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Title: Anarca-Islam Author: Mohamed Jean Veneuse Date: 2009 Language: en Topics: islam, Middle East, religion Notes: A thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology. Queenâs University Kingston, Ontario, Canada (August, 2009)
As an anarchist and a Muslim, I have witnessed troubled times as a
result of extreme divisions that exist between these two identities and
communities. To minimize these divisions, I argue for an anti-capitalist
and anti-authoritarian Islam, an âanarca-Islamâ, that disrupts two
commonly held beliefs: one, that Islam is necessarily authoritarian and
capitalist; two, that anarchism is necessarily anti-religious. From this
position I offer âanarca-Islamâ which I believe can help open-minded
(non-essentialist/non-dogmatic) Muslims and anarchists to better
understand each other, and therefore to more effectively collaborate in
the context of what Richard JF Day has called the ânewestâ social
movements.
In Open Sky (1990), Paul Virilio argues that âthe ban on representation
in certain cultural practices and the refusal to see â women, for
example, in the case of Islam â is being superseded at this very moment
by the [Western] cultural obligation to see, with the overexposure of
the visible image taking over from the underexposure of the age of the
written wordâ (90). That is, Islam and Muslims[1] are now not only
facing the perils of invisibility, but also âthe impossibility of not
being seenâ (1997: 90, emphasis added). This Western obligation to
âgingerly sneak a sidelong lookâ (Virilio, 1990: 90) at Islam and
Muslims, I contend, is generally based on two intents: First, an intent
to unmask an inexhaustible supply of hidden terrorists. And, second, to
set up Islam as an oppressive regime, as is the case with the clichéd
view of veiled Muslim women undergoing the horrors of Non-Western
patriarchy, or of Iraqis and Afghanis as feeble subjects of Islamic
tyranny who must be freed. Muslims in the West face an intensified
assault on representation; in other words, representations are abundant
and often function through binary significations. As Jean Baudrillard
argues there is a âreduction of Islam [and Muslims] toâ the
representations Fundamentalism and Orientalism, or terrorism and
oppression, ânot to destroy but to domesticate [them]...and the symbolic
challengesâ they represent âfor the entire Westâ (Baudrillard, 1995:
28).
In the West, it has practically become a pathological obligation, born
âof scornâ, to clear the semiotic space of any alternative
representations, as if the Fundamentalist/Orientalist pairing were
school uniforms (Foucault in Afray and Anderson, 2005: 210). The Westâs
symbolic challenge is forcing Muslims to submit to these
representations, especially immigrant and citizen Muslims of the West
who have slipped across that formationâs necessarily porous borders
(Deleuze, 2000: 90). To the West, controlling[2] Muslims by limiting
fields of possibility for revolutionary representations of their
subjectivities is now the only remaining feasible form of discipline,
considering that the West cannot ex-communicate Muslims en masse to
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or the notorious Abu Ghraib that has been renamed
Baghdad Central Prison[3]. But then I rhetorically ask, what is the
difference between being held between the four walls of a prison cell,
and the manipulation of oneâs identity to the point that one comes to
resent oneself?.[4]
Many scholars have contended that September 11^(th) has resulted in the
intensification of reductive imagery of Muslims. As Jean Baudillard
argues, âSeptember 11^(th) ...is there first â only then does its
possibility and its causes catch up with it, through all the [binary]
discourses that will attempt to explain itâ (2005: 135), like
heroes/villains, victims/perpetrators, innocent/evil, âenemies/future
alliesâ (Virilio & Der Dian, 1998: 89), with us/against us,
terrorists/oppressed, Fundamentalist/Orientalist. âThe United Statesâ
âwar on terrorââ successfully bred âa particular geopolitical terrain in
the post-9/11 period,â enabling the blatant racism now being exercised
on the bodies of Western Muslims (Razack, 2008: 84). Now when Westerners
âspeak of the âmartyrsâ, it is their way of Islamicizing the Japanese
suicide attack[s]â (Virilio, 2002: 178) on Pearl Harbor. But the satire
behind 9/11 is not only that it created Muslims as racialized enemy
targets, but that any âotherâ remotely resembling, defending or
supporting Muslims became a terrorist or a co-conspirator of terror as
well. In the article 9/11 Violence âstalks UK Sikhsâ (2004), published
on the British Broadcasting Corporationâs website, Jagdeesh Singh, a
member of the Sikh Community Action Network in Britain, noted that
âracial assaults on Britainâs Sikh community have become âfashionableâ
since the 11^(th) September attacks,â[5] with âracist
abusers...shout[ing] âBin Ladenâ at Sikh men because of their beards and
turbansâ.[6] Singh, himself a victim, not just of a racial assault as a
result of a case of mistaken identity, but also of the general climate
of 9/11, is now seen as a co-conspirator of terror. In this sense, 9/11
has caused the confusion of others as Muslims, legitimizing violence not
only on Muslims but âthe generalized otherâ as well.
Beyond generalities, and although these representations can be seen as
abstractions, they can be brought closer home to demonstrate their
existence on an everyday level through the specific example of racist,
Islamaphobic incidents at Queenâs University, Kingston, Canada in
2008â2009. In late September 2008, as Jane Switzer reported in the
article Muslim Student Targeted in Racist Incidents (2008) of the
Queenâs Journal, the Queenâs Muslim Student Associationâs (QUMSA) prayer
space was barraged by multiple âanti-Islamic crimesâ.[7] Crimes that
started with advertised slogans spanning a mass condemnation of Muslims
to death (âall Queenâs Muslims should die,â[8] the graffiti said) to the
âbreaking in, [and the] theft of charitable donationsâ[9] (Switzer,
2008). These incidents were followed later by the âvandalizing of a
posterâ[10] and the tearing to shreds of religious texts (Switzer,
2008). These incidents happened in two days, seven years after the
attacks on 9/11.
Under such circumstances, it would seem that Western Muslims have one of
two options: We must either use mainstream media and politics against
those who represent us, or continue to silently accept our lot and truly
live in hell. It seems to me that most Muslims in the West have in fact
chosen one of these options. Some, however, are resisting this false
choice, by recreating alternatives to it, by becoming[11] Muslim
anarchists.[12] They are becoming revolutionary subjects in a Deleuzian
and Guattarian sense (1984: 127). That is, they are âcasting off their
shame [of being identified as Muslim] and responding to what is
intolerableâ, i.e. the dichotomous representations themselves (Deleuze,
1990). These Muslims, many of whom identify as anarchists, are taking it
upon themselves to pierce open desiring processes by reconstructing a
new understanding of what it âisâ to identify and to be identified as a
Muslim in the West. And it is because of anarchismâs anti-authoritarian
and anti-capitalist orientations that these Muslims are particularly
drawn to it. Anarchism offers Muslims new avenues for their identityâs
reformulation.
This embracing of anarchism by a minority[13] of Muslims as a response
to the âproblem of Muslims and Islamâ (Foucault in Afray and Anderson,
2005: 210), and this presentation of Muslims as a socio-political force,
allows us to see Muslim anarchism as an example of what Richard JF Day
has called the newest social movements[14] (2005: 9). Because of the
critical role it has to play, by acting as a safe space for Muslimsâ
(further) resistance, it is in the newest social movements that I see
hope, not only for Muslim anarchists, but also for all Muslims. It is in
this critical space where I can see a place for Muslims and Muslim
anarchists to be able to begin again and again the radical recreation of
their socio-political identities in a way that is conducive to Islamâs
present confrontations with contemporary Western societies. It is there
that there are infinite possibilities and opportunities for a Muslimâs
resistance to the horrors and neuroses of a Muslimâs daily life. Muslims
supported with time by a passage through anarchismâs vernaculars in the
newest social movements can be bodies that are not frozen in their
current socio-political state of coma and naiveté.
It is in the newest social movements too, that anarchism and anarchists
stand to learn from interacting with Muslims. For instance, anarchists
could benefit by learning how to disagree ethically as a community as
opposed to tearing each other apart over ideological and personal
differences. Islam developed this type of ethics early on, in what is
referred to Usul Al-ikhtilaf,[15] or the ethics of disagreements, as a
compassionate and forgiving form of etiquette for Muslims to address
disagreements amongst themselves. Anarchists in the newest social
movements, as much as Muslims, indeed stand to gain, culturally,
aesthetically, politically and ethically, should anarchists learn to
accept that others who are not exactly like them ought to be able to
join them in their anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist revolt.
Despite the fact that the newest social movements can potentially act as
a safe space, Muslims and Muslim anarchists still have a long way to go
in terms of being made to feel welcome and comfortable by anarchists.
This necessitates the opening up of a panegyric desert of the present, a
metaphor that stands for a more hospitable space carved out for Muslims
and Muslim anarchists in the newest social movements. That is, a space
where they can interact with anarchists and anarchism, and similarly for
anarchism and anarchists to interact with Islam and Muslims. This
panegyric desert is especially pertinent given that vital and critical
misconceptions exist between Muslims and anarchists, which hinder
collaborations between the two. These misconceptions have an especially
adverse effect on Muslim anarchists. They leave Muslim anarchists facing
difficulties because of their ostracization by anarchists on top of what
is already their ostracization by Muslim communities. Still there is no
way to eradicate misconceptions completely. They will indefinitely
persist, given that their cause, stereotypes, can never be entirely
eliminated, but only identified, situated contextually, and minimized.
Throughout my thesis, I will showcase how the seemingly dichotomous
identities Muslim and anarchist can co-exist. For now however, let me
state that I self-identify as a Muslim anarchist. In fact, I am, in a
Deleuzian and Guattarian sense destined to be becoming both Muslim and
anarchist, considering there is no ideal state of either (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1987, 7â13). As a former immigrant and now citizen left
feeling as a disrespected worthless foreigner, a second-rate citizen,
studying, working and living in the West, I am a settler on indigenous
land. I am also a racialized person of color. I am a socially
constructed heterosexual male. I have class privilege. I am a human
being who has experienced a cosmopolitan upbringing taking me on
journeys across four continents. I have no home or community. I want one
with anarchists and anyone willing to share similar anti-capitalist and
anti-authoritarian commitments to myself, and more importantly to
anarchism. I would go anywhere for that community. I would do anything
for it. I am a fascist with fascisms crystallized at the centre of my
heart because of the privileges I possess (Guattari, 1995: 244â245). I
am a fascist till I arrive at a position of grasping and comprehending
my standings to privileges, but then undertaking journeys and stories of
warding off those privileges. Finally, I believe that âthose who enjoy
structural privilege must strive to identify and work against this
privilege if they hope to establish relations of solidarity with those
who do not share itâ (Day, 2005: 11).
In trying to convince anti-religious anarchists not to out rightly
reject what I am saying because it is religious, I say to them here
that: part of the reason that I feel the pain I feel is because though
your anarchistic ethical-political actions are so honorable, âinnocent
and disarmingâ (Derrida 1987: 186), they are also ones based on wanting
to take anarchism back from me on account of what to you is my âuselessâ
spirituality. As anti-religious anarchists, you shun me from our
community when you have never met me. You shun me when the anarchism you
and I believe in is a commitment to standing against the exercise of any
form of oppression. You shun me out of your fear of Islam as an
institutional and organized authoritarian mechanism of repression. But,
who is to say that Islam has to be institutional, organized,
authoritarian, and repressing? I prove in this thesis it does not have
to be. As for your dogmatic view that âGod is Deadâ, I believe that view
to be too easy to fathom because it simplifies what is, in fact, a
complex reality. Furthermore, there is no proof of Godâs life or death.
Your view is nothing more than a Euro-centric view, rooted in the
essentialist perception that âGod [and Godâs fettered religion solely
possess]...promises...null and void...only...fulfilled by manâs
subordinationâ (Goldman, 1969: 5â7). But Emma Goldmanâs statement
pertains to a particular interpretation of Christianity being practiced
at a particular place and time as opposed to all types of religious
interpretations. And so my belief in God is not an aesthetic thing or a
ritual I do, but the strength from which I derive reason to drive myself
to stand and share the same ethical and political commitments as you. It
is God who graced me with the gift of encountering anarchism after 9/11.
Now anarchism is what is compelling me to come back to Islam to unleash
the Islamic and anarchic anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist concepts
and practices that I believe exist in Islam in an attempt to bridge the
proximity between the two, Islam and anarchism, me and you.
As for you, immigrant and citizen Muslims, whoever and whatever
interpretation of Islam you choose to follow, I can feel some of you are
lost, trapped between the politics of a former corrupt native land and
an adopted Western immigrant and citizen tongue. I feel you by virtue of
my years of residency in the West and my prayers with and alongside you
in Mosques. And my interest here rests on not bending âmyself to your
determinationâ (Derrida, 1987: 186) by believing in barriers when
discussing anything ethical and political with anarchists. My intent is
to politically and ethically reorient your Islam and mine because our
Islam, as I will demonstrate, has given me the Koranic right to do so.
Know that what I write here cannot be rejected on the grounds of heresy.
I am merely writing here because I am deafened by the termination of
dialogue between us as Muslims, as well as the ambivalence and
complacency of some of us towards patriarchy, trans-queer-phobia,
racism, ageism, capitalism and authority, unwarranted and existing in
our communities. So after reading this come up with your own
interpretations and I welcome all criticisms after study, as long as
they are done respectfully.
Finally, what is left and what I expect from all Muslims and anarchists
reading this thesis is that they listen before passing judgment on what
I have come here to say.
There are five remaining chapters to this thesis:
In the second chapter, Who Says What With Respect to Islamic
anarchism...Can Anyone Speak to What it Is?, I carry out a literature
review of writings by Muslim anarchists. It includes Hakim Beyâs essays
Millennium (1996), Islam and Eugenics (1997), Sacred Drift: Essays on
the Margins of Islam (1993), and Michael Muhammad Knightâs fictional
text Taqwacores (2004). I also discuss three articles on the topic
âIslam and anarchismâ, written by non-Muslim writers. The first is
Harold B. Barclayâs âIslam, Muslim Societies, Anarchyâ published in
Anarchist Studies (2002). The second is Patricia Croneâs âNinth-Century
Muslim Anarchistsâ published in Past and Present Volume 10, no.2 (2000).
The third is Anthony Fiscellaâs âImagining an Islamic Anarchism: A New
Field of Study is Ploughedâ in Religious Anarchisms: New Perspectives
(2009, forthcoming). I also present contemporary and historical examples
of Muslim anarchists and anarchist Muslims, including Yakub Islam,
Gustave Henri Jossot, and Leda Rafenilli. The literature is a positive
step in resisting the dichotomous representations of Muslims but there
are three critical problems I address: First, the literature does not
deal with the Koran, leading to the secularization of the texts. Second,
the writers do not particularly identify who the intended audience is or
the purpose of what is written. Three, the writers adopt and advocate
for a Stirnerian individualistic approach to writing on Islam and
anarchism (Kropotkin, 1910).
I will be arguing for three things in light of this literatureâs
problems. The first is the construction of an anarchic interpretation of
Islam and an Islamic interpretation of anarchism. And for this
construction to be done Koranically and anarchistically, by drawing
conceptual and pragmatic anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist
resonances between Islam and anarchism. Second, that this synergistic
interpretation addresses a relevant audience and be with a particular
purpose. The audience addressed will be Muslims and anarchists within
the newest social movements, with the purpose of helping increase the
possibility of solidarity between Muslims and anarchists. Three, that
this interpretation adopt and advocate for a balanced approach between
communal politics, âbased on affinity-based ethico-political
commitmentsâ, and micro-politics (Day, 2005: 17, 143) as opposed to a
strict adherence to an individualistic Stirnerian approach. Under these
criteria, I offer the interpretation that I label Anarca-Islam.
This interpretation is of value for three reasons. First, it can allow
Muslims, and Muslim anarchists, to resist the aforementioned dichotomous
representations. Second, because it counters two misconceptions of Islam
and Muslims amongst anarchists. The first misconception is the
impossibility of the construction of either an anarchic interpretation
of Islam or an Islamic interpretation of anarchism. The second
misconception is the impossibility of the co-existence of Muslim and
anarchist identities in a single subjectivity. Evidence of these
misconceptions is to be demonstrated through anarchist articles, forums,
and blogs. Third, this interpretation is of value because it carves a
panegyric desert of the present where Muslims, anarchists, and Muslim
anarchists can collaborate more effectively in the newest social
movements. Examples of their current collaboration are groups like No
One Is Illegal (NOII) and Solidarity Across Borders (SAB).
In the third chapter, Methodology and Theories, I introduce a method I
call Anarchic-Ijtihad and outline the theoretical paradigms I use in my
contribution, Anarca-Islam, to the existing discourse on Islam and
anarchism. Throughout the thesis, I carry out a critical exegesis of the
Koran, as well as other Islamic and anarchistic texts, using
Anarchic-Ijtihad as a method of interpretation. Some orthodox Muslim
scholars, known in Arabic as Muftis or Imams, will doubtless regard this
method as heresy, and secular Muslims such as Michael Knight will regard
it as unnecessary. The accusation of heresy will be levied under the
guise of safeguarding Islam from an impure and tainted Westernized
reading. When, truthfully, the issue is related to power, its
concentration within institutions versus its dissemination amongst the
Muslim populace at large. The perception of Anarchic-Ijtihad as
unnecessary will be levied under the pretext that the Koran, as some
scholars like Knight contend, is a âtiny little book for tiny little
menâ (2004: 105). In defense of the practice of Anarchic-Ijtihad, I
argue that Islam grants me the right to conduct a critical exegesis of
the Koran and to write on Anarca-Islam. This right, whose classical form
is referred to as ijtihad, literally implies striving. Ijtihad denotes
not only an Islamic right, but an obligatory duty, entrusted by God to
Muslims involved in scholarly study, to interpret and re-interpret
Islamic ethico-political principles and thereby engage in âindependent
reasoningâ (Esposito, 2002: 159). Anarchic-Ijtihad is so-named to
highlight that it is an anarchistic type of ijtihad. Anarchic-Ijtihad is
the deconstructive logic and force I will use to reread conceptual and
pragmatic practices in the Koran and the Prophetic Oral tradition(s) so
that they resonate with anarchism.
Following my discussion on Anarchic-Ijtihad, I identify the theoretical
paradigms used to create Anarca-Islam: post-anarchist,
deconstructionist, post-colonial, and poststructuralist theories, along
with sociological theories of social movements. I discuss how these
theories will be individually and collectively used. Briefly,
post-colonial theory offers a discursive resistance to Eurocentric
biases (Gandhi, 1998: 4; 10; Minh-ha, 1991; Bhabha, 1994; Monod, 1970).
As Jacques Monod has argued, Muslims in the West face a âsurvivalist
necessityâ(1970) to resist assimilationist and racist practices and
policies directed against them. Poststructuralist and deconstructionist
theories offer a resistance to structuralism, hierarchies and dominant
relations established upon the construction of essentialist or
reductionist qualities. Here I have in mind qualities along the lines of
race, ethnicity, gender, ability, age, sexuality, religion and class.
Post-anarchist theory offers a poststructuralist interpretation of
anarchism, resonating with the interpretation of Islam I advocate for.
Social movement theory is the space where these theories are manifesting
and interacting (Deleuze, 1990).
In the fourth chapter, Anarca-Islamâs Space and Political Consciousness
in Relation to anarchism, Islam and the capitalist-State, I define
Anarca-Islam in relation to anarchism, Islam and the capitalist-State.
First, I argue for the death of a singular puritanical Islam, and the
death of a singular puritanical anarchism; both are in fact pluralistic
traditions (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 26â39). Islam is only alive in
so far as it manifests itself in the Holy Koran and the Prophetic Oral
tradition. Anarchisms, Western and Non-Western, are also only alive in
so far as they manifest themselves in their classical texts (Bakunin
1873; Kropotkin, 1890; Goldman, 1910; Adams; 2003). Anarca-Islam is then
defined. Its relation to Islam and anarchism, specifically
post-anarchism, is established. An immanent critique of Western
classical anarchismâs Euro-centricity and perception of power operating
strictly at the macro level â the state and institutionalized religion â
is carried out. This involves a discussion of Nietzschean/Foucaultian
and post-anarchistic views of micro and macro power (Day, 2005; May,
1994; Call, 2001; Rolando, 1990; Newman, 2001) and of the similarities
and the differences between strategic and tactical political philosophy
(May, 1994:10â11). This critique is done to distinguish between Western
classical anarchism and post-anarchism.
Following this, I define, in line with Saul Newman (2001), a triadic
relationship that consists of: Daddy (authoritarian practices of the
type macro and micro), Mommy (capitalist practices) and Me (oedipal
subject). The analogy, Mommy-Daddy-Me, is derived from Newmanâs reading
of Deleuze and Guattariâs Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia
(1977), and which Newman discusses in his text From Bakunin to Lacan:
Anti-authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power (2001). Newmanâs
argument is that in a capitalist-State society, the âHoly Stateâ acts as
a symbolic Father and âcapitalâ as the symbolic Mother as if the Oedipal
duality were active as âreligious signifiers to which individuals are
subordinated toâ (Newman, 2001: 99). In this light, I discuss the
particular role each parent has with respect to me and discuss the
effects their relationship has on me. Given, that is, that I am an
Oedipalized subject seeking to become relatively de-Oedipalized[16]
(Day, 2005: 142â143) by creating and attending a clinic, Anarca-Islam.
In other words, Anarca-Islam resembles a clinic that I, an Oedipalized
subject, construct and attend in an act of resistance to Daddy, Mommy,
and thus the capitalist-State.
In chapter five, The Birth of the Clinic â Seeing and Knowing the
Clinicâs Commitments in Resistance to Daddy-Mommy-Me, I construct
Anarca-Islam. I begin by establishing Anarca-Islamâs resistance to
authoritarian practices at the micro level through
micro-anti-authoritarian concepts and practices extracted from Islam,
i.e. Shura, Ijma and Maslaha. I then show how it is possible to resist
authoritarian practices at the macro level, such as institutionalized
religion and the modern state. I offer an alternative rereading of the
classical interpretation of the Islamic concept Khilafah, Islamic state.
I thereafter address the âauthorityâ of Prophet Muhammad and God. In the
end, I will have constructed an anti-authoritarian Islam through
Anarca-Islamâs resistance to authoritarian practices.
I then construct for Anarca-Islam its resistance to capitalism, through
concepts and practices extracted from Islam: Property, Communal and
Individual Caretakers, Mudarabah/Musharakah, Riba, Zakat, Ramadan,
Sadaqat Al-Fitr and Islamic banking. The rereading of these concepts and
practices produces an anti-capitalist Islam. Finally, I announce myself
as no longer merely Oedipalized but becoming relatively de-Oedipalized.
Anarca-Islamâs, or the clinicâs, construction is the symbolic act of
both delineating the misconceptions held by many anarchists in the
newest social movements and the opening up of a panegyric desert of the
present for Muslims, Muslim anarchists and anarchist Muslims in the
newest social movements.
In the sixth Chapter, The End is the Beginning is the End, I summarize
the argument and project the future trajectory of Anarca-Islam.
Anyone Speak to What it Is ?
âThe anarchist âmovementâ today contains virtually no Blacks, Hispanics,
Native Americans, [Muslims], or children...even tho in theory such
genuinely oppressed groups stand to gain the most from any
anti-authoritarian revolt. Might it be that anarchisms offers no
concrete program whereby the truly deprived might fulfill (or at least
struggle realistically to fulfill) real needs and desires?â
(Hakim Bey, 1991)
In this chapter, I carry out a critical assessment of academic texts as
well as non-academic anarchist movement works that are relevant to the
field of Islam and anarchism as it currently exists. Here I am seeking
to identify both academic and non-academic writers whose work could be
used to support my contentions, as well as what I consider to be gaps in
the existing literature.
In the first section of the literature review, I identify six tendencies
I have observed in academic texts that I will use as resources to
support my position for constructing Anarca-Islam. The first tendency I
observe is in academic texts by Muslim anarchists or anarchist Muslims,
such as Peter Lamborn Wilson (a.k.a Hakim Bey[17]) and Michael Muhammad
Knight.[18] Beyâs non-fictional texts Millennium (1996), Islam and
Eugenics (1997) and Sacred Drift: Essays on the Margins of Islam (1993),
as well as Knightâs fictional work Taqwacores (2002) dispel âthe false
image of Islam as monolithic, puritan, and two-dimensionalâ (Bey, 1993).
In other words, Bey and Knight argue that Islam is neither homogenous
nor monolithic, an issue I will return to in more detail in chapter
four. The second tendency is in academic texts by non-Muslim writers,
such as Harold B. Barclay,[19] Patricia Crone[20] and Anthony
Fiscella[21]. Barclayâs âIslam, Muslim Societies, Anarchyâ published in
Anarchist Studies (2002), Croneâs âNinth-Century Muslim Anarchistsâ in
Past and Present (2000) and Fiscellaâs âImagining an Islamic Anarchism:
A New Field of Study is Ploughedâ in Religious Anarchisms: New
perspectives (2009, forthcoming) provide evidence against âthe
traditional view that Islam and anarchism are necessarily incompatibleâ
(Fiscella, 2009). In other words, Barclay, Crone and Fiscella identify
resonances between Islam and anarchism, in support of my argument for
the possibility of constructing Anarca-Islam. The writers identify these
resonances anthropologically and historically, and therefore adopt Beyâs
approach. The third tendency is in Beyâs works Millennium and Jihad
Revisited (2004). In these two works, Bey advocates for a ânecessary
revolution â the jihadâ (1996), a method I develop in chapter three and
use to âform the constellation of a new propaganda within Islamâ (1996)
for Anarca-Islam in chapter five. The fourth tendency is in Beyâs text
Islam and Eugencics. In this work, Bey advocates for the rise of a
politicized Islam with a new spirit, what he calls the âspirit of
Sarajevoâ (1997), in America and Europe. Bey hopes that when this
politicized Islam rises that it is one based in âcommunities, not
professions of faith,â and that it creates in âmutual tolerance &
synergy a city-state of precious value, with an Islamic heritageâ(1997).
What Bey advocates and hopes for is descriptive of Anarca-Islamâs
orientation to a panegyric space in the newest social movements. The
fifth tendency is both in Beyâs text Sacred Drift: Essays on the Margins
of Islam and Knightâs text Taqwacores. In these two works, Bey and
Knight engage in a âscathing critique on âauthorityââ (1993) in Islam,
resonating with Anarca-Islamâs anti-authoritarian position that I
construct in chapter five. The sixth and final tendency is in Fiscellaâs
text Imagining an Islamic Anarchism: A New Field of Study is Ploughed.
In the text, Fiscella classifies the studies of Islamic anarchism into
three categories that are useful in defining the discourse of Islam and
anarchism. The first category is concerned with âstudies of Islamic
anarchist theoryâ (Fiscella, 2009). The second category is concerned
with âstudies in the anarchic character of tribal Muslim societiesâ
(Fiscella, 2009). The third category is âstudies of the anarchical
structure of Islamâ (Fiscella, 2009).
In the next section, I move from reviewing the academic texts to
reviewing non-academic works in the form of articles and blogs. The
review includes the article and blog forum titled Islam and Anarchy Join
Together[22] (2003) by Chris R. on Info-shop. It also includes the
articles, âThe Trouble with Islamâ in Red and Black Revolution: Issue 7
(2003) by Andrew Flood and Muslim Anarchism (2009) by Eric van
Luxzenburg. The movementâs articles and blogs reaffirm my contentions
that Islam is neither homogenous nor monolithic and that there exist
resonances between Islam and anarchism. Nevertheless, the articles and
blogs also paradoxically produce two misconceptions about Islam and
Muslims. The first misconception is the impossibility of the
construction of either an anarchic interpretation of Islam or an Islamic
interpretation of anarchism. The second misconception is the
impossibility of the co-existence of Muslim and anarchist identities in
a single subjectivity. I argue that these misconceptions exist amongst
anarchists for two reasons. The first reason is their exposure to
Western corporate media representations. The second reason is that they
do not speak nor read Arabic, practice the Islamic faith, nor have they
struggled with the Koran to adequately understand interpretative
traditions of Islam derived from it.
In the final section of this chapter, I argue that although the academic
and non-academic literature are a positive move in resisting the
dichotomous representations of Muslims there are three critical problems
with them. First, both types of literatures do not deal with the Koran
and the Prophetic Oral tradition(s), the Sunnah, leading to the
secularization of the texts. Second, the academic and non-academic
writers do not identify who the intended audience is or the purpose of
what they are writing. Three, but particular to the literature of Bey
and Knight, the writers adopt and advocate for a Stirnerian[23]
individualistic approach to writing on Islam and anarchism (Kroptkin,
1910). I argue for three things in light of the literatureâs critical
problems. The first is the construction of an anarchic interpretation of
Islam and an Islamic interpretation of anarchism, Anarca-Islam.
Moreover, I argue for the importance of this construction Koranically
and anarchistically by drawing conceptual-pragmatic anti-authoritarian
and anti-capitalist resonances between Islam and anarchism. Second, that
this synergistic interpretation addresses a relevant audience and be
with a particular purpose. The audience addressed to be Muslims, Muslim
anarchists and anarchists within the newest social movements. The
purpose of this approach is to help increase the possibility of
solidarity between Muslims and anarchists currently collaborating in
groups like No One Is Illegal (NOII) and Solidarity Across Borders (SAB)
â two groups that, in Dayâs view, constitute part of the growing newest
social movements (Day, 2005: 189â190). Three, for this interpretation to
adopt and advocate a balanced approach between communal politics, âbased
on affinity-based ethico-political commitmentsâ, and micro-politics
(Day, 2005: 17, 143) as opposed to a strict adherence to an
individualistic Stirnerian approach.
The first tendency Bey and Knight raise is supportive of my contentions.
They concede that Islam is not monolithic, but rather is multiple. To
them talking of Islam as a singularity is blasphemy. After all, it is
problematic to speak of Islam as singular when, as Bey argues, it is
born from the recognition that:
âThe âhyper-orthodoxâ & the ulemocracy canât...reduce [Islam] to a
hegemonistic/universalistic ideology...to rule out divergent forms of
âsacred politicsâ informed by Sufism [like the Naqshabandis], âradicalâ
Shia-ism, Ismaelism, Islamic Humanism and Sunni-ism, the âGreen Pathâ of
Col. Qadafi (part neo-Sufism, part anarcho-syndicalism)...not to mention
the âcosmopolitan Islam of Bosnia [Note: we mention these elements not
to condone them necessarily, but to indicate that Islam is not a
monolith of âfundamentalismâ]â[24] (Bey, 1996).
Following this premise, Beyâs work[25] focuses on mapping and
identifying, anthropologically and historically, âanarchisitic elements
in Islamâ (2009). In doing so, Bey demonstrates, as Fiscella notes, a
plurality of anarchically oriented interpretative traditions of Islam as
practiced through the:
âQalandars, Ismailis (especially the Assassins), the socialist Ali
Shariati, Khezr (or the Green Man whom Wilson associates with militant
environmentalism, Khaldunâs Bedouins, Sufis (such as Ibn al-Arabi,
al-Hallaj, and Rumi, Muammar Qaddafiâs Third Universal Theory, and his
own Moorish Orthodox Church (originally a white beatnik outgrowth of
Noble Drew Aliâs Moorish Science Temple)â (Fiscella, 2009).
In demonstrating a plurality of anarchically oriented traditions in
Islam, Bey is identifying Islam as multiple as opposed to it being
monolithic.
Next to Bey is Knight, who in his text Taqwacores also argues against
the idea of a monolithic Islam. Knightâs text is a fictitious story of a
straightedge Sunni, Umar, a drunken Mohawk-wearing Sufi who plays
ârooftop calls-to-prayer on his electric guitarâ[26] (Knight, 2009),
Jehangir, a dope smoking riot girl donning a burqa, Rabeya, and an
Iranian Shiâite skinhead, Ayyub. The central protagonist and narrator of
this renegade anarchist pack of Muslim-punk-rockers out of Buffalo, New
York, is Yusuf. Yusuf is an engineering student of Pakistani descent who
is caught between the worlds of âMuslim piety, angry hardcore music,
and....[a] mixed dose of both soft and hardcore sexâ[27] (Knight, 2009).
The novel beautifully illustrates its charactersâ âcollective
articulation of a heresy-friendly, pluralist Islamâ[28] (Knight, 2009).
The novel sheds light on a few of the representations of Islam that are
left out of mainstream representations of it by âlooking into the twin
identities of punk and Islam in their many varieties and degrees of
orthodoxyâ[29] (Knight, 2009). A memorable passage in the novel is when
Umar says to Yusuf,
ââIslam enjoins solidarity with our oppressed and persecuted bothers.
But Iâm not a nationalist; thatâs why I got that one up â â
He gestured to the Islam Conference flag. âWeâre one community, brother;
thatâs the umma, the only legitimate political entity on this earth.â
(Knight, 2002: 53).
In this passage, Knight clearly demonstrates, through Umar, a view he
believes exists amongst some Western Muslims. The view is that Islam is
monolithic. Only then pages later, in contrast to Umarâs view, during a
conversation between Jehingar and Yusuf, Knight writes of Jehingarâs
response to Yusuf when Yusuf asks Jehingar about what taqwacore is.
Jehingar reveals that it is about ugly Muslims, outcasts from their
individual communities, who constitute a multi-faceted Islam as opposed
to a monolithic Islam. Knight writes:
ââSo what do you think it is?â I asked.
âI think itâs just about being ugly...But yeah,
man...I think thatâs where itâs
at...ugly...â
âWhatâs taqwacore then? Ugly Muslims?â
âKind of.â
âI stayed plopped on the porch, Jehangir stayed stretched out on the
sidewalk and we went a while without speaking. In silence I lost myself
daydreaming of an Ugly Muslim Parade marching single-file down our
street with every Ugly Muslim included: the women who traveled without
their walis, the painters who painted people, beardless qazis, the dog
owners in their angel-free houses, hashishiyyuns like Fasiq Abasa,
liwats and sihaqs, Ahamdiyyas, believers who stopped reading in Arabic
because they didnât know what it said, the left-handers, the beer
swillers, the Kuwaiti sentenced to death for singing Quran, the guys who
snuck off with girls to make out and undo generations of cerebral
clitorectomy, the girls who stopped blaming themselves every time a man
had dirty thoughts, the mumins who stopped their clock-punching, the
kids who had pepperoni on their pizza, on and on down the lineâ (Knight,
2002: 56).
Knightâs juxtaposition of Umar and Jehingersâ positions on a puritanical
legitimate Muslim community versus an ugly impure Islam is commendable.
It symbolizes the way some post-colonial Muslims perceive themselves and
the relative ease with which the West appropriates these perceptions.
Knightsâ view, like Beyâs, is therefore in line with my contention that
Islam is not monolithic.
The second tendency I observe, as taken from academic texts by
non-Muslims, is the recognition that resonances exist between Islam and
anarchism. To these writers, Islam and anarchism are not identical, but
neither are they necessarily incompatible. For instance, Barclay in his
text Islam, Muslim societies and anarchy begins by addressing a
âpossible relationship between the idea of anarchy and Muslim
societyâ[30] as it exists in âKharijite and Sufi traditionsâ[31]
(Barclay, 2002). Barclay then proceeds to push his argument further by
considering âvarious [anarchic] manifestations of tribal organization in
North Africa and Southwest Asiaâ (Barclay, 2002). Barclay pays specific
attention to the anti-statist approach of these tribes that was
âdocumented by Ibn Khaldunâ (Fiscella, 2009), a thirteenth century
Muslim philosopher and sociologist. Barclay finally concludes his
contribution with an âassessment of writingsâ[32](Barclay, 2002) by
Colonel Muâammar Qaddafi, Libyaâs present day dictator. In doing this,
Barclay argues like Bey that Qaddafiâs writings âappear to have some
anarchist contentâ[33] (Barclay, 2002), especially in the context of
âQaddafiâs Third Universal Theoryâ[34] (Fiscella, 2009). At the end of
Barclayâs text, Barclay writes that âalthough there is no consistent
rejection of the notion of domination, and no advocacy of a free
societyâ,[35] nevertheless âit is apparent anarchistic themes do pervade
Muslim societiesâ[36](Barclay, 2002). Barclay therefore confirms my
contention that there are anti-statist resonances between Islam and
anarchism.
Crone, who adopts Beyâs anthropological and historical approach in her
text Ninth-Century Muslim Anarchists, also recognizes resonances between
Islam and anarchism. Crone identifies anti-statist Muslims such as
Jaâfar ibn Harb (d. 850), Al-asamm (d.816 or 817), Al-Nazzam (d. between
835 and 845), Hisham al Fuwati (d. 840) and his pupil Abbad ibn Slayman
(d. 870). All these Muslims are Muslims who:
âlived or began their careers in Basra [, Iraq, and belong to the] so
called Muâtazilite ascetics (sufiyyat al-muâtazila) [a Muslim sect],
active in Baghdad...[and who along with a] sub-sect [of the Kharijites,
another Muslim sect, called] the Najidiyya,[37] or Najadat, [but] who
had appeared [earlier] in the seventh century and who seem to have
survived into the tenth, possibly in Basra and possibly somewhere elseâ
held âthat Muslim society could function without ...the
stateâ[38](Crone, 2000: 3â4).
Crone, like Barclay, therefore reaffirms my contentions that
anti-statist resonances exist between Islam and anarchism.
Fiscellaâs text Imagining an Islamic Anarchism: A New Field is Ploughed
also recognizes resonances between Islam and anarchism. Fiscella does
this by pointing to contemporary examples of Muslim anarchists who find
compatible the identities Muslim and anarchist, and the discourse of
Islam and anarchism. Fiscella first points to a U.K. based Muslim, Yunus
Yakoub Islam, born Julian Hoare. Yakoub[39] had discovered anarchism in
the 80âs through a punk band, Crass, only to convert to Islam in 1991
and then began writing a âMuslim Anarchist Charterâ (Fiscella, 2009).
Amongst the commitments of Yakoubâs Muslim Anarchist Charter is that the
purpose of life as a Muslim anarchist necessitates a:
âWholehearted commitment to learning, where such learning is carried out
freely, consciously refusing to compromise with institutional power in
any form, be it judicial, religious, social, corporate or political...
the active pursuit of justice with the aim of establishing communities
and societies where free spiritual development is uninhibited by
tyranny, poverty and ignorance. Such a purpose requires an affinity with
all peoples who define themselves as belonging to cultures of
Judeo-Christian-Islamic origin in which both commonalities and
differences are acknowledged and understood, and disagreement engenders
debate rather than division and satire but never mockery...The Muslim
Anarchist Charter rejects fascist forces which seek to enforce a single,
absolute truth, including patriarchy, empire, and Wahhabismâ[40].
Fiscella also points to the seductress[41] Leda Rafenelli, whom I
consider as Islamâs contemporary Emma Goldman (Fiscella, 2009). Born
with an âearly [anarchistic] poetic veinâ[42] (Fiscella, 2009) in 1880
in Pistoia, Italy, Rafenelli immigrated in 1903 to Alexandria, Egypt.
Bewitched with her treatment by Arabs, Rafenelli learned Arabic,
embraced Sufism, and became a mystic anarchist. Rafenelli then started
writing[43] of her experience in Egypt. In the early 1920s, Rafenelli
went back to her native Italy and co-founded with Joseph Monanni their
Publishing House Company. She started publishing the works of
âNietzsche, Malatesta, Kropotkin, Stirnerâ[44] (Fiscella, 2009) only to
then write 50 novels in Italian dedicated âto
anti-colonialism...[opposing] European Imperialism...raging against
clericalism, militarism and the oppression of womenâ[45] (Fiscella,
2009). Near the end of her life, Rafenelli dedicated her writing to the
issue of solidarity among anarchists, writing:
âI see comrades who, because of a word or two which offends them, forget
the brother/sisterhood, the solidarity that bring us anarchists
together... It is natural that there should be some disagreements among
us...But when someone expresses his/her opinion on people or facts,
those who oppose those judgments should do so without personal
antagonismâ[46] (Fiscella, 2009).
Finally, Fiscella points to Gusatve Henri Jossot or Abdoul-Karim Jossot
(Fiscella, 2009). Jossot was an early 19^(th) century caricaturist and
contributor to the anarchist publications Les Temps nouveaux and
lâAssiette au Beurre (Moreel, 2003). Though Jossot never claimed to be a
Muslim anarchist like Rafenelli and Yakoub, Jossot targeted his
caricatures at authoritarian families, the army, the courts, the police
and the church[47], all of which are anarchist concerns (Moreel, 2003).
Converting to Islam in 1913, Jossot contributed a statement to La
DĂ©pĂȘche Tunisienne[48]. In his contribution, Jossot wrote: âno
mysteries, no dogmas, no priests, almost no ceremonies, the most
rational religion in the world...to start Islamic fatherlands [,
states,] is betraying Islamâ (La DĂ©pĂȘche Tunisienne, 10 February 1913).
Fiscella, by pointing to the former contemporary examples of Muslim
anarchists therefore, along with Crone and Barclay, reaffirms my
contentions that there are anti-authoritarian, pro-solidarity and
anti-capitalist resonances between Islam and anarchism, and the
identities Muslim and anarchist.
The third tendency I observe is in Beyâs texts Millennium and Jihad
Revisited (2004). In the texts, Bey emphasizes[49] the revolutionary
Islamic concept of jihad. Contrary to popular perception, the concept
does not mean holy war. It means âto struggleâ in the sense that it is
âderived from the Arabic root jhd, âto striveââ (Marranci, 2006: 17).
Jhd also âserves as the root for other verbs emphasizing effort and
struggle...in difficult tasksâ (Marranci, 2006: 17). An example of such
a verb is ijtihad, which means ââto strive for understanding and
interpreting the Qurâanic lawâ [and with]...the same jhd root as jihadâ
(Marranci, 2006: 17). Jihad and ijtihad are not just Muslim practices
that involve offering variant âmeanings of individual wordsâ (Alâawani,
1993: 83) in the Sunnah and the Koran. Rather they also involve dealing
with the âlinguistic difficulties...over questions of grammarâ in the
Sunnah and the Koran and deciding whether God is speaking in an active
or a passive voice[50] (AlâAwani, 1993: 82). Jihad is the reason why
there exists a pluralistic, impure Islam. It is the concept I develop as
a method in chapter three, through its form ijtihad, and which I then
practice when constructing Anarca-Islam in chapter five. Bey argues in
his text Jihad Revisited that it is jihad, which allowed the Neo-Sufis
and others, like the Sanussi order in Libya, to break with:
âthe medieval concept of the all-powerful âmasterâ. Instead, they sought
initiation in dreams and visions. In North Africa, the Sanussi Order and
the Tijani Order, amongst others, were founded by seekers whoâd been
empowered in dreams by the Prophet Mohammed himself...[It is jihad that
allowed] the Neo-Sufi orders...[to be] conceived and shaped to some
extent as reform movements within Islam, in competition with modernism &
secularism on one hand and Salafist/Wahhabi neo-puritan âIslamismâ on
the other. [It is jihad] that allowed] education & health and economic
alternatives to colonialism...[to be] stressed in the Sanussi Order in
Libya. And when armed struggle against Italian rule erupted, Sanussi
fuqara (dervishes) led the uprisingâ[51] (Bey, 2004)
Bey also rightly points out in Jihad Revisted that jihad has
unfortunately become a forsaken and an abandoned Islamic practice. This
is particularly important considering that âperhaps the single most
damaging blow to Islamic knowledge came in the tenth century under the
Abbasids when the âGate of Ijithadâ...was declared closedâ (Esposito,
1984: 19). In this light, Bey in Millennium advocates for jihad, because
it is only with it that:
âTraditions of tolerance, voluntarism, egalitarianism, concern for
social justice, critique of usuryâ, mystical utopianism â etc. â can
form the constellations of a new propaganda within Islam, unshakably
opposed to the cognitive colonialism of the numisphere, oriented to
âempirical freedomsâ rather than ideology, critical of repression within
Islam, but committed to its creativity, reticence, interiority,
militance, & style. Islamâs concern with pollution of the imagination,
which manifests in a literal veiling of the image, constitutes a
powerful strategic realization for the jihad; â that which is veiled is
not absent or invisible, since the veil is a sign of its presence, its
imaginal reality, its power. That which is veiled is unseenâ[52] (Bey,
1996).
Beyâs emphasis on jihad as an Islamic practice, therefore, affirms my
contention for the necessity of its development as a method for
constructing Anarca-Islam.
The fourth tendency I observe is in Beyâs text Islam and Eugenics. In
this text, Bey advocates and foretells the rise of an anarchic
interpretation of Islam and Islamic interpretation of anarchism in the
West. The interpretation Bey hopes will be endowed with a âspirit of
Sarajevoâ and in possession of its own Islamic heritage as it introduces
itself into âa precious city-stateâ, a metaphor I perceive Bey uses in
reference to social movements. Moreover, this interpretationâs task, as
Bey sees it, ought to create a panegyric desert for Muslims and Muslim
anarchists amongst anarchists in social movements. Bey describes the
interpretationâs spirit in Islam and Eugenics, writing:
âInshallah, some day Sarajevo will rise again as a unique particularity
in which European Moslems and European Christians (Iâm speaking loosely
here of communities, not professions of faith) will create in mutual
tolerance & synergy a city-state of precious value, with an Islamic
heritage. That would constitute an imaginal infusion, a flow of energy
from the past, which would now be âourâ past. This would mean far more
than an empty apology for the old Ottomans, Caliphs of Islam and
inventors of the fezâ[53] (Bey, 1997).
Bey then goes on in Islam and Eugenics to describe his vision of this
anarchic interpretation of Islam and an Islamic interpretation of
anarchism, writing:
ââIslamâ in Europe & America? Why not? Why not enjoy it? Autonomous
enclaves in Berlin, Paris, London â linked by anarcho-federalism with
other autonomous zones, squats, social centers, eco-farms & free rural
municipalities, & other anti-Capital entities & non-hegemonic
particularities. Revolutionary difference against the idols of Moloch &
Mammon, & the culture of global sameness. Why not introduce into
âwestern cultureâ the virus of a critique of the tyranny of the image â
an iconoclastic breath from the desert? Reactionary fundamentalism has
long since betrayed itself as a revolutionary force. Why not something
else, the âspirit of Sarajevoâ perhaps â or the castles of the
Assassinsâ[54] (Bey, 1997).
Beyâs hopes and visions in the passages above therefore affirm my
contention that it is indeed possible and favorable to construct an
anarchic interpretation of Islam and an Islamic interpretation of
anarchism.
The fifth tendency I observe is Bey and Knightâs anti-authoritarian
stance. In advocating for this stance, by âdrawing inspiration from his
interpretation of the abrogation of the Law (Qiyamat) during the
Assassin reign at Alamutâ (Fiscella, 2009), Bey writes:
âIn a sense anyone can be the Imam; in a sense, everyone already is the
Imam...the idea of the Iman-of-oneâs-own-being implies the idea of
self-rule, autarky: each human being a potential king, and human
relations carried out as a mutuality of âfree lordsâ... To liberate
everyday life...beings with the individual and spirals outward in love
to embrace others...âradicalâ (post-Qiyamat) Ismailism restores
âsovereigntyâ to the individual, who thus becomes his/her own
âauthorityâ. Spirituality is not a master/slave relation â it is not an
âOriental despotismâ. Not anymore. Not now. Maybe it never was. Who
cares? Here and now: â we need something differentâ (Bey, 1993: 58).
Similarly, Yusuf in Taqwacores expresses Knightâs anti-authoritarian
stance. Knight writes:
âFuck the local imam, fuck the PhDs at al-Madina al-Munawwara ... give
me the Islam of starry-night cornfields with wind rustling through my
shirt and reckless fisabilillah make-out sprees that wonât lead to
anything but hurt. Knee-deep in a creek is where Iâll find my kitab. If
Allah wants to say anything to me Heâll do so on the faces of my
brothers and sisters. If thereâs any Law that I need to follow, Iâll
find it out there in the worldâ (Knight, 2004: 252).
Bey and Knightsâ arguments for an anti-authoritarian Islam therefore
affirm my contention that it is possible to construct an
anti-authoritarian commitment as a foundation for Anarca-Islam.
The sixth and final tendency I observe in the academic texts is
Fiscellaâs categorization of the anthropological and historical studies
of Islamic anarchism to date in Imagining an Islamic Anarchism: A New
Field of Study is Ploughed. Fiscella applies three classifications that
could be useful in defining the Islamic-anarchism discourse. Fiscella
does this but also humbly acknowledges that:
âAlternative models are required. It is not possible right now to do
justice to the richness and complexity of the material but a crude tool
might be crafted in order to at least begin diggingâ (Fiscella, 2009)
the discourse on Islam and anarchism.
The classifications Fiscella uses include the following:
â[Type One[55], inclusive of works of Crone, Bey and Knight, are]
studies of anarchist theory [and with the subtypes Organic Islamic
anarchism and Post-modern Islamic anarchism]... [Type Two[56], inclusive
of the work of Barclay, are] studies in the anarchic traits of tribal
Muslim societies [and with the subtypes Pre-modern Muslim anarchy and
Post-modern Muslim anarchy]...and finally, [Type Three[57] are] studies
of the anarchical structure of Islam [with the subtypes Anarchical Islam
(Caliphate period) and Hyper-anarchical Islam (Post-Caliphate
period)]...Within each category further distinctions can be made based
on qualitative developmentsâ (Fiscella, 2009).
Fiscellaâs identification of the preliminary parameters of Islamic
anarchism as a discourse, affirms my contention that Anarca-Islam does
have a theoretical and pragmatic role to play in terms of its
contribution to anarchism and Islamic-anarchism as discourses as well as
the newest social movements.
Non-academic, movement articles and blogs reaffirm that there is no
monolithic Islam and that there have been historical, anti-authoritarian
movements within Islam resonating with anarchism. Nevertheless, the same
articles and blogs also paradoxically reproduce the two misconceptions
of Islam and Muslims that I discussed earlier. In Muslim Anarchism,
Luxzenburg writes of anti-authoritarian resonances between Islam and
anarchism and acknowledges the existence of multiple strands of Islam as
well. Luxzenburg writes:
âThe first recorded strand of anti-authoritarian Islam dates all the way
back to the death of the third [Caliph] UthmÄn ibn âAffÄn. They had a
disagreement about who should succeed him as the leader of Muslims,
resulting in the [Shia] â [Sunni] split. There was a third group,
however, the [Kharijites], who opposed both the Sunni and Shia sects,
and claimed that any qualified Muslim could be an Imam. They held that
all people were individually responsible for the good or evil of their
acts. They challenged all authority and encouraged all, especially the
poor and dispossessed, to see the struggle against injustice as being
divinely sanctioned. However, although Kharijites saw all believers
completely equal regardless of any social differences, they believed
that non-believers had no rights, and could be killed. At least one sect
of Kharajites, the Najdiyya, believed that if no suitable [imam] was
present in the community, then the position could be dispensed with. A
strand of Mutazalite thought paralleled that of the Najdiyya: if rulers
inevitably became tyrants, then the only acceptable course of action was
to stop installing rulersâ[58] (Luxzenburg, 2009).
In addition to Luxzenburgâs article, but hardly as historically and
anthropologically informative and interrogative as his, there is also
Chris R.âs article Islam and Anarchy Join Together. In the article,
Chris R. also acknowledges resonances between Islam and anarchism. He
writes:
âISLAM and the LIBERTARIAN SOCIAL struggle are, in no way, opposed, but
rather have an ample nexus that joins them together. To that end,
brothers and sisters, know that we are not different, we are like you
and have the same objectives, bringing awareness to social
struggles...in reality ISLAM is pureness, love, peace, social awareness
and moreâ[59] (Chris R., 2009)
Nevertheless, and in spite of the articleâs positive viewpoint(s) on
Islam and anarchism, anarchist bloggers like âBrain-Fearâ and âPJPâ
responded negatively to the article through its blog forum. In their
comments, the anarchist bloggers dismissed the possibility of Muslim
anarchists and the possibility of an anarchic interpretation of Islam
and Islamic interpretation of anarchism, basing their views on their
homogenization of Islam and Muslims. Brain-Fear and PJP write:
âAny form of religion is thought control â Islam is sexist and
homophobic... If they [Muslims] are serious about anarchism, they would
have dropped the sexist and homophobic aspects of the religion and
accentuated more libertarian aspects of the religionâ[60] (Chris R.,
2009)
A third anarchist blogger, âBurning-manâ, also expresses a similar yet
more direct critique towards what is described as âAnarcho-Islamâ; a
neither Koranic nor anarchically proven fusion of Islam and anarchism.
Burning-manâs comments demonstrate the two misconceptions of the
impossibility of an anarchic interpretation of Islam and an Islamic
interpretation of anarchism as well as the impossibility of the
co-existence of Islam and anarchism in a single subjectivity.
Burning-man wrote:
âAnarcho-Islam is about the stupidest thing Iâve ever heard of. Islam is
about submission. Slave to Allah and all that crap. It has an extremely
rigid set of rules and conduct and, while more enlightened than other
monotheistic religions in a number of important ways, it never quite
went through anything like the Reformation. It is reactionary,
pro-capitalist, pro-slavery, imperialist and misogynist to the core.
Just read the fucking Koranâ[61] (Chris R., 2009).
Treading in line with Brain-fear, PJP, and Burning-man, in regurgitating
these misconceptions are also anarchists associated with the Anarchist
Federation in London, England. The anarchists in question produced an
article in the âDecember 2001 issueâ[62] (Adam K., 2007) that levels all
differences between Islam and Muslims and portrays Islam as monolithic,
fundamentalist, reactionary, homo-trans-queerphobic, and oppressive
towards women. The article reductively and Islamophobically claims Islam
âthe enemy of all Freedom loving peopleâ[63] (Adam K., 2007).
Similarly, in Floodâs article The Trouble with Islam the two
misconceptions reappear. Floodâs argument revolves around this
introductory statement:
âThe left in general ...[but in particular] groups like the British SWP
[Socialist Party of Britain] have gone so far as to describe left
criticism of the Islamic religion as âIslamophobiaâ echoing the official
line of their government which insists âThe real Islam is a religion of
peace, tolerance and understandingâ. While there is a real need for the
left to defend people who are Muslims from state and non-state
victimisation in the aftermath of 9â11 this should not at any time imply
a defence of the Islamic religion. Freedom of religion must also allow
freedom from religion!â[64] (Flood, 2003).
While I concur with Floodâs views that âfreedom of religion must allow
freedom from religionâ and that the âleft ought possess the right to
critique Islam without fear of the accusatory charge of Islamophobiaâ,
Floodâs argument is problematic because Flood writes of Islam and
Muslims as if both were monolithic. Flood dismisses the possibility of
constructing an anarchic interpretation of Islam. Causally, and by
failing to acknowledge Islamâs multiplicity, Flood also denies the
possibility of the existence of Muslim anarchists in social movements.
However, I find that the most unfortunate part of Floodâs article is his
concluding statement. In it, he praises anarchists and anarchismsâ
historical commitments to anti-oppression, yet expresses his yearning
for an anarchic vigilance in opposition to Islam. Flood supports this
conclusion through his view of Islam as puritanical and running counter
to anarchismâs commitment to freedom from oppression(s). Flood writes:
âAnarchists have a long and proud tradition of fighting the power of
organised religion, including in countries like Spain fighting fascist
gangs formed on a religious basis. While we recognise the freedom of
people to hold a religion we also recognise that there has to be a
freedom from religion â an idea that runs against the basis of Islam.
Anarchists in the Middle East and beyond will need to determine for
themselves the most effective ways of counteracting the influence of the
fundamentalists there. In the west we can at least make sure their
attempts to impose themselves on the immigrant communities are
opposedâ[65] (Flood, 2003).
The two misconceptions exist amongst these anarchists for two reasons.
The first is that these anarchists are influenced by Orientalist and
Fundementalist Western representations of Islam and Muslims. The second
is the fact that these anarchists, for the most part, do not read
Arabic, practice Islam, and have never read the Sunnah or the Koran.
Moreover, these anarchists have never practiced jihad and ijtihad and
therefore have not understood interpretative traditions of Islam derived
from either the Sunnah or the Koran. The majority of anarchists are not
aware that within Islam, âeverything that is said under the explicit
form of the law usually also refers to another meaningâ (Foucault, 1978:
753â4). For instance, they are not aware that the Arabic word ayn in the
Koran may change from meaning âan organ of sightâ to ârunning waterâ,
from âpure goldâ to a âspyâ (AlâAwani, 1993: 82). Anarchists for the
most part do not realize that it is possible through jihad and ijtihad
that the Koranic âword qarâ (plural: qurooâ) can either mean
menstruationâ (AlâAwani, 1993: 82) or the exact opposite, âpurity
following menstruationâ (AlâAwani, 1993: 82). As a result of not being
aware of any of this, the majority of anarchists remain blind to the
fact that there are non-dogmatic possibilities in literal and figurative
connotations that Muslim scholars, Mujâtahâeideen, encounter when they
engage in jihad and ijtihad, especially when Mujâtahâeideen are
orienting Islam ethically and politically to a specific hermeneutic such
as anarchism.
What the majority of anarchists need to recognize then is that they
cannot take for granted the difficulty[66] Mujâtahâeideen face at
deriving different connotations and alternative readings based on the
subtleties of the Sunnah and the Koran. In not recognizing this, these
anarchists undermine the power and burden of a Mujâtahâeid (singular for
Muhâtahâeideen). Anarchists, for the most part, dismiss the sacred
responsibility a Mujâtahâeid is entrusted with and for which he and/or
she is accountable before God. All anarchists must understand that âthe
East and Islam donât necessarily have the same regimes of truth as the
Westâ (Foucault, 1978, 753â4). These regimes of truth are knowable
truths, but which a majority of anarchists know little of. Anarchists
cannot afford to be ignorant or ambivalent of Islam out of fear.
In drawing my conclusions from reviewing the literatures, let me say
that the literature is undoubtedly a vital symbolic step that can help
Western Muslims in confronting Western representations ascribed to
Islam. However, the literature shows weaknesses on three interrelated
fronts. First, there is the weakness of the secularization of the texts,
and this applies to both the academic and non-academic literature. The
secularization occurs because the texts use neither the Koran nor the
Sunnah. The writers abstain from offering conceptual and pragmatic
Koranic and anarchic justifications of how it is (im)possible to
construct an anarchic interpretation of Islam and an Islamic
interpretation of anarchism. The literature defers instead to
identifying useful but still just anthropological and historical
resonances between anarchism and Islam. The consequence is the
literatureâs weakened effectivity due to the overarching dismissal of
what I see as a critical aspect with respect to the discourse of Islam
and anarchism. As Fiscella argues, it is not âmerely about the
imagination of the potential options for how things can beâ (Fiscella,
2009) between the two, Islam and anarchism. Rather, it is about proving
the Islamic and anarchic concepts and practices necessary for this
ideaâs presentation to a socio-political arena comprised predominantly
of non-secular Western Muslims. That said, I have little doubt and can
almost guarantee that post-colonial immigrant and citizen Muslims,
regardless of how liberal, can tolerate but will never seriously accept
a word in any of these literatures unless the Koran and the Sunnah are
used.
Second, there is the weakness that the academic and non-academic writers
do not identify clearly who the intended audience or the exact purpose
of their writing. The literature lacks clarity when in fact the writers
could direct the literature and its intended message(s) far more
adequately to a particular audience. For instance, Bey and Knight parley
between representing Islam and Muslims either through fictional insights
that call the Koran a âtiny little book for tiny little menâ (Knight,
2004: 105) or through insights using what Bey calls âpoetic terrorismâ
(Bey, 1993: 58) in his quest for âpoetic factsâ (Bey, 1993: 58). As
Fiscella writes, Beyâs âwork is easy to read but difficult to
follow...seamlessly blend[ing] scholarly research with manifesto in a
quest for âpoetic factsââ (Fiscella, 2009). The consequence of the
inadequate addressing of the religious literature, as well as the lack
of clarity, is the persistence of the former misconceptions in the
hearts and minds of anarchists.
A third weakness found generally in literature on anarchism and Islam,
but one that is particular to the literature by Bey and Knight, is that
they adopt and advocate for a Stirnerian individualistic approach to
writing on Islam and anarchism (Kroptkin, 1910). I am vehemently against
this approach. Bey and Knight encourage Muslims to:
ânot only [be Muslims in] a complete revolt against the state and
against servitude...but also [after] the full liberation
of...[themselves] from all social and moral bonds [and responsibilities
to even themselves as community] â the rehabilitation of the âIâ, the
supremacy of the individual, complete âamoralismâ, and the association
of egoistsââ(Kroptkin, 1910).
For Bey and Knight, when it comes to representing Islam and Muslims
âheresy and the margins of legitimacy are perfectly respectable optionsâ
(Fiscella, 2009). This means, according to Bey and Knight, that any
Muslim reserves the right to do as they please without being bound by or
accountable for the ethico-political rights of the community over that
individual. On the one hand, Bey âspeaks of a need for the individual to
be bound by an ethical and spiritual stance...[yet] on the other hand,
he argues that the individual alone has the right to determine the
validity of those ethicsâ (Fiscella, 2009). Whereas in Knightâs case,
âKnightâs vision is one of multiple heresies and quasi-orthodoxies [of
Islam and Muslims] living under the same roof and together manifesting
an Islam where individualists are bound together in a radically
intentional pluralismâ (Fiscella, 2009). I however believe in the need
for a more balanced approach between the rights of the community and the
rights of the individual, and beyond Knightâs âradical intentional
pluralismâ and which is not rooted in shared ethico-political
commitments. In this sense, the literature inadequately addresses
Muslims and anarchists in the newest social movements, and remains
lacking in Koranic substance, encouragement, and call for communitarian
action amongst Muslims and anarchists.
It seems to me then, that Bey and Knight fail to construct what I think
is necessary. That is, an anarchic interpretation of Islam that is
simultaneously an Islamic interpretation of anarchism. I accept and
respect Beyâs anthropological and historical approach as well as
Knightâs fictional approach. However, the construction of an
interpretation or a multiplicity of interpretations is necessary, if
only to effectively mobilize Muslims, Muslim anarchists and anarchists
towards understanding each other better within the newest social
movements. Without this type of interpretation, Muslim anarchists are
fetishized revolutionary subjects and representatives of a dreary fusion
of Islam and anarchism. In fact, without this kind of interpretation,
Muslim anarchists exist only in name, since they are without the
adequate theological foundations for the fusion of their two identities.
Leaving Muslim anarchists susceptible to mockery by anarchists like
Brain-fear regarding something called Anarcho-Islam, and which no one,
not even Muslim anarchists, have defined. The consequence is more of the
same thing for Muslim anarchists. That is, their further separation and
ostracization from anarchists and Muslims. An interpretation is not a
guarantee of the end of misconceptions between Muslims, Muslim
anarchists and anarchists but it is a start in proving Koranically and
anarchistically the concepts and practices behind a Muslim anarchistâs
right to exist.
I argue for three things in light of this literatureâs critical
problems. The first, as I have already mentioned, is the construction of
an anarchic interpretation of Islam and an Islamic interpretation of
anarchism. This interpretation needs to be achieved Koranically and
anarchistically by drawing conceptual, pragmatic, anti-authoritarian,
and anti-capitalist resonances between Islam and anarchism. Second, that
this synergistic interpretation addresses a relevant audience and have a
particular purpose. The audience addressed needs to be defined to
include Muslims and anarchists in the West, but more particularly
Muslims and anarchists within the newest social movements; this
literature should have the purpose of increasing the possibility of
solidarity between Muslims and anarchists currently collaborating in
groups like No One Is Illegal[67] (NOII) and Solidarity Across
Borders[68] (SAB). Three, I am also arguing that this interpretation
adopt and advocate for a balanced approach between communal politics,
which would be based on shared ethico-political commitments, and
micro-politics as opposed to a strict adherence to an individualistic
Stirnerian approach. This way the interpretation is advocating for an
âescapeâ from what Day refers to as âthe hegemony of hegemony, but [not]
at the cost of an excessive [heretical] reliance upon a ânomadicâ
conception of subjectivityâ (2005: 17) and which ârejects not only
coercive morality, but affinity based ethico-political commitments as
wellâ (2005: 17). My hope is that this interpretation assists Muslims
and anarchists in forming a community where they can organize themselves
in a way
âso as to minimize domination and exploitation [amongst each other and
in their own communities], particularly in a world increasingly
colonized by neoliberal globalization and the societies of controlâ
(Day, 2005: 143).
In organizing in this communitarian way, as opposed to an
individualistic way, this interpretation is calling on Muslims, Muslim
anarchists and anarchists to avoid the legacy of what the Koran calls an
individualistic ânarrow and constricted existenceâ[69]. After all, there
has to be balanced approach between the rights of an individual and the
rights of a community. As God says in the Koran:
âAnd do not dispute with one another [by delighting in what each of you
thinks] lest you fail and your strength desert youâ (The Holy Koran,
Chapter 8: Chapter of âThe Accessionâ: Verse 46; Al-awani, 1993: 3).
In line with the three criteria, I advocate for this interpretation,
what I call Anarca-Islam, as this thesisâ contribution to emergent views
on the discourse of Islam and anarchism. I believe it to be an important
contribution, considering as Fiscella argues:
âNone of these [aforementioned literatures] can tells us what Islamic
anarchism is but all of them tell us how an Islamic anarchism might be
imagined â even if the imagining borders on the realm of wishful
thinking and fantasyâ (2009).
In response to Fiscella, I offer Anara-Islam as a reinvention of Islamic
forms of anarchist thought and anarchist forms of Islamic thought. For
now, however and before constructing Anarca-Islam the following chapter
will address the methodology and theories necessary to construct it.
âI will say only this: if I ask to look closer, concerning this concept
of position...it is that it bears at least the same name as an
absolutely essential, vital mechanism...The position-of-the-other...to
pose â oneself by oneself as the other of the Idea, as
other-than-oneself in oneâs finite determination, with the aim of
repatriating and re-appropriating oneself, of returning close to oneself
in the infinite richness of oneâs
determination...overturning...displacement...scenes, acts, figures of
dissemination.â
(Jacques Derrida, 1971)
In this chapter, I identify the methodological and theoretical
positioning(s) necessary in constructing Anarca-Islam. In the first
section of this chapter, I introduce a method I call Anarchic-Ijtihad.
Anarchic-Ijtihad is the method I use to construct Anarca-Islam in
chapter five. After introducing Anarchic-Ijtihad, I defend its use
against possible objections against this method of inquiry, such as the
critique offered by some orthodox Muslim scholars and secular Muslims
such as Michael Muhammad Knight. In the second and final section of this
chapter, I introduce the theoretical paradigms I use, alongside
Anarchic-Ijtihad, to construct Anarca-Islam, including post-anarchist,
deconstructionist, post-colonial and poststructuralist theories along
with sociological theories of social movements. Following the
identification of these paradigms, I explore the individual role of each
paradigm in constructing Anarca-Islam. I conclude this section and
chapter by clarifying a critical point to my argument for constructing
Anarca-Islam. That is, I distinguish between Islamic principles and
Muslim cultural practices. The two are not to be conflated, albeit that
they do intersect.
Anarchic-Ijtihad is the method I use to construct Anarca-Islam. This
method is derived from its classical form ijtihad. Ijtihad is the
Islamic practice of using independent and rigorous reasoning while
interpreting and re-interpreting Islamic principles in the Sunnah and
the Koran. The act of re-interpreting the Sunnah and the Koran in Islam
is referred to as âtafsirâ (AlâAwani, 1995: 25).
The principles on which tafsir is based are not connected to matters of
belief. Ijtihad is a particularly acceptable act for a Mujâtahâid, or a
scholar, to engage in when there are âmatters on which there is no clear
guidance in the Qurâan and the Sunnahâ (AlâAwani, 1993: 25). Ijtihad,
when there is no clear guidance in the Koran, therefore becomes a
critical deconstructive force for a Mujâtahâid to re-interpret
principles in Islam. A force that involves not only a Mujâtahâidâs
critical exegesis of the Koran, but rather:
âthe act of making a judgement, whether through considering the explicit
meaning of a text or analyzing it with respect to the pertinent
principles and proofs...[and in this sense is] one of the most important
types of juristic reasoning... one which the early Muslims followedâ
(AlâAwani, 1993: 25â26).
This act of making judgement requires knowledge of pertinent linguistic
and variant grammatical implications when analyzing and understanding
the Koran. This judgement allows the Mujâtahâid to exceed the parameters
of critically explaining, expanding, and interpreting the text and
therefore endows him and/or her with the ability to go beyond critical
analysis. The Mujâtahâid is authorized to make ethico-political
judgments with respect to the re-interpretation of Islamic principles,
provided the Mujâtahâid supports the re-interpreted principles by the
necessary textual evidence and Koranic justifications for the
Mujâtahâidâs ethical-political re-orientation of the Islamic principles
in a particular direction. The Mujâtahâid is able re-interpret the
principles, if the principles are not already oriented in the particular
ethico-political direction a Mujâtahâid believes they should be oriented
towards. In this thesis, I will show the textual evidence for my
argument regarding the existence of anti-capitalist and
anti-authoritarian principles, concepts and practices in Islam. As well,
I will provide the Koranic justifications for my re-orientation of these
principles in order to demonstrate the interpretative tradition of Islam
that resonates with anarchism.
One might ask: What does a Mujâtahâid do then with principles that
pertain to matters of belief and which a Mujâtahâid, as noted earlier,
is forbidden from practicing ijtihad with respect to? The Mujâtahâid is
to âadopt the manifest meanings and what is properly and strictly
sanctioned by the purport of the textâ (AlâAwani, 1993: 25). The reason
for the forbiddance of ijtihad in such cases is that these types of
Koranic verses address matters the details and the knowledge of which is
reserved for God alone. One example of such a verse is in the second
chapter of the Koran. The chapter is titled âThe Cowâ. It begins with
the verse âAlif Lam Mimâ[70]. The verse is comprised of three Arabic
letters âAlifâ, âLamâ and âMimâ, and which do not form an Arabic word.
The details of this verse, of which there exist ample similar Koranic
examples, are âbeyond the reach of human perception included in the term
al ghaybâ (AlâAwani, 1993: 27). Al-Ghayb means that the true meaning of
the verse belongs to God. In this light, no Mujâtahâid possesses the
ability to delve into interpreting such verses as âAlif Lam Mimâ. While
a Mujâtahâid is permitted to comment on these types of verses, the
Mujâtahâidâs comments are bound to and cannot contradict what has been
generally stated in other verses in the Sunnah and the Koran in regards
to the interpretation of this verse. That is, âAlif Lam Mimâ cannot
contradict enshrined principles of the faith such as the oneness of God.
God says in the Koran of these types of ambiguous verses:
âBut no one knows its interpretation except God. And those who are
firmly rooted in knowledge say: âWe believe in itââ (The Holy Koran,
Chapter 3: Chapter of âThe Family of Imranâ: Verse 7).
God therefore strictly demands in the verse above from a Mujâtahâid that
when an ambiguous verse as âAlif Lam Mimâ appears that the Mujâtahâid
simply accepts its ambiguousness. In a sense, a Mujâtahâidâs task here
is therefore one that exceeds that of conducting a discursive analysis
of the text. That is, a Mujâtahâidâs duty exceeds studying, analyzing,
and comprehending the circumstances behind the revelation of a verse as
âAlif Lam Mimâ or the linguistic boundaries of the very verse itself.
The Mujâtahâid accepts the verse as Godâs verse or as âisâ. That is, the
verse is not to be analyzed, understood or misunderstood, but
appreciated as it is beyond a Mujâtahâidâs grasp and comprehension. In
light of this and in the case of my thesis, there however are no such
types of verses upon which I will draw to construct Anarca-Islam.
In light of the mentioned verse above, it is clear that the Koran that
it is a complicated[71] text. This makes it more necessary for the
reader to comprehend the Koranâs complexity as a text. To quote Seyyid
Hossein Nasr on this matter:
âMany people, especially non-Muslims, who read the Quran for the first
time are struck by what appears as a kind of incoherence from the human
point of view. It is neither like a highly mystical text nor a manual of
Aristotelian logic, though it contains both mysticism and logic. It is
not just poetry although it contains the most powerful poetry. The text
of the Quran reveals human language crushed by the power of the Divine
word. It is as if human language were scattered into a thousand
fragments like a wave scattered into drops against the rocks at seaâ
(Nasr in Brown, 1992: 90).
Language in the Koran is therefore language that is not fixed in
meaning. Rather, the Koranâs language is endlessly reinventing itself
anew. Godâs words remake[72] the rules and limits of Arabic as a
language. In fact, as Nasr notes, God replaces human Arabic with a
Divine form of Arabic that is seemingly incoherent, poetic, and
mystical. The Koran offers a descriptive account of tales of past
prophets and callings upon the reader to contemplate the very truth of
the Divinity of the words and the language used.
The degree of detail in the Koran transforms the Koran into a text whose
principles can never be fully analyzed and understood by a Mujâtahâid.
It becomes a text that requires a Mujâtahâidâs endless struggle. Ijtihad
in a sense is Godâs perpetual challenge to a Mujâtahâid. In this
challenge, during a Mujâtahâidâs interaction with the Koran, a
Mujâtahâid encounters and reads a variety of different meanings for the
same Koranic words. The different meanings offer varying principles and
consequently result in different interpretations of Islam. Examples of
such words are âaynâ or âqarâ, which were discussed in chapter two, and
upon which Koranic principles are laid and based. The Mujâtahâidâs task
consists of offering varying insights, reasoning(s), and advancing
proofs regarding Koranic principles. In doing so, the Mujâtahâid is
continually engaging in an act of destabilizing dogmatic principles
interpreted by other Mujâtahâideen.
This analysis leads to this question: Who is entitled to conduct ijtihad
and who is permitted to become a Mujâtahâid? Ijtihad is considered to be
a divinely decreed right and gift from God to Muslims en masse. As Taha
Jabir AlâAwani argues in the Ethics of Disagreements in Islam (1993):
The Koranic âlegal intellectual effort is required by the divine
injunction: âLearn a lesson, then, O you who are endowed with insightââ
(26; The Holy Koran, Chapter 59: Chapter of âBanishmentâ: Verse 2).
Ijtihad is then a necessary right ordained and tantamount to duty for
Muslims through the Koranic verse AlâAwani indicates above. This right
exists for all Muslims according to their individual abilities and upon
scholarly study. God intends ijtihad as a merciful mechanism to
accommodate Muslims. In this regard, God states in the Koran:
âShouldst thou not bring them a sign, they say, âHast thou not yet made
choice of one?â Say, âI only follow what is inspired to me by my Lord
[i.e. in the Koran]. These are perceptions from my Lord, and a guidance
and a mercy to a people who believeâ. And when the Koran is read, then
listen thereto and keep silence; haply ye may obtain mercyâ (The Holy
Koran, Chapter 7: Chapter of âThe Elevated Placesâ: Verse 201).
In the verse, God acknowledges the Koran as a merciful text, a gift to
Muslims. Moreover, God advises Muslims to partake in ijthad with the
Koran, not necessarily by literally re-interpreting it, but by actively
listening to it as highlighted in the verse above. That is, God ordains
that Muslims understand the Koran as opposed to blindly ascribe to its
message. Furthermore, God advocates that Muslims neither dogmatically
accept nor rely upon a Mujâtahâidâs interpretation of the Koran. Muslims
are not to take ijtihad for granted. God even vows to guide Muslims in
explaining the Koran. That is, God vows to support and enlighten any
Muslim who engages and struggles with the Koran and not only
Mujâtahâideen. As God says in the Koran: âWe explain the signs in detail
for those who reflectâ (Chapter 10: Chapter of âYunusâ: Verse 24). Godâs
insistence that capable Muslims use ijtihad as a mechanism to
re-interpret Islamic principles in accordance with their spatial,
temporal, political, and social conditions and circumstances highlights
the relative ease which ijtihad offers and brings for Islamic practice.
In fact, God expects differences in Islamic principles due to the
practice of ijtihad in different spatial, temporal, political, and
social circumstances. Below are two Koranic verses that address this
matter:
âNot all of them are alikeâ (The Holy Koran, Chapter 4, Chapter of âThe
Womenâ: Verse 113)
and
âunto every one of you We [God] have appointed a different law and way
of life and if God had pleased, God would have made you a single Ummah
[community], but that God might try You in what God gave you. So vie
with one another in virtuous deeds. To God you will all return, so that
God will inform you of that wherein you differedâ (The Holy Koran,
Chapter 5, Chapter of âThe Dinner Tableâ: Verse 48).
In the above verses, God acknowledges that Muslims are created equal but
not alike. God did not intend for Muslims to be organized into a single
community, but rather that each Muslim individual and community vie with
the other in virtuous deeds while also appreciating the differences that
set them apart. The difference in laws as a consequence of ijtihad, and
which the second verse refers to, does not imply that Muslims ought not
appreciate Islamic interpretations of past Muslims or laws of other
communities. Rather it encourages Muslims to do right by themselves for
their own conditions, while drawing upon lessons from the past in order
to appreciate and contextualize past achievements and interpretations of
Islam (Esposito, 2002: 159). God confirms that the Koran is an adaptable
text through ijtihad and for all time:
âWill they not ponder on the Koran? If it had not come from God [i.e.
adaptable for all time[73]], they could surely find in it many
contradictionsâ (The Holy Koran, Chapter 4, Chapter of âThe Womenâ:
Verse 82).
In spite of the fact that Muslims are afforded this Divine gift of
interpretation most Muslims today have become complacent in their right
to ijtihad. This complacency can be traced historically, as I note in
chapter two, to when the âGate of Ijtihadâ was closed during the reign
of the Abbasids in the tenth century (Esposito, 1984: 19, emphasis
added). The consensus of the ulama[74] at the time of Abbasids was that
an Islamic way of life had already been established and thus there was
no need for further ijtihad or investigation. That is, that âthere could
be no justification for independent judgment or rational inquiryâ in
Islam (Mehmet, 1990: 60). The consequence of this closing off of
ijtihadâs gates was that future generations of Muslims were bound to
dysfunctional taqlid. That is, the âunquestioned acceptance and
memorization of precedents and interpretations of pastâ Muhâtahâeideen
(Mehmet, 1990: 60). Furthermore, with the closing of the gates of
ijtihad:
â...the ulama assumed a monopoly control of public education, morality
and opinion, and, in the process, advanced the cause of jahiliyya (mass
ignorance), fatalism and underdevelopment as effectively as imperialism
and colonialismâ (Mehmet, 1990: 61).
As a result of this monopolistic control over ijtihad most Muslims
nowadays are caught in a state of intellectual paralysis that has
âafflicted both their resolve and their decisive intellectual endeavorâ
(Alâawani, 1993: 8). This nearly total absence of ijtihad amongst
Muslims nowadays is all the more troubling[75] considering that the gate
of ijtihad was reopened in the nineteenth century.
At its opening, âIslamic modernists, notably Afghani, Abduh and Iqbal,
clamoured for freeing Islamic knowledge from its âdogmatic slumberâ as a
precondition for adapting it to the requirements of life in a modern
worldâ (Mehmet, 1990: 61). Islamic modernists understood the dire
consequences Muslims and the Islamic world faced due to the closure of
the gate of ijtihad. Muslim modernists fought for the gateâs reopening,
realizing the dire consequences should the new generation of Muslims
continue to be forbidden from partaking in ijtihad. Yet despite this
call by Islamic modernists, save for a âfew notable Islamic
scholars...[as] Ibn Timiya (1262â1328)... Jalal ad-Din as-Suyuti
(1445â1505)...[and] Ibn Khaldun (1332â1406)â (Mehmet, 1990: 61), few
others have dared to conduct ijithad or claimed their authority as
Muhâtahâeideen. The result is the continued state of intellectual
paralysis that nowadays exists amongst a predominant majority of
Muslims. It seems, as opposed to the acceptance of this divine gift,
Muslims have predominantly opted for a strict dogmatic adherence to past
interpretations by past Muhâtahâeideen. Muslims opted to dismissing the
divine gift of interpretation when the fact is that it is with ijtihad
that Muslims:
âwill undoubtedly release an abundance of energies [, hima,] in the
Ummah [Muslim Community] â energies which are now dissipated and wasted
in the theaters of futile internal [, as external] conflictsâ (Alâawani,
1992: 9).
As a Muslim, I see a necessity for ijtihad. The method I choose is its
anarchic form or Anarchic-Ijtihad. It is the method I develop for myself
in my attempt at reaching:
âout of the intellectual paralysis which afflicts the Muslim mind...by
tackling the roots of this intellectual crisis and rectifying the
methodology of [Muslim] thought ...[arming Muslims through] a renewed
stress on intellectual formation and the recovery of a sense of
[ethical-political] prioritiesâ (AlâAwani, 1993: 9).
Anarchic-Ijtihad is committed to identifying and re-interpreting, if
necessary, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian principles in the
Sunnah and the Koran. I use Anarchic-Ijtihad to identify these anarchic
commitments in Islam, so that the interpretation I am advocating for,
Anarca-Islam, resonates with anarchism. Similarly, I use
Anarchic-Ijtihad to reread Islamic anti-capitalist and
anti-authoritarian commitments in anarchism so that they resonate with
Anarca-Islam. Because Anarchic-Ijtihad is an anarchically oriented
ijtihad it is not only a form of critical or discursive form of
analysis. Anarchic-Ijtihad, by virtue of the very definition of ijtihad,
is a method I use to make judgements in favour of Anarca-Islam. It also
affords me the ability to critique interpretations of Islam that do not
uphold Anarca-Islamâs anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist
commitments. I regard these commitments as Islamic commitments, just as
I regard them as anarchist commitments. Anarca-Islam too is the method I
use to coalesce the individual anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist
concepts and practices from Islam.
The perception of this method of inquiry as unnecessary will be under
the pretext that in the mind of seculars as Knight the Koran is innate,
benign or useless. To Knight, as I discussed in chapter two, the Koran
is a âtiny little book for tiny little menâ (Knight, 2004: 15, emphasis
added). In Taqwacores, Knight has the female character Rabeya cross âout
a verse from the Koranâ (Fiscella, 2009) that Knight believes allows a
man to beat his wife. Knight highlights in the passage below through
Rabeya his point of view of the Koran:
âFinally I said, fuck it. If I believe itâs wrong for a man to beat his
wife, and the Quran disagrees with me, then fuck that verse. I donât
need to stretch and squeeze it for a weak alternative reading, I donât
need to excuse it with historical context, and I sure as hell donât need
to just accept it and go sign up for a good olâ fashioned
bitch-slapping. So I crossed it out. Now I feel a whole lot better about
that Quranâ (Knight, 2004: 105)
As a Mujâtahâid, and using Knightâs words, I prefer to stretch, squeeze
and work through the historical contexts of the verse and if necessary
to re-interpret and provide the Islamic justification(s) for the verseâs
re-interpretation using Anarchic-Ijtihad. I do this not to provide weak
alternatives for the verse as Knight claims, but rather to construct a
powerful position from it in Anarca-Islam. In sum, what I find beautiful
about the way the Koran uses language is that it does so using Arabic
words and sentences that are at times:
a) Extremely precise (whether in the scope of describing things and
events or giving guidelines, clear lessons, or ârulesâ to Muslims)
Or
b) Filled with metaphors that could be âdecipheredâ using ijtihad, or
any of its types like Anarchic-Ijtihad
Or
c) Contaminated by the use of Divine phrases that are âsecretâ and to
which Alâ Ghayb is applied.
As an Arabic reader, I find the Koran a difficult text to challenge that
way. That is, in its ability to resist âthe judgmentsâ of human beings
on its divine integrity as a text, especially without critics
understanding the different grammatical context to which rules of syntax
are also applied. Unlike Knight, I therefore believe that it is in the
spaces of these judgments that are leveled by critics as critiques on
the Koran that there is an advantage for Muslims in using this space to
their advantage while reinterpreting the Koran. After all there can be
little doubt that the Koran speaks a thousand lies and truths that to
this modern day creates uncertainty because of the language the Koran
uses. The Koran creates this uncertainty while also disabling the degree
to which heresy could be committed against it. This is because the Koran
prides itself on being a text of moderation and that is lucid yet
considerate to the understanding and comprehension of an Arabic reader.
As a text, it is the Koran that haunts and holds Islam, and which means
âthe middle pathâ, and without which Islam does not exist.
Throughout this thesis, the principal theories I use and which I intend
to fuse are: post-anarchist, deconstructionist, post-colonial, and
poststructuralist theories, along with sociological theories of social
movements. This fusion denotes a common ethical and political project to
dismantle the belief amongst Muslims and anarchists that it is
impossible to identify as a Muslim anarchist, as well as the belief that
it is impossible to construct an anarchic interpretation of Islam and an
anarchic interpretation of anarchism. My destination, Anarca-Islam, is
dependent upon the cohesive joining together of these ethical-political
theories and philosophies to establish what, I argue, ought to be a
designated space, a panegyric desert, for Muslims and Muslims anarchists
through Anarca-Islam. It is the above stated theories that will
individually and collectively allow me to contest the validity[76] of
that which is politically and ethically assumed of Islam and anarchism.
In this thesis, I argue that post-colonial theory allows Muslims to
challenge and resist assimilationist and racist practices and policies
directed against them by the West. As Jacques Monod argues,
post-colonial theory is premised upon fate (1972). That is,
post-colonial theory is a dividing line differentiating between
necessity and chance, or an ordered and erratic disordered set of
historical circumstances in light of colonial and imperial interventions
upon the Muslim other (Monod, 1970). It allows for the relocation of
post-colonial Muslims in light of âtheir definitive abandonment of an
âold covenantâ [for] the [survivalist] necessity of forging a new
oneâ[77] that can resist the representations ascribed to it by the West
(Monod, 1970). Post-colonial theory is a theoretical form of power that
functions for Muslims, as a singular step towards a âtheoretical
resistance to the mystifying amnesia of...colonial [and imperial]
aftermath(s)â (Gandhi, 1998: 4). That is, it offers Muslims a
discursive, if not also a pragmatic, form of resistance to Eurocentric
biases (Gandhi, 1998: 4; 10; Minh-ha, 1991; Bhabha, 1994). In
particular, it offers resistance to Fundamentalist and Orientalist
readings of Islam and Muslims by the West.
Poststructuralist and deconstructionist political philosophies, in this
thesis, offer a resistance to structuralism, hierarchies and dominant
relations that are established upon the construction of logo-centric[78]
and essentialist or reductionist qualities. Here I have in mind issues
like race, ethnicity, gender, ability, age, sexuality, religion, and
class. Poststructuralist and deconstructionist political philosophies as
discourses and practices therefore serve to challenge âandro-,
phallo-hetero, Euro-, and ethno-centrismsâ (Hutcheon, 1989: 31).
Poststructuralist and deconstructionist political philosophies also
signify the means necessary through which Anarca-Islam will reabsorb and
then counter attack the essentialisms of modernist Western
paradigms[79]. A critical point that I ought note is with respect to
what Jacques Derrida calls deconstruction. As Derrida argues
deconstruction is not a method. Richard Beardsworth explains
deconstruction in this way:
âDerrida is careful to avoid this term [method] because it carries
connotations of a procedural form of judgement. A thinker with a method
has already decided how to proceed, is unable to give him or herself up
to the matter of thought in hand, is a functionary of the criteria which
structure his or her conceptual gestures. For Derrida [...] this is
irresponsibility itself. Thus, to talk of a method in relation to
deconstruction, especially regarding its ethico-political implications,
would appear to go directly against the current of Derridaâs
philosophical adventureâ (1996: 4)
In other words, deconstruction is already always at work in a text. A
theorist does not âdoâ deconstruction. Rather the theorist[80] tries to
bring to the surface fragments of what the text is willing to offer and
reveal of itself from its depth and that is inscribed in it as a text.
Deconstruction is therefore not âthe dismantling of the structure of the
text but a demonstration that it has already dismantled itself, its
apparently-solid ground is no rock, but thin-airâ (Miller, 1976: 34).
In this thesis, post-anarchist theory offers a poststructuralist
interpretation of anarchism that resonates with Anarca-Islam. This is
particularly important considering that classical anarchism âretains the
marks of its birth out of the womb of the European Enlightenmentâ (Day,
2005: 16; May, 1994; Newman, 2001; Call, 2002). Western classical
anarchism emerges out of a Western modernist paradigm and which
poststructuralists and deconstructionists critique. Anarca-Islam is
therefore opposed to Western classical anarchism on this ground and
especially with regards to its dogmatic and essentialist perspective on
religion. Post-anarchism does not share Western classical anarchismâs
essentialist and dogmatic perspective with respect to religion. That is,
post-anarchism is more open to religion than Western classical
anarchism. Furthermore, post-anarchist theory sets itself apart from
other interpretative traditions in anarchism, especially Western
classical anarchism, by recognizing a Foucaultian analysis of power.
That is, post-anarchist theory sees that âpower is decentralizedâ and
therefore takes as one of its central pillars that sites of oppressions
are numerous and are not merely constricted, as in Western classical
anarchism, to the state and capitalism (May, 1994: 12). Again this is in
line with Anarca-Islamâs perspective on power. Power neither operates
from the bottom-up or from the top-down, but rather everywhere, although
points of concentration or conglomeration of power do exist, as will be
discussed in the following chapter. Post-anarchist theory also resonates
with Anarca-Islam because it realizes what is called a
âpoststructuralist critique of representation is, at the political
levelâ and therefore rejects âthe idea that one group or party could
effectively represent the interests of the wholeâ (May, 1994: 12).
Post-anarchist theory therefore refuses to play the role of the vanguard
of anarchism. This resonates with Anarca-Islamâs position[81]. That is,
Anarca-Islam is not intent nor is it going to seek to represent Islam
and Muslims as a collectivity for itself and its own interests. Finally,
post-anarchist theory, and in particular Dayâs work, recognizes the need
for a balance between communal and micro-politics, and again this
resonates with Anarca-Islamâs position and that goes against any
individualist approach to addressing the discourse of Islamic-anarchism,
as highlighted earlier with respect to the works of Bey and Knight.
Social movement theory in thesis is a membrane that indicates âprecisely
this boundary of a continuous two-way movement [to and fro] between an
Inside [theory] and Outside [praxis]â[82] (Deleuze, 1990). It bridges
the gap between academics and activists who are at war at the grassroots
and fighting against capitalism, the state, and numerous other
oppressions. Social movement theory[83] therefore is the space where all
the former theories I identified are manifesting and interacting. Social
movement theory is the source upon which the former theories I discussed
unfold and without which mediation of the theories is, without surprise,
theoretically and pragmatically impossible if not in fact useless to the
grassroots.
With the former theories discussed, I however strongly argue, as
others[84] such as Tariq Ramadan[85] have done, that while Islamic
practices and Muslim cultural practices may intersect, the two practices
are not to be conflated.
My intent here is to distinguish between Islamic principles and Muslim
cultural practices. That is, to clarify the fact that in constructing
Anarca-Islam my goal is neither to reduce Islamic cultural
sensitivities, nor dismiss culture altogether. I consider culture, in
general, and especially Muslim culture as valuable and is historically,
politically, and socially rich. Muslim cultural practices are
heterogeneous motifs by virtue of the fact that they are comprised of
intersecting interactions of ethnic, geo-political, trans-market,
social, and historical webs. Despite the fact that Muslim cultures of
all types do historically possess revolutionary power however, these
Muslim cultural practices in this thesis are viewed as bound to Islamic
principles. Islamic principles and Muslim cultural practices revolve
around and through one another, yet this revolving performance takes
place only in so far as the former does not contradict the latter[86].
As Tariq Ramadan argues, this Islamic theological perspective on culture
is an overarching one. It is a perspective that exists, astonishingly
enough, regardless of whichever culture Muslims identify with or belong
to and whichever interpretative traditions of Islam Muslims choose to
follow. That is, given the fact that all Muslims may differ over the
Sunnah, they however share an identical text: the Koran[87]. When asked
in an interview about the interaction and difference between Islamic
principles and Muslim cultural practices, Ramadan said:
âWe [Western Muslims] need to separate Islamic principles from their
culture of origins and anchor them in the cultural reality of Western
Europe...[We] can incorporate everything thatâs not opposed
to...religion [Islam] into...[Islamic] identityâ (Ramadan, 2009).
Therefore, Ramadanâs perspective, to which I adhere, stems from a desire
to neither abolish culture altogether nor utilize culture to
validate[88] Anarca-Islam. The existence of similar resonances between
Islam and anarchism is not a result of my offering a Westernized reading
of Islam either.
Having discussed Anarchic-Ijtihad and outlined the theories I use in
this thesis, in the following chapter I discuss Anarca-Islamâs relation
to Islam, anarchism and the capitalist-State.
Relation to anarchism, Islam and the capitalist-State
âThere are more ideas on earth than intellectuals imagine. And these
ideas are more active, stronger, more resistant, more passionate than
âpoliticiansâ think. We have to be there at the birth of ideas, the
bursting outward of their force: not in books expressing them, but in
events manifesting this force, in struggles carried on around ideas, for
or against them. Ideas do not rule the world. But it is because the
world has ideas... that it is not passively ruled by those who are its
leaders or those who would like to teach it, once and for all, what it
must think.â
(Michel Foucault, 1978)
In this chapter I sketch the outlines of Anarca-Islam, by identifying
its relation to Islam, anarchism, and the capitalist-State. By the end
of the chapter, having established Anarca-Islamâs relation to anarchism,
Islam, and the capitalist-State, I am prepared to establish
Anarca-Islamâs anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist commitments in
resistance to the capitalist-State in the following chapter.
In the first section of the chapter, I argue for the death of Islam.
Islam is only alive in so far as it manifests itself in the Sunnah and
the Holy Koran. A similar argument to this is posited with respect to
anarchism. That is, that anarchism, like Islam, is dead. Anarchisms,
Western and Non-Western, are only alive in so far as they manifest
themselves in their classical texts. The classical texts include works
such as: Michael Bakuninâs God and The State (1882), Peter Kropotkinâs
Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (1902), Emma Goldmanâs Anarchism and
Other Essays (1910), William Godwinâs Enquiry Concerning Political
Justice and its Influence on Modern Morals and Manners (1793), Sam
Mbahâs African Anarchism: The History of a Movement (1997), Arif
Dirlikâs Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution (1991), and Frank
Fernandezâs Cuban Anarchism: The History of the Movement (2001).
Following my argument for the deaths of Islam and anarchism, I define
Anarca-Islam in terms of its relation to anarchism, and particularly to
post-anarchism. I do this by carrying out a critique of Western
classical anarchismâs Euro-centricity, and a critique of Western
classical anarchismâs perception that power operates strictly at the
macro level, through the modern state and religion. The critique of
Western classical anarchismâs perception of power involves a discussion
of Nietzschean, Foucaultian, and post-anarchistic views of micro and
macro power, which result in micro and macro authoritarian practices
(Day, 2005; May, 1994; Call, 2001; Rolando, 1990; Newman, 2001). This
critique of classical Western anarchism also involves a discussion of
the similarities and the differences between what Todd May refers to in
The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism (1994) as
strategic and tactical political philosophy (10â11). In carrying out the
immanent critique of Western classical anarchism and establishing
Anarca-Islamâs relationship to post-anarchism, Anarca-Islam is defined
as an Islamic reinterpretation of post-anarchism. Having defined
Anarca-Islamâs relation to post-anarchism, I define Anarca-Islamâs
relationship to Islam. Anarca-Islam is defined as a post-anarchic
reinterpretation of Islam. Moreover, seeing that it is a post-anarchic
reinterpretation of Islam I argue that, Anarca-Islam resists the Euro,
phallo and logo centric tendencies that accompany Western classical
anarchist discourses (Day, 2005; Guattari, 1985; Adams, 2003). This
resistance offers Anarca-Islamâs anti-Euro-logo-phallo-centric and
feminized form â Anarca.
In the next section, and in line with Newman (2001), Rolando Perez
(1990), Deleuze and Guattari (1980), I discuss the relationship between
Anarca-Islam and the capitalist-State. I do this by defining a triadic
relationship that consists of: Daddy, symbolizing authoritarian
practices of the types macro and micro, Mommy, symbolizing capitalist
practices, and Me, as an Oedipal subject. Having defined this triadic
relationship, it is critical to note that capitalist practices too are
authoritarian in so far as capitalist practices are intent on
transforming everything in a social space into a commodity for the
forceful extraction of âsurplus valueâ (Marx, 1867: 1055). In this vein,
the triadic relationship, a result of the interaction between the modern
state, capitalism and individuals, is modeled on the Freudian Oedipal
structure of Daddy-Mommy-Me. As Newman argues, in line with Deleuze and
Guattari, a capitalist-State society consists of this Oedipal
relationship, where âcapitalism and the state form a system of
signifiers and axioms that become internalized within individualsâ
(Newman, 2001: 99). In defining the Oedipal relationship according to
these parameters, I discuss the particular role the modern state and
capitalism have with individuals (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 205).
The modern state, according to Deleuze and Guattari, functions as an
âapparatus of capture [which] has a power of appropriationâ (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1980: 437). That is, the modern stateâs role is disciplinarian
and coercive. The modern stateâs goal is the capturing and appropriation
of space in a social field, as the space of an individualâs identity for
instance. In this example of an individualâs identity, the modern state
operates by carving up and hierarchically ordering the space of identity
according to applied labels along lines of race, gender, sexuality,
ethnicity, and ableism, for example. Though capitalismâs role as
mentioned is disciplinarian and coercive, its particular role in the
Oedipal relationship is that of seducing an individualâs desire. That
is, it functions through âinscribing, coding and re-directing [of] the
flow of desire(s) so that they may correspond with the flows of capitalâ
in the market (Perez, 1990: 56). Again, in the example of an
individualâs identity, once the individualâs identification is
facilitated by the modern state, capitalismâs role is materially
exploiting the representations of the individual identities. After
discussing and distinguishing the particular role each parent has with
respect to individuals, I discuss the effects the relationship between
them particularly has on me as an Oedipal subject. That is, I discuss
the relationship between the capitalist-State and me. I discuss the
relationship between them, because as others like Day, Newman, Deleuze
and Guattari, have argued, I believe that the modern state is infinitely
intertwined and bound[89] with capitalism. Therefore, though it is
possible to distinguish between the particular role of each, as Day
argues, âit is clear that the state form and capitalism have grown up
together, in a relationship that while it may be fraught with localized
and short-term animosities, has been in the long term been mutually
beneficialâ (Day, 2005: 142). In the vein of Dayâs analysis,
Anarca-Islamâs relation to the capitalist-State is that it resembles a
clinic that I, an Oedipal subject, attend to become relatively
de-Oedipalized. The clinic is a âparody of the very self-defeating
symptoms,â capitalist and micro and macro authoritarian practices that
led me, an Oedipalized subject, to construct Anarca-Islam in order to
become relatively de-Oedipalized (Al-Kassim, 2007: 115). In other words,
I construct Anarca-Islam as an act of resistance to the
capitalist-State. I do this, while recognizing the impossibility of ever
constructing a space of resistance âfreeâ of capitalist and
authoritarian practices and the representations ascribed to me by the
capitalist-State.
Islam is dead. Islam is only alive in so far as it manifests itself in
the Sunnah and the Koran, besides which there is no monolithic Islam.
Rather, there are a pluralistic series of traditions, perspectives and
cultural discourses radiating from Islam. As Jacques Derrida argues:
âHow dare we talk religion, talk Islam? Of religion, of Islam? The
singularity of religion, the singularity of Islams today? How dare ...we
speak of them in the singular without fear and trembling, this very day?
And so briefly and so quickly?â (1998: 1).
Utilizing Derridaâs question, it is inappropriate[90] to speak of Islam
as a monolith, without the acknowledgment and recognition of the field
and host of possibilities that exist in the specific politicization of a
particular interpretation of Islam in a particular context. The variant
interpretations, or what could be referred to as the names of Islam,
arrive as a consequence of the concept and practice of ijtihad. Ijtihad
therefore serves as mechanism of resistance embedded within Islam in
resistance to Islamâs conception as monolithic. For instance, as a
consequence of ijtihadâs practice during the Iranian revolution of 1979,
Shiâism, a traditional branch of Islam, bore the fruit of the
âIslamic-Leftist Mujahedeen alâKhalqâ, âthe Marxist-Leninist Fedayeen
i-Khalqâ, and âAli Shariatiâs synthesis of Marxism, existentialism,
Heideggerianism [with]... a militant form of âtraditionalâ Shiâismâ
(Afray and Anderson, 2005: 38â40). These interpretations of Shiâism are
just three preliminary examples that bear witness to the power of
ijtihad. In the absence of context, it is blasphemous to pronounce or
write anything with respect to Islam as a whole. As Aziz Al-Azmeh writes
in Islam and Modernities, âthere are as many Islams as there are
situations that sustain itâ (1993: 1).
This argument regarding the âdeath of Islamâ is an argument that is
applicable to anarchism, as anarchism is dead too. Anarchism is only
alive in so far as it manifests itself in its classical and contemporary
texts. Particularly considering that anarchism, like Islam, bears fruit
to a multiplicity of different interpretative traditions. As Jason Adams
writes: âanarchists from all kinds of backgrounds with all kinds of
ideas have sought to make contemporary anarchisms relevant to them in
their own unique situationsâ[91] (2003). The result of the unique
situations is an ample number of variant reinterpretations and
traditions of anarchism. These interpretations of anarchism arrive not
only through the reinterpretation of anarchism, as it is classically
understood as a European tradition. Rather the interpretations include
anarchism, as it is presently understood to possess Non-Western[92]
roots despite the fact that these Non-Western traditions of anarchism
are not as well recognized and publicized as Western interpretations of
anarchism. As Adams writes,
â[that] most available anarchist literature does not tell this history
[of non-Western anarchism] speaks not to a necessarily malicious
disregard of non-Western anarchist movements but rather to the fact that
even in the context of radical publishing, centuries of engrained
eurocentrism has not really been overcomeâ[93] (2003).
Despite this engrained Eurocentrism, anarchism is to be understood as a
pluralistic tradition, enriched with variant interpretations of it like:
anarcha-feminism, anarcho-indigenism, poststructuralist anarchism or
postanarchism, anarcho-primitivism, African-anarchism, Cuban-anarchism,
panther-anarchism and so on and so forth. All the former interpretations
of anarchism are interpretations that arrive from a multitude of
cultures and subcultures that anarchism has come in contact with and
vice versa. If anything, the arrival of these variant interpretations is
a testament to anarchismâs appeal and ability, not to be âreformedâ, but
to be reinvented anew[94]. That is, I argue for the possibility for
anarchism to be made into the image of individuals and communities and
for it to address the particular struggles individuals and communities
encounter.
In light of anarchismâs identification as a pluralistic tradition, it
follows that Anarca-Islam is an Islamic reinterpretation of anarchism,
and more particularly post-anarchism. This Islamic reinterpretation of
post-anarchism is constructed through Anarchic-Ijtihad and the
multiplicity of theories I discussed in chapter three. Using
Anarchic-Ijtihad, I locate, extract, and interrogate Islamic commitments
in post-anarchistic texts, concepts and practices that resonate with the
Islamic interpretative tradition of anarchism I seek. Anarca-Islam
therefore operates on the promise of identifying and coordinating shared
ethico-political commitments between Islam(s) and anarchism(s) using
shared concepts and practices. For pragmatic reasons, in this thesis,
the ethico-political commitments are confined to anti-authoritarian and
anti-capitalist concepts and practices due to the fact that it is these
two commitments that symbolically represent the commitments upon which
classical anarchism was found and continues to predominantly operate.
Anarca-Islam, outside the parameters or confines of the thesis
nevertheless is not confined to the former two commitments. Nor are the
former two commitments regarded to be less or more important than the
ânewâ commitments to be established in the future[95]. Rather, I am
constantly drawn towards the continual search for what I regard as
important Islamic commitments resonating with post-anarchismâs
commitments. These commitments to be established cause an endless series
of transformations of Anarca-Islamâs ever-expanding contour towards
post-anarchism and vice versa. The contour of Anarca-Islam, in a sense,
is therefore constantly made anew. Examples of the future commitments
include, but are not confined to: anti-transphobic, anti-queerphobic,
anti-sexist, anti-racist, anti-Semitic, anti-ageist,
pro-environmentalist and anti-ablest.
There are four reasons that inform Anarca-Islamâs particular resonance
with post-anarchism. The first reason is post-anarchismâs immanent
critique of engrained Eurocentrism in classical Western anarchism. The
second reason is post-anarchismâs stance on religion. That is,
post-anarchism is not anti-religious. It distinguishes between an
individualâs right to hold religious beliefs and the transformation of
such beliefs through institutionalized forms of religion into
authoritarian practices. The third reason is post-anarchismâs immanent
critique of classical Western anarchismâs perspective with respect to
understanding what power is and how exactly it operates. Anarca-Islam,
as I show later, shares and adopts, like post-anarchism, a Foucaultian
and Nietzschean interpretation of power. Anarca-Islam in essence
possesses anti-micro-authoritarian concepts and practices, recognizing
that power plays âeverywhere...flow[ing] through every social relationâ
(Call, 2002: 52â66). This Anarca-Islamic reading of the operation of
power is in line with the generally accepted view amongst
post-anarchists that:
âpower is not essentially repressive (since it âincites, it induces, it
seducesâ); it is practiced before it is possessed (since it is possessed
in only a determinable form, [for instance] that of class [privilege],
and a determined form, that of the State; power passes through the hands
of the mastered no less than the hands of the mastersâ(Deleuze, 2006:
60).
According to this post-anarchistic reading, power is therefore
simultaneously libratory and repressive. However, this reading is
unfortunately not recognized or acknowledged in classical Western
anarchism. That is, classical Western anarchism does not recognize that
microforms of power or micro-power exists nor that power neither
reductively âoperates as many people believe from the top down nor the
bottom upâ (Call, 2002: 66). Rather classical Western anarchismâs
perspective is that power is âconcentrated at the topâ and is always
oppressively exercised âupon the bottomâ (May, 1994: 14). The sole forms
of power classical Western anarchism recognizes are macro forms of it,
through the modern state and capitalism. This classical Western
anarchist perspective therefore dismisses the responsibility, role, and
power individuals in any society have as social actors. That is, it
dismisses the existence of micro-authoritarian practices, settling only
for macro-authoritarian practices. However, in post-anarchism as in
Anarca-Islam, power is âdistributed among those affected by it...at the
bottomâ (May, 1994: 14). According to this analysis, in post-anarchism
and in Anarca-Islam, unlike in classical Western anarchism, individuals
have power, micro-power, that can be used to resist oppression. That is,
individuals are oppressed no less than they are oppressors themselves.
The fourth reason that informs Anarca-Islamâs particular resonance to
post-anarchism is post-anarchismâs immanent critique of classical
Western anarchismâs strict adoption of strategic as opposed to tactical
thinking. That is, in classical Western anarchism âoppressions and
injusticesâ and the possibility for justice pervade and are located in a
single problematic (May, 1994: 10â11). To classical Western anarchism,
the abstract modern state and capitalism are perceived to be the only
forms of oppressive powers that are at play in a social field. Classical
Western anarchism operates strategically, with its first and final
concern resting with the resistance of macro-forms of power. To
classical Western anarchism oppressions like heterosexism, queer-phobia,
racism, ableism, and trans-phobia, etc. are not seen to be as oppressive
as the modern state and capitalism. Classical Western anarchism in
adopting this view operates as if there is a definitive way to
quantitatively evaluate different oppressions. In fact, classical
Western anarchism genealogically and reductively attributes the
existence of the former oppressions to the modern state and capitalism.
In post-anarchism and Anarca-Islam however, power does not originate but
rather conglomerates around not one, but multiple and different sites.
Only then, upon its conglomeration, power interplays âamong these
different sites in the creation of the social worldâ (May, 1994: 10â11).
The interplay implies that oppression does not start nor end with the
modern state and capitalism. As May argues, this is ânot to deny that
there are points where various (and perhaps bolder) lines intersectâ but
rather that âpower does originate at those pointsâ (1994: 10â11).
According to post-anarchism, power thus operates everywhere and in its
operation everywhere offers individuals the means for oppressing and
repressing others at the micro or myopic level. In this sense,
post-anarchists are not interested in reducibly leveling and conflating
oppressions or attributing all oppressions to the modern state and
capitalism. Rather they are interested in analyzing âmutually
intersecting lines of powerâ to contextualize how an oppression visibly
peaks one moment, but then âdisappearsâ only for another oppression to
peak in its stead (May, 1994: 11).
In relation to Islam, Anarca-Islam is defined as a post-anarchic
reinterpretation of Islam in so far as Islam manifests in the Sunnah and
the Holy Koran. I choose to reinterpret Islam as a whole, as opposed to
choosing a particular tradition of Islam to reinterpret and focus on,
because I refuse to privilege one Islamic tradition over the other. Each
tradition exists because of the other. Each tradition possesses âgoodâ
and âbadâ ethico-political concepts and practices. I choose to seek the
âgoodâ in whichever traditions of Islam I encounter to serve for the
interpretation of Islam I am out to construct. In this thesis, this
post-anarchic reinterpretation of Islam then is constructed through
Anarchic-Ijtihad and the multiplicity of theories that I discuss in
chapter three. Using Anarchic-Ijtihad, I locate, extract, and
interrogate post-anarchic commitments, concepts and practices in Islamic
traditions, but particularly as they exist in the Sunnah and the Holy
Koran, such that the concepts and practices I locate resonate with the
post-anarchic interpretative tradition of Islam I seek. Seeing that
Anarca-Islam is a post-anarchic (re) interpretation of Islam then and
given post-anarchismâs critique of engrained Euro, logo, and phallo
centric tendencies in classical Western anarchism Anarca-Islam is
anti-Euro-logo-phallo centric. In this vein, it is Anarca-Islamâs
resistance to Euro, logo, and phallocentricity that leads me to adopt
for Anarca-Islam the feminine âAnarcaâ as opposed to âAnarcho-Islamâ.
âAnarcaâ is moreover adopted to dispel the general Western false image
that all interpretative traditions of Islam are naturally anti-feminist.
For now, and in relation to Islam, Anarca-Islam is grounded in the
anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist commitments, concepts and
practices I find.
In Deleuze and Guattariâs Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia
(1972) Deleuze and Guattari proclaim that presently:
âthe hour of Oedipus draws nighâ by dint of a âprivatization of the
public: the whole world unfolds right at home, without oneâs having to
leave the TV screen...private persons [are given] a very special role in
the system: a role of application, and no longer of implication, in a
code...[the capitalist State] is produced by the conjunction of the
decoded or deterritorialized flows...[while] capitalism merely ensures
the regulation of the axiomaticâ flows (251â252).
Deleuze and Guattari therefore argue that a familyâs been born and to
which individuals in a capitalist-State society are required to submit.
This submission could be in the context of the representations the
capitalist-State offers of different individuals. The capitalist-State
therefore forms an âopen praxis...the subaggregate to which the whole of
the social field is appliedâ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972: 262â265). The
capitalist-Stateâs family is constructed as a triadic hetero-normative
relationship modeled on the Freudian Oedipal structure of
Daddy-Mommy-Me. In this structure, Daddy symbolizes macro and micro
authoritarian practices, Mommy symbolizes capitalist practices and Me,
symbolizes an Oedipalized individual in a capitalist-State society. The
Oedipal relationship is a consequence of interactions between three
parties. The first party is the modern state. The second party is
capitalism and that forces the modern state âto enter with so much force
into the service of the signs of economic powerâ (Deleuze & Guattari,
1977: 252). The third party is an individual in a capitalist-State
society who is trapped as a consequence of his and/or her interaction
with the former two parties[96]. Because of the internalization of this
Oedipal relationship, an individualâs âpotentiality selfmastery and
autonomy is deniedâ (Perez, 1990: 28). The individual becomes someone
who is his and/or her own legislator, desiring his and/or her own
slavery and repression. The repression and slavery is due to an
individualâs unwillingness to create new political alternatives to the
dominating authoritarian and capitalist practices internalized by
individuals and the representations ascribed by the parents to
individuals as a consequence of the Oedipal relationship (Newman, 2001:
99â100).
In discussing the particular role of the modern State and capitalism on
individuals, while maintaining a non-reductionist approach to the role
of either, the task of modern states as Day argues is to:
âstriate the space over which they reign. States hope âto capture flows
of all kindsâ, to make order where is chaos, convert outside into
inside...whatever is outside and not part of the plan is to be brought
in, reduced to a the known, and thereby rendered manageableâ (Day, 2000:
42; Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 59).
Modern states, in the abstract sense, then macro-authoritatively
discipline and coerce individuals. Modern states form maps to divide and
establish walls to cordon and conquer landscapes and social spaces. In
other words, modern states territorialize and striate spaces[97]. The
purpose of the identification is for the modern state to authoritatively
insert the individual into a malleable hierarchy that is established
according to an individualâs race, ethnicity, gender, sexual
orientation, ability and so on and so forth. Any face that does ânot
conform, or seem[s] suspiciousâ and that attempts to escape or deviates
from the modern stateâs grasp is appropriated, disciplined and coerced
back into the hierarchy (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980: 177). As Deleuze and
Guattari note, the modern stateâs objective is to pinpoint and
discipline individuals, and once located a binary logic of âAha! Itâs
not a man and itâs not a woman, so it must be a transvestiteâ is applied
to an individual (1980: 177). The modern state pinpoints through its
establishment of institutions that apply macro-authoritative practices
to individuals by employing regimes of normalization. Normalization âis,
as its name implies, a practice of defining what is normal in a group
and attempting to [hegemonically] hold people to that normâ (May, 1994:
132). That is how, for instance, âracism operates: by the determination
of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man faceâ (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1980: 177). The hegemonic mechanism of establishing a norm by
the modern state therefore operates through ascribing judgments upon an
individualâs body. The judgments are passed upon the individual
regardless of whether an individual exudes, identifies, or possesses
affinity with the macro-authoritatively assigned representations that
led to the individualâs appropriation and insertion into the hierarchy.
But the macro-authoritative practices of institutions such as the
modern-state are not merely confined to disciplining and coercing
individuals through ascribed representations. Rather,
macro-authoritative practices are complicit in the production of
individuals as disciplinarians who have internalized the
macro-authoritative practices and representations produced and applied
by modern states and institutions to individuals. The
macro-authoritative practices, as Deleuze and Guattari write, create
ââlittle command centresâ proliferat[ing] everywhere, making coaches,
teachers and cops all little Mussolinisâ (1980: 228). In Deleuze and
Guattariâs vein, macro-authoritative practices possess the capacity to
colonize individuals. The process of colonization transforms individuals
in a capitalist-State society into micro-fascists in possession of
micro-fascisms[98] during social interactions with other individuals
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1980: 205). Individuals become micro-fascists who
operate according to the hierarchy imposed upon them by the
capitalist-State they have internalized. The hierarchy as noted earlier
is related to a particular set of privileges every individual enjoys a
relation to. The consequence of the play of privileges is the
transformation of individuals into âmicro-Oedipuses, microformations of
power, micro-fascismsâ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980: 205). Here individuals
are transformed into micro-Oedipuses, or the modern state and
capitalismâs handymen, where in each individualâs interaction with other
individuals, the individual possesses the ability and power to affect
others and the power to be affected by the forces and privileges of
others (Deleuze, 2006: 60). According to this analysis, the consequence
of this play of privileges is micro-authoritarian practices indefinitely
at work between individuals and in every social relation.
Contrary to the modern state, capitalism is:
ânot at all territorial: its power of deterritorialization [and
reterritorialization] consists in taking as its object not the earth,
but âmaterialized laborâ, the commodityâ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980:
454).
In applying Deleuze and Guattariâs quote above to the example of
representations constructed by the modern state, capitalismâs task in
the Oedipal relationship is the consumption and appropriation of
individual representations that the modern state assigns. Upon the
appropriation of the representations, capitalism then repeats,
multiplies and therefore produces varying expressions of the
representations, with slight adjustments each time. Capitalism does this
to permit the correspondence of the variant expressions of the
representations it creates to the market. In this sense, capitalism
enables the materialization of the representations the modern state
ascribes to individuals. In line with this understanding, capitalism
permits an individualâs desire[99] to create new forms of expressions
outside what is generically produced by the capitalist-State and
internalized by an individual. Yet âwhenever there is some danger thatâ
these new forms of expressions may take a life of their own, capitalism
reterritorializes the representations and therefore the individual
(Perez, 1990: 55). In this vein, capitalism and its practices are
authoritative and coercive as the modern statesâ, yet its early role
âfrom the startâ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972: 252) is the forceful
enslavement[100] of everything in a social field into the service of the
market. Whether this enslavement is:
âfrom the standpoint of âfreeâ workers; the control of manual labor and
of wages...the flow of industrial and commercial production; the
granting of monopolies, favorable conditions of accumulation, and the
struggle against overproductionâ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972: 253)
Capitalismâs task is thus the material exploitation of a social field.
It seductively creates desire for love and friendships merely to
transform them into something that can be brought and sold on the
market. It therefore assigns relationships a price, engraining in
individuals the capacity to calculate and rationalize relationships.
That is, it breeds in individuals the ability to themselves materialize
their relationships with a friend, a lover, such that the sole purpose
of an individualâs pursuit of friendship with a friend or love for a
lover is born out of egoistic interest. In this vein, capitalismâs
function in the Oedipal relationship is the appropriation of flows[101]
to push an individual further into connecting and consuming, as when a
childâs mouth could connect with a breast, a finger or noise to eat,
suck, or make. Capitalism waits for the childâs desire to appear and
transforms the childâs flow or event into a commoditized exchange.
In adopting and maintaining the same anti-evolutionary approach that
underlies Deleuzeâs, Guattariâs and Dayâs works regarding the conjoined
relationship between the modern state and capitalism, I too believe that
the modern state and capitalism are inseparable. That is, they are
infinitely bound together to form what is referred to as the
capitalist-State (Day, 2005: 142, emphasis added). The function of the
capitalist-State is the conjoined application of the described Oedipal
relationship[102] between the modern state and capitalism to
individuals. That is, individuals are made to feel dependent upon the
Oedipal relationship, incapable of either desiring or constructing
possibilities of life outside the ascribed parameters of the
capitalist-State. According to this analysis, and as a Western Muslim
internalizing this repression, my objective then is to re-channel my
desire as an Oedipalized subject, by inventing[103] a new form of
political action that counters this repression. In my case, it is a
repression that is a consequence of my internalization of the
dichotomous representations of myself as a Fundamentalist or an
Orientalist Muslim that the capitalist-State super-imposes upon me. It
is also a repression that is a consequence of my internalization of
micro-authoritarian and capitalist practices. The form of political
action I choose in resistance to the representations is the construction
of Anarca-Islam as a clinic that allows me to become relatively
de-Oedipalized (Day, 2005: 142â143, emphasis added). In other words, the
clinic is a place I go to in order to seek âtherapyâ and it allows me to
temporarily break free of dichotomous representations, and the
micro-authoritarian and capitalist practices I internalize by
constructing a new political identity as a Muslim anarchist. That is, an
identity, that for now is outside the purview of the representations
imposed on me by the capitalist-State. However, and in constructing the
identity, I also realize that no identity can be âfreeâ of capitalist
and authoritarian practices no matter how creative the identity
constructed may be.
Commitments in Resistance to Daddy-Mommy-Me
âItâs strange that we had to wait for the dreams of colonized peoples to
see that, on the vertices of this pseudo triangle, mommy was dancing
with the missionary, daddy was being fucked by the tax collector, while
the self was being beaten by a white man...Itâs precisely this pairing
of the paternal figures with another nature...their locking embrace
similar to that of wrestlers, that keeps the triangle from closing up
again, from being valid in itself, and from claiming to express or
represent this different nature of the agents that are in question in
the unconscious itself... The Father, mother, and self are at grips
with, and directly coupled to, the elements of the political and
historical situation â the soldier, the cop, the occupier, collaborator,
the radical, the resister, the boss, the bossâs wife who constantly
break all triangulations, and who prevent the entire situation from
falling back on the familial complex and becoming internalized by itâ
(Gilles Deleuze, 1997)
In this chapter I continue the construction of Anarca-Islam by
establishing Anarca-Islamâs anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist
commitments in resistance to the capitalist-State. By the end of the
chapter, having constructed Anarca-Islam, I will have delineated the two
misconceptions, discussed throughout the thesis, of Islam and Muslims
amongst anarchists. The two misconceptions are regarding the
impossibility of constructing either an anarchic interpretation of Islam
or an Islamic interpretation of anarchism, as well as the impossibility
of the coexistence of the identities Muslim and anarchist in a single
subjectivity.
In the first section of the chapter, I construct, using
Anarchic-Ijtihad, Anarca-Islamâs anti-authoritarian commitments with
respect to micro and macro forms of authority. First, I introduce three
micro-anti-authoritarian concepts and practices I extract from Islam:
Shura (mutual consultation), Ijma (community consensus) and Maslaha
(public interest). I read Shura, Ijma and Maslaha as
micro-anti-authoritarian concepts and practices that inform
Anarca-Islamâs commitment to minimizing micro-authoritarian practices
amongst individuals and communities. After reading these concepts and
practices through an anti-authoritarian lens, Shura, Maslaha and Ijma
are collectively taken to inform Anarca-Islamâs anti-micro-authoritarian
commitment in resistance to microforms of authority. From there, given
that âthe State is not a point taking all the other [authoritarian
practices] upon itself, but a resonance chamber for them allâ (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1980: 224), I construct Anarca-Islamâs anti-authoritarian
commitment at the macro-level. Anarca-Islamâs anti-authoritarian
commitment at the macro-level involves an anti-institutional and
anti-statist critique. Anarca-Islamâs anti-institutional commitment is
established through a critique of the Muslim clergy and Sheikhs, who
âwith the coming of [nationalist] independence... increasingly
proclaim[ed] their âattachment to Islam, in a frenzied search for an
ideological guarantee for their social and material
advantagesâ(Rodinson, 1973: 226). After constructing Anarca-Islamâs
anti-institutional commitment, I construct Anarca-Islamâs anti-statist
commitment. In doing so, I go against the Islamic concept Khilafah,
meaning representation, and which is used by the clergy and Sheikhs as
the context for the establishment of an Islamic state. I reinterpret
Khilafah to correspond to âidentifying human beings in general as Godâs
vicegerents [Khalifahs, multiple, in a vehement opposition to the
singular, Khalifah,] on Earth...[with] human stewardship over Godâs
creationsâ (Esposito, 1996: 26).
After constructing Anarca-Islamâs anti-statist commitments, I address
the âauthorityâ of the Prophet Muhammad and God. Regarding the
âauthorityâ of Prophet Muhammad, I argue, using the Koran, that the
Prophet Muhammad is nothing beyond a Rasul, a messenger, for a religious
call, working purely for the sake of the call on behalf of Islam. With
respect to the âauthorityâ of God, I first argue that in Anarca-Islam
âthere is no compulsion in religionâ (The Holy Koran, Chapter 2, Chapter
of âThe Cow:â Verse 26). That is, according to Anarca-Islam and in line
with the Koranic verse cited, anarchists are not required to accept
Anarca-Islamâs God, only to recognize the right of a Muslim to believe
in God. Second, I argue, in line with Newman, that âGod has not been
completely usurped...as has always been claimed [in anarchism]... only
reinvented in the form of essenceâ (2001: 6). According to this
analysis, anarchists ought to acknowledge the difference between
resisting God and resisting institutionalized religion. When anarchists
resist God, God is not truly the subject and object of resistance.
Rather anarchists are resisting institutionalized religion. There is a
difference between the two and therefore the two must not to be
conflated. Having addressed the authority of Prophet Muhammad and God,
Anarca-Islamâs resistance to micro and macro authoritarian practices
will be constructed.
In the next section, I construct, using Anarchic-Ijtihad, Anarca-Islamâs
resistance to capitalism through concepts and practices extracted from
Islam. These concepts include: Property, Communal and Individual
Caretakers, Mudarabah/Musharakah, Riba, Zakat, Ramadan or Sawm, Sadaqat
Al-Fitr and Islamic banking. First, I offer an anti-capitalist reading
of the concept and practice Property. In Anarca-Islam, property is
interpreted as belonging solely to God, with human beings as merely
Caretakers of Godâs property. Property is therefore publicly shared
amongst Caretakers and is not to be privately hoarded as in capitalism.
Second, I offer an anti-capitalist reading of the concept and practice
Caretaker. A Caretaker is a temporary beneficiary and a trustee or
borrower of Godâs property. A Caretakerâs role is that of a borrower and
is thus radically different from that of an absolute owner under
capitalism. There are two types of Caretakers: Communal and Individual.
Communal Caretakers are defined as Caretakers engaged in economic unity
and who are in collective partnerships as a community, dealing in
business matters as âa large number of small firmsâ (Awan, 1983: 30).
However, though Communal Caretakers in Islam are preferred, Individual
Caretakers are permitted because an individual and their desire(s) must
not live in servitude and be forgotten on account of the community. That
is, Individual Caretakers are permitted given that the âconstruction of
healthy communities begins and ends with unique personalities, that the
collective potential is realized only when a singular is freeâ
(Guattari, 1985: 17). However, while Individual Caretakers are permitted
there are three restrictions placed on Individual Caretakers to
establish equilibrium between the desires and rights of an individual
and those of a community. The first restriction is that they are
forbidden from caretaking for natural resources. That is, natural
resources like water or oil for example belong to the whole community,
and all its members have equal shares and rights of access to these
resources. Second, if their caretaking of property is done in an
ignoble, indignant, âmanner, which damages...othersâ then the community
intervenes to prevent them from causing further damage (Ahmad, 1991:
33). Third, is that if âa segment of society is without shelter,
clothing, food, and adequate economic opportunity, then societal
needs...take priority overâ (Ahmad, 1991: 33) the Individual Caretakerâs
rights by virtue of Maslaha. Having offered an anti-capitalist reading
of Caretaker and distinguished between Individual and Communal
Caretakers, I read Mudarabah/Musharakah as Anarca-Islamâs third
anti-capitalist concept and practice. Mudarabah/Musharakah in
Anarca-Islam is interpreted as a communally established
anti-monopolistic and anti-oligopolistic external financial structure,
completely devoid of interest and with the role of encouraging joint
ventures amongst existing Caretakers and new Caretakers.
Having read Mudarabah/Musharakah as an anti-capitalist concept and
practice, I read Riba as Anarca-Islamâs fourth anti-capitalist concept
and practice. Riba, interest, and its âcollection...was and is forbidden
because it...[serves] as a means of exploitingâ all those who undergo
dire and bare poverty (Esposito, 2002: 163). Having read Riba as an
anti-capitalist concept and practice, I read Zakat as Anarca-Islamâs
sixth anti-capitalist concept and practice. Decreed in the Koran, Zakat
is interpreted as an obligatory charity and denotes the perpetual
âdisassociation of oneself from oneâs accrued wealthâ(Cummings, Askari,
Mustafa, 1980: 27â28). I then read Ramadan and its associated Sadaqat
Al-Fitr as Anarca-Islamâs fifth and sixth anti-capitalist concepts and
practices. Ramadan is interpreted as an âact of worship ... [existing
to] lead Muslims to perceive, to feel inwardly, the need to eat and
drink and by extension to ensure that every human being has the means to
subsistâ (Ramadan, 2004: 89). Sadaqat Al-Fitr is interpreted as âanother
[obligatory] charityâ, along with Zakat, and that is given to those poor
and âimposed on every Muslim who has the means for themselves and their
dependentsâ (Budak, 2005: 93â96). Finally, I interpret Islamic Banking
as Anarca-Islamâs seventh anti-capitalist concept and practice. Islamic
Banking in Anarca-Islam is interpreted as an anti-capitalist concept and
practice that offers unrestricted access to financial resources in
banking systems without reference to the criteria of âcreditworthinessâ
(Ahmad, 1991: 46). In concluding the section, I clarify that it is the
anti-capitalist concepts and practices of Property, Communal and
Individual Caretakers, Mudarabah/Musharakah, Riba, Inheritance, Zakat,
Ramadan, Sadaqat Al-Fitr and Islamic banking that now collectively form
Anarca-Islamâs anti-capitalist position of resistance to capitalism.
In the final section, having established Anarca-Islamâs
anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist commitments, I make two claims:
First, that I am no longer Oedipalized but becoming relatively
de-Oedipalized. Second, that Anarca-Islamâs construction is the symbolic
act of delineating the two misconceptions of Islam and Muslims amongst
anarchists.
Practices
Islam seldom offers concrete guidance, in either the Koran or the
Sunnah, regarding macro-politics. Nevertheless, Islam invests in
pragmatic, micro-political concepts and practices. Islam develops the
micro-anti-authoritarian concepts and practices to limit Muslims,
individually, and as a community, from derision (Esposito, 1996: 28). To
dictate Koranically less to Muslims, Islam breeds an alternative sense
of individual and collective responsibility through these
micro-anti-authoritarian practices that are to be applied individually
and by the community. That is, in order to catalyze Muslims in an
anti-authoritarian direction, Islam creates the following
micro-anti-authoritarian concepts and practices as counter-measures to
micro-authoritarian practices: Shura (mutual consultation), Ijma
(community consensus) and Maslaha (public interest) (Esposito, 1996:
28).
This section will start with Shura as Anarca-Islamâs first
micro-anti-authoritarian concept and practice, signifying
ââconsultationâ, âconcertationâ or âdeliberationââ (Ramadan, 2001: 81).
Shura is not just a micro-anti-authoritarian concept and practice, but
rather is of critical importance, as evidenced by its having been named
and prescribed as a chapter, number 42, in the Holy Koran, Surrâat
Al-Shura; The Chapter of âThe Counselâ. This is the extent to which God
emphasized Shuraâs criticality. In this chapter, we can read:
â...but what is with God is better and more enduring for those who
believe and put their trust in their Lord...[than] those who avoid the
heinous sins and indecencies and when they are angry forgive, and those
who answer their Lord, and perform the prayer, their affair being
counsel between them, and they expend of that We have provided them...â
(The Holy Koran, Chapter 42: The Chapter of âThe Councilâ, Verses:
36â38).
In this verse God describes âthe enduring Muslim believerâ as a Muslim
who conducts his and her âaffairs through counselâ or mutual
consultation. The Koran therefore envisages âthe ... Ummah as a
perfectly egalitarian, open society based on good will and cooperationâ
with each Muslim, advised to seek Shura with âthe otherâ Muslim
(Esposito, 1996: 28). In other words, through Shura, Muslims,
individually and collectively, are encouraged to embody, each towards
the other, the essence of the practice described in the following words:
âIf you see me in the right, help me; if you see me in error correct
me...If any of you sees distortion in my actions, let him [and her]
rectify meâ (Ramadan, 2001: 83). To beckon for help, to beckon for
advice, is Islamically tantamount to humbling oneself in comprehending
the ârightsâ and the âwrongsâ of the self and hence caring for that
self. Muslims are to perceive these ârightsâ and âwrongsâ by
contemplating comprehensively and reflecting indefinitely, through
ijtihad, on the ethico-political commitments they espouse. For how else
can a Muslim seek counsel without comprehending, to a fair degree, the
ethical-political commitments they commit to or are charged with while
acknowledging the sets of privileges enjoyed by each Muslim (Ramadan,
2001: 83)? In this vein, Shura necessitates a âkind of radical personal
responsibilityâ, a jihad, on the part of each individual Muslim and a
responsibility to engage in internal molecular insurrections[104]
(Guattari and Negri, 1985: 116). As related in the Sunnah regarding
these insurrections:
Imam Jaâfar al-Sadiq (a) said: âThe Prophet (s) of God dispatched a
contingent of the army (to the battlefront). Upon their (successful)
return, he (s) said: âBlessed are those who have performed the minor
jihad and have yet to perform the major jihad.â When asked, âWhat is the
major jihad?â the Prophet (s) replied: âThe jihad of the self (struggle
against self)ââ(Al-Majlisi, Vol. 19: 182, hadith no. 31)
These insurrections therefore create room for the comfort and safety of
a Muslim in the Muslimâs community. They enable a Muslim to humble him
and/or her self publicly as an ethically and politically conscious
individual. That is, an ethico-political individual, who thrives in
seeking Shura with respect to other Muslims, and an ethico-political
individual who asks and trusts others to rectify his and/or her
politically and ethically distorted acts. This ability to ask and trust
other Muslims also demands a Muslimâs consciousness of the individual
ethico-political commitments that he and/or she espouses with respect to
their relationship to others. Accordingly, Islam, having recognized the
necessity of Shura sought to constitute Muslims as ethically-politically
conscious individuals, with each aware of their occupying and occupied
surroundings. In other words, due to a Muslimâs power dynamics in
relations to others as a concurrently singular individual as well as
being part of a community, God commands Shura as a form of retaliation
to micro-fascisms. Islam recognizes the necessity for constructing a
non-egoistic[105] spirit, to be engrained by Muslims, individually and
collectively, through the practice of Shura. In this vein, Islam
recognizes that social and political âorganizing signifies first, work
on one self, in as much as one is a collective âsingularityââ as âthatâ
singularity, in the end, constitutes, and contributes to the
collectivity (Guattari and Negri, 1985: 116).
Through Shura, a Muslim arrives, Islamically, at an understanding of the
dynamics of micro-power, and micro-fascisms that grow as a consequence
of pride. Shuraâs practice on an individual and a collective level
becomes a practice that is warranted to minimize dominating and
oppressive micro-authoritarian power relations occurring at the myopic
level. Islam targets micro-fascisms by recognizing micro-powerâs passing
through the domestic hands of the mastered no less than through the
hands of the masters. We can find Islamâs recognition of micro-fascisms
in the Koranic verse below, particularly with the emphasis on
micro-power existing in the word âinnerselvesâ:
âVerily God does not change peopleâs condition, unless they change their
inner-selvesâ (The Holy Koran, Chapter 13: Chapter of âYusufâ, Verse:
11).
Combating pride is therefore the heart of Islamâs Shura, as pride is at
the heart of micro-fascisms. As Spinoza writes of pride:
â...A man [and/or woman] is proud if he [and/or she] thinks too little
of other people [to seek their advice]...the proud man [and/or woman] is
necessarily envious [enough of the opinion of others]...he [and/or she]
hates those above all others who are the most praised on account of
their virtues. It follows, too, that his [and/or her] hatred of them is
not easily overcome by love or kindnessâ (1949: 229â230).
But Shura is not solely prescribed for its application to a group of
individuals beckoning for each otherâs call for counsel. Rather Shuraâs
prescription is for its everlasting engagement with the entire
community. Shura exists âto guide the communityâs decision-making
processâ (Esposito, 1996: 28). In its collective application, Shura
proffers a committed sense of communal cohesiveness. It breeds and
manifests in a community a shared notion of mutual responsibility. A
mutual responsibility, which too rises in Shuraâs varied communal form
when exercised during Ijma â Anarca-Islamâs second
micro-anti-authoritarian concept and practice.
Ijma is the pertinent practice required by a Muslim community in seeking
âconsensusâ, through Shura, on matters pertaining to the community as a
whole (AlâAwani, 1993: 24). For it is narrated, regarding Ijma, that
âupon the first confrontation of with the people of Makka at Badr,
[Prophet] Muhammad called his Companions: âO people! Share with me your
viewsâ (Ramadan, 2001: 82). Ijma stresses and calls for a well-spirited,
extenuated bonding, which ought to be embedded within a community,
particularly with respect to what is consensually agreed upon
collectively, through Shuraâs exercise by virtue of Maslaha â
Anarca-Islamâs third micro-anti-authoritarian concept and practice.
Maslaha is the communityâs search for and effort towards the
establishment of its political, as well as social, survivalist
necessities or interests. It is âthe principle of the âpublic interestââ
(AlâAwani, 1993: 75). Although it is possible that differences and
disagreements may surface in the absence of Ijma or consensus over
issues that pertains to the communityâs Maslaha, Islam develops an
ethics of disagreement in the event of disagreements as discussed in
chapter one. Under the presumption however that consensus is achieved
the concept and practice of Maslaha ought not be taken with requisite
delicacy, in spite of its ostensible ideality. That is, because Maslaha
has to âprovide benefit to individuals and the community as a whole and
not only to a class or an individualâ, Maslaha reemphasises the Islamic
importance of seeking an egalitarian community (Ramadan, 1999: 80). In
this vein, the micro-anti-authoritarian practice of Maslaha is âat the
essence of [communal] Islamic commandsâ and principles (Ramadan, 1998:
81). It is a command and principle that denotes the communityâs
collective search and struggle for not merely its cohesive existence,
but rather its existence as a healthy egalitarian community. That is, a
community striving to become egalitarian having comprehended its
necessities and cared for its mutual interests[106].
Ultimately, no singular individual or collective is immune to micro or
macro fascisms, irrespective of the quantity or the intensity of Shura,
Maslaha and Ijma practiced as micro-anti-authoritarian practices.
Nevertheless, these micro-anti-authoritarian practices assist in warding
off micro-fascisms, individually and collectively. In other words,
provided there is acknowledgment amongst the community of the
distinction between an individualâs personal opinions and the opinions
of the community. Islamically, an individual reserves the inherent right
not to seek consultation or the conduct of Shura. However, this
individualâs right[107] not to seek Shura exists only with respect to
what pertains to the individual. In the end, above a singular
individual, the giving of dues to Maslaha is indefinitely final. Maslaha
is always over and above the individual for that is precisely the reason
upon which Maslaha was Islamically prescribed to begin with (Al-Awani,
1993: 129).
To end the discussion of the themes of Shura, Maslaha and Ijma, I
identify Anarca-Islam through other Islamic interpretations. That is,
Anarca-Islamâs micro-authoritarian stance is not built upon the
âclassical doctrine of Shura, as it developed, [and] was in
error...[where] it viewed consultation as the process of one
person...asking other people for adviceâ (Esposito, 1996: 28). What I
advocate for and what Anarca-Islam demands is quite the opposite. That
is, that âthe Koranic understanding of Shura does not mean that one
person ask others advice, but rather refers to a process of mutual
advice through mutual consultationâ (Esposito, 1996: 28). Mutual
consultation, Shura, in so far as Anarca-Islam is concerned, must be
accompanied by Shuraâs multiple form, Ijma, which complements the lively
simultaneous practice of the individualized Shura on the personal
stratum with a preservation of Maslaha. Ultimately, as the Prophet
Muhammad proclaimed in Khutubatul Wadaâa, the last sermon given prior to
his death, regarding the necessity of Islamic egalitarianism:
âAll humankind is from Adam and Eve, an Arab has no superiority over a
non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab; also a white
has no superiority over black nor a black has any superiority over white
except by piety and good action... Nothing shall be legitimate to a
Muslim, which belongs to a fellow Muslim unless it was given freely and
willingly. Do not, therefore, do injustice to yourselvesâ[108].
The former overarching anarchic reading of the concepts and practices of
Shura, Ijma and Maslaha are collectively Anarca-Islamâs
micro-anti-authoritarian principles, unveiled using Anarchic-Ijtihad.
Over these principles there can be no compromise.
Before moving on to a discussion of Anarca-Islamâs
macro-anti-authoritarian principles, it is critical to clarify a few
matters. As stated earlier, generally, Islam offers little in concrete
guidance in the Koran or the Sunnah on macro-politics. With respect to
the arena of macro-politics, Koranic access is only offered to abstract
principles (Ramadan, 2001: 148). However, in general, any âhierarchal,
dictatorial system has been condemned as non-Islamicâ (Esposito, 1996:
25). The premise for the condemnation is the notion of God as the sole
sovereign and âprotector of rightsâ for all beings in the Islamic
concept Tawheed. Tawheed is âthe paramount duty of [a Muslim to solely]
affirm the oneness [, and thereby, the Absolute Authority,] of Godâ and
none other but God, human or otherwise (Alâawani, 1993: 2). With Tawheed
affirmed, God affords Muslims the right to embrace âanyâ macro-political
structure Muslims deem fit. That is, the right to orient
macro-politically is entrusted to a Muslim community. This is contingent
upon the guarantee that the macro-political structure chosen by a Muslim
community does not contradict the concept of Tawheed and the practices
Shura, Ijma and Maslaha (Ramadan, 2001: 148). God intends this right as
a merciful act for Muslims so that they can adapt to differing
geographical, spatial, temporal and historical circumstances (Ramadan,
2001: 148). Given these requirements, the macro-political orientation
adopted by Muslims could thus be anarchistic in its approach and
viewpoints.
This potential to render Islamic practice compatible with anarchism has
nevertheless been subverted by Monarchies of Meccan Kingdoms with
Sheikhs[109] and Muslim clergy ushered in by European colonialism.
Historically, this occurred during Europeâs imperialist fragmentation of
Islam in the 19^(th) century, and resulted in the abandonment of its
former native principles for Europeanized institutions via a gradual
transition towards nationalism (Abdul-Rauf, 1978: 13). Muslim clergy and
Sheikhs thus came into being and ânon-Islamic dynastic notionsâ were
introduced into Islam (Abdul-Rauf, 1978: 13). Currently, dynasties of
successive heirs have come to inherit âconcentrated power and corruptive
influences [preserved amidst their]... families and... entouragesâ for
generations to come (Abdul-Rauf, 1978: 13). While the Sheikhs
concentrated their power, a new generation of self-righteous Muslim
clergy also arrived to institutionalize Islam as in the example of
Al-Azhar Islamic University in Cairo, Egypt. This new generation of
Muslim clergy arriving with the Sheikhs is very similar to the earlier
generation of Muslim clergy who shut the door of ijtihad during the
Abbasids. As Max Rodinson argues, this new generation of Muslim clergy
âwith the coming of [nationalist] independence...gradually...[rose] on
the social scale...[alongside] the (more or less exploiting) upper
strata [who] increasingly proclaim[ed] their âattachment to Islam, in a
frenzied search for an ideological guarantee for their social and
material advantagesâ(Rodinson, 1973: 226).
In institutionalizing[110] Islamic knowledge the Muslim clergy
simultaneously opted for Europeanized institutions, dismissing the
imperative of Shura, Maslaha or Ijma as public and open practices. In
dismissing the rightful public practice of Shura, Ijma, and Maslaha, the
Muslim clergy violated a right decreed by God for Muslims to partake in
the interrogation of knowledge (Esposito, 1996: 26). This is
particularly important considering that seeking knowledge is a vital
task of Muslims. As Anas Ibn Maalik reports, the Prophet Muhammad said:
âSeeking knowledge is incumbent on every Muslim; he [and/or she] who
offers knowledge to those who do not appreciate it, is like the one who
decorates pigs with precious stones, pearls and goldâ[111]
The right violated by the clergy is one which âno authority, no leader,
no government, no assembly can restrict, abrogate or violate in any wayâ
(Arkoun, 1994: 106). The clergyâs corruption, as well as the fact that
they sought the accumulation of power in the consolidation of Islam when
Muslims did not elect the clergy as a representative[112] voice for
Islam, violates key Islamic principles. As a result of the overarching
corruption of the Muslim clergy, their disregard for what are divine
rights, and the clergyâs settlement for the adoption of Europeanized
institutions, Anarca-Islam is principled upon an anti-institutional
commitment. Over this commitment there is no compromise.
But the Muslim clergy did not only institutionalize Islam and advocate
for the adoption of Europeanized institutions as a mechanism of
controlling public knowledge, they also legitimized the authority of
Sheikhs using the Islamic concept Khilafah (Badiou, 2003: 149). That is,
Khilafah became the context the clergy manipulated to correspond to the
âdire necessityâ for kinship as a type of ruler-ship. Furthermore,
Khilifah became the justification used by the Sheikhs and the clergy for
the adoption of the Eurocentric[113] notion of upholding an Islamic
state. Khilifah âaccording to the Arabic lexicon means
ârepresentationâ...in addition to the connotations of ...a deputy [or]
representativeâ (Esposito, 1996: 26). Classically, the choosing of such
deputies occurred âby means of elections, a representative system or any
other original ideasâ (Ramadan, 2001: 148). The criteria for choosing a
representative included âall the conditions that allow Muslims the
opportunity to choose with full knowledge of the factsâ regarding
representatives (Ramadan, 2001: 148). The second criterion holds that
âany pressure or attempt at coercion, to influence public opinionâ is
unacceptable (Ramadan, 2001: 148). The classical criteria therefore
operate upon three presumptions. First, that Muslims participate in the
decision-making processes of choosing. Second, choosing without being
coerced by any means, measure or standard. Last, Muslims must possess
all the âfactsâ with respect to the field of candidates or
representatives from which they are to select. Nevertheless in light of
ignorance, illiteracy, poverty, corruption, and misery, social phenomena
rather rampant and predominant within societies, such criteria cannot be
fulfilled Islamically due to the failure to meet every condition
(Ramadan, 2001: 148). This un-fulfilment of every condition obstructs
the participation of grass-root Muslims in the process of choosing a
representative according to the classical principles and criteria
(Ramadan, 2001: 148). This move of the Muslim clergy, adhering to the
classical lexicon of Khilafah, clearly does not hold. Furthermore, it
undermines and clashes with the Koranically commanded
micro-anti-authoritarian practices Ijma, Maslaha, and Shura.
Given the absence of fulfilment of the conditions required for the
Khilifah, as the ânon-binding nature of the idea itselfâ, there can be
no doubt that a truly radical interpretation ought be posited in its
stead (Esposito, 1996: 26). Anarca-Islamâs anti-statist commitment
emerges therefore by marking a radically different ethical-political
territory[114] in reference to Khilafah. In resisting the classical view
of Khilafah, I contend that Muslims en masse are bearers of Godâs trust.
Muslims are collectively caretakers of one another and their affairs. As
it is assuredly:
âpossible to interpret...the Koran as identifying human beings in
general as Godâs vicegerents [Khalifahs, multiple, in opposition to the
singular, Khalifah,] on Earth...[with] human stewardship over Godâs
creationsâ (Esposito, 1996: 26).
In order to interpret Khilafah as multiple, it therefore follows that
upon a Muslimâs subscription âto the principle of Tawheed...Muslims are
then collectively and as a group ready to fulfil their responsibilities
of representation towards one anotherâ (Esposito, 1996: 26). According
to this analysis, each Muslim is then worthy of âthe responsibility of
the Khilafah ... [and] each one shares the divine Khilafahâ (Esposito,
1996: 26). That is, in this divine Khilafah, every Muslim in an Ummah, a
Muslim community, âenjoys the rights and powers of the Khilafah and in
that respect all individuals are equalâ (Esposito, 1996: 26). This
analysis that Khilafah ought to be interpreted as multiple is also
confirmed in Islamâs Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1996) that
emphasizes, âthat the ultimate objective of the Ummah, Muslim community,
... is to reach the level of self-governanceâ (Esposito, 1996: 26).
To conclude and concretely establish Anarca-Islamâs anti-statist
commitment, it is in reinterpretation of Khilafah from singular to
multiple that there is âa foundation for concepts of human
responsibility...of opposition to systems of dominationâ (Esposito,
1996: 26). Anarca-Islamâs anti-statist commitment is therefore informed
by two positions: First, an appreciation for human responsibility, where
individuals are responsible for themselves and for each other; second,
an opposition to systems of domination, given they contradict Tawheed,
This anti-statist commitment is the only way for âconsultation (Shurah),
consensus (Ijma) and independent interpretative judgments (ijtihad)â
(Esposito, 1996: 26) to be preserved and not contradict Koranically
decreed Muslim concepts and practices. That is, it is only with
Anarca-Islamâs anti-statist commitment that there may truly be a
âtransfer of power of ijtihad from individual representatives of schools
to Muslim legislative assemblies which in view of the growth of
âopposingâ sects is the only form of Ijmaâ possible (Esposito, 1996:
27). This type of Ijma would allow for contributions to and discussions
from lay Muslims who desire and have a right to publicly participate in
political decision-making processes (Esposito, 1996: 27). This is how an
anti-statist Anarca-Islam, an egalitarian Islam becomes possible.
The two remaining figures of authority â upon the failure of the
classical Khilafah and due to the âlack of any further [political]
generalities or specificitiesâ â are the Prophet Muhammad and God
(Esposito, 1996: 25). With regards to the former, Muslims ought to
appreciate everything that the Prophet Muhammad taught. However, a
prophet merely signifies prophecy, nothing beyond. Accordingly, Prophet
Muhammad â peace be upon him â is not a Sheikh or God. The Prophet
Muhammadâs function is nothing beyond that of a Rasul, a messenger, for
a conveyer of a religious call, purely for the sake of the call, on
behalf of Islam. Unblemished by the desire to rule[115], Prophet
Muhammad was not called forth to rule. Sufficient evidence justifying
this stance has been provided in three Koranic verses. The first Koranic
verse is: âSay (O Muhammad) that I am a man like youâ (The Holy Koran,
Chapter 18, Chapter of âThe Caveâ: Verse 110). The second Koranic verse
is: âSay I [Muhammad] am nothing but a man and a messengerâ Chapter 41,
Chapter of âExplained in Detailâ: Verse 6). In this vein, a third
Koranic verse was revealed to address directly the scope of Prophet
Muhammadâs authority. The third verse is:
âFor those who take as AwliyĂąâ [guardians, supporters, helpers,
protectors, etc.] others besides Him [i.e. whom take other deities,
other than AllĂąh as protectors, and worship them, even then] AllĂąh is
HafĂźz [Protector] over them [i.e. takes care of their deeds and will
recompense them], and you [O Muhammad] are not a WakĂźl [guardian or a
disposer of their affairs or have say] over themâ (The Holy Koran,
Chapter 42, Chapter of âThe Councilâ: Verse 6).
This verse reaffirms that God is an Absolute Authority with respect to
Muslims and Non-Muslims, and that the Prophet Muhammad himself is
forbidden from becoming a Wakil, a guardian, or a disposer of affairs or
having a say over Non-Muslims. According to this analysis, the Prophet
Muhammadâs âauthorityâ ought to be put to rest.
As for the âauthorityâ of God, it is pivotal to first understand that in
Anarca-Islam âLa ikrah Fiâd-dinâ (The Holy Koran, Chapter 2, Chapter of
âThe Cowâ: Verse 26). That is, there is no compulsion in religion. In
this vein, Anarca-Islam is not concerned with âtaking overâ,
âconqueringâ or âconvertingâ anarchists or anyone to either Islam or
Anarca-Islam. Rather, Anarca-Islam is determined through exchange and
the offering of an extended arm to individuals and communities who
espouse ethico-political commitments that resonate with those of
Anarca-Islams. In other words, Anarca-Islam could care less should
anarchists or anyone choose to believe in God, the Prophet Muhammad or
Islam. For it has been foretold, in the Sunnah that:
âIt is narrated through Thauban, that the Prophet peace be upon him
said: â[Upon the approaching of the day of judgement,] you [Muslims]
shall be in great numbers, but you will be as powerless as the foam of
the waves of the seaâ due to feebleness in hima, political-ethical vigor
of spirit (Prophet Hadeeth, Sunan Abu Dawud, Book 37, Number 4297).
Anarca-Islam is not interested in giving rise to mass-produced[116]
anarchist converts, nor does it require that anyone else become
conquered colonial Muslims.
Second, as Newman argues, anarchism has:
ânot ousted God ...[as anti-religious anarchists would have hoped
because] the place of authority of the category of the divine remains
intact, only re-inscribed in the demand for presence...Atheism changes
nothing in this fundamental structureâ (Newman, 2001: 6).
In this vein, anti-religious anarchists ought to concede that within a
scenario where anti-religious anarchists proclaim and chant âGod is
deadâ, as other religious anarchists argue[117] for the possibility and
the usefulness of divine presence within their lives, both remain
trapped in the unverifiable empirical existence of either Godâs life or
death. All that could result then â from the inexhaustible deliberation
or the cruel argumentation over this moot point â is a massive loathsome
expansion of dogmatic, essentialist, and flattened-out perceptions of
the world. These conceptions merely enhance micro-fascist tendencies
internalised amongst religious and anti-religious anarchists, while both
are aligned to cherish anarchic sensibilities and mutually resist common
enemies. According to this analysis[118], as far as Anarca-Islam
perceives it, and is committed, every politically and ethically
committed individual is a rightful bearer of âthe trustâ[119] in
themselves and the community. In this vein, the issue of Godâs authority
ought to be put to rest.
Having put to rest the question of the âauthorityâ of the Prophet
Muhammad and God, I hope to have made clear that my focus is on the
micro-anti-authoritarian concepts and practices, and the
anti-institutional and anti-statist commitments, that collectively
inform Anarca-Islamâs anti-authoritarianism. I will now return to the
level of the conceptual and practical inscriptions of Islam, where we
may discover, using Anarchic-Ijtihad, an ensemble of fundamentally
anti-capitalist concepts and practices, which complement its
anti-authoritarian leanings.
Practices
The first anti-capitalist concept and practice I want to discuss is
Property[120]. In Islam, property belongs to God. Human beings are
merely Caretakers of Godâs property. For it is stated in the Koran:
âO believers, expend of the good things you have earned, and of what We
have produced for you from the earth; and intend not the corruption of
it for your expending, for you would never take it yourselves...Those
who expend...night and day, secretly and in public, their wage awaits
them with their Lord, and no fear shall be on them; neither shall they
sorrowâ (The Holy Koran: Chapter 2, Chapter of âThe Cowâ: Verse 269).
It is in the divinely stated words: âWe have produced for you...for you
would never take it yourselvesâ that we can see that property is
produced and owned by God (Hasan & Siddiqi, 1984: 91). Godâs maxim and
intent is for property to be shared and distributed in equity by
Caretakers whom God had entrusted with Godâs property (Cummings, Askari,
Mustafa, 1980: 37). God ordains property as divinely possessed, to
circumscribe the hoarding of property by Caretakers. No Caretaker may
deprive another Caretaker from property, even if by force. This is
because the right of access to property is a divinely decreed right by
God, and is amongst a set of other divinely ordained rights referred to
as Al-Dururiyat Al-Khamas, or the fundamental qualities of life
(Cummings, Askari, Mustafa, 1980: 37). Al-Dururiyat Al-Khamas are five
divinely protected and sanctioned rights, two of which are property and
life (Cummings, Askari, Mustafa, 1980: 37). The role of a human being,
as noted, is the temporary caretaking for or âborrowingâ of Godâs
property. As Esposito argues, âeverything ultimately belong to
God...human beings are simply Caretakers, or vicegerents, for Godâs
propertyâ on Earth (Esposito, 2001: 165). Upon death and resurrection, a
Caretaker is accountable to God. That is, on the Day of Judgement, God
is the Witness and Absolute Judge of the Caretakerâs role in the
Caretakerâs âpartnershipâ with God. God judges whether the Caretaker
betrayed and corrupted the entrusted property or not. Property is thus
publicly entrusted, owned[121] by God, and to be collectively and
equitably shared by Caretakers[122] and not privately hoarded. Read in
this manner, property is an anti-capitalist concept and practice.
With property absolutely possessed by God, as noted, a unique economic
relationship emerges: God-Caretaker. A Caretaker is a temporary
âbeneficiaryâ, a âtrusteeâ or borrower of Godâs property, nothing more.
A Caretaker is not an absolute owner as under capitalism. A Caretaker
cannot become a capitalist, if the Caretaker is to fulfil the concept
and practice of caretaking (Cummings, Askari, Mustafa, 1980: 36).
Rather, a Caretaker has two types of available economic relationships
with God and with other Caretakers in Godâs community. The Caretaker can
either become an Individual and/or a Communal Caretaker.
Communal Caretakers are Caretakers who are engaged in economic unity and
collective partnerships. They deal in business matters as âa large
number of small firmsâ through borrowed property from God (Awan, 1983:
30). Communal Caretakers, are expected to âconduct their affairs by
mutual consultationâ by virtue of Shura and Ijma (Awan, 1983: 30).
According to this analysis, small firms co-borrowed by Communal
Caretakers from God and with Ijma from the community differ from
worker-owner relationships under capitalism. Furthermore, this economic
structure distances a Muslim communityâs economy from being economically
centralized and controlled by monopolies and oligopolies as under
capitalism. Instead, a Muslim communityâs economic system is
decentralized. That is, it is a system structurally comprised of a
multiplicity of decentralized small firms co-borrowed from God, with
each small firm constituted by a group of Communal Caretakers in
collective partnership. Communal Caretakers choose which small firm they
partake in. The collective partnership in each small firm is continually
transforming through the entry and exists of other Communal Caretakers
in a community into the small firm (Awan, 1983: 31). That is, the small
firms are open to âeveryoneâ in the community to participate in,
provided they adhere to certain particular ethico-political principles
over which there exist Ijma. In this vein, Communal Caretakers are
capable of entry and exit into or out of a small firm without having to
deal with âcapitalist suppliers, [and] planning authoritiesâ (Awan,
1983: 32). In this interpretation of Islam, the ethico-political
principles involve upholding anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist
commitments. According to this analysis, comfort, safety and a
collective sense of shared ethical-political commitment amongst Communal
Caretakers are bred as a result of this relationship between Communal
Caretakers and property (Wilson, 1997: 134). This entry and exist of a
new Communal Caretaker into an established small firm also minimizes the
possibility of the concretization of the partnership of the small firm
amongst existing Communal Caretakers. Communal Caretakers from this
Islamic perspective are therefore expected to be Caretakers who are
conducting their affairs collectively in Shirakah, partnership, with God
and with each other (Awan, 1983: 32). It is under Shirakah and this
decentralized Islamic economic structure that Communal Caretakers in
Islam can truly become worthy human beings capable of deciding âfreely
[, Ikhtiyâar,]...[to participate or not] without outside influenceâ in a
small firm of their choosing (Awan, 1983: 32). With all Communal
Caretakers equal before God, each Communal Caretakerâs voice contributes
to the decision-making processes of the small firm and each Communal
Caretakerâs voice is respected (Cummings, Askar, Mustafa, 1980: 44).
Communal Caretakers in Islam are thus afforded âa dignity in keeping
with ... [their] status as ... vicegerent[s] of God on earth...[whose]
return[s] can take the form of...a share in the useful profit of
enterpriseâ (Ahmad, 1991: 37).
Although Communal Caretakers are preferred in Islam, Individual
Caretakers are permitted. That is, Islam offers room and appreciation
for the arrival and survival of the unique and the singular, the stem of
every collective root, that is, the Caretaker as an individual
(Esposito, 1980: 42). The logic behind the Islamic right to become an
Individual Caretaker is that an individual must not be compelled to live
in servitude and forgotten in an act of forceful enslavement on account
of the whim of a community. As Guattari and Negri argue:
âthe most important lesson is that the construction of healthy
communities begins and ends with unique personalities, that the
collective potential is realized only when a singular is freeâ (1985:
17).
In Islam, it is therefore unnecessary to privilege the right of the
community over the individual, or the right of the individual over the
community, as both are interdependent. In Islam, âthe death of the
individualâ and âthe death of the communalâ denote extremes. Islam
therefore advocates for moderation, preserving an individualâs right to
introduce new desires into the individualâs corresponding social field,
while maintaining its position with respect to the importance of a
communityâs Maslaha. It is not necessary that a community explore the
same zone of desire that an individual might. And it is equally not
necessary that an individualâs desire be driven by an individualistic
ego or result in the exploitation of his and/or her community. Rather,
an individualâs desire may be guided by an individualâs search for a
communityâs Maslaha. Nepotism then is as lethal[123] to a communityâs
healthy existence as individualism is under capitalism, since nepotism
usurps and strips individual autonomy. Islam rejects the extremes of
both capitalism and communism. For as Guattari and Negri argue:
âCapitalism and Socialism have only succeeded in...[subjugating] work to
a social mechanism which is logo-centric or paranoid,
authoritarian...[resulting in that which is] destructiveâ (1985: 14).
According to this analysis, Individual Caretakers may exist as a small
firm. The Individual Caretakerâs small firm, as with Communal
Caretakers, remain unconditionally and conditionally open for other
Caretakers in the community to partake in. Therefore, while Individual
Caretakers are permitted the right to exist, Individual Caretakers are
restricted by three impediments that Individual Caretakers are not to
exceed. These impediments exist because it is expected that differences
in Mal, money, between Caretakers will naturally arise. The difference
in Mal is a consequence of differences in productivity and work ethics
between Caretakers. That is, some Caretakers may enjoy working a lot
while others may prefer to work less. There is no reason in the end that
the two should earn the same Mal. Nevertheless, the difference in Mal,
changes nothing with respect to the preservation of the latterâs right
to a decent quality of life in light of Al-Dururiyat Al-Khamas.
The first impediment an Individual Caretaker is restricted from
proclaiming base or natural[124] resources (Cummings, Askari, Mustafa,
1980: 41; Ahmad, 1991: 33). The Individual Caretakerâs community because
of the virtue of the communityâs Maslaha enforces this forbiddance.
Therefore, an Individual Caretaker is only permitted to borrow specific
types of property. As Cummings, Askari and Musafa argue, an Individual
Caretaker is forbidden from:
âNatural resources in the universe, such as land, capital, general
circumstances such as shortages for reasons of war or disasters as well
as laws of nature, all these belong to the whole of society, and all its
members have equal shares and rights of access to themâ (Cummings,
Askari, Musafa: 1980: 31).
The second impediment is that if an Individual Caretakerâs use of
property is accomplished in an ignoble, indignant, âmanner, which
damages...othersâ then the community is to intervene and stop an
Individual Caretaker from inflicting further harm or damage (Ahmad,
1991: 33). In the end, as the third impediment, if âa segment of society
is without [the qualities of life which include] shelter, clothing,
food, and adequate economic opportunity, then societal needs...take
priority overâ this myopic Individual Caretakerâs rights (Ahmad, 1991:
33). That is, the community is required to intervene in the Individual
Caretakerâs economic affairs by virtue of Maslaha. Read in this way, the
concept of Caretaker, Communal and/or Individual, is anti-capitalist in
principle and practice.
The third anti-capitalist concept and practice reread for Anarca-Islam
is Mudarabah/Musharakah. Mudarabah/Musharakah is a communally
established anti-monopolistic and anti-oligopolistic external financial
structure. It is completely devoid of interest, with the role of
encouraging joint ventures amongst existing Caretakers and new
Caretakers. In this sense, Mudarabah/Musharakah delimits attempts by
identical Caretakers to take control of small firms for themselves.
Mudarabah/Musharakahâs obstruction of the existence of monopolies or
oligopolies therefore tends towards extending existing Caretaker
relationships. That is, it creates room for new Caretakers and new small
firms as independent offshoots of presently pre-existing Caretaker
partnerships and small firms (Choudhury, 1997: 110). There are three
beneficiary effects of Mudarabah/Musharakah. The first is the creation
of other diversified autonomous small firms for new Caretakers. This
move assists in creating room for new Caretakers and facilitates less
animosity amongst new and existing Caretakers that may arise due to
jealousy between both. In this vein, Mudarabah/Musharakah promotes
sharing between both new and existing Caretakers, as well as Ehsan,
kindness or generosity by adequately and fairly allocating resources
between Caretakers of a community (Choudhury, 1997: 110). The second
beneficiary effect of Mudarabah/Musharakah is the minimisation of
stockpiling or otherwise what is referred in Islam to as Israf
(Choudhury, 1997: 110). That is, since Mudarabah/Musharakahâs objective
is adequate resource allocation, Mudarabah/Musharakah[125] minimizes
waste in production, consumption and commodity exchange values.
Mudarabah/Musharakah minimizes the gap of stockpiling and prevents
unnecessary depletion or destruction in production and consumption once
a threshold is reached (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980: 440). The third and
final beneficiary effect of Mudarabah/Musharakah is that Huquq
al-Ibadah, the dutiful responsibility to new Caretakers, and Huquq
al-Allah, duties to God, are expressly reaffirmed through a fulfilment
of Godâs intent for the preservation of Huquq al-Ibadah, or the duties
of Caretakers towards one another (Choudhury, 1997: 110).
Mudarabah/Musharakah is an anti-capitalist concept and practice.
The third anti-capitalist concept and practice is Riba. Riba, interest,
is forbidden at least thrice throughout the Koran. We may read:
âThose who benefit from interest shall be raised like those who have
been driven to madness by the touch of the Devil; this is because they
say: âTrade is like interestâ while God has permitted trade and
forbidden interestâ (The Holy Koran, Chapter 2, Chapter of âThe Cowâ:
Verses 275).
Riba, and its âcollection...was and is forbidden because it served as a
means of exploitingâ those who undergo dire and bare poverty (Esposito,
2002: 163). After all, Riba advances the life of the wealthy while it
exhausts and harshly abuses the life of others in dire poverty on
account of their weak economic position or strata. Riba is therefore
repugnant of the spirit of Islam, and contradicts the philosophies of
al-âadl waâl-ihasan, justice and benevolence (Ahmad, 1991: 36). Riba is
also an anti-capitalist concept and practice.
The fourth anti-capitalist concept and practice reread for Anarca-Islam
is Zakat, progressive alms tax. Zakat is a Haqq, a right[126], for the
poor over the rich. The Koran is clear that Zakat is ordained and to be
interpreted as such:
âThe offerings are for the poor and needy, those who work to collect
them, those whose hearts are brought together the ransoming of slaves,
debtors, in Godâs way, and the traveller; so God ordainsâ (The Holy
Koran, Chapter 9, Chapter of âRepentance and Dispensationâ: Verse 60).
Zakat progressively keeps social equity integrated in the wider social
field. Zakat desegregates class differences, which are due to
differences in Mal[127] between Caretakers. As the third pillar in
Islam, and there are five, Zakat is not merely a concept and practice
but is divinely decreed for any Muslim to attain salvation (Cummings,
Askari, Mustafa, 1980: 26â27). Zakat is an act of expiation for the sins
of a Muslim, aimed at engraining in the Zakat giver the desire to give
further. In this vein, Zakat is the temporary minimization of
micro-fascisms, which are a consequence of class privilege, through the
perpetual âdisassociation of oneself from oneâs accrued
wealthâ(Cummings, Askari, Mustafa, 1980: 27â28). An interesting element
with respect to Zakat is that a payer of Zakat is forbidden from
constituting a self-righteous ego because that negates the act of
Zakatâs payment. That is, if Zakat is paid begrudgingly, or
self-righteously, it is not accepted. Zakat ought be offered willingly
and ânot to be paid begrudgingly, if the divine law [associated with it]
is to be fulfilledâ (Cummings, Askari, Mustafa, 1980: 27). In this vein,
the Koran is rather clear with respect to the attitude of the individual
payment of Zakat:
âas does he [and/or she] who spends his [and/or her] wealth only to be
seen and praised by others...for his [and/or her] parable is that of a
smooth rock with [a little] earth upon it-and then a rainstorm smites it
and leaves it hard and bareâ (The Holy Koran, Chapter 2: The Chapter of
âThe Cow, Verse 264).
This Koranic verse is therefore an impassioned witness for the attitude
and the duty to give, bearing[128] âthe mark of respect for an
individualâs dignity in all circumstances, even the most
intimate...[and] to avoid being seen by anyone so that no one has to be
embarrassedâ (Ramadan, 2004: 181). Zakat is also repaid indefinitely to
humble the ego of the payer and remind the payer of Zakat that it is God
who is the Supreme giver and the true provider. This indefinite
repayment of Zakat therefore âdemands...knowledge of the environment,
the community, and the social and economic situationâ (Ramadan, 2004:
193). This knowledge of the communityâs circumstances has the further
positive effect of emphasizing and reinforcing a communal sense of
responsibility that is continuously renewed. Therefore, Zakat is not to
be understood as âjust a widowâs mite to be paid out of [spite or] duty
and distributed as charity...anything but that...Woven into the very
fabric of society...[it] aims at freeing the poor from their dependence
so that eventually they themselves will pay Zakatâ to help less
fortunate others (Ramadan, 2004: 189). That is, because Zakat is âthe
annual payment of alms in income and savings, in trade commodities, in
crops, and in certain other properties,â it acts as an anti-thesis to
taxation (Ramadan, 2004: 193). As Deleuze and Guattari note:
âtaxation ... creates money...and it corresponds with services and goods
in the current of that [economic] circulation...[In it] the state finds
the means for foreign trade, insofar as it appropriates that trade...and
which makes monopolistic appropriation of outside exchangeâ possible
(Deleuze, & Guattari, 1980: 443).
Thus Zakat, unlike taxation, is not a conventional source of
ânourishment supposedly for the poorâ provisionally provided through
government revenues then distributed (Cummings, Askari, Mustafa, 1980.
27). Nor is Zakat to be manipulated, as with taxation, for the
appropriation of an outside exchange as for foreign trade. Rather,
unlike taxation, Zakat is not to be collected by way of government or a
revenue-collecting agency but paid specifically and directly by hand and
through personal communication (Cummings, Askari, Mustafa, 1980: 27).
Zakat is not to be distorted or understood as a subsidy or charity for
some towards others in the hope that the wealth of the rich and the
destitution of the poor will miraculously find a point of balance
(Ramadan. 2004: 178). Zakat is the right of the poor over the rich and
not a privilege honourably bestowed to âthose in whose wealth is a right
known for the beggar and the outcastâ (Cummings, Askari, Mustafa, 1980:
27). For those who refuse the payment of Zakat, God in the Koran states:
âAs for all who lay up treasures of gold and silver and do not spend
them for the sake of God give them the tiding of grievous suffering [in
the life to come]: on the Day when that [hoarded blessings] shall be
heated in the fire of hell and their foreheads and their sides and their
backs branded therewith, [those sinners shall be told] âthese are the
treasures which you have laird up for yourselves! Taste, then, [the evil
of] your hoarded treasuresâ(The Holy Koran, Chapter 9, The Chapter of
âRepentance and Dispensationâ, Verses: 34â35).
To conclude, Zakat is a rightful act of giving what is already
rightfully due. In this sense, someone who willingly pays Zakat is
someone who has chosen âto bare faith ... to bear responsibility for
social commitment at every moment ... to possess is [tantamount] to have
the duty [and obligation] to shareâ (Ramadan, 2004: 182). Zakat, read in
this manner, is anti-capitalist concept and practice.
The fifth and sixth anti-capitalist concepts and practices for
Anarca-Islam are Ramadan and Sadaqat Al-Fitr. Ramadan is a fast, a Sawm,
from dusk till dawn, for a lunar month every year. Ramadan is an âact of
worship ... [decreed by God, designed] to lead Muslims to perceive, and
to feel inwardly, the need to eat and drink and by extension to ensure
that every human being has the means to subsistâ (Ramadan, 2004: 89).
Fasting during Ramadan leads to the purification of the fasterâs mind,
body and soul. That is, fasting is an act of expiation in the voluntary
washing out of a fasterâs sins internally and externally. Furthermore,
Ramadan reduces surplus, excessive acts of production and consumption,
and the waste of property entrusted to a faster by God. Ramadan, in
essence, sanitizes and purifies a fasterâs body and the property she
and/or he are entrusted with even if it is only for a month. Upon
Ramadanâs end is Sadaqat Al-Fitr. It is âanother [obligatory] charity
... imposed on every Muslim who has the means for themselves and their
dependentsâ (Budak, 2005: 93â96). Sadaqat Al-Fitr exists in connection
with Ramadan and is therefore:
ârelated to property and is obligatory on every Muslim that possesses
more than the prescribed amount of provisions after giving the
charity...[and is] to be given in person into the hands of those who are
eligible to receive ... [not] the wealthyâ (Budak, 2005: 93â96).
Again, like Zakat, Sadaqat El-Fitr is to be paid face to face and in
discretion, without any state or institutional-like intervention.
Ramadan and Sadaqat Al-Fitr, read in this manner, are anti-capitalist
concepts and practices.
The seventh and final anti-capitalist concept and practice read for
Anarca-Islam is Islamic banking. Islamic Banking is an act of resistance
to capitalism. It gives way to and offers a new form of unrestricted
access for Muslim and non-Muslim individuals and communities to
financial resources in banking systems. Unrestricted access in Islamic
banks is therefore different from capitalist financial systems because
it does not refer individuals or communities to the criteria of
âcreditworthinessâ (Ahmad, 1991: 46). Islamic banks first appeared in
âthe mid-nineteenth century ...[and consists in] funding trading
activities ... [opening] saving accounts with no interest ... [and]
whose patrons participate in investments and either earn a share of the
profit on the return or suffer a portion of the losses sustained by the
bankâ(Esposito, 2002: 167â178).
For their part, banking transactions do involve risk. That is, they
involve âthe use of equity sharing rather than debt financingâ
(Esposito, 2002: 178). However, despite this risk, Islamic banks offer a
way of supporting willing resistors with a preliminary necessary set of
credit systems that can be used to ward off current capitalist financial
systems. Islamic banks showcase an understanding of the problems with
current financial institutional systems. Islamic banks offer financial
opportunities that create favourable conditions for real transformation.
Islamic banks are capable of empowering âgrass-root levels by extending
their social funds towards developing a diversityâ of âsmall firmsâ and
generating resistance by offering an egalitarian way towards organising
autonomous grassroots workplaces (Choudhury, 1997: 178). Islamic Banks
are a way of demanding the reopening up of what are cordoned
credit-worthy asylums by setting up real alternatives and encouraging
individuals and communities in engaging in inter-communal economic
cooperation and participation. In this sense, Islamic banks possess the
capacity of restoring agency to every individual and collectively within
the community (Choudhury, 1997: 178). Islamic banking, read in this
manner, is an anti-capitalist concept and practice.
It is the former anti-capitalist concepts and practices that
collectively inform Anarca-Islamâs anti-capitalist commitment. That is,
it is in the rereading of the principles of Property, Caretakers,
Mudarabah/Musharakah, Riba, Zakat, Ramadan, Sadaqat Al-Fitr and Islamic
banking that there is clear evidence of alternatives to capitalist
practices and an offer, instead, of fair measure of value in economic
transactions.
Obviously, many of the anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist
commitments I have discussed work against currently dominant
interpretations of Islam. Indeed, these principles may be seen as
slogans against capitalist and authoritarian practices that Anarca-Islam
and post-anarchism oppose. That is, it is:
âthrough these [former] slogans, [that] each individual [Muslim] would
have to see himself [and herself] confronted with an immediate duty to
perform, each in his [and her] place...[through] a denunciation of the
privileges of wealth and power identified with those who had distorted
Islamsâ (Rodison, 1972: 230).
For it is only with Anarca-Islamâs construction that the
capitalist-State can be denounced as an adversary of the highest values
to which Anarca-Islamâs ideology appeals.
Moreover, it is in constructing Anarca-Islam, that I, a Muslim
anarchist, am able to stand with an attitude of theological and
epistemological certitude, becoming both anti-capitalist and
anti-authoritarian, breaking through the walls that purportedly cordon
Islam and anarchism from one another. Moreover, it is in constructing
Anarca-Islam, my clinic, that I remain a micro-fascist, yet one who
despite their micro-fascisms is now becoming relatively de-Oedipalized.
That is, I have no illusions of being completely free of the
capitalist-State. I suggest only that I have begun âto avoid
micro-fascismsâ by rejecting the practices imposed upon me by the
dominant order (Day, 2005: 176). Perhaps now that I have constructed
Anarca-Islam, and because of my willingness and openness âto sharing
values, resources and spacesâ with Muslims, anarchists, and others in
the newest social movements, we may collectively begin âbuilding
communities of resistance and reconstruction that are wider and more
open to othersâ, yet however that âremain non-integrative in their
relation to othersâ (Day, 2005: 176).
âIf literature dies, it will be a violent death, a political
assassination...Creation takes place in choked passages...Your writing
has to be liquid or gaseous simply because normal perception and opinion
are solid, geometric...So style requires a lot of silence and work to
make a whirlpool at some point, then flies out like the matches children
follow along the water in a gutter...Whatâs really terrible isnât having
to cross a desert once youâre old and patient enough, but for young
writers to be born in a desert, because theyâre then in danger of seeing
their efforts come to nothing before they even get going. And yet, and
yet, itâs impossible for the new race of writers, already preparing work
and their styles, not to be born...If you donât admire something, if
your donât love it, you have no reason to write a word about
it...[because writing is] the exigency of life against those who would
mutilate and mortify lifeâ
(Gilles Deleuze, 1990)
In this thesis, I offered an anarchic interpretation of Islam and an
Islamic interpretation of anarchism by identifying anti-authoritarian
and anti-capitalist resonance between Islam and anarchism.
In chapter one, I talked about how Muslims in the West are facing
dichotomous representations of terrorism and oppression, Fundamentalism
and Orientalism. I explored these representations as abstractions, but
then brought them closer to home by demonstrating their existence on an
everyday level by discussing specific examples of racist and Islamphobic
incidents at Queenâs University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada in 2009. I
then claimed that 9/11[129] resulted in the intensification of these
reductive representations of Islam and Muslims.
I also discussed the presence of a minority of Muslim anarchists
escaping these representations, and doing so in a positive sense, by
âtransversing the gaps, puncturing the holds [of
representations]...opening up the new world order to a quite different
and new world of the multipleâ as opposed to subscribing to the
aforementioned dichotomies (Howard, 1998: 123â124). Muslim anarchists
are escaping these dichotomous representations in the face of the
isolation and distress some Western Muslims have been facing since 9/11.
Instead of being led by the majority, Muslims anarchists have chosen not
to retreat. They did not become paralyzed and complacent as a result of
the damaging representations. Instead, they understood their standing(s)
and positioning(s) as political subjects in the West, whether they like
it or not, post 9/11. They chose to never again become âsubjects of the
signifier [, subjects of Western representations, and]...[of] Knowledge,
Power, Moneyâ (Guattari, 1984: 143). And based on that choice, Muslim
anarchists acted by engaging internally in âmolecular revolutionsâ
(Guattari and Sutton, 2005: 65), as well as externally by creating new
aesthetic, cultural and ethico-political Islamic territories of
reference with respect to anarchism through literature.
In this light, Muslim anarchists have creatively envisioned and
pragmatically embodied a unique formula in reinvigorating Islamic life
in the West. This has come at a cost of their ostracization by the
dogmatic and essentialist majority of constituents constituting the two
communities these Muslim anarchists belong to. This ostracization is the
price[130] paid for their simultaneous allegiance to Islam and
anarchism. There is always going to be a price exacted for inventing
anything new and, for now, the cost is ostracization and the lack of
community. Like the Holy Koran says: âVerily, God does not change
peopleâs condition until they change their inner selvesâ (Chapter 13,
The Chapter of âThe Thunderâ: Verse 11).
In chapter two, I examined academic literature written by Muslim
anarchists like Bey and Knight. I also discussed academic and
non-academic literature on the discourse of Islamic anarchism written by
non-Muslims like Crone, Barclay, Chris R., Luxenburg and Fiscella.
Moreover, I also empirically proved the existence of contemporary and
historical examples of other Muslim anarchists like Yakub Islam, Gustave
Henri Jossot, and Leda Rafenilli in order to demonstrate that Muslim
anarchists are not entirely a new phenomenon. I argued that though the
academic and non-academic literature is a positive step in resisting the
dichotomous representations of Muslims, there were three critical
problems with the texts. Based on these problems, I offered
Anarca-Islam, firstly, to give willing Muslims and Muslim anarchists the
Koranic and anarchic concepts and practices necessary to continue on
with their resistance against negative representations. I offered
Anarca-Islam, secondly, to counter two misconceptions of Islam and
Muslims amongst anarchists like Flood in the newest social movements. I
encouraged anarchists to overcome their fear of Islam by exploring jihad
and ijtihad in Islam. I tried to engage anarchists by explaining to them
the difficulties a Mujâtaâhid goes through while partaking in jihad and
ijtihad as well. I encouraged anarchists not to accept what they think
they know and hear of Islam. Thirdly, I offered Anarca-Islam so that
there is a more welcoming space for Muslims and Muslim anarchists in the
newest social movements. This space, which I call a panegyric desert, is
the place where I hope Muslims, anarchists, and Muslim anarchists can
collaborate.
In chapter three, I introduced a method that I call Anarchic-ijtihad,
and then defended it as my right against dismissive views from both
secular and orthodox Muslims. I distinguished between Anarchic-ijtihad
and ijtihad in that the former is an anarchically oriented type of
ijtihad that I put to practice when I write on Anarca-Islam. I
emphasized that I use Anarchic-ijtihad to extract anarchic concepts and
practices in Islam and vice versa. I adopted it as my method to engage
in a rigorous interrogation of semantics and syntax in the Sunnah and
the Koran, thus overturning themes in the arena(s) of Muslim, anarchist,
and Islamic and anarchic politics. After discussing Anarchic-ijtihad I
finally outlined the theoretical paradigms I used to construct my
contribution, Anarca-Islam, to the existing discourse on
Islamic-anarchism. In doing so, I discussed post-anarchist,
deconstruction, poststructuralist, post-colonial and sociological
theories of social movements.
In chapter four, I began the process of constructing Anarca-Islam. I
discussed Anarca-Islamâs relation to Islam and anarchism, but more
specifically to post-anarchism. I then defined a triadic relationship
that consisted of Daddy (authoritarian practices of the type macro and
micro), Mommy (capitalist practices) and Me (Oedipal subject). I
discussed the particular role each parents has with me and then
discussed the effects the relationship between them has on me.
In chapter five I constructed Anarca-Islam. I did this so that Muslim
anarchists are no longer just an illusory image gripped by repression
like essentialist Muslims and anarchists would have themselves believe
(Guattari, 1995: 82). I first constructed for Anarca-Islam its
resistance to authoritarian practices at the micro-level through
micro-anti-authoritarian concepts and practices extracted from Islam by
using Anarchic-ijtihad. The micro-anti-authoritarian concepts and
practices were Shura, Ijma and Maslaha. I then showed how it is possible
to resist authoritarian practices at the macro-level, through resisting
institutionalized religion and the state. I offered an alternative
rereading of the classical interpretation of the Islamic concept
Khilafah, Islamic state. I then concluded the discussion on
anti-authoritarianism by addressing the purported âauthorityâ of Prophet
Muhammad and God, all of which finally led to the construction of an
anti-authoritarian Islam and Anarca-Islamâs resistance to Daddy. After
this point, I constructed for Anarca-Islam its resistance to capitalist
practices through concepts and practices from Islam and again by using
Anarchic-ijtihad. The concepts and practices of Public Property,
Communal/Individual Caretakers, Mudarabah/Musharakah, Riba, Zakat,
Ramadan, Sadaqat Al-Fitr, and Islamic banking were reread and then
collectively used to construct an anti-capitalist Islam and
Anarca-Islamâs resistance to Mommy. At the end of the chapter, after
having established Anarca-Islamâs anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist
commitments, I proclaimed myself as a Muslim who is becoming relatively
de-Oedipalized. As for Anarca-Islamâs construction, it is the symbolic
act of delineating the misconceptions held by many anarchists in the
newest social movements.
I hope that what I am calling Anarca-Islam[131] will be seen as making
useful contributions to the discourse of Islamic anarchism, both
theoretically and pragmatically. For example, I do not believe that any
of Fiscellaâs three categories and their subtypes, which I point to in
chapter two, and which Fiscella devised for the discourse of Islamic
anarchism, made room for Anarca-Islam. The closest category and subtype
Anarca-Islam could fit into is the first category and particularly its
subtype, which Fiscella calls âPostmodern Islamic anarchismâ. Although
Anarca-Islam could fit into this category, I do not believe it ought to
for two reasons. In his description of âPost-modern Islamic anarchismâ,
Fiscella writes:
âPostmodernâ is meant to refer to that point (historically and
culturally) at which the two worlds meet and are capable of producing a
synthesisâ(Fiscella, 2009).
Given Fiscellaâs definition, the first reason I do not believe
Anarca-Islam would fit in this subtype is because of Fiscellaâs use of
the term âpostmodernismâ. It is an elusive and highly ambiguous term,
which, following other more established theorists who have been called
postmodernist, I reject in light of the fact that it signifies an era
that follows the âmodernist movementâ and not a movement that rejects
the âattitudeâ of modernity (Foucault, 1984: 32â50). If understood as
era then, I reject the term âPostmodernâ, given that the âmodernist
movementâ is still alive, well, and ongoing. That is, as an era in space
and time, the âmodernist movementâ in fact has not ended, and therefore
it is not possible for another movement labeled âPostmodernismâ to
follow it. The terms modernist and postmodernist are therefore
problematic because from the beginning their use as eras, as opposed to
attitudes, assumes a linear conception of time and history. However,
history is not linear, it is rhizomatic[132] (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980:
7â13). That is, the past, present and future are interconnected as the
inverted root of a tree.
The second reason that I do not believe Anarca-Islam fits in Fiscellaâs
subtype âPostmodern Islamic anarchismâ is that Fiscella reads Bey and
Knightsâ literatures as examples that âproduce a synthesisâ of the two
worlds, Islam and anarchism, and therefore as examples of âPostmodern
Islamic anarchismâ (Fiscella, 2009). Fiscella does this despite the fact
that Bey and Knight do not truly produce a synthesis, as I have argued
above. Neither Bey nor Knight provide the Koranic and anarchistic
conceptual and pragmatic practices for an Islamic anarchism, and
therefore neither develops an anarchic interpretation of Islam and an
Islamic interpretation of anarchism. Interestingly, Fiscella himself
acknowledges this when he admits that none of the English-based
literature he encountered on the discourse of Islamic anarchism can tell
us precisely what Islamic anarchism is (Fiscella, 2009). His
acknowledgment sets the stage for what I offer in this thesis. That is,
my thesis registers the possibility of Anarca-Islam and therefore
contributes and aspires towards the creation of a community between
Muslims, Muslim anarchists and anarchists in the newest social
movements. In light of these two reasons, perhaps a new category ought
to be constructed for Anarca-Islam, or perhaps Fiscella should
reconstruct the parameters of the subtype âPostmodern Islamic anarchismâ
in such a way so as to distinguish the works more adequately.
here
In my future[133] work, I intend to examine Islamic sexual practices. I
do this to add an anti-queerphobic commitment to Anarca-Islamâs set of
pre-established anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist commitments. I am
particularly interested in homosexuality in Muslim societies and
traditions, as I search for a different way of understanding,
demystifying, and justifying the rights of queer Muslims and non-Muslims
in Islamic terms, especially among immigrant Muslims in North America.
My starting point will be, as it was here, that Islam is not a
monolithic, unified belief system but rather a heterogeneous and
pluralistic series of traditions, perspectives, practices and
discourses, not all of which embrace the authoritarian, conservative and
essentialist positions that have emerged in modern and contemporary
expressions of orthodox or Fundamentalist and Orientalist Islam. My
current research will be strongly linked to my future project, which is
to develop the historical and intellectual bases for an
anti-authoritarian, anti-capitalist and anti-homo-trans-queerphobic
Islam that likewise can play a positive and critical role in political
and social theory and practice.
My early investigations indicate that different attitudes prevail in
Islamic interpretations of sexuality, which conceive of it not only as
necessary for reproduction but also for worthy experiences of pleasure
and enjoyment. Yet, often, the same texts attempt to limit, discipline,
and punish non-heteronormative sexual practices. Little has been done to
theorize this contradictory evidence. However, scholarship has begun to
document Islamic legal and medical discussions of sexuality and to
consider the cultural valence of same-sex desire in poetry and
historical accounts (See, AbdelWahab Bouhdibaâs Sexuality in Islam,
1975, Amr Shalkanyâs Comparative Law as Archaeology: On Sodomy, Islamic
Law and Human Rights Activism, 2006, Joseph Massadâs Desiring Arabs,
2007 and Michel Foucaultâs Discipline and Punishment, 1975).
To this end, I will take up cases like that of Sayyid-Sally, a
transsexual medical student at Al- Azhar University in 1982, a
pre-eminent institution for Islamic religious studies, in Cairo, Egypt.
In this instance, I will be examining the role that two psychoanalysts
and a surgeon played in judging Sayyid-Sally prior to Al-Azharâs
involvement. I will be showing that the psychoanalytic practices that
Sayyid-Sally underwent represented an embodied and an interpersonal
authoritarian and capitalist voice of an Eastern form of post-colonial
psychoanalysis, inherited from the West, which I argue constituted an
attempt at silencing Sayyid-Sallyâs voice. Because even after the
revelation of Sayyid-Sallyâs identity, her sex change operation and the
fact that Al-Azhar later admitted the existence of the category of the
âHermaphroditeâ, according to certain Islamic legal interpretations,
heteronormative gender orientations were re-established and re-worked to
correspond to a new logical order with the sub-categories: Natural Vs.
Un-natural Hermaphrodite.
In my future work, anarchism will provide a political and philosophical
orientation that I argue can help to move Islam, beyond a practice of
mere tolerance to developing a doctrine of acceptance of queer
identities. I will then use this as a basis for an exploration of the
possibility of a new radical politics and an ethics of friendship that
might emerge between these two traditions. I will suggest that Muslims
and anarchists can negotiate relations of friendship, appreciating the
similarities that bring them together, as well as the differences that
drive them apart. I will attempt to partially delineate the
circumstances under which these kinds of compromises might take place,
intellectually, politically, and practically, by developing an ethics of
disagreement between and for Muslims and anarchists.
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Verso.
Â
[1] Conscious of the force of such a word, and its singular form
âMuslimâ as opposed to its plural form âMuslimeenâ, I use it somewhat
differently. A Muslim is someone who chooses to identify as a Muslim, or
is by ânatureâ that (that is, embodies Islamic
tendencies/characteristics). Unless, and in either of the two cases
stated, the individual has undergone compulsion, coercion or rejected
Islam after knowing it. Moreover, I chose to use Muslim, as opposed to
Muslima â the feminized form â following a clichĂ©, but only in so far to
allow room for both the reader and myself to subscribe and/or not to one
area or category of gender, the other, or both. This way I am
recognizing that there are those who want to exhibit and remain in
states of the Deleuzian and Guattarian concept of becoming with respect
to gender, sex and sexuality. As for the question âwho is a Muslimâ?
Personally, I believe a Muslim is an individual who expends from his and
her wealth for a just cause, and who believes in the hereafter and also
chooses to believe in the value of the primary principle pillar of Islam
called Al-Shahada. That is, La illaha il Allah, Muhammadon Rasool Allah
(trans.: There is authority but God and Muhammad is the final Messenger
of God). The basis of these prerequisites and only these prerequisites,
to be identified as a Muslim, I take from the Koranic verse: âThe (true)
believers are those only who believe in Allah and His messenger and
afterward doubt not, but strive with their wealth and their lives for
the cause of Allah. Such are the sincereâ (The Holy Koran, Chapter 49:
Chapter of The âHujuratâ, Verse: 15). Respectively, when I use and
address Muslims (my own straw-persons, unless they are specified,
constructed for descriptive convenience) here: I mean to address all
Muslims (and also but indirectly non-Muslims as well). Particularly,
however I address those Muslims who have not yet embedded and opened
themselves up to an ethically and politically oriented Islam to meet our
conditions as Muslims in our present day and age.
[2] There is a special, delirious and different relation between
Disciplinary and Control societies. In disciplinary: âweâre supposed to
start all over again each time...itâs analogical ...as you go from
school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factoryâ (Deleuze,
1990: 178). Disciplinary societies adore relating between two
confinements they have created, and using binaries, male/female,
black/white or hetero/homo. That is, in order to define and manage
everyone all in an effort at characterizing and giving character the
complexities of what is really static in life. But in Control, the
various forms of control used want to jail us all the time using these
inseparable variations digitally. All the time in Control, there are
constantly modulating confinements, people and institutions, capable and
willing, identifying and differentiating, pinpointing and monitoring.
This results in the creation or birth of us as micro-fascists, ââlittle
command centresâ proliferat[ing] everywhere, making coaches, teachers
and cops all little Mussolinisâ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980: 279/228). In
Control there is a system of: âVarying geometry, a language thatâs
digitalâ and that can be, but isnât necessarily binary (Deleuze, 1990:
179). And now you and I are never finished with anything â not business,
training or military service without having coexisted with metastable
states of a single modulation of control; a sort of universal
transmutation of everything that is around you and I.
[3] The new prison, now supposedly a âhumane prisonâ, has âwater
fountains, a freshly planted garden and a gym â complete with weights
and sportsâ team jerseys on the wallsâ. And is this supposed to erase
and rewrite the history of all the atrocious monstrosities that happened
in between its prison walls before? Article: âAbu Ghraib now a human
prison, Iraq official sayâ by Arwa Damon. Retrieval Date: February
22^(nd), 2009. Retrieved from:
[4] âWhat is the differenceâ between a rage that destroys,
exterminating, strangling everything human poured between concrete
prison walls or inducing loss, manipulating all you want, wearing the
subject out with no objective or out of shear pleasure of watching, with
a grin, the subject wears and tears his and her own identity out; to
make them resent and despise the vine that makes them different. This is
not to insinuate â no difference â between a literal concrete asylum
wall as Abu Ghraib, but an emphasis that the greatest traumas, the real
asylums, are engrained as walls within. This view is in line with
Sherene Razackâs argument. That is, that Western Muslims, as Sherene
Razack argues, echoing Etienne Balibar, are clearly a stigmatized group,
barricaded and internally walled by the representations Orientalism and
Fundamentalism: âqualitatively âdeterritorializedâ, as Gilles Deleuze
would say, in an intensive rather than extensive sense; they âliveâ on
the edge of the city under permanent threat of elimination; but also,
conversely, they live and are perceived as ânomadsâ, even when they are
fixed in their homelands, that is, their mere existence, their quality,
their movements, their virtual claims of rights and citizenship are
perceived as a threat for [Western] âcivilizationâ (Balibar, 2003:
125â130; Razack, 2008: 84â85). Because of the dichotomous
representations, Western Muslimsâ subjectivities have been âmarked for
dyingâ (Razak, 2008: 85), âsubjected to conditions of life [, unworthy
of the full benefits of citizenship, tantamount to] conferring on them
the status of the living deadâ (Mbembe, 2003: 40).
[5] Article titled â9/11 violence âstalks UK Sikhsâ courtesy of the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Retrieval date: February 14^(th)
2009. Retrieved from:
[6] Article titled â9/11 violence âstalks UK Sikhsâ courtesy of the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Retrieval date: February 14^(th)
2009. Retrieved from:
[7] Article from The Queenâs Journal; âMuslim Student Targeted in Racist
Incidentsâ. Retrieved on: October 6^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
[8] Article from The Queenâs Journal; âMuslim Student Targeted in Racist
Incidentsâ. Retrieved on: October 6^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
[9] Article from The Queenâs Journal; âMuslim Student Targeted in Racist
Incidentsâ. Retrieved on: October 6^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
[10] But it did not end there. In the following weeks, the pyramid of
these cowardly incidents piled up sky high over crypts of Fundamentalist
and Orientalist clichĂ©s of Muslims, as a hijab dawning Queenâs Muslim
sister walking home one fine evening became a masturbatory target and a
recipient of racist wails by a speeding motorist. The motorist wailed:
âlet me unwrap youâ, âyou fuking Terrorist...you fuking Talibanâ. Who
then is the terrorist? A sister warranting unwrapping because she is
âoppressedâ or a cowardly motorist disappearing beneath the blanket of a
shared nightâs sky as the betrayals of a faded sun became queues, green
traffic lights, for this racist to flaunt âcar loveâ? In the meanwhile,
amplifying things even more, Queenâs Universityâs administration, having
done long ago with seeking justice on behalf of its othered minorities,
maintained itself in total ambiguity and total duplicity. Its response
only included enhanced campus security. Apparently âsecurityâ was the
best the administration could do as its sufficient evidence of aid to
the sister harassed in the face of racism, and terrorism. The fact of
the matter is that the sister was left behind, stranded, by the
administration, un-encouraged to even suggestively file a police report.
The administration did not even try to find out what the sisterâs life
at Queenâs was like as a Muslim, widening even more an already existing
distance between the administration and Muslim students. Since the
incident, the non-Kingstonian sister took the initiative of filing the
report herself. The harassed sister offers proof that the
administrationâs attention was diverted. In fact, it was nowhere,
already in a diversion, out of touch entirely with this âotherâ on its
grounds and left entrusted in its care. And even if it can be posited
that the administration did blink an eye in an affectionate public
display by denouncing these crimes publicly and adequately enhancing
campus security, undeniably these âactionsâ are anything but a performed
stunt on the administrationâs part, given the fact that a vast ample of
other crimes have happened since. Totally short circuited, it did not
occur to the administration as a simple gesture of common decency to
visit, not once, the Muslim prayer space broken into for instance. The
administration had washed its hands of the incidents, sweeping them
under a Persian carpet rug for ostracized Muslims, racialized
minorities, at least those demographically available, and radical allies
at Queenâs to deal with these racist incidents. QUMSA, as reported, was
compelled to form âa Task Force [, given the administrationâs inadequate
response,] to deal with the consequences of these incidents...to
implement security measures for the safety of the members, raise
awareness, and organize supportâ. The shouldered burden it seems was to
continue, as always, to shift onto the innocent recipients of racism, in
this case Muslims, to set up a âtask forceâ to educate Queenâs
non-Muslims of Islam in the hope of minimizing more terrorist attacks. I
offer these corroborating words from QUMSAâs progress report dated
November 27^(th), 2008: âWe are only a student group ...[we] are having
a hard time trying to collaborate with other [student] groups and the
Queenâs Administration, we are not even able to guarantee ...that
Canadian right [, that is, of respect]â. As a Queenâs Muslim, I cannot
bring myself to write anything more on these particular incidents.
Article from The Queenâs Journal; âMuslim Student Targeted in Racist
Incidentsâ. Retrieved on: October 6^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
[11] Becoming is the imagination and thereafter the actualization of
âperpetual projects of self-overcoming and self-creation, constantly
losing and finding ourselvesâ (Call, 2003: 33). The implication of which
is that subjectivities, not necessarily identities, are subject to
directions of motion and intensities, resulting in their instability.
(Call, 2003: 33). Anyone is already âa multiplicity, the actualization
of a set of virtual singularities that function together, that enter
into symbiosis, that attain a certain consistencyâ (Deleuze, 1993:
xxix). Our subjectivities are socially constructed through our
experiences. Becoming is the âperpetual projects of self-overcoming and
self-creation, constantly losing and finding ourselvesâ, consciously,
subconsciously and unconsciously (Call, 2003: 33). An anarchy of our
subjectivity is an anarchy of becoming(s) where becoming(s) are not
confined to linear progressions and regressions along the lines of the
past, present and future as a logos or telos. During becoming(s),
âeverything stops dead for a moment, everything freezes in place â and
then the whole process will begin all over againâ (Deleuze & Guattari,
1987: 7).
[12] I do not see a difference between the terms Muslim anarchist and
anarchist Muslim. Especially and considering that writing either âMuslim
anarchistâ or âanarchist Muslimâ, with one identity always before and
one always after the other, will always lead to the privileging of one
identity over the other. When, in fact, my initiative is for them to
always be together, with each other. It is only possible to keep the
impossible initiative when keeping the term silenced. In light of this,
and to avoid the readerâs confusion, from here on in I will use Muslim
anarchist as opposed to always referring to both.
[13] The difference between minorities and majorities isnât in their
size. âA minority may be bigger than a majority. What defines the
majority is a model you have to conform to: the average European adult
male city-dweller, for example ... A minority, on the other hand, has no
model, itâs a becoming, a process. One might say the majority is nobody.
Everybodyâs caught, one-way or another, in a minority becoming that
would lead them info unknown paths if they opted to follow it through.
When a âminority creates models for itself, itâs because it wants to
become a majority, and probably has to, to survive or prosper (to have a
state, be recognized, establish its rights, for example). But its power
comes from what itâs managed to create, which to some extent goes into
the model, but doesnât depend on it. A people is always a creative
minority, and remains one even when it acquires a majority â it can be
both at once because the two things arenât lived out on the same plane.â
(Deleuze in a Conversation with Antonio Negri)
Retrieved on: October 6^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
[14] Day wrote an entire book on this concept, the newest social
movements. I use, summarize, contextually, the term to imply social
movements that in his words are ânon-universalizing, non-hierarchical,
non-coercive relationships based on mutual aid, and shared ethical
commitmentsâ (Day, 2005: 9).
[15] Ikhtilaf is âthe Arabic term...[meaning] taking a different
position or course from that of another person either in opinion,
utterance, or actionâ (Al-awani, 1993: 11). Ikhtilaf is from âthe
related word khilaf ...from the same root...sometimes used synonymously
with [Ikhtilaf]...mean[ing] difference, disagreement, or even conflict
broader in meaning and implication than the concept of direct
opposition...because two opposites are necessarily different from each
other whereas two things, ideas, or persons that differ are not
necessarily opposed to or in conflict with each otherâ (Al-awani, 1993:
11).
[16] As Day argues, a relatively de-oedpalized subject is one who lives
their life without having the âcapitalist-Stateâsâ sanction or support
and âwho does not love the [capitalist-State] formâ(Day, 2005: 142â143).
In fact, a relatively de-oedipalized subject is one who âseek[s] to
render it [, the capitalist-State,] increasingly redundantâ as much as
the subject possibly can (Day, 2005: 142â143).
[17] Bey is an American political writer, essayist and poet. He is an
ontological anarchist and a non-practicing Muslim convert, mostly known
for his concepts of Temporary Autonomous Zones (TAZ), Semi-permanent
Autonomous Zones (SPAZ) and Permanent Autonomous Zones (PAZ). Bey âspent
years living and working in Iran under the reign of the Shah and
returned to the US after the revolutionâ (Fiscella, 2009). In response
to the question âwould you define yourself as a Muslim, and if so, what
kind of Islam would you say you practice amongst the multiplicity of
different forms?â Bey responded:
âWell, Iâve been many things in my life and I donât renounce any of
them. But I donât necessarily practice any of them on a daily basis
either. I never renounced Christianity or if I did, I take it back. Iâve
been involved in Tantric things that I guess you could call Hinduism,
although thatâs a very vague term. I practice Shâite Islam. I still
consider myself all those things but, obviously thatâs a difficult
position to take vis-a-vis the orthodox practitioners of these different
faiths. So, if I had to define my position now in terms that would be
historically meaningful in an Islamic context, I would refer to Hazrat
Inayat Khan and his idea of universalism, that all religions are true.
And if this involves contradiction, you know as Emerson said, OK. Weâll
just deal with it on a different level. And the inspiration for this in
his case was Indian synchrotism, between Hinduism and Islam especially,
although other religions were involved too such as Christianity, Judaism
and others. This happened on both a non-literate level of the peasantry
and still persists to this day on that level, and also occurred on a
very high level of intellectual Sufism which was almost a courtly thing
at certain times, especially under some of the wilder Mughal rulers like
Akbar who started Din-i Ilahi. So these things have precedents within
the Islamic traditions, this universalism, this radical tolerance would
be another way of putting it, but nowadays of course itâs hard to find
this praxis on the ground. I canât practice some Indian village cult
here, that would be a little â well I sort of do, you know â but
actually (laughs), itâs highly personalâ.
These excerpts from Peter Lamborn Wilsonâs Interview on Islam are part
of Richard JF Dayâs Affinity Project. The interview was done in 2005,
transcribed and listed in 2008 Retrieved on: November 12^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
. The Affinity Projectâs website and home:
.
[18] Knight encountered Islam at the age of thirteen while he was
listening to a record by Public Enemy with a reference to El-Hajj Malik
El-Shabazz, better known as Malcolm X. Knight converted by seventeen
then wrote two books Where Mullahs Fear to Tread and The Furious Cook
which he printed as Xeroxed zines. His bestseller arrives in the winter
of 2002, Taqwacores, a gesture of âhis farewell to Islamâ. After
Taqwacoresâ success, encouraging feedback from Michaelâs readers led him
to travel back, Inch Allah (God willing), not too far in reconsidering
âhis farewell to Islamâ. Knight âowes the spread of his Taqwacore...to
Wilsonâs anarchist publishing company Autonomediaâ (Fiscella, 2009).
Knight recently âdisavowed his former mentor due to Wilsonâs advocacy of
paedophilia/pedastryâ reflected in Beyâs âown membership and activism
within the North American Man-boy Association (NAMBLA)â(Fiscella, 2009).
A brief bio of Michael Muhammad Knight is available on the website
below. Retrieved on: October 8^(th), 2008. Retrieved from:
. For Beyâs view on NAMBLA see âuntitled letterâ in The Spark, 1 no. 5,
1984 and âMy Political beliefsâ, NAMBLA Bulletin (1986, 14).
[19] Barclay is an anarchist and an anthropologist, but not a Muslim,
whose central concern is âcharting what might be regarded as anarchist
elements in Islam in generalâ (Fiscella, 2009). His contribution to the
discourse of âIslam and anarchismâ was through ââIslam, Muslim Societies
and anarchyâ published in Anarchist Studiesâ (Fiscella, 2009). See
Anarchist Studies Volume 10, no. 2 (2002).
[20] Crone is a Danish born professor of Islamic History at Princeton
University, New Jersey (Fiscella, 2009). She is the author of Godâs
Rule: Government and Islam (2004) and âNinth-Century Muslim Anarchistsâ
in Past and Present (2000), no. 167.
[21] Fiscella is an anarchist researcher and author of âImagining an
Islamic Anarchism: A New Field of Study is Ploughedâ in the forthcoming
Religious Anarchisms: New Perspectives (2009).
[22] The article in the link below is âIslam and Anarchy Join Togetherâ.
It is available through Infoshop. Retrieval Date: October 17^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
[23] Max Stirner advocated for individualist anarchism, or an
individualistic approach to anarchism, and which viewed âthe âegoâ or
the âpersonâ as the repository of all that is human and
self-determining, and the States as the repository of all that is
inhuman and oppressiveâ (Horowitz, 2005: 48).
[24] Hakim Beyâs essay titled Millennium.
Retrieved on: October 8^(th), 2008. Retrieved from:
[25] However, Bey hardly stops there. Bey scorns Islam and Muslims on
masochistically offering a puritan representation of their self to the
world. Beyâs writes in the opening lines of Sacred Drift: Essays on the
Margins of Islam: âAs for Islam, it sometimes seems to want to represent
itself as an emaciated parody of itself, stripped of all organic
subtlety, âpurifiedâ to the point of mindlessnessâ (Bey, 1993: 5). To
Bey, why should âthe light of flaming oil wells seen on CNNâ (Bey, 1993:
5) surprise Muslims when there is a complicit role played by them,
resulting in little more than their desire of sameness transposing
itself to become material translated for âimperial/colonialist
appropriationâ (Bey, 1993: 5). Muslims are not powerless. They are
equally responsible for the images they have created and no less than a
West basking on the appropriation of the representations.
Appropriations, as Bey notes, âEdward Saidâ (1993: 5) showed in The
Clash of Ignorance (2001) and Orientalism (1978), and Joseph Massad
wrote of in Desiring Arabs (2008). Bey equally scorns and opposes the
Western appropriations, critiquing the Western monolithic logic of âthe
Huntington/CIA âClash of Culturesâ model of Islamâ (1997) adopted by
authors like Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris in Rising Tide (2003).
Huntingtonâs essentialist model is âthat the primary source of conflict
in the world today is the cultural difference between the West and
non-West, a culture clash in which Islam figures prominently as the
antithesis of Western civilizationâ (Razack, 2009: 89). Echoing
Huntington, Inglehart and Norris write: âregardless of the degree of
economic modernization, Islamic religious heritage remains ones of the
most powerful barriers to âself-expression, subjective well-being and
quality of life-concernsââ (Razack, 2009: 90; Inglehart and Norris,
2003: 154). Huntington, Norris and Inglehartsâ cultural clash rests on
their absurd portrayal of Islam as identical everywhere, paralyzed and
paralyzing its followers. A puritanical singular Islam perceived to be
with an innate âpropensity towards violent conflictâ (Huntington, 1997:
264), indefinitely ready to war with the West. A war which Huntington,
Norris and Inglehart propose Islam devoted itself to âfor fourteen
hundred years, a conflict that flows from the two civilizationsâ
differencesâ (Razack, 2009: 89; Huntington, 1993: 47). Huntington,
Norris and Inglehartsâ theses, like Said blatantly said in The Clash of
Ignorance (2001), amount to nothing short of âgimmick[s] like âThe War
of the Worldsâ, better for reinforcing defensive pride than for critical
understanding of the bewildering independence of out timeâ. The theses,
in fact, are uncritical and dismissive if not ignorant of âhistorical
processesâ (Razack, 2009: 89), with an interest in merely engaging in
essentialist, totalizing and homogenizing readings of Islam and Muslims
at an attempt at narrowly regurgitating and constricting the
representation of the duo as monolithic. In line with Said, Massad and
Razack, Bey writes: âThe Huntington/CIA âClash of Culturesâ model of
Islam proposes it as a kind of disease that has to be kept isolated &
confined. The neo-liberal âGlobal Marketâ model of the âOrientâ views it
as a source of raw material (such as black gold) and cheep labor that
must be exploited. The resources are to be taken away, the labor is to
be kept in place. Obviously Moslem immigration to the âNorthâ does not
fit well with either of these models. If Islam is a disease, then
ârefugeesâ are a virus, penetrating borders like immune systems. But
then disruptions are also inevitable, given the âlogic of the Marketâ.
The old liberal response to the problem of immigration was to turn the
migrants into Europeans or Americans, to erase their difference into
samenessâ (Bey, 1997).
[26] Article titled: âTaqwacores by Michael Muhammad Knightâ.
Retrieved on: October 8^(th), 2008. Retrieved from:
[27] Article titled: âTaqwacores by Michael Muhammad Knightâ.
Retrieved on: October 8^(th), 2008. Retrieved from:
[28] Brief bio of Michael Muhammad Knight is available on the website
below. Retrieved on: October 8^(th), 2008. Retrieved from:
[29] Taqwacoresâ description on Autnomediaâs website. Retrieved on:
October 8^(th), 2008. Retrieved from:
[30] âIslam, Muslim societies and anarchyâ in the Journal of Anarchist
Studies Volume 10, 2002, No. 2. Retrieved October 11^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
.
[31] âIslam, Muslim societies and anarchyâ in the Journal of Anarchist
Studies Volume 10, 2002, No. 2. Retrieved October 11^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
.
[32] âIslam, Muslim societies and anarchyâ in the Journal of Anarchist
Studies Volume 10, 2002, No. 2. Retrieved October 11^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
.
[33] âIslam, Muslim societies and anarchyâ in the Journal of Anarchist
Studies Volume 10, 2002, No. 2. Retrieved October 11^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
.
[34] âIslam, Muslim societies and anarchyâ in the Journal of Anarchist
Studies Volume 10, 2002, No. 2. Retrieved October 11^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
.
[35] âIslam, Muslim societies and anarchyâ in the Journal of Anarchist
Studies Volume 10, 2002, No. 2. Retrieved October 11^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
.
[36] âIslam, Muslim societies and anarchyâ in the Journal of Anarchist
Studies Volume 10, 2002, No. 2. Retrieved October 11^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
.
[37] Delving deeper with the case of the Najidiyya, Crone writes:
âNajdite Islam was a do-it-yourself religion. Politically and
intellectually a Najdite would have no master apart from Godâ (Crone,
2000: 25â26).
[38] Patricia Croneâs âNinth-Century Muslim Anarchistsâ in Past and
Present, No. 167 (May, 2000), pp. 3â28.
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present
Society
Retrieval Date: October 8^(th), 2008. Retrieved from:
[39] On Ihsanâs blog, Becoming a Muslim Anarchist, Yakoub writes: âPrior
to my conversion [to Islam], I had always considered myself an Anarchist
â one that believed in a spiritual reality. My anarchism was founded on
a mistrust of all forms of coerced authority, however tacit, and like
Emma Goldman...Thank God, I now realize Anarchism is the hermeneutic
through which I must approach and realize the truth [of Islam]â. Ihsanâs
blog-spot Retried on: October 8^(th), 2008.Retrieved from:
.
[40] Retrieved on: October 8^(th), 2008. Retrieved from:
.
[41] Rumor has it Rafenelli is later caught in a torrid love affair with
the fascist Mussolini. Mussolini writes her retro-love letters: âWhen I
want to have a break in my tumultuous busy but lonely life I will come
to you. You will make me live oriental hours. We will read Nietzsche and
the Koranâ. Farrell, Nicholas. (2005). Mussolini: A New Life. Sterling
Publishing Company, Inc. pg. 49. Retrieval Date: February 3^(rd), 2009.
Retrieved from:
. In 1923, Rafenelli rebuffs Mussolini. The result is that the scorned
Mussolini lights a great âholocausticâ fire to her publishing house.
Rafenelli died in 1971. Her self-obituary reads âLeda Rafanelli, leaving
forever, salutes all her comrades, Viva lâAnarchia!ââ. Inter-access
Website. Retrieval Date: February 3^(rd), 2009. Retrieved from:
[42] The link below is a brief bio of Leda Rafenelli. Retrieved on:
February 3^(rd), 2009. Retrieved from:
[43] he wrote: âNo one, other than the brute, can escape the charm of
the desert, to the charm oasis...Those who have lived several years
among the Arabs will hear the influence foreverâ. Brief bio of Leda
Rafenelli. Retrieved on: February 3^(rd), 2009. Retrieved from:
.
[44] Brief bio of Leda Rafenelli on a Sufi Website. Retrieval Date:
February 3^(rd), 2009. Retrieved from:
[45] âOur Daily Bleedâ from Recollections Books. Retrieved on: February
3^(rd), 2009. Retrieved from:
[46] Inter-access Website. Retrieval Date: February 3^(rd), 2009.
Retrieved from:
[47] RA-Forum Website. Retrieved on: October 8^(th), 2008. Retrieved
from:
.
[48] Following his anti-statist comments on Islam, Jossot went on to
demand from the French State equal pay for its French citizens,
refugees, legal and illegal immigrants but rejecting retaliatory acts of
violence if the demands he called for are not met (La DĂ©pĂȘche
Tunisienne, 10 February 1913). Before concluding his statement Jossot no
less turned against French schools and which to Jossot were supposed to
distribute knowledge but focused instead on engaging in pedagogical
practices and maintaining power in the hands of a certain social class
while excluding the other social class from that power. âSchool deforms
the brainâ is among the things Jossot said (La DĂ©pĂȘche Tunisienne, 10
February 1913).
[49] Jihad is a critical concept and implies the constant juristic
struggle through free thinking as well as the use of analogical
âindependent reasoningâ (Esposito, 2004: 148) by Muslims during their
localized daily practice(s) and contact(s) with the Holy Koran and
Sunnah, the Prophetic Oral tradition(s). Bey revisited this concept,
jihad, in Jihad Revisited (2004) having relegated it a brief paragraph
in Millennium. Bey writes this of jihad in the context of Sufism, a
denomination of Islam: âSufism itself is sometimes defined as the
âgreater jihadâ [, in Arabic, jihad al-nafs as jihad al-akbar,] while
holy war is called the âlesser jihadâ [, in Arabic, as jihad al-asghar].
[It, jihad al-nafs, is] the struggle to âbecome who you areâ [and that]
takes precedence over even the most righteous cause. But esotericism is
not always quietistic in Islam. Sufis have launched revolutions,
including 19^(th) and early 20^(th) century anti-colonialist/imperialist
struggles...I fantasized, itâs now time for a kind of Islamic Zapatismo
to emergeâ using jihad (Bey, 2004). Bey in this light advocates for
jihad, seeing that: âThere is only one world â [the] triumphant âend of
Historyâ, end of the unbearable pain of imagination â actually an
apotheosis of cybernetic Social Darwinism. Money decrees itself a law of
Nature, and demands absolute liberty. Completely spiritualized, freed
from its outworn body (mere production), circulating toward infinity &
instantaneity in a Gnostic numisphere far above Earth, money alone will
define consciousness. The 20^(th) century ended five years ago; this is
the millennium. Where there is no second, no opposition, there can be no
third, no neither/nor. So the choice remains: â either we accept
ourselves as the âlast humansâ, or else we accept ourselves as the
opposition. (Either automonotony â or autonomy.) All positions of
withdrawal must be re-considered from a point of view based on new
strategic demands. In a sense, weâre cornered. As the old time
ideologues would have said, our situation is âobjectively
pre-revolutionaryâ again. Beyond the temporary autonomous zone, beyond
the insurrection, there is the necessary revolution â the âjihadââ (Bey,
1996).
[50] For instance, a âdirect imperative of a verb, for example âDo!â
often indicates a command to fulfill an obligation; the negative
imperative (âDonât do!â) indicates prohibitionâ but âthese imperative
forms...are not always used in this absolute senseâ (AlâAwani, 1993:
82).
[51] The link below is for the article, Jihad Revisited, by Hakim Bey,
from the website âWorld War 4 Report â Deconstructing the War on
Terrorismâ. Retrieval date: October 21^(st), 2008. Retrieved from:
[52] The link below is for the article, Millennium, by Hakim Bey.
Retrieval date: October 21^(st), 2008. Retrieved from:
[53] The link below is for the essay, Islam and Eugenics, by Hakim Bey.
Retrieval date: October 21^(st), 2008. Retrieved from:
[54] The link below is for the essay, Islam and Eugenics, by Hakim Bey.
Retrieval date: October 21^(st), 2008. Retrieved from:
[55] With respect to the first type Fiscella explains and writes:
ââOrganicâ is meant to refer to any religious anarchism that arises
independent of influence from classical anarchist theory and this would
include all religious anarchism that preceded the eighteenth century
whether European or otherwise [as the work of Crone]. âPostmodernâ is
meant to refer to that point (historically and culturally) at which the
two worlds meet and are capable of producing a synthesis [as the works
of Bey and Knight]. Either of these subtypes could potentially draw
further distinctions between, for example, esoteric and literalist or
individualist and communist variations of Islamic anarchism. What all of
these variants share in common is that Islam as a conceptual framework
is the base from which an anarchist theory is developedâ (Fiscella,
2009).
[56] With respect to the second type Fiscella writes: âThere is already
a question of synthesis inherent in the material â â that of the
potential synthesis between tribal culture and Islamic religion.
Therefore, the term âorganicâ, in this case, might be replaced by
âpremodernâ to better characterise the point of distinction [as is the
case in Barclayâs work]. A âpostmodernâ tribal anarchy in Islam, wherein
anarchist theory and Muslim faith meets tribal culture, may not even yet
exist but it has the potential to do so [i.e. the work has not yet
manifested or been studies]â (Fiscella, 2009).
[57] Finally and with respect to type three, Fiscella writes that âthe
study of Islam as anarchical has not been covered here but it appears
nonetheless to be a related area of study that is clearly distinct from
the other two typesâ (Fiscella, 2009).
[58] The link below is to Eric van Luxzenburgâs article titled Muslim
Anarchism. Retrieval date: January 22^(nd), 2009. Retrieved from:
[59] The link below is to Chris R.sâ article titled Islam and Anarchy
join together. Retrieval date: October 23^(rd), 2008.. Retrieved from:
[60] The link below is to Chris R.sâ article titled Islam and Anarchy
join together and Brain-Fear and PJPsâ misconception. Retrieval date:
October 23^(rd), 2008. Retrieved from: (
)
[61] The link below is to Chris R.sâ article titled Islam and Anarchy
join together and Burning-manâs misconception. Retrieval date: October
23^(rd), 2008. Retrieved from: (
)
[62] The link below is to the article titled Anarchist Orientalism and
the British Muslim Community by Adam. K. Retrieval date: June 22^(nd),
2007
Retrieved from:
[63] The link below is to the article titled Anarchist Orientalism and
the British Muslim Community by Adam. K. Retrieval date: June 22^(nd),
2007
Retrieved from:
[64] The link below is to Anrew Floodâs article titled The Problem with
Islam. Retrieval date: October 23^(rd), 2008. Retrieved from:
.
[65] The link below is to Anrew Floodâs article titled The Problem with
Islam. Retrieval date: October 23^(rd), 2008. Retrieved from:
.
[66] Most anarchists do not realize that a Mujâtahâeid could succumb to
meanings and imprints âtotally at oddsâ (Alâalwani, 1993, 82) with Godâs
intended imprint and word. The two, the Mujâtahâidâs intent to imprint
and Godsâ intended meaning do not oppose. Each is the condition of
possibility for the existence of the other provided the Koran and the
Sunnahsâ textual sustenance of the imprint and the Mujâtahâeidâs sincere
investigative intent in dealing with the subject matter while deciding
whether a Koranic âtext may be regarded... as either general or
specific, absolute or limited, summing up or clarifyingâ (Alâalwani,
1993, 82). Otherwise and in the absence of this power of a Mujâtahâeid
there would not be a power of original formation of Islam or impression
to arrive anew to as inscribed through the concepts ijtihad and jihad.
In fact, as practices the two would be innate, benign and utterly
useless while Muslims dispute as they do now in ignorance. Most
anarchists do not recognize that Muhâtahâeideen, and whatever their
ârelation to religion may be, and to this or that religionâ (Derrida,
1996: 7), âare not priests bound by a ministry, nor theologians, nor
qualified, competent representatives of religion...in the sense the
certain so called Enlightenment philosophers are thought to have beenâ
(Derrida, 1996: 7). A Mujâtahâidâs jihad and ijtihad can never be a
quest for the Mujâtahâidâs self as an authoritative figure. Anarchistâs
need to realize that a Mujâtahâidâs Islam is longingly a spiritual bond,
âa reflecting faith...opposed to dogmatic faith...in so far as the
latter claims to know and thereby ignores the difference between faith
and knowledgeâ (Derrida, 1996: 10).
[67] NOII is a forum for âa loose coalition of activistsâ resisting
neo-liberal globalization in relation to its links âto the displacement
of people from the South compelled to leave their homes due to
persecution, poverty or oppression...[and] colonial exploitationâ (Day,
2005: 189â190). These people of the South leave âonly to be categorized
as âillegal aliensâ by the supposedly benevolent G8 countries where they
seek refuge; they are denied the same rights as âregularâ citizens, and
therefore face limited opportunities and further degradationâ (Day,
2005: 189).
[68] Solidarity Across Borders is a group where Muslim and anarchist
activists are âinvolved in awareness-raising activities and direct
action casework, and are committed to recognizing that âstruggles for
self-determination and for the free movement of people against colonial
exploitation are led by the communities who fight on the front linesâ
(Day, 2005: 190).
[69] This interpretation is seeking to encourage Muslims and anarchists
to exercising and embrace deep compassion towards each other as
community, without each individualistically focusing on âwhat divides
and disperses, ignoring the wisdom of difference and the objectives
of...[adhering to specific ethico-political commitments] to begin withâ
(Esack, 1997: 171). This is not to say individual differences or that
the individual should not exist. After all, âif intentions are sincere,
[individual] differences of opinion could bring about a greater
awareness of the various possible aspects and interpretations of
evidence in a given case...differences could generate intellectual
vitality and a cross-fertilization of ideasâ (Al-Awani, 1993: 14).
Moreover, âsuch a process is likely to present a variety of solutions
for dealing with a particular situation so that the most suitable
solution can be foundâ (Al-Awani, 1993: 14). In this light, it is not
that Muslims and anarchists in their own communities or amongst each
other should not have differences over individual opinions but rather
that they learn how to differ ethically because âif [the] differences of
opinion operate in a healthy framework they could enrich the Muslim [and
anarchist] minds and stimulate intellectual development. They could help
to expand perspectives and make us look at problems and issues in their
wider and deeper ramifications, and with greater precision and
thoroughnessâ (A-alwani, 1993: 4). What is critiqued here then are
heretical politics stemming from an egoistic desire for a divisive and
righteous approach to politics in order to preserve the individual,
without true regard for the politics of others save through a
purportedly shared intentional but not action oriented pluralism. This
interpretation is against this individualistic self-righteous approach
because righteousness cannot be âthe monopoly of any single
competitor...[In this interpretation,] the judge God, has to be above
the narrow interest of the participants...and any [arrogant] claims of
familiarity with the judge with any particular âteamâ will not avail the
participantsâ (Esack, 1997: 175).
[70] Electronic Text Centerâs translation of the Koran and which is
available at the University of Virginia library. Retrieval date: October
11^(th), 2008. Retrieved from:
[71] Furthermore on several occasions in the Koran, God even offers a
wager that should humanity and all intelligent life forms in their
entirety gather together to construct a verse, that the verse would fail
in matching a single Koranic verse. God demonstrates the wager in the
following two verses: â[For] If all humankind and the other intelligent
life were to band together to produce the likes of this Koran, they
could not produce the like thereof (The Holy Koran, Chapter 17: Chapter
of âChildren of Israelâ: Verse 8); [and] Bring then a single surah
[verse] like unto it, and call upon whomsoever you can if you are
truthfulâ (The Holy Koran, Chapter 10: Chapter of âJonahâ: Verse 37).
[72] At times the Koranâs descriptions are general and at times
bafflingly specific and ahead of its time. For instance, in this verse
below God describes the process of how the wrapping of muscles over the
bones of a child occurs inside a motherâs womb. God says:â[We] then
formed the drop into a clot and formed the clot into a lump and formed
the lump into bones and clothed the bones in flesh; and then brought him
into being as another creature. Blessed be Allah, the Best of Creators!
(The Holy Koran, Chapter 23, Chapter of âThe Believersâ, Verse: 14)As
Louis Massignon wrote: âGodâs word unmakes all human meanings, all the
proud constructions of civilisation, of high culture, and then returns
all the luxuriant cosmic, imagery back to the lowly and the oppressed,
so that in their imaginations it can be made anewâ(Cheetham, 2005: 202)
[73] In Godâs call upon Muslims to ponder the Koran, God assures Muslims
that the Koran is a text that is confident in its program and is capable
of situating exoterically and esoterically any analytic activity, where
truth plays apiece limited by a more powerful functioning of the text
itself.
[74] Ulama is another word for policymakers or religious scholars. See
John L. Espositoâs Practice and Theory: A Response to Islam and The
challenge to Democracy (2003). Retrieval date: October 13^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
[75] The absence of ijtihad is troubling considering that âlike many
others [, Muslims have to be] worried about the future being readied
for...[them], one that could make [them]...miss the fascism of yoreâ
such as during the Crusades and the Mongol wars (Guattari, 1995: 94).
[76] In doing so, I am therefore no longer neutralizing or accepting by
virtue of naturalizing that which has been given to me of Islam or of
anarchism, but rather opening up a new anarchistic horizon for Islam,
and a new Islamic horizon for anarchism, in Anarca-Islam.
[77] Monad, Jacques. 1970. âThe Ethics of Knowledge and the Social
Idealâ from Chance and Necessity. Collins Publishing. Retrieval date:
February 9^(th), 2009. Retrieved from:
[78] Logo-centricity is âthe assumption that words can
un-problematically communicate meanings present in individualâs minds
such that listener, or reader, receives them in the same way as the
speaker/hearer intendedâ (Sim, 2001: 306).
[79] That noted, I acknowledge that poststructuralist and
deconstructionist philosophies are without a doubt Western paradigms,
but they are Western paradigms that emerge out of a Western modernist
paradigmsâ insurrectionary movement against its own-self.
[80] With deconstruction, a theorist is doing work on work that is
already at work in the text. In other words, auto-reflecting. That is,
reflecting on an already present state of reflection. A theorist at the
end with deconstruction merely captures fragments from texts, while the
rest hides. With deconstruction, the ultimate achievement any theorist
could hope to accomplish is to reveal what Derrida refers to as
diffĂ©rance. As Jacques Derrida writes in Positions: âthere is no economy
without différance [...] the movement of différance, as that which
produces different things, that which differentiates, is the common root
of all the oppositional concepts that mark our language [...] différance
is also the production [...] of these differencesâ (2002: 7)
[81] Anarca-Islam will not save Western Muslims. Western Muslims are the
only ones to save themselves. Anarca-Islam cannot, however, do so
itself. Not now, not ever. Quite the contrary, I merely hope
Anarca-Islam will encourage and inspire other Muslims to conduct ijtihad
for themselves and that it mobilize Muslims in the West out of their
state of paralysis.
[82] From an interview of Gilles Deleuze by Antonio Negro. Retrieval
Date: February 9^(th), 2009. Retrieved from:
[83] That is, after these theories have been derived and confirmed by
warrior activists (Deleuze, 1990). Without academics then, this energy
that is derived from their efforts in analyzing the interaction between
theory and praxis and that is put to work through their publications to
the membrane of social movements and their activists, social movement
theory would not exist.
[84] Tamim Saidi shares Tariqâs view regarding culture and Islamic
practices. Saidi argues in an article titled Islam and Culture: Donât
mix them up: âThere are certain areas of overlap: A peopleâs religion
influences their culture, and culture influences how they practice their
religion. But in Islam there is a clear distinction between the twoâ
(2008). I agree with Saidi and Ramadanâs views and will illustrate this
further in Sayyid-Sallyâs case study as it pertains to Fatâwah, Islamic
laws, in light of their post-colonial encounters.
Retrieved on: October 18^(th), 2008.
Retrieved-from:
[85] Tariq Ramadan has âthe measured delivery of an academic, which is
no more than you would expect from a man who used to be a high school
principal and wrote his doctoral thesis on Nietzsche. But as the leading
Islamic thinker among Europeâs second- and third-generation Muslim
immigrants, the Geneva-based university lecturer also inspires a good
deal of mistrust â from both Arab Muslims for his Western sensibility
and Westerners for his controversial Islamic roots. Ramadan, 38, is the
grandson of Hassan al-Banna, founder, in 1928, of the Muslim
Brotherhood, an Islamic revival movement that spread from Egypt
throughout the Arab worldâ. Retrieval Date: February 9^(th), 2009.
Retrieved from:
[86] After all and from a theological perspective Muslims reserve the
right to engage in their different cultural practices. Even more so,
cultural practices are appreciated, respected and expected to exist in
Islam. God even acknowledges this intentional creation of varying
cultures and the existence of differences as result of cultures in the
following verse: âWe created...and made you into peoples and tribes so
that you might come to know each otherâ (The Holy Koran, Chapter 49:
Chapter of âThe Inner Apartmentsâ: Verse 13).
[87] And this had been the premise upon which God had vowed that it is
God that would protect the Koran. Godâs vow is in the verse: âVerily We
[God] ourselves have sent down this exhortation, and most surely will be
its Guardianâ (The Holy Koran, Chapter 15: Chapter of âThe Rock Cityâ:
Verse 10).
[88] Any perceived differences between Islam and anarchism are not the
result of a âcultural problemâ. Having that perception would be falling
into a trap and would only be regurgitation and a re-enforcement of
Eastern versus Western dichotomies. I am therefore not seeking to
establish a puritanical Islam by constructing Anarca-Islam, nor
dismissing the importance of culture, but giving paramount attention to
Islamic principles and that have been dismissed by a predominant
majority of Muslims or of which the predominant majority are not aware
of. I do this, as I put culture quietly to âsleepâ.
[89] In doing so I am âfollowing the same anti-evolutionary logic that
underlies Deleuze and Guattariâs concept of the state form, capitalismâ
(Day, 2005: 142).
[90] There is a danger when pronouncing or writing anything with respect
of Islam without context. It is more appropriate to speak of Islams or
Islam(s), given the variant different interpretations and names of
Islam. Considering, as Bey writes: âthat Islam possesses a far deeper &
more sophisticated critique of âthe modern worldâ than that proposed by
the âIslamistsâ. In fact, more than one critique. To mention a few
(without judgment or evaluation): -The militant anti-colonialist sufism
of Emir Abel Kader, or the Sanussi Order of Libya -The strange
âanarcho-sufismâ of Col. Qaddafiâs Green Book (Qaddafi rebelled against
a Sufi king, but was himself raised as a Sufi) _the Shiite socialism of
the martyred Ali Shariati -the idea of the Mahdi or Redeemer as a
collectivity â the ideal of Social Justice â the ban usury (which makes
Global Capital impossible, of course) -the heroic Naqshbandi Order in
Chechnya, resisting Russian imperialism for centuries -going back in
time, the Persian Syrian Nizaris or âAssassinsâ, who went so far as to
proclaim the Day of Resurrection, and to liberate a network of castles
in the cause of esoteric enlightenment -etc. etc. â or even further back
in time, the Prophet himself: professional revolutionary, guerilla
leader, returned from his exile to establish egalitarian iconoclastic
mystical/militant regime in Mecca...and so onâ (Bey, 1997).
[91] The link below is to Jason Adamâs article Nonwestern Anarchisms:
Rethinking the Global Context Retrieval date: October 18^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
[92] Adams writes of how he employs the terms Western and Nonwestern as
follows: âBy employing the label âWesternâ I am not referring to the
actual history of anarchism but rather to the way in which anarchism has
been constructed through the multiple lenses of Marxism, capitalism,
eurocentrism and colonialism to be understood as such. This distorted,
decontextualized and ahistoric anarchism with which we have now become
familiar was constructed primarily by academics writing within the
context of the core countries of the West: England, Germany, France,
Italy, Spain, Canada, United States, Australia and New Zealand. Since
there was virtually no real subversion of the eurocentric understanding
of anarchism until the 1990s, the vast majority of literature available
that purports to deliver an âoverviewâ of anarchism is written in such a
way that one is led to believe that anarchism has existed solely within
this context, and rarely, if ever, outside of it. Therefore, the
anarchism that becomes widely known is that which has come to be
identified with the West, despite its origins in the East; Kropotkin,
Bakunin, Godwin, Stirner, and Goldman in first wave anarchism: Meltzer,
Chomsky, Zerzan, and Bookchin in second and third wave anarchism. Rarely
are such seminal first wave figures as Shifu, Atabekian, Magon, Shuzo,
or Glasse even mentioned; a similar fate is meted out for such second
and third wave figures such as Narayan, Mbah, and Fernandez â all of
non-Western originâ. Retrieval date: October 18^(th), 2008. Retrieved
from:
[93] The link below is to Jason Adamâs article Nonwestern Anarchisms:
Rethinking the Global Context Retrieval date: October 18^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
[94] The particularity of uniquely moulding anarchism is accomplished by
these individuals and communities, while generally attempting to
preserve anarchismâs anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist tenants, in
so far as the two commitments are understood to be the foundations upon
which classical anarchism was grounded.
[95] In the future, and upon discovering the ânewâ commitments these
commitments are to be included with the two commitments that will have
been pre-established for Anarca-Islam in this thesis.
[96] Laing says: âIn some families, parents cannot allow children to
break the âfamilyâ down within themselves, if that is what they want,
because this is felt as the breakup of the family, and then where will
it endâ (Laing in Perez, 1990: 27; also in Cooper, 1971: 73). This
internal Oedipal structure that is inscribed by both parties/parents
into an individualâs psyche, its purpose is to destroy an individualâs
yearn for âself-directed action or what Nietzsche called the âinnocence
of becomingââ (Perez, 1990: 27). The result is that we become poor,
defenseless, guilt-ridden puppets in internal straightjackets, un-free
and Oedipalized (Perez, 1990: 28).
[97] The modern state attempts to do what God does with a space as an
individualâs face. That is, carving and establishing a place on the face
for the infinite shapes and sizes of the faceâs traits, and therefore
forming a map. Unlike God who appreciates and thus creates differences
amongst individuals, the objective behind the modern stateâs
construction of a map is the disciplining and coercion of a definitive
space. For example, in the case of an individualâs face, the face acts
as space that is to be defined, labeled and categorized to assure the
identification and recognition of an individual by the modern-state.
[98] Every âfascism is defined by a micro-black hole that stands on its
own and communicates with others before resonating in a [great and then]
great [er], [more] generalized central black holeâ; macro-fascisms are a
subsequent of the macro-politics of the couple, the neighbourhood, the
community, institutions and the modern state (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980:
214). With the Eurocentric State not being the common central point
âwhere all [these] other [macro-fascist] points melt together, but
instead acts as a resonance on the horizon, behind all other
pointsâ(Deleuze & Guattari, 1980: 224). Micro-fascisms therein provide
the necessary breeding ground, impetus, and conditions for the
germination of thinking which resonates with, as (re) affirms the
existence of the State, a macro-fascism possible (Call, 2003: 51).
Currently the modern state no longer merely exists external to us, to be
fought outside us, but engrained internally, entangled, crystallized,
within our hearts, as our thoughts, to be fought within us. With both
fascisms (re) affirming their resonance with the other, micro to macro,
and macro to micro.
[99] It is capitalismâs ability to seductively free, yet when necessary
contain an individualâs desire to resist the ascribed representations
that permits capitalism to never be saturated. Here I have in mind
desire, as Deleuze, Guattari, Donzolet and Marx understood it: âAs a
natural and sensual object, not bolstered by needs, but such that needs
are derived from desireâ (Donzolet, 1977: 36).
[100] In other words, âcapitalism constitutes an axiomatic (production
for the market), [while] all States and all social formations tend to
become isomorphic [, or of heterogeneous characters â democratic,
totalitarian, socialist â ] in their capacities of realizationâ of the
State form but âthere is but one centered world market, the capitalist
one, in which even the so-called socialist countries participateâ
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1980: 436).
[101] Flows like: the flows of milk from a breast to a childâs mouth, of
faeces from an anus, or flows of a look from a face; capitalism operates
through the appropriation of flows.
[102] A relationship that is internalized by individuals not to repress
an individualâs desire, but rather to construct desire âin such a way
that it believes itself to be repressedâ (Newman, 2001: 99).
[103] Deleuze and Guattari refer to this process of critiquing and going
beyond the Freudian Oedipal structure, âwhich determines the life of the
individual by making him or her dependent on the internalized âmommy,
daddy and meâ structureâ as âschizoanalysisâ (Perez, 1990: 22).
[104] Insurrections, that entails confrontations of knowable privileges
vis-Ă -vis political-ethical commitments committed to by a Muslim.
[105] There is no shame or pride, Islamically, in seeking the advice of
others. There is no shame or pride, Islamically, in being
compassionately and forgivingly called out by others. There is no shame
or pride in erring before others. Provided, that is, that a Muslim
possesses the will to comprehend the err erred, and the undeniable
resilience of heart and mind in correcting the err upon erring.
[106] And hopefully the communityâs interests are not deemed âbadâ
interests. Because âbadâ interests can exist regardless of the âtypeâ of
collectivity given that there is ârural [micro] fascism and city or
neighborhood fascism, fascism of the Left and fascism of the Right,
fascism of the couple, family, school and officeâ (Call, 2003: 52).
[107] Without a similar courtesy however bestowed, or extended, during a
matterâs pertinence to what there is collective contention over. Due, in
other words, to the matterâs pertinence as a necessity with respect to
the communityâs existence as a cohesive, healthy, egalitarian community.
[108] Translation of the Prophetâs last sermon is from the website,
Islam-city, with the link below. Retrieval date: October 13^(th), 2008.
Retrieval from:
[109] As for labels like âsultan/kingâ (Malik), there are absolutely no
grounds in the Koran for what really is just arbitrary personal
dictatorship and domination (Esposito, 1996: 25).
[110] It seems, as such, the meek come forth to inherit the Earth and
Islam. Considering as Rodinson argues: âthe more successful the
âclergyâ...[became] in raising their standard of living, or even merely
in becoming integrated in the nation [in the aftermath of colonialism
and imperialism], the less Islam serve[d] as... slogan[s] for the
disinheritedâ (Rodinson, 1973: 226).
[111] The quote is part of the Sunnah. It is retrieved from the link
below. Retrieval date: October 13^(th), 2008. Retrieved from:
[112] As John Esposito argues, the âtheory that the influential persons
could represent the general public was [and still is] operative in
[Islam] ... but in view of changed circumstances and in consideration of
the principles of consultation ... it is essential that this theory
should give place to the formation of an assembly ... [a] real
[representation] of the peopleâ (1996: 25).
[113] There exist a number of âsignificant problems with
Eurocentric-style democracy ... as every Muslim [is required, each
according to their abilities,] ... to give a sound opinion on matters
... entitled to interpret the law of Godâ (Esposito 1996: 25). This
becomes âa basis for distinguishing between democracyâ in Western
traditions and Islam (Esposito, 1996: 25â26). This is because the
vision, of bearing the communal right to self-govern, âdo[es] not fit
into the limits of Eurocentric based definition[s] ... [because of its
anchorage in] ... consultation (Shurah), consensus (Ijma) and
independent interpretative judgments (ijtihad)â (Espoito, 1996: 25â26)
[114] A territory that is bound by an anarchistic alternative and
Anarca-Islamâs never-ending aspiration for micro as macro
anti-authoritarian commitments throughout and in spite of authorityâs
stratas: myopic, and macro institutional and state-like existence.
[115] For further emphasis, see reference: to Ali Abdel Razeq (1925),
âAl-Islam wa Ushul al-Hukm â Islam and the Principles of Governance,â in
Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, Muhammad: Prophet and Politician (May 9, 2004).
Retrieval Date: December 8^(th), 2008.
Retrieved from:
see, Yunan Labib Rizk, âCabinet Toppled by a Book,â Al-Ahram Weekly
Online, 522 (February 22â28, 2001). Retrieval Date: January 2^(nd),
2009.
Retrieved from:
[116] For as it is, numerically Muslimsâ resemble âgrains of salt within
a seaâ but are as âthe foam of the wavesâ as narrated above in the
Sunnah.
[117] As Newman argues, âGod has not been completely usurped...as has
always been claimed [in anarchistic discourses]... only reinvented in
the form of essenceâ (Newman, 2001: 6). In other words âas long as
[anarchism and anarchists] continue to believe absolutely in grammar, in
essence, in the metaphysical presuppositions of language...they will
continue to believe in Godâ (Newman, 2001: 6).
[118] However, if in the end still â despite the aforementioned â
anti-religious anarchists perceive that with the metaphysical
slaughtering of God there lies an anti-authoritarian âsolutionâ to every
type of authority, an expense comes with the adoption of this conduct or
âsolutionâ. For with the presumed metaphysical âDeath of Godâ there
arrive infinite demagogues, mini-gods, vying and squabbling over the
displaced dead Godâs space and power. A space now âabandonedâ, open, to
receive the highest bidder. It would be deceiving to think otherwise. In
other words, to presume upon Godâs metaphysical death, Godâs space and
power will remain void and unoccupied is absurd, given that Godâs space
does not disappear with the âDeath of Godâ. Rather, Godâs space and
power, upon Godâs death merely becomes a battleground, battled for by us
as individuals â no longer human, but demagogues â instead.
[119] This is the case, whether the trust comes from atheists or
religious anarchists. The adoption of any other alternative
interpretation would merely imply the unleashing of an apocalypse upon
the constitution of political-ethical individuals, and communities, with
demagogues cropping up in the absence of a collective commitment to
becoming anti-authoritarian, each to the other. At least within the
framework of the absolute sovereignty of God, human hierarchy in theory
is impossible, as before God every human being becomes equal (Esposito,
1996: 25; Newman, 2001: 6).
[120] It is the role of property to drag. For it is reported in the
Sunnah, through âAbu Huraryrah that the Prophet [peace be upon him]
said: âThe poor will enter paradise five hundred years ahead of the
richââ(Hasan & Siddiqi, 1984: 91). That is, while the latter remain
behind accounting for accrued and hoarded wealth, how they received it
and how they expended it, the former will not be answerable for any such
thing; in this sense, property drags.
[121] There are four other Koranic verses that confirm this aspect of
God as Absolute owner of property. The emphasis in each of the four
verses below is on the constantly returned keyword âWeâ. The Koran
confirms: âAnd the earth We have spread out (like a carpet); set thereon
mountains firm and immovable; and produced therein all things in due
balance. And We have provided therein means as subsistence, for you and
for those whose subsistence ye are not responsible. And there is not a
thing but its (sources and) treasures (inexhaustible) are with Us; but
We only send down thereof in due and ascertainable measures. And We send
the fecundating winds, then cause the rain to descend from the sky,
therewith providing you with water (in abundance), through ye are not
the guardian of its stores, so intend not corruption of the earthâ and
âDo not kill a soul which Allah has made sacredâ(The Holy Koran, Chapter
15, Chapter of âThe Rockâ: Verses 19â22; and Chapter 6, Chapter of âThe
Cattleâ: Verse 151).
[122] In vein of this relationship, God-Caretaker, human beings,
individually and collectively, are nothing but Caretakers, legatees, and
Khalifahs of Godâs property, with none permitted claim or the corruption
of property borrowed from God.
[123] That is, catering to a communityâs needs. Otherwise, what remains
with an individualâs repression is not only the âdeath of an individualâ
but the eventual âdeath of the communityâ due the communityâs
constitution by what is now a repressed individual (Abdul-Rauf, 1978:
18â19).
[124] For further emphasis see Abdul-Hamid Ahmad Abu-Sulayman, âThe
Theory of Economics of Islam,â in Contemporary Aspects of Economic
Thinking in Islam, proceedings of the Third East Coast regional
Conference of the Muslims Students Association of the USA and Canada,
American Trust Publications (April 1968) (emphasis added).
[125] Mudarabah/Musharakah seeks to minimise the production of what a
community is not need of by transforming the threshold of production or
consumption into the exchange limit, in which exchange is of interest to
a consumer and a producer. As Deleuze and Guattari note: The exchange
limit, is âone of temporal succession[s] because ... [it] preserves
itself [from Israf] ... by switching territories [of that which is
produced and consumed by way of a joint consensual collaborative
operation between both parties, [consumer and producer,] at the
conclusion of each period (itinerancy, itineration)...[and it is] this
iteration [that] will govern the apparent exchangeâ (Deleuze, &
Guattari, 1980: 440). Capitalism, the other way around thrives on
stockpiling, as its cardinal law and concern is that of âthe
simultaneous exploitation of different territories; or, when the
exploitation is successive, the succession of operation periods bares
[exploitation] on one and the same territoryâ till âthe force of serial
iteration is superseded by...global comparisonâ; that is, capitalism
functions by over-producing, under-producing, intentionally, serially,
locally or globally, the consequence of which are exploitative
assemblages, markets, in the absence of consensual collaborations
between consumers and producers (Deleuze, & Guattari, 1980: 440).
[126] It is worthwhile noting as well the existence of other varying
forms of Zakat and that are considered too to be rights. For example,
Infaq and Itâam. Infaq of Sadaqah, denotes the act of the voluntary
spending of charity and though unlike Zakat in that it is un-obligated,
it is still as Zakat in that it is directed to the welfare of those in
more need, is always insolent and cheerfully encouraged as a practice
amongst the community. Of course there remains then Itâam. Itâam is the
act of leaping beyond worldly glory, to hosting and being able to do so
without cost, calculation or rationalisation, and therefore co-existing
and voluntarily feeding guests, foreigners, brothers and sisters in need
of sustenance; un-obligated, it stills brings strange freedom into the
Mutâimarâs or hostâs world by basking in the company of those poorer on
a dinner table (Ahmad, 1991: 42).
[127] In terms of money there is also the minimization of the
accumulation of it in terms of inheritance. Islam established
inheritance laws in order to maximise the mobility of comforts arriving
with wealth. Inheritance laws in Islam in a sense is a capitalist
mechanism directed at folding back wealth upon its own self. An anarchic
reading of Islamic inheritance laws would illustrate that Islamic
inheritance laws are fundamentally at their core anti-capitalist: âaimed
at achieving a wide distribution of wealth amongst the close relatives
of the deceased; at the same time the laws are geared to avoid hoarding
and individualistic discrimination and squabbling within the family
unitâ(Cummings, Askari, Mustafa, 1980: 35). Looking at them, âIslamicâ
inheritance laws therefore seek the reshuffling and de-centring of the
âpettinessâ of the deceased individualâs whims, with respect to their
individualistic allocation of their wealth upon death, through a
displacement of them, as the fabric of a community, Maslaha, is placed
âahead [of and above] the emotional whims of the deceased ... [thus] a
dispersal of wealth from the one to the many, instead of channelling
wealth from the many to the oneâ (Cummings, Askari, Mustafa, 1980: 35).
For we can read as the Holy Koran confirms: âNever let those who hoard
the wealth which God has bestowed on them out of His bounty think it
good for them: indeed it is an evil thing for them. The riches they have
hoarded shall become their fetters on the Day of Resurrection. It is God
who will inherit the heavens and the earth. God is cognizant of all your
actions. God has heard the words of those who said: âGod is poor, but we
are rich.â Their words We will record, and their slaying of the prophets
unjustly. We shall say: âTaste now the torment of the Conflagration.
Here is the reward of your misdeeds. God is not unjust to His
servants...[and] the multiplication (of possessions and its boasting)
occupied you (from worshipping and obeying) until you visit the graves.
But no, indeed, you shall soon knowâ The Holy Koran, Chapter 3: Chapter
of âThe Family of Imranâ: Verse 180; and Chapter 102; Chapter of
âRivalry in Worldly Affairs â Competitionâ: Verses 1â3).
[128] In this vein, the giver of Zakat is to experience, and to feel the
âshameâ the other feels, and the affect of the effects that hover over
the otherâs body when it is judged for being poor.
[129] 9/11, better than the first Gulf War, acted as the mask dawned by
the West for perfecting its ânon-colonial and non-imperialâ entry into
and exit out of Muslim life and resources under the name of freedom and
in the face of what a few Muslims in the name of Islam had done. Islam
and Muslims because of 9/11 have indefinitely become the ideal
candidates handpicked by the West as the enemy after the Cold War, with
the war on terror as a war on ghosts.
[130] For now Muslim anarchists are destined to be ostracized and
âotheredâ exponentially beyond the âotheringâ the average Western Muslim
faces as a result of the Westâs representations of them. Muslims
anarchists have no community. That is the cost however of the (re)
invigoration of Islam and that is now being driven forth by these
Muslims anarchists and their helpless falling in love with anarchism,
its currents and its commitments. Commitments, which I proved in this
thesis, were once Islamic but unfortunately have been abundantly
dismissed or forgotten by the majority of Western Muslims, let alone
most Muslims worldwide.
[131] What I did throughout this thesis is bring together two traditions
to a conversation, Anarca-Islam, which has been going on internally
inside me for over 21 years. They are now negotiating their resonances
and differences. And negotiations sometimes last so long you do not know
whether they mean the beginning of war or the beginning of peace.
Anarca-Islam is always going to be caught between anger with the way
things are and a peace so close when the discourse of Islamic anarchism
is broached. But, lest we ever forget or even fool ourselves,
Anarca-Islam is not power. Institutional religions, states, capitalism,
empires, multitudes, science, law, public opinion and television are
powers, but not Anarca-Islam. Anarca-Islam is always going to have its
internal battles between Islam and anarchism, but they are mock battles.
When it comes to powers, Anarca-Islam, not a power, cannot battle with
the powers that be, because it fights a war against these powers without
battles. It only fights a guerilla campaign against them all through
Islam and anarchism. Just it cannot battle with these powers,
Anarca-Islam cannot converse with them either. Anarca-Islam can only
negotiate between Islam and anarchism. But since powers are not just
external things, but permeate each of us, Anarca-Islam has already
thrown willing Muslims and anarchists into a panegyric desert of the
present where they will be eternally negotiating with each other, in a
guerilla campaign against their own selves, until Muslims and anarchists
learn that they will always stand in the shadow of their names in the
fight of their lives to live up to the commitments that ought have
arrived with the names, Islam and anarchism. Muslims and anarchists,
from here on in, have to learn to negotiate and compromise. It is time
for a community, which is not a totality but is, as in Spinoza,
absolute, to rise, with a force so strong, that it stands tall without a
base (Deleuze, 1995). One day the day will come when the day will no
longer come, but before that day, I promise you this: That Community
will come.
[132] What I have written in this thesis is part of a past, that is also
a present and also future, all intersecting at once. I would have
preferred Fiscella use the term poststructuralist, and which I discussed
in chapter three, this way leaving less room for ambiguity, as opposed
to the term postmodernist and which is altogether different from
poststructuralist.
[133] Nearing the end where the end is just the beginning of another
end, because the end can only mean that I would have to just begin again
and again, my silence has been temporarily broken and I feel incredibly
lonely. From here on in, the ethical and political anti-authoritarian
and anti-capitalist responsibilities I discussed will not and cannot
allow me to hesitate anymore before the cynicism of Muslims, anarchists
and anyone else who says that âthings are as they are because there is
no other wayâ (Freire, 1998: 101â104). And although Freire is writing
about a different topic, in a different time and context, I believe his
words are relevant here. Just as Freire notes, with respect to faith, I
cannot âsee how ...[Muslims] who so live their faith could negateâ the
rights of anarchists who do not want to have faith (Friere, 1998:
101â104). Even if that means that they do not want to have faith in
their selves or the ideals they espouse. In the same way Muslims cannot
be rejected by anarchists for having faith because âbeing in faith means
moving, engaging in different forms of action coherent with that faith
...to engage in action that reaffirms it and never action that negates
itâ (Friere, 1998: 101â104). Negating faith is not âbeing without it,
but rather contradicting it through actsâ (Friere, 1998: 101â104). Not
âhaving faith is both a possibility and right of human beings, who cease
to be human if they are denied their freedom to believe or not to
believeâ (Friere, 1998: 104). Having faith and believing never was and
never will be âthe problem; the problem is claiming to have it and, at
the same, contradicting it in actionâ (Friere, 1998: 104). Taking on a
name, Muslim and anarchist, will never be what it is about. It is about
the set of commitments that should have arrived by taking on those
signifiers. Besides that, one is always destined in the shadow of the
name. Let me also not that lonely is not being alone. The former denotes
is a state of catatonic lonelinessâ a neuroticism, revolving around the
absence of a profound connection with another like a friend, a community
or a lover without having to stutter or talk to this other. That is, the
incessant yearning for communication through an aesthetic meditative
type of silence, as opposed to moving oneâs tongue or speaking to the
âotherâ. That is loneliness. Everyone should be fine being alone. No one
should be fine being lonely. And the pain I feel is worse than Ovid, an
ostracized poet two millennia ago, who wrote in Tristia, describing âthe
cultural hostility... alienation...[and] bodily pain that reflect his
mental anguishâ as an immigrant (Hron, 2009: 33): âI often weep when
writing so...teardrops overflow to wet the page [and] cold sorrow drops
in the heart like rain...as [every waking moment] old fresh wounds feel
fresh againâ (Hron, 2009: 33). But in my case and beyond using Ovidâs
words, I cannot even begin to describe my pain and in a language,
English, that is not mine to begin with. I cannot begin to describe,
when I am left feeling every time like âa sufferer try[ing] to describe
a pain...and then language runs dryâ (Woolf, 1926: 84), as described in
Virginia Woolfâs essay On Being Ill (1926) and Elaine Scarryâs The Body
of Pain (1987) when it comes to the ineffability of translating pain
through language and especially in English. English will never be my
mother tongue, Arabic.