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Title: Anarchism & Poststructuralism
Author: John Moore
Date: 1994
Language: en
Topics: second wave, poststructuralism, primitivism, post-situationism, post-structuralist, review
Source: Second Wave Anarchy Zine.

John Moore

Anarchism & Poststructuralism

The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism

Todd May, University Park, Pennsylvania:

Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994.

Any discussion of the interface between anarchism and poststructuralism

is likely to be written from one side of the fence or the other, and

this will inevitably affect the nature of the analysis undertaken. This

text is written from the poststructuralist side, and as a result one

must carefully scrutinise the author's grounding in anarchism. The

book's bibliography provides a useful indicator in this respect. The

anarchist titles listed comprise two books by Bakunin, three by

Kropotkin, one by Proudhon, one by Bookchin, one by Ward, Reinventing

Anarchy, The Anarchist Reader, and the standard overviews by Woodcock

and Joll. The most notable aspect of this list is its omissions.

Elsewhere I have argued that anarchist history, on the model of feminist

history, can be assigned a two phase periodisation. Just like first-wave

feminism, anarchism has an early phase, conveniently labelled as

classical anarchism. From its intellectual origins in Godwin and

Proudhon, classical anarchism developed into its mature form during the

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, finding its climactic

expression (but also its swansong) in the Spanish Revolution.

This is the phase of anarchism which Woodcock pronounced dead in the

mid-1950s in the first edition of Anarchism.

But unbeknownst to those immersed in classical anarchist traditions, a

new, second-wave of anarchism (akin and indeed roughly contemporaneous

with second-wave feminism) was stirring. The Situationists represent a

convenient marker of the transition point, and serve as origin for the

remarkable effiorescence of second-wave anarchism that is currently

underway. Second-wave anarchism is still frequently not even recognised

by anarchists and commentators who still cling to the idea that

classical anarchism is the one and only true form of anarchism, even

though first-wave anarchism was seen as moribund by Woodcock forty years

ago.

As a result, many outside the anarchist milieu are given the misleading

impression that a) classical anarchism is anarchism, b) anarchism is

therefore an historical phenomenon, and thus c) there are no current

manifestations of anarchist praxis. The unfortunate consequences of

these misconceptions can be seen in May's understanding of anarchism.

With the partial exception of Reinventing Anarchy, the anarchist titles

in May's bibliography consist entirely of texts on or by classical

anarchists. (Ward, like Goodman, can perhaps be seen as a transitional

figure, but his grounding in the British anarcho-reformist tradition of

Godwin and Read underscores his classical anarchist orientation.

Bookchin, particularly in light of Social Anarchism or

Lifestyle-Anarchism, can be unproblematically characterised as a late

manifestation of the classical anarchist tradition.)

The question that must be addressed to May's text is: Where are the

second-wave anarchists? Where are Debord, Vaneigem, Perlman, Zerzan, and

so on? This is not mere pedantry. May is able to cast post-structuralist

thinkers as latter-day anarchists precisely because his knowledge of

anarchism suggests that currently there is an intellectual vacuum where

classical anarchism used to be. The fact that this vacuum is an

illusion— an illusion partly fostered by commentators who are either

ignorant of, or refuse to acknowledge the existence of, second-wave

anarchism— casts an unfortunate doubt on the validity of May's project.

May's book 'attempts to capture what is— or what ought to be— most

lasting in the legacy of post-structuralist thought: its anarchism'

(155). In order to achieve this aim, May distinguishes between three

types of political philosophy: formal, strategic, and tactical. Formal

political philosophy is 'characterized by its cleaving either to the

pole of what ought to be or to the pole of what is at the expense of the

tension between the two' (4). It provides abstract discussions of the

large-scale principles that define the ideal society, and thus generates

a totalising, unitary explanation of social relations.

Strategic political philosophy, on the other hand, is concerned with the

historical implementation of political philosophies and thus with the

pragmatic methodological concerns of achieving political goals. As a

result, it 'involves a unitary analysis that aims toward a single goal'

(11). In the strategic perspective, power is seen to emanate from a

particular centre (eg, the State, capitalist economic relations) which

then provides the focus for practical activities.

In contrast to these totalising forms of political expression, however,

tactical political philosophy refuses to align itself with the poles of

either what is or what ought to be, preferring to oscillate between the

two. Refusing any grand narrative or totalising explanation, the

tactical perspective does not see power as residing in a specific locus,

but as arising at a number of sites and in the interplay between these

sites. In practical terms, this means that political intervention must

be local and plural, rather than general and unified. It also has

important implications for social agency in that it questions the

legitimacy of representation. If the sites of power are multiple, then

no one vanguard group is in a privileged position to speak or act on

behalf of others.

For May, poststructuralist political philosophy differs from other types

of politics because it affirms the tactical rather than the formal or

the strategic. However, in anarchism— despite its ambivalent commitment

between tactical and strategic thinking— he perceives "a forerunner to

current poststructuralist thought' (13). In an interesting discussion.

May exposes the failures of Marxism in terms of its adherence to rigid

forms of formal and strategic thinking. He then proceeds to a

consideration of anarchism (for which read: classical anarchism) and

thence to a discussion of the compatibility of anarchist and

poststructuralist thinking, with the aim of outlining (in the words of a

chapter title) the 'steps toward a poststructuralist anarchism'.

The problem with this project is that it remains framed entirely within

terms of classical anarchism. May sees (classical) anarchism as

unsatisfactorily ambivalent in its strategic and tactical tendencies.

The reason for these contradictory commitments is easily deduced.

Classical anarchism isstrategic insofar as it locates the source of

power in a single institution— the State, but tactical where it resists

the different types of power that emerge where the State exists. For

May, however, the fact that (classical) anarchism— in contrast to

Marxism— has pronounced tactical tendencies remains sufficient to cast

it as a 'forerunner' of poststructuralist politics, and to characterize

the latter as the contemporary form of (intellectual) anarchism.

This is clearly unsatisfactory as well as inaccurate. Anarchism is not

the forerunner of anything— least of all a pallid academic tendency such

as poststructuralism— because it is not a dead Victorian doctrine, but a

living, thriving project. The fact that it has undergone various

transformations during its second-wave which have rendered it invisible

or unrecognisable to some, should not disguise the fact that classical

anarchism can no longer be taken as the basis for discussion of

contemporary anarchism. Second-wave anarchism has expanded the project

of the classical anarchists: the focus of contemporary anarchism is not

the abolition of the State, but the abolition of the totality, of life

structured by governance and coercion, of power itself in all its

multiple forms. And it is here that contemporary anarchism departs

markedly from May's poststructuralist anarchism. Not least in the fact

that second-wave anarchism incorporates an explicit rejection of the

political as an appropriate focus for practice.

In dealing with issues of power. May draws extensively upon Deleuze,

Lyotard and (particularly) Foucault. While approving of the classical

anarchist recognition that power is arranged through intersecting

networks rather than exclusively through hierarchies, he asserts: 'The

anarchist picture of networks requires deepening' (51). And the

poststructuralist analysis of power is to provide this development.

Poststructuralism, for May, rejects 'the a priori of traditional (ie,

classical] anarchism* (85): the notion of power as solely a negative,

repressive force, and the notion of subjectivity as a viable source of

political action. On the basis of a critique of these ideas from a

poststructuralist perspective. May postulates 'a new type of anarchism'

(85) which rejects strategic thought for a comprehensive tactical

approach: poststructuralist anarchism. The fact that 'a new type of

anarchism'— ie, second-wave anarchism— already exists,and has on

occasion (eg, in Zerzan's "The Catastrophe of Postmodernism') been very

critical of the poststructuralist project, escapes May altogether.

Following Foucault et al. May affirms the idea that power is not always

suppressive, but sometimes productive. But like his poststructuralist

mentors, he fudges the issue, from an anarchist perspective, by

reiterating this familiar formula. Whether power is suppressive or

productive, it is still power that is to say, it still uses force

(whether overtly or insidiously) to construct and define individuals and

make them think or act in particular ways. Whether power say 'thou shall

not...' or 'here are your options ...', coercion is involved. "One would

not call all exercises of power oppressive," May states (96). But surely

that depends upon whom one is. May admits that 'anarchists are

suspicious of all power' (61), although (as far as the second-wave is

concerned) suspicion is a far too cautious term for a project aimed at

the abolition of the ensemble of power relations, the control complex

itself. But this is not the case with Foucault, who is quoted

approvingly as saying:

relations of power are not something bad in themselves, from which one

must free oneself.... The problem is not of trying to dissolve them in

the Utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to give one's

self the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the

ethics, the ethos, the practice of self, which would allow these games

of power to be played with a minimum of domination. (123)

The references to law, management and minimalist domination, plus the

explicit anti-utopian stance, suggest the incompatibility of Foucauldian

ideology with contemporary anarchism, and undermine May's claims for a

poststructuralist anarchism. "The question," May avers, "is not whether

or not there is power, but which relationships of power are acceptable

and which are unacceptable" (123) But this is merely the question of

liberalism, and indicates the recuperative nature of poststructuralism

in co-opting radical impulses.

For contemporary anarchism, no relationships of power are acceptable.

"If power is suppressive, then the central political question to be

asked is: When is the exercise of power legitimate, and when is it not?"

(61). But for second-wave anarchism, the answer is the same, whether

power is suppressive or productive: never! 'Given that the old answers

to political problems— appropriating the means of production, seizing or

eliminating the state, destroying all relations of power— are found to

be lacking, what perspective can poststructuralist theory offer for

thinking about political change as well as power and political

oppression?' (112). Aside from the fact that for anarchists these are

social not political problems, the putative failure of 'the old answers'

is not proved and thus cannot be taken as a given. What can be

established, however, is that the perspectives offered by

poststructuralism are reformist.

May offers an unconvincing defence to the charge of reformism: "The

mistake that is made in contrasting revolution and reform lies in the

assumption that the former involves a qualitative change in society,

while the latter involves only a quantitative change. However, on the

alternative picture of politics being sketched here, there are in

reality only quantitative changes, qualitative ones being defined in

terms of them" (54) But this too fudges the point. Revolution (better:

insurrection) depends on a rupture, whereas the poststructuralist

perspective offered here depends on piecemeal change, the mark of the

reformist, and never results in that definitive break. Further, from a

second-wave perspective, the totality— the totality of power relations—

cannot be resisted in piecemeal fashion, and thus poststructuralist

anarchism could never hope to engage in dismantling the totality. As May

remarks, "The task of a poststructuralist politics is to attempt to

construct power relations that can be lived with, not to overthrow power

altogether" (114).

In fact, by undermining subjectivity as the basis from which to launch

resistance. May leaves no space from which the totality might be

questioned.

The point of [classical] anarchism's resort to the idea of a benign

human essence is to be able to justify its resistance to power. Suppose

that anarchists had a different view of power, one that saw power not

solely as suppressive but also as productive: power not only suppresses

actions, events, and people, but creates them as well. In that case, it

would be impossible to justify the resistance to all power; one would

have to distinguish clearly acceptable creations or effects (as opposed,

in the case of the suppressive assumption, to exercises) of power from

unacceptable ones. (63)

The coercive nature of both suppressive and productive power has been

demonstrated above, and there is little sense in staging a defence of

classical anarchism. However, the intent of this passage is clear, by

discrediting the notion of essentialism, May attempts to undermine the

anarchist project of resisting all power.This ploy remains ineffective

when applied to second-wave anarchism, however.

While classical anarchism may rest its claims on Being, second-wave

anarchism emphasises Becoming. Following from Nietzsche's notion of

self-overcoming, the Situationists stress radical subjectivity as the

basis for resistance.The project of resisting the totality rests, not on

some essentialist human subject, but on the subject-in-process, or

better, the subject-in-rebellion: the radical subject.The processual

nature of this identity undercuts May's charge of essentialism, but at

the same time provides a basis in lived experience for resistance to the

totality, rather than reformist quibbling over acceptable and

unacceptable forms of power.

May has written a stimulating and readable book, and one worth reading

for its candour about the politics of poststructuralism alone. This text

allows one to think through important issues, even though one's

conclusions differ widely from those held by the author. On one level,

however, the text stands as an indictment of the distance between

academia and contemporary anarchism, and between anarchist commentators

and the present anarchist milieu.