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Title: Security Culture Date: 2001 Language: en Topics: security culture, Warzone Distro Source: Retrieved on 2020-08-15 from https://warzonedistro.noblogs.org/files/2017/09/security_culture_handbook.pdf
This handbook is the third edition of what we has been an evolving and
growing document dealing with security issues and canadian activism. We
would like to say a big thanks to the Collective Opposing Police
Brutality in Montreal for editing some of the text of the original
pamphlet and adding so many great examples to the Informants and
Infiltrators section. We have replicated many of their changes in this
edition. Thanks also goes out to Eric Drooker whose artwork we used
throughout this pamphlet.
For more information or to make contributions to this document — please
email securitysite@tao.ca
Third edition — prepared November 2001.
Resistance has been on the rise for the past few years, with activists
adopting more and more effective tactics for fighting back. Our
increased activity and effectiveness has meant that the RCMP, FBI, and
local police have continued to escalate their activities against us. As
well, the events of September 11^(th) and ensuing state hysteria are no
small footnote to the way that our radical and revolutionary movements
have and will be targeted by repressive state forces.
If we want our direct action movement to continue, it is imperative we
start tightening our security and taking ourselves more seriously. Now
is the time to adopt a security culture. Good security is certainly the
strongest defense we have.
This is a handbook for the Canadian activist who is interested in
creating and maintaining security awareness and culture in the radical
movements. We are always looking for contributions — so please feel free
to email securitysite@tao.ca with any images or text you think belong in
a handbook such as this.
This is the third edition of this zine that we have put out in order to
add and improve on the original text (thanks for the work of the
Collective Opposing Police Brutality in Montreal for their help). There
will be future editions of this handbook so keep putting forward
suggestions to us.
We hope that you will put the material contained within to good use. Now
more than ever is the time to act!
it...
This pamphlet has essential information for anyone associated with
groups advocating or using economic disruption or sabotage, theft,
arson, self-defence from police or more militant tactics. The advice
that followsalso applies to anyone associated with groups practising
civil disobedience, especially since people often work in several groups
at the same time and gossip travels freely between them.
Even if you’ve never expressed your politics by doing property damage,
pitching cobblestones, or getting arrested for civil disobedience; even
if you think you have nothing to hide, these guidelines are presented
here to enhance your personal safety as well as the overall
effectiveness of our movements.
The simple reality is that governments in industrialized countries
target groups that advocate economic sabotage and groups that don’t,
movements that are militant and movements that are markedly pacifist.
The government’s security machinery serves the elitist political and
economic objectives of capitalism. There are over 250 political
prisoners in Canada and the US that can testify to this from first-hand
experience. By adopting a security culture, we can limit or neutralize
counter-intelligence operations meant to disrupt our political
organizing, be it mainstream or underground.
Peasant-rebels; communards; liberationists; abolitionists; labour
organizers; revolutionaries; from large uprisings challenging the entire
political structure, to isolated environmental and social struggles,
people have constantly worked to create a better world. The response of
government has always been repression to preserve the status quo.
Historically, government surveillance and harassment has increased
relative to the ascendancy of direct action movements. Minimizing the
destructiveness of political repression requires that we
implement and promote a security culture within our movements.
It’s a culture where the people know their rights and, more importantly,
assert them. Those who belong to a security culture also know what
behaviour compromises security and they are quick to educate those
people who, out of ignorance, forgetfulness, or personal weakness,
partake in insecure behaviour. This security consciousness becomes a
culture when the group as a whole makes security violations socially
unacceptable in the group.
Security culture is about more than just targetting specific behaviours
in individuals such as bragging, gossipping or lying. It is also about
checking movement behaviours and practices as a whole to ensure that our
own oppressive practices don’t feed into intelligence operations being
carried out against our community.
For example, racism or sexism in the movement can help to spread
division, make some people more open to infiltrators (those who feel
marginalized by group practices), and create openings that can be used
by state operatives. Obviously, our movements have a lot of work to do
before we address the bigger questions — what’s important here is to
recognize how oppressive behaviours play into bad security culture
overall.
Activists like to talk, we generally can spend hours and hours
discussing theory, tactics, and strategy. Mostly this is useful in
building our analysis and our work, but in other cases this can be
dangerous.
To begin with, there are certain things that are inappropriate to
discuss. These things include:
group
was illegal
Essentially, it is a bad idea to speak about an individual’s involvement
(past, present or future) with illegal activities. These are
unacceptable topics of discussion regardless of whether it is rumor,
speculation or personal knowledge.
Please note: this is not to say that it is incorrect to speak about
direct action in general terms. It is perfectly legal, secure and
desirable that people speak out in support of mokeywrenching and all
forms of resistance. The danger lies in linking individual activists to
specific actions or groups.
There are only three times that it is acceptable to speak about specific
actions and activist involvement.
The first situation would be if you were planning an action with other
members of your small group (your “cell” or “affinity group”). However,
these discussions should never take place over the Internet (email),
phone line, through the mail, or in an activist’s home or car, as these
places and forms of communication are frequently monitored. The only
people who should7dear this discussion would include those who are
actively participating in the action. Anyone who is not involved does
not need to know and, therefore, should not know. The second exception
occures after an activist has been arrested and brought to trial. If
s/he is found guilty, this activist can freely speak of the actions for
which s/he was convicted. However, s/he must never give information that
would help the authorities determine who else participated in illegal
activities. The third exception is for anonymous letters and interviews
with the media. This must be done very carefully and without
compromising security. Advice on secure communication techniques can be
found at
.
These are the only situations when it is appropriate to speak about your
own or someone else’s involvement or intent to commit illegal direct
action.
Veteran activists only allow a select few to know about their
involvement with direct action groups. Those few consist of the cell
members who they do the actions with AND NO ONE ELSE!
The reason for these security precautions is obvious: if people don’t
know anything, they can’t talk about it. When activists who do not share
the same serious consequences know who did an illegal direct action,
they are far more likely to talk after being harassed and intimidated by
the authorities, because they are not the ones who will go to jail. Even
those people who are trustworthy can often be tricked by the authorities
into revealing damaging and incriminating information. It is safest for
all cell members to keep their involvement in the group amongst
themselves. The fewer people who know, the less evidence there is in the
long run.
In an attempt to impress others, activists may behave in ways that
compromise security. Some people do this frequently — they are
habitually gossiping and bragging. Some activists say inappropriate
things only when they consume alcohol. Many activists make occasional
breeches of security because there was a momentary temptation to say
something or hint at something that shouldn’t have been said or implied.
In most every situation, the desire to be accepted is the root cause.
Those people who tend to be the greatest security risks are those
activists who have low self-esteem and strongly desire the approval of
their peers. Certainly it is natural to seek friendship and recognition
for our efforts, but it is imperative that we keep these desires incheck
so we do not jeopardize the safety of other activists or ourselves.
People who place their desire for friendship over the importance of the
cause can do serious damage to our security.
The following are examples of security-violating behaviours:
Lying: To impress others, liars claim to have done illegal actions. Such
lies not only compromise the person’s security — as cops will not take
what is said as a lie — but also hinders solidarity and trust.
Gossiping: Some people think they can win friends because they are privy
to special information. These gossips will tell others about who did
what action or, if they don’t know who did it, guess at who they think
did what actions or just spread rumors about who did it.
This sort of talk is very damaging. People need to remember that rumors
are all that are needed to instigate an investigation or even lay
charges.
Bragging: Some people who partake in illegal direct action might be
tempted to brag about it to their friends. This not only jeopardizes the
bragger’s security, but also that of the other people involved with the
action (as they may be suspected by association). As well the people who
s/he told can be charged as accessories after the fact. An activist who
brags also sets a bad example. Indirect-Bragging: Indirectbraggers are
people who make a big production on how they want to remain anonymous,
avoid protests, and stay “underground.” They might not come out and say
that they do illegal direct action, but they make sure everyone within
earshot knows they are up to something.
They are no better than braggers, but they try to be more sophisticated
about it by pretending to maintain security. However, if they were
serious about security, they would just make up a good excuse as to why
they are not as active, or why they can’t make it to the protest .
Concealing sensitive information from even trusted comrades is far
better than jeopardising underground work.
The unfortunate truth is there are some security-ignorant people in the
movement and others who have possibly been raised in a “scene” that
thrives on bragging and gossiping. It doesn’t mean these people are bad,
but it does mean they need to inform themselves and learn about personal
and group security. Even seasoned activists make mistakes when there is
a general lack of security consciousness in our groups.
And that’s where those of you who are reading this can help. We must
ALWAYS act to inform persons whose behaviour breaches security. If
someone you know is bragging about doing an action or spreading
security-compromising gossip, it is your responsibility to explain to
her or him why that sort of talk violates security and is inappropriate.
You should strive to share this knowledge in a manner that encourages
the person’ s understanding and changes her/his behaviour. It should be
done without damaging the person’s pride. Show your sincere interest in
helping him/her to become a more effective activist. Keep your humility
and avoid presenting an attitude of superiority. An insensitive approach
can raise an individual’s defences and prevent them from listening to
and using the advice offered. The goal of addressing these issues with
others is to reduce insecure behaviour, rather than showing how much
more security-conscious you are.
Share your concerns and knowledge in private, so that the person does
not feel as if they are being publicly humiliated. Addressing the person
as soon as possible after the security violation increases
effectiveness.
If each of us remains responsible for discussing security information
with people who slip up, we can dramatically improve security in our
groups and activities. When people recognise that lying, gossiping,
bragging, and inappropriate debriefing damages both themselves and
others, these behaviours will soon end.
By developing a culture where breaches of security are pointed out and
discouraged, all sincere activists will quickly understand.
So what do we do with activists who repeatedly violate security
precautions even after being informed several times?
Unfortunately for them, the best thing to do is to cut them loose.
Discuss the issue openly and ask them to leave your meetings, basecamps
and organizations. With law enforcement budgets on the increase, new
anti-terrorist laws that call for stiffer sentences for political
actions, and with courts handing down long sentences for political
“crimes,” the stakes are too high to allow chronic security offenders to
work among us.
By creating a security culture, we have an effective defence against
informers and agents who try to infiltrate groups. Imagine an informer
who, every time they ask another activist about their activities,
receives information about security. It would frustrate the informer’s
work. When other activists discovered that she/he continued to violate
security precautions after being repeatedly informed, there would be
grounds for isolating the person from our groups. And that would be one
less informer for us to deal with!
Recent incidents of repression against activists in British Columbia
illuminate the need for grassroots people to understand and practice
movement security. Police monitoring, infiltration and agent
provocateurs are routinely used by the state to collect information
about our groups, or specific individuals in them, and to subvert our
activities.
For example, during the APEC hearings, it was revealed that over seventy
groups and individuals were monitored before and during the APEC
meetings in 1997. A paid industry informant/disruptor was identified at
a wilderness action camp in 1999. Provocateurs also targeted some
Vancouver activists, trying to convince them to disclose information and
as well, to break the law.
The Canadian security apparatus identifies a number of our groups and
activities as a threat to “national security.” People and organizations
are widely targeted; even avowed pacifists have been included in
surveillance and repressive measures. According to the Canadian Security
and Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) annual reports, activities targeted in
the late 1990s included: native resistance, environmental & animal
rights movements, anti-poverty, anti-globalization, anti police
brutality, anti-racist, anarchist and communist groups.
With the rise in militant First Nations’ struggles; covert direct action
against corporations; the renewed militancy and strength of popular
struggles; and the mass-media’s increasing focus on anarchists and
anti-globalization protests, there is also a growing level of police
surveillance and repression.
The need for security in our movements is obvious — however, it is
incredibly important that we don’t fall into the trap of using our
awareness of security issues to shut other people out of our growing
movements.
One of the key aims of the FBI’s Counter-Intelligence Program
(“COINTELPRO”) operations against the Black Panthers and American Indian
Movement (AIM) was to spread distrust and paranoia so that these
activists would be reluctant to integrate new people into their
struggles.
A security culture can exist in a large movement; indeed, it is one
indication of a movement’s strength. Arming ourselves with knowledge
about how the system works and works against activists is essential in
building security culture. The aim of this section is to give a brief
run down of the working of domestic intelligence in Canada. In this way,
we can better understand how to avoid its traps.
The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) is probably the
best known of the “security” agencies that deal with activist “threats.”
Its predecessor was the Security Service division of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, (RCMP-SS). In 1984, following the MacDonald Commission
on the illegal activities of the RCMP, the civilian spy agency CSIS took
over RCMP spy work. That said, the RCMP did not abandon its intelligence
gathering, it’s just that CSIS specifically gathers political
intelligence.
The split from the RCMP allowed the new spy agency to do legally what
the Mounties had been doing illegally. At the operations level, the new
agency was granted more leeway in terms of public accountability than
the Mounties had ever had.
CSIS carries out a wide range of surveillance activities. Since they are
not a law-enforcement agency and since their evidence is not used in
court, nothing stops them from contravening the few regulations that do
exist regarding privacy rights. For example, CSIS is not required to
inform people, as is RCMP, ninety days after a wiretap (or bugging) is
over.
Agents working for CSIS are allowed, with “authorization,” to enter
people’s homes to plant bugs, wiretap phones, open mail and look into
health, employment and government records without ever having to tell a
targeted individual what they are doing. The information that they
gather is used to build profiles and dossiers (files) on individuals,
organizations, networks, etc. This information is also passed on to
other wings of the federal security system who are responsible for
“law-enforcement,” and will then obtain whatever warrants are necessary
for legal surveillance (to be brought into court as evidence).
The National Security Investigation Service (NSIS) is the primary
law-enforcement wing in Canada. The NSIS is a section of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Most major cities across the country
have an NSIS office including Vancouver, Edmonton, Montreal, Ottawa, and
Toronto. The NSIS maintains a computer database on activists, immigrants
and so called “terrorists” which is housed in Ottawa.
It is believed that the Vancouver NSIS employs between 12 and 18
members. Within NSIS there are several sub-groups called Team 1, Team 2,
Team 3 — etc. that have different investigative targets.
They employ informants, infiltrators, personal physical surveillance,
electronic surveillance including phone and room “bugs” and other means
of investigation and research.
The RCMP/NSIS also have other resources at their disposal during
counter-insurgency operations. “Special O” is a team of surveillance
specialists that may be called upon. “Special I” is a penetration team
whose specialty is to break into homes, vehicles and other properties
for investigative purposes. They are the team, which among other things,
installs listening devices, photographs building interiors, etc.
In a long-running case based in Vancouver, all of these methods of
surveillance were used against several Vancouver activists. During the
Vancouver investigation, house and vehicle bugs were located by some
targeted individuals. The bugs had large battery packs attached to
facilitate less frequent battery changes. The NSIS also visited several
activists across Canada in an attempt to question them regarding the
individuals under investigation.
It needs to be stressed throughout our movements that no one is under
any legal obligation to provide to the police anymore information than
one’s own name, address and birth date, and this only if one is under
arrest. That is it! Saying anything more jeopardizes security. Even
answering seemingly insignificant questions can assist the police in
developing personality profiles on a range of activists. It may not be
“evidence” but it is used to give police “leads” on other suspects and
construct intent during legal proceedings. The only principled response
to police questioning when under arrest is to say nothing more than your
name, birth date and address. If questioned further you can simply say
“I have nothing to say (except in the presence of my lawyer.”
The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is an agency of the
National Defence / War department, which has been long clouded in
secrecy.
They collect and process telephone, fax and computer communications of
foreign states, corporations and individuals. The federal government
uses the intelligence gleaned from the data to support troops abroad,
catch “terrorists” and “further Canada’s economic goals” (what that
means is up to them).
Although the CSE is not technically allowed to collect the
communications of Canadian citizens, it is known to be a partner in the
Echelon project — a multinational monitoring operation which sees CSE
and counterpart agencies in the United States, Britain, Australia and
New Zealand share intercepted communications of interest with one
another, effectively creating a global surveillance web.
The Terrorist Extremist Section (TES Unit) is British Columbia’s
anti-terrorist unit. A joint Vancouver/Victoria Police Department/RCMP
unit called the Organized Crime Agency (formerly the Coordinated Law
Enforcement Unit — CLEU), it is believed that the this unit employs two
or three members only.
Most activists will be initimately familiar with their local police
forces. Be aware that cops do not only show up in blue uniforms — but
routinely practice crowd infiltration and carry out surveillance and
investigative activities either alone or jointly with the RCMP depending
on the type of case. Watch for them on demonstrations — as they like to
come along and take photographs and video for the record — and they
often appear in crowds as “fellow demonstrators.”
Most Western nation-states follow a model of counter-insurgency
developed by a British intelligence expert named Kitson who wrote, Low
Intensity Operations, after much field work in the colonies. He broke
down movement development into three stages:
The Preparatory Phase: is when the movement is small, tends to focus on
education, publishing and groundwork.
The Non-Violent Phase: is when the movement takes on more of a mass
character. Large demonstrations are the norm.
In the Insurgency Phase: the movement has taken on a popular character.
Perhaps a more assertive, guerrilla component has emerged.
Kitson advises that the primary work of the intelligence agency should
occur during the preparatory phase. At this time the movements are most
vulnerable. They have not experienced a high degree of repression. They
consider talk of security as mere paranoia. As they are not breaking
laws they believe that it is safe to organize completely openly. The
intelligence agency is therefore able to exploit these conditions and
develop detailed dossiers on a wide range of people. The information
will be extremely valuable to them later on.
Important historical revolu-tionary activities and groups began as
small, serious-minded projects that grew in spite of surveillance and
repression. It is therefore important to practice security at all points
in the movement’s development. State agents gather more than just “hard
evidence;” they are interested in knowing about radicals’ beliefs as
well.
Police try to control with fear; don’t be intimidated. Remember — If an
agent comes knockin,’ do no talkin.’
Infiltrators seek information on most radical groups. The return of mass
mobilizations and radical actions in anti-globalization, anti-poverty,
anti-racism and anti-police brutality demonstrations, as well as
declarations to continue struggling in the streets and underground has
drawn attention from the state’s secret police. More infiltrators will
be sent into our ranks to try to bribe, entice or manipulate
individuals. The extent to which they are able to infiltrate our groups
depends on our seriousness and responsibility in learning about,
promoting, and working within a security culture.
Radical movements can learn to better identify covert enemies in our
projects. Once identified, appropriate action is needed to undo,
contain, or remove the danger.
This section is intended to arm you with information on how to spot and
deal with informers, infiltrators, and provocateurs in our ranks.
There are actually two kinds of informers. The deliberate informer is an
undercover agent on the payroll of government or industry. The second
type is the activist-turned-informer. Both kinds try to infiltrate our
ranks and are equally dangerous to our movements.
Let’s discuss the deliberate informers first. They are often difficult
to identify. Informers can be of any age and any profile, but they do
have a few discernible methods or operation, or “modus operandi.” These
are:
The “hang around” type: they are persons who regularly show at meetings
and actions but generally don’t get involved. They collect documents,
listen to conversations and note who’s who. This observation role is
relatively inactive.
The “sleeper” type: is similar to the “hang around” modus operandi,
except that their absorption of information is used to activate their
role at a later date.
The “novice” type: presents a somewhat more active role, but confines
themselves to less prominent work. They don’t take initiatives, but the
work they do is valued. This helps them build trust and credibility.
The “super activist” type: they come out of nowhere and all of a sudden,
they are everywhere. Whether it’s a meeting, protest, or an action, this
person will be right in the thick of it. Keep in mind however that this
can also be the mark of a new activist, whose enthusiasm and commitment
is so strong that she/he wants to fight the power every minute of the
day.
It should be said that with several of these modus operandi, the
behaviour is hard to distinguish from a sincere new person’s
involvement. How do we tell them apart? Well, a planted infiltrator will
ask a lot of questions about the direct action groups, individuals and
illegal activities. She/he may suggest targets and volunteer to do
reconnaissance as well as take part in the action. Infiltrators also try
to build profiles on individuals, their beliefs, habits, friends, and
weaknesses. At the same time, infiltrators will shield their true selves
from other activists.
Anyone who asks a lot of questions about direct actions isn’t
necessarily an infiltrator, but they ARE someone you should be careful
with. At the very least, they need to be informed about security issues.
New activists should understand that direct action tactics can be risky
(though some risks are worth taking!) and that asking a lot of questions
endangers people. If the person persists in asking questions, there is a
problem and appropriate measures must be taken. Activists who can’t
understand the need for security should be shunned and kept away from
the movement.
Some types of infiltrators stay in the background and offer material
support, other informants may have nothing to do with the group or
action, but initially heard certain plans and tipped off the police.
Among the more active types of infiltrators can be a gregarious person
that quickly wins group trust. Some infiltrators will attempt to gain
key forms of control, such as of communications/ secretarial, or
finances. Other informants can use charm and sex to get intimate with
activists, to better spy or potentially destabilize group dynamics.
Active infiltrators can also be provocateurs specializing in disruptive
tactics such as sowing disorder and demoralizing meetings or demos,
heightening conflicts whether they are interpersonal or about action or
theory, or pushing things further with bravado and violent proposals.
Infiltrators often need to build credibility; they may do this by
claiming to have participated in past actions.
Also, infiltrators will try to exploit activist sensibilities regarding
oppression and diversity. Intelligence organizations will send in
someone who will pose as a person experiencing the common oppression of
the particular activist group. For example, in the 1960’s, the Weather
Underground (“Weathermen” — a white anti-imperialist armed struggle in
the US) was infiltrated by an “ordinary Joe” informant with a working
class image. Black war veterans infiltrated the Black Panther Party.
A fresh example of police infiltration and manipulation tactics is that
of Germinal, a group targeted for arrest two days prior to the April
2001 anti-FTAA demonstrations in Quebec City. Five months prior, the
police set up a false transport company and specifically postered
opportunities for employment in the vicinity of a Germinal member
seeking employment.
The trap worked. Tipped off by an initial informant, two under-cover
cops worked for four months in the group. This operation resulted in the
media-hyped “dismantlement” of the group on the eve of the summit. Seven
Germinal members were arrested, 5 of whom spent 41 days in preventive
custody, only to be released under draconian bail conditions.
The police’s covert action was in part about dismantling the group, but
it was also about creating a media/propaganda campaign to justify the
police-state security for the summit.
What are some ways of looking into the possibility that someone is an
informer? Firstly, unless you have concrete reasons or evidence that
someone is an infiltrator, spreading rumours will damage the movement.
Rumours that you do hear of should be questioned and traced back.
A person’s background can be looked into, especially activism they
claimed to have participated in, in other places. Do your contacts in
those places know of the person, their involvement? Did problems ever
come up? One important advantage of having links with far away places is
that it makes it more difficult for informers to fabricate claims about
their activities.
What are a person’s means of living? Who are her or his friends? What
sorts of contradictions exist between their professed ideals and how
they live? One of our strengths as activists is our ideas and values,
our counterculture, our attitudes towards the dominant society. Our
sincerity in discussing these things is also a way of learning about
each other.
When planning for new actions, care must be taken concerning who is
approached. As little as possible should be said about the actual action
plan until a person’s political philosophy, ideas about strategy, and
levels of risk they are willing to engage in have been discussed on an
abstract basis. If there is a strong basis for believing this person
might be interested in the action, then the general idea of an action
can be run by them. Only when they have agreed to participate, do they
come to the group to discuss action details.
During the trials of activists, police often reveal the kinds of
information that they have gathered concerning our groups and
activities. Note what revelations come out of these trials. What are the
possible and likely sources of the information? Speak to persons that
have been arrested and interrogated to see what they may have said to
the police, or discussed in their jail cell.
Placing infiltrators in social justice and revolutionary movements is an
established practice. It was done to the Black Panthers, AIM, the Front
de Libération du Québec (FLQ), and the peace/ anti-war/and anti-nuclear
movements on a large scale. Small groups, such as affinity groups, or
working groups of larger more open organizations, need to be especially
careful with new members. Direct action organizing is ideally done with
longstanding, trusted members of the activist community.
This doesn’t mean that no one else should ever be allowed into these
groups. On the contrary, if our movement is to continue to grow, new
people should be welcome and recruited; we just need to keep security in
mind and exercise caution at all times.
Possibly an even greater threat to our movements than the covert
operative is the activistturned-informer, either unwittingly or through
coercion.
The unwitting informer is the activist who can’t keep his/her mouth
shut. If someone brags to you about what they’ve done, make sure this
person never has any knowledge that can incriminate you, because sooner
or later, the wrong person will hear of it. These activists don’t mean
to do harm, but their bragging can be very damaging.
It is your responsibility to instruct these people on the importance of
security culture.
The other type of activist-informer is the person who cracks under
pressure and starts talking to save his or her own skin. Many activists
get drawn into situations they are not able to handle, and some are so
caught up in the “excitement” that they either don’t realize what the
consequences can be, or they just don’t think they’ll ever have to face
them.
Keep in mind that the categories of “planted informer” and
“activist-turned-informer” can, and have been blurred. In 1970, during
the height of the FLQ’s activities, Carole de Vault — a young Parti
Quebecois (PQ) activist was drawn to the FLQ, but then became a paid
police agent. Her “activism” was with the PQ; she disagreed with the
heavier FLQ actions since it threatened the “legitimate” work of the PQ.
Her involvement with the FLQ was as a planted police informer.
We have to know the possible consequences of every action we take and be
prepared to deal with them. There is no shame in not being able to do an
action because of responsibilities or circumstances that make it
impossible for you to do jail time at this point in your life. As long
as capitalism and all of its evils exist, there will be resistance. In
other words, there will be plenty of great actions for you to
participate in when your life circumstances are more favourable.
If others are dependent on you for support, you aren’t willing to lose
your job, or drop out of school or ruin your future career, DON’T DO THE
ACTION. If you are addicted to an illicit drug and/or have a lengthy
criminal record, the cops will use this to pressure you for information.
If you don’t feel capable of detoxing under interrogation and brutality,
or doing a hell of a lot more time than your comrades, DON’T DO THE
ACTION.
Make certain that you talk with others in your affinity group about
situations that make you uncertain whether you should be involved in
particular actions, especially those that are at a high risk of being
criminalized.
Remember — there is no excuse for turning in comrades to the police —
and those activists that do effectively excommunicate themselves from
our movements. We must offer no legal or jail support to those activists
who turn in others for their impact on our movement is farreaching and
can have devastating effects.
Covert (or “Special”) Action from police and secret service is also done
outside of the group, with or without infiltration. These efforts
include: intimidation and harassment, blackmail and manipulation,
propaganda, informing employers and security checks, as well as physical
sabotage like theft and arson.
Intimidation and harassment can include visits from secret service
agents, calling you or your partner by their first name on the street,
thefts where obvious clues are left. Police will try to blackmail people
if they want to recruit or neutralize them.
Police uses propaganda in an attempt to poison the atmosphere and
manipulate media and public opinion. In December 1971, when the FLQ was
near its end and heavily infiltrated, the RCMP issued a false FLQ
communiqué in the name of the “Minerve” cell. The communiqué adopted a
hardline position, denouncing the abandonment of terrorist action by a
well-known activist, Pierre Vallières, and urging the continuation of
armed struggle.
In Genoa, Italy, police played an active covert role in trying to
discredit black bloc anarchists during the July 2001 meeting of the G8.
Several reports reveal that Italian police masked as black bloc members
attacked demonstrators and small shops. With a lack of public
information, the police help manipulate public discourse along the lines
of “how do legitimate demonstrators isolate activist thugs?”
Slanderous propaganda can take the form of anonymous letters, or rumours
aimed at the activist milieu. There are also examples where police will
make uncorroborated, casual accusations to journalists that, to use two
examples, a person is a drug dealer, or that at a demonstration, a
person aimed a handgun at an officer. It is often for slanderous reasons
that police charge activists with “weapons possession” for having a
penknife, or charges of violence like “assault.”
The growth of the anti-globalization movement has been accompanied by
renewed anarchist-scare propaganda on the part of authorities.
Politicians and police attempt to massage public opinion, preparing
people for a crack down, in order to legitimate the use of heavier
methods of social control, exclusion and repression.
Manipulative disinformation spread through the media needs to be
denounced as lies. There are activist-friendly lawyers who can help us
demand retractions and corrections. Speak to the journalists involved,
call them on their sloppy, dishonest work, expose their hypocrisy, and
complain to the journalists’ ethics body. We can not rely on capitalist,
private-media for any kind of fairness.
It is valuable for us to learn more about the covert actions of the
police. There exists a long and documented history. Factual information
about police covert activities also comes out as evidence presented in
court. An important, too often neglected part of our strength is our
knowledge of, and our protection from, police action against us.
(Taken from PROTECTING OURSELVES FROM STATE REPRESSION: A MANUAL FOR
REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVISTS. Published in 1984 by the Anti-Repression
Resource Team — Jackson, Mississippi)
Assuming that the security people within the group have suspicions about
a group member being an informer/provocateur, it is useful for
security/leadership to resolve certain questions both before and after
the investigation:
Clearly, if the person under suspicion is relatively important to the
group’s functioning, then leadership must know one way or the other. The
more important the person under suspicion is to the group, the more
intensive the investigation. We may suggest methods of investigation
which are unorthodox and from a certain point of view morally
indefensible. But the question is always how badly the group needs to
know. No group need use all or any of the methods we describe. But under
the condition that the correct information is a life-and-death matter
for the group, certain drastic measures may be justified.
not enough evidence to confirm that someone is a police agent, but there
IS enough evidence to confirm certain suspicions. A great deal will
depend upon what is at stake with the person under suspicion. In
general, the choices come down to
group;
common sense dictates that the person be exposed and severed from the
group, other actions might be initiated. If the presence of the agent is
a real threat to the group, then the agent should be neutralized in an
effective manner. Usually wide exposure of the agent will accomplish an
effective neutralization. But if the agent is no great threat to the
group’s functioning, the agent staying inside the group may be useful
for other purposes.
The group might decide that they prefer to keep the agent, rather than
risk not knowing who would replace a known quantity. It the agent is not
in a sensitive position, can be monitored and isolated from important
work, the group may want to keep such an agent at a low organizational
level. Or the agent might be given tasks that seem to be sensitive but
are in reality not crucial to the group. Under the cover of doing
“sensitive” work, false and semi-false information about the group can
be relayed to the intelligence agencies that the agent belongs to. Or
perhaps certain information that is in fact true about the group can be
willfully discredited by creation of pseudo-events and/or false
information. Remember that when the intelligence agencies have a great
deal of contradictory information, it decreases their ability to act
decisively against the group.
of an informer? If the group makes a decision to sever connection with
the agent it is certainly the group’s responsibility to quietly contact
leadership in other groups to warn them about the agent. Often public
exposure is done through the group’s newspaper/newsletter/journal; in
this case, the news article should be sent to a wide variety of groups.
The more pressing problem is the instance where there are only
suspicions but not decisive evidence.
Experience has shown that suspicions are taken seriously only when then
is a political bond that exists between persons with long movement
experience. People who have been in the movement a long time, and who
are known to each other and trusted as dedicated movement people, can
convey agent suspicions that will get a favorable hearing or be readily
believed. This “old hands trust network” is relatively independent of
political point of view; veteran leaders of rival radical organizations
can freely and easily exchange information on matters of security.
to talk to them on the street, if you’ve been arrested, or even if
you’re in jail. Do not talk about illegal actions with fellow “inmates”
in holding as they may be plants.
UNLESS THEY HAVE A SEARCH OR ARREST WARRANT. Demand to see the warrant.
It must specificallydescribe the place to be searched and things to be
seized. It must be authorized by a judge and should bear a signature.
ANYTHING OTHER THAN YOU NAME, ADDRESS AND BIRTH DATE. Carefully observe
the officers; you’re in your own home you’re not required to stay in one
room. You should take written notes of what they do, their names, badge
numbers, and what agency they’re from. Have friends who are present act
as witnesses. It’s risky to let cops roam around alone in your place.
WARRANT, JUST SAY NO. The police are very skilled at getting information
from people, so attempting to outwit them is very risky. You can never
tell how a seemingly harmless bit of information can hurt you or someone
else.
PEOPLE. Once you’ve been arrested, you can’t talk you way out of it.
Don’t try to engage cops in a dialogue or respond to accusations.
PERSONNEL. If you’ve been arrested you should refuse to take a blood
test until you’ve been brought before a judge and have a lawyer of your
choice.
POSSIBLE. This means after you’ve been arrested, charged and booked into
jail. This does not mean however, that you’ll be given the right to
speak with you family and friends. This is left up to the discretion of
the police involved in your case.
EASIER TO TELL THEM TO CONTACT YOUR LAWYER. Once a lawyer is involved,
people will know more about your state i.e. charges, bail, court date,
etc.