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Title: The Paris Commune Author: Errico Malatesta Date: March 17, 1900 Language: en Topics: revolutionary strategy, communism, socialism, anarchist analysis Source: Translated from “Il Comune di Parigi,” parts 1 and 2, La Questione Sociale (Paterson, New Jersey) 6, new series, nos. 28 and 29 (March 17 and 24, 1900)
A celebrated historian, Lecky said that legend is often more truthful
than history; and in so saying expresses, in a somewhat paradoxical
form, a true and profound insight.
Legend is truer and more interesting than history; since, while history
tries laboriously to establish hard facts about circumstances, events,
and individuals, and only with difficulty manages to ascertain the
truth, amid the complexity of always inadequate elements and
contradictory witnesses; legend instead, being formed unconsciously and
expressing, not the fact, but how people saw the fact, reveals the state
of mind of a people, the innermost meaning of a historical moment.
This was the case for the revolutionary movement known as the Paris
Commune, which erupted on March 18, 1871, and was suffocated in blood
the following May. Even before there was a single positive fact
established about it, every person interpreted it according to his own
desires; and the legend that circulated throughout Europe and the world
had a much greater influence than the precise knowledge of the facts
could have had. The result is this: that the Paris Commune is claimed by
all socialists of the world, while in reality it was not a socialist
movement; that it is claimed by all anarchists, while it was not an
anarchist movement.
In 1871 the minds were perfectly prepared to give the Parisian movement
the significance it has been given; and most likely, if the repression
had failed to snuff it out at birth, it really would have become what it
was believed to be from the very beginning.
The reactionary force born out of the defeat of the 1848 European
revolution was exhausted, and everybody sensed that the time was ripe
for a new revolution.
The impotence of “liberal” principles left as a legacy to the posterity
of the French Revolution at the end of the last century, had become
clear; and new currents of ideas, new aspirations were exciting the
masses. The “social question” had become the big question. The birth and
rapid ascendancy of the International, a consequence that became a cause
in turn of this situation, had given birth to hopes in some and fears in
others of upcoming political and economic radical changes.
At this juncture, the Franco-Prussian war breaks out. Everything hangs
in the balance; everyone anxiously watches the battlefield and makes
predictions about what will happen after the war: the suspense merely
increases the tension in people’s minds.
As the French army is defeated and the Emperor taken prisoner,
conservative and reactionary elements accept the republic as the only
feasible solution for the moment, but with the firm intention either to
re-establish the monarchy as soon as possible, or ensure that the
republic does not really differ from the monarchy. The people, stunned
by the thunder of war and discouraged by the defeats and betrayals,
which continue with the republic just as with the empire, looks on
wavering between hope, fear, and suspicion.
The people of Paris want to fight the besieging enemy, but are tricked,
betrayed, and vanquished in partial sorties that seem, or are, organized
deliberately to fail; they are subjected to a shameful surrender.
Provincial voters appoint an assembly made up of all the most
reactionary elements that feudal and militaristic France contains; and
this assembly, stigmatized with the name rural, hurries to accept all
the conditions of peace imposed by Bismarck, and prepares to subject
France to the rule of the saber and the aspersorium.
Enough is enough.
Revolutionary elements begin to come together; the workers of Paris,
Lyon, Marseilles, are champing at the bit, due partly to profound
economic uneasiness, partly to patriotic feeling offended by the
treachery and incompetence of the military and civilian leadership, and
partly to hatred of the monarchy whose restoration is a threat.
The government understands that to protect its reactionary work Paris
needs to be disarmed. On the night of March 17–18, secretly, it sent
troops to seize the cannons that the national guard has held since the
days of the siege; but the attempt is discovered, the alarm is sounded;
the soldiers of the national guard, startled awake, rush to defend their
cannons; the women accompanying them fling themselves into the midst of
the troops, beg them, insult them, embrace them; the troops turn their
rifles upside down and fraternize with the people. Two generals, Thomas
and Lecomte, renowned butchers, are shot, as if in a pact of blood
between the rebel troops and the insurgent people.
The next morning, March 18, all of Paris is shaken by the news; the
authorities flee… the insurrection is triumphant.
As news of the Paris events scatters through Europe, instinctively all
revolutionaries, socialists, anarchists, and republicans who looked upon
the republic as a radical transformation of the social order, all
friends of progress whose generous instincts were not paralyzed by
belief in religious and political dogma, all, from Bakunin, to Marx, to
Garibaldi, from the methodical German workers to the enthusiastic
Italian revolutionary youth, were on the side of the Parisians, on the
side of the Commune. And all reactionaries, all rulers, butchers, and
people’s tormentors were on the side of the government that, having
escaped from Paris and selected the city of Versailles as its
headquarters, was called the Versailles government. It was painful to
find among the latter Giuseppe Mazzini, whose hieratic instinct clouded
his intellect and his heart.
Revolutionaries and reactionaries believed it was a certain thing that
the social revolution had broken out in Paris, and with this persuasion
they judged the movement according to their tendencies.
The legend was created in one fell swoop, and this was a fortunate
circumstance, as it had an immense effect on propaganda. In every
country the socialist movement (socialist in the broad sense of the
term) benefited from it, and in some countries, such as Italy, it almost
gave birth to the movement. So big and beneficial was that influence
that the legend persisted and persists to this day, alongside the now
familiar history.
But while it is good to profit from the legend, which essentially means
profiting from popular tendencies that materialize by idealizing an
historical reality, it is also necessary to know the actual facts as
they occurred, in order to benefit from the lessons of experience.
More of that in our next issue.
Even the simplest historical facts, always being the result of a
thousand different factors, variously modified by a thousand
circumstances, never exactly correspond to the ideal of one party or
school of thought, and cannot fit into any ideological classification.
This is especially true when it involves those great social events that
all needs, all interests, all feelings, all ideas existing among the
people of a country, consciously or unconsciously, contribute to
determine—such events are not planned and prepared by a party nor
provoked by their initiative, but are spontaneously born by
circumstances and thrust themselves upon parties and men of ideas, who
must then accept them as they present themselves!
The March 18 insurrection and the resulting “Commune” was one of these
events.
On the eve of March 18 all advanced men and the general population of
the great cities felt the need for a revolution and intensely desired
one.
But what sort of revolution was this? What aims were pursued?
In the latter years of the Empire the social question was widely debated
in France and there was a spreading awareness of the need for a
transformation that went beyond the political constitution. All
socialistic ideas and systems that had excited minds during the decade
prior to 1848 and which had been snuffed out by the reaction, had been
brought back into discussion. The International proclaimed the principle
that the emancipation of the workers had to be the workers’ own doing,
and it was organizing the laboring masses outside of and in opposition
to all bourgeois parties.
But the war had brought an end to that entire movement. The
International in France did indeed protest the war and affirmed the
solidarity between French workers and German workers, just as the German
Internationalists did in turn; but patriotic prejudice prevailed, and
they were not able to stop the war. The defeats of the French army, the
surrender at Sedan, due to Napoleon’s incompetence and cowardice, the
surrender at Metz due to Bazaine’s treason, the surrender at Paris where
treason was again suspected, the shameful peace after arrogant boasting,
increasingly offended and irritated nationalist sentiment. The
intentions to restore the monarchy, clearly demonstrated by the
government and the assembly, ensured that nearly every revolutionary
element believed that the one and only big issue of the moment was to
save the republic from the danger of restoration.
Among the people of Paris the prevalent desire was to establish a truly
republican government… and to redo the war on Germany to take their
revenge. When suddenly, unexpectedly, following the government’s flight
after the failed attempt to seize the cannons that the national guard
had successfully rescued from the Prussians, Paris found herself master
of herself and with the need to see to her own destiny, and defend
herself against the attempts at repression that the government hidden in
Versailles was about to make.
The situation was faced as the circumstances allowed; but there was no
understanding of the need to revolutionize society and spread the
revolution beyond Paris, among the peasants, if only as the sole means
of being able to win the material struggle.
There were certainly some who intended to develop the movement into
social revolution, and the people, as in every insurrectionary movement,
were animated by a more or less vague aspiration for justice and
well-being. But the prevailing idea was to resist the government’s
high-handedness, save the republic, and avenge French honor.
A free Commune was proclaimed… essentially because there was no way of
imposing the will of Paris over all of France; however, a Parisian
government was immediately appointed, which was a government like all
the rest… although during the days when Paris had remained without a
government—from March 18 until elections were held on April 3—it had
shown that things of public interest, better than through orders from a
government, could be accomplished through the efforts of everyone
concerned, through Associations and Committees that had no powers beyond
those given to them by popular approval.
An attempt was made to make peace with the government provided that the
existence of the republic was guaranteed; and the attempts failed only
because of the criminal stubbornness of the government, of the hatred
and desire for revenge against Parisians of the Bonapartist generals’
(temporarily posing as republicans), and of the thirst for blood and
power of the morally monstrous Adolphe Thiers, who controlled the
executive power.
In the organization of the armed forces, defensively and offensively,
the old military traditions were followed.
True, there was none of the scandalous salaries of other governments,
but the principle of privilege and a hierarchy of salaries were
respected, as these ranged from 6 thousand lire a year paid to rulers to
thirty soldi a day paid to soldiers.
The arrangements to defend against the Commune’s internal enemies were
the usual police procedures of house searches, arrests, suppression of
newspapers and other and worse violations of freedom.
Private ownership was rigorously respected. The rich peacefully
continued to possess their wealth and, even during the scarcity of the
siege, managed to carouse and mock at the misery not only of the people,
but also of those fighting for the Commune. Benoît Malon, who was a
member of the Commune’s government (Council) recounts how the Fédérés
(the name given to the soldiers of the Commune) returning from combat
disheveled and bloodied through the wealthier avenues, were insulted and
called thirty-pennies by the bourgeois seated outside the luxurious
cafés, drinking and smoking.
The Commune’s work (manufacturing uniforms for soldiers) was
subcontracted out to entrepreneurs who had people work for little money.
The soldiers of the Commune were sent to guard the treasures of the Bank
of France, from whom loans were sought with all the same formalities and
guarantees used in the financial transactions of bourgeois governments.
The only undertakings of vaguely socialist leanings were (if memory does
not fail us) a decree against nighttime work in bakeries; a decree
(never implemented) that gave workers united in cooperatives the right
to take over factories deserted by owners, as long as they compensated
the owners upon their return; a postponement of payments on rents and
debts, some meager distribution of food to the hungry, and the return,
free of charge, of pawned items of minimal value:—all things that can be
done (and most of which have been done repeatedly) by a bourgeois and
monarchist government, in the interest itself of public “order” and the
tranquility of the bourgeois.
And along with this, a great deal of declarations of principles, very
advanced but never implemented; eloquent manifestos to the French
people, to the peasants, to the people of the entire world, which never
went beyond words; and symbolic acts, such as the demolition of the
VendĂ´me column and the burning of the guillotine, certainly of great
moral value, but of no practical importance.
This is what the Paris Commune actually was.
Given the people who took part in it, given the preceding ferment of
ideas that the war could interrupt but not destroy, given how the
European public interpreted the movement, something that could not have
failed to influence the movement itself, one can surmise that, had the
movement not been so quickly drowned in blood, perhaps it would have
turned into social revolution.
But was it not mainly the direction in which the movement was taken to
cause the Commune’s failure—even from a military point of view?
If armed bands of Parisians, prior to the tightening of the siege, had
ventured into the countryside to preach expropriation and help the
locals carry it out, the movement would have spread and the government
would not have been able to assemble its forces and send them all
against Paris.
If within Paris the bourgeoisie had been expropriated and everything
made available to the people, then the entire population would have been
interested in the revolution and would have defended it;—while instead,
according to the reports of the Communards themselves, only a small
number of inhabitants took part in the fighting, and in the last days
the Commune’s defenders numbered no more than ten thousand.
The Commune was defeated, and it was defeated without having done what
could and should have been done to win, because the principle of
authority killed its momentum.
We do not intend to blame the men, who all gave admirable proof of their
selflessness, devotion, heroism.
And we would be deceiving ourselves if we claimed that it was the fault
of the “leaders.”
The “leaders” exists only as long as the people want and tolerate them;
and they are what the people allow them to be.
The problem lies within the people themselves: it is within the people
that we must fight the cult of authority, the faith in the necessity and
usefulness of government. Once this is done the revolution may triumph.
Let us honor the martyrs of the Paris Commune, who, even though they
chose the wrong path, gave their lives for freedom.
But let us put ourselves in a position to do better than them.