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Title: War & Civil Rights
Author: Chris Hobson
Date: April 2004
Language: en
Topics: war, civil rights, black liberation, World War II, history, Utopian Magazine
Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20050511193317fw_/http://www.utopianmag.com/PDFs/NegroQtly.pdf
Notes: Published in The Utopian, Volume 4.

Chris Hobson

War & Civil Rights

A little over sixty years ago, African Americans faced the question of

how to respond to World War II. Most felt there were strong reasons for

supporting the war; the question was whether one should concentrate

single mindedly on victory, putting aside all other concerns “for the

duration,” or should continue to fight for civil rights during the war.

After some inevitable initial confusion broad sections of the African

American public came round to the second view, despite inconsistent

leadership on the national level and opposition by some major leadership

groups. This response was a step toward establishing a politically

independent African American movement and toward the emergence of the

civil rights movement in the 1950s.

One of the publications supporting this critical, pro-civil rights

response to the war was the Negro Quarterly, a magazine that appeared

for only four issues in 1942 and 1943 with the well known activist

Angelo Herndon as editor and Ralph Ellison, the future author of

Invisible Man, then just starting a career as essayist and short story

writer, as managing editor. My interest in the Negro Quarterly grows out

of work I am doing on Ellison, both on the broad issue of the

social-political background of Invisible Man and on the specific topic

of Ellison’s—and many other African American intellectuals’—relations to

the Communist Party. The issue of the Communist Party (CP) is central to

the larger topic of radical African Americans’ responses to the war

because for many,including Herndon and Ellison, the CP had been the

focus of their hopes for social justice and their effort to continue to

work for civil rights in wartime necessitated separating them-selves

from the its influence.

African Americans, the Communist Party, and the War to 1942

During the Depression years of the 1930s, African Americans in

considerable numbers had joined the CP. In the spring of 1938, for

example, Black membership in the Harlem branches of the party was about

1000, though many stayed only for a few months.[1] Black Boy, the

autobiography of Richard Wright, written partly as an exposé after he

left the party, nonetheless provides testimony to the CP’s power to

attract young African Americans—through neighborhood work on Chicago’s

Black South Side, and in Wright’s case through the John Reed Clubs,a

literary circle that welcomed him and provided his first chances for

professional publication in CP-friendly magazines.[2] In the year or so

just before World War II, the CP seemed poised to become a mass force

with a major segment of African American members.

For many intellectuals in and around the CP, the Stalin-Hitler

non-aggression treaty of August 1939, which freed Hitler to attack

Poland and Western Europe, and which all CPs supported, was a breaking

point; they had oriented to the party in large part because it promoted

a “People’s Front” against fascism that it had now abandoned. But for

many African American members and sympathizers, 1939 was not a crisis

year. Many had come to the party primarily around issues of workers’ and

civil rights, and after the European war began the CP intensified work

on these issues. Though the party’s twists and turns did cost it some

influence among the African American public, many members and

sympathizers—notably Wright and the young Ellison—cemented their ties to

the party during this period of exceptional militancy.[3] Their crisis

came later,provoked by the party’s switch to a pro-war position and

downgrading of civil rights work following Hitler’s attack on the USSR,

by the U.S. entry into the war, and—while all this was happening—by

A.Philip Randolph’s March on Washington movement for fair employment

(1941-43).

When the German invasion brought Russia into the war, the U.S. and other

CPs switched from a militantly antiwar stance to a fervently

interventionist posture. The party’s main task now was to get the U.S.

into the war and, after Pearl Harbor,to win the war. To this end it

focused on what it called “the Battle of Production,” supported and

carried out President Roosevelt’s no-strike policy, and downplayed the

same issues of Black civil rights it had highlighted a few months

before. Of course all these shifts took some time to

execute.Nonetheless, Maurice Isserman’s generally pro-CP account

summarizes, “By the fall of 1941, the Communists were arguing that a too

militant defense of black rights at home would interfere with the war

effort” (119). While the party did try to keep up work among African

Americans, it mainly did so by emphasizing their role in the war.

James W. Ford, CP national committee member and three-time

vice-presidential candidate, expressed the new position in two pamphlets

in August 1941 and January 1942. The first, The Negro People and the New

World Situation, written just after the USSR entered the war, devoted

its first half to Hitler’s attack and argued, “The oppressed Negro

people are not, can-not be, indifferent to the threat to the Soviet

Union” (7). The second half, on Negro positions and demands, included a

section on “Jim-Crowism” in the armed forces which, in the middle of a

paragraph, called for “an end to the segregation of Negro from white

troops” (12). However, the summary of the party’s tasks included only a

general formulation: “the right ofthe Negroes to bear arms on the basis

of equality” (14). A historical reference to Frederick Douglass added

apparent sup-port for this softer position: during the Civil War, Ford

wrote,Douglass had “demanded of Lincoln that Negro troops be placed in

the Union army on the basis of receiving equal treatment with white

troops” (11-12). Historically knowledgable readers would know these had

been all-Black units with white officers, as in the segregated army of

1941. Overall,Ford gave most attention to solidifying Negro support for

the war and did not urge active struggle for Negro civil rights in any

field.

The second pamphlet, The War and the Negro People, published the month

after Pearl Harbor, was even vaguer. Ford argued,“ No individual, no

organization, must stand in the way of Negro unity behind the war

effort” (9). In two paragraphs that contained the pamphlet’s only

discussion of civil rights, he urged that the “barriers of

discrimination” be “done away with so that the entire manpower of the

nation be put into winning the war”; he added, in italics, “Negro

Americans must be fully integrated into every phase of the war effort,

in the armed forces, in industry, in civilian defense, Allied and

Russian war relief” (9). That sentence left it unclear whether Negroes

should be “integrated” in the sense of ending segregation or simply in

the sense, “made part of ”; Ford deftly blurred over the issue of

segregated units, and did not repeat the specific point on this issue

from the earlier pamphlet. Though he admitted that Negro opinion was

“not yet united” in favor of the war, Ford insisted that the

overwhelming majority “stand ready to give their last drop of blood to

defend their country,”and he argued, “successful struggle against Nazi

enslavement is a defense of the liberation and freedom of the Negro

people” (7). Here too, Ford, an experienced political operative,chose

his words carefully: saying struggle against the Nazis“is” a defense of

the Negro people means no specific defense of African Americans is

needed.

While the CP was subordinating a militant defense of Black rights to its

“win the war” stance, African American anger over the blatant

contradiction between U.S. segregation and what many accepted as the

war’s democratic aims was growing. One early expression of this anger

was A. Philip Randolph’s March on Washington movement for equal

employment in defense industries, which began in 1941 and remained a

major force through 1942 before declining as its early victories proved

hollow. In early 1941 the U.S. was already gearing up war production

both to increase U.S. preparedness and to supply Britain under the terms

of the Lend-Lease Act, passed in March. Defense industries were

segregated south and north,either not employing African American sat all

or doing so only as janitors and the like. In January1941,Randolph,

longtime head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and a leader in

the Socialist Party, called for a Negro march on Washington July 1 for

equal employment in defense industries. Though Randolph’s promise to

mobilize 100,000 marchers was probably a bluff, he held the bluff down

the line and in a face-to-face meeting won Roosevelt’s pledge to

establish a Fair Employment Practices Commission with authority over

defense industries. As part of the agreement, Randolph called off the

march, but the next year, with the U.S. in the war and the FEPC

floundering, here activated the movement, this time organizing mass

rallies in New York, Chicago, and St. Louis. New York’s rally at Madison

Square Garden, June 16, attracted 16,000 angry, vocal people.The

highlight of a very long evening, all agreed, was a dramatic sketch in

which the well-known actor Canada Lee, as a Negro draftee, roused cheers

and yells by declaring, “I’ll fight Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japs all

at the same time, but I’m telling you,I’ll give those crackers down

South the same damn medicine!”[4]

As this response indicated, African American anger about discrimination

was seething. Common grievances included the army’s segregation of

African American troops and the navy’s refusal to recruit Blacks in

combat positions at all. Once Negroes were drafted in large numbers, the

segregated training camps in the south, in which Black draftees were

routinely beaten and sometimes killed, were added to the list. In the

north, white MPs and civilian cops harassed Black GIs, Black defense

workers were forced into substandard housing, and Roosevelt’s own

Executive Order 8802 on fair employment was mostly ignored. In the

Pacific, African Americans segregated into the Army Corps of Engineers

under white officers fought in half-construction, half-combat roles in

the New Guinea campaign, then were forced into segregated facilities

when on leave in Australia—by the Army, not the Australians—and in

several cases were killed in protests and riots.[5] Even the blood

supply was segregated.

Rather than uncritically supporting the war effort, as urged by the CP,

or opposing it on pacifist, revolutionary, or pro-Japanese grounds—each

of which had some support in the community—most African Americans had

decidedly mixed responses. They were ready to support the war as a

struggle for democracy against fascism but they flared up at segregation

in the armed forces and society at large and backed any efforts against

them. Some offered to accept induction into any branch of the services

that would take them on an integrated basis—then refused induction since

no such branchexisted. Some served in the merchant marine, which carried

draft exemption,partly because merchant ship service was less dangerous

but also because the merchant marine was not as segregated as the navy.

The zoot suit, a sartorial style that originated among Blacks and spread

to Mexican Americans as well as white hipsters, became a badge of

rebellious attitudes.[6] African Americans in general remained angry,

bitter, and ready to fight if pushed by whites—as they ultimately did in

Detroit and Harlem in the summer of 1943. With all these responses in

mind, in February 1942 the Pittsburgh Courier, then one of the country’s

leading Black newspapers, launched the slogan “Double V”—victory against

fascism at home and abroad—to crystallize the stance of supporting the

war while fighting for civil rights.

All these developments—the rising anger among African Americans at the

segregationist conduct of the war, their own party’s virtual inaction on

Black rights, the presence of supportable mass actions for civil rights

and of an alternative way of looking at the war—fed the misgivings of

some African American CP members and sympathizers. The party’s reversals

over the March on Washington movement were particularly vivid. In early

1941, with the Stalin-Hitler pact still in force and the party sticking

hard to an antiwar line, the Daily Worker ignored the march movement as

long as possible and then tepidly endorsed it shortly before the march

date, while attacking Randolph and other leaders for betraying “the just

aims of the Negro people” by favoring U.S. entry into the war. A year

later, on the eve of the renewed actions, the Daily Worker again kept

silent until just before the rally dates, again endorsed halfheartedly,

and again lashed out at Randolph—this time because he and the

“defeatist” SP would turn Negroes “against the war” (June 10, 1941; June

16, 1942). Covering the New York rally a day late—perhaps a sign of

uncertainty about how to respond—Ben Davis, Jr., a leading African

American member, praised several speakers’ “splendid win-the-war

addresses” but attacked Canada Lee’s skit as “insidious poison” (June

18, 1942).

Such reversals, and growing unwillingness to fight for Black demands,

were a sign of the CP’s bankruptcy for at least one prominent African

American member, Richard Wright.Constance Webb’s early biography of

Wright recounts a meeting between him, Ben Davis, and James Ford.

According to Webb, after hearing of the projected March on

Washington,Wright met with Davis to propose supporting the march.

Before Davis could speak, Ford angrily strode over to Richard and said:

“The alternative to support of the war and of Roosevelt is the support

of reaction! You’re an obstinate, subjective fool!” Anger engulfed

Richard; a shade more and he would have smashed Ford in the

face.Instead,trembling inside from the effort at control, he looked at

Davis and ignored Ford. [After Ford left,] Davis clapped him on the

shoulder in a friendly manner and commanded: “Go back to your writing,

Dick, and leave the politics to the Party.”

A few weeks later, according to Webb, Wright made his mind up: “He was

holding a tainted instrument in his hands and he would drop it.”[7]

Though the details are garbled—when the march was organized in 1941, the

CP was still antiwar, and so Webb must be referring to the 1942 MOW

rallies—Webb is undoubtedly writing some version of what she heard from

Wright, whoms he met around this time. Wright left the party silently in

1942and made his break public two years later. Others in the party’s

membership and periphery, at first still loyal to it and/or seeing no

alternative to it as a fulcrum for change, stillmoved to a more critical

and independent stance during this same period. These were the

circumstances in which the Negro Quarterly was launched in early 1942.

The Negro Quarterly , the War, and Civil Rights (1942)

The Negro Quarterly began with the spring 1942 issue, under Angelo

Herndon’s editorship. Herndon, who had been sentenced to a chain gang in

Georgia in 1932 for organizing unemployed councils, and successfully

defended by the CP,remained close to the party on his release. He wrote

an auto-biography, Let Me Live (1937). He is less well known today than

he might be because he left politics after the Negro Quarterly failed

and lived most of the rest of his life in deliberate obscurity. Ellison,

closely involved with NQ from the start, was listed as managing editor

starting with the second issue. Then in his late twenties, he had been

close to the CP since being introduced to it in 1937 by Wright, his

closest friend at this time, but he never joined. Ellison was known as a

promising writer who had published a few stories and a large number of

reviews and cultural articles in the CP-run New Masses and other

pro-party magazines.[8]

Herndon and Ellison founded NQ with help from the CP; its first issue

included articles and reviews by prominent writers in and close to the

party, including Herbert Aptheker, Doxey A. Wilkerson, and Henrietta

Buckmaster, who would not have contributed if the CP had opposed the

project. Other well-known names, such as Sterling A. Brown of Howard

University, author of Southern Road and an editor of the recent

anthology Negro Caravan, and L.D. Reddick, curator of the Schomburg

Collection of Negro Literature (now the Schomburg Division) at the New

York Public Library, were not as close to the CP but were probably

attracted as much by the idea of a forum for liberal-CP dialogue as by

the credentials of the editorial team. And the “Statement of Policy” in

the first issue, discussed below, stuck close to the CP conception of

the war. But the “Statement” also began with an implied step toward

independence:

The rapid change introduced by the war makes apparent the need of

reflecting upon the genuine attitudes,thoughts and opinions of

Negroes[....] (3)[9]

This, in reality, is what the CP was not doing. In subsequent issues,

though never criticizing the CP by name, NQ developed more and more

independently, laying out policies that knowing readers would understand

as moving away from those of the party. It did so on two key, related

issues, African American civil rights in the United States and

international anti-colonial struggle.

In its “Statement of Policy,” in the spring 1942 issue, NQ had called

for expanding Negro rights in the context of the war effort, in terms

similar to the CP’s: “Because our country is now engaged in an all-out

war with the Axis forces, the full capacity of its man power must be

thrown into the battle in order to insure final victory. This can be

done more effectively when the barriers of Jim Crow in the Army, Navy,

Air Force,and other national defense bodies are removed” (3). This tack

was close to Doxey Wilkerson’s in his article “Negro Education and the

War” in the same issue. Focusing on the “all-important Battle of

Production,” Wilkerson called for dismantling“racial barriers to the

quick and effective provision of adequate and trained personnel for the

armed forces,” and he noted, “‘history is on our side’ in the creation

of job opportunities” for African Americans because labor shortages were

creating openings (24, 25). Wilkerson did not call for any organized

action for any civil rights demand, or for ending segregated education,

even as a distant goal. In essence, while favoring civil rights, he was

pressing for them only so far as would fulfill the government’s war

needs.

The editors’ and Wilkerson’s statements were actually far more

conservative than some by other contributors. “If you read the Afro [the

Baltimore Afro-American] if you read the Amsterdam News,” Waring Cuney

wrote in the first of two poems in imitation blues stanzas, “Then you

know what makes the colored folks always have the blues.” One stanza

focused on Georgia governor Eugene Talmadge:

He’s all puffed up with white superiority pride

Puffed up with what they call white superiority pride

Says black children and white can’t sit in school side by side. (40)

This was straight pre-June 1941 CP politics and aesthetics,down to the

fake-folk style, but Cuney was saying what Wilkerson wouldn’t in 1942.

In a second poem Cuney invoked Crispus Attucks, Frederick Douglass, and

Harriet Tubman—CP icons—but he was reading the Black press and his

closing stanza made the essential point:

If our dead heroes could see us in ’42

They’d say we did our part what you going to do? (41)10

It is unclear whether Herndon and Ellison were embarrassed by poems like

Cuney’s, which would have reminded them of their own underlying

politics, or if, possibly, they deliberately printed such work to offset

views like Wilkerson’s (and their own). In either case, their tone and

approach changed sharply in later issues.The “Editorial Comment” in the

second issue(summer 1942) declared bluntly, “Negroes do not support the

war wholeheartedly, and all statements that Negroes ‘are

over-whelmingly’ in back of the efforts of the Allies are not only not

true, but are misleading” (ii).[10] This was a tacit rebuke to claims

like James Ford’s, quoted earlier, that Negroes were ready to “give

their last drop of blood” for war victory. The editors went on to take

aim at the rationale offered by Ford and Wilkerson (and NQ itself in the

previous issue) for the civil rights they did support: Negro leaders and

their white allies, they wrote, should work “not merely with the idea of

securing more jobs in the present situation, or of enlisting Negro aid

in fighting for their own objectives but with the aim of obtaining a

real representative government which includes Negro members of the House

of Representatives, the Senate, the Supreme Court, the President’s

Cabinet and all other powerful governmental committees” (v).

Further,repeating the common CP definition of the war as a “people’s war

for national liberation,” they declared that African Americans were “a

nation” within the U.S.—a long-held CP position that the party itself

was de-emphasizing. The implication was that African American liberation

should be a fundamental war goal, essentially the “double V” position

restated in Marxist language (i, iv).

Moreover, in an audacious claim that implicitly rejected the CP belief

in the necessity of its own leadership, the editors declared that

working class African Americans, in particular,must define their own

social-political goals:

[I]n the new light of the Four Freedoms: why should not decisions

relative to the national aspirations of American Negroes rest with

themselves rather than with those out-side their own group? [...]

[W]hile the Negro middle class, for the most part, strives to adapt

itself to programs outlined for it from above, the Negro people seek to

define the world in their own terms, rejecting or accepting the values

of our society as best suit their own needs.(iii)

The basis for doing this, they wrote even more explosively, lay in the

common outlook of ordinary African Americans and other dark-skinned

people: Negroes, together with the world’s“darker peoples” in general,

“have created a culture and the basic outlines of a truly democratic

vision of life” (v). The implication was that African Americans

themselves already possessed, independently of any political party, the

capacity to move toward greater democracy for themselves and others.

Besides the editors’ own views, Negro Quarterly no. 2 included paired

essays on “Anti-Negroism Among Jews,” by Louis Harap, managing editor of

The Jewish Survey, and “Anti-Semitism Among Negroes,” by L.D. Reddick;

an excerpt from Wright’s recently published Twelve Million Black Voices;

articles on housing discrimination in Detroit, racial divisions in Cuba,

and the movement for Indian independence; a literary essay, “What Should

We Demand from Historical Fiction,” by Henrietta Buckmaster—which argued

that historical fiction should be objective and non-propagandist and

that this could only happen when it was written from a Marxist

viewpoint—and poems and fiction by writers both close to and independent

of the CP, including a remarkable short verse drama on Samson as an

emblem of slaves’ liberation, “Somday We’re Gonna Tear Th Pillars Down,”

by Owen Dodson, then a young teacher at Hampton Institute and later head

of drama at Howard University.[11] As a group—regardless of individual

quality—these contributions embodied the editors’ idea that Negroes must

define their own goals and culture, and specified the magazine’s scope

as all national and international issues of interest to Negroes rather

than just “Negro issues.”

Herndon and Ellison moved farther toward an independent viewpoint, and

toward support for an independent African American mass movement for

civil rights, in their third issue. At a time—autumn 1942—when the Daily

Worker was urging all-out support for Roosevelt Democrats in the

congressional elections, the editors laid the blame for the Senate’s

defeat of an anti-poll tax bill squarely on Roosevelt’s shoulders, and

went on to declare, “[T]he key to a world victory for democracy lies in

the victory of full democracy in the U. S. and in British territories”

(195). Ellison and Herndon pictured Roosevelt and Churchill as divided

men, “mocked by the vision of a world they flirt with but fear to

embrace,” and asked, “What are we fighting for?” (196). Demanding a

commitment to full civil rights, NQ promised,“American Negroes shall

continue to seek democratic freedom regardless of where it lies, and the

‘common man’ of the world will be with them” (240).

The Negro Quarterly and Internationalism (1942)

These remarks, especially on Britain, point to another aspect of the

Negro Quarterly’s reorientation, its internationalism. NQ devoted

considerable space to international articles and literature in each of

its four issues. Members and sympathizers of the CP, of course, were

bred up as internationalists: they “knew” that the USSR was leading a

“people’s war” (Ford, The Negro People and the New World Situation, 7 ;

NQ 2, 136), that China’s anti-Japanese resistance (led by Communists,

though this was not said aloud) was a positive model for other oppressed

peoples (Kumar Goshal, “India and the People’s War,” NQ 2, 136), etc.,

and they “knew” a great deal about politics in a great many countries

they didn’t really know much about. But NQ made international issues

part of its move away from CP views on the war, and argued that African

Americans should see themselves as part of an inter-national

anti-colonial movement continuing during the war.

Already in their second issue (summer 1942) Herndon and Ellison had

projected a future article (never completed) that would “examine, in the

light of the true aspirations of American Negroes [...] their unity of

interest with India,China, Africa, the Philippines, Latin America, and

all other darker peoples of the world” (v). In addition, NQ distanced

itself from Communist positions without saying so explicitly on at least

two major issues of international politics.

The first was Indian independence, and in particular, critical events in

India that occurred during 1942. India, then part of the British empire,

had a large, active mass movement that was pressing for immediate

self-government. In March 1942 a British Cabinet official, Sir Stafford

Cripps, came to the country with government proposals that amounted to

freezing the current power setup in return for a promise of slight

revisions after the war. The major nationalist group, the Indian

National Congress led by Mohandas K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru,

rejected the proposals, Cripps went home, and on August 7-8, 1942, a

special session of the Congress executive passed what came to be called

the “Quit India” resolution. This asked Britain to establish a

Provisional National Government that would enter the war with Britain

“as allies,” and warned that if this were not done Congress would

mobilize a mass nonviolent struggle “for the vindication of India’s

inalienable political right to freedom and independence.” In response

the British government arrested Gandhi, Nehru, and other Congress

leaders and held them prisoner until late in the war.[12]

Of particular interest to me, the Indian CP members on the Congress

executive voted against the Quit India resolution. In common with other

Communist parties, since June 1942 the Indian party had been militantly

in favor of the war and British or “Allied” victory. In line with this

policy much of the world’s Communist press, like the liberal and

conservative press, blamed Cripps’s failure on Indian inflexibility and

regarded Congress’s demand for immediate self-government as premature at

best.

Kumar Goshal, an Indian writer and actor living in New York, reported on

the Cripps mission in the summer 1942 issue of NQ and on the Quit India

resolution in the autumn issue. In the first article, he mainly filled

in the background of Indian conditions, the independence movement’s

history, etc., but also stated directly, “The real reason for the

failure of the Cripps mission was the refusal to make any changes in the

present governmental set-up” (136). He did not comment at all on the

Communists’ stance. Neither did the NQ editors. But they did print,

without any explanation, an untitled statement by Richard Wright in the

empty half-page at the article’s end:

One of the most disgraceful episodes of the war was the widespread

expression of disgust by millions of people of the United Nations over

the failure of the native leaders of India to accept the proposals of

the British government as outlined by Sir Stafford Cripps[....] It seems

not to have occurred to even people of good will that the spirit of this

war makes it imperative that we not attempt to define what India should

do, but rather that we sup-port the national will of the natives of

India. (140)

And the editors themselves criticized as an example of “paternalism” the

“democratic peoples’ haste in blaming the Indian leaders for the failure

of the Cripps mission before the content of the proposals had been

revealed” (v). Neither comment mentioned Communist positions directly.

But “millions of people of the United Nations” and “the democratic

peoples”were political formulas that anyone in the CP orbit under-stood

to include Russia and the Communist movement. The inclusion of this

criticism in the “Editorial Comment” and the placing of Wright’s

statement in unused page space make it likely that both were late

decisions made because Herndon and Ellison concluded that some at least

indirect rebuttal of CP positions was needed. And both comments

strengthened NQ’s support for Indian independence.

In his second article, Goshal took the lid off concerning CP politics,

though only in a half sentence, mentioning without comment that the

resolution had been passed “with thirteen Communist members dissenting”

(220). And he strongly endorsed the independence movement and the Quit

India resolution, ending with the call for a “Provisional National

Government now” (226). In however gingerly a way, Goshaland NQ were

repudiating the CP position and saying the independence struggle could

and must go on in wartime.[13]

On a second international topic, Africa, Negro Quarterly 3 (autumn 1942)

ran a truly wretched article, “Africa Against the Axis,” by John

Pittman, foreign editor of the Los Angeles People’s World, the CP’s west

coast newspaper. Most of the article concentrated on the material

contribution to the war by African colonies: in the last year, Pittman

boasted, “the relative importance of Africa as a source of vital food

stuffs and the sinews of war”—in other words, the importance of the

colonial exploitation system—“has leaped incalculably” (207). About half

the article focused on how colonial governments were supplying food,

strategic materials, and troops to the Allies. The second half explored

political “barriers to Africa’s full integration in the war effort” and

did criticize the colonial system, though it went no further than

endorsing the call of English “trade unions, liberals, leftists, and

churchmen, for the extension of democracy among the native subjects of

the Empire” (213, 217). Pittman did not mention African political

organization at all.

Though its basic approach contradicted Herndon and Ellison’s own

criticisms of “paternalism” and emphasis on oppressed people determining

their own demands, the editors appended a note saying that though

written “before the present African offensive,” most of the article’s

“facts and conclusions are still valid”(207). This endorsement, however,

may have been meant only to reassure readers about the article’s

timeliness.In any case, NQ’s next issue featured a followup, “African

Opinion and World Peace,” by a Ghanaian newly arrived in the U.S., Kweku

Attah Gardiner. Gardiner’s article took no definite position on African

independence and is best under-stood as an implied corrective to

Pittman’s. Gardiner’s focus was on African political activity and

leadership, including the presence of African leaders in the

legislatures of some colonies, and on the potential for Africans’

development of their own economies—all topics unmentioned in the earlier

article. While not referring to the several Pan-African Congresses held

in Europe since 1900, Gardiner mentioned a series of African leaders who

were, in fact, giants in the pre-independence (and sometimes post

independence) histories of their countries—Casely Hayford and Nana Ofori

Atta in the Gold Coast (Ghana), Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwein

Nigeria, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, and others. He gave the impression that

Africans were fully capable of taking rapid steps toward greater control

of their countries. Overall,Gardiner rejected the need for “education

and training [of Africans] for leadership,” as stated in a liberal U.S.

study he cited (345-46). He insisted, instead, that Africans were ready

to assume leadership. He emphasized the “political maturity of [African]

peoples,” their “ability to participate intelligently in the political

and economic development of their country,”and the need “to consult

African opinion” in all matters (345,353, 359). While quite moderate in

its politics, Gardiner’s article both embodied and advocated, in regard

to Africans, the point NQ’s editors had made about African Americans,

“Why should not decisions relative to the national aspirations” of

Africans “rest with themselves[?]” (summer 1942: iii).[14]

The Negro Quarterly and the Future: The Final Issue

Herndon and Ellison summed up what they had learned so far in the

Editorial Comment in NQ 4, the issue that also included Gardiner’s

article. By now NQ was in serious trouble. There were fewer

contributions—the editors maintained the magazine’s 5-by-8 inch 96-page

format but switched to a larger typeface—and the issue was delayed;

announced in a “house ad” in NQ 3 as the winter 1942 issue, it appeared

dated winter-spring 1943. Of the three essays (there had been an average

of six in issues 1-3), one was by an editor, Herndon. It’s fairly plain

that the CP had pulled the plug; while Henrietta Buckmaster still

contributed a review, gone were the articles by Wilkerson, Aptheker,

Harry Slochower,and other prominent writers in and close to the party

that helped bulk up previous issues. Herndon and Ellison may have

understood that this would be the last issue, though this can’t be known

for sure.

“By way of group self-examination,” the Editorial Comment began, “it

might be profitable to list a few of the general attitudes held by

Negroes toward their war-time experiences.” There were three. First, the

editors listed “unqualified acceptance of the limited opportunities for

Negro participation in the conflict.” This attitude, they charged, went

together with“acceptance of the violence and discrimination which so

contradicts a war for the Four Freedoms” and was “justified by the

theory that for Negroes to speak out in their own self-interest would be

to follow a ‘narrow Negro approach’ and to disrupt war-unity.” Though

granting that this attitude was“sometimes honestly held,” Herndon and

Ellison felt it arose “out of a lack of group self-consciousness” and

led to “the most disgusting forms of self-abasement” (295). Though not

saying so directly, the editors were taking aim at statements like

Wilkerson’s on “the all-important Battle of Production,” Pittman’s

comments on the importance of colonial production, and Ben Davis’s view

that the militant sketch at the June1942 MOW rally was “insidious

poison.” Opposite to this approach, the editors continued, was an

attitude of “unqualified rejection”of the war, Allied war aims, and

African American participation. Herndon and Ellison treated this view at

greater length and with much more sympathy.However, they felt it did not

recognize “that Negroes have their own stake in the defeat of fascism”

and, in addition, that in fighting for “a free America and a free

world,” African Americans “are also creating themselves as a free people

and as a nation” (296-98).

Finally, Herndon and Ellison defined their own stand as one of “critical

participation, based upon a sharp sense of the Negro people’s group

personality.” This attitude, “while affirming the justice of the Allies’

cause, [...] never loses sight of the Negro people’s stake in the

struggle.” Overall, Herndon and Ellison felt that “the main task of the

Negro people is to work unceasingly toward creating those democratic

conditions in which it can live and recreate itself.” And they

further-more defined “the historical role of Negroes to be that of

integrating the larger American nation and compelling it untiringly

toward true freedom,” a belief Ellison would later advocate in his

novels and essays (298).

From these assumptions Herndon and Ellison derived several related

political and cultural ideas. First, they advocated fighting

unequivocally for civil rights during the war: “[p]rograms which would

sacrifice the Negro or any other people are [i.e.,should be] considered

dangerous for the United Nations; and the only honorable course for

Negroes to take is first to protest and then to fight against them.”

Second, they hoped for “centralization of [Negroes’] political power,”

building an independent African American leadership, maximizing African

Americans’ economic leverage by gaining skilled positions that would

allow them to “give leadership to the working class,” and “participating

along with labor and other progressive groups as equals” so that “all

policies are formulated and coordinated with full consideration of the

complexities of the Negro situation” (298, 299, 301-2). Finally, and

perhaps most significantly, they pressed for “learning the meaning of

the myths and symbols which abound among the Negro masses.”In words

often quoted because of Ellison’s later use of the zoot suit in

Invisible Man, they noted, “Much in Negro life remains a mystery;

perhaps the zoot suit conceals profound political meaning; perhaps the

symmetrical frenzy of the Lindy-hop conceals clues to great potential

power—if only Negro leaders would solve this riddle” (301). In sum, they

wished to build a working-class based African American movement that

could act as a component force for reform or revolution rather than

being an appendage of the white labor movement or the CP, and they

wished it to be based on a greater awareness of the beliefs and culture

of poor and working class African Americans than earlier movements.

Herndon expanded on the “critical participation” idea in a lengthy

article that was also an unstated polemic against the CP, “Frederick

Douglass: Negro Leadership and War.” As noted earlier, African American

CP leaders such as James Fordhad used Douglass’s support of the Civil

War to justify the party’s positions. Herndon, apparently, wanted partly

to correct the CP’s current image of Douglass—and more broadly to

reclaim Douglass as a Negro figure whose legacy was not to be traded

back and forth by a largely white organization—and partly to illustrate

and elaborate the ideas in the Editorial Comment. So he began by

reiterating the attitudes of “rejection” and “unqualified acceptance” of

participation in the war,went on to discuss Douglass historically, and

drew political inferences in his conclusion. The historical discussion

gave some attention to Douglass’s early career and to his view after1852

that the U.S. Constitution, far from permitting slavery as the

Garrisonian wing of abolitionism believed, was “a warrant for the

abolition of slavery in every state of the Union” (309). Thus Herndon

embraced or at least noted the longstanding view of most African

Americans that stated U.S. ideals can become an instrument for African

American freedom, a view Ellison would also stress in Invisible Man.

Herndon further suggested that Douglass’s new position represented a

Negro declaration of independence from white organizations—“I am not

sure that I was not under the influence of something like a slavish

adoration of these good people,” he quotes Douglass as saying

[15]—implying that the Negro Quarterly’s developing position was

likewise a blow for race independence. Herndon devoted the most space,

however—four pages and three sizable appendices—to Douglass’s conduct

during the war and specifically his temporary withdrawal of support for

recruiting Negro troops until the government gave credible assurances

that it could and would protect their rights(315-18,324-29). In effect,

though he didn’t use this term, Herndon was taking a position of

conditional support for World War II, i.e., support if and only if the

federal government implemented Negro rights; and in his hands, the

history became an argument against the CP’s unquestioning support of

Roosevelt. Finally, Herndon enunciated two specific demands—modest

enough, but far-reaching in implication—and a more general conclusion.

One demand was for the voluntary formation of racially integrated Army

divisions. The other proposed replacing the dying Fair Employment

Practices Commission with an enforcement body drawn from“unions and

Negro organizations”; the significance here is the independent role

Herndon envisioned for the latter (321). And in his more general

conclusion, Herndon provided a ringing call for active struggle that a

careful reader would also understand as an indictment of the CP:

Still do you say “Now is not the time to insist upon our freedom. It

might hurt the war effort?” To insist upon freedom where it does not

exist is proper at all times. [...]Still again do you say “But be

patient. Things are being done and we are making gains?” [...] There is

no record in the history of mankind where freedom has ever been given to

anybody. Those who have it, have invariably been the ones who strongly

and clearly asserted their right to have it. (323)

Fine words, and a legacy for the future.

The Negro Quarterly’s evolution shows the impact of African American

struggles in the early part of World War II, particularly the March on

Washington Movement, and of the “double V” campaign. The ideas of

“critical participation” in the war, that the “main task” for African

Americans was to “work unceasingly toward creating [...] democratic

conditions,” and that insisting on freedom “is proper at all times”

generalized and rephrased what African Americans had done in action and

the African American press had called for, although the editors used

their own CP-influenced language and included their particular

conceptions, such as that African Americans are a nation.[16] Strategic

ideas as well, like those of an African American movement that would

cooperate with other social groups on an independent and equal basis,

and of African American leadership in the trade unions, may have been

influenced by the March on Washington Movement, by the substantial

though circumscribed power wielded by A. Philip Randolph as head of a

Negro union, etc. Finally, NQ’s emphasis on Negroes’ making “decisions

relevant to [their own]national aspirations” and on the importance of

street-level beliefs and myths may also reflect the March on Washington

Movement’s successful if short-lived mass organization and the evidence

of deep ferment, anger, soul-searching and strategy-searching found in

the African American press.

The Negro Quarterly’s story is one of how African Americans responded in

their own lives to the conflicting pressures of a democratic war (as

most believed) waged by an undemocratic society and military, and it is,

secondarily, a story of how some politically savvy African Americans

moved under the impact of this mass response from the political tent of

the Communist Party to an independent position closer to that of the

African American mass movement.[17] This story is of enormous

significance in the life of one of its characters, Ellison; the impact

of African American wartime experiences, including his own on NQ, is

felt repeatedly in Invisible Man’s portrayal of the Brotherhood (its

fictional equivalent for the CP),the Harlem streets and rebellion

(chaps. 20-25), and its effort to define a politically independent

future course for African American struggle (Epilogue). NQ’s story is

also significant as showing intellectual steps toward the political

independence of the African American mass movement and toward the

formation of the Civil Rights Movement a decade later. While NQ’s

immediate influence was not great, its political evolution is

significant as one instance of changing ideas in the intellectual milieu

of young African American radicals, a milieu whose varied ideas were

important influences on the next political generation.

The Negro Quarterly’s story is also one of how consciousness changes.

There are two ways (if not more) in which I might have recounted the

events covered in this article, especially in its early pages. One would

be to begin with the conditions African Americans lived through and

their responses to the war, and then turn to the CP. This would throw a

glaring light on the inadequacy and dishonesty of the party’s stances

and would be a more “polemical” approach, offering the lessons to the

reader in bite-size. The second is to begin from the experiences of the

party’s members and periphery. In this telling, the party’s policies,

which the story’s characters at one time believed in wholeheartedly,

occupy the foreground and the base-level African American response to

the war emerges slowly to challenge the policies, straining and finally

tearing the activists’ bonds with the party. In either telling, social

development and mass sentiment diverged from the activists’ picture of

reality, but the second approach makes the added point that their

readjustment was slow and often contradictory. Such points as NQ’s

initial “tap Negro manpower for the war” stance and its continuing

idealization of the Soviet Union in later issues do not contradict the

idea that NQ was differentiating itself from the party; they are part of

how political evolution occurs, by half-steps forward, then back and

forward again.

Finally, the Negro Quarterly’s story is about the validity of political

positions—what makes a political stand right in principle and gives it

the potential to build active struggle. My approach to World War II

starts from the utopian: we want a world with no states,no imperialism,

no war, no oppression.From this starting point we still have to deal

with the world as it is in order to get to the world we want. In my

opinion, it is not true that World War II was, overall, a war for

democracy. Britain and France were fighting not just to defend their

territories but their empires—as Britain’s refusal to make any

con-cessions to India, which would have brought India into the war on

the Allied side, shows. The U.S. had its imperialist aims (taking over

as much of the British Empire as possible,among others) and Stalin’s

USSR had its own. Nevertheless,the savagery of Nazism and to a lesser

extent Japanese militarism,and their global ambitions, were not a myth,

and had to be defeated. This meant that in the immediate situation,when

it wasn’t yet possible to defeat imperialism as a system,it was right to

favor an Allied victory in Europe and Asia while fighting to win

independence for the colonies, civil rights for African Americans, and

rights in general for the common people to the greatest extent possible.

If this conception is true, then, from the vantage point of sixty years

of later history, the “double V” idea, despite its illusions about the

war’s democratic character, had a profound truth that the CP’s pol-icy

and also what Ellison and Herndon called a “rejectionist” policy did

not.

This was to a certain extent an “illogical” policy, one that pursued

contradictory aims. To my mind that is not a weakness.The situation was

contradictory: the U.S. and Britain were in fact defending against

brutality and enslavement while practicing brutality and enslavement

themselves. The “double V”conception merely recognized the

contradiction. In contrast,each of the main competing ideas, absolute

support for the war and nonsupport, started from one end of the

contradiction and derived from it a logically consistent position that

was only half correct. Put another way, “double V” simply means being

for and struggling for the rights of all people—Europeans conquered by

the Nazis, African Americans and Indians denied rights by the U.S. and

Britain—even when those rights may seem to be in conflict. In this

sense, “double V”and “critical participation” had a creative

inconsistency: the Allies’ war aims and the freedom of oppressed people

were in conflict but to fight for both was to move closer to a world in

which they would no longer be.

These points may have some application in the present day,after the Iraq

war. If anything in the African American response to World War II can be

applied to the present, it is not the conclusion of supporting the

Allies, which belongs to a different world situation, but the method of

starting from the contradictory reality of world conflict and struggling

for the rights of all people. In Iraq there are two sides to this

reality: the aims of the U.S. and the rights of the peoples of Iraq.The

United States’s overall purpose in the war was the extension and

consolidation of U.S. global power, and in particular its extension to

Iraq, an area outside its immediate power orbit before the war. Within

Iraq, to accomplish this extension, the U.S. had to overthrow a

particularly brutal and dis-gusting regime and is now trying to

construct a neocolonial U.S. dependency with a half-democratic facade.

The right of the Iraqi people, on the other hand, is to have an

independent country under whatever type of government they choose.

Within the limited situation “on the ground,” this is to some extent a

contradictory right—to defend independence under the Saddam Hussein

regime would normally mean defending the dictatorship, to fight for a

new regime seemed to some to mean collaborating with the U.S. The

solution, I think, was to accept the contradictory reality and not

follow either position to its logical conclusion—not defend Saddam along

with Iraq,not accept U.S. domination along with Saddam’s overthrow,but

oppose the invasion and occupation yet reach out for democracy and

independence. Because of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, it was difficult

or impossible to do this in the best way, by overthrowing Hussein and

then opposing the U.S.In the absence of this possibility there were two

ways people might have responded: (1) by defending Iraq, as

independently as possible from Hussein, and later opposing the

occupation, or (2) by standing aside, not opposing the U.S., and later

seizing democratic rights and opposing the occupation. I’m concerned

here particularly with those Iraqis who did the second. Many may have

genuinely believed the U.S. came to free them; only later, as the

occupation troops stormed into their houses, shot or beat prisoners to

death, and sadistically abused them on orders of Military Intelligence,

did the full barbarism and antidemocratic character of the occupation

become clear.But in other cases, I suspect, people were following a

strategy of taking what they could from the U.S.—Saddam’s over-throw—and

then fighting to reclaim their country. These strategies’ apparent

contradictions—defending Iraq in a limit-ed way, and later opposing the

U.S.; standing aside during the U.S. invasion but opposing U.S.

power—are, aren’t they, a sort of Iraqi “double V,” victory against

fascism abroad and at home? At times this approach may seem to create

dilemmas or contradictions. (For example: support the armed resistance

or support the call for direct elections? In my view, both.) However, so

at times did “double V” seem contradictory, yet out of it came the

greatest force for democracy in the last century of U.S. history.

The history of African American responses to World War II needs to be

more widely known, and, within this overall topic,the Negro Quarterly’s

evolution during its brief lifetime presents a particularly fruitful

case study. Both the overall history and this specific facet help to

expand our understanding of our own past, and both present rich lessons

for the present.

[1] See Mark Naison, Communists in Harlem During the Depression(New

York: Grove Press, 1984), 279.

[2] Black Boy (American Hunger), in Richard Wright: Later Works (New

York: Library of America, 1991), chap. 18; Michel Fabre, The Unfinished

Quest of Richard Wright, trans. Isabel Barzun (2nd ed., Urbana:

University of Illinois Press, 1993),chaps. 5-6.

[3] See Naison, chap. 12; Maurice Isserman, Which Side Were You On? The

American Communist Party During World War II(Middletown: Wesleyan

University Press, 1982), chaps. 4-5.

[4] See Herbert Garfinkel, When Negroes March: The March On Washington

Movement in the Organizational Politics for the FEPC (1959;New York:

Atheneum, 1969), 37-96.

[5] See John Oliver Killens’ novel And Then We Heard the Thunder,

loosely based on this history. There is also a nonfiction record,Love,

War, and the 96th Engineers (Colored), the diaries of a white Jewish

officer in this service, Capt. Hyman Samuelson, edited by his niece,

Rutgers historian Gwendolyn M. Hall.

[6] See Stuart Cosgrove, “The Zoot Suit and Style Warfare, ”History

Workshop Journal 18 (autumn 1984): 77-91; online

at<http://www.edc.org/CCT/lemcen/u7sf/ u7materials/cos-grove.html>

[7] Constance Webb,Richard Wright: A Biography (New York:Putnam, 1968),

154-55.

[8] The best source on Ellison in this period (though unreliable on

dates) is Lawrence Jackson, Ralph Ellison: Emergence of Genius(New York:

Wiley, 2002). As far as I know there is no biography of Herndon. There

is some information on him and Ellison in Frederick T. Griffiths, “Ralph

Ellison, Richard Wright, and the Case of Angelo Herndon,”African

AmericanReview35.4 (winter 2001):615-36.

[9] References to NQ are given by page numbers, which were consecutive

in the four issues except for the “Editorial Comment” in Issue 2, which

was numbered i-v.

[10] NQ’s editorial statements were unsigned. Some scholars have

concluded that Ellison wrote the statement in issue no. 4,because of

similarities with Ellison’s later views, but there is no conclusive

evidence of single or joint authorship for any of them. I assume that

all four statements represent a common editorial position.

[11] The poem was reprinted with some changes in Dodson’s Powerful Long

Ladder(1946).

[12] Jawaharlal Nehru,The Discovery of India, abridged and edited by

Robert I. Crane (New York: Anchor, 1959), 364-81,quotation on 381;

Goshal.

[13] Goshal’s full career is not known to me. Online sources show him as

an actor in two New York theatre productions, in1927 and 1942 (the

former with Archie Leach, the future Cary Grant, in a minor role). He

remained in the CP periphery,collaborating on a 1964 book,Bitter End in

Southeast Asia,with Victor Perlo, an economist very close to the CPUSA

leadership.

[14] Gardiner, born in Kumasi, Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1914,graduated with

honors from Cambridge University in 1941. After the war he was an

academic in Nigeria, then a member of the Gold Coast and Ghana

governments, and finally a United Nations official.

[15] He is quoting Life and Times of Frederick Douglass, the third

version of Douglass’s autobiography, chap. 7.

[16] In later years Ellison dropped this conception, regarding African

Americans as a people culturally entwined with as well as distinct from

overall U.S. culture. I do not know how Herndon’s views on this point

evolved.

[17] Since the CP documents I have been quoting date from 1941 and

1942,it may be of interest that the CP’s unconditional support for

Roosevelt only deepened later in the war. Doxey Wilkerson’s pamphlet of

April 1944, The Negro People and the Communists, makes this clear. The

pamphlet seems to have two purposes: to state the CP stance on Negro

issues in preparation for the 1944 elections, justifying an all-out

support for Roosevelt, and to win support from African American members

for Earl Browder’s policy of preparing to dissolve the party in favor of

a “Communist Political Association” (19-20). On pages 7-10 there are

some quotations from party statements in favor of civil rights together

with references to ongoing social developments favoring Negro rights;

and on 17-18 there is a general call to “intensify our fight for [...]

democratic rights, not solely on the grounds of justice and fair play,

but primarily on the broader grounds of national security” (17).

However, there is not even one specific call for a struggle (by Negroes

led by the CP, or in any other form) for any specific civil right. There

is no call to work for Negro voting rights, desegregation of the armed

forces, nondiscrimination in housing, or desegregation of public

facilities and/or schools, even as distant goals.There is a principled

subordination of Negro rights to war victory and the victory of

progressive (i.e., pro-Soviet) capitalism during and after the war:

“[I]n this period of national crisis, the Communist Party has put aside

all partisan interests of its own, even its historic advocacy of

socialism. Our sole practical program during the war and on into the

peace which will follow is to strengthen the democratic camp of national

unity” (19-20; also see 13, 14, 17).