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Title: Aftermath Of A Gulf War Author: Anonymous Date: 1991 Language: en Topics: war, Canada, anarchist opposition, the state, violence, Iraq, Middle East Source: Resistance 15 (1991), reprinted in Only A Beginning: An anarchist anthology, edited by Allan Antliff (Arsenal/Pulp Press, Vancouver, 2004), page 128 Notes: Scanned from original, 2014
It is now several months after the conclusion of the Gulf War. The US
has staged its victory parade and fallout from the war continues to be
felt, not the least by the Iraqi people, the Kurdish and the
Palestinians.
Southern Kurdistan (northern Iraq), the Persian Gulf and other areas in
the region now contain American troops, ships and aircraft, with a
permanent military presence now being put in place. How did this come
about, what was the background to the war, and why a war in the Middle
East?
Prior to the beginning of the war, Luis Bilbao wrote in the Buenos Aires
daily Nuevo Sur,
âIn the show of force in the desert, one can now precisely measure
abstract concepts that only months ago were nearly out of reach: a
breakup of the international balance of power and a strengthening of the
seven leading industrialized countries...the conflict of interest
between the Big Seven and the rest of the world is merely beginning to
take on its true shape.â
The background to the war can be traced to recent international
developments, in particular a reconstitution of the global order. This
includes not only the breakup of the Eastern Bloc in 1989 and the ending
of the Cold War, but also the forming of three competing economic blocs:
Europe, Japan-Asia and North America.
One can say that the East-West conflict has shifted to a North-South
conflict or, as Bilbao has already said, a âconflict of interest between
the Big Seven and the rest of the worldâ. But while itâs clear that the
world economy is now subject to conditions imposed by the G-7, the Gulf
War must be seen first of all as an assertion of US hegemony (a dominant
leadership).
The restructuring of international capital, the economic competition
rising from Europe and Japan-Asia, concurrent with the economic decline
in the US, means the US is now capable of asserting its hegemony in an
economic-political-military way.
The Persian Gulf was the proving ground of the New World Order, in
essence an order led by the US which
âdominates its affairs and destiny on the international and regional
levels...the US conquest of the Arabian Peninsula is part and parcel of
the US global policy at this Juncture. The Arabian Peninsula has 66
percent of the worlds oil resources. Oil is no longer only a source of
energy, although that is important. Oil now means [1] energy; [2] a
series of major, diversified and growing petrochemical industries; and
[3] control of the circulation of international finance...the US has
invaded the Arabian Peninsula to retain its leading world position. By
domination of Arab oil, the US dominates not only the political and
economic destiny of this region, but can also determine the outcome of
its fierce competition with Europe and Japanâ (George Habash, the
Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic
Palestine, November-December, 1990).
As well, western and US imperialism has had to contend with various
threats to its power in the Middle East, including the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism (which can be characterized as decidedly anti-western as
in the 1979 Iranian revolution), the Palestinian resistance and the
Intifada (which has increasingly challenged the western imperialism
asset in the region, Israel), Pan-Arab nationalism, and the Kurdish
guerrilla struggle in NATOâs southern flank, Turkey.
Combined, these factors make the region one of the most unstable in the
world for western imperialism.
In this context, Iraq was another essential factor. Iraq was a major
military power in the region and an oil producing country that worked
against the interests of the US. Not only with the invasion of Kuwait,
which was nothing more than a preconceived context for US military
intervention, but through its oil policies which included raising the
price of oil and limiting production, contrary to the agreements reached
by OPEC and western imperialism.
The Iraqi challenge had to be dismantled to deter threats to western
interests and/or to the security of the Zionist state of Israel and the
pro-US Arab regimes.
The Gulf War was aimed at establishing US hegemony in the New World
Order, gaining control of the Arabian Peninsula, dismantling Iraq and
crushing the liberation struggles in the region.
Canadaâs military involvement in the Gulf War was, in the overall
balance of forces deployed, minor. With only 2,000 troops, Canadaâs role
was limited to providing logistical support in sea and air operations.
Despite this, it must be noted that Canada was one of the first
countries--outside of the US--to respond militarily, by sending three
ships to the Gulf on August 24, 1990 to enforce the economic embargo.
The Canadian government also supported, with little reservation, all
US-led UN resolutions against Iraq.
Under Operation Friction, naval and air task groups from the Canadian
Armed forces (CAF) were deployed in Saudi Arabia at Al Quaysuma and Al
Jubayl; in Manama, Bahrain; Qatar; in the southern Gulf; and aboard the
US Hospital ship Mercy. By January 15, the deployment consisted of the
three ships, HMCS Athabascan, Protecteur, and Terra Nova; 24 CF-18
fighters; field hospitals; and two companies of infantry for security.
The role of the CAF was limited to logistical support: interdiction of
cargo ships, escort of supply ships, escort of bombers and medical aid.
What may at first appear to be another facet of the world-wide myth,
âCanada the peacekeeperâ, is in reality the extremely limited military
capabilities of the CAF; only 80,000 personnel in total, outdated and
overworked equipment, and a lack of desert fighting equipment and
training. As well, an activation of more troops would have âplaced a
severe strain on the ability of the CAF to take on such tasks as
responding to another Mohawk crisis at home (an unnamed source, Globe
and Mail, January 12, 1990).
The Canadian military contribution was limited, but Canadaâs economic
and political interests in the war knew no boundaries.
Canadaâs political and military involvement in the war was determined by
economic interrelation with the US, realized through the Free Trade
Agreement on one level, and international groupings such as the G-7;
âIf the war is ended quickly, Mr. Wilson (the Canadian Finance Minister)
said, he agrees with US officials that an Allied victory could help
improve consumer confidence and trigger a rebound in the N. American
economies...All of the countries were searching for ways to make sure
the recessions facing the US, Britain and Canada donât become severe
enough to trigger a global downturnâ (Globe and Mail, Report on
Business, January 21, 1991, a meeting of the G-7 in New York).
In the development of three competing economic blocs (Europe, Japan-Asia
and N. America) Canadaâs economic and political destiny now lies with
that of the US. As a participant in and beneficiary of US imperialism,
Canadaâs interests are strongly connected with those of the US.
Militarily, Canada can contribute little to the USâs New World Order.
Rather, it will be in the economic and political fields, through
Canadaâs position in the IMF, the G-7 and the UN, that Canada will
re-affirm US imperialisms new era of exploitation.
The New World Order will be a period of more military interventions,
primarily by the US--the one nation militarily capable of such
incursions--and increased exploitation of the three continents. The
effects of this New World Order, the ending of the Cold War (which was
greeted with such euphoria as opening to an era of âpeaceâ) and the
economic restructuring, can now be seen in the aftermath of the Gulf
War.
The struggle continues.
The Gulf War & âInternal Securityâ
Throughout the course of the Gulf War and in the months leading up to
it, North America and Europe experienced unprecedented levels of
âinternal securityâ. The threat of âterroristâ attacks was almost as
newsworthy as the war itself. Soldiers and armored vehicles patrolled
airports in Britain, SWAT teams and bomb squads were deployed at Super
Bowl V in Florida, Arabs were detained, harassed and placed under
surveillance. The massive security campaign had specific goals;
repression of Arabs, repression of opposition to the war in general;
propaganda for the war; and actual security of potential targets of
resistance.
If the US and other nations had learned anything from the defeat in
Vietnam, it was that wars can be significantly disrupted from internal
movements. Therefore, the role of counter-insurgency, maintaining the
âinner peaceâ, controlling dissent to ensure the ability to wage war
from the military-economic centres, and mobilizing social consensus in
favour of the war, was given a high priority.
The use of âanti-terroristâ hysteria attempted to establish an image in
the social consciousness of a society under siege--not only involved in
a âjust warâ in the Persian Gulf--but under threat in its own peaceful
backyard. Prior to the war, reports were already filtering through the
media of âterroristâ groups in Canada. This followed the pattern of the
âLibyan hit squadsâ of the early â80âs and the IRA unit gunning for
Thatcher at the 1988 Economic Summit in Toronto. Neither of these cases
proved much substance.
Not easily discouraged, âterrorist unitsâ appeared in the headlines on
January 21, 1991: âTerrorism hits home--Canadians believed targeted by
radical supporters of Iraq.â [4] This report originated from the
expulsion of three Iraqi diplomats in Ottawa. Diplomats it was later
discovered, to have âhad suspected links with Arab terrorist cells in
Canadaâ. Suddenly, âterrorist cellsâ appeared ad nauseam: âSmall cells
of the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah had been uncovered in Toronto and
Montreal...Also involved were cells of the Shiite party known as Al
Daâwa. Meanwhile, terrorists linked to Iraq may be trying to infiltrate
the US through Canada...it is possible we will see terrorist attacks in
the coming week.â [5]
No such attacks occurred in N. America, nor were there any spectacular
and âhigh-levelâ actions of the sort security officials could even
attribute to Arab guerrillas (one action, six pipe-bombs found near a US
naval base in Virginia turned out to be an insurance scam by three
businessmen).
Undaunted by this conspicuous absence of attacks, security agencies
continued with their campaign. Arabs in Canada continued to be
interrogated by Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS)
agents, [6] to the point where the Canadian Arab Federation was forced
to hold news conferences on the issue and distribute a brochure on CSIS.
The CAF received over 60 complaints by Arabs who had been followed,
questioned at length or photographed by CSIS. CSIS claimed their
activities were merely to learn more about the politics of the middle
East. However, such overt and aggressive surveillance techniques have
less to do with information gathering and more to do with repression via
intimidation. The Arab community and particularly the radical elements
were to be neutralized--not because they were âpotential
terroristsâ--but because they offered the strongest orientation of
resistance, because they had the ability to expose the real goals of the
war, and to provide a perspective that went beyond the âNo Blood for
Oil, Bring Our Troops Homeâ sloganeering of the anti-war movement.
Along with the highly publicized activities of CSIS, the use of
immigration laws and refugee status was used to further silence the Arab
community. Throughout N. America and Europe, Arabs and particularly
Palestinians and Iraqis were detained, denied entry, had their visaâs
revoked or denied extension. In the UK, Iraqi nationals were barred from
entry and those already living in the UK were required to register with
police. By the end of the war, up to 200 Iraqis and Palestinians had
been detained. In Germany, the surveillance of Arabs and new laws
against immigrants required doctors, lawyers and public officials to
give the government all information they had on immigrants. In Spain,
some 6,000 Arabs were âsuspectâ and entered into computer files under
âOperation Dunaâ. In France, a similar program was enacted under
âVigipirateâ.
In Canada, amongst other cases, was the example of an Iraqi couple
arriving at Torontoâs Pearson airport allegedly carrying false Saudi
passports, who were detained on January 9, 1991. The couple applied for
refugee status, and the man was a member of the opposition Daâwa party
and had fought on the side of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. He was found to
be carrying a notebook with a list of weapons, which he claimed he
compiled during the Iran-Iraq war.
Initial government efforts to have the couple detained as security
threats were overturned when immigration adjudicator Dennis Paxton ruled
that the governmentâs arguments were âto be generous, unlikelyâ. [7]
However, his decision to order the couple released was overruled by a
ânational security certificateâ filed by then-Immigration Minister
Barbara McDougall and Solicitor-General Pierre Cadieux.
The certificate, used for the first time, is issued under section 40 of
the Immigration Act if both the Immigration Minister and
Solicitor-General âare of the opinion, based on security or criminal
intelligence reportsâ that an individual poses a threat to the safety of
Canada. On march 12 the Federal Court of Canada ruled the government
lacked any evidence that the couple were a security threat. In his
ruling, the judge stated that the couple âappeared to have a genuine
refugee claim based upon their opposition to the regime of Saddam
Hussein.â Interestingly, the use of the couple as propaganda shifted
from âpotential terroristsâ prior to and during the war, to refugees
fleeing the Iraqi regime after the US military âvictoryâ.
Along with the CSIS surveillance and the use of immigration laws was the
actual security presence:
âA vast array of strategic facilities--everything from airports and
border crossings to power plants--are on the alert...Security at nuclear
plants in New Brunswick and Ontario has been strengthened.â [8]
On January 15, 1991 the National Energy Board issued directives to oil
and gas pipeline companies to increase security at key installations.
âItâs a quiet reminder of the crisis in the Persian Gulf and of the
potential for sabotage.â [9]
The heightened security ran from the highest levels of state agencies
such as the national Security Coordination Centre down to local police
forces.
In Toronto, city police met with public department heads. According to
Nick Vardin, commissioner of Torontoâs Public Works Department, they had
a âstrategic meeting with police to discuss what would be expected in
the event of an emergency or terrorist attack...that we would be
expected to provide manpower and any resources to help out.â [10]
In Vancouver, Jewish Congress chairperson Dr. Michael Elterman stated
his organization had âhad discussions with Vancouver police and worked
out a planâ in the event of âterrorist actions.â [11]
There was also a marked increase in policing of anti-war demonstrations
in Vancouver with higher numbers of police including the use of
riot-equipped police on the international protest day of January 26
(this occurred after demonstrators assailed a militia armory, destroyed
recruiting signs and proceeded to a recruiting center, presumably to do
similar actions). In other demonstrations when more radical
demonstrators blocked streets in downtown Vancouver to further disrupt
traffic and âbusiness as usualâ, the police were quick to point out that
the people involved were âfringe groupsâ and that the police âknew who
they were and were keeping an eye on themâ.
The final phase of such security would have been enactment of the
Emergencies Act, requiring only a simple declaration by the federal
cabinet. The Emergencies Act, which replaced the War Measures Act in
1988, contains all the necessary instruments to launch an internal war
on âdissentâ. [12] Under the Act, a âwar emergencyâ can be declared
which is a âwar or other armed conflict, real or imminent, involving
Canada or any of its allies that is so serious as to be a national
emergencyâ. With this, the government can make any âorders or
regulationsâ that it believes âon reasonable grounds, are necessary or
advisableâ. Another aspect of the Act is the âinternational emergencyâ,
which enables the government to regulate âany specified industry or
servicesâ and control the travel of any Canadian citizen. in this way,
any substantial increase in resistance, such as workers strikes
involving military equipment or armaments, widespread sabotage, could
prompt implementation of the Emergencies Act.
But where was this wave of âterrorismâ? Certainly, armed attacks
occurred in many countries throughout the world--but even
counter-insurgency âexpertsâ claimed it wasnât from Iraqi or Palestinian
groups but in fact endemic (local) guerrilla groups. Even with this, the
offensive of armed actions was primarily in the Three Continents and
relatively limited in the major western states.
According to Yigal Carmon, adviser on âterrorismâ to Israeli prime
minister Yitzak Shamir, this was due to the increased vigilance in the
west:
âCarmon noted western countries had taken an unprecedented range of
countermeasures to detect and deter terrorism...Among other measures,
maintenance workers and cleaners of Arab origin were dismissed from jobs
in European airports, government buildings and military installations.
Asked if such dismissals violated civil rights, Carmon said he assumed
such measures were all legal because the countries concerned were all
law-abiding (!!!-ed.). He pointed with approval to western countries
that have âinvestigated and restricted the movements of Arab nationals
and have detained and deported them.ââ [13]
However, the reality of this âvigilanceâ in deterring armed attacks can
be seen in the actions which did take place: the Red Army Fraction
machine-gunning of the US embassy in Bonn, bombings by the November 17
organization in Greece, bombings throughout Turkey, scores of
firebombings of military recruiting centres, corporations and US
interests throughout the US and W. Europe, and most striking of all, the
February 7 IRA mortar attack on No. 10 Downing St.--the very nerve
centre of the British government--while the prime minister met with his
war cabinet!
Clearly, when radical groups have the ability and determination to carry
out attacks, any level of security can be breached or avoided.
The actual security of targets is in many ways a side-effect of the
ultimate goals. That is, while security of military, government and
corporate property is of importance (more so in the Three Continents),
such security also has political goals aimed at a level of social
control that goes beyond more guards and razor-wire. The guards and
razor-wire are necessary, but they are used to also mobilize people into
acceptance and even support for the military force used against Iraq,
and de facto Arab people, because not only is there a war âover thereâ
but also an âinner threatâ here. The crudest manifestations of this
social control politic was the upsurge in racist violence against Arab
people. Vandalism, assaults, firebombings and even shootings occurred.
The Canadian Arab Federation documented over 100 violent anti-Arab
incidents. Another effect of the racist war hysteria was an increase in
anti-semitic attacks on synagogues, Jewish schools and businesses.
Clearly, many of these actions can be attributed to the extreme
right/fascist groups who, if they werenât fully supporting the war, were
railing against the war as yet another âJewish conspiracy to rule the
worldâ, such as Tom Metzgerâs White Aryan Resistance, which instructed
its members not to fight for âJews or camel-jockeys and sand-niggersâ.
The response in much of the anti-war movement to this racism was to
reinforce it. Aside from other critiques of the anti-war movement, such
as its lack of clear analysis as to how to resist the war, its sexism
and lack of class consciousness, was its own racism.
Seemingly unable and/or unwilling to go beyond slogans and perspectives
of the 60âs, or more correctly the media image of that movement,
anti-war opposition relied on opportunistic slogans: Bring Our/The
Troops Home (to which one must ask why--to suppress another Oka or
enforce Martial law?), and No Blood for Oil (to which one must ask,
whose blood--white Anglo-Saxonsâ blood?). The movement in general played
up to white supremacy and patriotism as it attempted to depoliticize
every aspect of imperialist war except self-interest: Hell No, We Wonât
Go, We Wonât Die For Texaco. What mattered most to the âofficialâ peace
movement was the numbers of people it could attract to demonstrations
and vigils where its sacred rituals of pseudo-dissent were enacted like
a broken record. A broken John Lennon record!
But at whose expense?
The failure to link the Palestinian and Kurdish struggles with the war,
to analyze the economic and political conditions which have ensured
there has not been one day of peace since World War 2, the absence of an
attempt to develop a perspective for resistance to the war and not just
protest, meant that the anti-war movement was circumscribed. It had come
to a dead end even before it started. Who was absent from its programs
and platforms: people of colour and particularly Arabs. The
crystallization of this process was the Jan. 26 mobilizations in which
the Vancouver âdisarmamentâ group End the Arms Race refused to allow a
member of the Arab community to speak on a platform they controlled.
Allegedly to avoid âcontroversyâ, it was yet another attempt to retain
the depoliticization EAR had worked so hard to achieve, and in the end
can only be seen as furthering the efforts by the state to silence the
Arab perspective: collaboration is the definitive term.
In conclusion, the use of âanti-terrorismâ and security plays a special
role in social control. It creates the conditions for selective and if
necessary widespread repression. In this way, the argument that armed or
militant actions create repression is shown to be an absurdity; the
state constantly organizes its repressive laws and apparatus and
constructs the necessary conditions to implement them.
However, it isnât only counter-insurgency that can weaken or even
destroy oppositional movements. Nor is it the state which is solely
responsible for widespread racism, or in the context of the Gulf War,
attacks against Arabs and support for the wholesale slaughter of Arabs.
This is something the âpeaceâ movement can also lay claim to.
In this way, the question must also be asked: what role does false
opposition play in social control? Certainly, as long as movements of
opposition do not attack causes and instead rally around effects, and do
not direct themselves against the determining point of conflict between
the exploited and exploiter, they fulfill the role of reaffirming the
âpluralistic democracyâ by acting as the (false) voice of dissent.
Above all, the security measures taken during the Gulf War need to be
understood and, in future conflicts as well as now, countered by
breaking through the limitations imposed by the state and the âofficialâ
peace movement. Limitations not only in our analysis, but in our actions
and solidarity work.
[1] Vancouver Province, January 21, 1991.
[2] Ibid.
[3] See also Resistance no. 14.
[4] Vancouver Province, January 21, 1991.
[5] Ibid.
[6] See also Resistance no. 14.
[7] Globe and Mail, February 6, 1991.
[8] Globe and Mail, January 12, 1991.
[9] Globe and Mail, Report on Business, January 15, 1991.
[10] Globe and Mail, January 18, 1991.
[11] Vancouver Province, January 22, 1991.
[12] Enacted in October 1970 during the FLQ âOctober Crisisâ.
[13] Globe and Mail, February 14, 1991.