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Title: Anarchism = Zerzan? Author: Michael Albert Language: en Topics: anti-civ, critique, John Zerzan, primitivism, technology Source: Retrieved on 1 January 2010 from www.insurgentdesire.org.uk/albert.htm Notes: From Z Magazine
In a number of mainstream media outlets, anarchism has recently been
associated with John Zerzan. In my last ZNet commentary (
), I instead suggested that anarchism ought to be associated with
identifying structures of authority, hierarchy, and domination
throughout life and with challenging them as conditions and the pursuit
of justice permit. Anarchism would seek to eliminate subordination based
on political and economic power, power relations among men and women and
between parents and children, power among cultural communities, power
over future generations, and much else as well. I then suggested that
emerging from this were different strands of activism. One, I argued,
went from the above to rejecting technology, institutions, and reforms
per se. The other, I argued, is seeking to expand the conceptual base of
anarchism to more fully comprehend extra-political dimensions of life,
to develop sound vision, and to elaborate and win non-reformist reforms
that enhance peopleâs current lives and further empower future struggles
leading toward ultimate goals.
I made this differentiation and opted firmly for the latter approach
without naming advocates of either because I wanted to avoid discussing
individual people and instead focus on ideas and choices. Some felt,
however, that I was wrong to critique a trend â the ânot so desirable
anarchismâ â without giving evidence of its actual existence and
examining its actual self-representations.
Okay, the most visible advocate and exemplar of what I called ânot so
desirable anarchismâ is John Zerzan. Of course other folks are also in
the camp, but sticking to Zerzanâs work should amply display at least
the most touted arguments behind the positions I reacted against.
Zerzan starts out by anarchistically rejecting all authoritarian
constraints on human well being and development. This is admirable, of
course, but where does he wind up?
Well, Zerzan rejects technology per se. He rejects all institutions that
distinguish different tasks and responsibilities for different actors,
which is all institutions per se. He derivatively contributes to
rejecting the idea of all reforms because no institution is worthy of
improvements, so no improvements are worthy of our time. But even beyond
these three themes of my last essay, Zerzan also rejects language, math,
and even counting items or registering time passage. I think all these
rejections repeat the same error that other opponents of all technology,
all institutions, and all reforms also make, though Zerzan does it most
relentlessly. Letâs see.
Zerzan tells us âthat technology has never been neutral, like some
discreet tool detachable from its context. It always partakes of and
expresses the basic values of the social system in which it is embedded.
Technology is the language, the texture, the embodiment of the social
arrangements it holds together.â This is unobjectionable, though it
neglects another point that Zerzan never returns to. Yes, technologies
bear the mark of the society they are born and used in. How could it be
otherwise? However, technologies not only reflect those societiesâ
attributes, including their worst, but also often meet real needs and
expand real potentials. So you get electric chairs to kill people and
assembly lines to constrain them, but you also get warm clothes for
people to wear, and penicillin to enhance their longevity.
Zerzan says technologies are contextual, and of course they are. They
arise in some social setting. They are produced in it, or perhaps
another. They are used in it, or perhaps a third. Technologies donât
spring spontaneously from nothing with no lineage and imprint. Nor are
technologies utilized in social vacuums. Zerzan is correct that each
technology, whether a pencil or a shoe lace much less a guided missile
or an assembly line, bears a social inscription carrying into it diverse
imprints of the motives of its conception, production, and utilization â
part of which generally reflect the defense of social elites, but
another part of which often reflect the accomplishing of needed
functions. We should therefore expect technologies conceived, produced,
and utilized in feudal times to be different than those in prehistoric
times, or than those in capitalist times. So it is elementary.
Zerzan moves on, however, to a point that is not at all elementary. He
says, âthe idea that [technology] is neutral, that it is separable from
society, is one of the biggest lies available. It is obvious why those
who defend the high-tech death trap want us to believe that technology
is somehow neutral.â This is disingenuous hand-waving, I think, or else
evidences an immense confusion.
That is, when someone says that technology per se is neutral, they of
course mean that technology does not by its internal logic have to serve
only dominating elites. Technology can serve any constituency including
broad populations. Technology can arise in any social setting and
system, and can accomplish diverse tasks that can be beneficial or
horrendous, humane or cruel, liberating or stultifying. Technology isnât
necessarily prehistoric, or feudal, or capitalist, or anything else
other than always a product of human design and labors, and having a
human origin imposes on technology no particular social direction, no
universal social stamp. Zerzan rightly notices that our contemporary
technologies encapsulate forces at play in our societies. He wrongly
concludes, however, that all technology must forever and always be as
our technology is now. It is therefore not true that if we donât like
specific instances of our technology now, to get rid of them we must
dispense all technology per se.
The most obvious way to discern the unwarranted leap in Zerzanâs claim
is to note that without technology humans would have no clothes, no
source of power outside their own muscles, and not even agriculture to
renew their muscles. Life would be brutish, isolated, and short. Disease
would be rampant. Communication, mobility, knowledge, music, art, play,
and pretty much everything else would be harshly limited. This alone
ought to close the case, of course, that eliminating technology per se
is not the way to avoid the ills of harmful technologies. But another
way to see the point rests on examining Zerzanâs logic.
Suppose I were to say that all human thought, all human expression,
emotion, and even locomotion, manifests an imprint of the society in
which it occurs. This is certainly equally true as saying that all
technology bears such a societal imprint. So now what? Do I follow
Zerzan to deduce from the fact that it is imprinted â like technology is
â that all human thought, expression, emotion, and even locomotion must
always embody oppressive attributes so that I should reject them all in
the same way that Zerzan says we should reject technology? Or do I
assert that in desirable social settings (and to a degree even in
undesirable ones) human thought, expression, emotion, and even
locomotion also have wonderful and essential attributes that we
certainly donât want to reject, and that in good environments the
defining features can become overwhelmingly positive making the idea of
rejecting them utterly ridiculous? I prefer the latter logic, both for
human attributes and for technologies.
Zerzan, in contrast consistently prefers the former logic. His mistake
is to rightly notice various horrible technologies but then wrongly
attribute the problem they pose not to mutable social structures and
institutions which impose the bad features on the technologies and the
bad technologies on us, but to the entire category of technology per se.
Ubiquitous manifestation of this leap from disliking instances of some
category to rejecting the whole category would lead to rejecting pretty
much everything that is social or otherwise a product of human exchange
and thought, but which turns up with horrible aspects in contemporary
societies, and would thus imply wanting humans to revert to a kind of
pre-humanity state. Amazingly, Zerzan follows exactly that trajectory.
Thus, Zerzan offers that âmy working hypothesis is that division of
labor draws the line [between a desirable prehistory and everything
since], with dire consequences that unfold in an accelerating or
cumulative way. Specialization divides and narrows the individual,
brings in hierarchy, creates dependency and works against autonomy.â And
he continues by deducing that âtools or roles that involve division of
labor engender divided people and divided society.â
That is, again Zerzan drags partial truths to outrageous conclusions. Of
course typical corporate divisions of labor diminish and even destroy
individual and social potentials. Zerzan points out, for example, that
âthe first âbreakthroughâ for me was in terms of the Industrial
Revolution in England. Namely, it became clear that the factory system
was introduced in large part as a means of social control. The dispersed
craftsmen were deprived of their autonomy and brought together in
factories to be de-skilled and disciplined. This shows that technology
was not at all âneutralâ.â Perhaps Zerzan first encountered brilliant
expression of such ideas a quarter century ago in the same places I
first did, for example, in the wonderful essay by Steven Marglin, âWhat
do bosses do?â or in Harry Bravermanâs Monthly Review work. But if so,
he missed the key insight that the imposed division of labor served
specific social relations and elites, and that the problem posed for
suffering humanity wasnât that different people were doing different
tasks per se, but was the particular limited combinations of tasks that
most of the people were compelled to do, as well as what little they
received for it.
Zerzan is right, of course, that (corporate and sexist and racist)
divisions of labor have buttressed hierarchy, imposed dependency, and
impeded autonomy. And of course many institutions incorporate these
damaging divisions of labor and therefore deserve rejection. But beyond
this, virtually all institutions involve roles that diversify peopleâs
tasks and responsibilities. To jump from the correct and familiar
insight that some divisions of labor are horrible so that institutions
embodying them are unworthy, to then claiming that no division of labor
at all can be abided and therefore all institutions are unworthy, says
that each individual must, in essence, either do everything for him or
herself or at least only randomly seize on doing this and that task
without lasting institutional coordination with others. It rejects roles
per se and leads to an anti-institutional, anti-social, and I think
ultimately even anti-human stance. So rather than solely rejecting
imposed divisions of labor that are contrary to our aspirations, which
would be fine, Zerzan argues all divisions of labor of any kind have to
go.
Should we reject divisions of labor that relegate many to obedience and
rote boredom while privileging an elite few with empowering and engaging
endeavors? Of course. About this Zerzan and I presumably agree. But the
way to do this isnât to have everyone do everything with no
differentiation of different peopleâs responsibilities. The way to do it
is not to ignore that people have diverse tastes and inclinations that
they rightly wish to express in their actions. And it is not to forego
garnering the worthy gains that can accrue from taking advantage of
skills and training. Why throw out the baby of productivity and
individuality/diversity with the bathwater of alienation/hierarchy? Why
not divide tasks into jobs that are balanced for empowerment and quality
of life implications (to eliminate hierarchy), and that are self-managed
(to eliminate alienation), even as they also respect different actorâs
personal tastes? Get rid of the hierarchy/alienation inducing aspects â
the bathwater â of course. But keep the fulfilling and beneficial
attention to different peopleâs preferences and the utilization of
diversity to increase the breadth of our collective experiences and also
increase output and diminish required labor.
So why does Zerzan pose the problem as no division of labor versus a bad
division of labor (and similarly as no technology versus bad
technology), rather than as a bad division of labor versus a good
division of labor (or as bad technology versus good technology)? One
possible line of thought leading someone to propose such limiting
polarities would be to notice the one thing that all divisions of labor
(and all technologies) have in common, which is their being a human and
social creation, and deciding that this commonality somehow inevitably
infects them with harmful aspects. I am not sure Zerzan believes this,
nor sure if it matters much, because in any event intended or not this
is the practical and intellectual implication of his stance. Thus,
Zerzan says, âit seems evident that industrialization and the factories
could not be gotten rid of instantly, but equally clear that their
liquidation must be pursued with all the vigor behind the rush of
break-out. Such enslavement of people and nature must disappear forever,
so that words like production and economy will have no meaning.â In
other words, we not only have to eliminate bad economic activity that
divides us into unequal classes, or that exploits us, or that despoils
us, or that degrades us, all of which I certainly agree with, but we
have to eliminate economic activity tout court. It is human artifacts
that must go, it seems. As with technology and division of labor, so
with economy as a whole, we must opt for all or nothing. No more
production for Zerzan. No more workplaces. And what do we put in their
place? Foraging, it seems, because that bears no mark of specifically
human invention. So Zerzan rejects tools and roles, technologies and
institutions, and even production and economy, but amazingly, doesnât
stop there. He takes this line of thought all the way to its ultimate
destinations, going well beyond the confusions of âthe not so desirable
anarchismâ I discussed last essay.
Zerzan rejects even language, for example. He tells us that in âthe
process of transforming all direct experience into the supreme symbolic
expression, language, monopolizes life. Like ideology, language conceals
and justifies, compelling us to suspend our doubts about its claim to
validity. It is at the root of civilization, the dynamic code of
civilizationâs alienated nature. As the paradigm of ideology, language
stands behind all of the massive legitimation necessary to hold
civilization together. It remains for us to clarify what forms of
nascent domination engendered this justification, made language
necessary as a basic means of repression.â The problem is now
civilization...that is, humans entwined in social arrangements of their
own creation, conceived to allow each to pursue their lives as they will
without having to operate atomistically or in opposition to all others.
Since words are a big part of the glue of such arrangements, says
Zerzan, letâs dispense with them rather than try to fulfill their
potential.
âWords bespeak a sadness; they are used to soak up the emptiness of
unbridled time. We have all had that desire to go further, deeper than
words, the feeling of wanting only to be done with all the talk, knowing
that being allowed to live coherently erases the need to formulate
coherence,â says Zerzan. And of course one doesnât want to live by words
alone, or bread alone, or technology alone, or anything else alone. But
that is not the same as wanting to entirely dispense with each.
Likewise, of course we express sadness in words, but also in deeds and
feelings. Should we thus relegate not only words, but also deeds and
feelings to the junkyard? And consciousness is surely also often a
bulwark of existing oppressions. Conscious sometimes manifests sadness
and is often used in authoritative ways. Letâs lobotomize, too. For that
matter, why not notice that sexual intercourse has very often been
fraught with painful ramifications, not to mention outright violations,
and virtually universally to date in history with asymmetries of power?
Why not dump sex too? Shortly thereafter there will be no more humans,
and, Zerzan is correct, also no more human suffering. Terminating just
short of this species suicide, Zerzanâs agenda, or hope, seems to me to
be that we should end divisions of labor, reject technology, discard
institutions, silence language, eliminate numbers, reject time, and
perhaps dispense consciousness â though not reproduction â returning to
prehistoric relations. And the mainstream media says Zerzan is an
exemplar of anarchism. No wonder.
You think I exaggerate? Well, judge for yourself. Zerzan says, âmy
tentative position is that only a rejection of symbolic culture [that
is, language] provides a deep enough challenge to what stems from that
culture.â Thus: reject language. Or âonly a politics that undoes
language and time and is thus visionary to the point of voluptuousness
has any meaning.â Not just language, but time too. Wordplay is all well
and good for provocative or aesthetic exercises or entertainment. But
Zerzan claims to be challenging the realities that crush out peopleâs
lives. That carries a responsibility, it seems to me, to attend to
reality.
Zerzan rejects numbers too. To explain why, he tells us that âEuclid
developed geometry â literally, âland measuringâ â to measure fields for
purposes of ownership, taxation, and the assignment of slave labor.â
And: âWhen members of a large family sit down to dinner, they know
immediately, without counting, whether someone is missing. Counting
becomes necessary only when things become homogenized.â Can this be
serious? Apparently so. The thought pattern is by now familiar, after
all. Zerzan rightly notes that numbers can be used in harmful or
alienating ways and to service authority and power. Anyone would
conclude that in some pursuits we are better off without numbers. Fair
enough. But Zerzan wrongly extrapolates that weâd be best off without
numbers all the time. Goodbye to language, goodbye to numbers and time,
goodbye to technology and institutions...why not goodbye to sex one
wonders? After all, sex frequently manifests and undergirds harmful
behavior too.
In the prior essay on Anarchismâs trends I tried to focus on the
important confusions about technology, institutions, and reforms that I
think are diminishing the affectivity of a particular strain of ânot so
desirable anarchism,â and also on the more positive insights about
breadth of focus, new vision, and non-reformist reforms that give
another strain of anarchism the potential to become central to
successful activism in years ahead.
Zerzanâs thinking examined for this essay may or may not typify why some
folks hold the not so desirable views they do about technology,
institutions, and reforms. I have no way of knowing that. In any event,
Zerzan is most forthright, and the Zerzan quotations I employed are from
various essays and interviews he has done, all available on the
internet. I found most of the essays quoted on a site named
âPrimitivismâ at
Additional sites will immediately pop up if you search Google or Yahoo
or any other large internet engine for primitivism or for Zerzan, and
within the links listed, if interested, you will find other adherents of
views like Zerzanâs.