š¾ Archived View for library.inu.red āŗ file āŗ harry-chalmers-is-monogamy-morally-permissiblee.gmi captured on 2023-01-29 at 10:45:30. Gemini links have been rewritten to link to archived content
ā”ļø Next capture (2024-07-09)
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Title: Is Monogamy Morally Permissible? Author: Harry Chalmers Date: 09/28/2018 Language: en Topics: monogamy, relationships, autonomy, polyamory, not-anarchist Source: The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 53, no. 2, 2018, pp. 225ā241., doi:10.1007/s10790-018-9663-8.
Imagine that two partners are in a romantic relationship, and that they
are also (or perhaps a fortiori) friends. Yet theirs is not a typical
relationship, for the partners have agreed on a most unusual
restriction: Neither is allowed to have additional friends. Should
either partner become friends with someone besides the other, the other
partner will refuse to support itāindeed, will go so far as to withdraw
her love, affection, and willingness to continue the relationship.
Many of us, I think, would sense that thereās something morally
troubling about such a relationship. If asked to explain whatās morally
troubling about it, we might say something like this: Friendships are an
important human good, and when weāre in a romantic relationship with
someone, we should want our partner to have such goods in her life. Or
at least, we should want our partner to be free to pursue such goods as
she sees fit. And part of letting our partner have the freedom to pursue
her own good is to refrain from imposing costs on her when she does so.
In the case of friendship, then, we shouldnāt impose costs on our
partnerāfor example, by withdrawing our love, affection, or willingness
to continue the relationshipāif he becomes friends with someone else.
Indeed, many would say that we should go further and actively support
our partnerās efforts to find other friends. When our partner becomes
friends with someone else, we should be happy for herāfor she now has an
additional source of value in her life.
So far, so good. But now consider this: Sexual and romantic
relationships are themselves an important human good. They, too,
contribute to our well-being in myriad waysāwhether through sexual
pleasure, through a special kind of emotional support and closeness,
through helping us to discover more about ourselves, or through the
countless other everyday joys of sharing oneās life intimately with
another. So why not simply be happy for our partner if he found an
additional partner, much as weād be happy for our partner if he found an
additional friend? Is disallowing oneās partner from having additional
partners any better than disallowing oneās partner from having
additional friends?
Questions like these are rarely asked, and even less often taken
seriously. Most of us assume that thereās nothing morally suspect about
having oneās relationship be dyadic and exclusiveāthat is, involving
exactly two partners, and permitting neither partner to engage in
romantic or sexual activity with anyone outside the relationship. We
tend to assume, in other words, that monogamy is morally
permissibleāthat there must be some morally relevant difference between
disallowing oneās partner from having additional partners and
disallowing oneās partner from having additional friends. Yet finding a
morally relevant difference between the two is much more difficult than
it might seem, for, as Iāll now argue, the standard defenses or
justifications of monogamy all fail. I take this failure to be evidence
that the āno additional partnersā restriction of monogamy is in fact
morally analogous to the āno additional friendsā restriction described
earlier. Just as a categorical restriction on having additional friends
is immoral, so, too, is monogamyās categorical restriction on having
additional partners.
Weāve seen above how monogamous restrictions are prima facie analogous
to a morally troubling āno additional friendsā restriction. The task for
those who would defend monogamy, then, is to find a morally relevant
difference between the two kinds of restriction. There are broadly two
ways in which one might try to find such a morally relevant difference:
(1) argue that the āno additional friendsā restriction has bad-making
features that monogamous restrictions lack, or (2) argue that monogamous
restrictions have good-making features that the āno additional friendsā
restriction lacks.
It is easy enough to imagine how one might go about the first of these
strategies. One might say, for example, that a restriction on having
additional friends would be much more onerous than monogamous
restrictions. After all, to refrain from having additional partners
merely requires that we keep our romantic and sexual activity to one
person at a time, and surely thatās not so hard or extraordinary. But to
refrain from having additional friends would require a much more
sweeping change to our social life. Were we to restrict ourselves from
having additional friends, weād have to make sure not to be too friendly
to others we know, not to laugh or chat too much with them, not to
invite them to spend time with us, not to accept their invitations to
spend time with them, not to go out of our way to support them when
theyāre in need, not to accept their support when weāre in needāin
short, weād have to make sure that our relations to all others (save our
partner) stay businesslike at best. Such a straightjacketed social life
is something no minimally decent person would want for her partner.
I grant that a restriction on having additional friends would be a good
deal more onerous than monogamous restrictions, and that this is, in
some sense, a morally relevant difference between the two kinds of
restriction. Yet it is a morally relevant difference only in a weak
sense, namely that it suggests that the restriction on having additional
friends is morally worse than monogamous restrictions. And this, of
course, is not what the defender of monogamy needsā since however worse
the restriction on having additional friends is, it could, for all we
know, be that monogamous restrictions are still morally impermissible.
Some morally impermissible actions, after all, are worse than others;
ceteris paribus, itās morally worse to assault someone than to tell him
a lie, yet that hardly suggests that lying is morally permissible.
What the defender of monogamy needs, then, is not simply to show that
monogamous restrictions are morally better than the restriction on
having additional friends, but that monogamous restrictions are morally
permissible. And to do that, the defender of monogamy will have to go
beyond strategy (1) above; that is, sheāll have to go beyond simply
arguing that the restriction on having additional friends has bad-making
features that monogamous restrictions lack. After all, however many
unique bad-making features the restriction on additional friends might
have, what matters is whether there is even one bad-making feature that
it shares with monogamous restrictions. Iāve suggested above that there
is a bad-making feature they share: Both restrict oneās partnerās access
to a prima facie important human goodāin one case, (additional)
friendships, in the other, (additional) sexual and romantic
relationships.
At this point, the defender of monogamy might say that while both kinds
of restriction have this apparently bad-making feature, this is a
problem only for the restriction on having additional friendsāfor only
this latter restriction seems to lack any justification. Thereās simply
no good reason why partners should restrict one another from having
additional friends. When it comes to sexual and romantic relationships,
however, there are good reasons why partners should restrict one another
from having more than one at a time. Here the defender of monogamy is
opting for strategy (2) aboveāthat is, arguing that monogamous
restrictions have good-making features that the restriction on
additional friends lacks. This is a more promising route than strategy
(1), for, to the extent that monogamy has unique good-making features,
that could explain why monogamy is morally permissible while the
restriction on having additional friends is not. Letās consider, then,
some attempts to find unique good-making features of monogamyāin short,
some defenses of monogamy.
Here, regrettably, I cannot consider all the defenses of monogamy on
offer. In particular, I must set aside some of the more sophisticated
and rechercheĢ defenses in favor of those that are simpler, better known,
and more likely to resonate with monogamists in general. Given the very
limited state of the literature on the topic, even these latter kinds of
defenses of monogamy have not yet received much critical attention. In
addressing them here, I hope to show that defending monogamy turns out
not to be nearly as easy as most people assume.
One common defense of monogamy is that monogamy helps oneās romantic
relationships to be special. Many think that there is or can be a
distinctive value in choosing, and being chosen by, just one person.
This distinctive value, the thought continues, is enough to justify
monogamy.
The most obvious problem with this defense of monogamy is that it seems
to apply equally to the case of friendship. If having only one partner
makes for a more special romantic relationship, and if the value of this
specialness is sufficient to justify monogamous restrictions, then it is
difficult to see why having only one friend would not likewise make for
a more special friendship, and why this specialness would not likewise
justify the āno additional friendsā restriction described earlier. But
clearly such an appeal to specialness could not justify the āno
additional friendsā restriction. Having additional friends does not make
any particular friendship less special. And the same holds true for
affectionate or loving relationships more broadly. Consider, for
example, the relationship between parents and children. We do not
generally think that having strictly one child is a way of making the
parent-child relationship more special; were one to have more children,
would not oneās relationship with the first child remain just as
special? And would not oneās relationships with the other children be
just as special as oneās relationship with the first child? If indeed
that is so, then those who defend monogamy on grounds of specialness
must point out a relevant difference between romantic relationships and
other loving relationshipsāsome difference in virtue of which one could
have a more special romantic relationship by having only one partner yet
not have, say, a more special parent-child relationship by having only
one child. It is far from clear whether there is such a difference, much
less what it might be.
I can think of only one reason why one might think that monogamy helps
oneās relationships to be special: if one understands āspecialā to mean
āexclusive.ā (This sense of āspecialā occurs in sentences like āThere
will be special seating for us at the event.ā) Under this understanding
of āspecial,ā monogamy indeed helps oneās relationships to be special;
that, of course, follows trivially from equating āspecialā with
āexclusive.ā But surely there is more to this defense of monogamy than
the trivially true claim that monogamous relationships are more
exclusive than nonmonogamous relationships. We must, then, find another
understanding of āspecial.ā
I propose that we understand āspecialā here to mean āhighly valuable.ā
This, I think, is a much more natural sense of the word to use when
talking about loving relationships (e.g., āMy relationship with this
close friend is very specialā). If monogamy helped relationships to be
more special in this sense, that would certainly be a point in its
favor. Notably, however, it does not follow from the fact that monogamy
makes a relationship more special in the first sense, the sense of
exclusivity, that it makes a relationship more special in the second
sense, the sense of being highly valuable. Or at least, if it does
follow, it is not at all obvious. Especially in light of the other
examples of loving relationships, such as parent-child relationships, I
cannot come up with any good reason to think that exclusivity somehow
helps a relationship to be highly valuable. What seems more likely is
that it is only if one conflates the above two senses of āspecialā that
this defense of monogamy will seem plausible.
A further defense of monogamy centers on sexual health. The idea is that
having multiple sexual relationships at a time leads to a much higher
risk of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and, in heterosexual
relationships, of unwanted pregnancy. If partners want to reduce such
risks, they are well advised to restrict each other to one sexual
relationship at a timeāin other words, to embrace monogamy.
Sexual health is an important concern. For multiple reasons, however, it
fails to justify monogamy. First, a concern for sexual health is simply
too narrow to justify the full range of monogamous restrictions. After
all, monogamous restrictions apply not only to sex, but to activities
like intimate dancing and outercourse, and often to emotional intimacy
as well. Even if the sexual health defense succeeds in justifying
monogamous restrictions on sex, it does little to justify these other
restrictions that are a part of monogamy.
More damningly, the sexual health defense does not even succeed in
justifying monogamous restrictions on sexānot in light of the various
methods of contraception and safer sex. Through properly using condoms
and other methods of safer sex, partners can dramatically reduce the
risk of STIs and unwanted pregnancy. Some might object that even with
such methods, the risk is not wholly eliminated. But then, there are
risks of all kinds to be found in activities that we nevertheless find
worthwhile. Driving, biking, and playing sports, for example, all
involve risks, particularly risks of bodily harm or even death. Yet it
would be silly to say, merely on that basis, that we ought not to engage
in such activities, or that it is okay for partners to forbid one
another from engaging in them. I see no reason for thinking that
non-monogamous sex is any different.
A genuine, intellectually honest assessment of risk must take into
account not only the fact that a risk exists, but the nature and extent
of the risk weighed against the benefits of the activity that carries
the risk. In order to justify monogamy on grounds of sexual health, one
would have to show that the risk of STIs and unwanted pregnancy is so
serious, and the benefits of non-monogamous sexual activity so minor,
that it makes sense for partners to refuse one another even the
possibility of taking on board a new sexual relationship. To be sure,
some cases may well fit this description, especially in areas where
protection, contraception, and STI testing are unavailable. However, for
those of us in developed countries with access to contraception,
protection, and STI testing, considerations of sexual health alone are
not likely to justify monogamy.
Risk assessments ought generally to be done case by case, with open
discussion between partners. Admittedly, even for those who do have
access to sexual health resources, in some cases sex with another may
not be worth the risks involved. For example, suppose that a certain
person refuses to discuss his sexual history, get tested, or use
protection. In such a case, clearly each partner in a couple would be
right to bar one another from sex with that person. Acknowledging the
potential for cases like this, however, does nothing to justify the
across-the-board restrictions inherent to monogamy, for there are other
cases in which the risks are much lower (say, when a new potential
partner is perfectly willing to discuss his sexual history, get tested,
and use protection). Embracing non-monogamy, it is essential to
remember, does not at all mean that one must be open to any sexual
contact between oneās partner(s) and others. Rather, it means that one
will, at least in principle, be open to sexual contact between oneās
partner(s) and others in at least some cases. More precisely, if one is
to be consistent in oneās non-monogamy, one should be open to sexual
contact between oneās partner(s) and others in any case in which there
is no good reason not to be open to it.
The next defense of monogamy centers on raising children. Specifically,
one might think that monogamy is the healthiest relationship style for
raising children; children develop best when they see their parents as
romantically involved only with one another. Of course, this point could
justify monogamy only for partners who have children, particularly young
children; it does nothing to justify monogamy for partners who are
child-free or whose children have grown up. Still, many partners do in
fact have young children. So if indeed in those cases monogamy is
justified, thatās a strong point in monogamyās defense.
There are multiple problems with this defense of monogamy. The first is
that, even if we assume that it is harmful to children to see their
parents be romantically involved with others, it does not follow that
parents ought not to be romantically involved with others. To draw an
analogy, we might suppose that watching violent films is harmful for
young children. It does not follow, of course, that parents ought not to
watch violent films. They need only make sure that, if they decide to
watch violent films, they do so when their children are away or asleep.
Similarly, even if young children need to see their parents as
monogamous, parents are nevertheless free to have other relationships;
they need only keep their other relationships private. Perhaps this will
strike some as wrongfully hiding the truth from children. Yet that
objection seems odd; since when are parents not allowed to have a
private life? Moreover, as a matter of course, parents refrain from
exposing their children to things that the children are considered too
young to confront or understandānot the least of which happen to be the
parentsā own sexual relations. Why would the parentsā sexual relations
with others be any less okay to keep private?
Thus far in my response I have assumed that children develop best when
they perceive their parents as monogamous. As it turns out, there is no
good evidence for this assumption; it is mere speculation, with about as
much plausibility as the speculation that children develop best with
heterosexual parents. By the evidence available, whether a family
environment is monogamous or non-monogamous does not by itself have any
bearing on how suitable it is for children. Apart from having basic,
material needs met, what matters most for children is having an ample
amount of love, support, acceptance, and understanding. There is no
reason to suppose that parents must be monogamous for their children to
have the love, support, acceptance, and understanding that every child
needs. If anything, for parents to have other partners who help provide
these needs is likely to be helpful, not harmful, to the children.
Still, some might feel a lingering worry. One feature of non-monogamous
relationships, after all, is that partners break up. A pair of
non-monogamous parents will often have a gradual stream of partners
coming into and out of their lives over the years. If the children get
to know and to spend time with these partners, the children are prone to
becoming attached. Thus, when either parent breaks up with a partner,
does that not present a hardship for the children? Wonāt the children
feel hurt and abandoned?
It is indeed true that non-monogamous parents sometimes break up with
their partnersāincluding partners who have become a valued part of the
childrenās lives. In not at all such cases, however, will this present a
hardship for the children; particularly when the breakup is amicable,
the ex-partner might well remain friends with the parents and thus
continue to have a place in the childrenās lives. Of course, in cases
where the ex-partner does depart from the childrenās lives, whether for
having broken up with the parents on bad terms or for any other reason,
that is indeed saddening for the children. Ultimately, though, such a
prospect is not a good reason for parents to stick to monogamy. After
all, there are all kinds of figures who give invaluable support and
guidance to children, and to whom the children become attached, yet who
have only a passing presence in the childrenās lives. As children grow
older, they must say goodbye to valued teachers, coaches, camp
counselors, grandparents, pets, and friends. I doubt anyone would
suggest that it would be better in the end if such figures were never an
important part of childrenās lives in the first place, just so the
children could be spared the pain of seeing them go. Even with the pain
of saying farewell, the children are better off for having known them.
But then, why would the same not hold true in cases where non-monogamous
parents cut ties with one of their partners?
A further point is that the above worryāthe worry about how children
might be affected by breakups between parents and their partnersāapplies
not only to nonmonogamous parents, but also to monogamous single
parents. A monogamous single parent might well have a series of partners
gradually coming into and out of her life as her children grow up. Is
the risk of the childrenās being harmed by breakups so grave that
monogamous single parents ought not to start new relationships? Surely
few would want to say this.
There is only one further way I see of defending monogamy by appealing
to the need to protect children, and that is to charge that non-monogamy
is too impractical for raising children: Parents simply do not have
enough time or energy to devote themselves adequately both to their
children and to (multiple) other partners. But that leads us to the next
defense of monogamy, a defense that deserves a section of its own.
One might defend monogamy on practical grounds. One might argue, for
instance, that while it would be nice if we could devote our romantic
attention to unlimited partners at a time, our time and energy are
finite. Being monogamous, then, is a way for us to ensure that we do
not, by taking on too many partners at a time, become unable to devote
the time and energy to our partnerāand, if we have them, our
childrenāthat are called for in a relationship.
Thereās no doubt that we humans are limited in our time and energy. Yet
this does nothing to justify monogamous restrictions. The mere fact that
we are incapable of devoting our romantic attention to unlimited
partners at a time hardly justifies setting the limit to one. After all,
we are likewise incapable of having unlimited friends at a time, but
surely that doesnāt justify a āno additional friendsā restriction like
the one described in the introduction.
Another problem with the practicality defense is that it could be
directed at any use of time and energy that does not involve oneās
partner or children. Should one pursue a hobby or spend time with oneās
friends, thenābarring the prospect of having oneās partner and children
along for everything one doesāone will be spending time and energy away
from oneās partner and children. Surely there is nothing wrong with
this. Indeed, it is a normal part of healthy relationships. But in light
of this, the practicality defense is in trouble. Since it is acceptable
for one to spend time and energy away from oneās partner and children,
why should it matter if some of the time and energy one spends away from
oneās partner and children happen to involve sex and romance with
others? From the standpoint of time and energy management, at least,
there seems to be nothing wrong here.
There is, however, an improved version of the practicality defense.
Specifically, one might propose that not merely time and energy
management, but considerations of peopleās emotional limitations can
justify monogamy. Romantic relationships, after all, require us to
extend our concern to others, to be wrapped up in their world, to become
vulnerable to them. And, no matter how much we may wish it were
otherwise, we can love and care for other people only so much. Given the
emotionally demanding nature of romantic relationships, along with our
own emotional limitations, it is entirely legitimate to focus our
attention on developing one relationship at a timeāand to expect our
partner to do the same. In at least some cases, partners who commit to
directing their attention in this way will have a deeper, more
manageable, and more satisfying romantic life than they would if they
spread themselves more thinly.
While more plausible than what came before, this new version of the
practicality defense has its own set of problems. The first stems from
the fact that not all forms of non-monogamy involve openness to multiple
emotionally intimate relationships at a time. In some forms of
non-monogamy, the focus is on sex rather than emotional intimacy. Even
if we grant that a single romantic relationship will leave us
emotionally exhausted, allowing casual sex on the side (but nothing
beyond that) seems just as much a solution as opting for full-blown
monogamy.
But surely this wonāt do, some will objectāfor what starts as a bit of
casual sex on the side can all too easily become something more serious.
If we wish for security and stability in our romantic relationships,
then, we must stick to monogamy. This maneuver, I must say, strikes me
as tenuous. Surely much of the time, we can reasonably be confident that
the potential for a close emotional bond with another is low, and that
the connection is purely or primarily sexual. Nevertheless, we can set
that issue aside. For there lurks a deeper problem here. To see what it
is, let us imagine a case in which a casual sexual relationship does
morph into something more serious. It begins with two acquaintances who
decide to indulge in the occasional hookup. At this stage, their
connection will not be emotionally draining, since it lacks an emotional
bond altogether. Now imagine, though, that over time their connection
comes to hold a deeper emotional significance. The two come to have not
just a sexual acquaintanceship, but a sexual friendship. Surely this new
stage of their connection need not be emotionally burdensomeānot more
than any other friendship, anyway. Now imagine, lastly, that their
sexual friendship becomes more serious stillāindeed, that it becomes a
close friendship. Must it now be emotionally burdensome?
No again, it seems. After all, close friendship is not something we in
general find emotionally taxingāmore truly the opposite, in fact.
Rather, in our close friendships we find a source of love, support, and
empathy. And even when close friendships do contain challenges, such as
moments of stress or tension, these do not tend to be dominant or
definitive features of the friendship; they are the exception rather
than the rule. On the whole, our close friendships energize, encourage,
and empower us. And their doing so does not appear at all contingent on
whether they happen to involve sex. Thus, we may conclude that the above
partnersā connection in its final stage need not be emotionally
draining. And now for the crucial point: Their connection in its final
stage just is a romantic relationship. In having a sexual relationship
that is equally a friendshipāand not just a friendship, but a close
friendshipā the partners hold a deep bond both physically and
emotionally. It is precisely this kind of bond that is a hallmark of
romantic relationships. The result we face, then, is that romantic
relationships need not be so emotionally burdensome after all.
Why might it seem to so many that romantic relationships, by their very
nature, leave us emotionally exhausted? One thing that might explain the
popularity of this thought is the common assumption that oneās partner
is supposed to meet all of oneās deepest personal needs, such as love,
sex, and companionship. In holding this assumption, partners subject
themselves to a more stringent standard of behavior in their
relationships. Any failure of either partner to meet the otherās
personal needs will present itself as a grinding obstacle that must be
set straight, should it be possible, in order to have a proper
relationship. To live under such a standard can no doubt be tiring.
The assumption that oneās partner is supposed to meet all of oneās
personal needs, however, is itself a relic of monogamy. If one is
allowed to have no more than one partner at a time, then it is easy to
see why oneās partner would be expected to meet all of oneās personal
needs. When no one else is allowed to provide sex or romantic love,
failures of oneās partner to meet these needs will, barring cheating,
mean that these needs will go unmet. But absent a background of
monogamy, the assumption that oneās partner is supposed to meet all of
oneās personal needs collapses. If one is allowed to have multiple
partners at a time, after all, then failures of a certain partner to
meet some of oneās personal needs do not have to be grinding obstacles
in the way of a satisfying romantic life. For one can simply have those
needs be met by another partner. For example, for some partners the
focus can be on fulfilling sexual needs, while for other partners the
focus can be on emotional needs.
While such arrangements might at first seem strange, a similar pattern
holds in friendship: We do not expect a friend to be everything, to
provide everything, to meet all of our personal needs. (Indeed, imagine
that one did hold such an expectation of a friendāwould we not find this
neurotic and absurd?) Some friends are valuable to us in some ways,
while other friends are valuable to us in other ways. Why should it not
be the same with our partners in romance?
I arrive now at what appears to be the most popular defense of monogamy,
the defense that comes almost immediately to everyoneās mind: the appeal
to jealousy. In jealousy our thoughts and feelings flail about within a
mire of crippling anxiety, despair, self-loathing, sometimes even rage.
And it all seems to come from seeing our partner take an interest in
someone else. What option is left to us partners, then, but a mutual
promise to forsake all others? At stake here is our comfort, our
happiness, our sanity. Only monogamy can keep us safe from jealousy;
that is its justification.
In the face of the sheer power of jealousy, itās easy to lose sight of
the question of why we feel jealous. Yet that is a question worth posing
here at the outset, for jealousy, when we pause to reflect on it, truly
is odd. After all, when we see our partner find joy in someone else,
would it not make more sense for us to be happy for her? Would it not be
truer to our love, truer to our good will, to share in her joy? Surely
delight and encouragement are the right, the sensible, the matureātruly,
one might say the lovingāreaction to our partnerās good. Why, then, when
our partnerās good happens to involve an interest in someone else, do we
feel so awful instead?
The answer, I think, can only be that we feel jealous precisely because
we are less rational and less mature than we could be. Were it not for
certain unreasonable fears and preconceptions that burden our minds, we
would react to our partnerās new love in the way that is so evidently
called for: by simply being happy for him. Which fears, which
preconceptions keep us from this? First and foremost here is the fear of
losing our partner to someone else. When we feel dread at the prospect
of our partnerās finding a new lover, what most often underlies our
feelings is the worry that our partner will come to desire her not in
addition to us, but instead of us. Second, what breeds jealousy further
is the common assumption that if our partner wishes for another or finds
happiness in another, this means that thereās something wrong with us
and our relationshipāin short, that weāre ānot enoughā for our
partner.13 When we see any indication of interest in someone else as a
sign that our partner is dissatisfied with us, itās only natural for us
to feel hurt at the sight of our partner taking interest in another.
Although other factors can play a role in jealousy, it is these twoāthe
fear of losing our partner to someone else, along with the assumption
that for our partner to show interest in someone else is a gesture of
dissatisfaction with usāthat appear to lie most insidiously at its root.
Now that we have in mind these key factors behind jealousy, we are in a
better position to consider whether monogamy is the solution. Many
people take it as obvious that monogamy is the only answer, or at any
rate the best answer, to jealousy. In fact, however, this is far from
obvious. As is well known, monogamy does not preclude jealousy; indeed,
it is a commonplace in monogamous relationships to worry whether oneās
partner is interested in someone else, or even simply whether she might
become interested in someone else. Why is this? Wasnāt monogamy supposed
to ensure freedom from jealousy? As it turns out, itās no surprise that
monogamy fails to preclude jealousy. For monogamy is not a way of
addressing the factors, described above, that underlie jealousy;
instead, it is merely a capitulation to them.
I use ācapitulationā quite intentionally here. What I mean by it is
that, rather than confronting the underlying needs or problems that
jealousy indicates, monogamy is instead simply a way of avoiding
behaviors that trigger jealous feelings, even at the cost of restricting
the partnersā freedom and well-being. To see in more detail what I mean,
letās consider an example from another context. Imagine that two
partners are beset by jealousy not of the romantic or sexual kind, but
jealousy of a kind that centers on one anotherās accomplishments in the
workplace. Each fears seeing his own work become outmatched by that of
his partner. This fear, in turn, feeds on the partnersā shared
assumption that if oneās partner is producing superior work, that shows
oneās own work to be inadequate. In the face of their jealousy, the
partners mutually commit to putting out only mediocre work from now on;
that way, neither will feel jealous of the otherās accomplishments.
Now let us ask ourselves whether the partners have chosen a healthy,
desirable solution to their jealousy. Clearly notāand not simply because
the doubts and disquiets of jealousy remain likely to lurk in the
partnersā minds. (āOh dearāwhat if he gets careless on his current
project and ends up producing something good?ā) More deeply, what is
wrong is the very spirit, the very direction of the partnersā whole
approach to the matter. Rather than running away from their jealous
feelings, as it were, by restricting their behavior so as not to trigger
them, the partners should confront their jealous feelings head-on. They
should take responsibility for their feelings, seek to overcome their
insecurities, work to free themselves from the fears and false
assumptions that give rise to the problem in the first place. They
should, in short, take the path of greater maturity.
Iād now like to suggest that monogamy is analogous to the above case.
Monogamy, too, is a capitulation to jealousy. Just as with workplace
jealousy, the proper response to romantic and sexual jealousy is not to
restrict our behavior in order to avoid triggering it, but instead to
confront it head-on. Below Iāll say more about how we can do so. First,
though, we should take a moment to recognize just how counterproductive
monogamyās capitulation to jealousy really is.
Not only does monogamy fail to be a guarantee against jealousy. Worse,
by capitulating to jealousy, monogamy in fact perpetuates it. To see
how, consider the opportunity costs that are a part of monogamy. If you
are in a monogamous relationship, your partner has committed not to be
with anyone else. By this simple fact, monogamy makes it much more
natural to worry about keeping your partner. For in being with you, your
partner is forgoing other options, and the only way for him to openly
pursue those options is to end his relationship with you. From here
seeps the unshakable awareness: āThe more desirable those other options
seem, the more desirable it will seem to my partner to leave me for
someone else.ā Itās this kind of relationship style that breeds jealousy
so well, that stokes the fear that your partner will decide to ātrade
up.ā Under monogamy, itās all too natural to be concerned not simply
that your partner likes you, but that he does not like anyone else more.
Together with this heightened fear comes a sense of pressure: pressure
to be more impressive than the others, to ensure that you always one-up
the ācompetitionā for your partner. (How sad it is that monogamy makes
the word competition come so naturally here, when talking about
something like the love of your partner!) And a trying task this often
is. As noted earlier, monogamy fosters an expectation that youāre to
fulfill all of your partnerās personal needs; after all, itās not as if
she is allowed to reach out to other partners here. Naturally, facing
such a high standard only makes it easier to feel insecure, to worry
whether youāre really enough for your partner. In every mistake, every
shortcoming lies an invitation to wonder, āMight this just have led my
partner to think, even if only for a moment, that itād be nicer if
someone else took my place?ā All of this builds up a perfect environment
for jealousy to fester.
As these considerations suggest, monogamy is not the solution to
jealousy; indeed, it is largely what makes jealousy so persistent a
problem in the first place. The kind of context in which jealousy most
readily stews is that of a refusal to share, that of competition for
somethingāprecisely the kind of context sustained by monogamy. By
abandoning monogamy, we destroy much of the lifeblood of jealousy.
Accordingly, it is with the abandonment of monogamy that the real
solution to jealousy begins.
But abandoning monogamy is only the first step. Other steps remain.
Rather than capitulating to jealousy in the vain hope that that will
make it go away, as monogamy does, these further steps involve
confronting jealousy directly. That is how we can best be assured of
being free of jealousy in the endāor, at the very least, assured that
whenever jealousy does arise, we will have healthy, effective ways of
coping with it and working through it.
Here, more specifically, are some of the key steps by which we can
confront jealousy directly. The first is simply to realize how
irrational jealousy is. Jealousy is built on a bed of unreasonable fears
and false preconceptions. Consider, first, the assumption that for your
partner to feel interest in someone else is a sign of dissatisfaction
with you, a sign that you are ānot enoughā for him. Implicit in this
idea is a view of relationships as driven by a need to correct for
deficiency. In such a view, being a good partner is like filling an
empty receptacle: If you do your job well, there is nothing left to be
filled, nothing that your partner could possibly gain from having
another partner. Thus, if your partner does become interested in someone
else, it must be because of some deficiency in your partnerās life that
youāve failed to offset, some portion of the receptacle that youāve
failed to fill. But this is a false and pernicious view of
relationships. Itās notāor at least, it need not be, and arguably should
not beāas if we form relationships as a way of correcting for some
problem or deficiency in our lives; rather, we form relationships
because they are a source of value within our lives and within the lives
of our partners. And thereās no tension between having a perfectly fine
relationship with one partner while acknowledging that additional
relationships could make for additional sources of value within our life
and within the lives of others.15
Once more, we might consider an analogy with friendship. To make a new
friend is no indication at all that thereās something wrong with an
existing friend. It doesnāt even remotely suggest that the existing
friend āisnāt enough.ā (And letās imagine now that the existing friend
did confront us with such a charge. āWhatās wrongāam I not enough for
you?ā he demands. How sadly neurotic, how appallingly petty and immature
this would be!) After all, at least in typical, healthy cases, we form
friendships not to correct for some deficiency, but to add a source of
value to our lives and to the lives of our friends. The same, it seems,
holds true for love. Just as we have no reason to feel hurt when a
friend of ours makes an additional friend, we have no reason to feel
hurt when a partner of ours finds an additional partner.
Consider, next, the fear that is so central to jealousy: that of losing
a partner to someone else. When in the grip of this fear, we often
forget to ask ourselves a simple yet crucial question: If our
relationship is mutually fulfilling, shouldnāt we trust our partner not
to leave us for someone else? Of course, for many of us, being
monogamous will have made this a more difficult question to answer. As
noted earlier, under monogamy the stability of our relationship is not
just a matter of whether itās fulfilling on its own terms; rather, itās
likely also to be a matter of whether our partner perceives other
potential relationships as more fulfilling. To the extent that she does,
sheāll have reason to leave us for someone else. But letās assume here
that weāve already taken the first step toward overcoming jealousy,
namely abandoning monogamy. Absent monogamy, for our partner to suspect
that another relationship would be fulfilling, or even more fulfilling
than his relationship with us, need not present a reason for him to
leave us. For weāve left it open to him to pursue others while staying
with us; we havenāt forced him to choose between us and another. With
this in mind, letās come back to the above question: If our relationship
is mutually fulfilling, shouldnāt we trust our partner not to leave us
for someone else? It appears so. That our partner would leave us for
someone elseāand would leave us despite being in a mutually fulfilling
relationship with usādoes not seem like the kind of prospect toward
which it is reasonable to harbor so much fear. By realizing and
reflecting on this, we are likely to loosen the fearās hold on us. (And
what if our relationship is not mutually fulfilling? Then, presumably,
it is not worth maintaining in the first place. For our partner to leave
us for someone sheās happy with would then be something to be welcomed,
not feared.)
Admittedly, there are circumstances that make more salient the prospect
of your partnerās leaving you for someone else. For example, what if
your partner discovers that she would find being with a certain other
person even more fulfilling than being with you, yet this other person
lives far away, in someplace you cannot move to? In order to be with the
other, your partner would have to move away from you. In cases like
this, it might seem that thereās good reason to fear that your partner
will leave you for someone else. It might seem, further, that monogamy
would function as a kind of protective barrier here; if two partners
have decided to restrict themselves from sex and romance with outsiders,
then each partner is less likely to discover that there is someone else
with whom he has better sex, to whom he feels a deeper romantic
connection, or with whom he otherwise gets along better.
Yet there is something puzzling, if not deeply unsettling, in the hope
that your partner will remain ignorant of options that are better for
her. While seeing your partner abandon you for another is no doubt
painful, consider the nature of the alternative just described: a case
in which your partner stays with you only because, given monogamous
restrictions, she has not experienced a certain other personāa person
whom she would in fact be happier with. Is that really that desirable a
state of affairs? Indeed, is it not that state of affairs that we should
be more concerned to avoid here? When leaving us for someone else is the
path to a more fulfilling romantic life for our partner, should we not
want that for him? However much it may crush us to see our partner leave
us behind in this way, our love and care for her should lead us to want
whatās best for her. Even when it is reasonable, then, to suspect that
our partner will leave us for someone sheās happier with, that is a
prospect to be welcomed rather than feared.
To welcome such a prospect might seem to require a high degree of
emotional independence from oneās partnerāand, indeed, it almost
certainly does. By āemotional independenceā here I do not at all mean a
lack of love or affection, but rather, being comfortable with oneself,
satisfied with oneself, secure in oneself. To be emotionally independent
in this sense is to understand that, however much one treasures oneās
relationship, one does not require oneās partner for one to happy; one
could still live a deeply fulfilling life even if oneās partner decided
to leave. The more one attains this kind of emotional independence and
maturity, the less one is likely to suffer from the insecurity that lies
at the core of jealousy. As ever, the most genuine security comes from
within. Just as one should be prepared to face life should oneās partner
die, one should be prepared to face life should oneās partner decide to
leave.
Abandoning monogamy, recognizing the irrationality of jealousy, and
cultivating emotional independence are together a foundation for
overcoming jealousy. Of course, they do not guarantee that one will
never feel jealous at all. Many nonmonogamous relationships involve
occasional moments of jealousy. But then, many non-monogamous
relationships have likewise been the site of partnersā discovering
powerful ways of coping with and working through their jealousy. Such
experiences suggest that jealousy is not something to which partners in
a non-monogamous relationship must resign themselves. Rather, when
partners in a non-monogamous relationship find themselves feeling
jealous, they can simply accept it as a challenge to be managed
constructively, much like other challenges that arise in relationships.
With that I conclude my responses to what are, in my view, the most
prominent defenses of monogamy. If my responses are on the mark, these
defenses all fail. Of course, there are other, less well-known defenses.
Regrettably, I cannot respond to them here. And even if these further
defenses likewise fail, there remains the possibility that newer, better
defenses of monogamy will arise. Still, given the apparent failure of
what might have seemed its flagship defenses, monogamy is in a bad way.
Unless some other defense turns out to succeed where its more prominent
forerunners have failed, monogamous restrictions will, by all
indications, be analogous to the morally troubling restriction on having
additional friends. Thus, while the case Iāve advanced against monogamy
is not conclusive, it is, at the very least, suggestive. However far the
matter remains from being settled, the evidence thus far points largely
in one direction: We morally ought to reject monogamy. Just as one
morally ought to allow oneās partner to have additional friends, one
morally ought to allow oneās partner to have additional partners.
A few final clarifications are called for. First, in suggesting that
non-monogamy is morally required, Iām not suggesting that partners have
no right to be monogamous. That is, Iām not suggesting that partners
ought to be coercively prevented from holding one another to monogamous
restrictions (whatever such coercive prevention would mean in practice).
Even if a certain restriction is immoral, partners could stillāand, I
believe, often or typically doāhave the right to hold one another to it.
This, at any rate, is what I take the case to be with monogamy. Partners
indeed have the right to be monogamous, though that does not suffice to
make monogamy right.
Second, at this point some might feel a lingering worry: Isnāt
non-monogamy a radical lifestyle change? Could people really be expected
to abandon so much of what is familiar to their romantic life? In fact,
however, non-monogamy need not pose as radical a lifestyle shift as it
might seem. Contrary to what people often assume, being non-monogamous
does not mean that one must maintain multiple relationships at a time.
After all, one can be non-monogamous and in a relationship with only one
person at a certain timeāfor example, in a case in which one simply
hasnāt found others in whom one is interested. For that matter, one can
even be non-monogamous while single, just as one can be monogamous while
single. What being non-monogamous means, rather, is simply that one is
open to having multiple relationships at a timeāopen in the sense of
rejecting restrictions thereonāboth for oneself and whatever partners
one might have.
Thus, even if you have little desire to pursue multiple relationships at
a time, you can live accordingly while remaining non-monogamous. You can
stick to relationships with only one person at a time; the key is simply
that you remain open to your partnerās having multiple relationships at
a time, should she desire it. Now, if your partner likewise has no
interest in pursuing multiple relationships at a time, then your
relationship with him will, from a certain distance, appear no different
from a typical, monogamous relationship. Crucially, though, in being
non-monogamous, you and your partner would both remain open to having
multiple relationships at a time. That is, you and your partner would
recognize that if either of you does come to desire an additional
relationship, neither of you will in principle stand opposed to pursuing
it. It is this openness, rather than the actual state of being in
multiple relationships at a time, that is the essence of non-monogamy.