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Title: In Defence of the Truth
Author: Anarcho
Date: April 28, 2009
Language: en
Topics: truth, russian revolution, a reply, Makhnovists
Source: Retrieved on 29th January 2021 from https://anarchism.pageabode.com/?p=240

Anarcho

In Defence of the Truth

The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci once wrote that “to tell the truth

is a communist and revolutionary act.” If we apply this maxim to most of

the left, we would draw the obvious conclusion that it is neither

communist nor revolutionary.

The Socialist Workers Party is a classic example of this mentality,

rewriting history to suit the recruitment needs of the organisation. One

of the ironies of history is that the Trotskyists who spent so much time

combating the “Stalin school of falsification” have created their own.

I

The SWP is notorious, of course, for its inaccurate diatribes on

anarchism. Pat Stack’s laughably bad “Anarchy in the UK?” (Socialist

Review, no. 246) is just the latest in a long line of articles whose

relationship to reality is one of accidental coincidence.

Unsurprisingly, when it comes to the Russian Revolution, we get a

similar distortions for a similar reason: the necessity to maintain the

Bolshevik Myth. The idea that Leninism works would be impossible to

argue if an accurate account of the Russian Revolution (and the role of

Bolshevism within it) was widely available to radicals.

One of the party’s major attempts to “defend” the Bolshevik tradition is

“In Defence of October” by John Rees, which appeared in International

Socialism no. 52 and as been reprinted has a pamphlet. Needless to say,

a comprehensive analysis of the whole article cannot be done here and,

therefore, it is necessary to concentrate on his account of the

anarchist influenced Makhnovist movement. Such an analysis is useful for

three reasons. Firstly, it exposes the flaws (and honesty) of Rees’s

approach. Secondly, it shows the depths to which a so-called

“revolutionary” will sink to justify his ideology. Thirdly, it allows us

to review the activities of the Makhnovists and show that there is an

alternative to the bankrupt politics of Bolshevism.

Objective Factors

Rees is at pains to blame the authoritarian policies of the Bolsheviks

on what he calls “the weight of objective factors” facing the

Bolsheviks, by which he means the combined impact of events the

Bolsheviks could not control (namely economic disruption, civil war and

so on). He argues that the “subjective factor” of Bolshevik ideology

played had an impact (indeed, “was decisive”) on the outcome of the

Russian Revolution within the “choice between capitulation to the Whites

or defending the revolution with whatever means were at hand.” Such an

argument explains his dishonest account of the Makhnovist movement.

After all, they faced the same “weight of objective factors” as the

Bolsheviks yet did not make the same choices, act in the same way, or

come to the same ideological conclusions.

Clearly, then, the Makhnovists undermine Rees’s basic thesis and

effectively refutes the claim that the Bolsheviks had no choice but to

act as they did. This means that the Makhnovists provide strong evidence

that Bolshevik politics played a key role in the degeneration of the

Russian Revolution. Such a conclusion is dangerous to Bolshevism and so

the Maknovist movement must be attacked, regardless of the facts. This

Rees does in abundance, distorting and abusing the source material he

bases his account on in the process.

Rees on Makhno

The Makhnovist movement, named after anarchist Nestor Makhno, was a

popular peasant based army which was active in the Ukraine from 1918 to

1921. It played a key role in the defeat of the White Generals Denikin

and Wrangel and pursued the anarchist dream of a self-managed society

based on a federation of free communes and workers’ councils (soviets).

Rees, however, talks about the “muddled anarchism” of Makhno, dismissing

the whole movement as offering no alternative to Bolshevism and being

without “an articulated political programme.” Ultimately, for Rees,

Makhno’s “anarchism was a thin veneer on peasant rebellion” and while

“on paper” the Makhnovists “appeared to have a more democratic

programme” than the Bolsheviks, they were “frauds.”

The reality of the Makhnovist movement was totally different than Rees’s

claims. We shall analyse his account of the Makhnovist movement in order

to show exactly how low the supporters of Bolshevism will go to distort

the historical record for their own aims. Once the selective and edited

quotations provided by Rees are corrected, the picture that clearly

emerges is that rather than the Makhnovists being “frauds,” it is Rees’

account which is the fraud (along with the political tradition which

inspired it).

Rees’s critique of the Makhnovists comprises of two parts. The first is

a history of the movement and its relationships (or lack of them) with

the Bolsheviks, which we discuss here. The second is a discussion of the

ideas which the Makhnovists tried to put into practice (as discussed in

the next issue). Both aspects of his critique are extremely flawed.

Indeed, the errors in his history of the movement are so fundamental

(and so at odds with his references) that it suggests that ideology

overcame objectivity (to be polite). The best that can be said of his

account is that at least he does not raise the totally discredited

accusation that the Makhnovists were anti-Semitic or “kulaks.” However,

he more than makes up for this by distorting the facts and references he

uses. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to argue that the only

information Rees gets correct about his sources is the page number.

To give a flavour of the quality of Rees’s scholarship, we can point to

his comparison of the Makhnovists and the Tambov rebellion. He claims

that Makhno’s was the “smaller rebellion” of the two in spite of the

facts that the Makhnovists lasted longer (over four years compared to

less that one), started in a larger area and later expanded (the Tambov

revolt was restricted to the southern half of one province) and had more

troops (a peak of around 40 000 compared to around 20 000). Perhaps Rees

simply meant that Makhno was physically smaller than Antonov, the leader

of the Tambov rebellion?

Needless to say, every distortion and error cannot be corrected as space

would prohibit it. As such, we must concentrate on the important ones.

Rees starts by setting the appropriate tone. He states that the “methods

used by Makhno” in his “fight against the Red Army often mirrored those

used by the Whites.” Strangely enough, he fails to specify any. He

quotes Red Army reports from the Ukrainian Front to blacken the

Makhnovists, using them to confirm the picture he draws from “the diary

of Makhno’s wife” from 1920. These diary entries, he claims, “betray the

nature of the movement” when fighting the Bolsheviks in early 1920

(after the Bolsheviks engineered the outlawing of the Makhnovists). The

major problem for Rees’ case is the fact that this diary is a fake and

has been known to be a fake since Arshinov wrote his classic account of

the Makhnovists in 1923. [1] Rees implicitly acknowledges this by lamely

admitting (in an end note) that “Makhno seems to have had two ‘wives’”

As regards these “methods,” Rees simply shows that Bolsheviks were shot

by Makhno’s troops. This went both ways, as Rees fails to note. In

“military operations the Bolsheviks shot all prisoners. The Makhnovists

shot all captured officers unless the Red rank and file strongly

interceded for them. The rank and file were usually sent home, though a

number volunteered for service with the Insurgents.” Equally, “[o]n the

occupation of a village by the Red Army the Cheka would hunt out and

hang all active Makhnovite supporters; an amenable Soviet would be set

up; officials would be appointed or imported to organise the poor

peasants ... and three or four Red militia men left as armed support for

the new village bosses.” [2] As such, Rees’ account of Makhnovist

“terror” against the Bolsheviks seems somewhat hypocritical. We can

equally surmise that the methods used by the Bolsheviks against the

Makhnovists also “often mirrored those used by the Whites”! And it

should also be stressed that the conflict Rees is referring to was

needlessly started by the Bolsheviks and so Rees is attacking the

Makhnovists for defending themselves!

Betraying the Makhnovists

As regards the historical summary Rees presents, it would be fair to say

his account of the relationships between the Makhnovists and the

Bolsheviks are a total distortion. The two armies had three “pacts” and

Rees totally distorts the first two. Simply put, Rees alleges that the

Makhnovists broke with the Bolsheviks. The opposite is the case – the

Bolsheviks turned on the Makhnovists and betrayed them. These facts are

hardly unknown to Rees as they are contained in the very books he quotes

as evidence for his rewritten history.

According to Rees, “[c]o-operation continued until June 1919 when the

Insurgent Army broke from the Red Army” and quotes Michael Palij’s book

as follows: “as soon as Makhno left the front he and his associates

began to organise new partisan detachments in the Bolsheviks’ rear,

which subsequently attacked strongholds, troops, police, trains and food

collectors.” Rees is clearly implying that Makhno attacked the

Bolsheviks, apparently for no reason. The truth is totally different.

Rees quotes Palij on page 177. This page is from chapter 16, which is

called “The Bolsheviks Break with Makhno.” As this was not enough of a

clue, Palij presents some necessary background to this event. He notes

that “the Bolsheviks renewed their anti-Makhno propaganda. Trotsky, in

particular, led a violent campaign against the Makhno movement.” He also

mentions that “[a]t the same time, the supplies of arms and other war

materials to Makhno were stopped, this weakening the Makhno forces

vis-a-vis the Denikin troops.” In this context, the Makhnovists

Revolutionary Military Council “decided to call a fourth congress of

peasants, workers, and partisans” for June 15^(th), 1919, which Trotsky

promptly banned and warned the population that “participation in the

Congress shall be considered an act of state treason against the Soviet

Republic and the front.” [3]

The Bolsheviks had tried to ban the third congress in April but had been

ignored. This time, they made sure that they were not. Makhno and his

staff were not informed of Trotsky’s dictatorial order and learned of it

three days latter. On June 9^(th), Makhno sent a telegram informing the

Bolsheviks that he was leaving his post as leader of the Makhnovists. He

“handed over his command and left the front with a few of his close

associates and a cavalry detachment” while calling upon the partisans to

“remain at the front to hold off Denikin’s forces.” Trotsky ordered his

arrest, but Makhno was warned in advance and escaped. On June

15–16^(th), members of Makhno’s staff “were captured and executed the

next day.” Now Palij recounts how “[a]s soon as Makhno left the front he

and his associates began to organise new partisan detachments in the

Bolsheviks’ rear, which subsequently attacked strongholds, troops,

police, trains and food collectors.”

Palij “subsequently” refers to Makhno after Denikin’s breakthrough and

his occupation of the Ukraine. “The oppressive policy of the Denikin

regime,” he notes, “convinced the population that it was as bad as the

Bolshevik regime, and brought a strong reaction that led able young men

... to leave their homes and join Makhno and other partisan groups.” As

Makhno put it: “When the Red Army in south Ukraine began to retreat ...

as if to straighten the front line, but in reality to evacuate Ukraine

... only then did my staff and I decide to act.” After trying to fight

Denikin’s troops, he retreated and called upon his troops to leave the

Red Army and rejoin the fight against Denikin. He “sent agents amongst

the Red troops” to carry out propaganda urging them to stay and fight

Denikin with the Makhnovists, which they did in large numbers. This

propaganda was “combined with sabotage.” Between these two events,

Makhno had entered the territory of pogromist warlord Hryhor’iv (which

did not contain Red troops as they were in conflict) and assassinated

him. [4]

Clearly, Rees’s summary leaves a lot to be desired! Rather than Makhno

attacking the Bolsheviks, it was they who broke with him as Palij,

Rees’s source, makes clear. The dishonesty is obvious, although

understandable as Trotsky banning a worker, peasant and partisan

congress would hardly fit into Rees’ attempt to portray the Bolsheviks

as democratic socialists overcome by objective circumstances! Given that

the Makhnovists had successfully held three such congresses to discuss

the war against reaction, how could objective circumstances be blamed

for the dictatorial actions of Trotsky and other leading Red Army

officers in the Ukraine?

Rees moves onto the next alliance between the insurgents and the

Bolsheviks which occurred after Denikin’s defeat (needless to say, his

version of Denikin’s defeat downplays the Makhnovists key role in it).

Again, the Bolsheviks broke it and again Rees attempts to blame the

Makhnovists. He argues that “by the end of 1919 the immediate White

threat was removed. Makhno refused to move his troops to the Polish

front to meet the imminent invasion and hostilities with the Red Army

began again on an even more widespread scale.”

This, needless to say, is a total distortion of the facts. Firstly, it

should be noted that the “imminent” invasion by Poland Rees mentions did

not occur until the 26^(th) of April, 1920. The break with Makhno

occurred as a result of an order issued on the 8^(th) of January, 1920.

Clearly, the excuse of “imminent” invasion was a cover, as recognised by

all the historians Rees himself uses. In the words of Palij:

“The author of the order realised at that time there was no real war

between the Poles and the Bolsheviks at that time and he also knew that

Makhno would not abandon his region ... Uborevich [the author] explained

that ‘an appropriate reaction by Makhno to this order would give us the

chance to have accurate grounds for our next steps’ ... [He] concluded:

‘The order is a certain political manoeuvre and, at the very least, we

expect positive results from Makhno’s realisation of this.’” [5]

Footman concurs, noting that it was “admitted on the Soviet side that

this order was primarily ‘dictated by the necessity’ of liquidating

Makhnovshchina as an independent movement.” [6] Rees argues that “[i]n

fact it was Makhno’s actions against the Red Army which made ‘a brief

return of the Whites possible.’” In defence of his claims, Rees quotes

from W. Bruce Lincoln’s Red Victory. Looking at that work we discover

that Lincoln is well aware who is to blame for the return of the Whites

and it is not the Makhnovists:

“Once Trotsky’s Red Army had crushed Iudenich and Kolchak and driven

Deniken’s forces back upon their bases in the Crimea and the Kuban, it

turned upon Makhno’s partisan forces with a vengeance ... [I]n

mid-January 1920, after a typhus epidemic had decimated his forces, a

re-established Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party

declared Makhno an outlaw. Yet the Bolsheviks could not free themselves

form Makhno’s grasp so easily, and it became one of the supreme ironies

of the Russian Civil War that his attacks against the rear of the Red

Army made it possible for the resurrected White armies ... to return

briefly to the southern Ukraine in 1920.” [7]

After reading the same fact in three different sources, Rees rewrites

history and reverses the facts in true Stalinist fashion. Consider what

Rees is (distortedly) accounting. The White Generals had been defeated.

The civil war appeared to be over. Yet the Bolsheviks turn on their

allies after issuing an ultimatum which they knew would never be obeyed.

They provoked a conflict with an ally against counter-revolution. It

cannot be justified in military terms, as Rees tries to do.

The third and final break

The third pact was suggested by the Makhnovists in light of White

success under Wrangel. The Bolsheviks ignored the offer — until

Wrangel’s break through in mid-September. Rees argues that this final

pact was (“unsurprisingly”) a “treaty of convenience on the part of both

sides and as soon as Wrangel was defeated at the end of the year the Red

Army fought Makhno until he gave up the struggle.” Makhno, however,

“assumed [that] the forthcoming conflict with the Bolsheviks could be

limited to the realm of ideas” and that they “would not attack his

movement immediately.” [8] He was wrong. Instead the Bolsheviks attacked

the Makhnovists without warning and, unlike the other breaks, without

pretext.

Let us not forget the circumstances in which this betrayal took place.

The country was, as Rees continually reminds us, in a state of economic

collapse caused, in part by the civil war and on which he blames the

anti-working class and dictatorial actions and policies of the

Bolsheviks. Yet here they are prolonging the civil war by turning (yet

again!) on their allies. Resources which could have been used to aid the

post-war rebuilding were used to attack their former allies. The talents

and energy of the Makhnovists were destroyed or wasted in a pointless

conflict. Should we be surprised? The Bolsheviks had preferred to

compound their foes during the Civil War (and, indirectly, aid the very

Whites they were fighting) by betraying their Makhnovist allies on two

previous occasions. Clearly, Bolshevik politics and ideology played a

key role in all these decisions. They were not driven by terrible

objective circumstances (indeed, they made them worse).

Dictatorship of the Party

To understand why the Bolsheviks betrayed the Makhnovists, we need to

consider the very factor which Rees is at pains to downplay — the

“subjective” role of Bolshevik ideology.

Ever since taking power in 1917, the Bolsheviks had become increasingly

alienated from the working class (something Rees simply fails to

acknowledge). Rather than subject themselves to soviet democracy, the

Bolsheviks held on to power by any means necessary. The spring and

summer of 1918 saw “great Bolshevik losses in the soviet elections.” The

Bolsheviks forcibly disbanded such soviets. They continually postponed

elections and “pack[ed] local soviets once they could not longer count

on an electoral majority” by giving representation to organisations they

dominated which made workplace elections meaningless. [9] The regime

remained “soviet” in name only.

These events occurred before the start of civil war. However Rees argues

that “the revolution and civil war ... were one” and so the Bolsheviks

cannot be blamed for any of their actions. This is incredulous. Lenin

correctly argued that revolutions “give rise to exceptionally

complicated circumstances.” He stressed that revolution was “the

sharpest, most furious, desperate class war and civil war. Not a single

great revolution in history has escaped civil war. No one who does not

live in a shell could imagine that civil war is conceivable without

exceptionally complicated circumstances.” [10] If Bolshevism cannot

handle the inevitable, then it is one more reason to reject it!

Therefore to blame the inevitable effects of revolution for the

degeneration of Bolshevism is question begging. Rees argues that it “is

a tribute to the power of the Bolsheviks’ politics and organisation that

they took the measures necessary.” Let us consider these measures, the

politics Rees claims had no effect on the outcome of the revolution. In

the same year as the Bolsheviks twice turned on the Makhnovists, Trotsky

(in Terrorism and Communism) argued that there was “no substitution at

all” when “the power of the party” replaces “the power of the working

class.” [11] Zinoviev argued at the 2^(nd) Congress of the Comintern

that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is at the same time the

dictatorship of the Communist Party.” [12]. Lenin had argued in 1919

that “we are reproached with having established a dictatorship of one

party ... we say, ‘Yes, it is a dictatorship of one party! This is what

we stand for and we shall not shift from that position ... ‘”[13] By the

end of the civil war, he was arguing that “the dictatorship of the

proletariat cannot be exercised through an organisation embracing the

whole of the class ... It can be exercised only by a vanguard.” This was

applicable to “all capitalist countries.” [14]

This was applied to the Makhnovists. The final agreement which the

Bolsheviks ripped-up consisted of military and political sections. The

political agreement just gave the Makhnovists and anarchists the rights

(such as freedom of expression and participation in soviet elections)

they should have had according to the Soviet Constitution! The

Makhnovists, however, insisted on a fourth point of the political

agreement, which was never ratified by the Bolsheviks as it was

“absolutely unacceptable to the dictatorship of the proletariat” [15] :

“One of the basic principles of the Makhno movement being the struggle

for the self-administration of the toilers, the Partisan Army brings up

a fourth point: in the region of the Makhno movement, the worker and

peasant population is to organise and maintain its own free institutions

for economic and political self-administration; this region is

subsequently federated with Soviet republics by means of agreements

freely negotiated with the appropriate Soviet governmental organ.” [16]

This idea of worker and peasant self-management, like soviet democracy,

could not be reconciled with the Bolshevik party dictatorship as the

expression of “the dictatorship of the proletariat.” As such, Bolshevik

policy explains the betrayals of the Makhnovists. A libertarian

alternative to Bolshevism could not be tolerated and was crushed.

Rees argues that the Bolsheviks were “inclined to make a virtue of

necessity, to claim that the harsh measures of the civil war were the

epitome of socialism.” The question arises of how committed to socialist

values were the leading Bolsheviks when they could eliminate soviet,

military and workplace democracy, raise the dictatorship of their party

to an ideological truism and argue that this was socialism? Does Rees

really believe that such perspectives had no impact on how the

Bolsheviks acted during the Revolution? The betrayal of the Makhnovists

can only be understood in terms of the “subjective factor” Rees seeks to

ignore. If you think, as the Bolsheviks clearly did, that the

dictatorship of the proletariat equalled the dictatorship of the party,

then anything which threatened the rule of the party had to be

destroyed. Whether this was soviet democracy or the Makhnovists did not

matter.

Thus, Rees’s underlying objective is to prove that the politics of the

Bolsheviks had no influence on the outcome of the revolution — it was a

product purely of “objective factors.” He also subscribes to the

contradictory idea that Bolshevik politics were essential for the

success of that revolution. The facts of the matter are that people are

faced with choices, choices that arise from the objective conditions

that they face. What decisions they make will be influenced by the ideas

they hold — they will not occur automatically, as if people were on

auto-pilot — and their ideas are shaped by the social relationships they

experience. Thus, someone placed into a position of power over others

will act in certain ways, have a certain world view, which would be

alien to someone subject to egalitarian social relations.

So, obviously, political ideas matter, particularly during a revolution.

Someone in favour of centralisation, centralised power and who equates

party rule with class rule (like Lenin and Trotsky), will act in ways

(and create structures) totally different from someone who believes in

decentralisation, federalism and working class autonomy (like the

Makhnovists). As the practice of the Makhnovists proves, Rees’ basic

thesis is false. Faced with the same “objective factors,” the

Makhnovists did everything they could to promote working class

self-management and did not replace working class power with the power

of “revolutionaries.”

II

In the first part of “In Defence of the Truth,” we proved how SWP member

John Rees rewrote the history of the anarchist influenced Makhnovist

movement and its relationship with the Bolsheviks in his article “In

Defence of October.” (International Socialism, no. 52). Using sources

that clearly argued that the Bolsheviks broke with and attacked the

Makhnovists, Rees presented a radically different version of the events

and portrayed the Makhnovists as the guilty party. Moreover, we

indicated that the actions of the Bolsheviks could only be explained in

terms of their ideology which, at the time, was proclaiming to the world

the necessity of the dictatorship of the party during a proletarian

revolution.

Rees’s rewriting of history was one part of a double attack on the

Makhnovists. Not intent in rewriting history, he also sought to

discredit the Makhnovists by attacking their ideas. As we prove in this

section, this attempt fails. Rather than present an honest account of

the Makhnovist programme and ideas, Rees simply abuses his source

material again to present a radically false picture of Makhnovist theory

and practice. Once his distortions are corrected, it quickly becomes

clear that the Makhnovists provided a real libertarian alternative to

the authoritarianism of Bolshevism.

Anarchism in practice

After distorting Makhnovist relations with the Bolsheviks, Rees moves

onto distorting the social-political ideas and practice of the

Makhnovists. Like his account of military aspects of the Makhnovist

movement, his account of its theoretical ideas and its attempts to apply

them again abuse the facts.

For example, Rees states that under the Makhnovists “[p]apers could be

published, but the Bolshevik and Left Socialist Revolutionary press were

not allowed to call for revolution” and references Palij’s book. Looking

at the page in question, we discover a somewhat different account. What

the Makhnovists actually “prohibited” was these parties “propagat[ing]

armed uprisings against the Makhnovist movement.” [17] A clear rewriting

of the source material. Significantly, Palij notes that “freedom of

speech, press, assembly and association” was implemented under the

Makhnovists “[i]n contrast to the Bolshevik regime.”

However, this distortion of the source material does give us an insight

into the mentality of Leninism. After all when the Makhnovists entered a

city or town they “immediately announced to the population that the army

did not intend to exercise political authority.” The workers and

peasants were to set up soviets “that would carry out the will and

orders of their constituents” as well as “organis[ing] their own

self-defence force against counter-revolution and banditry.” These

political changes were matched in the economic sphere, with the

“holdings of the landlords, the monasteries and the state, including all

livestocks and goods, were to be transferred to the peasants” and “all

factories, plants, mines, and other means of production were to become

property of all the workers under control of their professional unions.”

[18]

As the Makhnovists were clearly defending working class and peasant

self-government, a call for “revolution” (i.e. “armed uprisings against

the Makhno movement”) could only mean a coup to install a Bolshevik

party dictatorship and the end of working class autonomy. Arshinov makes

the situation clear:

“The only restriction that the Makhnovists considered necessary to

impose on the Bolsheviks, the left Socialist Revolutionaries and other

statists was a prohibition on the formation of those ‘revolutionary

committees’ which sought to impose a dictatorship over the people. In

Aleksandrovsk and Ekaterinoslav, right after the occupation of these

cities by the Makhnovists, the Bolsheviks hastened to organise Revkoms

(Revolutionary Committees) seeking to organise their political power and

govern the population ... Makhno advised them to go and take up some

honest trade instead of seeking to impose their will on the workers ...

In this context the Makhnovists’ attitude was completely justified and

consistent. To protect the full freedom of speech, press, and

organisation, they had to take measures against formations which sought

to stifle this freedom, to suppress other organisations, and to impose

their will and dictatorial authority on the workers.” [19]

Little wonder Rees distorts his source and the issues, transforming a

policy to defend the real revolution into one which banned a “call for

revolution”! We should be grateful that he distorted the Makhnovist

message for it allows us to indicate the dictatorial nature of the

regime and politics Rees is defending.

Rees claims that “Makhno held elections, but no parties were allowed to

participate in them.” This is probably derived from Palij’s comment that

the free soviets would “carry out the will and orders of their

constituents” and “[o]nly working people, not representatives of

political parties, might join the soviets.” [20]

Rees comments indicate that he is not familiar with the make-up of the

soviets, which allowed various parties to acquire voting representation

in the soviet executive committees (and so were not directly elected by

the producers). [21] In addition, Russian Anarchists had often attacked

the use of “party lists” in soviet elections, which turned the soviets

from working class organs into talking-shops. [22] This use of

party-lists meant that soviet delegates could be anyone. For example,

the leading left-wing Menshevik Martov recounts that in early 1920 a

chemical factory “put up Lenin against me as a candidate [to the Moscow

soviet]. I received seventy-six votes he-eight (in an open vote).” [23]

How would either of these two intellectuals actually know and reflect

the concerns and interests of the workers they would be “delegates” of?

If the soviets were meant to be the delegates of working people, then

why should non-working class members of political parties be elected to

a soviet?

As such, the Makhnovist ideas on soviets did not, in fact, mean that

workers and peasants could not elect or send delegates who were members

of political parties. They had no problems as such with delegates who

happened to be working class party members. They did have problems with

delegates representing only political parties, delegates who were not

workers and soviets being ciphers covering party rule.

This can be seen from the fact that the Makhnovist Revolutionary

Military Soviet created at the Olexandrivske congress in late 1919 had

three Communists elected to it. Of the 18 worker delegates at that

congress, six were Mensheviks and the remaining 12 included Communists

[24] As such, the idea that free soviets excluding members of political

parties is false – they were organised to stop parties dominating them.

This could, of course, change. In the words of the Makhnovist reply to

the first Bolshevik attempt to ban one of their congresses:

“The Revolutionary Military Council ... holds itself above the pressure

and influence of all parties and only recognises the people who elected

it. Its duty is to accomplish what the people have instructed it to do,

and to create no obstacles to any left socialist party in the

propagation of ideas. Consequently, if one day the Bolshevik idea

succeeds among the workers, the Revolutionary Military Council ... will

necessarily be replaced by another organisation, ‘more revolutionary’

and more Bolshevik.” [25]

As such, the Makhnovists supported the right of working class

self-determination, as expressed by one delegate to Huliai Pole

conference in February 1919:

“No party has a right to usurp governmental power into its hands ... We

want life, all problems, to be decided locally, not by order from any

authority above; and all peasants and workers should decide their own

fate, while those elected should only carry out the toilers wish.” [26]

Therefore, Rees’ attempt to imply the Makhnovists were anti-democratic

backfires on Bolshevism. The Russian soviets were no longer organs of

working class power and had long since become little more than

rubberstamps for the Bolshevik dictatorship. Under the Makhnovists, the

soviets had independence and were made up of working people and executed

the wishes of their electorate. If a worker who was a member of a

political party could convince their work mates of their ideas, the

delegate would reflect the decisions of the mass assembly. The input of

political parties would exist in proportion to their influence and their

domination eliminated.

Making the trails run on time

Rees tries to paint the Makhnovists as anti-working class. This is the

core of his dismissal of them as a “libertarian alternative to the

Bolsheviks.” He gives the example of Makhno’s advice to railway workers

in Aleksandrovsk “who had not been paid for many weeks” that they should

“simply charge passengers a fair price and so generate their own wages.”

He states that this “advice aimed at reproducing the petit-bourgeois

patterns of the countryside.” Two points can be raised to this argument.

Firstly, we should highlight the Bolshevik (and so, presumably,

“proletarian”) patterns imposed on the railway workers. Trotsky simply

“plac[ed] the railwaymen and the personal of the repair workshops under

martial law” and “summarily ousted” the leaders of the railwaymen’s

trade union when they objected.” The Central Administrative Body of

Railways (Tsektran) he created was run by him “along strictly military

and bureaucratic lines.” In other words, he applied his ideas on the

“militarisation of labour” in full. [27] Compared to this, only an

ideologue could suggest that Makhno’s advice (and it was advice, not a

decree imposed from above, as was Trotsky’s) can be considered worse.

Indeed, by being based on workers’ self-management it was infinitely

more socialist than the militarised Bolshevik state capitalist system.

Secondly, Rees fails to understand the nature of anarchism. Anarchism

argues that it is up to working class people to organise their own

activities. This meant that, ultimately, it was up to the railway

workers themselves (in association with other workers) to organise their

own work and industry. Rather than being imposed by a few leaders, real

socialism can only come from below, built by working people by their own

efforts and own class organisations. Anarchists can suggest ideas and

solutions, but ultimately its up to workers (and peasants) to organise

their own affairs. Thus, rather than being a source of condemnation,

Makhno’s comments should be considered as praiseworthy as they were made

in a spirit of equality and were based on encouraging workers’

self-management.

However, the best reply to Rees is simply the fact that after holding a

“general conference of the workers of the city” at which it was

“proposed that the workers organise the life of the city and the

functioning of the factories with their own forces and their own

organisations” based on “the principles of self-management,” the

“[r]ailroad workers took the first step in this direction” by “form[ing]

a committee charged with organising the railway network of the region.”

[28]

Peasants and revolution

Rees states that the Makhnovists “did not disturb the age old class

structure of the countryside” and that the “real basis of Makhno’s

support was not his anarchism, but his opposition to grain

requisitioning and his determination not to disturb the peasant

economy.” He quotes Palij:

“Makhno had not put an end to the agricultural inequalities. His aim was

to avoid conflicts with the villages and to maintain a sort of united

front of the entire peasantry.”

Needless to say, Rees would have a fit if it were suggested that the

basis of Bolshevik support was not their socialism, but their opposition

to the world war! However, this is a side issue as we can demolish Rees’

argument simply by showing how he selectively quotes from Palij’s work.

Here is the actual context of the (corrected) quote:

“Peasants’ economic conditions in the region of the Makhno movement were

greatly improved at the expense of the estates of the landlords, the

church, monasteries, and the richest peasants, but Makhno had not put an

end to the agricultural inequalities. His aim was to avoid conflicts

within the villages and to maintain a sort of united front of the entire

peasantry.” [29]

Rees has, again, distorted his source material, conveniently missing out

the information that Makhno had most definitely “disturbed” the peasant

economy at the expense of the rich and fundamentally transformed the

“age old class structure”! In fact, “Makhno and his associates brought

sociopolitical issues into the daily life of the people, who in turn

supported the expropriation of large estates.” The official Makhnovist

position was, of course, that the “holdings of the landlords, the

monasteries, and the state, including all livestock and goods, were to

be transferred to the peasants.” At the second congress of workers,

peasants and insurgents held in February, 1919, it was resolved that

“all land be transferred to the hands of toiling peasants ... according

to the norm of equal distribution.” [30] This meant that every peasant

family had as much land as they could cultivate without the use of hired

labour.

That the Makhnovist policy was correct can be seen from the fact that

the Bolsheviks changed their policies and brought them in line with the

Makhnovist one. The initial Bolshevik policy meet with “peasant

resistance” and their “agricultural policy and terrorism brought about a

strong reaction against the Bolshevik regime” and by the “middle of

1919, all peasants, rich and poor, distrusted the Bolsheviks.” In

February, 1920, the Bolsheviks “modified their agricultural policy” by

“distributing the formers landlords’, state, and church lands among the

peasants.” [31] Which was a vindication of Makhnovist policy.

As such, it is ironic that Rees attacks the Makhnovists for not pursuing

Bolshevik peasant policies. Considering their absolute failure, the fact

that Makhno did not follow them is hardly cause for condemnation!

Indeed, given the numerous anti-Bolshevik uprisings and large scale

state repression they provoked, attacking the Makhnovists for not

pursuing such insane policies is deeply ironic. After all, who in the

middle of a Civil War makes matters whose for themselves by creating

more enemies? Only the insane – or the Bolsheviks! We can also wonder

just how sensible is it to “disturb” the economy that produces the food

you eat. Given that Rees in part blames Bolshevik tyranny on the

disruption of the economy, it seems incredulous that he faults Makhno

for not adding to the chaos by failing to “disrupt the peasant economy”!

After distorting the source material once, Rees does it again. He states

“by the spring of 1920” the local Bolsheviks “had reversed the policy

towards the peasants and instituted Committees of Poor Peasants, these

‘hurt Makhno ... his heart hardened and he sometimes ordered

executions.’ This policy helped the Bolshevik ascendancy.” Rees quotes

Palij as evidence. We shall quote the same pages:

“Although they [the Bolsheviks] modified their agricultural policy by

introducing on February 5, 1920, a new land law, distributing the former

landlords’, state and church lands among the peasants, they did not

succeed in placating them because of the requisitions, which the

peasants considered outright robbery ... Subsequently the Bolsheviks

decided to introduce class warfare into the villages. A decree was

issued on May 19, 1920, establishing ‘Committees of the Poor’ ...

Authority in the villages was delegated to the committees, which

assisted the Bolsheviks in seizing the surplus grain ... The

establishment of Committees of the Poor was painful to Makhno because

they became not only part of the Bolshevik administrative apparatus the

peasants opposed, but also informers helping the Bolshevik secret police

in its persecution of the partisans, their families and supporters, even

to the extent of hunting down and executing wounded partisans ...

Consequently, Makhno’s ‘heart hardened and he sometimes ordered

executions where some generosity would have bestowed more credit upon

him and his movement. That the Bolsheviks preceded him with the bad

example was no excuse. For he claimed to be fighting for a better

cause.’ Although the committees in time gave the Bolsheviks a hold on

every village, their abuse of power disorganised and slowed down

agricultural life ... This policy of terror and exploitation turned

almost all segments of Ukrainian society against the Bolsheviks,

substantially strengthened the Makhno movement, and consequently

facilitated the advance of the reorganised anti-Bolshevik force of

General Wrangel from the Crimea into South Ukraine, the Makhno region.”

[32]

Amazing what a “...” can hide, is it not! Rees turns an account which is

an indictment of Bolshevik policy into a victory and transforms it so

that the victims are portrayed as the villains! Given the actual record

of the Bolsheviks attempts to break up what they considered the “age old

class structure” of the villages with the “Committees of the Poor,” it

is clear why Rees distorts his source. All in all, the Makhnovist

policies were clearly the most successful as regards the peasantry. They

broke up the class system in the countryside by expropriating the ruling

class and did not create new conflicts by artificially imposing

themselves onto the villages.

Peasant Communes

After distorting the wealth of information on Makhnovist land policy,

Rees turns to their attempts to form free agrarian communes. He argues

that Makhno’s attempts “to go beyond the traditional peasant economy

were doomed” and quotes Makhno memoirs which state “the mass of the

people did not go over” to his peasant communes, which only involved a

few hundred families.

Looking at Makhno’s memoirs a somewhat different picture appears. Makhno

does state that “the mass of people did not over to it” but,

significantly, he argues that this was because of “the advance of the

German and Austrian armies, their [the peasants] own lack of

organisation, and their inability to defend this order against the new

‘revolutionary’ and counter-revolutionary authorities. For this reason

the toiling population of the district limited their real revolutionary

activity to supporting in every way those bold spirits among them who

had settled on the old estates [of the landlords] and organised their

personal and economic life on free communal lines.” [33]

Of course, Rees failing to mention the “objective factors” facing these

communes does distort their success (or lack of it). Soon after the

communes were being set up, the area was occupied by Austrian troops and

it was early 1919 before the situation was stable enough to allow their

reintroduction. Conflict with the Whites and Bolsheviks resulted in

their destruction in July 1919. In such circumstances, can it be

surprising that only a minority of peasants got involved? Rather than

praise the Makhnovists for positive social experimentation in difficult

circumstances, Rees shows his ignorance of the objective conditions

facing the Makhnovists. His concern for “objective factors” is

distinctly selective.

Paper Decrees?

Ironically, Rees states that given the Makhnovist peasant base, it is

“hardly surprising” that “much of Makhno’s libertarianism amounted to

little more than paper decrees.” Ironically, the list of “paper decrees”

he presents (when not false or distorted) are also failings associated

with the Bolsheviks (and taken to more extreme degrees by them)! As

such, his lambastes against the Makhnovists seem deeply hypocritical.

After all, if the Bolshevik violations of principle can be blamed on

“objective factors” then why not the Makhnovists?

However, rather than apply his main thesis to the Makhnovists, he

attempts to ground the few deviations that exist between Makhnovist

practice and theory in the peasant base of the army. This is an abuse of

class analysis. After all, these deviations were also shared by the

Bolsheviks (although they did not even pay lip service to the ideals

raised by the Makhnovists). Take, for example, the election of

commanders. The Makhnovists applied this principle extensively but not

completely. The Bolsheviks abolished it by decree (and did not blame it

on “exceptional circumstances” nor consider it as a “retreat” as Rees

asserts). Unlike the Red Army, Makhnovist policy was decided by mass

assemblies and conferences. Now, if Rees “class analysis” of the

limitations of the Makhnovists was true, does this mean that an army of

a regime with a proletarian base (as he considers the Bolshevik regime)

cannot have elected commanders? Similarly, his attack on Makhno’s advice

to the railway workers suggests, as noted above, that a “proletarian”

regime would be based on the militarisation of labour and not workers’

self-management. As such, his pathetic attempt at “class analysis” of

the Makhnovists simply shows up the dictatorial nature of the

Bolsheviks. If trying to live up to libertarian/democratic ideals but

not totally succeeding is “petty-bourgeois” while dismissing those

ideals totally in favour of top-down, autocratic hierarchies is

“proletarian” then sane people would happily be labelled

“petty-bourgeois”!

Conclusion

As should be clear by now, Rees’ account of the Makhnovist movement is

deeply flawed. Rather than present an honest account the movement, he

abuses his sources to blacken its name. This is hardly surprising as an

honest account of the movement would undermine his basic argument that

Bolshevik policies played no role in the degeneration of the Russian

Revolution.

Faced with the same “objective factors,” the Makhnovists did not embrace

the Bolshevik mantra of party dictatorship. They regularly held workers,

peasant and partisan assemblies and conferences to discuss the

development of the revolution, promoted freedom of speech, organisation

and assembly and did all they could to promote self-management in

difficult circumstances. In contrast, the Bolsheviks continually

violated socialist principles and created increasingly bizarre

ideological justifications for them. And Rees states that “[n]either

Makhno’s social programme nor his political regime could provide an

alternative to the Bolsheviks”!

This indicates the weakness of Rees’ main thesis as, clearly, the

“subjective factor” of Bolshevik politics cannot be ignored or

downplayed. Rees states somewhat incredulously that the “degree by which

workers can ‘make their own history’ depends on the weight of objective

factors bearing down on them. At the height of the revolutionary wave

such freedom can be considerable, in the concentration camp it can be

reduced to virtually zero.” Post-October 1917, one of the key “objective

factors” bearing down on the workers was, quite simply, the Bolshevik

ideology itself. Like the US officer in Vietnam who destroyed a village

in order to save it, the Bolsheviks destroyed the revolution in order to

save it (or, more correctly, their own hold on power, which they

identified with the revolution). As the experience of the Makhnovists

showed, there was no objective factors stopping the free election of

soviets, the calling of workers and peasants conferences to make policy,

and protecting the real gains of revolution.

Little wonder Rees spent so much time lying about the Makhnovists.

III

In the first two parts our article, we have recounted how John Rees of

the SWP distorted the history and politics of the Makhnovist movement

during the Russian Revolution (“In Defence of October”, International

Socialism, no. 52). We proved how Rees had misused his source material

to present a clearly dishonest account of the anarchist influenced

peasant army and how he failed to indicate how Bolshevik ideology played

a key role in Bolshevik betrayals of that movement.

The Makhnovists are not the only working class movement misrepresented

by Rees. He also turns his attention on the Kronstadt revolt of 1921.

Kronstadt was a naval base and town which played a key role in all three

Russian Revolutions (i.e. in 1905 and 1917). In 1917, the Kronstadt

sailors were considered the vanguard of the Russian masses. In February

1921 they rose in revolt against the Bolshevik regime, demanding (among

other things) the end of Bolshevik dictatorship, free soviet elections

and freedom of speech, assembly, press and organisation for working

people. The Bolsheviks, in return, labelled the revolt as “White

Guardist” (i.e. counter-revolutionary) and repressed it.

The Kronstadt revolt is considered a key turning point in the Russian

revolution. As it occurred after the end of the Civil War, its

repression cannot be blamed on the need to defeat the Whites (as had

other repression of working class strikes and protests). For anarchists

like Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman, it was the final straw and they

had to recognise that the Russian Revolution was dead.

Knowing this, Rees attempts to justify Bolshevik repression of this

revolt. He does this in four ways. Firstly, by arguing that the

revolutionary sailors of 1917 had been replaced by raw peasant recruits.

Secondly, that the revolt had “the same root as the peasant rebellions”

of Makhno, Antonov and others. Thirdly, by portraying the Kronstadt

sailors as responsible for the Bolsheviks actions by refusing to

negotiate. Fourthly, by arguing that the Kronstadt revolt was pro-White

to some degree.

All four rationales are false. This is easy to prove, it is just a case

of using the same references that Rees uses to build his case. If this

is done, it will quickly be seen that Rees distorts the evidence,

selecting quotes out of context to prove his case. As with his account

of the Makhnovists (see parts I and II), it is clear that Rees has

distorted his source material deliberately to paint a radically false

picture of the Kronstadt revolt.

We discuss the first two rationales in this part, the last two in part

IV.

A Peasant revolt?

Rees is at pains to portray the Kronstadt rebellion as (essentially) a

revolt by peasants, in favour of peasant interests. As with the

Makhnovists, he thinks that by painting the Kronstadters as being non-

or anti-working class then this, somehow, justifies the Bolshevik regime

and its policies. Hence Rees argues that although “preceded by a wave of

serious but quickly resolved strikes, the motivation of the Kronstadt

rebellion was much closer to that of the peasantry than it was to

dissatisfaction among what remained of the urban working class.”

However, the facts of the matter are different.

Firstly, there is the question of the social context in which revolt

took place. Rees fails to present an accurate account of the strike wave

which preceded (and inspired) the Kronstadt revolt. Secondly, he fails

to note the obvious similarities of the strikers demands and those

raised by Kronstadt. This is unsurprising, as to do so would totally

undermine his case. We will look at each issue in turn, using the same

sources that Rees uses for evidence for his case.

Looking at these “serious but quickly resolved strikes,” we can say that

Rees downplays the importance of these strikes in the revolt and simply

ignores how they were “quickly resolved.” By failing to mention these

issues Rees quite clearly deliberately falsifies the facts.

The Kronstadt revolt was sparked off by the strikes and occurred in

solidarity with them. The strikes started with “street demonstrations”

which “were heralded by a rash of protest meetings in Petrograd’s

numerous but depleted factories and shops.” Speakers “called for an end

to grain requisitioning, the removal of roadblocks, the abolition of

privileged rations, and permission to barter personal possessions for

food.” On the 24^(th) of February, the day after a workplace meeting,

the Trubochny factory workforce downed tools and walked out the factory.

Additional workers from nearby factories joined in. The crowd of 2,000

was dispersed by armed military cadets. The next day, the Trubochny

workers again took to the streets and visited other workplaces, bringing

them out on strike too. [34]

A three-man Defence Committee was formed and Zinoviev “proclaimed

martial law” on February 24^(th). A curfew of 11pm was proclaimed, all

meetings and gatherings (indoor and out) were banned unless approved of

by the Defence Committee and all infringements would be dealt with

according to military law. [35]

As part of this process of repression, the Bolshevik government had to

rely on the kursanty (Communist officer cadets) as the local garrisons

had been caught up the general ferment and could not be relied upon to

carry out the government’s orders. Hundreds of kursanty were called in

from neighbouring military academies to patrol the city. “Overnight

Petrograd became an armed camp. In every quarter pedestrians were

stopped and their documents checked ... the curfew [was] strictly

enforced.” The Petrograd Cheka made widespread arrests. [36]

The Bolsheviks also stepped up their propaganda drive. The strikers were

warned not to play into the hands of the counterrevolution. As well as

their normal press, popular party members were sent to agitate in the

streets, factories and barracks. They also made a series of concessions

such as providing extra rations. On March 1^(st) (after the Kronstadt

revolt had started) the Petrograd soviet announced the withdrawal of all

road-blocks and demobilised the Red Army soldiers assigned to labour

duties in Petrograd. [37]

The Bolshevik slandering of the Kronstadt rebels cannot be ignored, as

Rees does. Victor Serge, a French anarchist turned Bolshevik and a

favourite Rees source, remembered that he was first told that “Kronstadt

is in the hands of the Whites” and that ”[s]mall posters stuck on the

walls in the still empty streets proclaimed that the

counter-revolutionary General Kozlovsky had seized Kronstadt through

conspiracy and treason.” Later the “truth seeped through little by

little, past the smokescreen put out by the Press, which was positively

berserk with lies” (indeed, he states that the Bolshevik press “lied

systematically”). He found out that the Bolshevik’s official line was

“an atrocious lie” and that “the sailors had mutinied, it was a naval

revolt led by the Soviet.” However, the “worse of it all was that we

were paralysed by the official falsehoods. It had never happened before

that our Party should lie to us like this. ‘It’s necessary for the

benefit of the public,’ said some ... the strike [in Petrograd] was now

practically general.” [38]

Thus a combination of force, propaganda and concessions was used to

defeat the strike (which quickly became a general strike). As Paul

Arvich notes, “there is no denying that the application of military

force and the widespread arrests, not to speak of the tireless

propaganda waged by the authorities had been indispensable in restoring

order. Particularly impressive in this regard was the discipline shown

by the local party organisation. Setting aside their internal disputes,

the Petrograd Bolsheviks swiftly closed ranks and proceeded to carry out

the unpleasant task of repression with efficiency and dispatch.” [39]

Ignoring the Bolshevik repression and systematically lying against

Kronstadt, Rees argues that the “Bolshevik regime still rested on the

shattered remnants of the working class. The Kronstadt sailors’ appeals

to the Petrograd workers had met with little or no response.”

One has to wonder what planet Rees is on. After all, if the Bolsheviks

had rested on the “shattered remnants of the working class” then they

would not have had to turn Petrograd into an armed camp, repress the

strikes, impose martial law and arrest militant workers. The Kronstadt

sailors appeals “met with little or no response” due to the Bolshevik

coercion exercised in those fateful days. To not mention the Bolshevik

repression in Petrograd is to deliberately deceive the reader. That the

Kronstadt demands would have met with strong response in Petrograd can

be seen from the actions of the Bolsheviks (who did not rest upon the

workers but rather arrested them).

Thus Rees’ account has no bearing to the reality of the situation in

Petrograd nor to the history of the revolt itself.

Peasant demands?

It was the labour protests and their repression which started the events

in Kronstadt. While many sailors had read and listened to the complaints

of their relatives in the villages and had protested on their behalf to

the Soviet authorities, it took the Petrograd strikes to be the catalyst

for the revolt. Moreover, they had other political reasons for

protesting against the policies of the government. Navy democracy had

been abolished by decree and the soviets had been turned into fig-leaves

of party dictatorship.

Unsurprisingly, the crew of the battleships Petropavlovsk and Sevastopol

decided to act once “the news of strikes, lockouts, mass arrests and

martial law” in Petrograd reached them. They “held a joint emergency

meeting in the face of protests and threats of their commissars ...

[and] elected a fact-finding delegation of thirty-two sailors which, on

27 February, proceeded to Petrograd and made the round of the

factories... They found the workers whom they addressed and questioned

too frightened to speak up in the presence of the hosts of Communist

factory guards, trade union officials, party committee men and

Chekists.” [40]

The delegation returned the next day and reported its findings to a

general meeting of the ship’s crews and adopted the resolutions which

were to be the basis of the revolt.

It should be noted that Rees (like most Leninists) does not provide even

a summary of the 15 point programme of the revolt. He asserts that the

“sailors represented the exasperated of the peasantry with the War

Communism regime” while, rather lamely, noting that “no other peasant

insurrection reproduced the Kronstadters demands.” By not providing the

demands of the rebels or the strikers it is impossible for the reader to

evaluate this (contradictory) assertion.

The full list of demands are as follows:

“1. Immediate new elections to the Soviets. The present Soviets no

longer express the wishes of the workers and peasants. The new elections

should be by secret ballot, and should be preceded by free electoral

propaganda.

2. Freedom of speech and of the press for workers and peasants, for the

Anarchists, and for the Left Socialist parties.

3. The right of assembly, and freedom for trade union and peasant

organisations.

4. The organisation, at the latest on 10^(th) March 1921, of a

Conference of non-Party workers, solders and sailors of Petrograd,

Kronstadt and the Petrograd District.

5. The liberation of all political prisoners of the Socialist parties,

and of all imprisoned workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors

belonging to working class and peasant organisations.

6. The election of a commission to look into the dossiers of all those

detained in prisons and concentration camps.

7. The abolition of all political sections in the armed forces. No

political party should have privileges for the propagation of its ideas,

or receive State subsidies to this end. In the place of the political

sections various cultural groups should be set up, deriving resources

from the State.

8. The immediate abolition of the militia detachments set up between

towns and countryside.

9. The equalisation of rations for all workers, except those engaged in

dangerous or unhealthy jobs.

10. The abolition of Party combat detachments in all military groups.

The abolition of Party guards in factories and enterprises. If guards

are required, they should be nominated, taking into account the views of

the workers.

11. The granting to the peasants of freedom of action on their own soil,

and of the right to own cattle, provided they look after them themselves

and do not employ hired labour.

12. We request that all military units and officer trainee groups

associate themselves with this resolution.

13. We demand that the Press give proper publicity to this resolution.

14. We demand the institution of mobile workers’ control groups.

15. We demand that handicraft production be authorised provided it does

not utilise wage labour.” [41]

We can see that these demands echoed those raised during the Moscow and

Petrograd strikes that preceded the Kronstadt revolt. For example, Paul

Avrich records that the demands raised in the February strikes included

“removal of roadblocks, permission to make foraging trips into the

countryside and to trade freely with the villagers, [and] elimination of

privileged rations for special categories of working men.” The workers

also “wanted the special guards of armed Bolsheviks, who carried out a

purely police function, withdrawn from the factories” and raised “pleas

for the restoration of political and civil rights.” One unsigned

manifesto which appeared argued that “the workers and peasants need

freedom. They do not want to live by the decrees of the Bolsheviks. They

want to control their own destinies.” It urged the strikers to demand

the liberation of all arrested socialists and nonparty workers,

abolition of martial law, freedom of speech, press and assembly for all

who labour, free elections of factory committees, trade unions, and

soviets. [42]

As can be seen, these demands related almost directly to points 1, 2, 3,

5, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13 of the Kronstadt demands. As Avrich argues, the

Kronstadt demands “echoed the discontents not only of the Baltic Fleet

but of the mass of Russians in towns and villages throughout the

country. Themselves of plebeian stock, the sailors wanted relief for

their peasant and worker kinfolk. Indeed, of the resolution’s 15 points,

only one — the abolition of the political departments in the fleet —

applied specifically to their own situation. The remainder ... was a

broadside aimed at the policies of War Communism, the justification of

which, in the eyes of the sailors and of the population at large, had

long since vanished.” Avrich argues that many of the sailors had

returned home on leave to see the plight of the villagers with their own

eyes played at part in framing the resolution (particularly of point 11,

the only peasant specific demand raised) but ”[b]y the same token, the

sailors’ inspection tour of Petrograd’s factories may account for their

inclusion of the workingmen’s chief demands — the abolition of

road-blocks, of privileged rations, and of armed factory squads — in

their program.” [43] Simply put, the Kronstadt resolution merely

reiterated long standing workers’ demands.

As can be seen, a far stronger case can be made that the “motivation” of

the rebels were far closer to “dissatisfaction of the urban working

class” than “that of the peasantry.” This can be seen both from the

demands raised and the fact they were raised after a delegation of

sailors had returned from visiting Petrograd.

This is, ironically, implicitly confirmed by Rees himself, who notes

that “no other peasant insurrection reproduced the Kronstadters’

demands.” If, as he maintained two pages previously, the Kronstadt

rebellion’s motivation was “closer to that of the peasantry,” then why

did no other “peasant insurrection” reproduce their demands? Perhaps

because the Kronstadt revolt was not a peasant insurrection but rather a

revolt by the politicised sailors in solidarity with striking workers?

Clearly Rees’ account leaves a lot to be desired! No mention that the

strikes were “resolved” by force nor that the Kronstadt revolt was not

only “preceded” by the strikes but was in solidarity with them and

raised many of the same demands! Not that Rees is unaware of these facts

— they are contained in the very books he uses for evidence.

Changing composition or changing the facts?

The conclusion that the Kronstadt revolt reflected interests other than

peasant ones is one that Rees is at pains to avoid. A major aspect of

his account of Kronstadt is to prove that the sailors of 1921 were not

those of 1917. As he puts it, “the composition of the garrison had

changed” because “the peasants had increased their weight in the

Kronstadt.” He apparently presents evidence to support this argument.

Sadly, on close inspection Rees’ evidence falls apart as it soon becomes

clear that he has simply cherry-picked quotes to support his case,

ignoring evidence from the same sources which contradicts it.

Rees argues as follows:

“In September and October 1920 the writer and the Bolshevik party

lecturer Ieronymus Yasinksky went to Kronstadt to lecture 400 naval

recruits. They were ‘straight from the plough’. And he was shocked to

find that many, ‘including a few party members, were politically

illiterate, worlds removed from the highly politicised veteran Kronstadt

sailors who had deeply impressed him’. Yasinsky worried that those

steeled in the revolutionary fire’ would be replaced by ‘inexperienced

freshly mobilised young sailors’.”

This quote is referenced to Israel Getzler’s Kronstadt 1917–1921. Rees

account is a fair version of the first half of Yasinskys’ report. The

quote however continues exactly as reproduced below:

“Yasinsky was apprehensive about the future when, ‘sooner or later,

Kronstadt’s veteran sailors, who were steeled in revolutionary fire and

had acquired a clear revolutionary world-view would be replaced by

inexperienced, freshly mobilised young sailors’. Still he comforted

himself with the hope that Kronstadt’s sailors would gradually infuse

them with their ‘noble spirit of revolutionary self-dedication’ to which

Soviet Russia owed so much. As for the present he felt reassured that

‘in Kronstadt the red sailor still predominates.’” [44]

Rees handy ‘editing’ of this quote transforms it from one showing that

three months before the rising that Kronstadt had retained its

revolutionary spirit to one implying the garrison had indeed been

replaced. The dishonesty is clear.

Rees tries to generate ”[f]urther evidence of the changing class

composition” by looking at the “social background of the Bolsheviks at

the base.” However, he goes on to contradict himself about the

composition of the Bolshevik party at the time. On page 61 he says the

“same figures for the Bolshevik party as a whole in 1921 are 28.7%

peasants, 41% workers and 30.8% white collar and others”. On page 66

however he says the figures at the end of the civil war (also 1921) were

10% factory workers, 25% army and 60% in “the government or party

machine”. An endnote says even of those classed as factory workers “most

were in administration.” The first set of figures is more useful for

attacking Kronstadt and so is used.

What is the basis of Rees “further evidence”? Simply that in “September

1920, six months before the revolt, the Bolsheviks had 4,435 members at

Kronstadt. Some 50 per cent of these were peasants, 40 percent workers

and 10 percent intellectuals ... Thus the percentage of peasants in the

party was considerably higher than nationally ... If we assume [my

emphasis] that the Bolshevik party was more working class in composition

than the base as a whole, then it seems likely [my emphasis] that the

peasants had increased their weight in the Kronstadt, as Trotsky

suggested.”

So on the basis of an assumption, it may be “likely” that the “class

composition of the garrison” had changed! Impressive “evidence” indeed!

Moreover, as evidence of changing class composition these figures are

not very useful. This is because they do not compare the composition of

the Kronstadt Bolsheviks in 1917 to those in 1921. Given that the

Kronstadt base always had a high percentage of peasants in its ranks, it

follows that in 1917 the percentage of Bolsheviks of peasant origin

could have been higher than normal as well. If this was the case, then

Rees argument falls. He is not comparing the appropriate figures.

It would have been very easy for Rees to inform his readers of the real

facts concerning the changing composition of the Kronstadt garrison. He

could quoted Getzler’s work on this subject. Getzler notes that “by the

end of 1919 thousands of veteran sailors, who had served on many fronts

of the civil war and in the administrative network of the expanding

Soviet state, had returned to the Baltic Fleet and to Kronstadt, most by

way of remobilisation.” [45] He goes on to argue that “Yasinsky’s

impression that veteran politicised Red sailor still predominated in

Kronstadt at the end of 1920 is borne out by the hard statistical data

available regarding the crews of the two major battleships” at

Kronstadt. This demonstrates that the crew of the battleships

Petropavlovsk and Sevastopol, which formed the core of the rising, were

recruited into the navy before 1917, only 6.9% having been recruited

between 1918 and 1921. [46] This information is on the same page as the

earlier quotes Rees uses but are ignored by him. Unbelievably Rees even

states ”[w]e do not know how many new recruits arrived in the three

months before Kronstadt erupted” in spite of quoting a source which

indicates the composition of the two battleships which started the

revolt!

Or, then again, he could have reported Samuel Farber’s summary of

Getzler’s (and others) evidence. Rees rather lamely notes that Farber

“does not look at the figures for the composition of the Bolsheviks” Why

should he when he has the appropriate figures for the sailors? Here is

Farber’s account of the facts:

“this [the class composition] interpretation has failed to meet the

historical test of the growing and relatively recent scholarship on the

Russian Revolution.... In fact, in 1921, a smaller proportion of

Kronstadt sailors were of peasant social origin than was the case of the

Red Army troops supporting the government ... recently published data

strongly suggest that the class composition of the ships and naval base

had probably remained unchanged since before the Civil War. We now know

that, given the war-time difficulties of training new people in the

technical skills required in Russia’s ultra-modern battleships, very few

replacements had been sent to Kronstadt to take the place of the dead

and injured sailors. Thus, at the end of the Civil War in late 1920, no

less than 93.9 per cent of the members of the crews of the Petropavlovsk

and the Sevastopol ... were recruited into the navy before and during

the 1917 revolutions. In fact, 59 per cent of these crews joined the

navy in the years 1914–16, while only 6.8 per cent had been recruited in

the years 1918–21 ... of the approximately 10,000 recruits who were

supposed to be trained to replenish the Kronstadt garrison, only a few

more than 1,000 had arrived by the end of 1920, and those had been

stationed not in Kronstadt, but in Petrograd, where they were supposed

to be trained.” ‘ [47]

And Rees bemoans Farber for not looking at the Bolshevik membership

figures! Yes, assumptions and “likely” conclusions drawn from

assumptions are more important than hard statistical evidence!

In summary, Rees has distorted the source material on which he bases his

argument. The evidence Rees musters for the claim that the “composition”

of the Kronstadt sailors “had changed” between 1917 and 1921 is a useful

indication of the general Leninist method when it comes to the Russian

revolution.

Changing politics?

After stating “if, for the sake of argument, we accept Sam Farber’s

interpretation of the evidence” (evidence Rees refuses to inform the

reader of) Rees then tries to save his case. He states Farber’s “point

only has any validity if we take the statistics in isolation. But in

reality this change [!] in composition acted on a fleet whose ties with

the peasantry had recently been strengthened in other ways. In

particular, the Kronstadt sailors had recently been granted leave for

the first time since the civil war. Many returned to their villages and

came face to face with the condition of the countryside and the trials

of the peasantry faced with food detachments.”

Of course, such an argument has nothing to do with Rees original case.

Let us not forget that he argued that the class composition of the

garrison had changed, not that its political composition had changed.

Faced with overwhelming evidence against his case, he not only does not

inform his readers of it, he changes his original argument!

So, what of this argument? It is hardly an impressive one. Let us not

forget that the revolt came about in response to the wave of strikes in

Petrograd, not a peasant revolt. Moreover, the demands of the revolt

predominantly reflected workers demands, not peasant ones (as Rees

himself implicitly acknowledges). Had the political perspectives in

Kronstadt changed? The answer has to be no, they had not.

Firstly, we must point out that Kronstadt in 1917 was never dominated by

the Bolsheviks. At Kronstadt, the Bolsheviks were always a minority and

a “radical populist coalition of Maximalists and Left SRs held sway,

albeit precariously, within Kronstadt and its Soviet.” The

“Bolshevisation” of Kronstadt “and the destruction of its multi-party

democracy was not due to internal developments and local Bolshevik

strength, but decreed from outside and imposed by force.” [48]

The Maximalists were occupied “a place in the revolutionary spectrum

between the Left SR’s and the anarchists while sharing elements of

both.” The anarchists influence “had always been strong within the

fleet” and “the spirit of anarchism” had been “powerful in Kronstadt in

1917” and “had by no means dissipated” in 1921. Like the anarchists, the

Maximalists “preached a doctrine of total revolution” and called for a

”’toilers’ soviet republic’ founded on freely elected soviets, with a

minimum of central state authority. Politically, this was identical with

the objective of the Kronstadters [in 1921], and ‘Power to the soviets

but not the parties’ had originally been a Maximalist rallying-cry.”

[49]

Economically, the parallels “are no less striking.” They denounced grain

requisitioning and demanded that “all the land be turned over to the

peasants.” For industry they rejected the Bolshevik theory and practice

of “workers’ control” over bourgeois administrators in favour of the

“social organisation of production and its systematic direction by

representatives of the toiling people.” Opposed to nationalisation and

centralised state management in favour of socialisation and workers’

self-management of production. Little wonder he states that the

“political group closest to the rebels in temperament and outlook were

the SR Maximalists.” and stresses that Indeed, ”[o]n nearly every

important point the Kronstadt program, as set forth in the rebel

Izvestiia, coincided with that of the Maximalists.” [50]

Clearly, the political composition at Kronstadt had not changed much

between 1917 and 1921. The demands of 1921 reflected the political

traditions of Kronstadt, which were not, in the main, Bolshevik. The

sailors supported soviet power in 1917, not party power, and they again

raised that demand in 1921. In other words, the political composition of

the garrison was the same as in 1917. Rees is clearly clutching at

straws.

IV

In the first three parts our article, we have recounted how John Rees of

the SWP distorted the history and politics of both the Makhnovist

movement and Kronstadt revolt during the Russian Revolution (“In Defence

of October”, International Socialism, no. 52). We proved how Rees had

misused his source material to present a clearly dishonest account of

social movements and how he failed to indicate how Bolshevik ideology

played a key role in Bolshevik relationship with them.

In part III, we indicated how Rees had distorted his source material to

show that the revolutionary sailors of 1917 had been replaced by raw

peasant recruits and to portray the revolt as being a “peasant

insurrection.” The facts show that a large number of the Kronstadt

sailors had been at Kronstadt since 1917 and that the revolt had been in

solidarity with striking workers and had repeated many of their demands.

Now we show how Rees distorts the evidence in order to portray the

Kronstadt sailors as responsible for the Bolsheviks actions by refusing

to negotiate. In the process he invents a demand and attributes to the

Kronstadters. We also how that Rees’ attempts to show that the Kronstadt

revolt was pro-White is also based on the same lack of concern for his

sources.

What were they fighting for?

While Rees fails to present the demands of the Kronstadt rebels, he does

state that the Kronstadters insisted “that they were fighting for a

‘third revolution’, freedom of expression and for ‘soviets without

parties’” While the Kronstadters did raise the anarchist slogan of the

“third revolution” and call for freedom of expression, they did not call

for “soviets with parties.” As Paul Avrich notes,

”’Soviets without Communists’ was not, as is often maintained by both

Soviet and non-Soviet writers, a Kronstadt slogan.”

Nor did they agitate under the banner “soviets without parties.” They

argued for “all power to the soviets and not to parties.” Political

parties were not to be excluded from the soviets, simply stopped from

dominating them and substituting themselves for them. As Avrich notes,

the Kronstadt program “did allow a place for the Bolsheviks in the

soviets, alongside the other left-wing organisations ... Communists ...

participated in strength in the elected conference of delegate, which

was the closest thing Kronstadt ever had to the free soviets of its

dreams.” [51] Given that Rees quotes the slogan “soviets without

parties,” the question arises which source does he use? Neither Avrich

or Getzler in their in-depth analyses of Kronstadt mention this slogan,

suggesting that Rees simply invented it.

Not intent in inventing Kronstadt demands, Rees goes one step further

and tries to blame the Bolshevik repression of the revolt on the sailors

themselves. He argues “in Petrograd Zinoviev had already essentially

withdrawn the most detested aspects of War Communism in response to the

strikes.” Needless to say, Zinoviev did not withdraw the political

aspects of War Communism, just some of the economic ones and, as the

Kronstadt revolt was mainly political, these concessions were not enough

(indeed, Bolshevik repression directed against workers rights and

opposition socialist and anarchist groups increased). He then states the

Kronstadters “response [to these concessions] was contained in their

What We Are Fighting For” and quotes it as follows:

“there is no middle ground in the struggle against the Communists ...

They give the appearance of making concessions: in Petrograd province

road-block detachments have been removed and 10 million roubles have

been allotted for the purchase of foodstuffs... But one must not be

deceived ... No there can be no middle ground. Victory or death!”

What Rees fails to inform the reader is that this was written on March

8^(th), while the Bolsheviks had started military operations on the

previous evening. Moreover, the fact the “response” clearly stated

”[w]ithout a single shot, without a drop of blood, the first step has

been taken [of the “Third Revolution”]. The toilers do not need blood.

They will shed it only at a moment of self-defence” is not mentioned.

[52] In other words, the Kronstadt sailors reaffirmed their commitment

to non-violent revolt. Any violence on their part was in self-defence

against Bolshevik actions. Not that you would know that from Rees’ work.

Pro-White?

The Kronstadters’ rejected every offer of help from the National Centre

and other obviously pro-White group (they did accept help towards the

end of the rebellion from the Russian Red Cross when the food situation

had become critical). Historian Israel Getzler stressed that “the

Kronstadters were extremely resentful of all gestures of sympathy and

promises of help coming from the White-Guardist emigres.” He quotes a

Red Cross visitor who stated that Kronstadt “will admit no White

political party, no politician, with the exception of the Red Cross.”

[53]

Avrich notes that the Kronstadter’s “passionately hated” the Whites and

that “both during and afterwards in exile” they “indignantly rejected

all government accusations of collaboration with counterrevolutionary

groups either at home or abroad.” As the Communists themselves

acknowledged, no outside aid ever reached the insurgents. [54]

In other words, there was no relationship between the revolt and the

Whites.

Obviously aware of the sympathy which the Kronstadt rebels gain from

most of the non-Leninist left (and from some critical Leninists), Rees

tries to blacken their memory by associating them with the Whites. As he

puts it, the obviously democratic and socialist demands raised by

Kronstadt “has convinced many historians that this revolt was

fundamentally distinct from the White Rebellions.” But this, apparently,

is not the case as “one must be careful to analyse the difference

between the conscious aims of the rebels and the possible outcome of

their actions.”

He argues that “[h]ad the Kronstadters’ demands for ‘soviets without

parties’ been realised they would have expressed the ferocious, element

hostility of the peasants to the Bolsheviks in particular and to the

cities in general ... the Whites were the only remaining political force

which could have profited.” Ignoring the awkward facts that the

Kronstadters raised no such demand and it was Bolshevik repression that

had ensured that they and the Whites were the only “remaining political

force” around, the question becomes whether Kronstadt was (objectively)

pro-White.

Rees argues that net result of Kronstadt’s “utopian programme and its

class root” would have resulted in counter-revolution, something the

Whites “sensed ... immediately.” Ignoring (yet again!) some awkward

facts (such as Rees’ non-discussion of its programme, his invention of

one of its slogans and the overwhelming evidence against Rees’ “class

root” argument), what can we make of this? What evidence does he

present?

Rees argues that the Whites “had predicted a rising in Kronstadt and the

White National Centre abroad strained might and main to provide food for

the Kronstadters ... Indeed, the National Centre was already making

plans for the forces of the French navy and those of General Wrangel,

who still commanded 70,000 men in Turkey, to land in Kronstadt if the

revolt were to succeed.” He quotes a secret White “Memorandum” on

Kronstadt as evidence for his claims. This is contained in Paul Avrich’s

book and so we turn to this in order to refute his claims.

The Memorandum does predict that a revolt would take place and also

predicts that “even if the French Command and the Russian anti-Bolshevik

organisations do not take part in the preparation and direction of the

uprising, a revolt will take place all the same during the coming

spring, but after a brief period of success it will be doomed.” As

regards the “plans” to transport French and Wrangel’s troops to

Kronstadt, the “Memorandum” states that the “Russian ant-Bolshevik

organisations should hold the position that they must refrain from

contributing to the success of the Kronstadt rebellion if they do not

have the full assurance that the French government has decided to take

the appropriate steps in this regard,” the transporting of troops being

point 4. [55] This, to state the obvious, is not “making plans ... to

land” troops but rather the stating of essential preconditions for

action.

The question is, of course, was this “Memorandum” actually implemented?

Avrich rejects the idea that it explains the revolt:

“Nothing has come to light to show that the Secret Memorandum was ever

put into practice or that any links had existed between the emigres and

the sailors before the revolt. On the contrary, the rising bore the

earmarks of spontaneity ... there was little in the behaviour of the

rebels to suggest any careful advance preparation. Had there been a

prearranged plan, surely the sailors would have waited a few weeks

longer for the ice to melt ... The rebels, moreover, allowed Kalinin [a

leading Communist] to return to Petrograd, though he would have made a

valuable hostage. Further, no attempt was made to take the offensive ...

Significant too, is the large number of Communists who took part in the

movement...

“The Sailors needed no outside encouragement to raise the banner of

insurrection... Kronstadt was clearly ripe for a rebellion. What set it

off were not the machinations of emigre conspirators and foreign

intelligence agents but the wave of peasant risings throughout the

country and the labour disturbances in neighbouring Petorgrad. And as

the revolt unfolded, it followed the pattern of earlier outbursts

against the central government from 1905 through the Civil War.” [56]

He explicitly argues that while the National Centre had “anticipated”

the revolt and “laid plans to help organise it,” they had “no time to

put these plans into effect.” The “eruption occurred too soon, several

weeks before the basic conditions of the plot ... could be fulfilled”

(such as gaining French support). It “is not true,” he stresses, “that

the emigres had engineering the rebellion.” The revolt was “a

spontaneous and self-contained movement from beginning to end.” [57]

Moreover, whether the Memorandum played a part in the revolt can be seen

from the reactions of the White “National Centre” to the uprising.

Firstly, they failed to deliver aid to the rebels nor get French aid to

them. Secondly, Professor Grimm, the chief agent of the National Centre

in Helsingfors and General Wrangel’s official representative in Finland,

stated to a colleague after the revolt had been crushed that if a new

outbreak should occur then their group must not be caught unawares

again. Avrich also notes that the revolt “caught the emigres off

balance” and that ”[n]othing ... had been done to implement the Secret

Memorandum, and the warnings of the author were fully borne out.” [58]

If Kronstadt was a White conspiracy then how could the organisation of

the conspiracy have been caught unawares?

As regards Wrangel’s troops, the facts are that there simply was no real

threat, as Avrich again makes plain.

Firstly, the Kronstadt revolt broke out months after the end of the

Civil War in Western Russia. Wrangel had fled from the Crimea in

November 1920. The Bolsheviks were so afraid of White invasion that by

early 1921 they demobilised half the Red Army (some 2,500,000 men).

Secondly, the Russian emigres “remained as divided and ineffectual as

before, with no prospect of co-operation in sight.” Thirdly, as far as

Wrangel’s forces go, they were in no state to re-invade Russia. His

troops were “dispersed and their moral sagging” and it would have taken

“months ... merely to mobilise his men and transport them from the

Mediterranean to the Baltic.” A second front in the south “would have

meant almost certain disaster.” Indeed, in a call issued by the

Petrograd Defence Committee on March 5^(th), they asked the rebels:

“Haven’t you heard what happened to Wrangel’s men, who are dying like

flies, in their thousands of hunger and disease?” The call goes on to

add ”[t]his is the fate that awaits you, unless you surrender within 24

hours.” [59]

Clearly, the prospect of a White invasion was slim. This leaves the

question of capitalist governments. Avrich has this to say on this:

“Apart from their own energetic fund-raising campaign, the emigres

sought the assistance of the Entene powers.... the United States

government, loath to resume the interventionist policies of the Civil

War, turned a deaf ear to all such appeals. The prospects of British aid

were even dimmer ... The best hope of foreign support came from France

... the French refused to interfere either politically or militarily in

the crisis.” The French government had also “withdrew its recognition of

Wrangel’s defunct government” in November 1920 “but continued to feed

his troops on ‘humane grounds,’ meanwhile urging him to disband.” [60]

Thus, the claim that foreign intervention was likely seems without

basis. Lenin himself argued on March 16^(th), 1921 that “the enemies”

around the Bolshevik state were “no longer able to wage their war of

intervention” and so were launching a press campaign “with the prime

object of disrupting the negotiations for a trade agreement with

Britain, and the forthcoming trade agreement with America.” [61] The

demobilising of the Red Army confirms this perspective.

While the Whites were extremely happy that Kronstadt revolted, it would

be weak politics indeed that based itself on the reactions of

reactionaries to evaluate social struggles. Sadly, this is exactly what

Rees does.

Balance of class forces?

John Rees continues by arguing that:

“As it became clear that the revolt was isolated Petrichenko was forced

to come to terms with the reality of the balance of class forces. On 13

March Petrichenko wired David Grimm, the chief of the National Centre

and General Wrangel’s official representative in Finland, for help in

gaining food. On 16 March Petrichenko accepted an offer of help from

Baron P V Vilkin, an associate of Grimm’s whom ‘the Bolsheviks rightly

called a White agent.’ None of the aid reached the garrison before it

was crushed, but the tide of events was pushing the sailors into the

arms of the Whites, just as the latter had always suspected it would.”

We should note that it was due to the “food situation in Kronstadt ...

growing desperate” that Petrichenko contacted Grimm, asking him to

“petition Finland and other countries for assistance” and the aid they

asked for was “food and medicine” from the Red Cross. [62] If the revolt

had spread to Petrograd and the striking workers there, such requests

would have been unnecessary. Rather than isolation being due to “the

reality of the balance of class forces” it was due to the reality of

coercive forces — the Bolsheviks had successfully repressed the

Petrograd strikes and slandered the Kronstadt revolt. The key to

understanding the isolation of the revolt is to know that the Bolsheviks

had suppressed the workers uprising in Petrograd in the first days of

March (something Rees fails to mention). The Kronstadt, revolt was an

outgrowth of the uprising in Petrograd and was cut off from its larger

social base and localised on a small island. Rather than express a

“balance of class forces,” the acceptance of outside help simply

expressed the power of Bolshevik coercion over the Russian workers and

peasants.

So, given that the Bolshevik dictatorship had lied to and repressed the

Petrograd working class, the Kronstadters had few options left as

regards aid. Rees’s argument smacks of the “logic” of Right as regards

the Spanish Civil War, the Cuban revolution and the Sandinistas.

Isolated, each of these revolts turned to the Soviet Union for aid thus

proving what the Right had always known from the start, namely their

objectively Communist nature and their part in the International

Communist Conspiracy. The Stalinists also used such “logic,” using

capitalist support for the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the Polish

union Solidarity as evidence to justify their repression. Few

revolutionaries would evaluate social struggles on such an illogical and

narrow basis but Rees wants us to do so with Kronstadt.

In reality, of course, the fact that others sought to take advantage of

these (and other) situations is inevitable and irrelevant. The important

thing is whether working class people where in control of the revolt and

what the main objectives of it were. By this class criteria, it is clear

that the Kronstadt revolt was revolutionary as, like Hungry 1956, the

core of the revolt was working people and their councils. It was they

who were in control and called the tune. That Whites tried to take

advantage of it is as irrelevant to evaluating the Kronstadt revolt as

the fact that Stalinists tried to take advantage of the Spanish struggle

against Fascism.

Moreover, in his analysis of the “balance of class forces”, Rees fails

to mention the class which had real power (and the related privileges)

in Russia at the time — the state and party bureaucracy. The working

class and peasantry were officially powerless. The only influence they

exercised in the “workers’ and peasants state” was when they rebelled,

forcing “their” state to make concessions or to repress them (sometimes

both happened). The balance of class forces was between the workers and

peasants and ruling bureaucracy. To ignore this factor means to

misunderstand the problems facing the revolution and the Kronstadt

revolt itself.

After the revolt

Rees quotes Paul Avrich to support his assertion that the Kronstadt

revolt was, in fact, pro-White. He argues as follows:

“Paul Avrich ... says there is ‘undeniable evidence’ that the leadership

of the rebellion came to an agreement with the Whites after they had

been crushed and that ‘one cannot rule out the possibility that this was

the continuation of a longstanding relationship.’”

What Rees fails to mention is that Avrich immediately adds ”[y]et a

careful search has yielded no evidence to support such a belief.” He

even states that ”[n]othing has come to light to show that ... any links

had existed between the emigres and the sailors before the revolt.” How

strange that Rees fails to quote or even mention Avrich’s conclusion to

his own speculation! As for the post-revolt links between the

“leadership” of the rebellion and the Whites, Avrich correctly argues

that ”[n]one of this proves that there were any ties between the

[National] Centre and the Revolutionary Committee either before or

during the revolt. It would seem, rather, that the mutual experience of

bitterness and defeat, and a common determination to overthrow the

Soviet regime, led them to join hands in the aftermath.” [63] Seeing you

friends and fellow toilers murdered by dictators may affect your

judgement, unsurprisingly enough.

Rees notes that one of the leaders of the rebellion, Petrichenko, “got

in touch with Wrangel” in exile and “joined forces” with him. Rees

comments that the “balance of class forces had finally brought ideology

and reality into alignment.” It seems incredible that a self-proclaimed

socialist could base his case on the activities of just one individual,

but for all his talk of “class forces,” Rees seems happy to do just

that.

Let us, however, assume that certain elements in the “leadership” of the

revolt were, in fact, scoundrels. What does this mean when evaluating

the Kronstadt revolt?

We must point out that this “leadership” was elected by and under the

control of the “conference of delegates,” which was in turn elected by

and under the control of the rank-and-file sailors, soldiers and

civilians. This body met regularly during the revolt “to receive and

debate the reports of the Revolutionary committee and to propose

measures and decrees.” [64] The actions of the “leadership” were not

independent of the mass of the population and so, regardless of their

own agendas, had to work under control from below. In other words, the

revolt cannot be reduced to a discussion of whether a few of the

“leadership” were “bad men” or not. Indeed, to do so just reflects the

elitism of bourgeois history — yet Rees does just that and reduces the

Kronstadt revolt and its “ideology” down to just one person

(Petrichenko).

Conclusion

As can be seen, Rees has totally distorted the facts as regards the

Kronstadt rebellion. On almost every point, Rees distorted his sources.

His argument about the changing “class composition” of the Kronstadt

garrison depends on his suppressing the numerous facts which contradict

it (facts that exist on the very same page he quotes!). As regards the

objectively “pro-White” nature of the revolt, his argument is

effectively refuted by the very sources he uses as evidence. All this is

unsurprising, as the same abuse of the source material was evident in

Rees’ account of the Makhnovist movement.

What is significant is his attempts to justify the Bolshevik repression

in terms of the class nature of the revolt. Rees can only do this by

ripping the Kronstadt revolt from its roots in the Petrograd strike

movement and by ignoring both the demands of the strikers and of the

sailors. This, again, is unsurprising. Like most pro-Bolshevik accounts

of the Russian revolution after October 1917, the working class is

absent from Rees’s account of the degeneration of Bolshevism. This is

because a key Leninist justification for Bolshevik tyranny is the claim

that the industrial working class disintegrated soon after the

Bolsheviks had seized power. However, this position cannot be defended.

For all Rees’ claims that the Russian working class did was an

“atomised, individualised mass” which was “no longer able to exercise

the collective power” the facts are that all during the Civil War period

and in February/March in 1921, the Russian workers were able to take

collective action up to and including the level of a general strike.

This is implicitly acknowledged by Rees who notes that Kronstadt was

preceded by a “wave of serious ... strikes” all across Russia. How can

an “atomised, individualised mass” incapable of “collective power”

manage to conduct general strikes that required martial law to break?

The explanation of this “oversight” is simple. Collective working class

revolt and power was directed towards the Bolsheviks from 1918 onwards.

To mention this (and the resulting Bolshevik repression) would be to

contradict Rees’ claim that “[i]n the cities the Reds enjoyed the fierce

and virtually undivided loyalty of the masses throughout the civil war

period” and so goes unmentioned. However, this opposition by the workers

to the Bolshevik regime does explain Bolshevik support for “the

dictatorship of the party” (see part 1 of this series). A party which

did have the “virtually undivided loyalty of the masses” would not need

to undermine soviet democracy and raise its own dictatorship to an

ideological truism. Perhaps Rees means by this something similar to his

claim that the Bolshevik “rested” upon the working class (as it was

arresting them)?

This perhaps explains Rees’ attempt to personalise the Kronstadt events

by his discussion of Petrichenko. The class criteria is the decisive

one, something which cannot be evaluated by the actions of just one

person and to evaluate the real balance of class forces you need an

honest account of the events. As Rees does not (and, indeed, cannot)

present such an account, it is understandable that he looks to

individuals. Ironically, his comment that Petrichenko’s liaisons with

the Whites during exile “brought ideology and reality into alignment”

can better be applied to the Bolshevik repression of Kronstadt and the

subsequent rise of Stalinism.

Ultimately, by agreeing with Trotsky that suppressing Kronstadt was “a

tragic necessity,” Rees is admitting that the SWP would do the same (as

can be seen, he currently follows their example by slandering the

revolt) and consider a regime based on repression of workers as somehow

“socialist.” Clearly, the Bolshevik tradition sees working class

autonomy and self-management as having little to do with socialism and

that, if necessary, these and the self-emancipation of the working class

can be postponed provided people like Lenin and Trotsky run the

“workers’ state” on behalf of the workers and raise the red flag.

Working people will never be inspired by a socialism which represses

them and their hard won freedoms in the name of their “objective”

interests (as defined by the party leaders).

If the Leninist tradition is revolutionary, Rees would not need to

rewrite history in order to defend it. That suggests that

revolutionaries should look elsewhere for a theory with which to both

understand and change the world. If, as Rees claims, the October

revolution is both “our past” and “our future,” then he should not have

to distort its history and legacy so.

[1] Peter Arshinov, History of the Makhnovist Movement, p. 226f

[2] David Footman, Civil War in Russia, p. 292–3

[3] Michael Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, p. 175–6

[4] Palij, Op. Cit., p. 177, p. 190, p. 191 and p. 173

[5] Palij, Op. Cit., p. 210

[6] Civil War in Russia, pp. 290–1

[7] W Bruce Lincoln,Red Victory, p. 327

[8] Palij, Op. Cit., p. 231

[9] Samuel Farber, Before Stalinism, pp. 23–4, p. 22 and p. 33

[10] Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power?, p. 80 and p. 81

[11] Trotsky stressed that “it can be said with complete justice that

the dictatorship of the Soviets became possible only by means of the

dictatorship of the party. It is thanks to the ... party ... [that] the

Soviets ... [became] transformed from shapeless parliaments of labour

into the apparatus of the supremacy of labour.” In 1937, he was still

arguing this: “Those who propose the abstraction of Soviets to the party

dictatorship should understand that only thanks to the party

dictatorship were the Soviets able to lift themselves out of the mud of

reformism and attain the state form of the proletariat.” [“Stalinism and

Bolshevism,”,

www.marxists.org

m]

[12] Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress 1920, vol. 1, p.

152

[13] Collected Works, vol. 29, p. 535

[14] Collected Works, vol. 32, p. 21. This was obvious considered a key

lesson of the revolution, as Trotsky was still speaking about the

“objective necessity” of “revolutionary dictatorship of a proletarian

party” due “the heterogeneity of the revolutionary class” in 1937!

“Abstractly speaking,” he stressed, “it would be very well if the party

dictatorship could be replaced by the ‘dictatorship’ of the whole

toiling people without any party, but this presupposes such a high level

of political development among the masses that it can never be achieved

under capitalist conditions.” [Writings 1936–37, pp. 513–4]

[15] Bolshevik military historian, quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 225

[16] quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 224

[17] Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, p. 152

[18] Palij, Op. Cit., p. 151

[19] Arshinv, The History of the Makhnovist Movement, p. 154

[20] Palij, Op. Cit, p. 151

[21] Samuel Farber, Before Stalinism, p. 31

[22] Paul Avrich, The Russian Anarchists, p. 190

[23] quoted by Israel Getzler, Martov, p. 202

[24] Michael Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Revolution, p. 111, p.

124

[25] quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 103–4

[26] quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 154

[27]

M. Brinton, The Bolsheviks and Workers’ Control, p. 67

[28] Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 149

[29]

M. Palij, Op. Cit., p. 214

[30] Palij, Op. Cit., p. 71, p. 151 and p. 154

[31] Palij, Op. Cit., p. 156 and p. 213

[32]

M. Palij, Op. Cit., pp. 213–4

[33] quoted by Paul Avrich, The Anarchists in the Russian Revolution,

pp. 130–2

[34] Paul Avrich, Kronstadt 1921, pp. 37–8

[35] Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 39

[36] Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 46–7

[37] Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 48–9

[38] Memoirs of a Revolutionary, pp. 124–6

[39] Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 50

[40]

I. Gelzter, Kronstadt 1917–1921, p. 212

[41] quoted by Ida Mett, The Kronstadt Revolt, pp. 37–8

[42] Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 42–3

[43] Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 74–5

[44] Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 207

[45] Getzler, Op. Cit., pp. 197–8

[46] Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 207

[47] Samuel Farber, Before Stalinism, pp. 192–3

[48] Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 179 and p. 186

[49] Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 171, p. 168, p. 169 and p. 171

[50] Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 171–2

[51] Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 181

[52] Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 243

[53] Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 187, p. 112 and p. 123

[54] Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 187, p. 112 and p. 123

[55] quoted by Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 239–40

[56] Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 111–2

[57] Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 126–7

[58] Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 212 and p. 123

[59] Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 13, p. 219, p. 146 and p. 105

[60] Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 117–9 and p. 105

[61] Lenin and Trotsky, Kronstadt, p. 52

[62] Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 121–2

[63] Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 111 and p. 129

[64] Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 217