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Title: Hunting Specters Author: Alex de Jong Date: 2016 Language: en Topics: communist party, History, Leninism, maoism, Philippines, purges, puritanism, Stalinism, vanguard, Vanguardism, authoritarian socialism, not-anarchist Source: https://www.academia.edu/7681257/Hunting_Specters._Purges_in_the_Communist_Party_of_the_Philippines
âBut tell me this first. Is it not dangerous to live by yourself in this
wild mountain?â
âWhat is there to fear? The beasts, birds, trees, storms, and tempests â
would you be afraid of them? There is nothing to fear in the night, in
the dark heart of the night. But in the daytime, among men, there is the
greatest fear of allâ
âWhy is that, apo lacay?â
âIn the savage heart of man there dwells the greatest fear of all
creation.â
âBut man has a marvelous mind. He can think, analyze, break apart and
put things together.â âThat is the seed of all living fears. The mind.
The beasts in the jungle with their ferocious fangs are less dangerous
than one man with a cultivated mind in a civilized city.â
Carlos Bulosan, The power of the people (Quezon City 1986).
In 1986 a popular uprising ended the rule of Ferdinand Marcos, who had
been dictator of the Philippines since declaring Martial Law in 1972
(officially lifted in 1981). The final years of Marcosâ rule and the
first years of restored âdemocracyâ were a period of disorientation and
fracture for the principal anti-Marcos force, the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP), which by the early eighties claimed an armed force of
about fifteen thousand, a similar number of political cadres and about a
million supporters, spread over the countryâs countryside and cities.[1]
During these years, CPP members tortured and killed hundreds of their
own comrades.
The torture and killings were part of campaigns against suspected
government spies in the underground party and its armed wing, the
guerrilla force New Peopleâs Army (NPA). The intra-party violence was
most intense in Mindanao, the southern island of the Philippine
archipelago. Mindanao had become a CPP stronghold during the eighties
but the purges there, roughly lasting from halfway 1985 to halfway 1986,
dealt a heavy blow to the organization. A quarter century later, many
questions are still unresolved.
This essay will examine explanations for the purges offered by survivors
and political and academic commentators. More fundamental than the
question who was guilty is the question why this process happened. Many
of the explanations for the purges offered so far â such as âparanoiaâ
fostered by the conditions of underground armed struggle, the
instrumental use of humans by an authoritarian, âLeninistâ organization
or the use of accusations to resolve political conflicts â offer only
parts of an explanation because they donât take the specific historical
context of the CPP in Mindanao and the rest of the Philippines into
consideration. The CPP was not an isolated bubble or only defined by its
purported ideology, clean of outside influences. It was part of the
development of Philippine society and the purges were a consequence of
both internal and external developments.
This essay will try to locate the wave of purges as a part and a product
of the historical development of the CPP. The interaction between the
party and its social and political context needs to be considered. The
structure and ideology of the CPP are important elements of an
explanation of the purges but are not sufficient: the purges came at a
time of intense political and social crisis in the Philippines, a crisis
that also afflicted the party and its supporters. On August 21, 1983,
Marcosâ gunmen killed opposition leader Benigno âNinoyâ Aquino when he
returned from exile in the United States. Before the Marcos
dictatorship, Aquino had been a governor and a senator and he was the
figurehead of the liberal opposition. The assassination caused an uproar
and the Marcos regime, already weakened by the CPP-led
âNational-Democraticâ movement, started to decompose. Large parts of the
hitherto politically passive urban middle-classes moved onto the
political field. The regime was out of balance and nearing collapse.
Trying to regain the upper-hand, Marcos announced in late 1985 that he
would forward the presidential elections to 1986. The CPP, misreading
the political situation and underestimating the anti-dictatorship
sentiment in the country, declared a boycott of the elections but the
majority of the anti-Marcos camp rallied behind presidential candidate
Corazon âCoryâ Aquino, widow of Benigno Aquino. The massive fraud that
declared Marcos the official winner was transparent and too few were
willing too support him any longer with even parts of the American
government, long a supporter of Marcos, now backing Cory Aquino.
Finally, on the 22 second of February 1986 a failed military coup
sparked the âPeopleâs Powerâ mass uprising in Manila that forced Marcos
to flee the country.
This tumultuous sequence of events, taking place while the purges were
going on, threw the CPP off balance. A surge of excitement went through
the CPP as it expected the day the autocrat would fall to come quickly
but almost simultaneously, debate broke out in the party on how to
proceed in the changing circumstances. The party stuck to its strategy
of boycotting the fraudulent elections and accumulating forces for its
rural based guerrilla, which was supposed to be the principal force in
bringing down the government. But developments left the party isolated:
its call for a boycott received little attention. The party didnât play
a decisive part in the urban mass-protest against Marcos in which
middle-class opposition leaders were more prominent. In a few short
months the CPP had gone from âvanguardâ of the anti-Marcos movement to
societyâs ârear-guardâ.[2]
The second major part of an explanation is the nature of the party
itself. People âmake their own historyâ but under âgiven and inherited
circumstancesâ, as Marx wrote.[3] The CPP was the product of Philippine
society that was going through a protracted crisis, a crisis that shaped
the form of the revolutionary movement that sought to resolve it. The
situation of the CPP in Mindanao was highly peculiar: in about five
years, the party developed from a small ragtag band of hunted activists
into a formidable force, leading a series of mini-uprisings and
commanding an armed force that engaged the national army in pitched
battles. The rapid growth of the party meant the introduction of many
raw recruits who were unfamiliar with underground work and who were ill
prepared to respond to changing circumstances. The Mindanaon CPP was
highly successful but also unstable, exactly because of its rapid
growth. This growth was linked to a crisis of Mindanaon society that
weakened social ties and attracted a large number of people to a
revolutionary movement.[4]
An examination of the CPP in Mindanao shows that it was far removed from
the idea of the âMarxist-Leninistâ party it liked to project.[5] But the
disconnection between theory and practice was not complete and claims of
authority and the supposedly unique role of the party did influence its
policies. To compare the differences between its Marxist-Leninist theory
and its practice on the ground, both need to be examined.
Finally, any explanation that seeks to present one single cause for the
purges will not do justice to the complex realities of the CPP and
Philippine society in the mid-eighties. Schematically, the purges pose
two main questions. The first is what started the purges, the second why
the purges were so damaging. I argue the CPP was unable to overcome a
number of difficulties that have plagued the Philippine Communist
movement for decades and that have their roots in the social make-up of
its social base and its ideology. The CPPâs theory failed to prepare its
supporters for the challenges of the acute crisis and near civil-war
circumstances of the mid-eighties. These weaknesses made the party
susceptible to a process of self-destruction.
To illustrate this, a discussion of the purges is followed by a
historical sketch of Philippine Communism as a movement and of its
ideology in which the development of three key-themes are highlighted: a
reduction of political struggle to violent confrontations, the notion
the party had a âcorrectâ and âobjectiveâ view of reality and a gap
between the movementâs rank-and-file and its national leadership.
Together, these conditions made the purges possible. Finally, I argue
that the purges begun as a failed attempt of the party to adept to the
changing political circumstances.
Like for many other revolutionaries, Cecilâs involvement with the
movement began at a young age.[6] She became active as a courier for the
movement when she was still in high-school, transporting secret notes or
maybe a gun between kasamas â comrades. In 1981 she was assigned to the
area of Mountain Banahaw, working as an organizer in the urban area of
Batangas. There she met her husband, Mario, a former student-leader who
like others had joined the NPA. Mario would later tell her that already
in 1985 suspected âDeep Penetration Agentsâ (DPAâs), government agents
who had penetrated the organization, were detained in the area.
Cecile got pregnant in 1986 and when she returned to her party
collective after an assignment to another area, she found them âdeep
into the process of screening possible spies in the movementâ. A hunt
for spies called âOplan (Operation Plan) Missing Linkâ (OPML) was in
full swing. In early 1988 a military operation by the NPA in Biñan
Laguna had gone wrong: the failure was considered mysterious and led to
speculation about spies. The speculation grew wider and brought an old
case back to the surface: in 1977 the whole regional party-committee had
been wiped out by the government. The movement had never found out how
this happened and after the failure in Biñan speculation that a
connection between the two setbacks existed started to circulate.
A relatively junior cadre, Kenneth, once the Political Officer (PO) of a
collective of students in an urban area, was given the task of forming a
Task Force to find âthe missing linkâ between the two debacles. Robert
Francis B.Garcia, one of the students in Kennethâs collective and
another survivor of OPML, drew the following picture of him in his book
about his ordeal, To suffer thy comrades; Kenneth thought of himself as
an intellectual and had enjoyed the prestige he had in the eyes of the
young revolutionaries as their âPOâ. He was only a middle-level cadre
but ambitious: he saw leading the Task Force as his âbig breakâ.[7]
Kenneth gathered a group of other junior party-cadres around him and
together they started to arrest people directly involved with the failed
operation in Biñan.
Suspects were interrogated but since this delivered no revelations, the
Task Force resorted to torture: punching and kicking at first, hanging
from the wrists and searing of the skin later. Under pain and duress,
the suspects had no other way of ending their suffering than giving
answers the interrogators wanted to hear. Victims made up false
confessions and named other âinfiltratorsâ, crating a domino-effect that
led to more and more arrests.
In late â88 Cecil came under suspicion and was ordered to report to a
guerrilla-camp. Considering herself a good soldier of the movement, she
had never expected to become a suspect herself. Cecil was arrested and
accused of being a spy â even the comrade who had recruited her into the
movement assumed she was guilty, refusing to have anything to do with
âpeople like herâ. Another suspect was Ka (short for kasama) Lala, a
high ranking veteran who had been with the movement from almost its
beginning. They and other suspects were chained and tortured. During
torture, Cecile was forced to listen to recordings of her childrenâs
voices. She would get to see them and her husband if she confessed, she
was told.
The torture drove Cecil to make up a confession about how she and Mario
had been DPAâs from the early eighties on. Much of her story came from
her interrogators as Cecil second-guessed what they wanted to hear. A
few days after Cecilâs âconfessionâ Mario was brought in, also in
chains. Mario and Cecil were kept apart but sometimes had a chance to
see or hold each-other when guards made fun of the prisoners and forced
them to dance together. Dozens of suspects were killed. Cecil and Mario
were relatively lucky: they survived until the party leadership ordered
a review process. All of the suspects alive got the chance to retract
their testimonies and were released one by one.
Even before the mid-eighties, internal violence in the CPP was not
unheard of. A purge in 1982 in Southern Tagalog, the south of the
northern island of Luzon, named Oplan Takipsilim (Twilight) cost the
lives of dozens of people, about two hundred more were arrested and
tortured. Still earlier a purge in response to Kadena de Amor, an
anti-insurgency drive of the Marcos regime, cost around 30 lives.
According to a former leading member of the party, the earliest purge
took place in 1980, on the islands of Samar and Leyte.[8]
Operation Missing Link, which almost cost the lives of Cecile and Mario,
and an operation led by a special committee called âOlympiaâ hunting for
spies nation-wide, cost around a hundred lives and seem to be the last
two instances of widespread âpurgingâ in the party.
All victims of the purges in the CPP were executed for the same reason:
they were suspected of being infiltrators. Cecilâs experience was
typical for the fate of suspects: most of them were asked, under false
pretenses, to report to a guerillabase in the countryside. Others were
âarrestedâ by NPA-fighters.[9] They were imprisoned in camps in the
countryside and tortured to force them to confess. Suspects were assumed
guilty, whether they confessed or not, and killed as punishment for
their âtreasonâ. It seems only those were still alive when the
leadership ordered an end to a purge survived.
The number of victims of operations like Olympia and OPML was far
surpassed by that of a purge less than two years earlier on the island
of Mindanao which cost hundreds of lives. In July 1985 members of the
partyâs top leadership of the region, the Mindanao-commission
(Mindacom), were in Manila to attend the tenth plenum of the partyâs
Central Committee. To take care of daily affairs while they were away,
the leadership appointed a âcaretaker commissionâ of three high-ranking
cadres. This commission received reports military agents had infiltrated
the party, its armed wing and its united front of underground
organizations, the National Democratic Front (NDF). Afraid of the damage
these agents could do, the caretaker group did not wait for the return
of Mindacom but ordered an immediate hunt for the infiltrators. Even
before the plenum ended, Mindacom met to evaluate this campaign and
estimate the threat.[10]
Basing themselves on an evaluation of the purge in Southern Tagalog that
deemed the operation a success, Mindacom gave the green light to proceed
with an island-wide purge and put the party in Mindanao under a state of
emergency. Named Operasyon Kampanyang Ahos (Operation Campaign Garlic)
or âKahosâ, the operation began in Misamis Oriental and Bukidnon and
rapidly spread. The name ahos was not chosen on accident: folktales said
garlic was effective against vampire-like creatures, monsters in human
form.[11] The partyâs âPolitical Officersâ in charge of the collectives
members were organized in, received permission to use âhard tacticsâ (an
euphemism for torture) to obtain information. The POâs were given the
role of judge, jury and executioner. Accused had no right of appeal. It
was easy to come under suspicion: being named once in a âconfessionâ
meant being placed under surveillance, being mentioned twice was ground
for arrest.[12]
The hunt for the military agents escalated: investigative teams were
sent north, to Cebu, and even to Manila to hunt down suspects. Rumors of
comrades torturing and killing each-other began to spread as NPA camps
were used as prisons and graveyards. Others saw prisoners coming in but
not leaving and heard cries of pain. Afraid of being the next victim,
disillusioned or both, many party-members and sympathizers left the
movement. These departures, often unannounced and unexplained, fed new
feelings of distrust in the movement. Distrust and suspicions grew to
such proportions that one top cadre in the Southern Tagalog region
concluded the whole movement was âfakeâ. He set up an operation to save
the few cadres he still considered âgenuineâ and to start anew. The plan
was canceled after the supposed leader of the operation shot himself in
the leg.[13]
Three months later, Mindacom ordered an end to Kahos. But before this,
even representatives of the leadership had become suspect and it would
take another six months, until April 1986, for Kahos to end completely.
By that time, the killings had cost hundreds of lives. How many is
uncertain: the total number of victims of Kahos probably exceeded 800.
Harry, at the time a leading cadre in central Mindanao and involved in
organizing the purge, estimates the total number of deaths was about
2000.[14]
Like assessments of earlier anti-infiltration drives, an assessment of
Kahos by Mindacom initially concluded âmistakesâ had been made but that
the operation as a whole had been a success. Only in the early nineties
did the party adjust this assessment and declared Kahos, OPML and
Olympia to be âcriminalâ. Responsibility for the killing was attributed
to party-members who by this time had developed political differences
with the CPP and were expelled for deviating from the party-line. The
pre-Kahos purges were ignored.[15]
The following figure contains information gathered by a Human Rights
group set up by survivors of the purges: âPeace Advocates for Truth,
Healing and Justiceâ (PATH). The figure shows purges occurred throughout
the eighties but that Kahos was exceptional for the number of victims it
caused.
Advocates for Truth, Healing and Justice. Research, Education and
Communication Project Final Reportâ, may 2006. Numbers are approximate
minimums.
Many of the purges were linked because they were organized on the basis
of assessments of earlier operations. The assessment of âOplan
Takipsilimâ in Southern Tagalog played an important role in convincing
the Mindanao leadership to implement Kahos. Kahos itself was a
continuation and escalation of the earlier âOperation Zombieâ or
âOperation Cleaningâ.The wide range of party-organizations involved in
the purges and their geographical spread indicate they were not the
result of individual decisions but of policies and ideas present in the
CPP as a whole.
As far as I can judge, all the purges followed a similar pattern of
accusations â torture â more accusations â more executions. Accused who
survived were released when the party organized a review-process of the
guilt of the suspects. After every purge, an assessment was made that
deemed the operation a success, leading party-leaders in the future to
chose the same disastrous methods to deal with suspected infiltrators.
The purges in Mindanao in 1985â86 stand out for the number of victims:
chapter eight argues that the intensity of the war in Mindanao and the
peculiar situation of the party on this island â especially its rapid
growth â meant that a dynamic that cost dozens of lives elsewhere here
made hundreds of victims.
Halfway 1984, the partyâs newspaper Ang Bayan (The People / The Nation)
published an article under the title âBusting a spy network: one
regionâs experienceâ which gives an insight into how the purges were
perceived in the organization.[16] The article describes the
anti-infiltration campaign of 1981 in Quezon-Bicol as very successful.
The article asserts the military organized a plan under the supposed
name âLipulin ang Rebolusyonaryong Pilipinoâ (âAnnihilate the Filipino
Revolutionariesâ) as part of its counter-insurgency drive. Supposedly
launched in 1977 already, the plan aimed at sneaking a large number of
agents into the movement, some of whom were âAction Agentsâ, tasked with
assassinating revolutionary leaders, while âDeep Infiltration Agentsâ
were to concentrate on gathering information.
Still according to the article, the conspiracy was discovered when âa
ranking infiltrator made the mistake of telling one of [his] comrades
that the enemy was recruiting himâ and suggested this was a chance for
the movement to infiltrate âthe other sideâ. But âpenetrating analysisâ
by âresponsible comradesâ supposedly showed this story was meant âto
serve as a cover for the spyâs contacts with his superiorâ. Those
considered proven guilty were âpunished according to the nature and
seriousness of their crimesâ â we can assume this means execution. In an
assessment of the campaign, the party âaffirmedâ its correctness.
It was probably not a coincidence this article was published on the eve
of Kahos, during âOperation Zombieâ when rumors of spies already
circulated. The first rumors of police-spies in the party had started to
circulate right after Aquinoâs assassination on the 21^(st) of August,
1983.[17] After Kahos came Operation Missing Link (OPML) in Luzon and
the organization of Olympia. These operations proceeded relatively more
cautiously but still cost dozens of lives. Olympia was set up around the
same time as OPML and oversaw the hunt for spies in Central Luzon,
Cordillera, Leyte, Cebu and the National Capital Region around Manila,
making the purges a nationwide phenomenon.
All in all, from late 1985 to almost the end of the decade, the party
was in the grip of purges. Except from the hundreds of members and
sympathizers killed, thousands more left the movement. Revelations of
the purges heavily damaged the movementâs image and the party struggled
to recover from deep, self-inflicted wounds.
The history of the Communist movement is scarred by experiences of
murderous internal purges of those deemed a threat by party-leaders.
However, a comparison between the purges in the CPP and other in
Communist parties shows the peculiar character of the CPPâs
self-destructive behavior.
The archetypical example of a Communist purge is that of the Communist
Party of the Soviet-Union when Josef Stalin in the late thirties
subjected the whole country to purges that almost completely wiped out
the old revolutionary guard and countless others. Political differences,
being perceived as a threat to the position of Stalin and his varying
circle of allies, or just bad luck as intelligence services tried to
meet their arrest quotas led to arrest, torture, imprisonment in labor
camps and for many to death. Between 1936 and 1938 alone, between 4 and
7 seven million people were arrested and transported to labor camps.[18]
One and half million deaths were direct results of repression.[19]
Stalinâs terror in Russia was preceded by purges in China that almost
paralyzed the Communist movement there. In the early 1930âs the Chinese
Communist Party was fighting a civil war with the nationalists of Chiang
Kaishekâs Guomindang. Consolidating his forces after a number of defeats
in which the Guomindang had crushed Communist attempts at urban
uprisings, Mao Zedong â then a relative outsider among CCP leaders â
established a base in southern Jiangxi in mid-1930. After the defeats in
the cities in the cities Mao had further developed his thinking on the
central role of the peasantry in social revolution, a break from the
Communist orthodoxy that saw wage-workers as the central subject in a
revolution, and was gaining more influence as a military and political
leader. In Jiangxi however a Communist movement already existed before
Maoâs arrival. This indigenous movement was unwilling to submit to the
Maoist line. Tensions build between Mao on one side and the Jiangxi
Communists and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party that
disagreed with Maoâs course on the other side.
These tensions exploded in late 1930 in a âbloody orgy of internal
conflictâ.[20] This so-called âFutian incidentâ had several causes,
including differences over the redistribution of land and over military
tactics and the loyalty of the local Communists to party chairperson Li
Lisan, a political opponent of Mao. That year, rumors started to
circulate that the Nationalists had infiltrated the party. Mao ordered
over four thousand members of the Red Army to be arrested on suspicion
of betrayal: more than half of them were forced to confess their âguiltâ
and executed.
The vast majority of those executed were local Jiangxi Communists.
Another round of purges followed after Li Lisanâs ouster. Li Lisan was
made responsible for the partyâs defeats in failed urban uprisings in
the late twenties, declared an âanti-Leninistâ and exiled and imprisoned
in the Soviet-Union. Li Lisan was the victim of a struggle over control
of the CCP with Stalinâs emissaries from the Communist International or
Comintern, the international network of Communist Parties based in
Moscow. His removal brought a group of Chinese Communists, trained in
Russia and selected for their loyalty to Stalin, to power in the Chinese
party.[21]
The âNationalist infiltratorsâ who had been the targets of the first
round of purging were now re-labeled âLi Lisan loyalistsâ. Since Li
Lisan was now considered an enemy of the revolution, his followers and
those of Chiang Kaishek were deemed to be essentially in the same camp.
The convoluted reasoning behind this was that Li Lisanâs failures proved
he was not a âLeninistâ, and because of this he was not a true
revolutionary but rather an enemy of the revolution. This placed his
followers in the same camp as Chiang Kaishek. All signs of a lack of
loyalty to Mao or of fealty to Li Lisan were collected under the label
of âcounter-revolutionaryâ and thousands more were killed. We will later
return to the question of why deviation from a political line was
equated with treason in the ideology that â with modifications â was
also adapted by the Maoists.
Mao used the hunt for infiltrators to break up a local site of
resistance to his political influence and then seized on the occasion of
Li Lisanâs fall to further strengthen his position â just like Stalin
used the purges to remove potential or suspected threats to his rule.
There are other similarities between the two purges, including the
conflation of political differences with conscious betrayal, that flowed
from the similar worldview that dominated both the Chinese and Russian
Communist parties. The purges in China and the Soviet-Union were part of
the consolidation of ruling groups in the party and of their attacks
against supposed enemies.
In the first round of purges in Jiangxi panic âfrom belowâ about
infiltration set off the process, just like in the Philippine case, but
Mao seized the opportunity to go after a specific category of
party-members that opposed him. Mao played an decisive role in the
Chinese purges, expanding them and making sure any possible loyalty to
Li Lisan, an old rival, was destroyed.[22] Likewise, Stalin and his
Politburo carefully followed the purges. When the dynamic of
accusations, distrust, torture and forced confessions threatened to spin
out of control, they pulled back, found scapegoats for the âexcessesâ
and allowed the terror to diminish somewhat to re-stabilize the
party.[23]
The purges in the CPP however, were not the outcome of a faction fight
like in the Russian and Chinese examples, they were not another example
of the removal of dissidents under the cover of the hunt for spies and
saboteurs. Even though a questioning of the party-line could mean one
fell under suspicion, victims of the purges in the CPP did not belong to
specific categories and the purges were not the work of a faction or
group of leaders aiming at strengthening its position. Because of this,
the term âpurgeâ could be considered to be a misnomer. But since in
examples of Communist purges itâs most often the persecutors that create
the categories that are victimized I decided to stick to the term
âpurgeâ. After all, the claim the people killed by the CPP were âDPAâsâ
was not more fictitious than the one that Stalinâs victims were, for
example, âtrotskyite-bukhanarinite-fascistsâ.
In the Chinese and Russian purges, as in those in eastern Europa in the
fifties, the persecution of prominent victims was widely published to
make their cases into examples to others. In the CPP in contrast, the
accusations and executions were unacknowledged, even hidden: the purges
were apparently not meant to have a pedagogic effect on others. And,
crucially, although the central leadership of the Philippine party could
initiate purges or stop, purges like Kahos started on a local level,
independently from the national leadership. Neither did the national
leadership control who were going to be the victims. At one point, even
CC-members and their emissaries were suspect and one alternate member of
the CC was arrested â this was not because of a power-struggle in the
leadership but because in the party distrust had become generalized.[24]
The Philippine purges are a rare example were a dynamic âfrom belowâ was
decisive in causing and sustaining the process.
Another peculiarity of the purges in the CPP is they took place in a
party that was not in power. The purges in the Russian and eastern
European Communist parties were part of the attacks of a ruling group
against an opposition or a perceived threat to its power. In both the
Chinese and Cambodian Communist parties, purges took place before the
seizure of state-power but in a context that these parties formed the de
facto government over substantial areas of the country. Although the CPP
at the height of its influence established parallel governments in areas
it heavily influenced these were only shadow-governments, existing
underground. Certainly, there existed struggles inside the CPP, as we
will see later, but these were first struggles over what course it
should take and only secondly over power.
The CPPâs ideas and the shape of its organization grew from a longer
history of Communism in the Philippines and circumstances that were in
several ways similar to that of its predecessors. Sometimes decades old
characteristics of the Communist movement and the society of which it
was part came violently to the fore in the eighties. To understand how
this movement could, in Garciaâs words, âdecimate its ownâ in such a
peculiar way we need to look at its history and how it developed two
crucial conditions for the purges: a reduction of politics to violent
conflict and an absolute faith in the correctness of its policies.
The original Partido Komunista Pilipinas (PKP) was formed in 1930. The
PKP grew out of the Congreso Obrero de Filipinas (COF) or Katipunan ng
mga Anak Pawis ng Pilipinas â a movement that in its turn was based on
the earliest trade-union groups in the country. From the twenties on,
the influence of Marxist ideas increased in the COF before it renamed
itself into a Communist party and joined the Communist International.
The young PKP was remarkable among Communist Parties in colonial
countries in that wage-workers were far more dominant than peasants. It
has been described as âsmall, urban based collection of intellectuals
and union activistsâ â in this collection the intellectuals were very
much a minority.[25]
In 1938 the PKP merged, on insistence of the Comintern, by then firmly
under control of Moscow, with another left-wing party, the Partido
Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (Socialist Party of the Philippines, SPP). The
SPP had been formed six years earlier, in 1932, the year the PKP had
been officially banned as a subversive organization by the American
colonial government. By this time the Philippines were no longer a
direct colony of the USA but, since 1935, part of a âCommonwealthâ.
Philippine president Manuel L. Quezon had negotiated with the
Philippines âbig brotherâ that his country would receive full
independence after a term of ten years to âprepareâ for
independence.[26]
The SPPâs leader, Pedro Abad Santos, had conceived of his organisation
in part as a legal surrogate for the PKP. But it was a quite different
party: its base was mostly agrarian, whereas the PKPâs support had
mostly come from the urban working class.
In terms of organization and ideology, the SPP was more radical populist
than Communist. Santos was described by a future PKP-leader as âa
Marxist, but not a Bolshevikâ and had applied, unsuccessfully, for
affiliation to both the Comintern and the social-democratic Second
International.[27] Organizationally, his party was far from the ideal
type of a Bolshevik party as propagated by the Comintern: it almost
completely lacked structure and it was practically impossible to
distinguish between party-members and members of its peasant
organization. It shared this with the PKP were lines between members of
the party and its workers and peasant organizations were barely
recognized.
At their peak, the PKP and the movements it led, strongest in central
Luzon, consisted largely of tenant farmers. These farmers had a
contractual relationship with landlords: the landlord provided a piece
of land and an advance to pay for expenses, the tenant provided
laborforce and tools. The harvest was shared between tenant and
landlord. This relationship was embedded in a larger patron-client
relation in which the landlord gave a degree of protection to âhisâ
tenants, who in turn showed their gratitude by providing various
services. These relationships deteriorated from the twenties on as more
landlords invested more in other branches of the economy, were less
present on their estates and demanded a larger share of the harvest.[28]
Apart from strengthening the PKPâs peasant-base, the merger of the SPP
and the PKP reinforced an anti-reflective current in the new party which
attracted only a few intellectuals and crucially failed to produce its
own âorganic intellectualsâ.[29] Those intellectuals who were part of
the PKP didnât undertake research or theoretical work. Filipino Marxist,
and ex-PKP member, Francisco Nemenzo wrote that âanti-intellectualism
was one of the PKPâs most enduring traditionsâ. This lack of reflection
went hand in hand with an unquestioning faith in a party-line based on
categories borrowed from Soviet Marxism.[30]
Although the PKP was not known for intellectual liveliness, the SPP was
even less developed theoretically. Even the PKP charged SPP members with
being âtoo lazyâ to âstudyâ Marxist theory.[31] The attitude of SPP
members was that revolutionary consciousness was best gained through
involvement in struggle. Lino Dizon, a leader of the SPP, said âbring
Marx over here and Iâll teach him socialismâ, implying that someone who
was directly involved in struggle knew more about revolution than
someone who spend his time writing about it in the confines of the
British Library.[32] Attitudes like this fed a lack of reflection on its
actions.
The struggle of the party was assumed to be in large part a violent one.
PKP-members had in principle no objections to the use of force:
Marxism-Leninism, their official ideology, regarded violence as a
necessary part of social transformation. One of the reasons for the ban
of the PKP in 1932 was its use of several rather grotesquely violent
slogans, like, referring to the symbols of the Communist movement, âthe
sickle on our flag is for cutting the throats of the bourgeois thieves,
the hammer is for breaking the skulls of the bourgeoisieâ.[33] Still,
six year later many, PKP-members thought the SPP was needlessly violent
while SPP-members thought the Communists were not âmilitantâ enough.[34]
In his book on the early history of the PKP, Ken Fuller links this taste
for violence to a tradition of peasant uprisings that aimed to finish
exploitation by the landlords with swift, violent acts.[35] Like the
PKP, the rank-and-file of the CPP consisted largely consist of peasants
and this heavily influenced the PKP and the CPP.
After Hitlerâs victory in Germany, Moscow formulated, through the
Comintern, a new strategy for the Communist Parties. Instead of
confronting social-democratic parties and attacking them as traitors,
Communist Parties should establish âPopular Frontsâ in which all
anti-fascist forces, from bourgeois democrats to the Communists, worked
together. All political considerations should be subordinated to the
struggle against fascism. Counseled by the Communist Party of the United
States, the PKP followed this line and declared that international
fascism â not the Philippine bourgeoisie or American imperialism â was
the main-enemy. From 1938 on the PKP began to work as a legal party
again.[36]
One the eve of the war, the ideology of the Communist movement in the
Philippines had acquired two characteristics that would remain present
in the tradition: a view of violence as a privileged political tool and
an unreflected approach to its policies. A characteristic of the
movementâs social base was that it was largely of peasant origin,
although its leadership was more urban and middle-class.
The Japanese invasion of the Philippines was a turning point and crucial
in reorienting the PKP to the path of armed revolution. The brutality of
the Japanese army rather spontaneously produced armed resistance. This
was strongest in the northern part of the country, the island of Luzon:
the PKP had traditionally been strong there and it was home to a
tradition of peasant movements. People here had become used to
collective action and had experience in, at times violently, confronting
the state. Luis Taruc, a PKP-leader who would become head of its armed
wing, said: âthe resistance movement that sprang up in Central Luzon was
unique among all the groups that fought against the Japanese. The
decisive element of difference lay in the strong peasant unions and
organizations that existed there before the war. It gave the movement a
mass base, and made the armed forces indistinguishable from the people,
a feeling shared by both the people and the fightersâ.[37]
In March 1942, representatives of several groups of peasants fighting
the Japanese and members of the PKP or its peasant organizations formed
the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon or âPeopleâs Army against Japanâ. The
name was quickly shortened to âHukbalahapâ and then to Huk. It is a
matter of debate just how big the movement was at the end of the war
when the Huks had become the most efficient anti-Japanese guerrilla-army
in South Asia. According to Benedict J. Kerkvliet the growth of the
Huk-movement was quite remarkable: from less than three-hundred in 1942
to over ten-thousand two years later, mainly concentrated in central
Luzon.[38] Although the PKP was the leading group in the Huks, Kerkvliet
makes clear the movement was more than just a insurgency led by the PKP:
it was a movement with thousands of supporters, deeply rooted in the
local population.
Like many of the peasant rank-and-file of the pre-war PKP, most Huks had
little time for Marxist theory and the movement didnât break with the
anti-reflective tradition of the pre-war PKP. Many members found the
political education âboringâ and of little use in their fight. More
popular lectures focused on the practical sides of guerillawar:
âMilitary Disciplineâ or âGuerrilla Tacticsâ were names of some of the
classes. The most important class was on âThe fundamental spirit of the
Hukbalahapâ which stressed the egalitarian character of relations within
the army.[39]
The fight of the Hukbalahap was primarily but not only against the
Japanese: the class contradictions that led to peasant movements before
the war persisted and Huks seized land, implemented improvised
land-reform programs and sometimes killed landlords. Social ties between
landlords and the peasants had been deteriorating before the war. The
support a majority of landlords gave to the Japanese invaders further
eroded these ties. The Hukbalahap on the other hand became folk heroes
in Central Luzon because of their resistance against the Japanese.
When the Japanese army after a series of guerrilla-attacks decided to
launch an attacks against Huk strongholds, the guerillaâs suffered heavy
blows. This made the PKP-leadership decide to retreat â a decision not
implemented on the ground and overturned by the partyâs congress in
1944.[40] In the meantime the Huks recovered and gained new
strength.[41] By the end of the war, when American forces defeated the
Japanese occupiers, the Huks had âcome close to establishing a de factoâ
government in Central Luzon.[42]
The post-war period of peace for the PKP and the Huks didnât last not
long. Just as spontaneously as they had risen to fight the Japanese,
most Huks simply went home after the defeat of the Japanese. Some talked
of joining the new government army. All expected recognition and even
reward for their services. The PKP was eager to maintain its Popular
Front policy and reenter the electoral arena. However, the Americans
were distrustful of the Hukbalahap: already during the war the American
command had concluded they aimed at establishing a âCommunistic stateâ,
an assessment that overestimated the ideological role of the PKP and
missed the fact that many peasants joined the movement out of
self-defense against the Japanese.[43]
The Huks joined the rest of the Philippine nation in celebration after
the American victory, but instead of rewarding them, American and
Philippine troops forcibly disarmed and sometimes killed Huks. Leaders
like Taruc were jailed. The landlords, many of whom had spend the
war-years in the relative safety of Manila, found upon return to their
estates that the peasant movement had grown and was demanding better
wages and a larger share in the harvest. With help of American and
Filipino forces, the landlords retaliated. Peasant leaders, often former
Hukbalahap members, were arrested, evicted from their lands or even
killed by the police.[44] Although the PKPâs united front organization,
the Democratic Alliance, won six congressional seats in the elections
1946, its candidates were barred from taking their seats by the new
Philippine president Manuel Roxas, who had been an official in the
Japanese puppet-regime during the occupation.[45]
Just as unorganized as during the first phase of the anti-Japanese
struggle, peasants began to retaliate and defend themselves. The first
clashes took place while the PKP leadership, which had returned to
Manila, was still hoping it could be part of the new congress. In June
1946, two main fronts were established in Luzon. The majority of the
PKP-leadership refused to support offensive actions and demanded the
Huks avoid armed encounters.[46] Again, the peasants didnât pay much
attention to party-leadership and fought against the government forces
on their own initiative. Huk squadrons reassembled on the initiative of
their members: âno Huk command,â said Luis Taruc later, âissued such a
directiveâ.[47] By 1948 Taruc revived the Hukâs wartime general command
and the Philippine government outlawed the Huks. Fighting increased.
The PKP was pressured to change its course and organize armed resistance
from below, by the Huk rank-and-file, from the outside by repression and
from inside by a minority in the party. A new PKP leadership finally
made a dramatic turn. Not only did it decide in 1950 to support armed
struggle, it declared the Philippines was in a ârevolutionary situationâ
and formulated a two-year timetable for seizing power. This approach
overestimated the potential support for the Huks and underestimated how
far the United States government would go to support the Philippine
government. PKP leaders used to part by saying âsee you in Malacañangâ
(the presidential palace) â but instead the rebellion was forcibly
suppressed a few years later.
However, even though the fight was now against a Philippine government,
and not a foreign occupation, the Huk army, now renamed the Hukbong
Mapapalaya ng Bayan (HMB, Peopleâs Liberation Army) reached between 1949
and 1951 a peak of between 11.000 and 15.000 armed men and women,
roughly equal to that of the Hukbalahap, although with less social
support than during the occupation.[48]
The Huks hadnât expanded beyond certain parts of the northern island of
Luzon. To prepare the party to seize power, its leadership gave orders
for a drastic expansion. They specified HMB membership had to increase
from 10,800 in July 1950 to 172,000 in September 1951. Party-membership
had to increase at the same ratio. Huk members were made into
party-members, simply by asking them to carry out the party-program, and
each Huk member was told to recruit a minimum of three new members in
the first quarter of the year, starting in July 1950. In the second
quarter, each Huk-member, old and new, would again recruit at least
three new members. The scheme turned out to be a disaster. The party,
whose grip on the development of the situation was shaky already, was
flooded with new, untested and raw recruits. The army seized the
opportunity to infiltrate the organization â in contrast, during their
resistance against Japan the Huks had once had a remarkably effective
intelligence system.[49][50]
With American aid, the government organized a successful
counter-insurgency. The Philippine army was re-organized and equipped by
the US Army and engaged in a brutal campaign against the rebels.
Villages considered Huk strongholds were burned down, prisoners were
executed, terror was used methodically to sap Huk support. The PKP
described it as âfar exceeding any punitive actions by the Japanese
fascistsâ.[51]
One of the biggest coups of the Philippine army was thanks to a traitor
in the PKP. Tarciano Rizal, a former Huk commander, informed the
government of the location of the PKP politburo and on the 18^(th) of
October 1950, the police arrested a large part of the PKP leadership.
Other intelligence failures followed: teams send out to expand the Huks
support beyond Luzon were betrayed, the commanders of one area were
almost all killed when a traitor led the military in the camp.
Supporters of the party living above ground started to lay low, afraid
they would be next.[52]
Military operations were combined with reforms, mostly symbolically,
that aimed to weaken the Huksâ social support. The governments of Roxas,
who died in 1948, and his successor Elpidio Rivera Quirino had become
deeply unpopular because of their brutality and corruption. Quirinoâs
secretary of defense, RamĂłn del Fierro Magsaysay, instead cultivated an
image of a clean and honest politician. This helped him win the 1953
elections and undermine Huk propaganda. One of his initiatives was a
resettlement program: surrendered rebels and even ordinary peasants were
given land and some rich-landowners were induced to trade their large
farms for public lands in the southern island of Mindanao so their lands
could be cut up and the rented out to small peasants. Only a small
number made use of the program, but it made for effective
government-propaganda.[53] When Luis Taruc himself surrendered in 1954
the backbone of the Huk rebellion had already been broken. The
PKP-leadership ordered party-members to lay low and the few dozen of
surviving Huk fighters were ordered to avoid clashes with government
forces.
With the suppression of the Huk rebellion, a cycle of the revolutionary
movement in the Philippines came to an end. But this powerful movement
left behind memories and experiences of armed struggle and showed the
potential of mobilizing the peasantry. When the CPP was formed in the
late sixties, itâs motivation to launch armed struggle was based partly
on the Huk experience.
Direct connections between the PKP and the CPP are weak: only a few
members of the CPP and its armed wing were ever PKP-members or Huks,
although these included individuals that played a crucial role in the
CPP/NPA. Some similarities between the parties are striking: a distaste
for what Mao called âbook-learningâ, a lack of reflection on its
practice, and a conception of political knowledge as springing
unmediated from participation in struggle are also prominently present
in the CPP. These similarities were caused by similarities in the social
base of the insurgencies, consisting mainly of peasants and often lead
by middle-class intellectuals both eager to prove their revolutionary
credentials and maintain their monopoly on theory. A third similarity is
the privileged place given to violence as part of the revolutionary
struggle.
Anti-intellectualism and the idea that knowledge springs directly from
âstruggleâ are related since this idea makes theory appear superfluous.
The emphasis on violence flows from the unreflected idea of
revolutionary struggle as a direct confrontation with the oppressor.
Rather than based on a theory, ideas like these are part of the
spontaneous ideology of rebelling peasants. In peasant rebellions, the
primary motivation of the rebels is the wish to have land of their own,
thus they tend to conceive of revolutionary struggle as a direct
confrontation with those control who the lands.
Emphasizing the exceptional nature of peasant revolts, James C. Scott
said; âto speak of rebellion is to focus on those extraordinary moments
when peasants seek to restore or remake their world by force. It is to
forget both how rare these moments are and how historically exceptional
it is for them to lead to a successful revolution; It is to forget that
the peasant is more often a helpless victim of violence than its
initiatorâ.[54] Peasant rebellions are not only the result of gradual
increase of exploitation but of a combination of exploitation with
sudden shocks that break the social ties underpinning a moral economy
based on mutuality. The breakdown of the patron-peasant relationship in
the commercializing Philippine countryside of the thirties, the violence
with which the Japanese occupiers confiscated foodstuffs to supply their
troops and their overall intimidation and abuse of the population were
grounds for the Huk rebellion. The later NPA insurgency would likewise
be a combination of structural causes, like land shortage, and
conjunctural ones like the military brutality during and after Martial
Law.
This is because generally peasants are âcultivators with a set of
pressing needs rather than ideologues with a long viewâ that seize âthe
opportunities that are available to [them]â.[55] The Huk rebellion was
in many ways a defensive movement, literally protecting the rice-harvest
â peasant engagement in the CPP/NPA was also often part of a survival
strategy. Membership in the NPA was for many landless peasants a way to
survive and a hope for acquiring land of their own after the revolution.
Itâs obvious the Huk rebellion was born from local circumstances, not
from the ideological commitment of Communists and to a large degree
independent of this. It has even been disputed by Benedict Kerkvliet if
the PKP was the actual leadership of the Huk movement. Kerkvliet
examined the movement from the viewpoint of the participants,
interviewing members of the PKP rank-and-file and its
mass-organizations. The gap between the PKPâs ideology and the ideas of
its mass base he found and the denial of many participants that they
were involved with the PKP led Kerkvliet to conclude the party âadded
little to the resistanceâ and it did ânot control the Hukbalahap,
although individual Communists participated actively in itâ.[56]
Francisco Nemenzo criticized this conclusion by pointing out that many
former rebels had good reasons to deny involvement with the PKP when
Kerkvliet did his research in 1970: the party was still banned. In fact,
Nemenzo points out, the leaders of the HMB and the PKPâs
peasant-organization had been PKP members down to the lowest level.
Kerkvliet conceived of the PKP as it liked to see itself, Nemenzo
argues; âas a unified organization of Marxist-Leninist cadresâ. But
there is âa vast discrepancy between party documents and propaganda
material on the one hand and the governing ideology of the mass movement
on the otherâ. PKP-members led the rebellion but they, including leaders
of the party, were Marxists âonly in the sense that they belonged to a
party which confessed to be soâ, Nemenzo argues. The Huks were led by
members of a Communist party but their ideology was not determined by
this.
The effective ideology of the PKP and the Huks was what Nemenzo calls
âmillenarian populismâ: the outlook of rebelling peasants who seek to
turn the world upside-down. This outlook appealed to peasants but also
caused the movement to collapse âlike a pack of cardsâ the moment its
apocalyptic vision was disproved.[57] This spontaneous ideology of
revolting peasants remained an important influence on the Communist
movement in the Philippines.
âAlways ruled over, never the ruler, peasants are mostly familiar with
the state and its representatives as a source of violence â a rebellion
against it will be likely be a violent attempt to replace this âcold
monsterâ in short thrift by their own âhomemadeâ social orderâ.[58]
Writing about Indian peasants, Sanjay Seth pointed out the âinsignia of
domination and subordinationâ are âeverywhere inscribed â in the naked
use of force, in dress, in language and body language, as well, of
course, as in economic exploitationâ.[59] In such a context, and that of
the Philippine peasants is similar in many ways, it is not enough to
strip the landlord of the legal rights to his land. This is why peasant
rebellions often seek to turn the world upside down trough force. Kevin
Fuller sums up the desire of the peasant rebels of the Philippines to
âsettle accounts with the landlords with one violent blowâ.[60]
The reasons of the peasant involvement also explain why, when it seemed
like an easier route to satisfy the pressing needs had opened up, many
peasants left the revolutionary movement. The reforms of the Philippine
government during the fifties sapped the Huk movement of support, the
fall of Marcos convinced many former NPA-fighters and supporters that a
less risky strategy than continued armed struggle had become
possible.[61]
Neither the PKP-leadership nor that of the SPP âexerted significant
ideological influence over the rank-and-fileâ.[62] Citing the rapid rate
at which supporters left the movement after Marcosâ fall, Kerkvliet
writes âthe degree of commitment to a Communist ideologyâ was probably
âshallowâ.[63] Despite the existence on paper of a sophisticated program
for ideological training, in reality many cadres in Mindanao had only
âlimited familiarity with Marxist toolsâ. A 1980 party evaluation
concluded that in Mindanao, were growth of the party was particularly
quick, âparty-buildingâ was weak.[64] According to Harry and notes for
an internal study session by a cadre called âNongâ, a large part of the
CPP-members in Mindanao did not receive any formal political education
at all.[65]
A NPA commander in the early nineties, discussing reasons for the
decline of the movement in the late eighties, confirmed many peasants
were primarily motivated by âpressing needsâ; âpeasants are shrewd. You
cannot expect them to keep fighting indefinitely if they cannot taste
the fruit of their struggle â their own land â except in the distant
future. They weigh the costs exacted by their revolutionary
participation â which might include children who were recruited into the
NPA â against this promise, and you can understand why many might scale
down their commitment.â[66]
Despite ideological differences, similarities in their social base
contributed to similarities between the PKP and CPP. A gap between the
outlook of its supporters and the partyâs supposedly marxist ideology
was notable in both and the CPP continued the PKPâs legacy of
anti-intellectualism. The PKP, Kevin Fuller argues, was unprepared to
deal with setbacks in its struggle, to make an analysis of these and
place them in a evaluation of the political situation.[67] A similar
inability would contribute to the purges that wrecked the movement when
the search for an explanation of setbacks fostered a hunt for spies.
The emphasis on violence as a method for political struggle and the
inability of the movement to formulate political answers to the rapidly
changing circumstances of the mid-eighties â a result of both its
theoretical weakness and the gap between the official ideology and the
everyday consciousness of its supporters â are important to understand
the murderous and self-destructive character of the purges.
The Philippines had been, after the Second World War, the most developed
country in Southeast Asia but started to experience serious social and
economic problems in the mid-1960âs. In a context of rising unemployment
and a rising cost of living, Ferdinand Marcos won his first election as
president of the republic. Marcos used all the tricks in the arsenal of
a traditional Filipino politician from the elite to win; a campaign fund
filled with money accumulated when he was senator and pacts with wealthy
businessmen and political dynasties. Still, this doesnât mean Marcos was
not also adept at responding to the popular mood.[68]
Marcos used the publicâs yearning for stability and disgust with a
corrupt and inefficient Congress to concentrate more power in his own
hands. Bypassing Congress, he revived executive agencies established by
his predecessors and extended the stateâs presence into the countryside,
often with help of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The use of
the army and loyal technocrats enabled him to concentrate more and more
power in his own hands.
In the second half of the sixties, Marcos ran the risk of falling victim
to the problems that had prevented his predecessors from winning
reelection: economic difficulties and public dissatisfaction with a
corrupt and inefficient government. Taxing was lax â representatives of
powerful businessmen for example prevented a tax on the export of sugar
â and corruption bled the state of funds. Still, in 1969 Marcos won his
reelection. By this time, Marcos had become the most powerful âcaciqueâ
in the country. A cacique or âpolitical bossâ refers to those who
concentrate economic and political power in their hands through the use
of patronage politics, corruption and often through private armies.
Caciques are a persistent feature of Philippine political live.[69]
To compensate for his decreasing popularity, Marcos used the tools of a
cacique: âguns, goons & goldâ. Marcos was not the only one intimidating
opponents, buying votes and using public money for propaganda â but he
was exceptionally brazen in it and as president he had unequaled access
to resources. As much as 50 million dollars went into his campaign, much
of it public money.[70] The increase of power in Marcos hands and
political instability fed fears he would try to stay in power beyond the
limit of two terms by declaring Martial Law.
Against this backdrop of increasing social tensions and an increasingly
authoritarian president, the Communist movement in the Philippines was
reorganized. After being introduced to the party, a young intellectual,
Jose Marie Sison, was tasked with creating a new youth-organization. He
set up the Kabaatang Makabayan (KM, Nationalist Youth) which would
quickly make a name for itself. After joining the PKP Sison became an
activist in several organizations but KM was the most important one.
Although it was not openly Communist, it had a very radical appeal.
The KM soon broke with the PKP and Sison and 12 or 13 others went on to
âre-establishâ the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1968
along Maoist lines. They felt the old PKP was not longer a revolutionary
party: after the Huks had been defeated, the PKP was afraid to take
radical action. But exactly that was what Sison and his companions
believed was necessary. Calling the formation of the CPP a
âre-establishingâ of the Communist party was an attempt to claim the
heritage of the Huks.
The experiences of the Huks were transmitted to the CPP not only through
the study of its history but also directly â the CPPâs armed wing, the
New Peopleâs Army was formed a few months later out of one of the last
surviving Huk groups that hadnât degenerated into an armed gang. The PKP
leadership in Manila had very little contact with the remaining Huks,
afraid of police repression. Looking for a political party to ally with
and break its isolation a groups of Huks, led by Commander Dante, born
Bernabe Buscayno, made contact with the CPP in 1969. The connection
between the fledgling party and Danteâs Huks was mediated by elite
politicians opposed to Marcos, among them Benigno Aquino.[71]
In early 1970 Marcos was pelted with stones by protesters after leaving
Congress. The events of the following months became a turning point.
Called the âFirst Quarter Stormâ (FQS), a series of riots and turbulent
protests against the government of Ferdinand Marcos took place in the
first three months of the year. The protests targeted Marcosâ
corruption, his close alliance with the United States, the American war
in Vietnam and the attempts by Marcos to concentrate power in his hands.
Radical groups like the KM played an important part in the movement.
Although it would take two more years for him to declare Martial Law on
September 21 1972, the unrest of the FQS was one of the justifications
invoked by Marcos.
On the other side of the barricade, for many of the protesters the FQS
was a major step in their radicalization. Confrontations between the
police and protesters, many of whom were students, rapidly became
intensely violent. Protesters responded to police truncheons, teargas
and bullets with stones, Molotov-cocktails and âpillbombsâ, home-made
explosives. Police violence cost the lives of several students.
Commenting on the violent protests, the president of the University of
the Philippines, the prestigious academic institution where many of the
young radicals studied, said they were a âgrave portent for the future
of the nation. It has brought us face to face with the fundamental
question: is it still possible to transform our society by peaceful
means so that the many who are poor, oppressed, sick and ignorant may be
released from their misery?â[72] Many answered the question in the
negative. Messages on the placards acquired a âdefinite tenorâ;
âPeopleâs war is the answer to martial lawâ and, quoting Mao Zedong,
âpolitical power grows out of the barrel of a gun.â[73]
The young CPP and its NPA became heroes for the protest movement:
protesters chanted âKa Dante for presidentâ. Using the umbrella-term for
the Maoists and allied groups, the âNational-Democraticâ movement, a
reporter on the FQS stated that in the months after January 1970 âa new
political force would come on the scene: the national democratic
movement. All others would acquire meaning only in juxtaposition with
itâ.[74] Many of the members of radical youth-organizations like KM
would become leaders in the CPP. And not only they. The chairperson of
the moderate National Union of Students of the Philippines, Edgar
Jopson, went underground after the declaration of Martial Law in 1972.
He joined his erstwhile political rivals, becoming a CPP member.
The events of the First Quarter Storm protests, growing social
contradictions and the wave of radicalization sweeping the world in the
late sixties left the PKP and its front-organizations behind. The PKP
was bigger than the radical youth-groups and more implanted among the
poor peasants and the poor â but it lacked dynamism, the will to
actually use its resources.
When the CPP was organized, it drew a number of lessons from the Huk
experience. The PKP leadership was condemned for both its âadventuristâ
attempt at a quick military victory after 1950 and its later refusal to
re-start armed struggle. Two of the most important conclusions the CPP
drew from the experience of the Huks and their reading of revolutionary
theory were armed violence was necessary but that this struggle should
be spread over the whole country and that it should slowly built up
strength before an attempt at seizing power was made. The Huks had
shown, they reasoned, the willingness of the Filipino people, especially
poor peasants, to support an armed insurgency. It was up to the party to
organize this insurgency in such a way that it could seize power. The
debacles of the PKP, including its security failures, were the subject
of Sisonâs Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party, one of the CPPâs
founding documents.[75]
One of the lessons Huk-veterans conveyed to the NPA was the need to be
on guard against infiltration. Many of the new NPA commanders were
former students who had âgone to the mountainsâ, convinced of the need
of armed resistance. They were hesitant to use violence against
suspected spies since these were often poor peasants, manipulated and
pressured by the military. There was an idealistic notion that with
enough guidance, these peasants could be convinced to stop cooperating
with the army, a NPA veteran called âJesâ recalled.[76] According to
Jes, the NPA learned the hard way as several highly motivated leaders
were lost due to police-spies. The guerillas most likely to survive were
those trained by veteran Huk fighters who taught that liquidating
informers was necessary to stay alive.
As time passed, more peasant-born fighters became commanders. These
peasants were, according to Jes, less hesitant in using force. Jes
doesnât give an explanation why peasants were more willing to use
violence, but coming from the peasantry themselves, they maybe had a
more realistic notion of the motives and potential to change of peasants
turned into infiltrators than students with romantic notions about âthe
massesâ. Itâs likely that coming from communities that had suffered from
the counter-insurgency campaigns against the Huks and the violence of
the corrupt, repressive Philippine security apparatus, peasants had a
clearer idea of the risks of armed struggle than students with
relatively privileged backgrounds.
When the CPP grew into in a nationwide mass-movement in the second half
of the seventies, it was an organization that combined cadres and
leading members that often had a background as students with a peasant
mass-base. The political turbulence of the early seventies had
radicalized many students-activists. For many peasants it had been clear
already they could not count on the government for help. From the
earlier Huk-experience, the young movement had learned the potential of
armed struggle and the need for a strict policy of security to protect
itself. Its ideology would not only emphasize the need for violence
against its enemies â it would also reinforce the conviction of the
students that became its leadership that they were making the right
decisions. To understand why this ideology fitted the social composition
of the movement and traditions of anti-reflectivity and the use of
violence so well, we need to look at this in more depth.
The Communist Party of the Philippines was officially formed on the
seventy-fifth birthday of Mao Zedong: December 26^(th), 1968. The date
symbolizes the partyâs adherence to the Maoist interpretation of
Marxism. Maoâs China was then going through its most radical phase, the
so-called âGreat Proletarian Cultural Revolutionâ and had broken with
the Soviet Communist Party, citing ideological differences. Many
radicals perceived the Cultural Revolution to be an attempt at avoiding
the stultifying bureaucracy that burdened the Soviet-Union. They were
inspired by what they thought was a more dynamic Communist current than
the one aligned with the Soviet-Union.
Political differences between the Moscow and Peking aligned currents of
the Communist movement were debated heatedly from the early sixties on.
The cautiousness of PKP in this period, after the crushing defeat of the
Huks, had more in common with the course of the Soviet-Union but this
approach had little appeal to young radicals. A CPP party cadre,
remembering his early days as a student in the movement, said: âit was
easy to be a Maoist; aside from its being trendy, nobody wanted to be
associated with [the Soviet-Union] kind of conservatism, even if that
were Communist. Young ones, almost without effort, were drawn into
[Maoism] and I was one of them.â[77]
Maoâs insistence on the importance of the âsubjective factorâ â for him:
the Communist party and its supporters â in making revolution appealed
to many in the Third World where, according to Soviet marxism, the low
level of the development of the economy â the âobjective factorâ â
precluded a peasant and proletarian lead revolution. Internationally,
the Soviet-Union counseled national liberation movements in the Third
World to compromise with, and make concessions to, bourgeois nationalist
movements and governments. This meant demands of poor workers and
peasants were sidelined in order not to antagonize bourgeois
nationalists who were seen as the driving force in further developing
capitalism and the forces of production. This economic development
would, according to Soviet theories, open the way for socialism by
strengthening the working class and the productive potential in the
country.[78]
Against this policy, Mao Zedong formulated a theory of a âNew Democratic
revolutionâ. In countries dominated by foreign imperialism, this theory
argued, the first task of a Communist movement was the so-called
ânational-democraticâ phase of the revolution: land-reform to abolish
pre-capitalist (âfeudalâ) influences in the economy and national
sovereignty. Only after this could socialism be introduced. In this Mao
agreed with the Soviet Communists â but he differed with them on the
pace of this process and most importantly on who should lead it: for Mao
this was not the national bourgeoisie but the proletariat, in alliance
with the peasantry, petty-bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. The
âproletariatâ or working class here refers not to a social-economic
category in the sociological sense but to a group with a certain
political line â in effect the Communist Party.
A third element in Maoist ideology that appealed to radicals in Third
World countries was its stress on revolutions in countries dominated by
imperialism. During the Cultural Revolution Lin Piao, Maoâs designated
successor before he fell from grace in the early seventies, formulated
the idea that Maoâs concept of revolution through guerrilla-war had
universal value. Mao had written that to win, a rural based
guerrilla-movement would have to encircle and isolate the cities. Lin
Piao argued this model of âpeopleâs warâ could be applied on a global
scale: Third World countries were the âcountrysideâ and the rich,
imperialist countries the âcitiesâ.[79] Whereas in orthodox Marxism
countries with a low level of economic development were considered to be
the furthest away from socialism, they became in this theory the
revolutionary vanguard.
Maoism was appealing because it reflected the radical mood among many
young people, seemed applicable to a largely rural country like the
Philippines and spoke to the perceived increase of radical sentiments
among the countryâs poor. Maoâs ideas were appealing to student radicals
who didnât see any future in subordinating themselves to moderate forces
and who didnât see a Philippine bourgeoisie that could play a
revolutionary role on its own. Maoismâs embrace of anti-imperialist
nationalism and armed struggle connected with the older traditions in
the Philippine left of the anti-Japanese resistance and the
Huk-rebellion.
For a long time, it was difficult to get hold of Maoâs writings in the
Philippines. âMaoismâ was often more an attitude and a collection of
slogans that people could identify with than a coherent ideology. One
participant in the movement recalled the attraction of Maoâs famous
âlittle red bookâ â a small compilation of quotes from Mao, originally
intended for soldiers â was its radical tone and at least a number of
activists felt that reading it âsparedâ them from having to read Marx
and Lenin.[80] The student radicals who formed the CPP had a somewhat
better grasp of Maoist theory which gave them a lot of credit. For
tactical reasons, the CPP has not always been very open in claiming
itself to be a Maoist party: Maoist implied being pro-Chinese or even
depending on foreign support, which could clash with the often rather
xenophobic nationalism of the movement â but in terms of strategy and
organization, the influence of Maoist thinking has been deep.[81]
One of the channels through which Maoism reached the Philippines was
through CPP founding chairman Jose Maria Sison who in the early sixties
had close ties with the Indonesian Communist party (Partai Komunis
Indonesia, PKI).[82] At the time, the PKI was the largest Communist
party that was not in power and it was influenced by Maoist ideas. The
Indonesian influence on Sison is clearly visible in his most important
work, Philippine Society and Revolution (often referred to as PSR) which
is very similar in âorganization, terminology and substance...[to] the
analysis of Indonesian society and revolution written by the late
chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party, Dipa Nusantara Aiditâ.[83]
When Sison and a few comrades established the CPP in 1968, it was only
three years after the PKI had been annihilated by the Indonesian army.
Between 200.000 and one million (suspected) PKI-members and sympathizers
had been killed in a wave of mass-violence after the army accused the
party of trying to seize power in a coup dâetat. The PKI and its
mass-organizations were completely unprepared for a violent
confrontation and put up only minimal resistance. The insistence of the
new CPP on having an armed wing and on the need for a violent overthrow
of the government was not based solely on theoretical considerations but
on the tragic fate of what was once one of the most powerful Communist
movements in the world.[84]
Revolution era
When trying to explain the purges in the CPP, two elements in its Maoist
ideology stand out: its evaluation of violence and the idea of the role
of the party. The first encouraged the use of violence, while the second
demanded CPP-members had absolute faith in the partyâs decisions.
Political violence was a drastic step in Philippine society but
certainly not unheard of. There was the tradition of the Huks, some of
whom kept their arms long after the rebellion was defeated. Many
establishment politicians had their own private armies and elections
were bloody affairs. That an establishment politician like Benigno
Aquino had no qualms in bringing Danteâs Huks into contact with the
young radicals of the CPP, about four years before Marcos declared
Martial Law, shows how accepted political violence was. The violence of
the police during the FQS made peaceful protests difficult from the
beginning. Although officially a democracy, the country was ruled by
caciques, many of them coming from landholding families that had
cooperated with the US to crush the Huk rebellion.
Because of the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the government
of Marcos, space for peaceful protest declined further. For activists
who saw the willingness of their rulers to use violence and were aware
of the history of the Huks, the question was not so much why a movement
that claimed it wanted to change society, like the PKP, would embrace
violent methods but why it choose nĂłt to do so. The answer was, Sison
charged, that the PKP was no longer revolutionary in any sense and its
leadership was even reactionary: the defeat of the Huks had not only
turned them into cowards, they were in the service of
counter-revolutionary forces.[85]
Maoismâs emphasis on the role of violence is remarkable. Marx saw
âforceâ (violence) as âthe midwife of every old society which is
pregnant with a new one.â[86] This means violence can have a progressive
role during certain historical conjunctions. In itself it can not create
a new society, only be a part of giving, as it were, the last push.
Contrast this with a statement like: âIn the more than one hundred years
from Marx to Mao Zedong, revolutionary violence was the essence of
Marxism in both theory and practice.â CPP chairman Amado Guerrero â
(âBeloved Warriorâ, nom de guerre of Sison) â wrote this in a polemic
against the PKP.[87]
This privileging of violence was also present in other Maoist movements
that had their roots in the international attraction of the Cultural
Revolution. The leader of the Peruvian Sendero Luminiso (Shining Path)
claimed the revolution must âcross a river of bloodâ.[88] The same years
as the CPP was organized a Maoist movement took shape in India that not
only stressed the killing of landlords but also that this be done not
with guns but with knives, spears and sickles. It was thought this would
âemboldenâ the peasants. âHe who has not dipped his hands in the blood
of class enemies can hardly be called a Communistâ, Indian Maoist leader
Charu Mazumdar wrote.[89] Maoâs party was an organization build for and
through war â something he, confronted with the armies of Chiang Kaishek
and Japan, had not much choice in. In the context of the Philippines,
Maoist ideas about violence blended well with the tradition of peasant
uprisings.
Some years after its founding the CPP would adjust an earlier, very
militarist orientation. The new orientation stressed the importance of
popular support as the basis of military strength. The extraordinary
endurance of the CPP can only be understood when its emphasis on
building social support for its struggle is recognized. But for the CPP,
social revolution remained in essence a military struggle: the NPA is
defined as âthe most important organization for defeating the
reactionary stateâ and armed struggle as the primary method of struggle.
Legal, above-ground front-organizations were led by âundergroundâ cadres
in the interest of the guerilla-struggle, movements in the towns
supported the rural guerillas.[90]
Aside from the emphasis on violence, a second characteristic of Cultural
Revolution-era Maoism was the heavy emphasis on voluntarism; ânothing in
the world is difficult for the one who sets his mind to itâ â a Chinese
saying approvingly quoted by Mao and reproduced in the âlittle red
bookâ.[91] This kind of optimism was based on a an assessment of the
world-situation that imperialism and capitalism were in irreversible
decline and the revolutionary forces had âhistory on their sideâ. As
Sison put it in Philippine Society and Revolution, âMarxism-Leninism-Mao
Zedong Thoughtâ was âthe acme of proletarian revolutionary ideology in
the present era when imperialism is heading for total collapse and
socialism is marching toward worldwide victoryâ.[92] According to the
orthodox Communist concept of history, society develops according to
certain laws, from capitalism to socialism to communism. In this
teleological vision of history peopleâs actions receive meaning in light
of the final judgment of history: defense of Stalinâs actions usually
center on their supposed âhistorical necessityâ and the progressive role
Stalin supposedly played in world history.[93]
Since the Communist movement is supposedly on the side of history,
knowledge of the historical laws ensures success. Reflecting on the
growth of the NPA from a force of 60 men with 35 rifles in 1969 to one
that was active in over 40 provinces in the early eighties, Ang Bayan
wrote; âbecause the Party implements the correct line, it was certain
that from being small and weak at the start, the peopleâs army would
grow big and strongâ.[94] History was framed as struggle between the
forces of revolution and of a dying capitalism. However, when the
movement was confronted with difficulties in the eighties, this kind of
confidence flipped over in panic and the search for the ones
responsible. Because of the role this organization plays in maoist
ideology, blame for for setbacks was placed on enemies out to sabotage
the party.
Assuming history is on their side, the Maoists still needed an
organization to make use of the opportunities offered by history. This
for them is the revolutionary party. The extraordinary significance of
such an organization in Maoist thought can hardly be overstated. Itâs
telling Maoist documents consistently refer to âthe Partyâ with a
capital âPâ. For Maoists the Communist Party is the force uniting the
most consistent revolutionaries and coordinating the different
emancipatory movements in a country. Since a movement is based on the
interests of a specific social group (workers, peasants, students...)
they supposedly lack revolutionary potential. Only if the sectional
movements are united by a Communist Party, a revolutionary movement is
possible according to Maoism.
Maoist ideas about the role of a party are partly based on those of
Stalin who said that failing to build a party is âto doom oneself to
hopeless despair, to inevitable defeatâ.[95] After defeating the
government, it is the Communist party that âexercises the dictatorship
of the proletariatâ in order âto protect the revolutionâ. This is
because for Maoists, there is a qualitative difference between the
consciousness of the party and that of the working class, which is
supposed to be the leading force in a united front leading a revolution.
The working class has to be directed by the party because only the party
can ârise above the momentary interests of the proletariatâ.[96]
Stalin argued that knowledge is simply a reflection of material reality
â but since reality comes before its reflection, knowledge lags behind
reality. The popularity of this worldview has a lot to do it with its
simplicity and âcommon senseâ character â note how close it comes to
SPP-leader Lino Dizonâs statement he would teach socialism to Marx
because he, unlike the scholar, had actually seen a lot of âstruggleâ.
Only a privileged, higher consciousness like that of the Party can
overcome the lag of knowledge behind reality.[97] For Stalin, the party
is âthe General Staff of the proletariatâ and it has the duty to direct
all other organizations of the working class which should function as
âauxiliary bodiesâ and âtransmission beltsâ, âlinking the Party with the
classâ to enable this higher consciousness.[98]
In this worldview, the party is not just a political tool â it is, quite
literally, what psychoanalyst Jaques Lacan called the âsubject supposed
to knowâ. According to Lacan, humans form their personality through
comparing themselves with other, often imagined subjects, âthe Otherâ;
like the child who first becomes familiar with its body by looking at
others and their movements. The âsubject supposed to knowâ arises
through transference: in the context of a psychoanalytic session, the
analyst is supposed to know the meaning of the patientâs symptoms.
According to Lacanian thought, this structure of transference is a more
general structure âin which a figure of the Other is not only supposed
to know, but can also believe, enjoy, cry and laugh, or even NOT know
for us.â[99] The âsubject supposed to knowâ is assumed to have access to
a higher form of knowledge. Placebos work for their patients because
doctors are âthe subject supposed to knowâ. In politics, the government
often has this position (âI donât know why the government does this or
that but I suppose that they know best, so Iâll do what they sayâ).
The CPP was âthe subject supposed to knowâ for many of its supporters
who lacked a clear idea of what routinely invoked phrases like
âpetty-bourgeois revisionismâ or âsemi-feudal, semi-colonialâ actually
meant or why an analysis of the Philippines as âsemi-semiâ should be the
bedrock of a correct strategy â but who still followed its guidance.
Because crisis ensues when the chain of transference breaks down, people
insist on maintaining it, even when the subject supposed to know
âobviouslyâ doesnât know â like when the party starts killing its own
members.
As the carrier of historical knowledge and the incarnation of the
revolution, the Communist Party is not just a political tool, it also
has characteristics of a Church (it is the highest carrier of âtruthâ)
and of the government: the CPP controls the National Democratic Front
that is supposed to be the embryonic revolutionary government. The party
also controls the NPA which is not only the army but also functions as a
police-force and punishes crime. The party also enforces a moral order,
for example by punishing adultery and by codifying âregulations
pertaining to courtship, establishment of relationships, marriage and
divorceâ and insisting sexual relationships must be monogamous and lead
to marriage and family.[100]
The Party should, Stalin wrote, be instilled with âiron disciplineâ
meaning unity of both âaction and willâ. With this, Stalin made a
significant modification to the older Bolshevik idea of âdemocratic
centralismâ. Democratic centralism meant that once the party had arrived
at a decision, everybody, including those who disagreed with it, had a
duty to carry it out (âfreedom of discussion, unity of actionâ).[101]
According to Stalin, the party must consistently purge itself of
âopportunist elementsâ. Where do these âelementsâ come from? They can
not be reflections of differences in the working class since this class
is presumed to be homogeneous. Differences must then come from the
outside: Stalin declared they were the result of capitalist
influences.[102] This meant dissent made one an enemy of the revolution
and political discussion in the party was impossible (Stalinâs
lip-service to internal debate not withstanding). This principle would
have a strong impact on the Philippine Communist movement and its
inability to accommodate a variety of views.
The demand of âunity in willâ, essentially introduced the category of
thought-crimes. It makes it possible to victimize party-members not on
the basis of their actions but on basis of their supposed ideas when the
leadership decides these disrupt the unity of the party. A âdisruption
of willâ might not even be the consequence of certain political ideas
but just be a matter of attitude.[103]
To the ideas of Stalin on the party, Maoism made two contributions. The
first is the idea of the mass-line. Mao described this as âtaking the
ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrating
them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas)
and going to the masses and propagating and explaining these ideas until
the masses embrace them as their ownâ.[104] This means the party has a
decisive role in formulating the âcorrectâ ideas that should lead the
movement in all its aspects.
The second contribution by Mao on thinking on the party regarded the
question of differences within the party. Mao agreed with Stalin that
contradictions within the party are âreflections of class
contradictionsâ.[105] Unlike Stalin, Mao made a distinction between
different kinds of contradictions: âantagonisticâ and ânon-antagonisticâ
ones. This was supposedly a change from Stalinâs insistence on purging
the party of people with âincorrectâ ideas since non-antagonistic
contradictions can be resolved through discussion and persuasion.
Because non-antagonistic contradictions however may change into
antagonistic ones if the minority persists in âerroneous thinkingâ and
it is the party-leadership which decides when this change in
contradiction occurs, the distinction is almost meaningless.
This may seem to be all so much empty verbiage â but put into practice
in the Philippines, it became literally a matter of life and death. The
use of violence to settle differences in both the old PKP and the CPP
may have happened without these theories â but it is the worldview that
is contained in these theories that helped justify these acts and
convince others of their inevitability, no matter how deplorable their
necessity. The idea that differences in the party were caused by alien
class-influences made it possible to regard fellow party-members as
enemies and tools of the bourgeoisie. The gap between the ideas of the
rank-and-file and those of their leaders in the PKP persisted in the CPP
but it were cadres like the Political Officers and higher, those who
underwent political education, who played a crucial role in starting and
carrying out the purges.[106]
Itâs also important that many cadres of the CPP were either former
students or, somewhat later, came from the Roman Catholic clergy. Since
for many of them their involvement in the CPP was motivated by its
ideology, they evaluated their actions according to ideological
criteria. The CPPâs Maoism considered these âintellectualsâ to be
relatively privileged and called on them to go over to the side of the
proletariat, further motivating them to always follow strictly the
Maoist line to prove they were loyal party-members and true
revolutionaries. As time passed, more and more CPP-members with a
proletarian or peasant background became cadre members but the partyâs
top leadership remained dominated by former students and clergy.[107]
For large parts of its later social base, official party-ideology was
not very important but the disconnection between the ideology of the
leadership and the ideas of the rank-and-file and its social base didnât
mean the leadership didnât enjoy credibility. In fact, such
disconnection can even contribute to a higher level of respect for the
ideologues since they seem to have access, thanks to their education and
familiarity with the writings of admired revolutionary leaders, to
privileged knowledge.
The cadres of the CPP who drew up balance-sheets of the purges and
judged them to be successful, leading to new purges, were familiar with
these Stalinist-Maoist ideas. The CPP had some advantage over the âold
partyâ attracting educated members but it never went beyond Stalinism.
It also inherited the PKPâs anti-intellectualism and political education
stagnated in the party. The simple, vulgar materialism of Stalinism was
attractive because it fitted the worldview of underground activists who,
for understandable reasons, tended to privilege directly practical work
over theoretical reflection.
In many cases, it is possible to argue the Stalinist-Maoist theories
were only invoked as cover for more prosaic interests of political
leaders. For example, when the PKP-leadership in the early seventies
decided to enter into a âpolitical settlementâ with Marcos, dissenters
unwilling to surrender to the dictator were denounced as
âanarcho-trotskyitesâ and tortured and killed.[108] Itâs easy to see
this as part of thoroughly cynical maneuvering to secure a comfortable
life for the party-leaders as supporters of the dictator. But to always
reduce peopleâs ârealâ motives to only their direct self-interest
(itself a kind of âvulgar Marxismâ) is of little use when trying to
explain purges that brought no benefit, real or imagined, to an
organized group in the party â like those in the second half of the
eighties in the CPP.
The CPPâs ideology saw history as a violent struggle with only two
sides: on one side the party, on the other side the forces of reaction.
The party was assumed to be the carrier of the knowledge and skills
necessary to defeat reaction. Any weaknesses or setbacks the party
experiences must then be the work of enemy agents or of the failure to
live up to oneâs âhistorical roleâ. Confronted with a deep crisis, a
hunt for those preventing âthe Partyâ to play its âhistorical roleâ was
opened. But the limits on the effectiveness of the party had more to do
with its internal defects, as we will see in the next chapter.
The CPP was not a party known for its innovative thinking â Sisonâs
Philippine Society and Revolution has since publication in 1970 remained
the handbook of the party and still is the basis of its political
education. The partyâs educational courses mainly consisted of work by
Mao Zedong and texts by Sison. In 1975, it was decided to launch an
internal theoretical magazine, Rebolusyon, as part of one of several
attempts to higher the level of debate in the party. In 1977 it ceased
publication until it was relaunched in 1990.[109]
A kind of division of labor, quite similar to that of society at large,
developed in the CPP and its allied organization; NPA-fighters were
mainly drawn from the poor peasantry, former students and clergy â a
major pool of recruits, especially in Mindanao â became organizers and
educators. A description of the eight plenum of the Central Committee in
1980 by a participant shows this division was visible all the way to the
top: âwe were half military people and half coming from city-oriented,
we respect each other once the âbig guysâ [NPA commanders] talked. They
were there, Kintanar, Calubid, Capegsan, De Vera, Bilog, Tabara. (âŠ) all
from military and CS [countryside] background. (âŠ).â[110]
At times, those âaboveâ and those âbelowâ were talking past one another,
making it difficult to develop effective education. The CPP was aware
political education was lacking and in the early eighties appeals for
further study and education were a recurring element in editorials and
articles in the party newspaper Ang Bayan. One article for example
complained that even the partyâs own publications were not distributed
and read well among its members.[111] That such complaints and calls to
improve political education were repeated so often show the official
program of political education was not strictly implemented and that
there were doubts about the ideological level of members. We will see
how in the case of Mindanao especially these doubts were justified.
When the CPP in Mindanao was flooded with new recruits in the first half
of the eighties, some attempts were made to raise their political
thinking but these ran into great difficulties. A number of Maoâs essays
were translated for study by the new members but these were of little
use: the translations were too formal was one complaint.[112] But no
matter the quality of the translation, it is hard to see what use the
members could have made of a text like âThe foolish old man who removed
the mountainâ, one of the texts used, in dealing with political
obstacles. This short essay, originally a speech, is a homily on the
virtues of perseverance: an old man is rewarded for his determination to
remove a mountain with the intervention of two angels (symbolizing âthe
massesâ) that carry the mountain away for him.[113]
A romantic notion of the revolutionary potential of the âbasic massesâ
(to use CPP jargon) and the division of labor between
former-students-turned-ideologues and peasants-turned-guerrillaâs
obscured just how brittle ties between the partyâs ideology and the
motivations of its rank-and-file and social base could be. The
communication-breakdown between the cadres and the partyâs supporters
sometimes led to darkly funny misunderstandings. David Glanz relates how
in 1993 one party member told him of her experiences organizing slum
dwellers in Tondo, a poor neighborhood in Manila and the historical home
of a strong movement of slum dwellers. People responded well to her
lectures against âimperialismâ, one of the three âbasic problemsâ facing
Philippine society according to the CPPâs textbook. (The other two are
âfeudalismâ: the existence of large landed estates with tenants and
sharecropping â and âbureaucrat-capitalismâ: Philippine capitalists that
supposedly owe their economic success to an alliance with the state and
imperialism). The party-organizer was disappointed when she realized the
local population âunderstood imperialism to be the ethnic Chinese
traders in the neighbouring thoroughfareâ.[114]
Just how brittle the partyâs mass-support could be can be illustrated by
the example of Davao. In the eighties, parts of the poor neighborhoods
of Davao had become NPA strongholds. These neighborhoods became no-go
areas for the authorities as the party experimented with urban
guerrilla-war. The neighborhood Agdao where the NPA was particularly
active was nicknamed âNicaragdaoâ in reference to Nicaragua where
insurrections had driven away the Somoza dictatorship a few years
earlier. A few years later, exactly the same neighborhoods would be the
home of Alsa Masa (Risen Masses), an anti-Communist vigilante group.
According to local tales, Alsa Masa was formed after the killing on the
22sd of March 1986, in the midst of the anti-DPA hunt, of a popular
local party-cadre by his former comrades. This killing led to a series
of defections to the army by activists who were afraid they would be
next. Together with the military and local criminals, these defectors
created a violent anti-Communist vigilante group that drove even legal
leftist groups underground.[115] Except from fear and government
support, a major reason for the CPPâs decline in Davao was that he
partyâs experiments with urban warfare had invited repression and people
objected to violence like the killing of unarmed traffic cops or of
neighborhood-police for no other reason than to obtain their pistols.
Developments like these fed feelings of distrust and suspicion. As the
hunt for traitors created treason and defection, the persecutors thought
they saw their suspicions affirmed.
Thinking in concepts and writing has remained the task of a selective
few, in the first place that of Jose Maria Sison, who insisted rigidly
on the use of the Maoist framework for analyzing society. However, on
the level of the practical application of these ideas, the CPP made a
number of inventions. One of these is the shift from building âred base
areasâ to several âguerrilla frontsâ that move around in certain areas.
Sisonâs idea of mobile guerilla-fronts modified the Maoist model of
building âbase areasâ that serve as the center of operations of the
revolutionary forces. This model had earlier proved to be inapplicable
in the Philippines: since the country is an archipelago, the movement of
guerrillaâs is limited. The CPP, unlike the Thai Communists or the
Vietnamese National Liberation Front, also lacked large hinterlands or
the border of a friendly country behind which they could retreat beyond
the grasp of the government army.
A second modification was the principle of âcentralized leadership and
decentralized operationsâ: the party âmust distribute and develop
throughout the country cadres who are of sufficiently high quality to
find their own bearing and maintain initiative not only within periods
as short as one or two months, periods of regular reporting, but also
within periods as long as two or more years, in case the enemy chooses
to concentrate on an island or a particular fighting front and blockade
it.â[116] These principles were laid out in the texts Specific
Characteristics of our Peopleâs War (SCPW, 1974) and Our Urgent Tasks
(OUT, 1976), both written by Sison.
The principle âcentralized leadership and decentralized operationsâ
meant regional party-units enjoyed relative freedom to experiment with
different approaches. But since the principle of âcentral leadershipâ
included adherence to the Maoist line, these experiments remained at a
local level, tolerated as long as they were successful and could be
combined with a formal adherence to the Maoist strategy.
An example is the approach of the party in Manila-Rizal were the
regional party committee (KR-MR) proposed in 1974 to form an alliance
with anti-Marcos bourgeois forces for the elections. The goal was to try
and draw these forces âinto a broader...anti-fascist [meaning
anti-Marcos] legal frontâ, to help divide the bourgeoisie and diffuse
national-democratic ideas. The KR-MR did not doubt the principle that
they could only seize power through the Maoist strategy of a âpeopleâs
warâ but were of the opinion that Manila, the bloated capital city
could, by helping to create a revolutionary situation in the country,
play a more important role than is assumed in the principle of
âsurrounding the cities from the countrysideâ.
The plan was vetoed by the centralized leadership who enforced the idea
that the tempo of the urban movement had to be subordinated to the rural
guerrilla-struggle. Obviously, this veto didnât convince the
âdecentralizedâ activists of the movement in Manila since only a year
later the KR-MR proposed the idea to campaign for elections. This
proposal was again vetoed and Sison made his criticisms explicit in Our
Urgent Tasks.
When Marcos in 1978 called elections it was again the Manila-Rizal
branch that deviated from the national course: it participated by
standing candidates in the campaign run from prison by Benigno
Aquino.[117] The rationale behind this was similar to the reasons given
four years before to form an alliance with the anti-Marcos bourgeoisie.
The Manila-Rizal leadership had obviously not been convinced by the
insistence on the orthodox âprotracted peopleâs warâ or âPPWâ model.
This time, the Manila-Rizal leadership went as far as defying explicit,
last minute instructions to boycott the elections: such a boycott would
have, in their assessment, damaged the movement.[118] In an extended
meeting with national leaders in the countryside in 1979 tensions ran
high. According to one account, the Manila-Rizal leaders even feared
they would be executed.[119]
Long before the outbreak of open disagreements and splits in the
nineties then, a range of opinions existed in the supposedly monolithic
party. The principle of âcentralized leadership and decentralized
operationsâ accommodated the existence of these differences but the
refusal to discuss anything that could not be made to fit the Maoist
paradigm made it impossible to arrive at a synthesis of the various
viewpoints and experiences. Local innovations ârarely worked their way
âupwardsâ as ideas that prompted a re-thinking of the central tenets of
Party thoughtâ.[120] Instead, differences were buried, only to resurface
later.
The partyâs high level of involvement in political work could not
function as a guarantee against dogmatism: the view of a theory as
absolute, instead of relative knowledge and as abstract, isolated from
further input and not affected by experience. On the level of
short-term, locally applied tactics militants had to respond quickly and
flexible to their direct surroundings. But since there was no mechanism
to synthesize these local experiences, lessons from daily experience
didnât prevent theoretical reification. The CPP was, despite its
tactical brilliance, unable to modify its strategy. Its political
thinking became a reified ideology that could explain setbacks only by
assuming the work of enemies.
The other region that became notorious for its dissenting views was the
branch in Mindanao. The principle of decentralized operations would here
lead to the kinds of âdeviationsâ that Sison later held responsible for
the purges. As we have seen, the purges were not limited to Mindanao and
his analysis that it was their âwrong lineâ that led to the purges is
unable to explain why the first purges took place on the Visayas and
Luzon, and why after the purges in Mindanao, new ones took place in
other parts of the country. It is however true that because of the
number of victims Mindanao takes an exceptional place in the history of
the purges.
The southern island of Mindanao is the second largest of the country,
after Luzon, and has in Davao, a sprawling city, the second largest
urban area outside Manila. The party had been almost completely
wiped-out in the early seventies but in the late seventies it was the
fastest growing branch of the movement. To better regulate the party, a
special commission (âMindacomâ) was set up. Edgar Jopson, who had been
the chair of the largest moderate student organization of the country
during the First Quarter Storm protests, had been radicalized by Marcosâ
destruction of parliamentary democracy and his declaration of Martial
Law in 1972. Jopson joined the CPP somewhere in 1973. Soon, he made a
name as a talented organizer and in late 1979 âEdjopâ was sent to
Mindanao to help reorganize the party there.
The reality he encountered in Mindanao was far from the typical cliché
image of a Leninist party. Recruiting standards were low, meetings were
chaotic and informal, often there were not even notes being taken,
decisions were not implemented.[121] Thanks to the efforts of Jopson and
Mindacom, party-work became better organized and more professional but
any organization going through such rapid growth as the CPP in Mindanao
would have great difficulties in absorbing and training all the new
members. Obviously, the rapid growth meant the introduction of many new
recruits and little time to vet and train all of them. The pernicious
distrust that would tear the Mindanao-branch apart a few years sprung up
between people who were hardly familiar with each-other and that, even
though they all supported the same party, often had little in common.
One of the reasons that made it possible for the Mindanao CPP to grow so
quickly was that it was not the only force confronting the government: a
powerful secessionist movement of the Muslim-minority (called âMorosâ, a
name given to them by the Spanish) had also taken up arms against
Marcos. Partly as an effort to defuse the political unrest in the north
of the Philippines, the national government had organized migration of
peasants from Christian Luzon to the relatively sparsely populated
southern island of Mindanao in the fifties and sixties. Without
effective land-registration or control on the immigration of Christian
settlers into Mindanao, tension over land increased as new settlers
displaced people from territory they had been living and working on. The
social unrest from below this created was combined with conflicts inside
the ruling class. Local leaders in Mindanao who were politicians and
datus (Muslim aristocrats) were losing substantial amounts of power as
Marcos from 1965 on attempted to centralize the state, âbringing it
directly to Mindanaoâ, and overruling the local elite.[122]
By 1970, these tensions had intensified to the point that a virtual
civil war broke out in Mindanao between Christian and Muslim militia.
Marcos send in the national army, bypassing local leaders, in some cases
disarming and neutralizing their private armies. Radical Muslim
students, weapons from the politicians and Libya and a training-ground
in Malaysia combined in the formation of the secessionist Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) in the early seventies.[123] After fierce
fighting in 1973 â 77 caused more than thirteen thousand deaths,
violence declined to the level of skirmishes and guerrilla-war.
Militarily, the Muslim secessionist movement was a lot stronger than the
CPP â in no small part thanks to its foreign support.
The Islamic secessionists didnât compete with the Communists, who mostly
won supporters from among the Christian population, for support. The CPP
and the MNLF and its split, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),
were on friendly terms: sometimes NPA fighters played basketball with
their Islamic counterparts in guerrillacamps. The war between the MNLF
and the Marcos regime involved at its height more than half of the
government-army, giving the CPP much needed âbreathingspaceâ and making
violence a familiar phenomena in society.[124]
Patricio N. Abinales, an expert on Mindanao, described how the CPP could
grow so rapidly on the island thanks to the âfluidityâ of society there:
Mindanao had long been a frontier-zone with large, unsettled stretches
of land but by the late 1960âs this frontier started to âfill upâ.[125]
The frontier could no longer function as a safety-valve, absorbing the
poor and landless. At the same time, capital increasingly penetrated the
island: to tap the islandâs rich agricultural and mineral resources,
existing industries were expanded and new ones opened up. These
developments increased class-tensions in Mindanaon society. Marcosâ
attempts to incorporate the frontierzone and implement developmentalist
policies increased these tensions and meant the marginalization of
communities of indigenous people and settlers from the north of the
country.
The social tensions radicalized great numbers of people and created a
stream of new recruits to the movement. Membership in Davao alone jumped
between 1978 and 1985 from 50 to 1000.[126] Abinales estimates that
between 1981 and Kahos in 1985, the number of party-members grew from
950 to as many as 2396: a growth of over 250 percent in about four
years.[127] The period of the most rapid advance was between 1981 and
1984 â about a year before the start of Kahos â with a âseveralfold
expansion of the guerilla fronts, mass organizations and the Partyâ.
According to Harry, the party neglected security-measures and the
political consolidation of its mass-basis. He described how armed
propaganda-teams would visit communities in new areas at night to make
contact with the local population; âimagine when armed people ask you to
let them in and listen to their propaganda. Of course you cooperate and
say you agree with them. With four or five squads of about five people
we could cover an area and after a few weeks we declared it solid,
reliable.â[128]
This way the party expanded rapidly but on a weak basis. But
party-leaders were, according to Harry, more interested in success
stories about newly won areas and communities. This period saw the rapid
promotions of cadres and the formation of many new committees composed
of inexperienced cadres â things the party later admitted âbrought
within their train some new weaknesses and further aggravated old
onesâ.[129]
Despite Jopsonâs work, training and education of the new members was
weak. According to one cadre who was a member of the National Propaganda
committee even the partyâs newspaper Ang Bayan was not distributed in
large parts of the island and cadres assigned with political eduction
were reassigned to âmore important tasksâ. According to this âKa Nongâ,
in 1987 or 1988 Mindacom reported that only about a third of the total
number of party members had gone through the just the âBasic Party
Courseâ and many of those who did only followed part of the course.[130]
Many party supporters were unprepared to deal with the coming political
changes. My hypothesis is that, lacking education in the partyâs
ideology, they acted on the basis of a âradicalized every-day peasant
consciousnessâ and their experiences in a largely military struggle. One
outcome of this was what one member of the caretaker committee, the
group that was responsible for the daily affairs while Mindacom attended
the CC meeting in Manila and set Kahos in motion, Frank Gonzales (aka Ka
Taquio or Takyo) described as âa tendency towards a narrow
interpretation of class struggle as the physical elimination of the
perceived enemyâ.[131] What was needed for this tendency to victimize
other comrades was the conviction that they were in the service of the
enemy.
Before the purges and the governments counter-attacks crippled the
movement, the Mindanao-CPP used its new found strength to experiment
with new techniques. In 1982 it introduced Armed City Partisan Units
(ACPUâs) in Davao, making the city and not only the countryside a site
for guerrilla war. After the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983
anti-Marcos protests in the cities increased and the party became more
active in urban settings. The Mindanao-branch adopted the tactic of the
welgang bayan (âpeopleâs strikeâ) where people in certain areas would
stop working while guerrillaâs enforced roadblocks and workstoppage. By
1985, âthe combination of urban partisan warfare, the demonstrated
capability to paralyze the city [of Davao] with transport strikes and
CPP/NPA control over most of the poor neighborhoods in the urban area of
Davao City had come close to defeating government power in the
Philippineâs second largest cityâ.[132] This experience led Mindanao
cadres to formulate theories that on the basis of urban insurrections
the fall of the government could be hastened and maybe even power might
be seized without militarily defeating the government army.
But even before Kahos, the Mindanaon CPP was weaker than it looked; its
base was unconsolidated, its members hardly educated or prepared for
coming challenges. But apparent successes and rapid growth gave the
impression of strength, making the shock of future setbacks even
stronger.
When the CPP entered into a crisis in the second half of the eighties,
differences that had been more or less hidden behind the principle of
âcentralized leadership and decentralized operationsâ became public. For
a few years, the CPP saw intense debates about strategy and over the
evaluation of its past, its mistakes and its successes. Broadly
speaking, two camps took shape: those who defended the Maoist orthodoxy
and those who rejected it. Many in the second camp agreed with
each-other that the city and social movements other than the guerrilla
should play a more important part in the partyâs strategy than the
Maoist orthodoxy allowed them but except from that, they agreed on
little else.
After the decision of the CPP to boycott the elections that made Cory
Aquino president and after the âEDSA revolutionâ (named after Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue, one of the main roads of the capital and the
location of huge crowds) that drove Marcos from power, a furious debate
erupted in the party. The boycott decision itself was heavily criticized
â and the leadership admitted this was a mistake â but there were also
disagreements on the partyâs strategy, the lack of democracy in the
organization and the control the party sought to exercise over
above-ground organization and alliances. These differences were
compounded by the implosion of the eastern-bloc in the late eighties.
Although the party had little ties with these countries and Maoists
generally considered the eastern-bloc to be capitalist anyway, the
implosion of the Soviet-Union and the other nominally socialist regimes
in Europe made a number of cadres question CPP goals like a single
party-state and a state-led economy.
The partyâs forces decreased sharply: between 1987 and 1990,
party-membership decreased by 15 percent, the number of barrios under
its coverage by 16 percent, the number of NPA fighters with 28 percent
and the total membership in party-controlled rural mass-organizations
with 60 percent.[133] To counter these negative developments, critical
voices urged deep going changes in the partyâs strategy and ways of
operating â which way these changes should go they often disagreed on,
but there was a shared feeling in the opposition that the old Maoist
model should be discarded and that the party needed more internal
democracy.
Sison, who after his release by Aquino in March 1986 re-assumed the
position of chairman in 1987, went the other way.[134] Under a new
alias, Armando Liwanag (âArming with Lightâ) he started to attack those
who criticized the Maoist model and Stalinist conception of the party.
The debate came to a head and led to splits after Sison published in
1992 a document called Reaffirm our basic principles and rectify
mistakes which called for a return to Maoism after the âdeviationsâ of
the eighties.[135] Sison won over a majority of the party-leadership and
he and his supporters, now dubbed âre-affirmistsâ or âRAâsâ, started to
expel the âre-jectionistsâ (âRJâsâ) who rejected the Maoist model. At
the end of 1992, the RAâs had control of a unified but weakened
party.[136]
On the eve of Kahos then, the CPP was a party filled with contradictions
and tension. Long standing internal differences deepened as Philippine
society underwent deep social and political changes in the early and mid
eighties. Despite great progress, the CPP had reproduced many of the
same weaknesses of the earlier revolutionary movements: a gap between
existed its cadre and rank-and-file, reproducing in many ways the
inequalities of Philippine society. Its Maoist ideology was not enough
to close this gap, leaders and followers often still lived in different
mental worlds. This gap made it difficult to change the partyâs thinking
and contributed to its disconnection from its daily experiences.
However, the leadership and the party enjoined a great deal of prestige
because of the organizationâs successes in fighting the Marcos
dictatorship.
We can now identify three necessary but not sufficient conditions for
the purges in this decade. One was a reduction of politics to violence â
this reduction was encouraged by two, seemingly opposed, worldviews;
official Maoist ideology and the âradicalized every-day peasant
consciousnessâ. A second condition was an ideology that declared the
party to posses a higher level of knowledge. A third condition was the
reification of the CPPâs thinking into an inflexible ideology as result
of the gap between the worldviews of the activists and official thinking
and the refusal to question Maoism itself. This combination made a
crisis of the movement unavoidable. In the following chapter, we will
look at reasons why this crisis took the specific shape it did: repeated
and murderous hunts for fictive infiltrators.
Schematically, the pattern of violent âanti-infiltration operationsâ in
the CPP poses two questions. The first is what caused these hunts, the
second is what made it possible for the purges to continue for so long.
The most substantial evaluations of the purges by Paco Arguelles[137]
(Ric Reyes, a member of Mindacom during Kahos), Walden Bello,[138]
Robert Francis Garcia[139] and Patricio N. Abinales[140] all provide
elements of the answers to these questions but focus on explaining why
the purges could last so long, not on why they started.
Arguelles, Bello and Garcia for example all discuss the lack of a
judicial system in the movement and an instrumental view of individuals
(linked by Bello to the CPPâs âLeninismâ). Garcia especially draws
attention to the CPPâs intolerance towards dissenting views and its
militarism. The dehumanization, ideological intolerance, the use of
torture and the weakness of the internal justice-system these authors
discuss are important to explain why the purges lasted as long as they
did.
In two important essays on the purges in Mindanao, Abinales pointed to
reasons why the purges here were so much more devastating than
elsewhere. In the first essay, he discusses the increase of tensions in
Mindanaon society during the eighties and how these were reflected in
the growth and self-destruction of the Mindanaon CPP. The second essay
is an analysis of the assessment of Kahos made by the Mindanao
leadership. It points to the institutional and ideological weakness of
the Mindanaon CPP and interprets the purge as the attempt of a
bewildered leadership to keep the organization together under the
pressure of an intensifying civil war and rapid political changes.
The CPP made an official evaluation of the purges in documents like
Reaffirm our basic principles and General review of significant events
and decisions (1980 â 1991).[141] These documents were written and
published as part of the intense political debates and splits in the
National-Democratic movement in the late eighties and early nineties.
Their analysis of the purges is obviously motivated by the desire to
attack and discredit opposing tendencies in the movement. They should be
treated carefully but contain useful information and are revealing of
the mindset of the CPP. The CPPâs analysis, again written by
party-ideologue Jose Maria Sison, can be easily summarized; the party
deviated form the âcorrectâ (Maoist) line, leading to militarism and
exaggerated hopes of victory. Confronted with setbacks caused by this
deviation and unable to explain these, the âdeviationistsâ started to
look for spies, leading to the purges.
Reaffirm and a 1989 booklength interview with Sison left open the
possibility there were real DPAâs â because of the carelessness of the
Mindanao leadership â but that Mindacom overreacted because of its
âpetty-bourgeoisâ nature.[142] Sison later suggested it were the âLeft
opportunistsâ themselves who spread rumors of DPAâs.[143] [144]
My argument is that the purges were a reaction to the political and
social instability of Philippine society in the eighties. Using its
familiar but reified political framework, the CPP was unable to make
sense of this crisis since the CPPâs political ideas had become
inflexible dogma. This created cognitive dissonance between ideology and
external reality. To make reality âideologically consistentâ again it
needed to be reinterpreted in such a way it could fit the
expectations.[145] The only way CPP-members who were unwilling to reject
or alter their ideology could make such a reinterpretation was by
looking for people in the party that stopped it from playing âits
historical roleâ. These âsaboteursâ could only be seen as traitors and
enemies.
This chapter first looks in more detail at how three elements of the
CPPâs worldview (the tendency to reduce politics to armed violence, its
class-reductionist and economistic view of individuals and its belief
the party is the carrier of truth) played out during the purges. After
this, it discusses two factors internal to the CPPâs functioning that
were important in creating the dynamic of the purges: its organizational
weakness, including the lack of a sophisticated judicial apparatus,
(especially in Mindanao) and its use of torture. Finally, we consider
how in the party during the crisis of Philippine society in the period
1983 (the assassination of Aqauino) to the end of the decade a mindset
was created that has been described as âparanoidâ.
Tse-Tung, âProblems of war and strategyâ in: Idem: Selected Works II
(Peking 1967) 219 â 237, there 225.
The insistence on violence as the primary form of struggle, shared by
Maoist ideology and the tradition of peasant revolts, became more
important as the war between government and CPP intensified. A
conception of political struggle as the physical killing of opponents
and a belief the party was always right formed an explosive mixture that
exploded as the party began running against the limits of its ideology
and practice.
One shouldnât make a caricature out of the NPA fighters, as if they were
just ruthless fighters. In an earlier phase of its struggle the fact the
NPA was more than a fighting organization was one of the causes that
enabled it to grow. Of the students that joined the guerrilla, those
that had studied medicine for example gave basic aid to people who had
no access to healthcare, others would maybe learn the peasants they
worked among to read and write. NPA units helped peasants with their
daily tasks. New recruits were taught to always be respectful and honest
to âthe peopleâ.
But with the intensification of the armed struggle in the early
eighties, it was inevitable the military aspect would become more and
more dominant. War, no matter what kind, has a logic of its own. Mao,
who often used ideas of ancient warlords and commanders of the ruling
classes in his writing on military affairs, knew this. Armies can
survive and win when they act quickly in applying force where the enemy
is weaker. To be able to do this, armies need discipline, regimentation
of knowledge and tasks and a command structure.
A guerrilla-army canât escape from this logic but finds itself in a
complicated double-bind: it has to grow bigger to win and as the war
continues, it will tend to become more and more like its opponent. At
the same time, itâs raison dâetre is that it is different from the
government army. Specialized soldiers are more efficient in combat than
NPA members who are part-time fighters and part-time doctors or
educators â but they are not as efficient in winning support. Itâs no
accident that Sison, who wanted to âre-affirmâ the partyâs Maoist line,
ignored that one of the signs of Mindacomsâ âmilitarismâ he criticizes â
the formation of company-sized armed units â was pioneered by
party-units in Samar and Northern Luzon that stuck closely to the Maoist
model.
The overemphasis on the military side of the struggle was hardly unique
to the Mindanaoans. According to the Maoist theory of âprotracted
peopleâs warâ (âPPWâ), revolutionary wars go through three stages: a
strategic defense, where the guerrilla is weak and limited to hit and
run attacks, strategic stalemate, characterized by the formation of
larger units of full-time fighters and the creation of liberated zones,
and the strategic offensive in which the revolutionary forces defeat the
government army through conventional warfare. Since the overall movement
is subordinated to the development of the guerrilla-war, there can be no
significant step forward in the revolution without an escalation of the
military struggle from one phase to another.
The militarism of the CPP in Mindanao was not caused by a deviation from
Maoism, rather the Maoist âPPW modelâ itself was militarist. One reason
militarism as a political strategy, and more general a reduction of
politics to violent confrontation, could take hold in the CPP was its
view of individuals.
In the CPPâs conception of the world, individuals and their actions are
reduced to their class-identity: âthe political moves of each
[individual or group] is actually in pursuit of its own
class-identityâ.[146] And class-identity is equated with political
ideas: for or against âthe Partyâ.
The methods some supposed enemies, the so-called âconfirmed spiesâ
caught during Kahos, used according to Mindacomâs initial assessment of
the Kahos are curious: âdistorting the political line during educational
sessionsâ, âmismanagement of moneyâ, âbreaching party-disciplineâ and
âembezzling fundsâ are named as ways to sabotage the party.[147]
Mindacom was not the first leading body in the party that thought
police-spies would use such impractical methods. In the article on the
anti-infiltration drive in 1981 in Quezon-Bicol it is written that spies
âneglected political education to the massesâ, âdisplayed liberalism in
their workâ (Maoist jargon for a lack of discipline) and neglected
security.[148]
It is unlikely infiltrators used methods like these as part of a plan to
sabotage the party â it is much more likely these were the result of the
raw, untrained nature of many new activists. We saw there was a lack of
political education and the CPP in Mindanao in particular took in large
numbers of new, raw recruits â it is likely that distortions of the
political line had more to do with unfamiliarity with the theory and
with the anti-intellectual current in the movement than with a
complicated plan to destabilize the party.
Likewise, the other âsabotage-methodsâ mentioned in the assessment of
Mindacom and the in Ang Bayan article can easily be explained by
incompetence, opportunism and a plain lack of experience. But its
Manichean ideology, that saw reality as a struggle of the Party versus
capitalism, provided the CPP with a framework in which these weaknesses
were characteristics of the enemy. Obviously referring to this
mechanism, one member of the Mindanao-leadership talked about a
âtendency to lump up (sic) alleged criminal violations with ordinary
cases of organizational violationsâ.[149]
Garcia narrates how differences caused by different class-backgrounds
persisted in the movement. He and the others who made up the
âeducational committeeâ of his unit all came from the city and had been
students.[150] People like him, Garcia writes, were instantly
recognizable: by their skin, their demeanor, their difficulties in
climbing the mountains, et cetera. They were also recognizable by the
kind of work they did in the movement: their priority was not fighting
but political education, a division of labor that on occasion caused
resentment. Most of the time, this resentment only led to teasing
remarks and jokes, Garcia writes.[151]
But in the dynamic of a hunt for infiltrators, with people being
tortured to give names, why not name the ones you dislike anyway? At
least one cadre said that sometimes âinterpersonal conflicts were
affecting these investigations.â[152] The Ang Bayan article âBusting a
spy networkâ relates how spies supposedly âsought out those with
grievancesâ against the leadership.[153] Garcia writes that under
torture he too was tempted to name members that had accused him, to give
them âa taste of their own medicineâ.[154]
When the purges came, the party cracked along similar lines as existed
in the rest of society. When Garcia was arrested, it was together with
the other former students and two peasant guerrillas who happened to
share their sleeping quarters. Werenât people like Garcia more suspect
from the beginning? A DPA is a tool of the bourgeoisie, a âp-b
(petty-burgis) elementâ, like students after all. According to Ka Nongâs
remarks on Kahos the victims came âespecially from the White Areasâ â
the party term for cities.[155] The majority of the NPA-fighters were
peasants and leading members had noted that it was hard for
party-members who stayed for a long time in the countryside to
understand what was going on in the cities.[156]
Other pre-existing lines along which the party fractured were sexuality
and gender. Especially female suspects were subjected to sexual abuse
and several party-members later said a non-heterosexual orientation
could be a reason for suspicion.[157] This comes as no surprise in an
organization that in many ways reproduced the (hetero-)sexist, Catholic
morals of Philippine society.[158]
In the CPPâs thinking there was no room for attention to these
fault-lines: joining the movement was supposed to obliterate all
differences between comrades. A proletarian supports âthe Partyâ because
this organization is supposed to be the carrier of the revolution. Of
course, the CPP was aware unifying people with diverse backgrounds in a
common struggle and in a shared movement is not an easy process. This is
why in Maoist literature, including that of the CPP, one finds many
references to the process of âremouldingâ; through study, work and
âstruggleâ, activists are supposed to turn themselves into
âproletariansâ with the âcorrectâ ideas, habits and values.
Deviation from the majority-view is seen as a result of incomplete
remoulding, of the continuing influence of alien class-influences.
Remoulding is supposed to correct both ideas and behavior â an idealist
notion that could take on bizarre extremes. Regarding romantic
relationships between party-members, for example, Ang Bayan wrote, that
those âshall always be guided by and subordinated to love for the
working classâ. This was âeasier said than doneâ but a âstruggle of
ideasâ would lead to âgladly accepting sacrificesâ.[159]
Since ideas and behavior are assumed to be caused by oneâs âclassâ, the
wrong kind of behavior, irregardless of stated political opinions, could
mark one as a suspect. Because of the reduction of people to their
âclassâ, there was also no guarantee of the Human Rights of the accused,
like the right to defend oneself, not be tortured and to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty. The attitude of the Communists towards
Human Rights was at best ambivalent, even though the CPP and its
front-organizations played a major role in creating a Human Rights
movement in the Philippines.[160] But they approached Human Rights
activism initially as only a tool to further discredit the Marcos regime
and bring more international pressure to bear on him â Human Rights were
not recognized as such. National Democratic Front-chairperson and
CPP-leader Rafael Baylosis declared in the eighties; âthe struggle for
âhuman rightsâ is a legitimate and necessary part of the overall
national democratic struggle. In my opinion, however, it should be
confined to the sphere of tactical struggle or the struggle for reforms,
used as only one of the means or forms of organization in working or
forging alliancesâ.[161]
According to the CPPâs Maoism, there existed no universal Human Rights,
only âclass-rightsâ. One of the activists interviewed by Bello explained
what this meant for those considered class-enemies: â[I]ndividuals have
rights....only by virtue of their membership in the right classes or,
failing that, in their holding the right politics. Thus, if an
individual is suspected or judged to be a class-enemy, he or she has no
innate rights to life, liberty, and respect, what happens to him depends
purely on the tactical needs of the movementâ.[162] This neglect of
Human Rights had disastrous consequences when torture was accepted as a
method of investigation.
The violence against the victims of the purges was, to CPP-members, just
another example of justified struggle against âenemies of the peopleâ.
Abinales has correctly criticized Belloâs assessment that it was the
partyâs âLeninistâ, instrumental vision of people that led to the
torture and killing by pointing out that especially in Mindanao the CPP
was actually very far from the Leninist idealtype.[163] Paraphrasing
Nemenzoâs criticism of Kerkvlietâs view of the Huks, Bello made the
mistake of perceiving of the CPP as it wĂĄnted to be perceived, not as it
really was. Leadership was often individualist and informal, procedures
were not followed. Itâs even possible that had the party been more
tightly organized, the kind of self-destruction as occurred in Kahos
could have been avoided.[164] But this âun-Leninistâ organizational
weakness didnât contradict an instrumental view of individuals. A former
leader of the National-Democratic coalition BAYAN, Lidy Nacpil-Alejandro
explained: â[P]er se, I find nothing wrong with [the principle of doing
anything and everything for the revolution]â.[165]
The economistic view that reduced people to their âclassâ circumstances
was one reason the party stubbornly clung to the notion there was a
revolutionary flow in the country until the end of the eighties and even
in the early nineties. Because of the deep economic difficulties there
had to be, in the CPPâs thinking, an upsurge of the revolutionary
movement.[166] But the second half of the eighties saw larger and larger
numbers of supporters and activists break with the party. Either the
partyâs analysis was incorrect, a conclusion only few members were
willing to draw, unfamiliar with strategic thinking and loyal to the
Party as they were, or the movement was being sabotaged...
All the campaigns were motivated by a certainty that spies and saboteurs
were active in the party, and on a large scale. It was not investigation
that led to a growing certainty enemies agents were active, it was the
other way around: the conviction spies were active led to investigations
and purging. A view of the party as a site of superior knowledge and the
instrument of historical development was crucial in making torture seem
an acceptable choice and in convincing members to continue with the
purges.
Even when activists with the mindset of Lidy Nacpil-Alejandro were
willing to âdo anything and everything to save the revolution and to
save the peopleâ they needed to be convinced that the killing and
torture of the purges was âsaving the revolution and the peopleâ. A
large part of the CPPâs political education was aimed at instilling in
members unquestioning loyalty and faith in the Party.[167] This
certainty was combined with the reduction of people to either friends or
enemies, a blindness for other factors than âclassâ and the denial of
Human Rights.
Its remarkable how long the purges could go on and how little resistance
there was against the killings. The position of unquestioned authority
the Party had for its militants was a factor in this. Party cadres had
been told âabsolute devotionâ to âthe cause of the proletariat and its
partyâ was âforemostâ.[168] One survivor of the purges remembered how
before her arrest she had doubts about the guilt of the accused but:
âmuch as I wanted to disagree, I could not because I did not have full
knowledge of the persons they were investigatingâ.[169] Of course,
neither the interrogators had such knowledge â but they enjoined
prestige on behalf of the party. The Party was supposed to be a guide
towards the future and have the âcorrect ideasâ: how could one presume,
on the basis of mere âsubjectiveâ reasoning, the Party was making such
catastrophic errors?
Resistance against the purges mostly took a more quiet shape than going
openly against the party-leaders. Although the party tried to keep the
purges out of view rumors started to circulate. Prisoners were kept in
camps were others could see them pass and hear their cries. Friends and
comrades from urban areas were summoned to NPA-camps in the countryside
but never returned. People started talking and speculating, putting
pieces of information together and deciding to leave. A leader of the
NPA in Luzon, Ka Roger, says that in 1998 âour guerrilla front committee
was almost wiped out because everybody had leftâ.[170] In Mindanao, the
purges led in nine months to a decline of party-membership of 9000 to
3000 due to resignation, surrender to the government or simply breaking
contact; the NPA shrank from fifteen or sixteen companies to two
companies and 17 platoons. Half of the partyâs mass-base was lost.[171]
Once the willingness to use torture, no matter how âselectivelyâ in
theory, was combined with the certainty of the accusedâs guilt, a
process with a dynamic of its own was unleashed. The cycle of
accusation, torture of the accused until confession, the revealing of
so-called co-conspirators, execution and the torture of the new suspects
was repeated over and over again, claiming hundreds of lives. This cycle
went through an ebb and flow with each separate campaign, one campaign
leading indirectly to the next.
One of the questions raised by the purges in the CPP is why it
sanctioned the use of torture (called âhard tacticsâ) since the kind of
information produced by extensive torture is to a high degree shaped by
the wishes of the torturers: many victims will formulate answers they
think their torturers want to hear, using frameworks provided by their
interrogators.[172] Information extracted through torture is not always
unusable but the extended use of torture against a large group of
accused is best seen as part of a wider strategy of repression, in which
torture functions as means to extract knowledge, as punishment and as a
warning against potential dissenters. This is the pattern familiar from
regimes like several Latin-American military dictatorships and that of
Marcos.
Torture is âa tool of regimes seeking to govern by the âreign of
terror.ââ Political torture, âthe systematic use of violence to obtain
information from opposition and dissident suspects, to destroy the
individualâs personality and/or to create terror into the hearts of
opponents and dissidents or potential opponents and dissidentsâ became
âpart of Philippine politics during the Marcos regimeâ.[173] Torture
that seems at first âirrationalâ â torture without questions asked or
until the point of death, killing the source of information â becomes
intelligible if it is seen as part of a strategy of repression.
But these motivations donât seem to apply to the CPP â here torture was
meant initially to gather information and rumors of torture were doing
great damage to the movement. The decision to use torture was taken
under the pressures of underground struggle that, so the leadership
thought, didnât allow time for other, slower methods to discover the
âtruthâ.
What is puzzling, is how a movement with so many members familiar with
the character of torture â they had been victims themselves or knew
victims â still thought it would be an effective way to combat
police-infiltration. To put an end to their suffering, many victims
mentioned names of completely innocent people and made up stories to
satisfy their torturers. One survivor called it âthe standard mode of
survivalâ: âto invent your story as a true deep-penetration agent, so
that they would stop hurting youâ.[174]
These âconfessionsâ led to new victims and more torture (and eventually
executions) and the cycle repeated itself. This mechanism will be
familiar to readers of studies of medieval witch-hunts, so much that the
term âwitch-huntâ itself more or less consciously refers to it.[175] But
the CPP-leadership let this self-destructive dynamic occur repeatedly
throughout the eighties. The 1984 Ang Bayan article about the
anti-infiltration drive in 1981 makes no mention of âhard tacticsâ but
it is likely the same dynamic claimed innocent lives here as well:
without going into details, the article states many supposed spies âwere
uncovered through confession of those who had been arrestedâ.[176]
The accused were already assumed guilty and denial only made their crime
worse. Those that withstood the torture and maintained their innocence
were executed: the only way to survive a while longer was to enter into
a perverse pact with the interrogator, implicating yourself further and
further by making new âconfessionsâ.[177] The interrogators, eager to
discover enemy agents and inexperienced, asked leading questions,
guiding the answers in already presumed directions: âhow much was your
salary?â, âA thousandâ, âThe truth!â, âTwo thousandâ, âI said: the
truth! Or else...â[178] The combination of suggestive questions,
punishing deviating from the path laid out by these questions â by for
example insisting one is innocent â and torture lead to a spiral of
escalating accusations and new, made-up ârevelationsâ about
infiltrators. In its turn, this convinced the interrogators more spies
still had to be discovered.
The torture brought out a previously unknown potential for cruelty among
a number of party-members. Certain âcreative meansâ of torture and
mock-executions served no other purpose than satisfying the sadism of
the guards and interrogators. One tortured suspect was given a strange
haircut by his tormenters to make him look ridiculous â a small example
of sadism. Forms of torture except from humiliation and beatings were
burning, sexual molestation, rape, forceps used on genitalia, denial of
food and water, mock-executions, âwater cureâ and suffocation.
Tranquillizers and drugs were used as âtruth serumsâ.[179] The arrested
were bound by chains, placed in cages or tied to trees. According to
Harry, in his party-unit it was decided to stab the condemned to death
instead of shooting them to save bullets and avoid the noise of
gunshots.[180] Other methods of killing were beheading, starvation,
crushing the skull, breaking the neck or stabbing with sharpened bamboo
sticks.
If cruelty was the result of anger at suspected treason, the assumption
of guilt was crucial in causing anger against the accused and in
providing the interrogators with a framework to base their suggestive
questioning on. There is an additional, more general explanation for the
kind cruelty that is so familiar from âwitch-huntsâ and purges. The
torturers and the guards placed themselves in service of a cause, of a
Party that was supposed to have a privileged insight into society and
history. This position makes it possible to inflict suffering on victims
while at the same not having to accept any responsibility for it: the
torture and abuse are âHistorical Necessitiesâ. Even more, if I regard
myself as a mere tool in the hands of History, I can inflict suffering
and at the same time be angry at my victims for creating a situation in
which I have âno choiceâ but to break my own ethical rules.
The torturers were not only free from responsibility and able to direct
any feelings of guilt they might have in the form of anger towards their
victims â they could even regard themselves as exemplary people, strong
enough to set aside their âpetty subjective moralsâ and engage in
horrible violence â all in the in name of a noble cause.[181]
The unquestioned authority of the party and the certainty of the guilt
of the accused must be considered when trying to explain the start and
duration of the purges in the CPP. These factors help to answer the
question why it was possible that so many people so long accepted or
even participated in a witch-hunt that was in hindsight so obviously
misguided. Reducing opponents to less than human beings is a major part
of the explanation why the violence of the purges and the use of torture
was accepted or even embraced so easily by so many.
Like any other army, the NPA-fighters dehumanized its opponents to make
it easier to kill them. When talking about military operations of the
NPA, Ang Bayan would refer to killed enemy troops as âfascist elementsâ
who were âwiped outâ. In the early eighties, Ang Bayan ran an article on
a family of which both mother and father were active in the movement.
Lisa, the eight year-old daughter of the couple, was asked if she would
cry if her father died in combat. âNo, I wonâtâ, she supposedly said;
âIâll be angry and kill our enemiesâ.[182]
The accused were dehumanized from the beginning. Trying to explain the
cruelty of Kahos one party-leader rhetorically asked; â[âŠ] can we not
trace this to our old view of class-enemies as ânon-peopleâ that
therefore do not have rights at all as human beings?â[183] Alleged spies
were seen as the lowest of the low, the âlowest existing mammalsâ in the
words of one party-member: exactly because they had shared so much with
their accusers they were seen as devious, despicable. Another term used
for the âanti-infiltration drivesâ was âsanitation campaignsâ, literally
designating spies and infiltrators as filth. Remember the name ahos,
garlic, was chosen on the basis of folktales that garlic was effective
against monsters: suspects were âzombiesâ or demonyos (a term already
used by the Huks to designate infiltrators), they were non-human. The
supernatural terms seem out of place in the rigid, âmaterialistâ
discourse of Stalinism â Stalin referred to the targets of purges as
âelementsâ. That sounds more scientific but it served the same purpose:
deny the accused their humanity or any shared basis with the accusers.
Like almost all humans, CPP-members had to overcome internalized taboos
against hurting other people. It was one thing to have made the choice
that revolutionary violence was necessar â but another thing to use
violence themselves. The goal of dehumanization was to encourage members
to transgress the internalized taboos of harming other humans. A number
of the CPP-cadres who engaged in torture could probably be accurately
characterized as sadistic â how else to explain the more âcreativeâ
means of torture, torture that didnât provide any information? But this
was only a minority. Writing about the Khmer Rouge, Alexander Laban
Hinton describes how to overcome the taboo against hurting other people
a person must make a series of âpsychological moves, like changing the
understanding of what they are doing, altering their behavioral norms or
learning new cognitive models for actionâ.[184]
In the case of the CPP, the belief the party was right and the victims
enemies, legitimate targets of violence, facilitated these changes.[185]
Another mechanism was the use of euphemisms that permit perpetrators to
avoid acknowledging the full reality of their acts. In the Philippine
case, torture was called âhard tacticsâ. The Khmer Rouge said those who
had been executed, âwent to Angkarâ, CPP-cadres claimed people that were
about to be executed were ârehabilitatedâ.
Except from its worldview, the nature of the CPPâs struggle and the
condition of Philippine society over time contributed to a numbness
towards, and acceptance of, violence. The seventies and eighties were a
violent time: even compared with other military dictatorships of the
period, the Marcos regime was brutal. A few statistics compiled by
Alfred McCoy for a 1999 speech at the Ateneo de Manila University show
this: between 1975 and 1985, there were 3,257 extra-judicial killings,
35,000 tortured, and 70,000 incarcerated. Some 2,520, or 77 percent of
all casualties, were âsalvagedâ: tortured and left in the open for
public display.[186] The continuous violence of the âlow-intensity
conflictâ in the Philippines must have had a numbing effect on the
population. An American journalist writing about the NPA in Davao city,
the largest city of Mindanao, was shocked by the ease with which people
accepted and even applauded their executions by saying âthe NPA, they
know who to killâ.[187]
Mindanao, where the purges were most intense, was also the part of the
country hit hardest by war. Ronald Edgerton gave the following
description of the Bukidnon province in Mindanao â where Kahos would
erupt a few years later â in 1983; âsoldiers are everywhere, tearing
around in ramshackle jeeps. Civilian Home Defence Forces (CHDF) encamp
for training on random hillsides, New Peopleâs Army (NPA) ânight
visitorsâ haunt barrios as well as the dreams of the rich (who hire
armed guards and accumulate small but lethal arsenals [âŠ]), armed sects
terrorize barrios in the south, Manobos and Bukidnons (the two âtribal
minoritiesâ in the province) conduct sporadic raids[...], Army renegades
locally known as âLost Commandsâ maraud along the southern border, and
bandits â posing as NPA, Army or âLost Commandsâ â still further confuse
this picture of growing violence and insecurityâ.[188]
In his attempts to integrate Mindanao, a frontier-zone wealthy in
natural resources, in the Philippine state and discipline its population
Marcos used brute force. In 1983, disappearances due to military arrest
and execution reached a high of 115 in Mindanao, compared to 13 in Luzon
and 15 in the Visayas, the cluster of islands in the middle of the
country. In 1984, there were 93 disappearances in Mindanao (34 in Luzon,
24 in the Visayas) and these rose to a new high in 1985, on the eve of
Marcosâ ouster: Mindanao 129, Luzon 28, Visayas 43. From 1977 to 1985,
490 people were âsalvagedâ in Luzon, 371 in the Visayas and 1511 in
Mindanao.[189] As fighting with the Muslim secessionists declined, the
army turned its attention to the CPP. By this time, the early eighties,
the Philippine army was led in the field by officers who enrolled and
had been trained under Marcosâ rule and during Martial Law.[190] These
were men who were willing to fight his dirty wars and employ extremely
brutal methods.
The accusations against comrades were plausible because of the worldview
of the CPP but also because the war itself had blurred distinctions
between friends and enemies. In a guerrilla-war civilians can be
part-time combatants and ties between the guerrillaâs and their
supporters in the local communities are tight. Rebels fight against
their âownâ soldiers and police: people that speak the same language,
some might even be relatives. The government army reacts by treating
whole communities as enemies, convincing more civilians to join the
struggle. Civil wars for control of the state in general tend to be
exceptionally brutal since there are no borders behind which a party can
retreat. Either a revolutionary movement is defeated â militarily or
because it gives up â or the state is destroyed, no other end is
possible. In these circumstances, for many CPP-members violence had
become a familiar part of live and distinctions between friends and
enemies were blurred.
The two internal causes of the purges discussed, the use of torture and
the attitudes that allowed the use of torture to take place were made
possible, although not caused, by weak organization and the failures of
its leadership.
The spiral of interrogation, torture and killing was allowed to continue
so long in part because of the lack of well-organized mechanisms and
procedures to deal with accusations and investigation.[191] A weak
organization and the failures of a leadership that was unable to control
the situation had grave consequences. By the mid-eighties, the
organization in Mindanao had grown big and unstable and came under heavy
stress â the leadership of the party didnât intervene in time to remedy
this situation.
Organizational weaknesses were noted repeatedly by people in the party
and recommendations to deal with this problem were made in the
assessment of âOplan Takipsilimâ but, as later developments showed,
little was done improve this situation. Even in late November 1988 one
party-cadre felt it necessary to re-emphasize basic principles like the
necessity of strong evidence before making arrests, the distinction
between investigation and interrogation and that arrest and
interrogation should not âpreclude the possibility of eventual
releaseâ.[192]
Many people in remote areas supported the NPA because they were the only
kind of justice-system around. The NPA functioned for example as their
protectors against cattle-rustlers and thieves or punished men who beat
their wives. The Philippine police was either absent or not interested
in these kinds of cases. It was up to the NPA to enforce order and
secure safety, it was part of the ideal of âserving the peopleâ.[193]
The lack of due process and the mistake of mixing of the roles of
prosecution, judge and executioners in one body were already present
here.
The circumstances in which the NPA operated certainly hindered the
development of a sophisticated justice system. A guerrilla movement that
lacks a secure hinterland can not have prisons where suspects are held
while their cases are examined. The Argentine-Cuban revolutionary
Ernesto âCheâ Guevara wrote the guerrilla should not take prisoners but
release captured soldiers. But this is not an option with infiltrators
whose knowledge can be lethal. With no place to keep them and unable to
release them, execution becomes an option.
The already ramshackle justice system of the CPP was put under heavy
stress as the war intensified. One CPP-member described it like this;
âbecause it is a life and death struggle, when you are always tense, you
are always living in the risk; you donât have the luxury of verification
of data.â[194] What this meant in the context of the anti-DPA hunts was
declared by one party-member, referring to the Geneva convention
regarding the protection of victims of non-international conflicts;
âwala munang Protocol II!â (âno Protocol II for now!â).[195]
The CPPâs judicial system had remained rudimentary even when during the
Marcos-era in certain areas it was the only force fulfilling a
police-function, because in the field of justice and legality too, it
drew almost exclusively on Maoist examples. The CPP claimed to have
organized âpeopleâs courtsâ after the example of the Chinese Communists
in the 1930âs and â40âs. One of the goals of these courts was to involve
people in fighting alleged counter-revolutionaries and the Chinese
âpeopleâs courtsâ were rudimentary organizations, with little protection
for the accused.[196] The claim that the party is the carrier of
universal truth made an independent judicial system superfluous. With no
institutional framework to give shape to judicial procedures and an
ideology that implicitly and explicitly went against guarantees of the
rights of accused, itâs no surprise that repeated recommendations to
improve the movementâs judicial system fell flat.
Still, it was not unavoidable that the partyâs judicial system would
spin as much out of control as it did. When they partyâs national
leadership intervened, they could stop the purges and we can assume that
if they had intervened earlier in the process, before distrust became
generalized, it would have been easier for them to stop Kahos. Why
didnât they do this?
Although disagreeing on details, commentators on the purges agree that
from the beginning, opposition to the purges in the CC was
marginal.[197] According to Paco Arguelles, a member of Mindacom at the
time, not one member of the Central Committee, the partyâs highest
decision making body between congresses, was opposed to the purges. Only
one CC-member, Ka Thomas, objected to the purges as the number of
suspects increased. The dynamic of the purge silenced his objections:
when his own wife fell under suspicion, Ka Thomas fell silent, afraid
that his objections would be seen as a sign of his partnerâs guilt.[198]
Former chairperson and NPA commander Rodolfo Salas claims that he,
together with NPA commander Romulo âRollyâ Kintanar, stopped Kahos but
the Executive Committee of the CC later instigated OPML and
Olympia.[199]
According to Robert Francis Garcia CC members were present in the same
NPA camp where he and other suspects were imprisoned and tortured.[200]
Although their earliest decisions were based on faulty information â
each evaluation of a purge deemed the operation a success â these CC
members were aware of the reality of the purges. Unlike the
lower-ranking CPP members and sympathizers who were swept up in the
purges from the beginning and for whom dissent would have meant being
suspected themselves, the CC leaders were â at least in the early phase
â not suspects themselves. It was the CC and especially the Executive
Committee of the CC that could have stopped the purges.
Garcia describes the CC as being in a state of disarray in 1986, going
from hesitating to continuing the purges to wanting to extend them even
further.[201] I suggest that this confusion, resulting in a failure to
put an end to the purges, was part of the overall political confusion
and intense pressure that gripped the party in the mid-eighties. For
many of its peasant supporters, nothing much seemed to fundamentally
change, even with the fall of the dictatorship and restoration of
so-called âdemocracyâ: the army continued or even intensified its
counter-insurgency war, land was still scarce, and they remained as poor
as ever. But the national leadership saw its whole paradigm of
revolution come apart and important sections of the movement break away.
Crucially, confusion and indecision at the top and a weak judicial
system gave middle-level cadres wide room to manoeuvre. Kenneth, the
cadre who organized the Task Force responsible for Operation Plan
Missing Link, was ambitious and thought success in ferreting out spies
could mean promotion. People like Kenneth were more motivated to find
people guilty, no matter how flimsy the evidence, than admit nothing was
wrong. With no effective higher leadership monitoring him, Kennethâs
ambition cost lives. In Mindanao, the low-ranking cadres conducting the
purges had little idea of earlier purges or of the size of the purge on
the island. Harry explained information was compartmentalized â a
sensible measure in an underground organization.[202] But the leadership
that should have kept an overview of the situation failed to do this and
didnât intervene when an impossibly high number of alleged spies was
âdiscoveredâ.
One of many unanswered questions is why the purges finally stopped. The
decision of the CC to review the whole process was experienced by Garcia
as if it had been suddenly jolted awake and realized what was going one
â the speed with which the review-process forced a turnaround showed
again how thin evidence against the accused were: as far as is know,
everybody was released. But what gave the central leadership the âsudden
joltâ that made them stop the purges?
Harry explained that â although he was forced to participate â he
started to voice doubts about the process long before it ended.[203] As
time passed and the party and the movement in Mindanao fell apart, more
cadres must have started to feel doubts; the conclusion the purges were
a mistake became impossible to avoid for those who saw the consequences.
But even after Kahos, at the end of the eighties, the Luzon-based
leadership probed the possibility of âcontinuing Kahosâ.[204]
It was only after open and highly acrimonious debates and splits broke
out in the party that Kahos and the following purges where declared not
simply âmistakenâ but âcriminalâ. The official documents declare that
Kahos, OPML and Olypmia were linked to âdeviationsâ from the Maoist
line. They put the major part of the blame on opposition leaders like
Nathan G. Quimpo, Ricardo Reyes and Benjamin de Vera. Perpetrators from
the RA camp are not named, itâs only claimed they already have been
adequately sanctioned.[205] This, and the ignoring of pre-Kahos purges,
shows the CPP-leadership was less interested in explaining these events
than that it was in looking for a stick to beat the opposition with.
The CPPâs worldview predisposed it to look for infiltrators to explain
set-backs. Neither itâs judicial system nor its leadership prevented the
outbreak of violence against other comrades. But why did the purges
reach their peak when they did, in the mid to late eighties? What gave,
at that moment, the push that set the internal mechanisms described
above in motion? The decisive factor in this is what commentators,
witnesses and survivors have called âparanoiaâ or âmadnessâ. To
understand the use of these psychological terms, we need to look at the
way the party responded to the crisis of Philippine society.
The âStanding Group, Visayas Commisionâ, part of the anti-Sison
opposition in the CPP, wrote that it was âpainful for all us when the
anti-infiltration campaigns in the history of the Party are dredged up â
from what happened in ST [Southern Tagalog] in the early 1980s to Kahos
in Mindanao to the anti-infiltration hysteria in Luzon including the
OPML in Southern Tagalog in 1988...Many innocent comrades, red fighters
and masses paid with their lives because of the insanity [kahibangan]
that happened. These campaigns caused serious political and
organizational setbacks.â[206]
By including the purges outside of Mindanao, the writers made clear
their rejection of Sisonâs thesis that Kahos was linked to Mindacomâs
errors of âadventurismâ and âinsurrectionismâ. Instead, they blamed
âparanoiaâ and lack of trust in comrades.[207] They are not the only
ones using such terms.[208] Where did this âparanoiaâ and âinsanityâ
come from?
The CPP was a tightly knit group, bound together by a common cause and
the dangers of underground struggle. Certainly, the attitudes of
comrades affected each-other â itâs useful to speak of a collective
psychological condition when its done to describe this kind of mutual
influence. When rumours of the purges started to circulate, long before
the first official revelations, large numbers of activists broke contact
with the party, fearful they might be next. Parts of the membership were
in the grip of panic, the persecutors saw the large scale defections and
the sudden instability of the party as proof of sabotage.
This reaction could be described as paranoid if we take the word to mean
not just âirrational fear of prosecutionâ (the purges were looking for
infiltrators in the wrong places but there is no question that the
Philippine intelligence services were trying to infiltrate and sabotage
the party) but the âinventionâ of spies to explain reality. Paranoia is
linked to fear and anxiety â the attention of the intelligence services
to the party and military operations were certainly sources of anxiety
for even the most seasoned cadres, especially in the mid-eighties when
the war intensified and government violence reached a peak.
What is to be explained is the leap from a level of anxiety âhealthyâ
for an organization like the CPP to the frantic search for saboteurs and
agents. I suggest this leap came from the combination of an intensifying
civil war, shifting political circumstances and, crucially, a world-view
that could not explain for the problems these circumstances posed in
other terms than infiltrators. Once the conclusion infiltrators were
active was reached, the mechanisms discussed above became active.
Those responsible for making decisions in the party were convinced they
had a superior, objective view of reality. According to Harry, it was
hard for them to accept setbacks were caused by their own mistakes; âhow
could that happen to us? After all, we thought we were well-trained
Marxists, we should have prepared for thisâ.[209] This worldview could
explain setbacks only by blaming saboteurs. It is striking how Sison in
his criticism of the Mindanaon CPP reasons along the same lines as the
purging âdeviationistsâ themselves by blaming class-influences from
outside the correct, âproletarianâ consciousness for Kahos. Supposedly,
it was the âunremoulded petty-bourgeois mode of thoughtâ of the
Mindanaon leadership that led, according to him, to the purges: just
like Mindacom at the time, he refused the possibility that the party was
confronted with unforeseen difficulties or that its way of analyzing the
world was incomplete or even incorrect. Instead, he blamed âoutsidersâ â
in his case meaning people with supposedly ânon-proletarian
behaviorâ.[210]
For the CPP, Maoism provided the model of its party and strategy. As
long as the party grew and membership increased, these ideas were not
put into question. The principle of âcentralized leadership and
decentralized operationsâ and the unacknowledged gap between
rank-and-file and cadre helped to reify their Maoist ideology. The
crisis of the CPP is usually traced to the 1985 snap elections, its
impopular boycotdecision and the following Peopleâs Power uprising that
sidelined the party. But, behind a façade of glowing health, the partyâs
worldview had entered into a crisis parallel with that of the Marcos
regime after the assassination of Benigno Aquino.
The following months saw the explosive growth of anti-Marcos sentiments
and the blossoming of anti-Marcos movements in region and strata that
had always been considered secondary in the CPPâs framework: the cities
and what it considered âthe middle classesâ (which included large parts
of the somewhat better educated and better paid working class). Marcosâ
support among army, technocrats, cronies and the US government
fractured. The CPP was surprised by these developments since it had
always assumed that âthe middle classesâ were not capable of playing an
independent role in politics and the US would not drop their support for
Marcos.[211]
The CPP had no answer to these developments. For a large part of its
supporters, the struggle of the party had been identified with that
against âthe US-Marcos regimeâ â a regime that had been in power for
over a decade. Hopes were high that with the removal of Marcos himself,
large gains could be made. For the leadership it was clear the
Marcos-regime was not just the work of one man and that it had deep
social roots. But the leadership was unable to communicate this warning
to its followers. More seriously, it had no answer to the developing
crisis. In a rapid chain of events, the CPP lost itâs dominant position
in the anti-Marcos movement.
Maoism lacks a theory of revolutionary crisis, of what Lenin described
as a time when âthose below do not want to live in the old wayâ and
âthose above cannot carry on in the old wayâ. In such times a ânational
crisisâ, including bĂłth rulers and ruled, develops as the population no
longer accepts the government and the government is unable to maintain
control because of the loss of legitimacy and disunity among the ruling
classes.[212] Instead Maoism assumed countries in the underdeveloped
world to be in a more or less permanent revolutionary situation. In a
Third World country like the Philippines a revolutionary situation was
supposed to be âinherent, chronic and constantâ.[213] When after the
assassination of Aquino a real revolutionary crisis developed, the CPP
was unable to formulate an adequate response, instead organizing hunts
for fictitious spies.
The purges were an âindirectâ symptom of a crisis of the ideological
framework of the CPP. The framework was left intact (unlike other armed
movements in the late eighties, the CPP did not change its ideology or
give up armed struggle) but this framework could only be left intact and
explain reality by assuming the work of enemy spies. âParanoid behaviorâ
might be irrational but is not without a logic of its own: it is an
attempt to make sense of the world and its development. In as far as the
label âparanoidâ can be applied to a collective process like the purges
in the CPP, I suggest we see it as the result of an effort to create a
new cognitive map by forcing unexpected developments in the familiar
Maoist framework. Even before the assassination of Aquino, purges were
responses to pressures on the party, like government counter-insurgency
campaigns or the failure of NPA operations.
Because of its claim to complete truth, its prestige as the ideology of
the party and the low-level of political debate inside the movement,
many activists were not willing or able to change the Maoist framework.
The isolation of the CPP, with parts of its periphery breaking away to
join the Aquino campaign and the party caught by surprise during the
Peopleâs Power uprising, meant that either the Maoist framework was
incorrect, or at the very least needed drastic modifications â or dark,
hidden forces were active.
From âaboveâ, this must have been a tempting conclusion for cadres who
had been trained in the tradition that the party is always right. The
daily motivating ideology from âbelowâ was very different from the
partyâs official ideology. The rank-and-file often only had haphazard
knowledge of the ideology, but this however didnât meant that ideology
was unimportant: what kept the movement together was a shared ideology
among the rank-and-file, compatible with and linked to the ideology of
the leadership.
The kind of unspoken, daily âcommon senseâ that guided that guided the
bulk of the partyâs practical work was just as unable to deal with an
intense crisis as the reified, official models of the leadership. When
complex social process were simplified to conspiracies, comrades became
targets of violence.
As different the mental worlds of many people in the movement were, they
shared the idea that setbacks must be the work of people who were
enemies and thus legitimate targets of violence. This unleashed time and
time again a murderous dynamic that ended only after it, in the context
of a weakly organized party-branch and war-wrecked society in Mindanao,
reached such proportions that its foolishness and criminality could no
longer be ignored.
In an interview in 2003 CPP-spokesperson Gregorio âKa Rogerâ Rosal
criticized the organization of survivors of the purges, PATH, by saying
their work served the interests of the government. He called the
activists âcounterrevolutionaries masquerading as advocates of truth and
justice for the sake of the purge victimsâ.[214] A few months later, Ang
Bayan published an article laying the blame for Operation Missing Link
on individuals who have since then formed the rival Marxist-Leninist
Party of the Philippines and, in a sinister twist, on two survivors of
the torture; PATH activists Manuel Quiambao Pena and Robert Francis
Garcia, writer of To suffer thy comrades.[215] Once again Garcia was,
without a shred of evidence, declared an enemy of the revolution.
That this kind of allegation is not just empty talk the party proved
with a series of assassinations of former members who were deemed
guilty, on the basis of evidence nobody outside the CPP saw, of crimes
against the revolution and the people. The most high profile case was
the assassination in 2003 of Romulo âRollyâ Kintanar, the former head of
the NPA who had been so instrumental in stopping the purges. Sison had
started accusing Kintanar among others of being ârenegadesâ, âenemy
agentsâ and âgangstersâ in the early nineties and the CPP announced
Kintanar and other ârejectionistsâ would be tried by âpeopleâs courtsâ
and meted out death sentences.[216] Since Kahos, the CPP has not seen
purges on the scale comparable to those in the eighties. For Sison, this
proves their causes have been ârectifiedâ â the policy of threatening
Human Rights advocates like Garcia and killing political opponents tells
a different story.
The tragedy of the purges in the Communist Party of the Philippines is
that of 20^(th) century Communism: a movement that inspired people with
a vision of equality and freedom turned on the very people it had set
out to liberate. The victims of Kahos, OPML, Olympia and the other
âanti-infiltration drivesâ dedicated their lives to a movement they
hoped would bring freedom and justice. Like Edgar Jopson (shot by police
in 1982, aged 34), labour leader Rolando Olalia (tortured and murdered
in 1986, aged 52), student-leader Leandro Alejandro (assassinated in
1987, aged 27) and thousands of other Filipinoâs they were killed while
pursuing a noble vision. Only if the movement draws its lessons from
what happened to the victims of the âanti-infiltration purgesâ their
deaths will become a little less meaningless.
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Ang Bayan. Pahayagan ng Partido ng Komunista pinapatnubayan
Marxismo-Leninismo-Kaisipang Mao Zedong 1980 â 1986.
[1] Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and society in the
Philippines (Oxford 2005) 219.
[2] The description is from Kathleen Weekley, The Communist Party of the
Philippines 1968 â 1993. A story of its theory and practice (Quezon City
2001) 224.
[3] Karl Marx, âThe eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparteâ, in: Idem,
Surveys from exile. Political writings, volume 2 (Middlesex 1973) 143 â
250, there 146.
[4] Patricio N. Abinales, âWhen the revolution devours its children
before victory: Operasyong Kampanyang Ahos and the tragedy of Mindanao
communismâ in: Idem, Fellow traveller. Essays on Filipino communism
(Quezon City 2001) 153 â 193.
[5] Patricio N. Abinales, âKahos revisited: the Mindanao commission and
its narrative of a tragedyâ in: Rosanne Rutten, Brokering a revolution.
Cadres in a Philippine insurgency (Quezon City 2008) 144 â 188.
[6] The description of Cecilâs experience has been taken from Robert
Francis B.Garcia, To suffer thy comrades. How the revolution decimated
its own (Manila 2001) 44 â 46.
[7] Garcia, To suffer thy comrades 22.
[8] Authors interview with âHarryâ (15 â 09 â 2011). Harry, not his real
name, joined the CPP in 1977 or 1978 and was a senior partymember in
Mindanao during the purges. A few years later, he took part in
negotiations with the government. He left the party in the nineties
because of political differences.
[9] Authors interview with âHarryâ (15 â 04 â 2011).
[10] Two essays by Patricio N. Abinales specifically deal with the purge
in Mindanao and provide an overall picture of the sequence of
developments: Abinales, âWhen the revolution devours its children before
victoryâ, Abinales, âKahos revisited: the Mindanao commission and its
narrative of a tragedyâ.
[11] Garlic was also thought to repel snakes, another term used for
infiltrators. Yet another name for infiltrators was âzombiesâ, creatures
that are also said to be repelt by garlic.
[12] Authors interview with Harry (15 â 04 â 2011).
[13] This episode is discussed in Garcia, To suffer thy comrades, 41,
42. Harry claimed this person shot himself on purpose to escape from
this task.
[14] Authors interview with Harry (15 â 04 â 2011).
[15] The âofficialâ CPP-view of Kahos, OPML and Olympia can be found in
Armando Liwanag, âReaffirm our basic principles and rectify errorsâ,
Kasarinlan, 1 (1992) 96 â 157.
[16] âBusting a spy network: one regionâs experienceâ, Ang Bayan 10
(1984) 13 -16.
[17] Authors interview with Harry (15 â 04 â 2011).
[18] Wolfgang Leonhard, Kanttekeningen bij Stalin (Houten 2009) 98.
[19]
J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The road to terror. Stalin and the
self-destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932 â 1939 (New Haven 1999)
591.
[20] Rebecca E. Karl, Mao Zedong and China in the twentieth-century
world. A concise history (Durham 2010) 41.
[21] Pierre Rousset, âThe Chinese revolution. Part I: The Second Chinese
Revolution and the shaping of the Maoist outlookâ, Notebooks for Study
and Research 2, january 1987, 30.
[22] Karl, Mao Zedong and China, 43.
[23]
J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The road to terror, 495.
[24] Authors interview with Harry (15 â 04 â 2011).
[25] William Chapman, Inside the Philippine revolution. The New Peopleâs
Army and its struggle for power (New York 1987) 56.
[26] Abinals and Amoroso, State and society in the Philippines, 147.
[27] Ken Fuller, Forcing the pace. The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas.
From foundation to armed struggle (Quezon City 2007) 96.
[28] Willem Wolters, âMaatschappelijke bindingen in centraal Luzon.
Staat, klasse en lokale samenleving in de Filippijnenâ, Symposion.
Tijdschrift voor maatschappijwetenschap 2 (1980) 83 â 103, there 87.
After the Second World War, the class structure of Luzon changed: the
peasantry became more differentiated while owning just land was not
anymore enough to be part of the ruling elite.
[29] Fuller, Forcing the pace, chapter eight, 259 â 291.
[30] Francisco Nemenzo, âThe millenarian-populist aspects of Filipino
marxismâ in: Randolf S. David ed., Marxism in the Philippines. Marx
centennial lectures (Quezon City 1984) 1 â 45, there 10 â 11.
[31] Alfredo B. Saulo, Communism in the Philippines. An introduction
(Manila 1969) 34. Saulo was a former leading member of the PKP.
[32] Francisco Nemenzo, âThe millenarian-populist aspects of Filipino
marxismâ, 1 â 45, there 6.
[33] Fuller, Forcing the pace, 71.
[34] Saulo, Communism in the Philippines, 34.
[35] Fuller, Forcing the pace, 334 â 341.
[36] Idem, 124.
[37] Chapman, Inside the Philippine revolution, 57.
[38] Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk rebellion. A study of peasant revolt
in the Philippines (Berkeley 1977) 87.
[39] Vina A. Lanzona, Amazons of the Huk rebellion. Gender, sex and
revolution in the Philippines (London 2009) 50.
[40] Fuller, Forcing the pace, 197.
[41] Saulo, Communism in the Philippines, 41, 42.
[42] Lanzona, Amazons of the Huk rebellion, 67.
[43] Chapman, Inside the Philippine revolution, 60.
[44] Kerkvliet, The Huk rebellion, 110 â 118.
[45] Kerkvliet, The Huk rebellion, 150.
[46] Chapman, Inside the Philippine revolution, 62.
[47] Fuller, Forcing the pace, 243. Kerkvliet, The Huk rebellion, 143.
[48] Ibidem, 278.
[49] Saulo, Communism in the Philippines, 56.
[50] Fuller, Forcing the pace, 182.
[51] Ibidem, 261.
[52] Ibidem, 312.
[53] Fuller, Forcing the pace, 307.
[54] James C. Scott, The moral economy of the peasant. Rebellion and
subsistence in Southeast Asia (London 1976) 203.
[55] Scott, The moral economy of the peasant, 204.
[56] Kerkvliet, The Huk rebellion, 99.
[57] Francisco Nemenzo., âThe millenarian-populist aspects of Filipino
marxismâ in: Randolf S. David ed., Marxism in the Philippines. Marx
centennial lectures (Quezon City 1984) 1 â 45, there 8 -10.
[58] Eric R. Wolf, Peasant wars of the twentieth century (New York 1969)
295.
[59] Sanjay Seth, âFrom Maoism to postcolonialism? The Indian âSixtiesâ
and beyondâ, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 7 (2006) 589 â 60, there 595.
[60] Fuller, Forcing the pace, 334 â 341.
[61] Authors interview with Harry, April 15^(th) 2011.
[62] Chapman, Inside the Philippine revolution, 56.
[63] Ben J. Tria Kerkvliet, âA different view of insurgenciesâ HDN
discussion paper series 5, Quezon City, 3.
[64] Kerkvliet, âA different view of insurgenciesâ 4.
[65] Authors interview with Harry (15 â 04 â 2011), âRemarks of Ka Nong
at study session of January 19, 1992â.
[66] Walden Bello, âThe Crisis of the Philippine Progressive Movementâ,
Kasarinlan, 1 (1992) 168.
[67] Fuller, Forcing the pace, chapter 10, 331 â 346.
[68] Unless noted otherwise, information on Marcosâ presidency and
campaigns before 1972 is based on: Abinales and Amoroso, State and
society in the Philippines, chapter eight 193 â 230.
[69] Benedict Anderson, âCacique democracy in the Philippinesâ in: Idem,
Spectre of comparisons. Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the world
(Quezon City 2004) 192 â 227.
[70] Abinales and Amoroso, State and society in the Philippines, 198.
[71] It was not uncommon for elite politicians to be in contact with
armed groups that could provide useful muscle and votes. Chapman, Inside
the Philippine revolution, 79.
[72] Jose F. Lacaba, Days of disquiet, nights of rage. The first quarter
storm and related events (Manila 2003) 58.
[73] Lacaba, Days of disquiet, 130.
[74] Ibidem, XXIII.
[75] Amado Guerrero, âRectify Errors and Rebuild the Partyâ, ratified by
the CPP founding Congress, December 26, 1968.
[76] Chapman, Inside the Philippine revolution, 188.
[77] Quoted in Weekley, The Communist Party of the Philippines 1968 â
1993, 36.
[78] A discussion of the split of the world Communist movement and
Maoismâs appeal in the Third World can be found in: Henning Böke,
Maoismus. China und die Linke â Bilanz und Perspektive (Stuttgart 2007),
chapter 4: Das Schisma der kommunistischen Weltbewegung 86 â 96, and
Alexander C. Cook, âThird world maoismâ in: Timothy Cheek ed., Mao. A
critical introduction (Cambridge 2010) 288 â 313.
[79] Lin Piao, Vive la victorieuse guerre du peuple! â Pour le 20e
anniversaire de la fin victorieuse de la guerre de RĂ©sistance du peuple
chinois contre le Japon (Peking 1965).
[80] Raul E. Segovia, Inside the mass movement. A political memoir
(Pasig City 2008) 49.
[81] Armando Malay Jr., âSome random reflections on Marxism and Maoism
in the Philippinesâ in: Randolf S. David ed., Marxism in the
Philippines. Marx centennial lectures (Quezon City 1984) 50. Malay
discusses the removal of some of the more outspoken Maoist rethoric in
new editions of party-documents in the mid-seventies and the proposal to
drop the reference to âMao Zedong-thoughtâ from the Ang Bayan masthead.
These were however more based on considerations of image, in the light
of rather strong sinophobic sentiments in the country, the
reconcialiation between China and the United States and Chinese support
for Marcos, than on a programmatic break with Maoism.
[82] Ninotchka Rosca, Jose Maria Sison, Jose Maria Sison: At home in the
world. Portrait of a revolutionary (Greensboro 2004) 13.
[83] Weekley, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 21.
[84] The events in Indonesia also made a deep impression on others in
the region. Chandler writes in his biography of Pol Pot that the
destruction of the PKI was an important event in the development of the
Khmer Rouge. David P. Chandler, Brother number one. A political
biography of Pol Pot (Chiang Mai 1993)78 -79.
[85] After 1971 the PKP would definitely choose the Soviet-Union over
China. This âRussian turnâ was combined with a capitulation to the
Marcos government which became definitive in 1974 when the party signed
a treaty of reconciliation with the government. Francisco Nemenzo, âAn
irrepressible revolution: the decline and and resurgence of the
Philippine Communist movement.â Work-in-Progress seminar, Department of
Political and Social Change, The Australian National University, 1984,
75.
[86] Karl Marx, Capital. A critique of political economy (London 1990)
916.
[87] Ang Bayan, 15 June 1971, page 23, quoted in: Randy Malay Jr., âSome
random reflections on Marxism and Maoism in the Philippinesâ in: Randolf
S. David ed., Marxism in the Philippines. Marx centennial lectures
(Quezon City 1984) 58.
[88] Orin Starn, âMaoism in the Andes: the Communist Party of
Peru-Shining Path and the refusal of historyâ, Journal of Latin American
Studies 2 (1995) 399 â 421, there 408.
[89] Quoted in: Sanjay Seth, âFrom Maoism to postcolonialism? The Indian
âSixtiesâ and beyoundâ, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 7 (2006) 589 â 60,
there 595.
[90] Dominique Caouette, âPersevering revolutionaries: Armed struggle in
the 21^(st) century, exploring the revolution of the Communist Party of
the Philippines. PhD dissertation, Cornell University. 2004. 183 â 220.
The new orientation was outlined in two important documents: Amado
Guerrero, Specific characteristics of our peopleâs war (Oakland 1979)
and âOur urgent tasksâ, Rebolusyon 1 (1976) 2 â 33.
[91] Mao Tse-Tung, Quotations from chairman Mao Tsetung (Peking 1976)
309.
[92] Amado Guerrero (Jose Maria Sison), Philippine society and
revolution (np, 2005) 59.
[93] An example is Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanismus und Terror
(Frankfurt am Main 1966).
[94] Editorial, Ang Bayan 6 (1981) 1 â 5.
[95]
J. V. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Peking 1976) 98.
[96] Ibidem, 183.
[97] Henri LefĂšbvre, Probleme des Marxismus, heute (Frankfurt am Main
1967) 118.
[98] Stalin, Problems of Leninism, 99.
[99] Slavoj Zizek, Mel Gibson at the Serbsky Institute, online at
http://www.lacan.com/symptom8_articles/zizek8.html
[100] Kaira Zoe Alburo Kintanar, âBrothers and Lovers in Arms:
Negotiating Male Homosexuality with Military Masculinity in the New
Peopleâs Army, Philippinesâ. A Research Paper in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for obtaining the degree of Master of Arts in
Development Studies. 2008. 27.
[101]
V. I. Lenin, âReport on the unity congress of the R.S.D.L.P. A letter
to the St. Petersburg workersâ (1906) in: Idem Collected works X
(London 1972) 317 â 383, there 380. The degree to which either
âdemocracyâ or âcentralismâ was emphasized in Leninâs writings
depended on whether the party was legal or underground and
whether criticism (like that of the reformist socialist Eduard
Bernstein) attacked the basic fundamentals of Marxism or not.
Needless to say, under Stalin these kinds of nuances were
obliterated. See Lars T. Lih, Lenin rediscovered. What is to be
done in historical context (Chicago 2008) for a discussion of
Leninâs conception of democratic centralism.
[102] Bruce Franklin (ed.), The essential Stalin. Major theoretical
writings 1905 â 1952 (London 1973) 276.
[103] Lefebvre, Probleme des Marxismus, heute, 121.
[104] Mao Tse-Tung, âsome questions concerning methods of leadershipâ
in: Idem Selected works III (Peking 1967) 117 â 123, there 214.
[105] Mao Tse-Tung, âOn contradictionâ in: Idem Selected works I (Peking
1967) 311 â 347, there 344.
[106] For example, a survivor of OPML remembers the persecutors spoke
English. Garcia, To suffer thy comrades, 110.
[107] Authors interview with Harry (15 â 04 â 2011).
[108] Nemenzo, âAn irrepressible revolutionâ 75.
[109] Editorial âOn resuming publicationâ, Rebolusyon. Theoretical &
political journal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Philippines 1 (1990) 3 â 4.
[110] Caouette, âPersevering revolutionariesâ, 273. Maoism insists the
party should always command the army, not the other way around.
[111] âNewspapers: flag bearers of the mass movementâ Ang Bayan (12)
1982, 12 -14.
[112] Abinales, âKahos revisited: the Mindanao commission and its
narrative of a tragedyâ,167.
[113] Mao Tse-Tung, âThe foolish old man who removed the mountianâ in:
Idem Selected works III (Peking 1967) 271 â 275.
[114] David Glanz, âConfusion grows from the barrel of a gun. The
Communist Party of the Philippines.â PhD dissertation, Monash Univerity.
2001. 70.
[115] Jones, Red Revolution, 269 â 270.
[116] Guerrero, Specific characteristics of our peopleâs war (Oakland
1979), âOur urgent tasksâ, 2 â 33.
[117] Gregg R. Jones, Red revolution. Inside the Philippine guerilla
movement (Boulder 1989) 115.
[118] Glanz, âConfusion grows from the barrel of a gunâ 148.
[119] Ibidem, 150.
[120] Kathleen Weekley, âFrom vanguard to rearguard, The theoretical
roots of the crisis of the Communist Party of the Philippinesâ in:
Patricio N. Abinales ed., The revolution falters: the left in Philippine
politics after 1986 (Ithaca 1996) 28 â 60, there 36.
[121] Benjamin Pimentel, U.G. An underground tale. The journey of Edgar
Jopson and the First Quarter Storm generation (Pasig City 2006) 147 â
166.
[122] Abinales and Amoroso, State and society in the Philippines, 216.
[123] Mara Stankovitch ed., âCompromising on autonomy. Mindanao in
transitionâ, Accord. An international review of peace initiatives 6
(1999) 93.
[124] Patricio N. Abinales, âMarcos and Mindanaoâ in: Idem, The joys of
dislocation. Mindanao, nation and region (Pasig City 2008) 34- 36
[125] Abinales, âWhen the revolution devours its children before
victoryâ, 163.
[126] Jones, Red revolution, 135.
[127] Abinales, âWhen the revolution devours its children before
victoryâ 166.
[128] Authors interview with Harry, April 16^(th) 2011.
[129] âRevolution in Mindanao: recovery and advanceâ, Ang Bayan 6 (1988)
2 -6, there 2.
[130] âRemarks of Ka Nong at study session of January 19, 1992â.
[131] âAnnotations on the article by Taquio entitled âComments on the
current polemics within the partyââ.
[132] Joel Rocamora, Breaking through. The struggle within the Communist
Party of the Philippines (Pasig City 1994) 28.
[133] Nathan F. Quimpo, âThe debacle of the Communist Party of the
Philippines. A complete failure of the maoist paradigmâ (n.p., n.d.) 10.
[134] Quimpo, âThe debacle of the Communist Party of the Philippinesâ
74. As a leading member of the CPP at the time, Quimpo was well placed
to know of these developments. Sison denies that he is Armando Liwanag
but Weekely, Rocamora and Caouette al agree with Quimpo that Sison and
Liwanag are the same person.
[135] Liwanag, âReaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors â.
[136] Kerkvliet suggests its possible that since the nineties, âCPP
members today are more united around a Communist ideology.â Kerkvliet,
âA different view of insurgenciesâ, 4.
[137] Paco Arguelles, ââKahosâ: A Soul Searching,â Human Rights Forum, 5
(1995).
[138] Bello, âThe Crisis of the Philippine Progressive Movementâ.
[139] Garcia, âTo suffer thy comradesâ.
[140] Abinales, âWhen the revolution devours its children before
victoryâ and âKahos revisited: the Mindanao commission and its narrative
of a tragedyâ.
[141] Armando Liwanag, âReaffirm our basic principles and rectify
mistakesâ, Communist Party of the Philippines, âGeneral review of
significant events and Decisions, 1980-1991â, Debate 7 (1993) 33 â 95.
[142] Jose Maria Sison, Rainer Werning, The Philippine revolution. The
leaders view (New York 1989) 106 â 108.
[143] Sison, Rosca, At home in the world, 125.
[144] Authors interview with Jose Maria Sison (29 â 4 â 2011).
[145] Patricia G. Steinhoff, âDeath by defeatism and other fables: the
social dynamics of the RengĆ Sekigun purgeâ in: Takie Sugiyama Lebra,
Japanese social organization (Honolulu 1992) 195 â 225, there 207.
[146] âCadres should grasp principles, methods for political analysisâ,
Ang Bayan 2 (1985) 2 -5, there 2.
[147] Abinales, âKahos revisitedâ 152.
[148] âBusting a spy network: one regionâs experienceâ, Ang Bayan 10
(1984) 13 -16.
[149] Draft on the Kahos question (n.p., n.d.) 5.
[150] Garcia, To suffer they comrades, 8.
[151] Ibidem, 3.
[152] Caouette, âPersevering revolutionariesâ, 239.
[153] âBusting a spy network: one regionâs experienceâ, Ang Bayan 10
(1984) 13 -16, there 14.
[154] Garcia, To suffer thy comrades, 18.
[155] âRemarks of Ka Nong at study session of January 19, 1992â.
[156] âAnnotations on the the article by Taquio entitled âComments on
the current polemics within the partyââ. (mimeograph, n.p., n.d.).
[157] Caouette, âPersevering revolutionariesâ 239.
[158] Kaira Zoe Alburo Kintanar, âBrothers and Lovers in Arms:
Negotiating Male Homosexuality with Military Masculinity in the New
Peopleâs Armyâ and Patricio Abinales, Love, sex and the Filipino
Communist (Pasig City 2004). Into the eighties, a non-heterosexual
orientation was seen as an âideological failingâ. Sunny Lansang, âGender
issues in revolutionary praxisâ, Debate. Philippine Left Review 1 (1991)
41 â 52.
[159] âProletarian principles govern party-marriagesâ Ang Bayan 15
(1983) 9 -11, there 9.
[160] Milabel Cristobal, âMensenrechten en de nationaal-democratische
bewegingâ in: Evert De Boer, Huub Jaspers and Gerard Prickaerts, Wij
leerden mensenrechten niet uit boeken. (Enschede 2000) 37 â 51.
[161] Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, âThe use of Human Rights for the
protraction of warâ, Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World
Studies 21 (2006) 34 â 54, there 39, 40.
[162] Walden Bello, âThe Crisis of the Philippine Progressive Movementâ,
Kasarinlan, 1 (1992) 166 â 177, there 51 â 52.
[163] Abinales, âKahos revisited: the Mindanao commission and its
narrative of a tragedyâ. The essay gives a detailed overview of the
organizational weakness of the Mindanaon CPP.
[164] The Peruvian Maoist movement Sendero Luminoso was much more
willing than the CPP to use violence against non-combatants: it was
responsible for about half of the civilian casualties during the civil
war. Still, it never saw anything like Kahos: its extremely
authoritarian and centralized organisation was probably a factor in
avoiding such a development. See Steve J. Stern ed., Shining and other
paths. War and society in Peru 1980 â 1995 (Durham and London 1998),
especially Carlos BasombrĂo Iglesias, âSendero Luminiso and Human
Rights: a perverse logic that captured the countryâ.
[165] Quimpo, âThe debacle of the Communist Party of the Philippinesâ
74.
[166] Ibidem, 24.
[167] âThereâs need to systematize development of party cadresâ Ang
Bayan 10 (1984) 9 â 11 states: that âforemostâ in education is âabsolute
devotion to the cause of the proletariat and the partyâ. The article
âIdeological work is essential to army buildingâ Ang Bayan 12 (1982)
doesnât mention politics but describes how NPA members were taught
virtues like willingness to sacrifice, bravery and putting the
collective first.
[168] âThereâs need to systematize development of party cadresâ, Ang
Bayan 10 (1984) 9 -11, there 9.
[169] Garcia, To suffer thy comrades, 45.
[170] Weekley, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 172.
[171] Abinales, âWhen the revolution devours its children before
victoryâ 155. A company normally consists of three to five platoons,
each counting between 25 and 55. In guerrilla-armies these numbers can
vary.
[172] Michel Foucault, Discipline and punish. The birth of the prison
(London 1991) 3 â 32.
[173] Aurora A. Parong a.o., âRehabilitation of Survivors of Torture and
Political Violence: The Philippine Experienceâ, Economic and Political
Weekly 33 (1992) 1755 â 1761, there 1755.
[174] Earl G. Parreño, âComrade vs. Comrade, Newsbreak 31 March 2003.
[175] See for example Carlo Ginzburg, âHekserij en volksreligositeit.
Aantekeningen bij een proces te Modena uit 1519â in: Idem: Omweg als
methode. Essays over verborgen geschiedenis, kunst en maatschappelijke
herinnering (Nijmegen 1988) 16 â 44, a study of a suspected witch who
confessed under torture, only to withdraw her confession later, and then
was tortured again to make her repeat the confession.
[176] âBusting a spy network: one regionâs experienceâ, Ang Bayan 10
(1984) 13 -16, there 15.
[177] Garcia, To suffer thy comrades, 17.
[178] Ibidem, 18.
[179] PATH. Peace Advocates for Truth, Healing and Justice. âResearch,
education and communication project final reportâ, 2006.
[180] Authors interview with Harry (15 â 04 â 2011).
[181] Slavoj ĆœiĆŸek, Did somebody say totalitarianism? Five interventions
in the (mis)use of a notion (London 2002) 112.
[182] âParticipation in struggle molds revolutionary familiesâ, Ang
Bayan 6 (1981) 11 â 12, there 12.
[183] Draft âOn the Kahos questionâ 13.
[184] Alexander Laban Hinton, Why did they kill? Cambodia in the shadow
of genocide (Berkeley and Los Angeles 2005) 236.
[185] Harry himself compared the CPPâs attitude towards percieved
enemies to that of the Khmer Rouge. Authors interview with Harry (15 â
04 â 2011).
[186] Alfred W. McCoy,, âDark Legacy: Human Rights Under the Marcos
Regimeâ, paper presented at Memory, Truth-Telling and the Pursuit of
Justice: a conference on the legacies of the Marcos Dictatorship, Ateneo
de Manila University, 20 September, 1999.
[187] Chapman, Inside the Philippine revolution, 179.
[188] Ronald Edgerton, âSocial disintegration on a contemporary
Philippine frontier: the case of Bukidnon, Mindanaoâ, Journal of
Contemporary Asia 13 (1983) 151 â 175, there 151.
[189] Patricio N. Abinales, The joys of dislocation. Mindano, nation and
region (Pasig City 2008) 36.
[190] McCoy, âDark Legacy: Human Rights Under the Marcos Regimeâ deals
with the âlegacyâ of torture these men left behind.
[191] Bello, âThe crisis of the Philippine progressive movementâ, 174.
[192] Bong, âsuggestions re sanitation campaignâ (mimeograph, 23
november 1988).
[193] Kerkvliet, âA different view of insurgenciesâ, 4, 5.
[194] Caouette, âPersevering revolutionariesâ 398.
[195] Quimpo, âThe debacle of the Communist Party of the Philippinesâ
74.
[196] Ibidem, 66.
[197] Walden Bello, âThe crisis of the Philippine progressive movementâ
writes that one CC member was opposed to the extension of the purges
outside of Mindanao. Garcia, To suffer thy comrades, writes one CC
member was initially opposed. Indicative of the role of the CC, the CPP
hasnât had a single meeting of its congress, the only party-organ higher
than the CC, since its founding in 1968.
[198] Garcia, To suffer thy comrades, 42.
[199] Rodolfo Salas, âRK was a true hero of the massesâ online at
http://www.philsol.nl/A03a/Kintanar-Salas-feb03.htm
.
[200] Garcia, To suffer thy comrades, 23.
[201] Ibidem, 22.
[202] Authors interview with âHarryâ (15 â 04 â 2011).
[203] Authors interview with âHarryâ (15 â 04 â 2011).
[204] Draft âOn the Kahos questionâ 6. This information was confirmed by
Harry.
[205] PATH, âResearch, education and communication project final
reportâ, names a number of RA-cadres involved in OPML and Olympia who
were punished by demotion or suspension.
[206] Rocamora, Breaking through, 122.
[207] Ibidem, 123.
[208] Bello uses âcollective paranoiaâ: Bello, âThe crisis of the
Philippine progressive movementâ 172. CPP, âGeneral reviewâ describes
Kahos as âhyteriaâ (63), Garcia also talks about paranio: To suffer thy
comrades, 78.
[209] Authorâs interview with âHarryâ (15 â 04 â 2011).
[210] The formulation is from âAnnotations on the the article by Taquio
entitled âComments on the current polemics within the partyââ. The
article is anonymous but itâs very likely the author is Sison â official
documents by Sison/Liwanag use the same way of reasoning. Another
example is Sison description of the development of Kahos as the result
of a âcover upâ, Ninotchka, Sison, At home in the world, 125.
[211] In the periode 1983 â 1986, Ang Bayan regularly featured articles
on non-CPP anti-Marcos opposition. A typical article in March 1983
argued that âthe organized forces of the bourgeois reformists are smallâ
and that âthe prospects of the bourgeois reformists becoming strong
depends on the push and support of US imperialismâ â using the
bourgeois-reformists as a âreserve optionâ for Marcos â but US
imperialism is âon very good terms with the Marcos cliqueâ, âBourgeois
reformists: facing a cross roadâ, Ang Bayan 14 (1983) 6 â 9, there 8.
[212]
W. I. Lenin, De âlinkse stromingâ; een kinderziekte van het communisme
(Amsterdam 1978) 85.
[213] Quimpo, âThe debacle of the Communist Party of the Philippinesâ
23.
[214] Delfin T. Mallari, âGet over purges of 80s, Reds urge former
comradesâ, Inquirer News Service May 17, 2003.
[215] PATH will not be silenced (draft press release, 2004).
[216] Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, Why Kintanar was killed â the true storyâ
Philippines Daily Inquirer, January 28, 2003 online at
http://www.philsol.nl/A03a/Kintanar-Quimpo-jan03.htm
.