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Title: To Love The Inhuman Author: Bellamy Fitzpatrick Date: 2016 Language: en Topics: review, anarcho-primitivism, animals, morality, civilization, anti-civ, Return Fire, Manichaeism Source: reprinted in Return Fire vol.4 Notes: To read the articles referenced throughout this text in [square brackets], PDFs of Return Fire and related publications can be read, downloaded and printed by searching actforfree.nostate.net for "Return Fire", or emailing returnfire@riseup.net
âFaced with the meaninglessness of the world â the real[...] the
individual most often quakes and turns away. The experience of the real
is literally unbearable, and philosophy has traditionally come to the
rescue to save humanity from meaninglessness, to create the illusion of
a truth...â
â David F. Bell, introduction to
Joyful Cruelty by Clément Rosset
Anarcho-Primitivist[1] John Zerzanâs thinking exemplifies just such an
attempt at rescue, one not only unnecessary, but in fact unwanted, for
an anti-civilization critique lived as a joyful life. This essay
examines John Zerzanâs recent âAnimal Dreamsâ, first situating it in a
typical anarchist critique motivated through the enshrinement of
particular reifications, then exploring how such action leads to
Manichaean thinking [ed. â i.e. that breaks everything down into good or
evil, light or dark, or love and hate (named after an Iranian prophet
Mani): essentially, dualistic thinking], and finally challenging
specific claims made within his essay. An alternative mode of relating
to the nonhuman closes the piece.
Radicalization, that is, the development of one's critical theory, can
be understood largely in terms of dispossession by reification[2]; as
one's critique grows sharper, one increasingly liberates oneâs life from
these enslaving concepts. All anarchists worth the name have dispelled
themselves of State, most have excised Capitalism and God, and many have
also banished such subtle ghosts as Family and Production â but some, as
a result of their radicalization, not only fail to dispel, but actually
enshrine all the more fiercely, Morality and Nature.
Moral socialization is an odd, dissonant thing in the dominant culture.
Children are taught at an early age to share, to treat others as they
would like to be treated (the Golden Rule), to believe everyone's
opinions are of value, and similar maxims according to the altruistic
paradigm generally descended from Christian and Enlightenment [ed. â see
'A Profound Dis-ease'] beliefs, even if those value tables are never
explicitly cited during this socialization. Simultaneous to this
inculcation is childrenâs experience of realities often at odds with the
prescriptions they receive: they see not only the concerted exploitation
of the majority by the few, but also commonplace avarice among the many;
they see the obvious destitution of some, often disproportionately along
visually recognizable demographic lines; and they see women's opinions
more or less subtly devalued in quotidian conversation. This dissonance
stirs feelings of moral distress that need some form of catharsis. For
some, this release is a naturalization of perceived evils, perhaps via
an unknowable divine plan, a misanthropic dismissal of humanity as
essentially flawed, or a self-identification with Social Darwinism.
Others, though, balk at the horrorshow, as their rationalization of the
dissonance is that Morality's normative purchase is genuine and reality
is simply out of step with it; they demand either a sweeping change or
annihilation of the status quo and the earthly manifestation of heaven.
Pyotr Kropotkin[3], an inspirational figure to many radicals, preaches
with precisely this kind of moral indignation: âOur principles of
morality say: "Love your neighbour as yourself"; but let a child follow
this principle and take off his coat to give it to the shivering pauper,
and his mother will tell him that he must never understand moral
principles in their direct sense. If he lives according to them, he will
go barefoot, without alleviating the misery around him! Morality is good
on the lips, not in deeds.â
Thus, the process of radicalization for many is the moral impugnment of
the world. Though I am unaware of any empirical study, it has been my
own experience (and, I suspect, that of most readers) that the vast
majority of radicals born into the dominant culture were at least
initially radicalized in this manner, typically as especially indignant
progressive liberals, and the majority of this set still occupy that
analytical space, having only clarified their morality. Morality's
ontological status is never called into question; indeed, in its
besiegement by either the openly immoral or the falsely moral â i.e.,
greed is good or people need authority or we would have the war of all
against all â amidst an obviously bleak culture, it is all the more
vindicated as the Real, the Good, and the True.
In the same vein is the burgeoning anti-civilization anarchist who sees,
on the one hand, the culture in which they are forcibly immersed, with
its multifarious horrors of dehumanization, objectification, wilted
affect, wanton waste, variegated and abundant interhuman oppression, and
denuding of the Biosphere; and then sees, seemingly diametrically
opposed, the nonhuman world with its vivaciousness, intimacy, immediacy
of experience, nutrient and energy cycles in which nothing is wasted or
wanted but the energy that the Sun or hydrothermal vents replace,
various niches through which all lifeways are valuable, and species
interactions in which, even as one kills another, one seemingly never
acts against Life itself. It is a small leap, then, to see the Culture
as the Evil against Nature, the Good.
Being a radical thus comes to mean taking a position on the Manichaean
battlefield, fighting for and alongside Nature. Theoretically, it may
mean embodying Nature or restoring an essential substance of wildness
within oneself, as the battlefield may be not only material but also
spiritual. Actionably, it may realize itself as protecting Nature via
stopping particular non-human organisms from being killed, stopping
industrial development in particular places perceived as wild or sacred,
or attacking persons or infrastructure associated with Civilization; as
well as aligning oneself personally with Nature via learning primitive
[sic] skills, eating a particular diet, or adopting certain spiritual
beliefs.
Again, these sentiments are eminently understandable and the actions may
or may not be well placed, as what is beautiful in the organic, our
habitat as human organisms, is being despoiled horribly by Civilization.
The globalized, industrialized, spectacle-commodity culture is
destroying kinds of beings at a rate one thousand times faster than they
would normally go extinct, and huge portions of wildlife have been
destroyed just in recent decades as the process accelerates, reaching
such a rate as to prompt the creation of a neologism, âdefaunationâ.
Meanwhile, the always-present thinness of such efforts as conservation,
sustainable agriculture, and green technology becomes an increasingly
revolting joke, recently exemplified by the ridiculous efforts this past
year of endangered species translocation[4] and the attempted
displacement of indigenous populations in Alvaro Obregon for the
construction of a wind power farm[5] [ed. â including the 3rd largest in
Latin America, after a 'wind-rush' for industry; see Return Fire vol.3
pg39].
Considering all of this horror, it is not especially poetically
adventurous to describe the culture as a death engine, essentially
inimical to the organic. And emotionally intense or poetic writing can
be a useful tool and a breath of relief amidst a general bleachedness,
so long as it avoids obfuscation by being clear about how, when, and why
it is doing so. As a perhaps unfortunate linguistic consequence, calling
oneself anti-civilization might leave one feeling obligated to be for
something else that is similarly grand in scope, something bigger than
our immediate lives and relations. But while Civilization is a kind of
useful shorthand that can be quite clearly defined[6], the abundant
references to Nature, animality, and wildness coloring
anti-civilization/anti-industrial literature, speech, and thinking are
misleading vagaries at best and phantoms at worst.
Civilization, itself a set of overlapping and mutually reinforcing
reifications and their corresponding material infrastructure, is
characterized and reproduced by exactly this kind of absolutist,
dualistic, universalizing thought. Abstract and transcendental values
are themselves intrinsically authoritarian and antithetical to embodied
and vivacious life, even if they are posited for ostensibly liberatory
purposes, as I have written of elsewhere[7]. To reiterate briefly, to
compartmentalize oneâs raw, lived-and-felt, moment-to-moment experience
in order to render it, to self-alienate it, into such categories as
Nature or wildness is itself an act of separation. Insofar as our loving
gaze assigns to our lover fantasies of perfection, mutilating them into
a quasi-divine being into which we can dissolve our inadequacies and
disappointments, thus completing ourselves, we have betrayed anything
worth the name of love and entered into the realm of religion.
Anarcho-Primitivism (AP, whether the nouns or the adjective) is thus,
ironically, the stuff of civilized thinking, a pattern of thought that
mourns for an imagined reunion with a de-anthropomorphized, but
nonetheless extant, divinity.
To elaborate this point, I will unpack âAnimal Dreamsâ, a recent essay
by John Zerzan that appeared in the first issue of the biannual green
anarchist journal Black Seed, as I find the AP analysis to be one of the
most interesting ones with which I disagree because of something like
convergent evolution: I arrive at superficially similar conclusions to
the APs, but with a fundamentally different analysis.
Before examining âAnimal Dreamsâ in particular, some context is in
order. I am not merely accusing: for Anarcho-Primitivists, the world is
avowedly a Manichaean battlefield. Zerzan has emphasized more than once
on his radio show Anarchy Radio, as well as in personal exchanges, that
he is dismissive of any anarchist analysis that does not regard a
Civilization/Nature dualism as metaphysically fundamental: Civilization
with its slavery, death, or undeath versus Nature with its freedom,
wildness, and life.
In âAnimal Dreamsâ, Zerzan adds to the Good seemingly all non-human
animals, who apparently not only occupy the proper side of Maniâs ranks
but also serve as models for us to do the same. I will examine how
Zerzan assigns to various animals (predominantly charismatic megafauna)
humanistic and Christian virtues and how these characterizations are
either misleading (because they reflect only one or a few examples among
a great many) or simply wrong. Later, I will propose what I find to be a
more appropriate relationship to the nonhuman.
In sharp contradistinction to much of Zerzanâs writing that is, even
where I disagree, compelling and provocative, âAnimal Dreamsâ reads
largely like a set of platitudes, some disturbingly normative for the
culture. I want nonetheless to briefly begin where it has merit.
From both the piece itself as well as personal conversations with its
author, it is clear that part of Zerzanâs goal was to repudiate the
dreadfully common and grotesquely speciesist [ed. â see Return Fire
vol.2 pg10] diminution of the inner lives/umwelts [ed. â environmental
factors collectively capable of affecting the behaviour of an
individual] / phenomenalities of nonhuman organisms. This goal is
certainly worthwhile and admirable, especially in light of
Behaviorist/Cartesian [ed. â see
'A Profound Dis-ease'] residues that linger in both popular and academic
cultures[8]. Zerzan aptly decries the allergy to so-called
anthropomorphism, more accurately described in this particular case as
qualitative inference to the presence of consciousness in nonhumans, an
act of the very same kind of abduction that nearly every human commits
with nearly every other human on an everyday basis[9].
The common critique that humans can report their mental states while
nonhumans cannot is laughable and evinces what a lack of understanding
there is about communication: the whine of a distressed dog, the
enticing change of color of a ripe fruit, the limb-waving and
stridulation of a threatening tarantula, and the garish and warning
colors of a toxic nudibranch [ed. â a type of poisonous sea-going slug]
are all communication. Almost any pet owner, forager, or anyone else who
has spent a good deal of time with nonhuman animals, including this
author, would readily say that nonhuman animals reasonably seem to have
an inner life that they are capable of communicating to a greater or
lesser extent depending on the particular case. I agree completely with
Zerzan that âIt is not âanthropomorphicâ to recognize that animals
playâ[10]; and that we also can only loosely speculate what these inner
lives are like, as âwe do not know how to even comprehend
consciousnesses different from our own.â
Where Zerzan errs, heavily and repeatedly, is his flagrant and
nonsensical moralizing that dominates the piece. He seems to wish to
tell us, implicitly, the following: that we should value animals because
they exemplify our popularly held morals, as he lists a number of cases
of animals seemingly championing them; but also that we should view
animals as moral exemplars, models of behavior, as âwe are lost, but
animals point to the right road.â Besides the odd circularity inherent
in this bifurcated claim that undermines its entire thrust (animals are
good because they follow moral X; moral X is good because animals follow
it), it is easy to find a number of counterexamples for every moral
example Zerzan deploys.
Though he acknowledges, seemingly anticipating a critique like mine,
that âAll is not sweetness and light in the non-human realm,â he softens
this admittance by adding âespecially in this shaken and disturbed
worldâ, as though the human, somehow causa sui, were perhaps really to
blame. He proceeds to make this caveat close to meaningless by using the
bulk of his essay to enumerate cases of non-human organisms exhibiting
behaviors in line with liberal humanism or Christian ethics.
As an anarchist, Zerzan of course desires a world without formal
hierarchy; he seeks to find animals, needlessly, to validate this desire
â as though it were not sufficient for him to simply desire it, but that
it instead needed to be written in the cosmos to be legitimate â and
thus offers a repudiation of the commonly held idea of animal pecking
order. It may indeed be the case that domestication induces hierarchy in
some animals in whom it does not exist in the wild, such as has been
recently observed with the behavior of wolves versus dogs. There are
nonetheless numerous cases of dominating behavior in wild organisms.
Many parasitoids[11] seize control of their hostsâ bodies, ending their
reproductive possibilities through death or debilitation: barnacles of
the genus Sacculina castrate their crab hosts in order to hijack their
bodies, including their sex organs, for reproduction; the Gordian Worm
larva inhabits an arthropod host and, maturing, forces the host to drown
itself so that the adult worm may erupt from its dead body to reach an
aquatic habitat; and wasps of the genus Ichneumonidae inject their eggs
and symbiotic viruses into other insect larvae, restricting their
metamorphosis and creating abnormally large larvae that, like bloated
cattle, are gradually devoured alive by the maturing Ichneumon
larvae[12]. Similar behavior exists in diverse organisms, the behavior
having developed numerous times among creatures not closely related to
one another: mollusks, nematodes, flatworms, and so on, including
non-animals like fungi and viruses.
Besides the parasitic dimension, the social Hymenoptera (colonial bees,
wasps, and ants) exhibit caste societies with a rigid division of labor
and violent enforcement of hierarchy via physical mutilation, ritualized
dominance/submission social interactions, infanticide, and other forms
of what entymologists actually dub âpolicingâ. Again, similar eusocial,
hierarchical behavior is exhibited by non-Hymenopteran insects like
termites as well as non-insects like certain crustaceans â creatures
that are not directly related evolutionarily â suggesting that, like
parasitoidalism, domination is a tendency that life produces again and
again, an eddy that the organic regularly recapitulates. There is thus
nothing to be gained from looking at animals in some generalized way in
order to legitimate our desires for anarchy.
Patriarchy is a repugnant aspect of the dominant culture that seems to
lie at the core of Civilization, perhaps being among the first forms of
alienation and generative of the compulsory division of labor[13] [ed. â
also see Return Fire vol.2 pg6]. Any thoroughgoing anarchist analysis
demands a critique of it, but Zerzan seems to think, again, that we need
to look to nonhumans to rationalize this critique â this venture is a
useless one, as gendered behavior among animals reveals itself to be a
riotous smorgasbord of possibilities.
Among our closest relatives, despite Zerzanâs highlighting of lioness
hunting and elk matriarchy, the overwhelming majority of mammals are
polygynous, often with harem-holding male dominance and sexual
dimorphism that leaves the male considerably larger, stronger, and more
aggressive. Perhaps the starkest example is that of the elephant seal,
in which males violently compete for harems of females numbering up to
the hundreds.
In a variety of invertebrates, again having evolved repeatedly in
diverse phyla, mating takes place through traumatic insemination, in
which a spined â literally weaponized â penis pierces the femaleâs body
to deliver sperm directly to her viscera. One theory for why this
vicious method evolved is to bypass mating plugs, an adhesive substance
secreted by penises to literally glue a femaleâs reproductive tract
closed after mating in order to block the sperm of competing males. I
thus shudder at the brazenly general sentiment that âanimals[...] are
the right road.â
Moreover, even engaging in comparative gender relations among the
incomprehensible diversity of nonhumans is a close to useless endeavor
given the incommensurability of gender across species. In a great many
animals, particularly many arthropods but also certain vertebrates like
hyenas, females are physically larger and stronger, more socially and
sexually dominant, and longer-lived, inverting the physical and social
power relations characteristic of patriarchal humanity. And a good deal
of genderfucking is present with the abundance of hermaphroditism and
sex-changing among nonhuman animals â a huge diversity of animals are
capable of changing their sexual organs to make the best of their
conditions. One is moved to wonder what could possibly be gained by
making human value inferences from beings so different from ourselves,
most of whom are indifferent to these human values.
Coupled with Zerzanâs appeals to anti-patriarchy is a shockingly
Christian sentimentalism for monogamy, as he cites geese and gibbons
favorably for their long-term coupling. Why Zerzan is implicitly
praising a human institution so closely associated with patriarchy,
intimate abuse [ed. â see Return Fire vol.1 pg46], and commodity culture
is bemusing prima facie; but his information is also simply wrong, as
this proposition has been debunked along with so many others about
nonhuman monogamy: studies since the late 70s have found that, for the
goose, âpromiscuity is a part of the repertoire of yet another seemingly
monogamous bird.â An estimated 95-97% of mammals are similarly
nonmonogamous. In contrast, ruffs, wetland birds in the sandpiper
family, mate in a manner resemblant of a queer bacchanal that, I must
say, were I ever to eschew my aversion to being prescriptive and morally
reifying nonhumans, would be what I wish more of us would consider to be
âthe right roadâ: among these highly promiscuous birds, there are three
different male phenotypes, including a female-resembling male that the
very masculine, domineering male phenotype will mate with, both topping
and bottoming, seemingly because the homoeroticism attracts the
attention of observing females and entices them to join the orgy.
Zerzan similarly cites examples of animal familiality, devotion, and
parental care â and, certainly, these exist, but only as some among a
great many. With parenting and devotion, there is the octopus mother who
starves herself, often fatally, vigilantly defending her young; all
around her are the numerous and variegated marine organisms â
cnidarians, mollusks, fish, crustaceans, etc. â engaging in the
zero-parenting that is broadcast fertilization, in which eggs and sperm
are both expelled into the water, the resultant zygotes carried away for
a planktonic larval existence in which many are sure to perish. As far
as familiality, we see on the one hand the whipspider mother who watches
over her eggs and then carries her young on her back while, strikingly
among arthropods, she seems to affectionately caress them. On the other
hand, we see the cannibalism among young sharks and strepsiptera
(parasitic insects who superficially resemble flies), who devour their
siblings before even leaving the egg or their motherâs body,
respectively; the incest among certain insects; and the parasitic
parenting of cuckoos and certain insects, whose parents leave their
offspring to be cared for by other species, as these host species
mistake them for their own young through cloaking mechanisms.
There is thus among the animals no model for egalitarian gender
relations and the ideal family. There is only an incredible variety of
genders, gendered behavior, and familial relations that highlight how
arbitrary human norms are at any particular time or place. If the world
offers us no model, why can we not choose our own without recourse to
it?
Continuing with Christian sentimentalism, Zerzan attempts to declaw the
wolf, and perhaps predators in general, by saying it may be the case
that âwolves only kill animals that are near their end anyway â the old,
sick, injuredâ. Though hedged as a supposition, it is difficult not to
see Zerzan attempting to soften predation into a world of mercy and
remorse. And, again, he cherry-picks his evidence to find the
conclusions he wants, ignoring readily available counter-examples. A
2009 observation of Canis Lupus[14] in a region in which they had a
variety of potential prey found, based on sampling the wolvesâ scat,
that 96.4% of the scat held remains of either roe deer or wild boar,
thus indicating the wolvesâ primary prey. Of the prey, 74.1% of the roe
deer and 84.2 % of the wild boar were juveniles, less than a year old.
Over time, the wolves took turns targeting the roe deer and the wild
boar, each during its birthing period, for the reasons one might expect:
âThe positive selection of young roe deer and wild boar may be
considered opportunist behaviour, because the individuals of this age
class are easier to capture than adults due to their inexperience.â
Indeed, âRoe deer fawns are left alone by their mothers for long periods
of time, making them even more vulnerable to wolf predation[...]â Mercy,
it ainât â babynapping, rather. The authors had occasion to cite six
previous studies, ranging from 1970 to 2004, that supported the
conclusion that wolves target vulnerable juveniles preferentially. One
might reasonably infer, as others have, that they might target the
elderly and ill for the same reasons â simple ease and opportunism. Far
from experiencing mercy or remorse, the manner in which wolf pups play
at hunting to gradually increase their skills suggests to me that the
wolf feels hunger, desire, joy, and exhilaration as it hunts and kills.
Of course, Zerzan is likely motivated by a desire to redeem the wolf
from its popular demonization as infinitely murderous, killing without
even the need to eat. To make such a case, I much prefer Farley Mowat,
who, besides indicting human civilization as being the real mindless
killer, writes at the conclusion of his loosely autobiographical novel
Never Cry Wolf, âSomewhere to the eastward a wolf howled[...] for me, it
was a voice which spoke of the lost world that was once ours, before we
chose the alien role, a world which I had glimpsed and almost
entered[...]â Mowat here redeems the besmirched wolf not by apologizing
for its killing, but rather by pointing at what seems a beautiful
intimacy between the wolf and its world. Similarly, in a theme exhibited
throughout his work, Nietzsche [ed. â see Return Fire vol.2 pg52] saw in
animality (including uncivilized humans) a kind of profound, child-like
innocence; not a moral innocence of being gentle, humble, and meek, all
of which he clearly despised, but an innocence of unmediated life in
which one is in tune with their senses, makes no apologies for their
instincts, and is unafraid to grasp immediate joy.
Anthropocentrism
At times, Zerzan exhibits nothing so much as his apparent biological
ignorance. He writes, oddly misanthropically for someone who repudiates
misanthropy, âWe are the top of the food chain, which makes us the only
animal nobody needs.â Besides the term food chain (Zerzan will later,
inexplicably, use this same term in sneer quotes, as though he finds it
unbelievable) being a bit of a misnomer â it is only one aspect of a
food web, used to organize organisms into trophic levels, that is
sometimes misleadingly employed to rank organisms in an Aristotelian
Great Chain of Being-esque manner[15] â one is moved by Zerzanâs
statement to ask whether he has ever heard of dust and face mites,
roundworms, flukes, or tapeworms, to name only a few and those very
broadly, or, if we extend beyond animals, any number of decomposers,
human gut flora, mitochondria, and so on ad nauseam. Zerzan is most
definitely aware of the evidence that North American Indians interacted
with their forest ecosystems so as to create pockets of sub-climax
forest succession zones that increased biodiversity in the forest as a
whole[16], so why is he playing these self-shaming rhetorical games?
What is such a misanthropy except another form of human exceptionalism,
another way of making the human the one and only Other who stands apart
from everything else? As the Invisible Committee notes, referencing the
anthropocentrism motivating the widespread move toward naming our era
the Anthropocene, âFor the last time, [Man] assigns himself [sic] the
main role, even if itâs to accuse himself of having trashed everything â
the seas and the skies, the ground and whatâs underground â even if itâs
to confess his guilt for the unprecedented extinction of plant and
animal species.â
Underlying all of the problems outlined so far, moreover, is the deeper
question of anthropomorphism that Zerzan uses to frame the entire piece.
Zerzan quotes Henry Beston's apt statement, âFor the animal shall not be
measured by manâ, but he seems not to take it to heart. Yes, of course
it is a mistake to have such an intense allergy to anthropomorphism that
one is averse to the abduction that nonhuman animals are conscious â
such an attitude suggests massive alienation. But Zerzan has tumbled
over the edge into an anthropocentrism that projects his own morality
onto the nonhuman world. As I write elsewhere of his friend and frequent
collaborator Kevin Tucker, Zerzan has committed the same error as the
ancient Stoics: he rejects anthropocentrism, but, in doing so, he is in
fact anthropocentric in a roundabout way.
Zerzan indicts others for projecting pecking order, Freudianism [ed. â
for example, in Animal Dreams, that âthe fallacy that the Freudian
paradigm of murderous rivalry between fathers and sons represents the
state of natureâ], and hierarchy onto the nonhuman world, but he does
the very same with his own values; once he has painted the nonhuman
biosphere a color of his liking, obscuring and pretending not to notice
its incredible variation, he swears his allegiance to it. He asks,
posing as the ingĂ©nue after his obfuscation, âMight it not be that
nature is for the happiness of all species, not just one?â I reply by
asking what is this ânatureâ that is somehow different than the gestalt
âof all speciesâ and the worldâs abiotic elements they inhabit and
cocreate; and what would it mean for this totality to be âforâ anything,
as though the gestalt of innumerable valuing beings could somehow
emergently value something in and of itself or, even if it did, that we
could somehow comprehend this evaluation? Like Tucker, Zerzan has
regularly distanced himself from the Left and has written apt criticisms
of it[17], yet he is still operating on the same Manichaean logic that
has characterized most forms of anarchism and leftism since their
earliest days. Bakunin[18] saw human beings, originating in the
objective good of Nature, as essentially moral until they were corrupted
by the unnaturalness of the State; Zerzan extends this line of thinking
by exalting the as-yet-uncorrupted nonhuman animals as moral exemplars.
Since I was a very young child, for as long as I can remember, I have
been fascinated by nonhuman organisms. The stranger, the more inhuman a
creature was, the more I loved it â it fascinated me to know, for
example, that a creature like a schistosome (a blood fluke that
parasitizes first snails, then mammals during its lifecycle, eventually
inhabiting a blood capillary) has a life incomprehensibly different from
my own: sensing mostly through smell, metamorphosing multiple times,
living as though âa vein is a riverâ[19], and mating perpetually as an
adult. I am surrounded by aliens who are yet my kin, each enclosed in
its own umwelt, such that the world is a nigh-infinite array of mutually
mysterious yet mutually informing perceptual universes that are
constantly spilling into one another. To call that vast and mysterious
gestalt either good or bad, something to be either followed or rejected,
is the greatest philosophical impropriety, as it entails tremendously
overstepping what can be known or evaluated.
The only reaction that seems appropriate is something like Nietzscheâs
Dionysian Pessimism, âa general approbation of the real in all its
chaotic and cruel presenceâ[20], because it is strange and lovely,
awesome and ecstatic to be alive â one is moved to joy despite the
purposelessness and lack of objective value one readily perceives. I
relish that my body eats and shits, fucks and rots, pointlessly â that
it dissolves other creatures into it, annihilating their consciousnesses
even as a myriad of new bodies and minds erupt from my effluence and
will erupt from my dead flesh. I recall once when I, having just fucked
in the Hambacher Forest [ed. â see Rebels Behind Bars; Some Light on the
Investigation Leading to the Imprisonment of the Comrade Arrested on
April 13th], watched as several flies descended to start feeding on my
ejaculate within maybe ten seconds â that is Dionysian Pessimism. In
short, to love the inhuman, do not preach to it or of it â simply accept
it as such, and revel in that acceptance.
[1] ed. â Despite finding quite a bit of common ground with some who
describe themselves as âprimitivistsâ, we have a strong dislike for the
terminology itself. The notion that the lifeways of pre-industrial
peoples were âprimitiveâ is present-centric, reductionist, and (if we
measure 'complexity' in terms not defined by the dominant techno-logic
and recognise the depth of methods and rituals employed by such peoples)
simply inaccurate. Primitivists also often display a tendency to
cherry-pick the parts deemed 'relevant' (in a utilitarian sense) to an
anarcho-primitivist ideology while ignoring or underplaying the many
other parts which said cultures used to understand and navigate their
world; an operation more befitting colonialism and its particular
scientific gaze. Additionally, this framing runs into the immediate
problem of surviving cultures which are not civilised: âThe use of the
term âprimitiveâ â which means âfirstâ or âearlyâ â for societies that
have existed into modern times without developing civilization carries
some questionable assumptions. How can societies that exist now be
âfirstâ or âearlyâ? Did they just now appear? In a living world that is
in constant flux, have they somehow remained static and unchanging? Can
human development only happen one way â as the development of
civilization? Besides, which of these societies is the genuine
âprimitiveâ one? They are certainly not all alike, or even all that
similar. Homogeneity is a trait of civilization, not of these other
social realitiesâ (Wolfi Landstreicher).
[2] Reification is a term that has been used in closely related, but
nonetheless significantly different ways in the history of critical
theory. A particularly well-developed definition is articulated by Jason
McQuinn in his âCritical Self-Theoryâ essay in the third issue of Modern
Slavery, too lengthy to cite in its entirety here. Going beyond the
typical understanding of reification as the phenomenon in which an
abstract idea is concretized, McQuinn notes that reification âincludes
two correlative moments[âŠ] On the one side an activity is reduced to a
passive object, and on the other side the activity that is removed from
the then passively-constructed object is projected onto a symbolic
agent.â
[3] ed. â A renegade of Russian nobility born in the late 19th Century,
this anarchist was also a prominent naturalist scientist of the day,
author of the famous book 'Mutual Aid'. âUnder the spell of [Charles]
Darwinâs Origin of the Species, Kropotkin has sought in vain across all
Siberia for keen competition between creatures of the same species. In
place of it, he has witnessed a thousand different manifestations of
mutual support; perhaps the latter is a more decisive factor in survival
than competition per se. The only exceptions he can think of are among
his own people: bureaucracies that resist improvement, regimes that
stifle their subjects, prisons that deform rather than reformâ
(Anarchists Traveling Through History, Part II: Kropotkin Escapes). This
work he combined with his organising with secret councils of
revolutionaries (who later assassinated the Tsar of Russia), for which
he was imprisoned, before being broken out during a hospital stay and
escaping to England, where he continued his naturalism publishing.
[4] âEpisode 61: Hail Satan; Itâs a Beautiful Worldâ and âEpisode 66:
Make Total Destroy, and Bring Us the Champagneâ, Free Radical Radio,
11/07/2014 and 12/10/2014
[5] âAlexander Dunlap on Alvaro Obregonâ, Free Radical Radio, 06/07/2015
[6] Many discussions of civilization are hampered by a lack of a clear
definition of the subject. Briefly, by civilization, I mean a way of
human life characterized by the growth of cities, areas of urban
population sufficiently dense as to require the routine importation of
food from corresponding rural surroundings characterized by agriculture.
Civilized life generally includes all of the following, to varying
degrees: collective activity tightly organized around a linear and
numerical conception of time; a high level of ritual and symbolic
culture; complex and explicit social hierarchy; political
representation; the formation of a State, which attempts to monopolize
the use of physical violence and delegitimize non-State violence;
bureaucracy; compulsory labor (work); and societal mores and ideology
rationalizing racial or cultural supremacy, dominance of Nature, and
social progress [ed. â see Return Fire vol.1 pg11]. Civilized persons
are characterized by highly reified thought, as Civilization itself is
largely a set of reifications intersubjectively constructed by persons
acting in social roles that create and maintain corresponding
infrastructure. To be anti-civilization, then, is to be
anti-reification; it thus is at least prima facie suspect to be in some
way for a different set of reifications.
[7] âCorrosive Consciousness, Part I: How One Might Profane Green
Platonismâ, Black Seed, vol. 4, Spring 2015.
[8] The mere need for an international assembly of scientists in 2012 to
sign a document declaring that at least some nonhuman animals are in
fact conscious (âThe Cambridge Declaration on Consciousnessâ) is a
testament to this incredible alienation.
[9] The ancient Problem of Other Minds â the fact that we ultimately
have no way of knowing, of directly experiencing, the consciousness of
other beings â is ultimately indissoluble. A difference of species does
not change the problem fundamentally. Because we routinely assume other
humans are subjects of a life, it is just as reasonable to do the same
with at least some nonhumans.
[10] All unreferenced quotes following this one are from Zerzanâs
âAnimal Dreamsâ piece.
[11] Parasitoids are organisms who, like parasites, spend a significant
portion of their life upon or within a host organism that they use for
some combination of food, shelter, and transportation. Unlike parasites,
parasitoids necessarily kill, devour, or sterilize their hosts to
complete their lifecycle. They are my favorite counterexample to the
moralization of nonhumans, due to the fact that their behavior is often
quite horrific from a Christian/humanist perspective - so much so, in
fact, that no less a figure than Charles Darwin was moved to write of
them to one of his colleagues: âI own that I cannot see as plainly as
others do, and as I should wish to do, evidence of design and
beneficence on all sides of us. There seems to me too much misery in the
world. I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God
would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express
intention of their feeding within the living bodies of Caterpillars[âŠ]â
Here we see Darwin resisting a metaphysical flight from the real that
David Bell describes in the epigraph.
[12] Interestingly, Zerzan brings up the ichneumon, referring to it
imprecisely as a fly [ichneumon are Hymenopterans, closely related to
other wasps, bees, sawflies, and ants; they are not Dipterans, the true
flies], in order to showcase its marvelous senses; he avoids bringing up
its reproductive cycle that might turn moralistic stomachs.
[13] The earliest known monument, Goebekli Tepe, depicts numerous erect
penises prominently, seemingly as signs of masculine power. Zerzan
himself has suggested that patriarchy may have generated the first
division of labor in his âPatriarchy, Civilization, and the Origins of
Genderâ.
[14] Barja, Isabel. âPrey and prey-age preference by the Iberian wolf
Canis lupus signatus in a multiple-prey ecosystemâ Wildlife Biology,
vol. 15
[15] ed. â Aristotle's hierarchical view of the universe was re-earthed
by Christian theologians during the Middle Ages, and remained
influential through to the birth of the modern era. God sits at the top
of this pyramid, followed by angels, then men, then women, then
'primitives', then animals, then plants, then rocks, then sand, then
soil etc. In the inherently body-hating tradition that Christian faith
coveys, those at the top are perfect, while those at the bottom are
imperfect (soil being all 'body' and no 'soul', whereas God is all soul
and no body). We could say that in secular modernity, now abstract
scientific law has replaced God at the top of this still-accepted
pyramid, and that machines (who live forever and don't make 'human
error') have replaced angels between God and 'men'...
[16] Jacke, Dave and Toensmeier, Eric. Edible Forest Gardens [ed. â
also, see Invasive].
[17] Consider his âThe Left? No Thanks!â as well as his excellent
examinations of the historical role of unions in Elements of Refusal.
[18] ed. â Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin, another influential 19th
Century anarchist from Russia and bitter foe of its imperialism in east
and central Europe (amongst that by other powers). Deported from France,
apprehended in Dresden for participation in a Czech rebellion of 1848,
and imprisoned in Russia before escaping to Japan, the U.S. and then
Europe, where he joined insurrections such as that in Lyon, France,
1870.
[19] The quote is taken from Zimmer, Carl. Parasite Rex.
[20] Bell, David F. Introduction to Joyful Cruelty by Clément Rosset.