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Title: Goodbye life, goodbye love… Author: Tristan Leoni Date: May 8th, 2022 Language: en Topics: Ukraine, self-organization, Russia, NATO, war Source: Retrieved on September 8th, 2022 from https://ddt21.noblogs.org/?page_id=3423 Notes: Originally in French, translated into English through Google Translate.
and peasant's blood Because the bandits, who cause wars Never die from
it, we only kill the innocent 1 . »
To evoke the uncertainty of the battlefield, Clausewitz spoke of "fog of
war", the term could just as well be applied to the media avalanche
that, since February 24, 2022, we are undergoing with regard to Ukraine.
The two camps are engaged in a fairly classic war of propaganda and
images reinforced in an unprecedented way by social networks. From this
point of view, the Ukrainians have the advantage; many images are
available on their side (taken by civilians or journalists), much less
on the Russian side (no smartphone for soldiers, no civilians, few
journalists). Hence, for example, at the beginning, an overabundance of
destroyed Russian vehicles. This is what Westerners (us) see, but it is
only part of the reality. Especially since algorithms accentuate the
banality of our respective cognitive biases, pushing us to favor
information that confirms our opinions and our presuppositions: this is
the "Diagoras problem", but in times of war this daily lot becomes
excessive, stuffy. It is not easy to maintain the necessary distance and
a cool enough head to understand what is happening and, possibly, to act
accordingly; it is even less so when you live in a belligerent or
co-belligerent country.
Russia invaded Ukraine, not the other way around. However, important as
it is, the difference between “aggressor” and “aggressor” is not a
sufficient criterion for understanding the situation. The democrat and
the authoritarian, the good guy and the bad guy, etc.
On July 28, 1914, after the assassination of Archduke
François-Ferdinand, the powerful Austro-Hungarian Empire (50 million
inhabitants) declared war on Little Serbia (ten times less populated).
In the days that followed, through the game of alliances, all the
European powers went to war, and one of the arguments of France and
England was the defense of the weak against the strong. " No one can
believe in good faith that we are the aggressors ", declares René
Viviani, President of the Council of a very democratic French Republic
on which Germany, inevitably despotic and cruel, has just declared war.
If, in their vast majority, the social democrats of all countries (and
even some anarchists including Pierre Kropotkine) adhere to this
narrative and to the respective policies of Sacred Union, the Serbian
Socialist Party refuses national defense, and does not vote war credits.
In 1914, few revolutionaries did not succumb to war propaganda 3 .
But the causes of the First World War are no longer explained in this
way. The initiator or the triggering incident of a conflict is only one
element of a much more complex overall situation 4 . Each country can
legitimately affirm that it defends itself, the invaded against the
invader of course, but also the invader intervening to prevent a third
party from occupying, dominating or manipulating the invaded. The USSR
acted in this way in Hungary in 1956, Great Britain and France in Egypt
the same year, the United States in Vietnam, the USSR in Afghanistan,
etc. The weak exist only through the strong which protect them against
other strong, and each defends itself to prevent its neighbor from
attacking it, or serving as a base for this purpose.
Like so many before it, the war that is being played out today on
Ukrainian territory, and at the expense of its population, is part of
the broader framework of the confrontation between large blocs; and the
characterization of the regimes involved (democracy or not) is (as
usual) anecdotal.
In the West, good minds lament that, instead of dissolving NATO when the
Warsaw Pact broke up after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the
United States gradually expanded this military alliance to include most
of the ex-satellites of the USSR. How would the United States react if
Mexico or Canada joined a military alliance directed against them ? In
2022, the Russian invasion has the advantage of retrospectively
justifying NATO enlargement and continuing it (Sweden, Finland).
That is not the question. It was only natural for the United States (and
its allies) to seize the opportunity of the demise of the USSR to
promote their interests and limit Russian power. Just like the USSR did
in the past whenever it could. Ukraine is far too strategic a territory
(especially the east and south of the country) for one side or the other
to agree to abandon it easily (mass of population and therefore of
proletarians, industries, irrigation, numerous existing or potential
resources including under the Black Sea, access to and control of this
sea, etc.).
“ Stop the war. Don't believe the propaganda. You are being lied to here
”… It took courage for Marina Ovsiannikova, on March 14, 2022, to dare
to publicly denounce the war waged by her own country. It is doubtful
that the television news of a major French channel could one day be
interrupted at 8 p.m. by an untimely questioning of Western war
propaganda. Are there more pacifists in Moscow than in Paris?
Rudyard Kipling may have never written that " the first casualty of a
war , is the truth but still... Certainly, this was to be expected, but
it is amazing how quickly the media in each country express a consensus
corresponding to the policy of the rulers 6 . The more or less general
acceptance of the state management of the Covid-19 crisis by the
populations did not prevent acts of protest, which were in the minority
and despite everything repeated with a certain echo. War, on the other
hand, creates not only submission, but adhesion – in any case, as long
as the conflict does not drag on to the point that its objectives appear
less and less credible. Knowing that in 2022 we no longer call tens of
millions of men to the flag: we mobilize hundreds of millions of
spectators in front of their screens.
In Paris or Marseilles, everyone is against the war… but wants Ukraine
to win, asks for more arms to be delivered to it, even for French
soldiers to be sent there. The "pacifist" rallies in yellow and blue
colors are very calm and meager if we compare them to the fiery
demonstrations against the 2003 war, where, it is worth remembering,
nobody wanted Iraq to win, nobody offered to deliver weapons to Baghdad
so that it could shoot down American planes. It is true that this very
special operation was officially aimed at debasing and demilitarizing
the country, fighting terrorism, liberating a people and bringing
democracy to them. We get a bit lost.
its historical reasons, its explanations. Nationalism, the Treaty of
Versailles, rivalries between expansionist 7 . »
Indeed, why did Russia embark on this operation, the consequences of
which will be catastrophic, including for her? What was his interest?
Let us first get rid of the psychologizing or pathologizing explanations
that are very fashionable today when it comes to talking about an
adversary; the senility or mental confusion of any political leader is
not in question; let's also evacuate personalization since you never
lead alone.
History shows us that to launch a war, this “madness”, is in reality, at
a given moment, the option which seems the most reasonable for a State;
but the logic and the interests of the ruling classes are very different
from those of honest people and proletarians.
Let us note first of all that, if the threat was hovering, the start of
this operation and especially its scale surprised almost all observers
and specialists. The invasion of the Ukraine had been considered and
planned (the staffs always make plans for the most diverse situations),
and preceded by gigantic maneuvers in Belarus. But it is not certain
that the operation was really chosen and even less the date of its
launch; it may have imposed itself on the Russian leaders because of a
complex but fatal spiral having as its framework the confrontation
between NATO and Russia (especially since 2014), and in which we find
elements such as:
Considered as a possibility, brandished as a threat in diplomatic poker,
the invasion of Ukraine was undoubtedly decided upon and then postponed,
perhaps several times; the final decision was probably taken only at the
last moment, after having lost several weeks, hence the very unfavorable
weather conditions, during the raspoutitsa .
What surprises first of all "advised" observers is that the Russian
ground offensive is preceded by only a few hours of aerial bombardment
and missile fire aimed at barracks, air bases, defense systems
anti-aircraft and Ukrainian radars 10 . Then, it is the audacity of the
initial plan (worthy of a perilous roll of the dice during a wargame).
The objective is then probably to make Ukraine capitulate in a few days,
following a large-scale helicopter operation against an airport in the
suburbs of kyiv, paving the way for a rapid penetration of armored
vehicles, the capture of capital and the fall of the government. If the
paratroopers take the airport well, the operation fails because they are
crushed by a counter-offensive. At the same time, at several points,
armored columns crossed the border and plunged through the country, but
without precaution or protection, without tactical air support and,
above all, another surprise, without preparation or artillery support;
whereas, heir to the Soviet doctrine, " the Russian army is first and
foremost a large artillery that rolls and an air strike force that drops
smooth bombs ” (Michel Goya). No destruction of strategic sites, means
of electricity distribution or communication either (in Serbia, in 1999,
NATO had targeted power stations and bridges). Whatever the Western
media say, Russia is waging a relatively "restrained" war in the first
fifteen days of its offensive. This can be explained by media pressure,
but also by Russia's desire to preserve the infrastructures, the heavy
industries of the areas it wishes to annex, and above all by the
prospect of accommodating a Russian-speaking population with whom it
expects to meet a warm welcome and that, officially, she claimed to want
to free herself from the Nazi yoke. But this strategy ended in failure.
Russian intelligence analyzes are completely erroneous: the population
proves to be hostile to the soldiers and, sometimes, improvises actions
of armed resistance (throwing Molotov cocktails). In addition, the
Russian invasion faces opposition from the Ukrainian army much more
stubborn than expected. This is primarily due to the fact that the
Russian army does not benefit from any surprise effect; Although the
weeks of maneuvers in Belarus obviously caused concern, the Ukrainians
received from American intelligence the precise details of the operation
to come and prepared for it, in particular by dispersing troops and
equipment to limit the effects of the first bombardments Russians.
The Russian columns of armored vehicles or supply trucks advancing as if
on conquered ground faced a virulent guerrilla force; they are a target
of choice, less for armed civilians than for small groups of heavily
equipped soldiers (in particular formidable American anti-tank missiles
Javelin or Swedish NLAW 11 ) or for combat drones (Turkish Bayraktar).
Progress also seems to be hampered by the lack of fuel, food, even
ammunition, that is to say by faulty logistics and/or working with a
degree of unpreparedness. Hence the relatively low morale of the
fighter, especially after weeks of exhausting maneuvers.
After fifteen days of fighting, as the thaw and mud spread and the
positions froze, the attackers began to make much less moderate use of
artillery, especially against the outskirts of the big besieged cities,
where the Ukrainian infantry. The Russian air force remains little used,
it seems to have only a few precision ammunition, so the strikes must be
done on sight, therefore in clear weather, but the weather is bad and
the ceiling is very low, so the planes are at range of Ukrainian Manpads
(man-portable anti-aircraft missiles), which inflict heavy damage on
them. In addition, the Ukrainian army very quickly benefited from
significant support from NATO, whether in terms of equipment (massive
and increasing deliveries of weapons and equipment), training (on site
or in Western countries) , in supervision (on site 12 ), but also in
intelligence 13 .
Very quickly there was talk of a failure or a stalemate of the Russian
army 14 , without however knowing the initial goals of the Kremlin;
there is, moreover, a difference between political aims and military
objectives, which must be broader than the former to make it possible to
seize places which will serve as bargaining chips during future
negotiations. Invading all of Ukraine is probably not the Kremlin's
project: too costly, too complex (notably to occupy the territory),
whereas it would be more practical for it to keep a Ukraine reduced to
its western part (if only so that the millions of refugees and the
populations most hostile to Russia may be received there). The desire
for more or less disguised annexation of new provinces (eastern bank of
the Dnieper, part or all of the Black Sea coast) is more likely. In any
case, unless it is humiliated (in the eyes of the world and its
population), Russia cannot stop its operation before having conquered a
minimum of strategic positions. " Putin is in the exact posture of the
gambler. He made a bet, he lost it at the start. How far will he
continue to bet so as not to leave with empty pockets? It's exactly
that. And the West must understand that it cannot walk away with empty
pockets, because if it has the feeling that it can walk away with empty
pockets, it will continue to bet. That is the mirage of victory that
seizes all leaders who engage in a military operation ” (General Vincent
Desportes) 15 .
At the end of March, when the stalemate was confirmed and it was
necessary to avoid too bitter a failure, the Russian troops withdrew
from the conquered territories around kyiv and in the north of the
country and redeployed in the East. From now on, the Kremlin's objective
is to complete the conquest of Donbass and to ensure territorial
continuity between this territory and Crimea, or even with Transnistria.
To this end, the Russian units reconnected with their classic doctrine
and placed great emphasis on the preparation of artillery and aerial
bombardment. At the end of April, slowly but methodically, these troops
advanced; the confrontation, both mechanical and human, is fierce,
especially since the forces are now relatively balanced. Moscow, which
in this war only mobilized relatively few men, around 200,000 (against
kyiv's 200,000 to 300,000), took advantage of a certain air superiority
(limited by the enemy's anti-aircraft missiles) and in artillery
(limited by the powerful fortifications of the defenders). If it does
not manage to break the resistance in the Donbass, Russia will have to
find another solution in order not to lose face... especially since some
are already talking about the possibility of a reversal of the situation
and Ukrainian offensives against Transnistria or Crimea. Since very few
countries seem to be working for de-escalation – quite the contrary –
the risk of a rise to extremes is very real today.
army, neither you nor me, nothing but rags of different colors which
only have the name of uniforms. What do we look like now in these
tinsel? There are no more borders, no governments, no noble causes, so
no reason to fight 16 … ”
As we have seen, Russia expected a good reception in the
Russian-speaking regions of the east and south of the country, but the
opposite happened. There was a lot of emphasis in the first days,
whether in the bourgeois media or on the militant networks, on the
mobilization of the Ukrainian population; this seems to us to come from
two different fields.
First of all, basic material solidarity in the face of disaster: helping
and welcoming refugees fleeing combat zones (they are below your home
and come from the town next door), helping the wounded or people buried
under the rubble of a house, etc. We organize ourselves as best we can,
in coordination with the emergency services, the town hall, an NGO or
just between neighbours. These gestures have sometimes been interpreted
as the harbingers of a necessarily emancipatory self-organization of the
proletarians if it spreads and strengthens. This seems to us
particularly exaggerated, these gestures proceeding from reflexes of
minimal mutual aid quite common among human beings.
And there is a mobilization that could be called martial, with the aim
of countering the Russian offensive. Here again, we organize ourselves
as best we can while the State services are completely overwhelmed:
artists creating a workshop for making Molotov cocktails, restaurateurs
establishing a canteen to provide rations to soldiers, business
converting into the factory of anti-tank obstacles, women gathering to
sew camouflage netting, pensioners filling sandbags, locals building
barricades, etc.
What strikes people unaccustomed to war (us) a lot are these civilians
who line up to put on the uniform and join the territorial defense (DT),
this branch of the Ukrainian army made up of reservists and volunteers .
Tens of thousands of assault rifles are distributed to the population,
convicts are freed in exchange for their participation in the fighting,
and so on. Very quickly, it is the weapons and the material which are
lacking, not the volunteers; at first, those who enlist must largely
equip themselves, at their own expense, from military surplus stores
(army, lashing, helmet, body armor, etc.). As for the following,
especially those who have registered on waiting lists, unless they have
military experience, the government asks them above all to continue to
work, another essential form of resistance.
The tactical value of units made up in this way is, understandably,
quite limited, but the role of the DT is above all to relieve the
best-trained soldiers of the most thankless and time-consuming tasks:
guarding the rear (warehouses, bridges , etc.), patrolling cities,
imposing curfews and fighting looting. The door is open to all
"excesses": checkpoints and identity checks are multiplying (under the
authority of your neighbour, your grocer or a work colleague), vigilant
citizens are watching and denouncing, we tracks down suspicious
civilians (spies, saboteurs, pro-Russians?), who are arrested and
transferred who knows where for questioning, etc. The courts no longer
functioning, it is the DT which sometimes applies summary justice, in
particular against thieves and looters (those who are not shot on the
spot are tied to a post, in the middle of the street, their pants down
on the ankles, the icy cold as a bonus).
Without making the apology of a blissful pacifism seem more interesting
to us the demonstrations of civilians that we have sometimes observed
and which aimed to block the roads, to stop the columns of tanks by a
non-violent action (things seen in Iran in 1979, in Beijing in 1989, in
Slovenia in 1990). But, here again, what is expressed is not a visceral
rejection of war, a somewhat naive pacifism, but a deep nationalism; it
does not wave flags of peace, but the Ukrainian emblem. It is because
with this crisis we are undoubtedly witnessing "live" the completion of
the construction of this Ukrainian nation, the result of a process born
with independence: a population which, whatever its language, suddenly
takes aware of its historical, cultural, even religious specificities
(the Orthodox Church, still dependent on Moscow, separates from it
today) and which, beyond the classes, is proud of itself... even if, at
the Looking at history, these specificities may seem very artificial,
even if they are created from scratch for the occasion (as after the
break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s). There will be some who will find
this moving. In any case, that doesn't seem to bother a number of
Western humanists and social democrats who are usually more resistant to
nationalism; we find a superb illustration of this with the filmmaker
Mathieu Kassovitz explaining to a journalist that the Ukrainians, whom
he knows well, are " ultra-nationalists in a good way, that is to say
that they are proud of their country and want to protect it absolutely
”. The same seems to be the case for some French far-left activists (for
whom, generally, waving a tricolor flag in a demonstration is a sign of
fascism). But there are already Ukrainian anarcho-syndicalists promoting
a “ liberating and creative nationalism ” !
A nationalist feeling which, quite logically, goes hand in hand with the
support of the population for its army, a vibrant and already
long-standing support, combined with a relationship to virility somewhat
different from that which we know in Western Europe, which explains
quite "naturally" this desire to take up arms to defend his country,
even if " the training, maintenance and armament of Ukraine, as well as
the IMF's requirements in terms of loans granted to the State, are at
the same time the structural causes of the dismantling of hospitals,
under-investment in education, poverty pensions for pensioners, the
absence of wage increases in the public sector 18 ”. Because defending
your country is first and foremost, let us remember, defending the
interests of your bourgeoisie against those of the bourgeoisie opposite.
The exaltation linked to land, blood and democracy has some limits,
however. From the beginning of the invasion, if conscription was
decreed, making it possible to enlist all men aged 18 to 60, it was
accompanied by a ban on leaving the territory... because all Ukrainians
didn't seem to want to join the army or the DT. There are indeed rebels
and deserters; some try to hide, to obtain false papers, to flee abroad;
it is therefore not for nothing that there are border controls for the
exit of refugees. Others, cautiously, engage in their local DT, in the
rear, to avoid being forcibly incorporated into a unit which would leave
for combat. Unfortunately for them, the deliveries of NATO (for example
tens of thousands of helmets and bullet-proof vests) allow the equipment
of a growing number of new recruits (and members of the DT) and their
sending on the dreaded Eastern front… from there, mechanically, a
growing number of resisters and perhaps even the first demonstrations
against compulsory conscription (in Khoust, in the west of the country).
But, if Ukraine experienced a few weeks of hesitation, the government
quickly took things in hand, in particular, it must be recognized,
thanks to the support of its citizens. The latter did not self-organize
against the state, or because of its absence, but in order to prevent it
from collapsing under the Russian battering. This is a fairly “normal”
reaction in a country that knows a strong sense of national unity, which
is formatted for this purpose by ad hoc . This is confirmed, once again,
self-organization is not in itself revolutionary.
steps 19 . »
We are not in the situation of Ukrainians nor in that of anarchists or
communists living in Ukraine; difficult to know what should be done
there, to make an on-the-spot assessment of their action, because
(whatever our ideas) we don't know how we would react in their place;
historical hindsight often allows this type of judgement, because it is
easy to be right when one knows the sequence and the end of events 20 .
However, should our Ukrainian comrades, simply because of their
situation as the “first concerned”, be exempt from any criticism? At the
very least, if their activity concerns them, the discourse that they
carry there, that they address to us and which is relayed in France
deserves quite another attention.
The reactions of Ukrainian “radical” militants appear very diverse,
sometimes contradictory. Some antimilitarist and pacifist comrades
maintain revolutionary defeatist positions, but propaganda in this
direction looks as risky in Ukraine as in Russia. Others engage in
helping refugees or the wounded 21 .
Nevertheless, what surprised many in France was to learn, via a few
texts and testimonies, that Ukrainian anarchists had joined the army or
the DT. Some groups thus seem to have taken advantage of the
distribution of arms to form combat units; a brochure mentions the
creation of “ two squads ”; around twenty militants in fatigues and
Kalashnikovs pose for the photo around a black flag with a circled A,
the caption of the photo cautiously stating that these groups “ would
have a certain degree of autonomy ” within the DT – which, we will have
understood, signifies a certain degree of subordination 22 . Indeed,
even after a short period of chaos, it is evident that the army sought
to control groups of armed civilians, especially if they openly
proclaimed a political ideology a priori incompatible with state
authority. The fact remains that the anarchist or antifa military units
probably do not group together more than a few dozen local fighters
(perhaps joined by a few dozen Westerners), in an area where two
gigantic armies confront each other, several hundred thousand of men 23
… As a reminder, the famous Azov regiment – ​​one of the military branches
of the many organizations of the Ukrainian extreme right – is a
permanent unit of the DT comprising several thousand combatants and
having armored vehicles and tanks.
The first scenes of a victorious ambush against a Russian convoy led
some to believe that if the Ukrainian state collapsed, the Russian army
would have to face a vast popular guerrilla force composed of autonomous
groups acting each in their corner; groups certainly mainly animated by
a patriotic feeling, but in the midst of which anarchist groups could
perhaps hold their own and play an influential role... This is to forget
that, to be effective, a resistance of this type must be particularly
structured, disciplined, funded and supported by other states.
But, after a few days marked by spectacular techno-guerrilla actions led
by small units of professional soldiers (trained in this type of action
by the Americans), the fighting very quickly took on a more classic
aspect, that of the clash between vast, heavily equipped units, within
which coordination, movement, fortifications, artillery duels and the
flow of ammunition and fuel become central. What has become of the
anarchist “squads” in this maelstrom? It is unlikely that their
“autonomy” was thereby increased.
So why get involved? In several texts, Ukrainian anarchists and radicals
testify that they want to “weigh in” on events, be ready “just in case”
and not remain cut off from the rest of society 24 ; it is in the
defense of this "society" that they explain that they participate, but
of course not in that of the State, and moreover, if some state that
they have suspended their anti-State fight, it is in the perspective of
resuming it more vigorously once peace has returned. First win the war,
then work for the revolution… the refrain is well known. If, obviously,
they draw no lesson from the Russian civil war or the war in Spain, some
evoke to justify themselves the memory of these wars which preceded the
Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917 – one can also think of 1871 – or
the supposed role of the Afghan conflict in the collapse of the USSR.
However, if the unfolding of wars, and especially their consequences,
can trigger a revolution, the situation must already be quite mature;
that which has nothing mechanical about it. And, above all, it is not
clear how the fact of actively participating in such a conflict, through
a engagement in one of the armies in question, would change anything 25
.
" Historically, the overwhelming majority of proletarians, on the
occasion of each warlike conflict, aligned themselves with their
national capital and the imperialist front of which they were a part (in
the era of imperialism, all national capital is potentially imperialist
, just as all war is by definition imperialist). It is only when the
conflict has dragged on – beyond the expectations of the very
governments that promoted it – to the point of having a heavy impact on
living and working conditions, that they are opposed more or less
vigorously 26 . »
It should all the same be remembered that if the history of humanity is
larded with wars, in almost all cases, their consequences on the
proletarians are catastrophic.
Under the blows of a popular fed up or a proletarian revolt, could
Russia, following its army, collapse? The low morale of the invading
troops initially led some to believe that a wind of mutiny was blowing
over the Russian army in the field, but this was not the case. The
withdrawal of forces around kyiv went well, and the offensive launched
in April in the Donbass shows that the mistakes and errors of the first
weeks have been corrected.
Admittedly, pacifist demonstrations have taken place in several Russian
cities, but a large part of public opinion (including certain opposition
parties) supports the current invasion there. We know that an external
war is generally a good way to reunite citizens around a government, to
make them forget the daily ills under a rain of propaganda (see for
example the war against Libya in 2011). In this context, if the economic
sanctions impoverish the populations, they often have the effect of
strengthening the national feeling, and therefore the regime in place
(Cuba, Iraq, etc.).
Nevertheless, if due to a prolongation of the war the Russian government
found itself weakened and a popular revolt loomed, and if repression
were ineffective, the ruling class would seek to divert the protest
towards a political alternative: either extreme ( on the side of the
Kremlin hawks who find that the invasion of Ukraine lacks firmness), or
more democratic (without opting for the colt of the West).
The likelihood of a revolt seems even lower in Ukraine. We have said
what we think of the self-organization of citizens on the basis of a
national feeling; the state has been strengthened, just as the
government is currently legitimized by its management of the crisis. A
great popular outpouring seeing the strengthening of national sentiment
is, by nature, interclassist and counter-revolutionary.
It is difficult to predict whether the process of democratization will
be strengthened as a result. So far, we are witnessing above all a
(real) militarization of society, censorship of the media, the banning
of left-wing opposition forces, a hunt for dissenters, etc. ; above all,
nationalist and reactionary forces are on the rise, which is nothing new
in Ukraine. If Anatole France were alive, he would probably sum it up
like this: “ we believe we are dying for democracy, we are dying for
industrialists ”.
One might wonder why devote so many lines to this question when,
ultimately, the role of Ukrainian anarchists and radicals in this
conflict is so weak. The interest of a subject is not measured first of
all by the number of people involved. Then, many media, including
bourgeois, and of course social networks, evoke this commitment; the
militants on the spot communicate abundantly, and their prose meets a
certain echo in France; it would therefore not be surprising if, in the
near future, the figure of the anarchist fighter in Ukraine becomes,
after that of the Kurdish soldier in Rojava, the reference in terms of
political radicalism. This would be in our opinion – it will be
understood – very regrettable.
aspect of events, by propaganda, by the ease of simplification. There
are times when we have no control over the course of things. It is
better to know this and not mask one's impotence with gesticulation or,
worse, embark on a boat that is not ours 27 . »
The problem is that, concretely, we cannot do much. The most classic,
and the most in accordance with the old principles of revolutionary
defeatism, if at least one thinks that the proletarians have no
fatherland, would be to fight, here, against our own bourgeoisie. This
would be logical, since France is almost co-belligerent. If this
revolutionary internationalist position is maintained by various
anarchist, ultra-left, left communist or even Trotskyist groups or
groupings, it is not certain that it is the majority among activists and
movementists. We know what is happening with the current state of the
class struggle in France; hence, once again, very often, a despairing
feeling of helplessness. In fact, it seems that the more gloomy the
times, the stronger the injunction to act: it would be a question of
being effective, of " having an impact " on reality, whereas the
revolutionary movement perhaps does not have any. to be never had so
little... Hence this attraction for distant battlefields and this need
to choose a side even if it means accepting compromises and, barring a
bad conscience, the moral obligation to help those who, precisely, are
doing something, anything. A sour comment, found on Twitter, about the
call for comrades to participate in the last presidential election (by
voting for a left-wing candidate) could just as well apply to some of
the positions on the war in Ukraine: " these people really think that
their call […] is a break with their usual militancy when it is only an
end ”. Acid…
So what to do? Difficult, as some libertarians had done in favor of
Rojava, to demonstrate to ask NATO for arms deliveries… they are already
flowing in by the thousands of tons, accompanied by billions of dollars.
It is difficult, as some humanists do, to ask for the dispatch of French
soldiers on the spot, or even the imposition of a no-fly zone over
Ukraine, acts which would amount to a declaration of war on the Russia.
This vision of the camp of Good being attacked by that of Evil (much
less subtle than in the works of J. R. R. Tolkien) has the corollary of
bringing to the fore the need to have good armies, those which deploy in
order to defend democracy and “ our values”, therefore the usefulness of
NATO 28 , therefore the importance of substantial defense budgets and of
an efficient and innovative military-industrial complex ahead of its
Chinese and Russian counterparts. You have to know what you want.
The Sacred Union around the figure of democracy and more generally the
camp of Good obviously replaces that which could once be constituted
around the fatherland; it is better to present the patriots – who,
strictly speaking, can be differentiated from the nationalists – as
freedom fighters . A logic that comes to interfere even in the most
radical militant circles 29 – it should be noted that there is also a
more confidential current which, through a rather primitive
anti-Americanism, defends Moscow's positions.
Support (financially) the anarchists and antifas who fight in the ranks
of the Ukrainian army? While some make this choice by organizing parties
or concerts, they generally tend to minimize the military nature of the
issue and, no doubt a little embarrassed, embark on uncertain lexical
contortions: such a militant newspaper which, in 2016, had denounced the
creation in France of a national guard of reservists today praises the
merits of that which exists in Ukraine; we speak moreover rather of "
resistance ", of " volunteers in arms " or of a " militia structure "
evoking Spain in 1936 (although here it is two nationalist camps which
oppose each other), we relativize the weight of the extreme right,
despite being very present in the Kiev army, etc. 30 . We translate and
distribute texts that evoke the situation, with a slight uneasiness and
a lot of indulgence, even with a touch of the condescension that was
expressed for the Kurds of Syria, except that in Ukraine there is not
even shadow of the illusion of social change.
What, once again, distorts the point of view and the analysis, is
obviously the fact that men make the choice to take up arms, to risk
their lives, while we are discussing them buried in a sofa mauve. And
the prestige of the uniform, of the fighter, of the guy who wielded an
assault rifle – which is easily criticized when it concerns the extreme
right – can also exist among supporters of social emancipation (of Spain
to Rojava via Nicaragua).
Support deserters? This at least is a classic revolutionary activity in
wartime (organizing networks to cross borders, obtain false papers,
harbor fugitives), more applicable in neighboring countries. In France,
we can certainly come across banners or initiatives in support of “
deserters, refractory and rebellious Russians ”, but not, it seems, in
favor of their Ukrainian counterparts, whose number is however
increasing. The situation may change, but for the moment it reminds us
that, during the war in Syria, the Kurds refusing compulsory military
service within the YPG were conveniently forgotten when many of them
took refuge in the big cities. European 31 .
We repeat it, it is a question here for us of criticizing not the way in
which people react to the bombardment of their city or their country,
but, possibly, the speeches that they can intend for us and, especially,
those that the we carry on them.
The propensity is now well established in militant circles to see
revolutionary “potential” everywhere, especially if the region is
distant and exotic… a point of view that is particularly far-fetched
here. But, beyond this reflex, the specters that haunt the Ukrainian
question, in a very bewitching way and perhaps more openly than in other
"theaters of operation", are nothing less than militarism, nationalism
and the concept of Sacred Union, morbid variants of interclassism.
Ideologies by which even the most seasoned militants, the most
structured by theory, can be carried away if the circumstances lend
themselves to it, history has sadly demonstrated.
But it turns out that we do not suffer from bombardments, that fighting
does not take place in our streets and that we do not risk being killed
every minute. So we have no excuse, no excuse to lose our minds. We can
take advantage of a relatively comfortable setting in order to reflect
calmly on current events. We would be wrong not to abuse it, because
this framework will perhaps disappear more quickly than we think.
The implication of the formula is that it is about the return of the war
in Europe . But had she ever left? The difference is that in 2022 it
will hit the center of Europe more than its periphery, as was the case
in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, until NATO's offensive against
Serbia. in 1999. Who can today doubt that these wars were ultimately
very profitable for both the European Union (EU) and NATO, if only
through the integration of new members 34 . Sarajevo may be closer to
Paris than kyiv, but Serbia has never challenged the supremacy of the
United States and the EU over Europe: that is what Russia is doing
today. Contrary to the fate of Bosnia in the past, the Ukrainian issue
is crucial, because it touches the heart of a Europe where one of the
main industrial, financial and commercial centers of the world is
located. It is crucial as it sees some of the major powers on the planet
clash, including nuclear powers, that it mobilizes considerable
mechanical and human forces - if there is a return, it is that of the
war of high intensity – and that it is already having enormous economic
repercussions.
At present, the most probable course, which would be the most
"reasonable", is for Russia to complete the conquest of the Donbass
oblasts in the short term, for the fighting to stop, for negotiations to
be initiate and lead to a peace agreement and the attachment of these
regions to the Russian Federation; a territorial adjustment that could
have been achieved through negotiations in 2021, without war, and which
today would benefit both Russians and Ukrainians. It would be in no
one's interest for the war to continue with, for Russia, a sort of
Afghan-style stalemate. Nobody, if not the United States, but,
precisely, it is they who will decide what happens next. Will they
choose to concede Russia a meager victory, keep the conflict going for a
few more months, or fight to the last Ukrainian soldier?
In the meantime, NATO's military supplies to Ukraine, already strong
before the invasion, add up to thousands of tons of steel and billions
of dollars. But not only.
A process that has already been sensitive for several years is suddenly
accelerating. Although Russia has just displayed its weaknesses, we will
see an increase in military budgets in the countries of the EU and NATO,
which are already jostling to place orders with the military industry of
the United States. (tanks, combat aircraft, etc.). The latter are, for
the moment , the great victors of the war. While the grave of the
military industries of the Old Continent is being dug, the idea of ​​a
European Defense is finally buried in favor of a reinvigorated NATO.
Many countries are now openly opting for their very conscious
vassalization in Washington. A voluntary (and very costly) submission
which could only be interrupted if, for example, a new military power
emerged in Europe, but this is unlikely since one of NATO's functions is
precisely to prevent it 35 . However, among the surprising consequences
of the war in Ukraine, we should note the remilitarization of Germany,
which has already announced an extension of 100 billion euros for the
year 2022 (for a defense budget of around 50 billion , that of France
being 40 billion); an investment which, for the moment, only translates
into orders for American equipment. To be continued…
It would certainly be tempting for certain Western governments to bog
down and ruin Russia in Ukraine, but the powers involved at the margins
should not accidentally find themselves plunged into a military
escalation, that the conflict does not escalate, does not extend and
that, ultimately, it does not require the direct involvement of NATO,
and therefore of the United States; such as in the event of an incident
around Kaliningrad and the Suwalki Gap (eg an attempted blockade) or an
invasion of the Baltic States by a beleaguered Russia. This would not
necessarily mean a nuclear war, but perhaps, in turn, a stagnation of
the Americans in Europe, very little indicated since the Third World War
must take place in the Pacific 36 . So the question is: how far not to
go too far?
If we exclude the deaths on the ground (which the capitalist class never
has trouble doing), the main collateral damage of this story is, of
course, to endorse the fact that Russia broke with the Europe to turn to
Asia and, in particular, to China. Shame ? The fanciful idea of ​​a
rapprochement and then an alliance between the EU and Russia (which
could have favored its democratization) disappears in passing. The
blocks are formed, formalized. The risk would be that the war in
Ukraine, despite its share of horrors, is only a skirmish heralding
conflicts of another magnitude, in the short or medium term.
In the meantime, those who pay for the damage are always the same, the
proletarians: accentuation of the crisis, increased international
competition and exploitation, inflation, increase in military budgets
which can only mean increases in taxes and reductions in services
(health , education), etc. Local revolts will take place, in particular
in France, but nothing that for the moment cannot shake the capitalist
order or extinguish interstate tensions.
We bet, however, that if, in the coming months or years, France and its
army were to be involved much more directly in a high-intensity war (of
the kind that Ukraine is undergoing), the government and the media will
explain to us that it is in order to defend justice, law and democracy,
as in 1914! So, to be consistent, what shall we do?
Footnotes
1. Montéhus, The Red Butte , 1923.
2. A Ukrainian soldier reassuring a French journalist about artillery
fire, Le Figaro , March 4, 2022.
3. There will be, for example, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in
Russia, Karl Liebknecht then Otto RĂĽhle in Germany. On this subject, see
the brochure Anarchists Against War. 1914-2022 .
4. In September 1939, France and Great Britain declared war on Germany,
which had just invaded Poland. A few months later, the two countries
plan a major military operation against the main ally of the Third Reich
, the USSR, which, for its part, has just attacked Finland. These are
Operation Pike, a vast program to bomb oil wells in Baku; the German
offensive of May 10, 1940 leads to the abandonment of the project.
5. One only has to see, at the time of writing, the efforts that the
United States is making to ensure that the Solomon Islands do not sign a
defense agreement with China.
6. On this question, through the examples of the wars in Kosovo, Iraq,
Afghanistan or Libya, see: Serge Halimi, Mathias Reymond, Dominique
Vidal, Henri Maler, L'opinion, ça se travail… Les media et les “ just
wars ” , Agone, 2006, 272 p.
7.Louis Mercier Vega, The Anonymous Ride , Noir editions, 1978, p. 78.
8. We now know that in 1990, a few weeks before the invasion of Kuwait
by Saddam Hussein's troops, American diplomacy had given its Iraqi
counterpart to understand that the United States would not intervene in
the event of an operation such a soldier.
9. Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke, Prussian field marshal (1800-1891).
10. The American army and its Western auxiliaries generally do not
venture into the field before having bombarded enemy positions and towns
for weeks if not months (Iraq 1991, Serbia 1999, Iraq 2003, Mosul 2017,
etc.). What really differentiates these armies is their relationship to
death, that of their own soldiers.
11. Until February 23, 2022, American, British and Canadian special
forces units are officially present in Ukraine to train the military in
the use of these weapons; they leave the country a few hours before the
Russian offensive.
12. Some members of American or British special forces have the
unfortunate tendency to lay off and immediately acquire a new
nationality, in this case Ukrainian. Journalists have for example shown
that it is Americans who manage and control the engagement of foreign
volunteers in the Ukrainian army, Régis Le Sommier, “With French
volunteers”, Le Figaro magazine , April 8, 2022, p. 55-57.
13. If Western spy satellites are at work, the same goes for NATO's
electronic intelligence planes or drones, which, since the start of the
invasion, have been skirting the Ukrainian borders and Russian
territorial waters (we sometimes sees them on the Flightradar24 ) and
provides Kiev, in real time, with crucial information for the fights.
14. According to the French media, Russian troops only bombed schools,
nurseries, maternities and hospitals… we therefore understand that they
are struggling to overcome the Ukrainian forces.
It is characteristic of modern wars to take place in urban areas,
therefore in the midst of civilians, in their homes and in their
workplaces. And when the Ukrainian troops take back a locality from the
Russians, it is after having used the same methods as them, almost the
same equipment (minus the air force), and almost the same doctrine.
For a serious and technical point of view, see for example Gaston Erlom,
“Strength or weaknesses of the Russian army”, Raids , no . . 430,
p.29-42
15. " War in Ukraine: what is Putin's military strategy?" »,
video.lefigaro.fr, March 3, 2022.
16. Montgomery Pittman, "Two", first episode of the third season of The
Twilight Zone , 1961.
17. Perrine Poupin, “ The irruption of Russia in Ukraine. Interview with
a Kyiv Territorial Defense volunteer ,” Movements , March 29, 2022.
18. “ Letters from Ukraine ”, first part on the Tous hors website.
19. Marie-Joseph Chénier, Song of Departure , 1794.
20. But what would we have really done in France in August 1914 or in
June 1940? On these questions, we recommend reading the book by Louis
Mercier Vega La Chevauchée anonyme: une attitude internationaliste avant
la guerre (1939-1942) or that of Pierre Lanneret, The Internationalists
of the “ third camp ” during the Second World War (Acratie, 1995),
available in PDF at: archivesautonomies.org
21. See in particular the blog Another war: uneautreguerre.wordpress.com
22. Between two fires. Provisional collection of texts by anarchists
from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus about the current war , March 13, 2022,
64 p.
23. We use the word men as an outdated synonym of soldiers , because the
forces involved seem relatively insensitive to recent Western
developments concerning gender. Here, although we are in Europe, the
pattern is much more classic: those who fight are men (with perhaps a
few very rare exceptions in the DT) and those who flee the fighting are
women, children and women. old people.
24. “ If we stay away from conflicts between states, we stay away from
real politics. This is one of the most important social conflicts taking
place in our region today. If we isolate ourselves from this conflict,
we isolate ourselves from the current social process. So we have to
participate in one way or another. Cf. “ Interview: “Anarchists and the
war in Ukraine” ”.
“[…] any force investing in future political development must be present
here and now, alongside the people. We want to make strides to connect
with people on a larger scale, to organize with them. Our long-term
goal, our dream, is to become a visible political force in this society
in order to obtain a real opportunity to promote a message of social
liberation for all. See “ Interview: Resistance Committee, Kyiv ”, March
2022.
25. In 1870 and 1914, how many proletarians donning the uniform of a
very undemocratic imperial army imagined that they would then take part
(for some) in the Paris Commune or in the German and Russian
revolutions?
26. An Italian comrade from Il lato Cattivo , " Ukraine "At least, if
one wants to be materialistic" ".
27. Louis Mercier Vega, op. cit.
28. Since it is a question of value and democracy, it is always good to
remember that NATO takes care of its LGBTQI+friendly reputation. “ NATO
is committed to diversity. Any discrimination based on sexual
orientation, gender, race or ethnic origin, religion, nationality,
disability or age is strictly prohibited. It also broke new ground by
being the very first organization in the world to recognize same-sex
marriage, offering same-sex couples the same benefits as opposite-sex
spouses, at a time when same-sex marriage was recognized only in one
country, the Netherlands. » www.nato.int
29. After the war against Serbia, Claude Guillon publishes Dommages de
guerre. Paris-Pristina-Belgrade, 1999 (L'Insomniaque, 2000, 128 p.),
incisive book which returns to the hesitations and NATO compromises of
some of the French "radicals".
30. We put things into perspective, whereas in France Marine Le Pen and
Éric Zemmour are described as Nazis; while, next to the members of the
Azov regiment, the militants of the RN would look like timid social
democrats; whereas, apart from Ukraine, there are relatively few
countries in the world where far-right organizations have their own
military units integrated into the national army.
31. About 2,000 deserters from the French army each year prefer flight
and illegality to the continuation of their engagement; some end up in
court. But nobody cares. This could change in the future.
32. On these questions, see our book, Manu milit ari? Critical
radiography of the army , Le Monde Ă l'envers, 2020 (new edition), 120
p.
33. Bruce Springsteen, Born in the USA , 1984.
34. Apart from the jackpot that the war represents for the US
military-industrial complex and for its gas industry, and although it is
likely to cause an economic disaster for the EU, it is a boon for a few
sectors of activity, in particular because of the arrival of Ukrainian
refugees; this is particularly the case of the prostitution sector (in
Germany) or the industrial and manufacturing sector in Poland (a country
that lacks labor since its proletarians go to work in Western European
countries) .
35. In the words of its first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, NATO's role
is to “ keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans under
control ”. See Wikipedia.
36. The gigantic arms deliveries to Ukraine planned by the United States
are already slowing down those destined for Taiwan. Cf. Laurent Lagneau,
“ Taiwan is concerned about possible delays in its orders for American
military equipment ”, Zone militaire , May 3, 2022.
Ukraine has already received about 7,000 Javelin anti-tank missiles,
which is about a third of the US stockpile, with an estimated
replacement time of three or four years. Cf. MatĂas Maiello, “ Some
elements of military analysis on the war in Ukraine ”, Permanent
Revolution , April 28, 2022.