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Title: Demise of the Beehive Collective
Author: brad
Date: 1995
Language: en
Topics: Love and Rage Revolutionary Anarchist Federation, infoshops
Source: 1995 Aug/Sep issue of L&R. Retrieved on 2016-06-13 from https://web.archive.org/web/20160613073201/http://loveandrage.org/?q=infoshop

brad

Demise of the Beehive Collective

In April, 1995 the Beehive Community Space & Infoshop in Washington, DC

shut its doors. The Beehive Autonomous Collective, which started and

operated the infoshop, had started meeting in July 1993, and opened the

infoshop in October, 1993. This article will analyze some of what

happened at Beehive and attempt to draw some lessons that might be

useful for the Infoshop movement and the anarchist movement in general.

I was involved with Beehive for the entire life span of the group. In

this article I am only speaking for myself as one member of the project.

What is an Infoshop?

An infoshop is a space where people involved with radical movements and

countercultures can trade information, meet and network with other

people & groups, and hold meetings and/or events. They often house “free

schools” and educational workshops. Infoshops have existed in Europe for

decades. The Spanish revolutionary infoshops of the 1930s, and the

current European infoshops provided some of the inspiration for the

newer North American infoshops.

The North American Infoshop Movement

While a few bookstores/infoshops existed in the 1980s, the current wave

of infoshops basically started in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991.

Their growth seems to have in some ways been a direct response to

frustrations some anarchists felt trying to organize a movement against

the Gulf War without any institutions to draw upon or sustain day-to-day

activism in our communities. The Long Haul infoshop in the Bay Area and

the Emma Center in Minneapolis served as inspirations and models for

some of the other infoshops. The more punk music oriented spaces like

Epicenter in San Francisco and Reconstruction Records in New York were

also inspirations for some people.

Origins of Beehive & Drawing Lessons

Like many of today’s infoshops, Beehive’s origins are in the punk-rock

counterculture. It developed out of the contradictions facing the DC

punk community in 1993. Many people in the DC punk scene had been

politically active since the mid-1980s, and many of the more popular DC

punk bands had political lyrics and had played many benefit concerts

during that time. While the benefit concerts have continued, by 1993 the

tendency toward activism in the punk scene was fading. A few of us who

had been involved in punk- oriented activist groups, such as Positive

Force, Riot Grrrl and Food Not Bombs, were feeling more isolated from

the rest of the punk scene. We came together out of the experiences we

had in these other groups, in a mostly unarticulated attempt to move

beyond the confines of the “punk scene” to become more involved with and

relevant to other DC communities. Others who hadn’t been previously

involved in DC punk/political groups also got involved, attracted to the

concept of either a “free space,” a record store or a hangout space.

Little Participation from Local Community

One of the most noticeable things about Beehive’s beginning was that

almost all of the people who got involved were not from DC--and even

further, many people had just recently moved to DC Only a few people who

were ever involved with Beehive actually grew up in the DC area or had

lived here more than a couple of years. This helped produce a larger

problem--none of the people in the collective were from the particular

neighborhood where we opened our infoshop, and we never succeeded in

attracting neighborhood residents to the project.

When Beehive was starting out, the fact that so many people were from

out of town was refreshing, as it strengthened the waning “political”

tendency in the DC punk scene. But in retrospect it was a weakness which

caused a continual shortsightedness, and contributed to the group’s end.

This “transient” tendency isn’t surprising considering the social base

Beehive came out of. The punk scene is generally young, politically

inexperienced and has very high turnover. There is a strong commitment

to individual and/or spontaneous acts of creativity (bands, fanzines,

fashion, etc.) but a non-committal or skeptical attitude toward

organized movements or organizations. To start a community- based

organization such as an infoshop, however, requires long-term thinking

and commitment. This basic tension-- between the attention span and

commitment level of our social base, and the commitment necessary to do

what we said we wanted to do--was a problem in Beehive from beginning to

end.

Dominance of Punk-Rock Culture

The fact that Beehive came out of the punk-rock community isn’t

inherently bad by any means. But we need to recognize the limitations of

the punk scene, and how those limitations make a community organizing

project very difficult, if not impossible.

At Beehive we also experienced the strange tendency for punk to dominate

all that it comes in contact with. While Beehive was started by punks,

some non-punk anarchists and other activists were attracted to it at

first. But none of the non-punk activists stayed involved, and it wasn’t

until the last few months of the group that a few more non-punk

anarchists got involved. While the non-punks who left had their

individual reasons for leaving the group, I think in most cases it was

partly related to the dominance of punk in the group.

Since the visible activities happening at Beehive were punk-related,

more middle-class punks continued to be attracted to the project, mostly

from outside of DC So we were continually treading water, always saying

we wanted to “get beyond” the punk community and interact with and

involve people from the neighborhood around us, but continually

attracting more and more punks (with varying degrees of commitment to

community organizing). This further strengthened the association of

Beehive with the punk scene, and made it increasingly more difficult to

attract other communities to the project.

The answer to this question is not easy, as punk has probably done more

than anything else in the last 20 years to popularize anarchism and to

articulate the anti- authoritarianism of alienated white youth. Punk

culture should exist, and thrive, in radical spaces, but it shouldn’t

dominate.

There is an underlying strain of arrogance and elitism to much of punk

culture, a belief that “the masses are asses” or that everyone else is

just stupid and conforms to society’s expectations. Also the fact that

punks tend to come from white, middle- class backgrounds means that many

punks have more resources and money at their disposal to develop their

projects than do people from more working- class countercultures. This

factor makes it easy for punk to unintentionally dominate a space--many

punks receive “hidden” support from parents and middle- class jobs,

which allow more punk bands to buy nicer equipment, put out their own

records, tour more easily, etc.

Gentrification

When we started looking for a building to move our community space into,

we were immediately confronted with the high cost of rent in DC. The

cheapest rent we were able to find--somewhat near a subway station and

somewhat near where some of us lived--was in a neighborhood that is in

the process of gentrification.

Gentrification is the process by which a working- class or poor urban

neighborhood starts to become desirable to middle-class or yuppie people

(“gentry”) from outside of that neighborhood. One of the main desirable

factors is the cheap rent. Once middle-class people move in, they start

to make “improvements,” demand more police presence to protect their

property, and businesses start to appear to cater to their middle-class

and yuppie tastes. As the neighborhood becomes more “desirable” for

people with more money, property values start to rise, and the original

poor or working-class residents of the neighborhood can’t keep up with

the rising costs and have to move out. It is a process of colonization

on a smaller level.

Some of us repeatedly raised the issue of gentrification in the group

while we were deciding where to locate our infoshop. We were conscious

of our role as outsiders to the U Street neighborhood we were

considering, and we were weary of the “revitalization” going on a few

blocks down the street. The U Street & 14^(th) Street corridors were

burned out in April 1968 in the urban uprisings after Dr. Martin Luther

King Jr. was assassinated.

Until the early 90s, the commercial corridors remained partly vacant

while surrounding neighborhoods suffered from the violence and decay

that has wreaked havoc on inner cities over the past 30 years.

Around when we were looking at the neighborhood, a group of new “hip”

businesses had joined together to market the concept of “The New U,”

which was used in ads in citywide papers to try to attract outsiders to

come shop the new U Street businesses. The “New U” businesses down the

street hit a nerve with us because many of them were started by people

from our community--punks and alternative types. Since they were from

our community, we wanted to differentiate from them, but in reality we

didn’t really know how.

We didn’t want to contribute to the gentrification process, although

none of us had a clear idea of how to oppose it. We agreed that we would

try to be different than the stores of “The New U” down the street. We

would be different because we would try to serve needs of people who

lived in the neighborhood (through free clothing, free food, and free

daycare programs, for example) rather than trying to bring in yuppies

from outside with money. We knew we would make mistakes, but we didn’t

see ourselves as contributing to gentrification as long as we were

actively struggling against it politically.

Gentrification turned out to be one of the two major divisive issues in

Beehive, and it seems to be that way at most infoshops around the US.

Internal Group Dynamics: Race, Class & Gender

Other than gentrification, it was internal group dynamics centering on

race, class and gender that were the most pressing and most divisive

issues that Beehive faced. This also seems to mirror the experience of

other infoshops around the US. We had a series of internal conflicts

which escalated in intensity, until May 1994 when two members and two

non-members of the group confronted the rest of the group in a very

abrasive way for what they saw as sexism, classism and racism in the way

the group operated. Those of us involved in Beehive learned a lot from

these internal struggles. It forced us to confront many of our personal

motivations and approaches, to try to figure out which of our actions

come out of our genuinely progressive aspirations, and which come from

our culturally brainwashed upbringing in a white-supremacist,

patriarchal, and capitalist society.

Unfortunately, some who supported Beehive but weren’t directly involved

seemed turned off or intimidated by the perceived hostile infighting.

This further isolated us from the community that we originally emerged

from.

More importantly, I think these internal struggles happened in a way

that was disconnected to any practice of trying to change oppressive

institutions in society, and without seeing that our mistakes were not

just due to our individual shortcomings, but were being replicated by

many other groups at the same time. Although it wasn’t easy to see at

the time, the struggles over internal dynamics in the group escalated

precisely when it had become clear that Beehive wasn’t accomplishing the

political goals that we claimed to aspire to. The free daycare never

happened. A proposal for a community organizing project was passed but

then never acted on. Anti-gentrification discussion and efforts had been

pushed into the background. Other activist groups weren’t using Beehive

as a meeting space or resource center. The lending library was falling

apart.

This wasn’t because we didn’t care about these things anymore. We just

hadn’t realized how much work it would take just to maintain and staff

the infoshop, let alone actually using it as a base from which to launch

activist projects. Once we had rented a building and moved in, it took

all our energy (and then some!) to just staff and open the infoshop

three days a week (we would have liked to have been open every day).

Repairs to the building were never made. Bureaucratic paperwork with the

government to make our infoshop “legal” was never filled out--partly

because we decided not to, but even if we had wanted to we just weren’t

organized enough to handle it.

Among the people who were consistently involved with the group, many of

us traveled for weeks or months at a time and our involvement varied

accordingly. Core people moved away from DC at a few key moments in the

group’s history. There was never a clear sense that people would be

around very long. This “come and go” situation among core members and

the high turnover among others made it impossible to progress on

internal group dynamics.

For example, at a meeting one week, a woman would confront the group

about sexism, and we would agree to spend the next meeting discussing

the situation in depth. Then at the next meeting there would only be a

few people there who were at the previous meeting. Everyone else there

missed “the incident” and had no idea what was happening or why it was

suddenly so urgent to spend the whole meeting talking about our sexism.

The discussions on internal dynamics would mostly consist of

uncomfortable silence. The people who brought the issue up in the first

place would say what they thought, and there would be some hesitant

discussion, but real group dialogue on these issues almost never

happened. We just weren’t able to handle it as a group.

Transience makes it impossible to deal with internal dynamics. To get

anywhere on such issues, I think a group needs to have a somewhat stable

membership who can work out interpersonal dynamics over time, and the

group also needs to be actively struggling to bring about change outside

of itself. Otherwise, dealing with internal dynamics becomes

all-consuming, and becomes more like group therapy than struggling to

change the society we live in. (This is not to degrade therapy for those

who want or need it to deal with life in a fucked up society; It is just

to say that political organizing and therapy are different things, and

we should be clear which one we want to be doing at what times.)

Some people attracted to counter-institutions, like many other political

projects, like this act in oppressive ways (intentionally or not) and

take up more than their share of the group’s time in dealing with their

personal problems or idiosyncrasies. I don’t think we should be afraid

of criticizing or “alienating” people who are detracting from the focus

of the group or making others feel uncomfortable. I think we need to

commit ourselves to finding ways to deal seriously with oppressive

aspects of our group dynamics in a way that encourages people to speak,

grow, and learn to become better activists through experience and

comradely criticism.

No Unifying Vision, No Clear Goals, No Strategy

The other missing link in dealing with internal dynamics is a clear

sense of vision in the group. If everyone involved is clear about the

purpose of the group (i.e. if the purpose and goals are worked out at

the beginning, and clarified into a written statement) then the group

can always refer back to that to see if its outward activities and

internal dynamics are actually helping to fulfill those goals or not.

But with Beehive, and I think at many other infoshops too, we never

truly had political agreement on what our goals or purpose were.

We did have a statement of purpose, but it was crafted in a carefully

vague way to basically allow for anything and avoid making choices about

a specific course of action. We defined Beehive as, “an all volunteer

collective promoting communication through books, records, ‘zines,

performance, meetings, and social/political networking. In our attempt

to break the cycle of an historically classist, sexist, racist,

heterosexist and authoritarian social system, we feel it is imperative

to oppose capitalist oppression. It has denied us self-realization and

free association. Beehive intends to bridge the ever increasing gap

between privilege and underdevelopment by providing access to space and

information at low cost or free. We will: be organic, radical, wild, and

revolutionary; creative and critical locally and internationally.”

When you take away what we are abstractly for & against, that leaves

only promoting communication and providing a space for other people to

“do their own thing.” While this is a good thing to do, it does not

differ fundamentally from the mission of a public library, for example.

And I would argue in the current context, at least in DC, it is not the

most valuable use of our energies in building a revolutionary

anti-authoritarian movement.

While our statement took some political stands (against capitalism,

racism, sexism, heterosexism), we did not have a political focus of our

own to fight against those things. By coming out against those things

politically while having no program to work against them, we were

setting ourselves up to be torn apart by struggles over those

oppressions in the internal dynamics of the group--and that’s what

happened. This shows why it is important to have an agreed upon purpose

for the group, as well as an attempt to create a strategy to realize

those goals.

Having no agreed upon purpose creates one set of problems that will

probably lead to misunderstandings and frustration, factionalism, and

people leaving the group confused or frustrated about what the group is

supposed to be doing. Having a unified purpose but no strategy creates

another similar set of problems, which will also often cause people to

become frustrated and look to each others’ individual shortcomings for

the source of the problem, rather than trying to create a strategy to

have an effect on the world around us. Most infoshops seem to be stuck

in one or the other of these problems; Beehive was usually somewhere in

between.

The Unstated (Dis)Ideology of Infoshops

While Beehive’s political statement avoided articulating a specific

strategy or focus, we were still following an unspoken strategy. The

failure to articulate a strategy doesn’t mean that you don’t have one,

it just means that you haven’t consciously worked through it as a group.

I think most infoshops try to take the easy way out of developing and

implementing a strategy to reach our stated ideals, by stating our

purpose simply as sharing information and providing a space for people

to use. This creates a big gap between our stated goals (against

capitalism, racism, sexism, heterosexism) and our actual activities

(educational and logistical support work). We had revolutionary ideas

but little strategy to work toward realizing them.

Counter-Institutions as “The Revolution”?

As you can probably tell by now, I don’t see infoshops or

counter-institutions as “the answer” or “the strategy” for building a

revolutionary anarchist movement. I do, however, think that they can be

an important part of a strategy, if there is a mass movement to support

and sustain them. Some people (though probably not many in the anarchist

infoshop movement) do see counter-institutions as “the revolution.”

Their strategy basically says that through creating non- profit

cooperatives (food co- ops, free medical clinics, housing co-ops, etc.)

we will set examples of a different type of society and serve the needs

of our communities, which others will then copy. The

counter-institutions will continue to gain power and will be able to

serve the needs of the people, making the current power structures

irrelevant without having to struggle directly against them.

What this strategy leaves out is that the institutions in power now have

an interest in staying in power, and will fight to preserve and expand

their power. They will struggle directly against our

counter-institutions whether we fight them or not. So without a means to

directly confront them, our counter-institutions will be crushed when

they are perceived as enough of a threat to the status quo.

However, in the current political context without strong mass movements,

the greater danger to counter-institutions is being co-opted into a

harmless “alternative” without revolutionary content. We can see this in

many food co-ops that started in the co-op upsurge of the early 1970s

which are now catering increasingly to a yuppie clientele and adopting

more of a capitalist approach. I think this shows that counter-

institutions are not inherently revolutionary--they can go in many

directions.

Counter-Institutions as a Foundation for Revolutionary Growth?

A more developed analysis sees infoshops not as inherently revolutionary

but as one part of a revolutionary strategy. As Jacinto from Chicago’s

Autonomous Zone Infoshop wrote in the first issue of (dis)connection,

“the revolution is not in the formation of these counter-institutions,

but in the revolutionary potential of the collectives which can use the

resources provided by liberated spaces.” Jacinto argues that building

sustainable radical counter-institutions now will provide a launching

pad for all sorts of radical projects and collectives. This strategy

makes sense--it sees the need for building ongoing institutions to

sustain radical activism, and it also sees the limitations of those

counter- institutions by themselves. This strategy says that the missing

ingredient--the reason there are not more radical projects and

collectives--is that there is not a base of support, information, and

resources for such projects to develop. According to this strategy, if

we build infoshops as that base, then the amount of activist projects in

our communities should grow.

This was the unstated strategy that I was pursuing through Beehive, and

I think it’s the unstated strategy of a lot of people who are involved

in infoshops. While this strategy sounds good, it did not work in

practice for us, and I don’t see much evidence of it working elsewhere.

One possibility is that Beehive did not survive long enough to “bear

fruit” in the form of new projects and collectives. But as it was, our

whole group was drained just keeping the Beehive infoshop afloat and

staffed from week to week. The anarchist and radical communities are

just too small in DC to sustain an anarchist infoshop and to also

develop other projects. Rather than building the basis for further

growth of radical projects, my experience is that infoshops will burn

out the core group of activists and thus prevent them from developing or

contributing to new projects.

Where To From Here: Revolutionary Pluralism & Infoshops as a Part of

a Revolutionary Strategy

This is the situation we find ourselves in--in North America in 1995 we

are trying to build a revolutionary anti- authoritarian movement on

almost no solid foundation. Many young anarchists realize that we need

ongoing institutions to sustain our work during the high points and low

points of mass movements. Over the past few years, many of us have tried

to build local infoshops and community centers to fulfill that function.

At best, the results have been mixed. Most of the infoshop collectives

have attracted new people to anarchist politics, and have given

anarchists an ongoing project to work on that at least has the potential

to deal with the issues faced by oppressed and alienated people in our

daily lives. Some of the infoshops have improved the reputation of

anarchists in their cities by having a visible example of their

politics, while a couple have also taken militant direct action on

neighborhood issues such as gentrification.

At the same time, every infoshop I know of has experienced severe

internal problems, with serious factional fights and with many people

leaving infoshops frustrated, angry, or burnt out. The factional fights

and splits have escalated to vandalism or threats of violence at places

like Emma Center in Minneapolis, Beehive in DC, and Epicenter in San

Francisco.

While much of the initial point of starting infoshops was to create a

stable, ongoing presence in a particular city or community, some

infoshops which opened with lofty expectations are already closed, such

as Croatan in Baltimore and Beehive in DC Other infoshops which are

still open have already had to move once or twice, like Chicago’s

A-Zone. And of all the infoshops I’m familiar with, I can’t think of any

that have helped facilitate the starting of new projects or collectives

except as hostile splits from the infoshop collective! Other projects

that have developed probably would have formed anyway without the

existence of the infoshops.

In cities where active anarchist projects and collectives already exist,

it might make sense to set up an infoshop. But generally infoshops

haven’t been very successful at supporting and helping develop new

projects. I think this is because of a lack of open discussion about our

politics, vision, and strategy. While skills-sharing is crucial to

helping disempowered and alienated people take control over our lives, I

think the “missing ingredient” in the lack of new anarchist projects is

our lack of a political vision for the future, and our lack of

developing realistic strategies to move toward that vision. Can we

really consider infoshops a cornerstone of a revolutionary movement if

we can’t have a discussion about anything deeper than what color to

paint the room without causing a major split in the collective?

To deal with these questions, I think we need to take a step back from

the specific political projects, such as infoshops, that we’ve chosen to

work on. I don’t mean to say that we should abandon such projects, but

that they are bound to fail unless we simultaneously take a step back

and build stable, ongoing political collectives, organizations, or other

forums as a political infrastructure for our movement. The focus of such

organizations hsoul be specifically to develop political vision and

strategy, and hen work to implement that strategy. These can be local,

regional, national or international groupings. Love and Rage is one

example of such a group, but there are many such organizations with

varying visions and strategies that will be part of any revolutionary

movement. This is what I think of when I think of “revolutionary

pluralism.”

Infoshops may be one aspect of a political strategy that such political

groupings could develop. But infoshops aren’t a strategy in themselves,

and are failing as a shortcut for working through our political

differences and coming up with coherent visions and strategies to

realize an anarchist future. I don’t think that it’s a mistake to work

on infoshops, and I wouldn’t say that the two years working on Beehive

were a waste of time, as long as we are willing to admit our

shortcomings and honestly sum up that experience to learn from it an

move forward. This article is my attempt to do that, and my view is that

it’s time to work on other projects instead of starting another

infoshop.