.

During his long evolution into “human” form, man has lost those

instinctual factors which determine his actions and has replaced them

with cultural factors, that is, with norms, rules, codes of

communication and interaction. It is precisely in this substitution that

man’s special freedom is to be found at its highest level:

self-determination. In fact, those culturally determined factors are not

given to man (by God or nature) but man takes them for himself. Norms do

not merely reflect natural necessities but create arbitrary ones. That

is to say that the creation of norms is necessary because it is

“written” in man’s nature (in man’s freedom which paradoxically imposes

his self-determination), but the individual elements of these norms are

not necessary. Man must create norms, but he can create those norms that

he wishes. The production of norms is therefore the central, founding

operation of human society and so of “humanity” itself, as man only

exists as such to the extent that he is a product of culture, that is,

of society.

The function of creating and recreating the “social” dimension by

inventing, transmitting and modifying norms is, by definition, a

collective function of the human species (that is, of the groups and

subgroups that make it up). Just as, by definition, there is no

individual code of communication, so too there is no individual norm of

social interaction. Therefore in the very moment that cultural

determination decides the highest expression of man’s freedom, his

faculty of self-determination, it opens the way for a permanent

asymmetry between the individual and the collective which means that the

role of society in determining the individual is always greater than the

individual’s role in determining society. Man produces society

collectively but is individually shaped by it.

The creation of norms obviously implies the application of these norms

(a rule that is not applied is not a rule). On the other hand, since the

norm does not possess the same overriding force as instinctive

bio-chemical mechanisms, and nor does the general consensus (which is

infrequent except for certain norms and in certain highly homogeneous

and static societies) give it this compelling strength, sanction comes

into play to render adherence to the norm, if not certain and universal,

at least statistically probable. In this way every human group and

subgroup produces models of behavior and related sanctions to induce its

members to conform to these; sanctions, the severity of which

corresponds to the degree to which the norm safeguarded by them is

considered as fundamental for the group.

As Lasswell and Kaplan point out, these sanctions are severe “in terms

of the prevalent values of the group being considered. While violence is

certainly a sanction of extreme severity, there are, none the less, many

situations in which dishonour, that is the drastic withdrawal of

respect, can play an even more important role”. Thus a sanction is

severe if it is conceived as such in the collective imaginary of the

particular group. And, naturally, the same applies to the gravity of the

infraction. It is well known that the same behavior may be judged very

differently in different cultural contexts with a consequent difference

in the sanctions that are applied. A loud belch may be considered a

minor offence and so be greeted with only mild disapproval or it may be

considered a serious infraction and so give rise to a correspondingly

severe sanction (for example, to expulsion from an exclusive club) or it

may even be judged positively and receive a “positive” sanction

(laughter, satisfaction…). We must, in fact, remember that there are not

only negative sanctions which discourage behaviour that is disapproved

of, but also positive sanctions which encourage approved behaviour. It

is even possible, at least in theory, to conceive of a society in which

individual behaviour is determined purely by means of positive sanctions

(although in this case the absence of positive sanctions could be

considered a negative one).

The production and application of norms and sanctions, therefore, make

up the social regulatory function; a function which I propose to call

power.[6]

Power is thus defined as a socially “neutral” function which is

necessary not only to the existence of society, culture and of man

himself, but also to the exercising of that freedom as freedom to choose

between determined possibilities from which this discussion began. The

absence of cultural determination would mean, in fact, a meaningless

vacuum in which there would be no choice but only pure chance. Freedom,

as choice, can only be exercised in the presence of determining factors,

just as the friction of the air is necessary for birds to fly.

However, the fact that human behaviour can never be completely

undetermined (nor, fortunately, completely determined)[7] and that the

cultural determination of man’s behavior is not only inevitable but, in

its turn, an expression of freedom, does not mean that the ways and

means of the social regulating function are neutral with respect to

freedom itself. It is fundamental for freedom as choice that the mesh of

the determining factors be both wide and elastic and modifiable as, the

greater is the range of possibilities left open by this “mesh”, the

freer is the individual. And equally fundamental for freedom as

self-determination is the level of participation in the regulatory

process, as the freedom of the individual is greater, in this sense,

when he has greater access to power. Equal access to power for all

members of a society is, therefore, the first unavoidable condition for

equal freedom for all; a condition necessary to equal freedom for all

but not sufficient for a high level of freedom for each. Power can

oppress all in the same degree and remain oppressive. There are examples

of so-called “primitive” societies in which all have more or less equal

access to power but in which those forces determining behaviour are so

all-pervasive and/or traditionally exempt from modification that they

give rise to a situation of socially diffuse “totalitarianism”.

A situation of “equal power for all” is not only conceivable but has

also been documented by more than one anthropologist. It is, however,

far from being the norm, either geographically or historically. It is

far more common to find social systems in which the regulating function

is exercised, not by the collective upon itself but by one part of the

collective (generally but not necessarily a small minority) over another

(generally the great majority); that is, systems in which the access to

power is the monopoly of one part of society (individuals, groups,

classes, castes…).

This brings us now to another conceptual category which we could call

domination. Domination, therefore, defines the relationship between

unequals, those unequal in terms of power and so of freedom; it defines

the situation of superordination/subordination; it defines the systems

of permanent asymmetry between social groups.

The relationship of domination typically manifests itself in

relationships of command/obedience in which the command regulates the

behavior of the person who obeys. The command/obedience relationship

does not in itself represent the regulating function. One does not

“obey” a norm (for example that which forbids killing or requires us to

drive on the right side of the road), rather one follows it. One obeys a

command, that is the form in which the norm is presented in a society of

domination. The fact that respect for the norm is seen in terms of

obedience is, in fact, a result of the expropriation of the regulating

function by one part of society which must therefore impose it on the

rest of society. And the lower the level of access, whether real or

fictional, to power in society, the more explicitly must this be

imposed.

If, in order that the cultural determination may not only give meaning

to behavior but also make it regular and foreseeable, the social norm

has, by its very nature, a compelling aspect (that is, relevant social

behaviour must be fitted to the norm if it is to be such), then it

becomes coercive in a situation of domination. Thus it is imposed

through a hierarchical chain of subordination along which there is one

general rule: command/obedience as a fundamental social relationship.

“From its origins,” writes Clastres in Society Against the State, “our

culture has thought of political power in terms of hierarchical and

authoritarian relationships of command/obedience. Every form of power,

actual or possible, can consequently be reduced to this privileged

relationship which expresses, a priori, its essence” [10, p. 16]. But,

“if there is one thing that is foreign to an American Indian it is the

idea of having to give or obey an order, except in very particular

circumstances” [10, p. 13]. “Therefore the model of coercive power is

only accepted in exceptional circumstances, when the group has to

confront a threat from outside… Normal civil power is based not on

constriction but on concensus omnium and so is profoundly pacific.” [10,

p. 27].

Evans-Pritchard also described a culture (the Nuer of Sudan) in which

obedience is not conceived of, where command is an offence and where no

one obeys anyone else. It is not by chance that these are societies in

which the regulating function is collective, where “the word of the

chief does not have the force of law”, where the chief can be an

“arbiter” and express an “authoritative” opinion (of this we shall see

more when we consider authority and influence) but cannot act as judge

or apply sanctions. And even the Amba, whom Dahrendorf (12) considers in

his attempt to show the universality of the “authority structure” (by

which he means, with an ease which goes ill with his usual accuracy,

both that which I have termed power and that to which I have given the

term domination) show, like the Nuer, the Tupinamba, the Guarani…, the

very non-universality of domination, demonstrating that the regulating

function need not necessarily assume the coercive form of hierarchy and

the relationship of command/obedience.[8]

Domination, as we have said, is the privilege of power. The holders of

domination reserve to themselves the control of the process of

production of the “social”, expropriating it from the others. This

phenomenon is similar to that of the privileged possession of the means

of material production (to which it is often, although not necessarily,

related)[9], but is still more serious as it concerns man’s very nature:

domination is the denial of the humanity of the expropriated, of those

excluded from the dominant roles of the social structure.

Power, understood as the regulating function of society, is not the only

form of cultural determination of behavior. There is a vast range of

asymmetric relationships between individuals in which certain behavioral

choices are totally determined by the opinions or decisions of others,

decisions to which are given a particular and determining weight.

These relationships may be either personal or functional. By personal I

mean those relationships in which the subjects interact as persons; by

functional those in which the subjects interact on the basis of roles

which define social functions (the distinction, as usual, is partly

arbitrary, insofar as all personal relationships are, in some degree,

also interactions of roles and vice versa). In the case of personal

relationships, we can define the asymmetry as influence, while for those

functional roles, it can be defined as authority.

In the first case the asymmetry can be attributed to differences –

moral, intellectual or of character – between individuals due to which

one personality is in some way “stronger” than another and influences

the other more than he or she is influenced.[10]

In the second case there is a type of delegation of decision-making,

tied to the expectations of a role and justified (explicitly or

implicitly) by “competence”. The ambivalence of this term (which can

mean ability or decisional capacity) makes it well-suited to the

ambivalent nature of the asymmetry of ability and of the faculty of

decision-making which is typical of a complete social division of labor

into differing functions and roles.[11]

Now, neither influence nor authority, as defined above, necessarily

implies a permanent social asymmetry. It is perfectly possible to

imagine a social system in which a multiplicity of single asymmetrical

relationships results in an overall equilibrium of influence and

authority for each individual (or, at least, for the latter, which is

conceptually closer to power and so to domination). The asymmetric

parent/child relationship is reshaped over a lifetime in an

“egalitarian” cycle: the asymmetry of professional roles between

individuals of differing professions can adjust itself through

reciprocal services; a function of coordination can be carried out in

rotation… The authority of a role does not infringe the freedom of one

who accepts it voluntarily and critically; it can even be complementary

by helping to avoid dispersion into a thousand insignificant rivulets:

by simplifying a large number of individual choices we can render it

possible to “concentrate” freedom on those choices that the individual

holds truly important (the individual himself and not others on his or

her behalf). And, analogously, by choosing not to participate, or to do

so only passively, in certain social decision-making processes (which is

very different from being excluded from them) an individual is able to

take a full part in those which interest him most.

It is, however, true that in a society with a hierarchical division of

social activity, there is, necessarily, a corresponding hierarchy of

authority and therefore a permanent asymmetry between the holders of

different roles. And it is also true that certain roles are

“authoritative” insofar as they are articulations of the power to

regulate society and so, in a system of domination, are hierarchic

articulations of domination itself and so, by definition, permanently

asymmetric. Thus the diversity of roles becomes social inequality.

In the same way, the existence of domination as a central category of

the social imaginary determines permanent asymmetries of influence,

since personal relationships are also perceived in terms of the

hierarchy of domination. Thus individual differences also contribute to

social inequality.

Therefore, while in the abstract those relationships which we have

termed influence and authority can be “neutral” categories, in the

concrete situation of existing society of domination they take on a more

or less pronounced value of domination and so they too often manifest

themselves in relationships of command/obedience.

To sum up, I have identified four conceptual categories which, in

current and scientific usage, all fall more or less under the umbrella

of the same term: power. I have proposed that this term should be

retained only for the first category: the social regulatory function,

the sum of those processes by which a society regulates itself by

producing and applying norms and ensuring their observance. If this

function is carried out by only one part of society, that is, if one

privileged (dominant) sector has a monopoly of power, it gives rise to a

second category, to a set of hierarchical relationships of

command/obedience which I propose to call domination. And, finally, I

propose the term authority for those asymmetries of roles which cause

asymmetries of reciprocal determination, and influence for those

asymmetries arising from personal natures.

I must reiterate that my main interest is not the terminology, the

formal aspect of a proposal of definition, but its substance, the

identification of concepts. It is not the name that we give to colors

that is important (even if it is useful to agree on these names if we

wish to understand each other quickly, without having to resort to long

paraphrasing) but rather that we agree on the existence of different

colors, which correspond to different bands of frequencies of the

visible range of light.

My proposal is intended as an initial differentiation and identification

of the groups of concepts which can then serve for a general analysis of

social phenomena. Further and differing differentiations (corresponding

to various forms and contents of power, domination and authority) will

of course be necessary for deeper and/or more detailed analyses, but I

believe that the four categories proposed above will suffice for an

initial anarchist approach to the problem.

In any case, it seems to me to be necessary to differentiate between

that which I have called power and that which I have called domination.

This is a fundamental qualitative difference which anarchists have

always perceived more or less clearly (when, for example, they

distinguish between society and the State); indeed it is this that is

the hard core of the insights central to their thought. But they have

not always been successful in making this difference explicit in their

analyses, in clearly identifying the two conceptual categories. This has

led them to theoretical and practical aberrations in widely differing

directions (as for example to the rejection in theory and practice of

all norms and sanctions or – as with their participation in the

Republican Government during the Spanish Civil War – to practise and, at

least partly, theorise a form of domination).

Non-anarchist thinkers have generally shown themselves to be incapable

of perceiving the difference between power and domination and, in any

case, have not been willing or able to explicitly differentiate between

them either in concept or terminology. But this, as we said above, is

not a defect in their case, given their institutional role of providers

of rationality within an ideology of domination.

As I have already said, what I have offered here is a proposal for the

identification of concepts rather than for a definition of terms. And

for this reason I would hope that the discussion – which I profoundly

hope will be provoked – will concern the concepts rather than the terms.

I would like these concepts and the contents of the proposed categories

to be analysed critically and contested. For example, if a norm must

needs be supported by severe sanctions is it “simple” power or does it

fall into the category of domination? Or, again, is it necessary, at

this point in the debate, to distinguish between that which I have

called influence and that which I have called authority? Or would it be

useful to distinguish between the asymmetries of effective ability and

those of formal roles?

I do believe, nevertheless, that it is worth spending some time on the

proposal for the terminology which could be “delicate” among anarchists,

in view of my use of two labels (“power” and “authority”) which are not

neutral for anarchists, and for concepts which are, or at least which

seem to me to be, neutral. As I said at the beginning of this article,

anarchists use the terms power, domination and authority, particularly

the first two, as synonyms, obviously with negative connotations (they

stand for the “-archy” which they deny and oppose).

Why then am I proposing an anarchically neutral use of power and

authority? In part it is to be provocative, to let a small semantic

scandal focus more attention on the substance of a debate, to underline

what seems to me to be a certain conceptual originality (small or

great!) with a linguistic novelty. And also because it seems to me

absurd that our terminology, the anarchist terminology, has three terms

for one concept and none for the two others. But, above all, because I

believe that what are termed power and authority in both common and

specialist terminology are in fact what I earlier defined as power and

authority plus domination. So if we take away domination from power and

authority, making it a conceptually distinct category on its own, even

if in all existing societies (except the residual forms of primitive

societies) it is in fact superimposed on the other two, we are left with

those types of relationships which I have proposed calling power and

authority.

On the other hand, no anarchist would give a positive use to the term

“powerlessness” (political, social, economic…) as a synonym of the

absence of domination, as the power whose absence is indicated by this

word has the positive connotation of “the power to do”, to exercise

one’s own freedom.[12] And I am sure that the expression “power for

everyone”[13] does not sound heretical to most anarchists as, in this

case, it is the individual’s capacity to decide and/or participate in

the social decision-making processes that is meant.

Let us now leave the nominal question and turn our attention to that of

the substance. In what way can the proposed conceptual definition be

useful to anarchist thought?

They (or any other definitions which distinguish two or three or ten

colours in that undifferentiated or barely differentiated area that we

call power) allow us to understand and express better the central

negation of anarchist philosophy (that is of the anarchist

interpretation of the world) and so of its central affirmation, of its

founding value: freedom. Furthermore, this definition paves the way for

a better formulation of an infinite number of problems for anarchist

“science” which studies both the “laws” (uniformity, constantly

recurring relationships, causal connections, necessary conditions) of

domination and the “laws” of freedom.

To give just a few examples.

In the field of politics, this allows us to think more clearly about the

gap between norms and the law, to bring into evidence the substantial

difference between the freedom of the liberals and the freedom of the

anarchists, to analyse the social decision-making processes, to go

deeper into all that “has already been said” about assemblies, rotation

of responsibilities, delegation, revocable mandates, etc. It could be

said that these definitions, or at least a definition that distinguishes

the regulating function from its possession by a privileged section of

society is a necessary starting point for the construction of an

anarchist political science (and for the working out of an anarchist

“law”). It is certainly not by chance that anarchists have generally

rejected “politics”, maintaining that it is the science and practice of

power and identifying power with domination (an identification which is

in fact the rule in existing societies).

In the realm of sociology these definitions could serve to distinguish

better between the differences and the inequalities between individuals,

roles and social categories; it could be useful for the identification

of the institutions and mechanisms of domination, differentiating them

from the structures of power; it could throw new light on the forms and

contents of cooperation and conflict.

In economics these definitions will allow a more effective formulation

of economic power (and domination). They allow us to see economic power

as distinct from economic domination and so to distinguish more clearly

between general economic “laws”, the economic “laws” which are common to

all societies of domination and those which are peculiar to particular

societies of domination.

In the field of psychology, they will allow us to distinguish between

those asymmetries between individuals which are unavoidable and those

which could be avoided, between personal and role differences (positive

or neutral in terms of freedom) and inequalities which deny freedom. It

will allow us a more effective study of the “libertarian personality”

and the “authoritarian personality”.[14] It may also help us to

understand why, except in very particular periods, the anarchist message

is incomprehensible for the great majority of people, why the

Kropotkinian “spirit of revolt” is normally not as strong as social

conformism.

In the field of education, these definitions may permit us to resolve

the contradiction between the authority of the adult and the freedom of

the minor[15] and to understand why “permissiveness”, understood as the

acceptance of anomie, is no more suited to libertarian education, that

is, to the process of constructing the libertarian personality, than is

discipline imposed through coercion.

And, furthermore, (speaking among anarchists) how many of our useless

diatribes could be avoided, how many arguments between the deaf, could

be resolved in rational confrontation? We need only think of the

recurrent discussion on anarchist organisation in which, for a century

now, the lack of understanding on a semantic level has been at least as

relevant as the disagreement on the substance.

There are many questions to which my proposal could help in

reformulating the problem (and the examples I have given above refer to

the conventional subdivisions of the study of man and society) and among

these there is one in particular which arises almost inevitably in the

course of any reflections on power and which, in particular, is evident

in more than one of the steps of logic in the process of identification

and division which I have followed. How, why and when are power,

authority and domination born?

With the definitions that I have proposed this question only arises, in

fact, in the case of domination. For authority and for power the answer

is implicit in the respective definitions. If we accept the

anthropological assumption that man is devoid of instinctual

determination and that, vice versa, he is, thanks to the particular

evolution of his cerebral organ, capable of producing a normative

symbolic universe, it follows that the cultural regulating function is

both possible and essential for him.[16] In the same way, in my

definitions, authority follows as a corollary of the postulate that

society structures itself in functional roles.

Domination, on the other hand, has no inevitable foundation in the

nature of man and his society. And it is for this that its origin

becomes a problem in my definitions.

Let us see, first of all, what solutions non-anarchist thinkers have put

forward. As we have already seen, they do not distinguish clearly

between power and domination. Even when they hint at a conceptual

difference they see the passage from one to the other as automatic – and

do not deem it necessary to demonstrate this. This passage is frequently

from domination to power (that is, the contrary of my logical process)

and there are only a few who see it moving in the opposite direction.

But even for them the process is indisputable and, in consequence, the

two are born together: from the necessity for one comes the necessity

for the other.

Let us now consider those “explanations” which seem to me, from my

reading, to exemplify the main approaches to the justification of

domination. One approach is that which, proceeding from domination to

power, justifies the former with innate “natural” psychological

mechanisms: there are some personalities naturally endowed for

domination and some naturally endowed for subjugation.[17] After laying

this first stone in the theoretical edifice, the apologists of

power-domination hasten to vest it with more attractive structural

elements and we are told that this “natural” subdivision of man into two

categories (the potential masters and the potential slaves) is

beneficial to both parties and that, basically, it is an admirable

artifice of nature or providence to bestow on mankind the consequent

advantages.[18] Sennet’s explanation can also be seen to fall into this

type of approach although it formally starts from influence, then moving

through authority to power and domination.[19]

The second type of approach is the cultural one, of which Dahrendorf

(12) is exemplar, with his thesis that no “natural” explanation of

power-domination can be sustained: it is not the effect of a

pre-existing inequality but, on the contrary, it is the cause of the

first fundamental inequality between men. But as he does not distinguish

between power and domination, for him the necessity of domination

derives logically from the necessity of power (which he terms

authority), that is from the regulating function. For him the regulating

function and the privileged possession of it are one and the same thing.

The approaches to the problem of the genesis of power-domination can

also be classified from another point of view: into those who assume,

explicitly or implicitly, that they are contemporary with man and/or his

society and those who postulate their appearance at a certain point in

history. For the latter it is not, curiously (in the case of those

theories which distinguish between power and domination),

power-domination that appears but, generally, only domination that

breaks into a social space which is undefined and is defined as the

state of nature.[20]

Where does the problem of the genesis of domination enter into the logic

of my proposed hypothetical definitions? Since, within that logic,

everything begins from the postulate of man’s cultural plasticity, it

excludes any hypothesis based on innate bio-psychological elements such

as the “will to rule” or the “instinct of domination”, etc. (and as a

necessary counterpart the propensity to obey, will to be ruled, etc.).

In the perspective of man’s cultural self-determination, his behavioral

models are not inscribed in his nature, and no more in the

gregarious-authoritarian one than in the anarchist one. (It is not that

I wish to deny with this last statement that a “naturalistic”

interpretation of anarchism is possible – it is in fact considerably

diffuse. There is a form of anarchism which postulates man’s natural

“goodness” in the sense of a natural self-regulative potential of human

society which does not require normative limits. However even this

anarchism cannot explain domination “naturalistically” but only

“culturally”, that is, as arising from man’s intervention).

Following a totally cultural interpretation of man, it is not strange

that we find, in cultural situations of domination, character traits

modeled on and for domination. Nor should we be surprised at not finding

those traits in cultures characterised by the absence of domination (the

already-mentioned inconceivability of command and of obedience, the fact

that, as Clastres writes, “no one feels the absurd desire to do, have or

seem more than one’s neighbour…”). It is the cultural context that gives

meaning to the differences of character that serve it. It is thus

evident that, in a context of domination, the individual character

differences are forced into models leading to either pole of the

command/obedience relationship.

But this still does not tell us when and how domination came into being.

And I certainly do not pretend to be able to answer this here. The

problem is perhaps destined to remain forever open, scientifically, if,

as seems likely at least in our present state of knowledge, the possible

answers are unprovable suppositions, since they are empirically

“non-falsifiable”. We are therefore less likely to develop scientific

theories about the origins of domination than “myths” (apologetic or

critical).

For now, I will limit myself to a sketch of an explanatory hypothesis

from an anarchist and “culture-based” point of view. My hypothesis is

that domination appeared at a certain point in the history of the human

race as a “cultural mutation”. We have recently begun to apply the

principles of natural evolution (chance mutations and the positive

selection of those characteristics best fitted to survival) to man’s

cultural evolution.[21] Domination could be seen to be a mutation (that

is as a cultural innovation which, in certain conditions, proved

advantageous, in terms of survival, for those social groups that adopted

it, for example for greater military efficiency, and so it was imposed

as a model either by conquest or by imitation for defensive purposes.

One variant of this hypothesis, which I find reasonably convincing, is

to suppose that the domination mutation did not appear completely ex

abrupto but rather that elements of domination (that is to say, social

relationships partly or temporarily modeled on the command/obedience

relationship and on the inequality of power that this implies) have

always existed, or at least pre-dated the society of domination, as for

example in the man/woman, old/young, warrior/non-warrior, chief/tribe

relationships. (In these relationships domination could have existed as

a cultural imitation of asymmetries seen in – or rather interpreted from

– nature, that is in the “social” animal hunted or reared or otherwise

observed.[22] But this is yet another hypothesis.) These elements of

domination would have been kept “under control” in the earliest human

societies and so could not become generalised as elements central to

culture and society, until changed “environmental” conditions allowed

their transformation into dominant regulatory models. At this point came

the mutation from which only those groups which were geographically

and/or culturally isolated were immune.

This hypothesis of mutation opens (or, better, restates) a whole series

of problems related to the project of abolishing domination, which is

the central, identifying feature of anarchism, since, in this light, the

anarchist transformation of society can also be seen as, essentially, a

cultural mutation. In that project, the anarchists are mutants who tend

to multiply or to transmit their cultural “anomaly” (in the face that is

of the normality of the dominant model) and, at the same time, to create

the “environmental” conditions which will favor their mutation, that is

the generalisation of the mutant character. This could open up the way

for a whole new interpretation of the relationship between existential

anarchism and its educational, revolutionary or other forms.

But all this is taking us too far from the original aim of this article

which was begun with the idea of offering some preliminary reflections

on power, limiting these to the ambit of a proposal of definitions. So,

at least for now, that is all.

Bibliography

No. 4.

rivoluzione, Antistato, Milan, 1977.

Antistato, Milan, 1977; Anarchici e orgogliosi di esserlo, elèuthera,

Milan, 2017.

1979; Anarchici e orgogliosi di esserlo, elèuthera, Milan, 2017.

93, 1981; Anarchici e orgogliosi di esserlo, elèuthera, Milan, 2017.

Evolution: a Quantitative Approach, Princeton University Press,

Princeton, 1981.

No. 4.

Laterza, Bari, 1970.

Bologna, 1971.

Bompiani, Milan, 1970.

3.

XXXVI [1982], No. 3.

Milan, 1978.

sociali, in AA.VV, Marxismo e non violenza, Lanterna, Genoa, 1977.

Laterza, Bari, 1972.

Berti (ed.), La dimensione libertaria di Proudhon, CittĂ  Nuova, Rome,

1982.

[1] “Power is the decisive formal category in both the analysis of the

structures and the analysis of the processes in society” [14, p. 155];

“In the entire lexicon of political science it is power that is,

perhaps, the most fundamental concept, the political process is the

formation, the distribution and the exercise of power” [22, p. 90]; “The

study of power is the principle of the science of sociology” [18, p.

20].

[2] For example, see (6).

[3] “When I have to do with boots I bow to the authority of the

shoemaker; when I have to do with a house, a canal or a railway I

consult the authority of the architect or the engineer… I bow to the

authority of specialists because it is this that my own reason dictates…

We accept all natural authority and all the influences of fact but none

of law or those which are imposed on us by officials” (3).

[4] Among the cases when domination is used with a “neutral” meaning

there are three which are particularly relevant: Simmel (31), for whom

domination is a universal category of social interaction and power is

one particular form of this; Dahrendorf (12), who proposes a definition

of domination understood as “the possession of authority and thus as a

right to give authoritative commands”; Lasswell and Kaplan (22), for

whom domination (in the Italian edition the term is dominio, but the

word actually used by the authors is “rule”, not “domination”) is the

model of effective power.

[5] The following are a few, rather random, examples: POWER. “Power is

a) ability or natural faculty of action; b) legal or moral faculty, the

right to do something; c) authority, especially in the concrete sense,

the constituted body exercising that authority, the government” (19);

“Power is the participation in decision making” and “A decision is a

line of behavior which carries with it severe sanctions” [22, pp.

89–90]; “We can designate as power the ability of a social class to

realise its specific objectives” [27, p. 410] . Power is “the ability to

make and carry out decisions even when others are opposed to them” [33,

p. 18]; Power is “a permanent body which one is used to obeying, which

possesses material means of constraint and which is supported by the

general opinion of its force, by the belief in its right to command,

that is, in its legitimacy and in the hope for its beneficence”; “By

power we can understand all the means by which a man can bend the will

of other men” [25, p. 9]; “Power can be defined as the ability to

realise one’s desires” [29, p. 29]; “By power we must understand (…) the

possibility that certain commands (or that any command) will be obeyed

by a certain group of men” (3); “Power is communication regulated by a

code” (25). AUTHORITY: Authority is “any power exercised by one man or

group of men over another man or group” (1); “Authority is a bond

between unequals” [30, p. 15]; “Authority is a way of defining and

interpreting difference in strength” [30, p. 118]; “Authority is a

search for stability and security in the strength of others” [30, p.

178]; Authority is “an accepted dependence”: M. Horkheimer quoted in

[16, p. 9]; “Authority is (psychol.) personal superiority or ascendancy

… and (sociolog.) the right to decide or command” (19); “The essence of

authority… is to give a human being that security and that respect for

his decisions that is logically given only to a super-individual and

effectual axiom or to a deduction” [31, p. 41]; “Authority is the

expected and legitimate possession of power” (22).

[6] This proposed meaning corresponds to a certain degree with

Proudhon’s power as a collective force and resembles Lasswell and

Kaplan’s definition, cited in footnote 5, which does however refer to

individual decision-making processes and not to the overall function

considered here. Clastres also seems to mean something similar when he

talks about power. “It is our view (…) that political power is

universal, immanent to social reality (…); and that it manifests itself

in two primary modes: coercive power and non-coercive power. Political

power as coercion (or the relationship of command/obedience) is not the

model of true power, but simply a particular case” [10, p. 21] and also:

“the social cannot be conceived without the political. In other words,

there are no societies without power” (ibid). Clastres’ coercive power

seems to correspond to that which I will later define as “domination”.

[7] Crespi would say that man “oscillates” between the determined and

the undetermined (11).

[8] As Lasswell and Kaplan write [22, p. 24], “The closer it moves to

anarchy, domination ceases to be such. The sphere of power is restricted

to a minimum; moving to the point where compulsion ceases to exist.

Social control, naturally, still continues to be, under different forms

of influence, but it is not coercive control”.

[9] It could be better said that the privileged appropriation of the

means of production is in fact the appropriation of the power of

regulating one sector of social life: it is therefore one case and one

form of the more general phenomenon of domination. With reference to

this see (20) and (21).

[10] This definition of influence is approximately the same as Sennet’s,

cited in footnote 5, although he extends it also to asymmetric

interactions of role (including the roles of power and domination).

[11] This definition of authority is approximately the same as Sennet’s,

cited in footnote 5, although he applies it only to roles of power and

domination.

[12] With regard to the relationship between will and freedom (which

are, emblematically, defined in Russian with the single term volija) see

(2).

[13] As, for example, in the following: “The power of all… means that

each individual must hold sufficient (real) power to influence and

control political decisions concerning his life, to the degree that this

is compatible with an equal power for every other individual in society,

so that everyone has, in every moment, the maximum possibility that is

compatible with the maximum possibility of every other person, to

realise the best life he can.” (26)

[14] Or, as De Jouvenal says, the libertarian personality and the

securitarian personality. “At every moment in any society there exist

individuals who do not feel sufficiently protected and others who do not

feel sufficiently free. Let us call the former securitarian and the

latter libertarian” [15, p. 352]. The “securitarians” are those who need

the highest possible level of cultural determination. “Once the

‘libertarian’ and ‘securitarian’ sentiments have been conceived (…) we

can represent any society (…) as a multiplicity of points that can be

ordered hierarchically according to their libertarian index. The most

‘securitarian’ will be situated towards the bottom and the ‘libertarian’

ones higher up” [15, p. 358]. (And so, voilà, we have domination and the

“libertarians” become members of the dominant social groups. And thus an

interesting idea turns into the same old story!).

[15] We can consider, in this light, Bakunin’s contribution (14). For

Bakunin, the educative process is a progressive movement from

“authority” to “freedom”: the smaller the child, the greater is his need

for external determination, as he grows the asymmetry between him and

the adult decreases and with maturity he becomes a man in the full sense

of the word and as such can and must reach the highest possible level of

self-determination.

[16] “The primordial role of culture is to ensure the existence of the

group as a group, and so to replace chance by organisation” [23, p. 75].

Culture provides a normative regulation for that which nature has

“forgotten” to regulate through biology: man’s social behavior. In this

it seems that there is no clear-cut gap between man and the other

animals; “everything seems to take place as if the great apes, already

able to disassociate themselves from the behavior of the species, did

not however succeed in re-establishing a norm on a new level.

Instinctual behavior loses that clarity and precision that it has for

the majority of mammals; but the difference is completely negative, and

the ground) abandoned by nature remains unoccupied territory” [23, p.

45].

[17] “The majority of men are timid, modest, passive beings, who

represent the plastic material of Power, being born to obey. The race of

masters is a minority with a more intense vital force; they are the

ambitious, the active, the imperious ones who need to affirm their

superiority in thought and in action” [17, p. 301]. This vulgar

commonplace with its racist overtones follows, surprisingly enough,

observations of a very different quality, such as the following: “The

beginnings of legitimacy are the justification of the right to command

since, of all the inequalities between humans there is none that has

such important consequences and so such a need for justification as the

inequality deriving from power” [17, p. 27]. And “if, apart from some

rare exceptions, all men have the same worth why should one have the

right to command and the others the duty of obeying?” [17, p. 28].

Analogously, but more “dialectically”, Simmel speaks of the “will to

dominate” and writes that “the human being’s feelings with respect to

subordination are twofold. On the one hand he, in fact, wants to be

dominated. Most men cannot only not exist without a guide but also feel

this: they seek a superior force which will free them from

responsibility (…) Nevertheless they have no lesser need to oppose this

power of direction (…) Thus it could be said that obedience and

opposition are the two aspects or elements of what is in fact coherent

human behavior” [31, p. 55].

[18] “This polarisation of man into masters and servants seems admirably

suited to the pre-arranged order in human nature” [17, p. 40]; “At its

origins, power (…) is originally a form of defense against the two

greatest terrors afflicting man: anarchy and war” [17, p. 30]. “Power is

a social necessity. It is thanks to the order which it imposes and the

agreement which it institutes that men can live a better life” [15, p.

29].

[19] “Authority is a way of defining and interpreting differences in

force. In a certain sense, the feeling of authority is actually the

recognition that such differences do exist. In another and more complex

sense it is one way of remaining aware of the needs and wishes of the

weak and the strong” [30, p. 118]. Then “the synonym of force in

political terminology (is) power” [30, p. 25]. Finally, “the existence

of power between two people means that the will of one intends to

prevail over that of the other” and “the chain of command is the

structure through which this disequilibrium of will can be extended to

thousands or millions of people” [30, p. 155].

[20] One example: “The natural society is small and the passage from the

small society to the big cannot come about by the same process. Some

factor is required to produce coagulation and in most cases this is not

the instinct of association but the instinct of domination (my italics)

(…) The creative principle behind the great aggregates of conquest:

sometimes the work of one of the elementary societies of the social

whole but more often of a warrior band coming from afar” [15, p. 103].

And again: “Thus the State has its origins, essentially, in the

successes of a ‘band of brigands’ which suppresses individual small

societies; a band which (…) exhibits an attitude of pure power with

respect to the conquered, the subdued” [15, p. 104].

[21] See (9).

[22] This is one point of view from which we can consider Clastres’

observation that the politics of the primitive societies studied by him

was organised around the understanding that coercive power in itself “is

nothing other than a surreptitious alibi of nature” [10, p. 38].