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Site Name - City Name State Cd
Report Date Notification Dt Notification Time
Event Date Event Dt Event Time
Event Text
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Curtiss Wright Flow Control Co. - Middleburg Heights OH
Report Date 06/24/2022 13:33:00
Event Date 04/24/2022 0:00:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/19/2022
EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT IN QUICK DISCONNECT CONNECTOR CABLE ASSEMBLIES
The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:
On April 24, 2022, a potential defect was discovered in a configuration of the 1 « inch Quick Disconnect Connector (P/N: 913602-111) cable assemblies supplied to Duke [(McGuire Nuclear Station)] under procurement document 30129014. During post installation testing by Duke, it was found that one of the cable wires was shorted to ground. This damage could cause the cable assembly to not perform its intended safety function. Upon further investigation, Duke found 9 other cable assemblies to have similar damage. Duke returned the identified cable assemblies to Curtiss Wright who is investigating the issue. Although some testing and verification activities have been completed, additional testing and research is necessary and in progress. The current testing and research is projected to take 30 days and a follow-up letter with results and status will be provided by July 24, 2022.
Currently, McGuire Nuclear Station is the only affected facility.
For additional information, please contact Jim Tumlinson, Director of Operations (256-425-8037), Christopher Covan, Quality Assurance Manager (256-624-7301), or Tim Franchuk of Quality (513-201-2176).
The following is an update received via facsimile:
"After further research on this condition, we have determined there was a defect that was provided to this utility. The nature of the defect is a bushing supplied with these cable assemblies. This bushing was found to have burr edges near the interface of the connector. This burr, when moved up and down the wires during the installation process, has the potential to cause damage. This damage could compromise the integrating of the dielectric characteristic of the supplied connector which could lead to the component not to perform its intended safety function.
"Based on history, where we have never had an issue of this defect being detected either by Curtiss-Wright or Duke Energy, Curtiss-Wright is confident that this is a recent issue and efforts/research are being done to bound this issue to determine the extent of condition. Due to the nature of the damage, we also have a high degree of confidence that the defect would be evident and caught during the pre/post installation testing/inspection of this device which would further prevent them from being installed in the plants.
"All configuration that utilize this defective component were supplied to Duke Energy and installed in the McGuire, Oconee and Catawba operating plants. As of this time, we have identified 11 cables which have this defect and we are working closely with Duke to determine the full extent of condition. These 11 cables have been returned to Curtiss-Wright. Further evaluation will require a projected addition 30 days to continue our evaluation with the help of the utility. Another follow up letter will be issued to the NRC on August 26, 2022."
Notified R3DO (Peterson), R2DO (Miller), and Part 21 Group (by email).
* * * UPDATE ON 08/26/2022 AT 1411 EDT FROM CHRIS COVAN TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
The following is an update received via facsimile:
"In pursuance of compliance to Federal Regulation 10CFR21, this letter is issued to provide closure for notification issued June 24, 2022 of the potential defect in a configuration of the 1 1/2 Inch Quick Disconnect Connector (P/N: 913602-111) cable assemblies supplied to Duke Energy under procurement documents 30129014, 03121479, 03114993 and 03124438 for of a total of 19 connectors at the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Power Stations. We have a high degree of confidence that this is limited to these supply of cables.
"Of the 19 connectors, 11 have been returned to Curtiss-Wright and have been confirmed to have the suspected defect. Curtiss-Wright will be working with Duke Energy to have these connector assemblies replaced. Due to the nature of the defect and installation routines of the plant, for items installed at Duke Energy we have reasonable assurance that these connectors do not pose an immediate safety risk but could cause damaged during routine maintenance associated with the connectors and should be replace at earliest convenience.
"To prevent this from reoccurring, Curtiss-Wright will implement an inspection activity to verify the absence of burrs and/or sharp edges of all fittings that could potentially cause damage which could prevent the items from performing its intended safety function.
"For additional information, please contact Jim Tumlinson, Director of Operations (256-425-8037), Christopher Covan, Quality Assurance Manager (256-624-7301), or Tim Franchuk Director of Quality (513-201-2176)."
Notified R3DO (Pelke), R2DO (Miller), and Part 21 Group (by email).
* * * UPDATE ON12/16/22 AT 0932 EST FROM CHRIS COVAN TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *
The following is an update received via facsimile:
"In pursuance of compliance to Federal Regulation 10CFR21, this letter is issued to provide an amendment for notification issued on June 24, 2022 of the potential defect in a configuration of the 11/2 Inch Quick Disconnect Connector cable assemblies supplied to Duke Energy for a total of 460 of connectors only supplied to Oconee, McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Power Stations. This increase of scope is due to new evidence provided by Duke Energy, where this potential defect was found in other lots of material other than the ones previously bound to this condition.
"The nature of the defect is a sharp edge located inside of the supplied reducing bushing which could cause damage to the cables when being installed or removed. These cable assemblies and bushing need to be evaluated to determine if this potential defect has occurred or if there is a potential for damage to occur at the earliest convenience. To the best knowledge of the application, we believe that there is a very low risk of damage to the cable assemblies after installation but this needs to be evaluated at the plants. We have been working with Duke Energy and will continue to support them until this issue is resolved.
"To prevent this from reoccurring, Curtiss-Wright will implement inspection activities to verify the absence of burrs and/or sharp edges of all fittings that could potentially cause damage and prevent the items from performing its intended safety function.
"For additional information, please contact Jim Tumlinson, Director of Operation (256-425-8037) or Christopher Covan, Quality Assurance Manager (256-624-7301), or Tim Franchuk, Director of Quality (513-201-2176).
Notified R3DO (Ruiz), R2DO (Miller), and Part 21 Group (by email).
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Braidwood - Braceville IL
Report Date 10/07/2022 8:35:00
Event Date 10/07/2022 1:19:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/14/2022
EN Revision Text: CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM (CRDM) PENETRATION DEGRADED
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax:
"Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) penetration 69 degraded.
"At 0119 [CDT] on October 7, 2022, it was determined that the CRDM penetration 69 was degraded because examination identified unacceptable indications in accordance with ASME Code Case N-729-6. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"The notification is being corrected to state:
"At 0119 [CDT] on October 7, 2022, it was determined that the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) penetration 69 was degraded because liquid penetrant testing, performed on the seal weld, identified unacceptable indications in accordance with ASME Section III and NRC approved licensee relief request for a previously performed embedded flaw repair. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel."
Notified R3DO (Ruiz).
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Georgia Radioactive Material Pgm - Cumming GA
Report Date 10/25/2022 13:29:00
Event Date 10/18/2022 6:30:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/5/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SEALED SOURCE
The following information was provided by the Georgia Radioactive Material Program via email:
"On 10/18/2022 at 0630 EDT, a Cs-137 vial source was being used to measure dose calibrator constancy. The nuclear medicine [NM] technologist noticed a crack in the bottom of the sealed source vial and possible contamination surrounding the vial.
"The sealed source was placed in a leak proof container, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was notified, and decontamination protocol was followed. A leak test of the vial confirmed there was more than 0.005 microcuries of removable Cs-137 contamination.
"Post-decontamination surveys and wipe tests of the staff and department indicated that there was no contamination in the department, but there was detectable contamination on the hands of one staff member. The staff member is the individual who was handling the sealed source and discovered the crack in the source. He repeatedly scrubbed his hands - first with lukewarm soap and water, then with Bind-It brand radioactive decontamination hand soap until there was no improvement in the surveys of his hands.
"A final survey of the individuals hands hands showed there was no detectable contamination on his left hand. A small area on his right-hand thumb still measured 1000 [Counts Per Minute] CPM above background, and another small area on his right-hand index finger measured 700 CPM above background using a GM probe. Measurements of the contamination on his fingers using the on-site well counter indicated it was Cs-137 contamination.
"Both the Radiation Safety Officer and Medical Director were notified of the incident. The RSO came on-site to supervise decontamination efforts and to secure the leaking source and decontamination waste.
"Dose calibrator measurements of the source by the RSO indicated the source had leaked approximately 6 microcuries total. Since 6 microcuries of Cs-137 is less than 10 percent of the annual limits on intake (ALI) for Cs-137 (100 microcuries ALI for oral ingestion as defined in Appendix B of 10 CFR 20), [the Program's] understanding is no individual bioassay monitoring is required for the individual.
"The sealed source has been placed back within its shielded container, sealed with tape, and marked as leaking and out-of-service. The waste generated during the decontamination process was placed in a leakproof plastic bottle and marked as containing Cs-137. Both items are currently stored in [a secure area]. We are contacting waste disposal companies to arrange disposal of both the leaking sealed source and decontamination waste. The NM staff was re-educated on the requirement to wear disposable gloves at all times while handling radioactive materials, which includes sealed radioactive sources, per the Model Rules for Safe Use of Radiopharmaceuticals."
Georgia Incident Number: 60
The following information is a summary of information received via email:
The licensee supplied an updated report to the state of Georgia. Georgia Radioactive Material Program employees will finalize and close out the report after disposal of the leaking source and contaminated waste.
Notified R1DO (Werkheiser) and NMSS Events Notification email group.
The following information is a summary of information received via email:
The licensee notified the Georgia Radioactive Material Program that the leaking source was returned and received by the manufacturer. The Georgia Radioactive Material Program has closed this report.
Notified R1DO (Cahill) and NMSS Events Notification email group.
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SC Dept of Health & Env Control - Pineville SC
Report Date 10/31/2022 14:24:00
Event Date 10/31/2022 0:00:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/29/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTERS
The following was received from the state of South Carolina via email:
"The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified via telephone on 10/31/22 that three fixed gauging device shutters were stuck in the closed position. All three fixed gauging devices are Thermo Fisher Scientific Model 5197 gauging devices, serial numbers B7842, B7847, and B7841. The activity of each gauging device is 100 mCi of Cs-137. The licensee is reporting that all three fixed gauging devices are mounted 12-15 feet above accessible areas. No elevated exposure rates are being reported. Department inspectors will be dispatched to the facility. This event is still under investigation by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control."
South Carolina Event Number: To be assigned.
"Department inspectors were dispatched to the facility and found the gauges as the licensee described. The gauges were expected to be repaired on 11/02/22. The licensee submitted a 30-day written report dated 11/11/22. The written report indicated the fixed gauging devices were repaired on 11/02/22. The licensee's corrective actions included repairing the fixed gauging devices and updating procedures to include examples of reporting requirements. This event is still under investigation by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control."
Notified R1DO (Carfang) and NMSS Events Notification email group.
"The licensee reported this event did not result in any personnel exposure to radiation or radioactive material. This event is considered closed."
Notified R1DO (Eve) and NMSS Events Notification email group.
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New York State Dept. of Health - Manhasset NY
Report Date 11/04/2022 12:33:00
Event Date 11/03/2022 14:30:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/9/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was provided by the New York State Department of Health Bureau of Environmental Radiation Protection (NYSDOH BERP) via fax:
"On November 3, 2022, at approximately 1430 EDT, an authorized user for the licensee had finished conducting soils testing at a temporary job site located in Manhasset, NY and locked the moisture density device in the carrying case within the trunk of their vehicle. The authorized user was conducting concrete work while the gauge was locked in the trunk and returned to their vehicle later to find that the vehicle was stolen, with the gauge locked in the trunk. The authorized user contacted the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and Nassau Police immediately and the case was initiated by Nassau [Police] to track this vehicle. The RSO contacted NYSDOH BERP the following morning to report the missing device.
"The following information is available on this device: Make/Model: Troxler 3430 Source 1: Cs-137 (10 millicurie); Source 2: Americium-241:Be (40 millicurie); Device S/N: 20136.
"New York State Department of Health is reaching out to the manufacturer and neighboring regulators to inform them of this event. NYSDOH will continue to monitor this event and provide updates as necessary.
"NY Event Report ID: NYDOH-22-07"
"On November 21, 2022, the licensee notified the NYSDOH BERP that the above mentioned vehicle and device were located by local law enforcement agencies and returned to the licensee. The licensee confirmed that there was no apparent tampering of the device and carrying case, however, the licensee is performing a leak test to confirm sources have not been breached during this incident prior to recommissioning this device into service.
"The licensee is providing a written description of this event including a failure analysis and proposed corrective actions. As a result, NYSDOH will continue to monitor this event and provide updates as necessary. This event is still open as of 11/21/2022."
Notified R1DO (Carfang) and NMSS Events Notification, ILTAB, and CNSC email groups.
"The licensee provided a written report [to NYSDOH] in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(b). This report further confirmed the events as previously described, and provided a copy of the police report filed by Nassau County Police Department. In discussion with the licensee, it was proposed that staff are re-trained in security and notification procedures as a preventative measure. The Radiation Safety Officer has purchased Apple AirTags for installation into the device case as an additional tool to rapidly track and locate any missing/stolen gauges in the future as a supplemental mitigation action.
"New York State Department of Health has independently evaluated the investigation, failure analysis, and corrective actions provided by the licensee and has deemed the response and subsequent actions sufficient. NYSDOH has closed this event."
Notified R1DO (Bickett) and NMSS Events Notification, ILTAB, and CNSC email groups.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency - Arlington Heights IL
Report Date 11/04/2022 13:04:00
Event Date 11/03/2022 0:00:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/6/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL LOST IN TRANSIT
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:
"The Agency was notified by Medi-Physics, Inc., doing business as GE Healthcare on the afternoon of 11/3/2022, that a radiopharmaceutical package containing 1.5 millicuries of In-111 was reported as lost while in the care of a common carrier. This does not represent a significant public safety hazard and there is no indication of intentional theft or diversion. Details on the package and shipment are provided below. The Georgia program will be notified along with the US NRC Operations Center.
"The package was shipped on 10/28/2022, from the licensee's facility in Arlington Heights, Illinois to Jubilant Radiopharma in Macon, Georgia. The package made it to the common carrier hub. Thereafter, it could not be accounted for and was declared lost on 11/3/2022. The package activity was 1.5 millicurie at the time of shipment but has decayed to approximately 1.147 millicurie at this time.
"IL Item Number: IL220042"
"No changes in status of the package have been provided by the carrier. The package has now decayed to under 1.0 microcuries of In-111. This matter is considered closed."
Notified R1DO (Bickett), R3DO (Peterson), NMSS (email), and ILTAB (email)
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Defense Health Agency (DHA) - Falls Church VA
Report Date 11/17/2022 16:30:00
Event Date 11/17/2022 13:00:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/5/2022
EN Revision Text: MEDICAL EVENT - PATIENT UNDERDOSE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"During an SIR [Selective Internal Radiation] Spheres treatment on November 17, 2022, a patient was to receive 10.8 milliCuries of Y-90 [Yttrium-90]. A measurement of the residue radiological waste from the procedure indicated that the patient only received 38 percent of the intended dose or 4.33 milliCuries. The total dose delivered differs from the prescribed dose by 20 percent or more.
"The doctor drew up a dose of 11.4 milliCuries for the procedure. Static readings on the vial averaged 0.205 mR/hr. Post procedure readings averaged 0.127 mR/hr. These readings resulted in the fraction delivered of 38 percent or a total of 4.33 milliCuries. Corrective action is pending."
"The event likely occurred due to microsphere blockage in the microcatheter, resulting from a torturous path to the delivery point required by the patient's vascular anatomy. Sirtex indicated that the spheres must have attached to the catheter walls due to a torturous path (excessive bends in the line)."
Notified R1DO (Cahill) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
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SC Dept of Health & Env Control - West Columbia SC
Report Date 11/18/2022 17:12:00
Event Date 11/18/2022 10:24:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/13/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
The following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (The Department) via email:
"The Department was notified on 11/18/22 at 1243 EST via telephone that a Troxler 3400 series portable moisture density gauge, serial number 33556, had been hit by a piece of construction equipment.
"The Troxler 3400 series portable moisture density gauge contains a maximum activity of 9 millicuries of Cs-137 and 44 millicuries of Am-241:Be. The licensee reported the source rod had been dislodged but had been successfully inserted back into the shielded position. A Department inspector was dispatched to the location on 11/18/22 and assisted the licensee in packing the damaged Troxler 3400 series device into the transport container. Dose rate readings using a ND-2000A survey instrument, calibrated 09/16/22 indicated readings as high as 30 mR/hr on the surface of the transport container and less than 1 mR/hr at 1 meter.
"The Troxler 3400 series moisture density gauge was transported and secured at the licensee's storage location and is awaiting shipment back to the manufacturer. This event is still under investigation by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control."
The following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (The Department) via email:
"The licensee submitted a written report, dated 11/28/22, outlining the event details and findings. The licensee did not indicate overexposure to any individuals. Records indicate the damaged gauge was not leaking and that the gauge/sources have been transferred to the manufacturer for disposal. This event is considered closed."
Notified R1DO (Henrion) and NMSS Events Notification email group.
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California Radiation Control Prgm - Mojave CA
Report Date 11/24/2022 15:38:00
Event Date 11/23/2022 20:34:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST THEN RECOVERED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was provided by the California Department of Public Health - Radiation Health Branch (RHB) via email:
"On Wednesday night, November 24, 2022, Arrow Infrastructure Solutions Inc. [doing business as] dba Arrow Engineering [Radiation Safety Officer] RSO [redacted] reported to [California Office of Emergency Services] Cal OES the loss or possible theft of a CPN moisture density gauge, MC-1DR-P (MD70803845) containing sealed sources of Cs-137 (10 mCi) and Am-241:Be (50 mCi), Cal OES Control :22-6906. The loss or possible theft was noticed by the authorized user [AU] at a gas station in Mojave, CA as the user was returning from a jobsite. The AU noticed the truck tailgate down and the CPN gauge missing as they were leaving the gas station after a restroom break, the gauge possibly fell out of the truck on Highway 58 in between Tehachapi and Mojave. The AU retraced their route on the Highway but had not located the gauge so far, they will search again on 11/24/22 during the daylight. The licensee will gather additional information for the follow up investigation and provide additional information to the department as it becomes available.
"UPDATE: The FBI notified RHB Management that the gauge had been found by a member of the public and turned into the Kern County Law Enforcement Agency. The RSO was notified and provided with contact information so the gauge could be retrieved. The RSO was instructed to do a wipe/leak test, get it analyzed quickly, and secure the gauge in storage until a negative result was returned. If a leak is detected, they will coordinate with a service company for repair or disposal. RHB Brea staff will continue with the investigation."
California 5010 Number: 112322
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Georgia Radioactive Material Pgm - Gainesville GA
Report Date 11/25/2022 15:04:00
Event Date 11/16/2022 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PATIENT UNDERDOSE
The following information was received from the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program via email:
"We received an emailed report of a misadministration, where there was over 50 percent deviation of the prescribed dose. The patient received only 10 percent of the [redacted] prescribed fractioned dose due to equipment malfunction. The patient is scheduled to receive the remainder of the dose at a later time. The licensee will conduct a thorough investigation and provide a formal report as soon as possible. We are still pending the source activity information and event date. We will update as more information comes in."
Georgia incident no.: 61
The following is a synopsis developed from information provided by the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program via email:
Was source able to be retracted to safe position? Yes Manufacturer and Model number of HDR: Elekta's Flexitron Serial number: 00625 Source activity (8.9 Ci); Prescribed dose (750 cGy); Delivered dose (12.7 cGy)
Root Cause: Equipment failure. Assessment by Elekta's field service engineer determined that the Flexitron selector assembly should be recalibrated including lubrication of all brackets on the assembly.
Corrective Action: Recalibration. Following recalibration of the Flexitron selector assembly, the treatment unit functions correctly. Spot checks performed by physics confirmed normal operation of the treatment unit. The treatment unit reentered clinical service the following day and this patient was successfully treated on 11/21/22 for their third fraction and they finished treatment on 11/23/22.
Notified: R1DO (Cahill). Notified via email: NMSS Event Notification.
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
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Fermi - Newport MI
Report Date 11/28/2022 8:38:00
Event Date 11/28/2022 4:00:00
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/12/2022
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0400 EST on November 28, 2022, during the performance of Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) cooling tower fan operability and RHR Service Water valve lineup verification, it was reported that the Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) Fan 'B' was making a loud metallic noise. The cause of the metallic noise is unknown at this time. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on inoperable cooling water to the HPCI room cooler, per LCO 3.0.6.
"Investigation into the Division 2 MDCT Fan 'B' abnormal noise is in progress.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous Event Notification 56241 reported on 11/28/2022. On 11/28/22, an event notification to the NRC was made when mechanical draft cooling tower (MDCT) Fan B was declared inoperable and issued Limited Condition of Operation (LCO) 2022-0428 for Division 2 MDCT Fan B abnormal noise. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) (Technical Specification [TS] 3.7.2). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system (TS 3.7.2), which cools various safety related components, including the High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler (TS LCO 3.0.6).
"Subsequent inspection and evaluation determined that the brake noise is expected while fans are running at low speeds. This is supported by plant technical procedure, 24.205.10 `Div. 2 RHR Cooling Tower Fan Operability and RHRSW Valve Line-up Verification' (line item 2.2 in Precautions and Limitations) which states `Chatter from the brakes of the MDCT Fans is expected and no cause for discontinuing the test.' The equipment vendor stated that brake chatter is possible and common given that the internal components are free to move along the splined connections. Internal Operating Experience from experienced station operators and maintenance technicians confirmed that the condition is normal and expected. Both Division 2 MDCTs exhibited the same behavior at low speed and passed surveillance testing satisfactorily.
"No other concerns were noted during fan operation. Therefore, HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The event did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"EN 56241 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R3DO (Stoedter).
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Colorado Dept of Health - Aurora CO
Report Date 11/28/2022 10:35:00
Event Date 11/28/2022 5:30:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GUAGES
The following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the Department) via email:
"At approximately 0715 MST on November 28, 2022, the Department was contacted by the [Company Radiation Safety Officer] CRSO of Kleinfelder, Inc. (CO 958-01) to inform the Department that two Troxler 3430 (SN 35349 & SN 35335) moisture density gauges were discovered to be stolen from their temporary job site. Each gauge had sealed sources containing not more than 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241:Be or 66 micro curies of Cf-252. An authorized user arrived at the temporary job site around 0530 MST to pick up supplies when they noticed the door to the container express (conex) box was open. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that both gauges were missing. The site was secured by a security fence and under video surveillance, and that footage is currently under review. The thieves broke the exterior lock to the conex box door and they broke a lock to a job box in the conex box that contained both gauges in their locked transport cases. The job box was also bolted to the ground but those bolts were left intact. The CRSO estimates that the gauges were last seen/used on November 23rd or 24th, but the date of the theft is unclear at this time. Additionally, multiple other contracted companies were targeted in this theft that presumably occurred during the Thanksgiving holiday weekend."
Colorado Event Report ID No.: CO220040
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Texas Dept of State Health Services - Borger TX
Report Date 11/28/2022 17:12:00
Event Date 11/23/2022 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE - STUCK SHUTTER
The following report was received via email from the Texas Department of State Health Services [the Agency]:
"On November 28, 2022, the licensee notified the Agency that it had discovered that the shutter on one of its Ohmart-Vega SH-F1A gauges had been stuck in the closed position since November 23, 2022. The gauge had been closed and locked out on November 22nd for work on the vessel. On November 23rd the gauge was placed back into service. Over the holiday weekend the unit operations had continued to get high readings which would indicate a buildup in the system or a closed shutter. On November 28th the gauge was checked. The licensee's radiation safety officer found the two bolts on the shutter handle were sheared and the shutter was in the fully closed position. No exposures have resulted from this event. An investigation is ongoing. Source: Cesium-137, 5 millicuries, SN: OV-0050 (this SN serves also as the gauge source holder SN). More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: I-9966
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Colorado Dept of Health - Englewood CO
Report Date 11/29/2022 10:05:00
Event Date 05/03/2022 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGNS
The following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:
The licensee discovered two tritium exit signs were lost. The exit signs are Isolite Corporation model 2040-60G-20BK signs containing 23 Ci of tritium (H-3) each. This is being reported under Colorado Regulations Section 4.51.1.1 (10 CFR 20.2202(a)(1)(i)).
Colorado Incident No.: CO220041
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Colorado Dept of Health - Fort Morgan CO
Report Date 11/30/2022 12:25:00
Event Date 11/18/2022 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGNS
The following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:
The licensee discovered four tritium exit signs were lost. The exit signs are Isolite Corporation model 2040-50G-20WH signs containing 11.5 Ci of tritium (H-3) each. This is being reported under Colorado Regulations Section 4.51.1.1 (10 CFR 20.2202(a)(1)(i)).
Colorado Incident No.: CO220042
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division - Cincinnati OH
Report Date 11/30/2022 13:53:00
Event Date 11/22/2022 0:00:00
PART 21 REPORT - INTERIM REPORT FOR EATON TRM5 TIMING RELAYS
The following is a summary of information provided by the Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division via email:
QualTech NP discovered the presence of a programmable logic device (a flash-based CMOS (complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor) microcontroller) in the timing relays that was not previously identified for this family of relays. The only affected facility is Perry Nuclear Plant. This could potentially lead to unevaluated electromagnetic interference or radiofrequency interference issues when installed in the plant.
For questions concerning this potential 10 CFR 21 issue, please contact: Tim Franchuk Quality Assurance Director QualTech NP, Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division (513) 528-7900, ext. 176
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Texas Dept of State Health Services - Queen City TX
Report Date 11/30/2022 17:19:00
Event Date 11/30/2022 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER
The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email:
"On November 30, 2022, the Agency was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that during routine testing the shutter on a Berthold model LB7440 nuclear gauge the shutter failed to close. The gauge shutter is in the open position, which is the normal operating position. The gauge contains a 30 millicurie Cesium - 137 source. The RSO stated the roll pin on the shutter operating arm had broken. The manufacturer has been contacted to repair the gauge. The RSO stated dose rates around the gauge were normal. No individual received any additional exposure as a result of this event. The gauge does not pose an exposure risk. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: 9968
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Maryland Dept of the Environment - Newburg MD
Report Date 11/30/2022 18:11:00
Event Date 11/30/2022 11:21:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING OR POSSIBLY LOST GAUGE SOURCES
The following information was received from the state of Maryland via email:
"A Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) radioactive materials inspector was performing a close-out survey in support of license termination. The facility is no longer operating with radioactive materials (RAM) and some essential staff are gone. The inspector found that three Cf-252 sources for installed gauges had been changed out. The licensee was unable to provide records for the disposal of the old sources, which are no longer present, the new sources were accounted for.
"The sources of concern are:
"Cf-252; serial # FTC-CF-Z3384; 5.2 Ci Assay date missing. Installed October 2009. Decay corrected activity to November 2022 = about 165mCi or less
"Cf-252; serial # FTC-CF-Z3383; 5.2 Ci Assay date missing. Installed October 2009. Decay corrected activity to November 2022 = about 165mCi or less
"Cf-252; serial # FTC-CF-Z3930: 5.2 Ci Assay date missing. Installed October 2009. Decay corrected activity to November 2022 = about 165mCi or less
"Total Activity: about 495 mCi or less
"The licensee is continuing the search for records of these sources. It does not appear to the licensee that an exposure could result to persons in unrestricted areas. The licensee believes that the sources were sent to ThermoFisher Scientific and is attempting to confirm. MDE is providing this precautionary notification pursuant to 10 CFR 2201(a)(1) using the best available information on the radioactive sources."
Updated activities for sources of concern and results of search for the sources are as follows:
"Cf-252; serial # FTC-CF-Z3384; 10.8 mCi on 25 September 2010. Decay corrected activity November 2022 = 445 microcuries
"Cf-252; serial # FTC-CF-Z3383; 10.8 mCi on 25 September 2010. Decay corrected activity November 2022 = 445 microcuries
"Cf-252; serial # FTC-CF-Z3930: 10.8 mCi on 25 September 2010. Decay corrected activity November 2022 = 445 microcuries
"Total Estimated Current Activity: 1.335 mCi
"The licensee is continuing to search for disposal records for these sources or the sources themselves. It does not appear to the licensee that an exposure could result to persons in unrestricted areas. The supplier, ThermoFisher Scientific, has confirmed that they do not have the sources. The waste disposer, RAM Services, is attempting to confirm their possession or the possibility that the sources remain in the gauge housing. MDE is providing this precautionary notification pursuant to 10 CFR 2201(a)(1) using the best available information at the time. This report principally revises source activities using information from the supplier and continuing efforts of the supplier and waste disposer."
Notified R1DO (Cahill), NMSS Events Notification, and ILTAB via email.
"An MDE radioactive materials inspector was performing a close-out survey in support of license termination. The facility is no longer operating with RAM and some essential staff are gone. All RAM sources had been reportedly removed and disposed. The inspector found that three Cf-252 sources from three installed process gauges had been replenished in the past. Each gauge contained one Cf-252 and one Cs-137 source; the Cs-137 are not normally replaced because of their long half-life. The licensee was unable to provide records for the disposal of the three old Cf-252 sources which were no longer present; the three new Cf-252 sources were accounted for. The sources of concern are:
"Cf-252; serial # FTC-CF-Z3384; 10.8 mCi on 25 September 2010. Decay corrected activity Nov 2022 = 445 microCuries
"Cf-252; serial # FTC-CF-Z3383; 10.8 mCi on 25 September 2010. Decay corrected activity Nov 2022 = 445 microCuries
"Cf-252; serial # FTC-CF-Z3930: 10.8 mCi on 25 September 2010. Decay corrected activity Nov 2022 = 445 microCuries
"Total Estimated Current Activity: 1.335 mCi
"The licensee and vendors continued to search for disposal records for these sources or the sources themselves. At no time did it appear to the licensee that an exposure could result to persons in unrestricted areas. A precautionary Event Report was made on 11/30/22 and updated on 12/01/22. On 12/02/2022 the waste disposer, RAM Services, confirmed by serial number that they have possession of the three old and three new Cf-252 sources in a neutron-shielded container in a secure, licensed facility in Wisconsin. The sources had been removed and misidentified when the gauges were de-sourced for license termination. The intended sources to be removed were three Cs-137 sources; these sources are presently unaccounted for and believed to be remaining in the gauges. The sources are:
"Cs-137; serial # CZ-2586; 30mCi on 10/01/2010. Decay corrected activity 12/01/2022 = 22.68 mCi
"Cs-137; serial # 0950/08; 30mCi on 10/01/2010. Decay corrected activity 12/01/2022 = 22.68 mCi"
"Cs-137; serial # 0949/08; 30mCi on 10/01/2010. Decayed corrected activity 12/01/2022 = 22.68 mCi
"Total Estimated Current Activity: 68.04 mCi
"It appears that the disposer had removed sources without actually verifying the serial numbers, isotopes, and activities of the sources, contrary to the records that were submitted. The source slots in the gauges are not visible and sources are moved remotely. The disposer will investigate and confirm or locate the three Cs-137 sources 12/05-12/09/2022. This is an update to the precautionary notification made 11/30/2022 pursuant to 10CFR 2201(a)(1) using the best available information currently available."
Notified R1DO (Cahill), NMSS Events Notification, and ILTAB via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection - Dayton OH
Report Date 12/01/2022 13:51:00
Event Date 09/28/2022 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE INADVERTENTLY SHIPPED
The following information was provided by the Ohio Department of Health via email:
"[The] licensee (NDC Technologies, Inc.) inadvertently shipped a 150 mCi Am-241 source to a customer in Germany. Only the electronic portion of the gauge should have been shipped to that customer. The source was [intended] to be shipped separately to a separate licensed facility in Germany. The source was not handled at the facility in Germany and was immediately sent back. The source has arrived at the NDC facility in Dayton."
Ohio Reference Number: OH220012
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
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SC Dept of Health & Env Control - Spartanburg SC
Report Date 12/01/2022 14:24:00
Event Date 06/27/2022 0:00:00
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED GAUGE
The following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (the Department) via email:
"On December 1, 2022, at approximately 1400 [EST], the Department was notified by the licensee that its contracted vendor used to replace sources, damaged the threads while attempting to exchange sources on June 27th, 2022. The source is a Berthold Model SSC-100 containing 20 millicuries of Cobalt 60, source serial number 1359/10/21. The source is designed to be mounted onto a dip tube via the use of threads. The source remains in the shielded position on the vessel and the area is roped off. This incident is still under investigation."
South Carolina Event Number: To be announced.
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