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Title: Liberty and Taxation
Author: Benjamin Tucker
Date: 1887
Language: en
Topics: liberty, taxes
Source: Retrieved on 30th August 2021 from http://www.panarchy.org/tucker/taxation.html
Notes: The power of taxation, being the most vital one to the State, naturally was a prominent subject in Liberty’s discussions. Mr. F. W. Read, in the London revue Jus, attacked the position of Anarchism on this point and was answered by Mr. Tucker with the following article.

Benjamin Tucker

Liberty and Taxation

THE idea that the voluntary taxationist objects to the State precisely

because it does not rest on contract, and wishes to substitute contract

for it, is strictly correct, and I am glad to see (for the first time,

if my memory serves me) an opponent grasp it. But Mr. Read obscures his

statement by his previous remark that the proposal of voluntary taxation

is “the outcome of an idea ... that the State is, or ought to be,

founded on contract.” This would be true if the words which I have

italicized should be omitted. It was the insertion of these words that

furnished the writer a basis for his otherwise groundless analogy

between the Anarchists and the followers of Rousseau. The latter hold

that the State originated in a contract, and that the people of to-day,

though they did not make it, are bound by it. The Anarchists, on the

contrary, deny that any such contract was ever made; declare that, had

one ever been made, it could not impose a shadow of obligation on those

who had no hand in making it; and claim the right to contract for

themselves as they please. The position that a man may make his own

contracts, far from being analogous to that which makes him subject to

contracts made by others, is its direct antithesis.

It is perfectly true that voluntary taxation would not necessarily

“prevent the existence of five or six ‘States’ in England,” and that

“members of all these ‘States’ might be living in the same house.” But I

see no reason for Mr. Read’s exclamation point after this remark. What

of it? There are many more than five or six Churches in England, and it

frequently happens that members of several of them live in the same

house. There are many more than five or six insurance companies in

England, and it is by no means uncommon for members of the same family

to insure their lives and goods against accident or fire in different

companies. Does any harm come of it? Why, then, should there not be a

considerable number of defensive associations in England, in which

people, even members of the same family, might insure their lives and

goods against murderers or thieves? Though Mr. Read has grasped one idea

of the voluntary taxationists, I fear that he sees another much less

clearly, — namely, the idea that defence is a service, like any other

service; that it is labor both useful and desired, and therefore an

economic commodity subject to the law of supply and demand; that in a

free market this commodity would be furnished at the cost of production;

that, competition prevailing, patronage would go to those who furnished

the best article at the lowest price; that the production and sale of

this commodity are now monopolized by the State; that the State, like

almost all monopolists, charges exorbitant prices; that, like almost all

monopolists, it supplies a worthless, or nearly worthless, article;

that, just as the monopolist of a food product often furnishes poison

instead of nutriment, so the State takes advantage of its monopoly of

defence to furnish invasion instead of protection; that, just as the

patrons of the one pay to be poisoned, so the patrons of the other pay

to be enslaved; and, finally, that the State exceeds all its

fellow-monopolists in the extent of its villainy because it enjoys the

unique privilege of compelling all people to buy its product whether

they want it or not. If, then, five or six “States” were to hang out

their shingles, the people, I fancy, would be able to buy the very best

kind of security at a reasonable price. And what is more, — the better

their services, the less they would be needed; so that the

multiplication of “States” involves the abolition of the State.

All these considerations, however, are disposed of, in Mr. Read’s

opinion, by his final assertion that “the State is a social organism.”

He considers this “the explanation of the whole matter.” But for the

life of me I can see in it nothing but another irrelevant remark. Again

I ask: What of it? Suppose the State is an organism, — what then? What

is the inference? That the State is therefore permanent? But what is

history but a record of the dissolution of organisms and the birth and

growth of others to be dissolved in turn? Is the State exempt from this

order? If so, why? What proves it? The State an organism? Yes; so is a

tiger. But unless I meet him when I haven’t my gun, his organism will

speedily disorganize. The State is a tiger seeking to devour the people,

and they must either kill or cripple it. Their own safety depends upon

it. But Mr. Read says it can’t be done. “By no possibility can the power

of the State be restrained.” This must be very disappointing to Mr.

Donisthorpe and Jus, who are working to restrain it. If Mr. Read is

right, their occupation is gone. Is he right? Unless he can demonstrate

it, the voluntary taxationists and the Anarchists will continue their

work, cheered by the belief that the compulsory and invasive State is

doomed to die.