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Title: The *Laozi* and Anarchism
Author: Aleksandar Stamatov
Date: 2014
Language: en
Topics: proto-anarchism, Taoism, China, philosophy
Source: *Journal Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East*. Volume 24, 2014 — Issue 3. DOI:10.1080/09552367.2014.960296

Aleksandar Stamatov

The Laozi and Anarchism

Abstract

In this article I will discuss the anarchist and non-anarchist

interpretations of the Laozi and argue that the political philosophy of

the Laozi does not completely conform to Western anarchism. Thus,

firstly I will give a brief introduction to Western anarchism. Then I

will present the strongest arguments of the anarchist interpretation and

try to find their mistakes and refute them. Finally I will try to give

an acceptable non-anarchist interpretation of the political philosophy

of the Laozi. In doing steps 2 and 3, I will base my arguments in a way

that is consistent with the text of the Laozi itself. Thus, I hope that

this article will bring a deeper understanding of the political

philosophy of the Laozi and break with the widely spread opinion that

the Laozi propounds an anarchist theory.

Introduction

It is almost a common opinion among the scholars today that the

political philosophy of the Laozi is a kind of anarchist theory. This

view is also widely spread among Western anarchists themselves. As A. C.

Graham (1989) says, ‘Western anarchists have claimed Laozi as one of

themselves ever since his book became known in the West in the 19^(th)

century’ (p. 299). During the twentieth century, the identification of

the political philosophy of the Laozi with anarchism has become so

common that almost every textbook on contemporary political philosophy

mentions the possible connection between the two. For example, Richard

Sylvan (2007) explains that ‘there are significant anticipations of

anarchism in earlier philosophy (notably in Stoicism and Taoism)’ (p.

257). Andrew Vincent (1992) similarly notes that ‘it is also asserted

that anarchist themes are to be found within ancient Chinese texts like

the Tao te Ching’ (p. 116). This trend continues up until today and has

become a popular understanding of the Laozi, as if it is already an

unquestionable fact. Both Chinese philosophy experts and anarchist

writers are among those who support the anarchist interpretation. Their

arguments rest on certain statements or concepts of the Laozi, but we

can also see that sometimes by supporting the anarchist interpretation

they attempt to show that the political philosophy of the Laozi is

worthless and with no feasibility, while emphasizing the superiority of

Confucian political philosophy. Or sometimes they just want to find out

anarchism’s source or ancestor, as Vincent again puts it: ‘There is a

strong demand for an “ancient lineage” in all ideologies which often

overwhelms intellectual caution’ (p. 116). However, there are

disagreements in the academic literature on the question whether the

political philosophy of the Laozi is an anarchist theory (Feldt, 2010;

Hsiao, 1979; Schwartz, 1985). In the following, I will try to break with

the commonly spread anarchist interpretation of the Laozi and argue that

the political philosophy of the Laozi does not completely conform to

Western anarchism. In order to do this, a short introduction to Western

anarchism is needed, which will be given in the first part. In the

second part I will present the strongest arguments of the anarchist

interpretation and try to find their mistakes and refute them. In the

third part I will try to give an acceptable non-anarchist interpretation

of the political philosophy of the Laozi. In refuting the anarchist and

proposing the non-anarchist interpretation, I will base my arguments in

a way that is consistent with the text of the Laozi itself.

What is Anarchism?

Before we discuss the possible connection between the political

philosophy of the Laozi and anarchism, we have to first explain what

anarchism is. The scope of this article does not allow us to engage into

an extensive discussion on anarchism including its historical

development and detailed explanation of its various types, but only to

offer an overview of anarchism explaining its meaning, implications and

main concepts. Various anarchists provided their own theories and

expressed their own understanding of anarchism, and sometimes different

anarchist types might be in a disagreement between one another. This

situation might cause difficulties in finding out unique definition of

anarchism, and since this article will only illustrate anarchism’s main

concepts and ideas in general, I will make use of some contemporary

writers on anarchism and present their general agreement on what

anarchism is.

‘Anarchism’ or ‘anarchy’ comes from the old Greek ‘an’ and ‘arkhê’; ‘an’

is a negative word or has the meaning of ‘there is no’, ‘arkhê’ means

authority or sovereignty, thus ‘anarchos’ became to mean there is no

head or leader, or there is no fundamental authority. Anarchist thought

emerged as a critique and rejection of the modern state, thus the main

intellectual anarchist work began in the eighteenth century, with the

outbreak of the French Revolution (Sylvan, 2007, p. 257). However, the

first use of ‘anarchism’ to denote a political position is to be found

in Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s 1840 work What is Property? An Inquiry into

the Principle of Right and Government (Qu’est-ce que la propriété ? ou

Recherche sur le principe du Droit et du Gouvernment). In this work,

Proudhon defines anarchy as the ‘absence of a master, of a sovereign’,

and because of this and other similar statements Proudhon became known

as the ‘father of anarchy’ (Vincent, 1992, p. 115). Proudhon’s

definition indeed tally with the superficial meaning of the coinage

anarchism, but the problem is that later, one after another, various

anarchist advocates announced their own types of anarchism, so that

today we are obliged to accept what Richard De Goerge (1995) says:

‘There is no single defining position that all anarchists hold, and

those considered anarchists at best share certain family resemblances’

(pp. 30–31). From the above we can conclude that the change of meaning

and ideas of the anarchist theory is dynamic and developing.

‘What is anarchism?’ is really a difficult question to answer. Different

dictionaries offer different definitions of anarchism, such as, the

‘lack of coercive government’, the ‘absence of a political state’, the

‘want of authoritarian political heads or leaders, institutions or

organizations’, etc. (Sylvan, 2007, p. 258). Thus, De George once again

says: ‘In its narrower meaning anarchism is a theory of society without

state rule. In its broader meaning it is a theory of society without any

coercive authority in any area—government, business, industry, commerce,

religion, education, the family’ (p. 30). We can see from this that the

principles of anarchism are not related only to the state and government

but also to other aspects of society. In other words, we can not only

discuss state authority but we can also consider all types of authority.

This is possible because the above-mentioned institutions are usually

arranged in hierarchical systems, so they can also be a subject to

critique by anarchism. However, using this kind of definitions to

describe anarchism can easily induce us to associate it with disorder or

chaos which is a misunderstanding. These statements only define

anarchism in its surface and extreme. Since in this more than 100 years

long history of anarchism there are various types of it, the meaning and

implications of anarchism itself exceed these definitions. So we can

accept the view of Leon Baradat (1984), another contemporary political

philosophy writer, who says: ‘At its extreme, anarchism means no

government beyond that of the individual over himself or herself. At its

mildest, it simply suggests that much of the authority of the state

should be eliminated’ (p. 52). In sum, anarchism is a kind of reaction

against state and authority; strictly said, anarchism rejects coercive

authority. Moreover, anarchism excludes the governing that is separated

from the people or the crowd and stresses that people should alone

govern themselves.

We can see a trend in the recent literature of attempting to avoid too

simplified descriptions and definitions of anarchism. So, as we said

above, the development and changing shapes of anarchism already exceed

the original meaning of the term. It seems that the definition the

famous anarchist writer John Clark (1978) has offered can approximately

be used to describe all types of anarchism. Accordingly, one anarchist

theory should include:

a view of an ideal, non-coercive, non-authoritarian society;

a criticism of existing society and its institutions, based on this

antiauthoritarian ideal;

a view of human nature that justifies the hope for significant

progress toward the ideal; and

a strategy for change, involving immediate institution of

non-coercive, non-authoritarian and decentralist alternatives (p. 13).

According to Clark, one can be labeled anarchist in a full sense only if

he or she meets the four criteria. However, he recognizes that this

definition can allow two types of anarchists, strong and weak. Thus, the

strong anarchist manifests all the four criteria, while the weak

anarchist does not manifest all of them, so this type can be labeled

anarchist in a limited sense. Actually, Clark’s description opens the

possibility of a wide scope in which many political theories can be

absorbed and labeled as more or less anarchist.

Or, as Sylvan explains, we normally take the conditions for anarchist

theory as conjoined, but we can also consider them disjointly. Thus, we

come to the so-called diluted anarchism (p. 258). But the problem is how

do we know where the limit to dilution is, and Sylvan acknowledges this

problem: ‘There are limits, however, to how far definitional dilution

should be allowed to proceed: a theory such as Nozick’s libertarianism,

postulating a minimal coercive centralized state, exceeds acceptable

bounds of dilution’ (p. 258).[1] We can see that the weak or diluted

type of anarchism can include a wide scope of political theories, so no

wonder the political philosophy of the Laozi is often seen as an

anarchist theory.

In conclusion, on the surface and simply stated, anarchism rejects

government or all forms of authority, but this definition perhaps

includes minority of the anarchist theories, if such exist at all.

However, the goal of anarchism is to eliminate the coercive authority or

most of the coercive authority, in the same time having respect for the

individual freedom. In other words, according to anarchism, the coercive

authority is the one that gives rise to the state’s problems and

people’s difficulties. Sylvan again stresses that anarchism centers on

two interacting foci: ‘(1) a top or centre; and (2) control or dominance

flowing from this top, by what are adjudged inadmissible (in particular,

authoritarian or coercive) means’ (p. 261). Thus, the top or central

political power exercises authoritarian and coercive government, and

‘anarchy entails structure or organization without inadmissible top-down

or centralized means’ (p. 261). What is crucial here is that the

structure with top-down centralized means is a hierarchical one, so in

the final analysis, anarchism wants to eliminate the hierarchical

structure or system.

Having thus briefly explained the main ideas and concepts of anarchism,

I believe we can now turn to the problem of the anarchist interpretation

of the political philosophy of the Laozi.

Anarchist Interpretation of the Political Philosophy of the Laozi

From the above presentation of the ideas of anarchism we can see that

the matter is not that simple. Moreover, just because the definition of

anarchism is so wide, it is easy for some to take the political

philosophy of the Laozi as one or another kind of anarchism. Off course,

if we say that the Laozi recognizes the existence of the ruler so it is

not an anarchist work, those who adopt the anarchist interpretation

would say that this kind of argument is an oversimplification of the

matter (Ames, 1983, p. 28). If we consider the above discussion on

defining anarchism, we can immediately understand the reasons for this

statement.

As stated above, after the appearance of anarchism as a political

theory, the Laozi became to be compared with it. One of the first who

considered the political philosophy of the Laozi as an anarchist theory

was the Confucian scholar Liang Qichao (Liang, 1930). He explains that

Daoism believes there is a kind of natural law and that people’s

skillfulness is harmful to this law, so, according to Liang, the Daoist

political theory believes that this natural law represents an absolute

freedom and rejection of any form of interference, so people’s return to

nature means that the government is not necessary. Thus, he concludes:

‘The ideal is that the people shall be unconscious of interference,

unaware of the existence of a government. This ideal is “anarchism” ’

(p. 79). However, not knowing that there is a ruler does not mean that

there is absolutely no government. If we continue reading Liang’s

exposition on Daoist thought, we can see that he has a negative view

toward all of the Daoist thought, so the reason why he adopts the

anarchist interpretation of the Laozi is because he wants to deny any

value and feasibility of the political philosophy of the Laozi.

The most elaborate arguments for the anarchist interpretation appeared

in the 1980s. First, in 1980 the International Society for Chinese

Philosophy set a symposium entitled ‘Is Political Taoism an Anarchist

Theory?’ in which three scholars presented their papers, namely

Frederick Bender, Roger Ames, and David Hall. Later, in 1983, these

three papers together with a fourth one by John Clark were published in

the Journal of Chinese Philosophy. In the Introduction to this edition,

Chung-Ying Cheng (1983) says that from these essays emerges ‘the general

consensus that Taoist thought is supremely anarchistic—not a totally

novel conclusion, but one that has not hitherto been articulated in such

cogent detail’ (p. 4). In these essays the discussion goes beyond the

Laozi including the Zhuangzi and the Huainanzi. This paper off course is

limited to the Laozi only and will not consider the possible relation of

anarchism to the other two works.[2] Hence, I will now begin the

discussion of the anarchist interpretation of the Laozi by the

above-mentioned writers with the exception of Bender for whom the

political philosophy of the Laozi is not strictly anarchistic.

Roger Ames (1983) distinguishes four necessary conditions for a

comprehensive anarchism which he mostly draws from Clark’s criteria.

Thus, an anarchist theory should include: (1) freedom is necessary to

approach consummation and achieve human realization, (2) rejection of

coercive authority, (3) a notion of a non-coercive, non-authoritarian

society realizable in the future, and (4) an attempt to authenticate

theory in practice, that is, a method or program of moving from the

present authoritarian reality to the non-authoritarian ideal (pp.

30–31).

As Ames explains, Western anarchism accepts the conception of individual

freedom and in accordance with the Western liberal tradition sees the

person as having autonomous, discrete, and discontinuous ‘atomistic’

individual characteristic. No matter if it is individualist or social

anarchists, they both perceive tension between individual liberty and

the collective will. Off course, Ames shows that in Daoist political

philosophy this tension does not exist because Daoism rejects the

ego-centric understanding of the self. In Daoist philosophy, ‘a person …

is understood as a matrix of relationships which can only be fully

expressed by reference to the organismic whole’ (p. 32). Thus, there are

different views on individual freedom; in Western anarchism individual

freedom has to do with self-determination and one’s own intrinsic

character, while Daoist freedom, in short, is the comprehension of the

Dao as the whole and the source of everything (p. 33). But although

Western anarchism and Daoism have different views on person and freedom,

they both agree that human realization lies in the achievement of

freedom, so here Ames concludes that Daoism satisfies the first

condition for an anarchist theory (pp. 33–34). However, as Ames himself

points out, Daoist conception of freedom is derived from a clearly

articulated metaphysical position (p. 33), and this is an important

difference between the political philosophy of the Laozi and Western

anarchism. Although both the Laozi and the Western anarchism rely on

freedom in achieving human consummation, the meaning of freedom of the

latter is in politics, that is, freedom of oppression by authority, so

it is a political and societal freedom, whereas the Laozi goes beyond

this meaning of freedom. Here we can quote what Benjamin Schwartz (1985)

has said about the political philosophy of the Laozi: ‘If it is

anarchism, it is anarchism completely lacking in dreams of individual

freedom and “creativity” and not incompatible with the idea of

sage-rulers’ (p. 213). Having in mind the context of the whole text of

the Laozi, we can conclude that the meaning of freedom in the book is

not only in politics but also on a metaphysical level, that is, humans

should have the freedom to obtain and cultivate their natural and simple

character that originally was endowed in them by the Dao. In short,

according to the Laozi, the political freedom of the individual is

inconceivable without this metaphysical freedom. Hence, the political

philosophy of the Laozi does not completely satisfy the first condition.

Ames continues by saying that there are philological similarities

between ‘anarchism’ and ‘wuwei’. Thus, ‘anarhia’ means lack of a leader,

where ‘arhia’ refers to rule of authority, and ‘wuwei’ means lack of

wei, where ‘wei’ refers to the imposition of authority (p. 34). But we

can immediately see that this is only a difference on the surface

because wuwei is not simply a lack of imposition of authority or lack of

action. Let us see some statements in the Laozi:[3]

Wuwei actually is not no action (buwei) but means that nothing is left

undone (wubuwei) (Chs 37 and 48). The above statements show that wuwei

is actually not the negative buwei, and we can even see that in Chapter

3 there is another wei added to wuwei thus becoming wei wuwei, acting

without action, which gives wuwei a positive connotation. So the

characteristic of wuwei is nothing to be left undone, that is, when we

talk about wuwei, we have to consider wubuwei and the result is do

nothing and leave nothing undone (wuwei er wubuwei). Wuwei does not mean

total passivity and doing nothing but means following Dao’s natural

operation so that nothing is left undone. In short, wuwei is a kind of

wei, action, in accordance with the naturalness or self-so (ziran) that

comes from the Dao.

Now, wuwei is actually opposed to youwei, which literally means having

activity, and this is shown in Chapter 75 of the Laozi:

This youwei is artificial activity, completely independent of Dao’s

natural activity, and this kind of activity harms people and things.

Thus, wuwei is seen as an activity like in the phrase wei wuwei which

would mean ‘do wuwei’, so it cannot be separated into the two elements

wu and wei but has to be taken together, thus wuwei does not oppose wei

or action but only youwei, the unnatural action.

Ames goes on to say that anarchism does not refer to the contrast

between political order and disorder but rather to the contrast between

‘natural order emanating from below and an artificial order imposed from

above’ (p. 35). This is similar to Ames’s view that wuwei means

rejection of the authority imposed from above or, in more concrete

terms, opposition to the coercive government. Thus, he claims that

Daoist political philosophy satisfies the second condition (p. 38). And

vice versa, if Daoism opposes coercive government, same as anarchism

recommends a non-coercive society that might be realizable in the

future. The proof for Ames is Chapter 80 of the Laozi and also Chapter

54 in which we can see that the Dao is cultivated in the person and

extended up to his or her household, neighborhood, state and to the

empire at large (p. 38). Finally, in order to prove this action from

bottom up, Ames finds textual support in Chapter 49 which says:

Thus, according to Ames, Daoist political philosophy satisfies the third

condition (p. 40).

The problem here is that one crucial statement from Chapter 60 is

forgotten:

It seems here that the Laozi allows the authority from above. How are

these two statements to be reconciled? Obviously, Chapter 49 describes

the expansion of the order from bottom up, while Chapter 60 describes

the imposition of the order from top down. I propose to understand them

as interrelated. That is, the Laozi suggests a kind of interaction

between the ruler and the ruled. It means that the ruler acts on the

people, but the people can also act on the ruler, and the actions of the

ruler can be determined by the people. Thus, it seems that the Laozi

proposes a kind of top-bottom interaction. People’s natural and simple

character influences the will of the ruler, and the ruler’s actions

enable the people to maintain their natural simple character. I would

agree with Alex Feldt (2010) who similarly states that ‘it is

conceptually unproblematic to view the ruler (the one with the ability

to coerce) and the ruled (one who is coerced) as mutually determining

one another’ (p. 329). So, I will argue that the Laozi breaks up with

the one-way expansion of the political order and allows for relationship

of bottom-up mutual function. If we accept the above, than the political

philosophy of the Laozi does not entirely satisfy the second and third

conditions.

Lastly, although according to Ames the Laozi and the Zhuangzi espouse

definite anarchist sentiments, he denies them the apparatus for

achieving widespread practical implementation. Only Huainanzi’s ‘The Art

of Rulership’ can contribute with a concrete political theory of

anarchist type that can be applied at a practical, social, and political

level (pp. 42–43). Hence, it is not necessary to talk anymore because

the author himself believes that the political philosophy of the Laozi

does not satisfy the fourth condition.

According to David Hall (1983), anarchism lacks cosmological theory

because it believes that ‘the received versions of cosmological theory

in our tradition are little more than disguised ideologies, having their

origins in precisely those authoritarian impulses which give rise to

traditional forms of government and the state’ (p. 49). Thus, according

to this view, it is necessary that we find a novel, ideologically

untainted, categorial ground for anarchism to be able to articulate its

main concepts. The only non-ideological metaphysical speculation,

according to Hall, can be found in Daoism, so he concludes that

political Daoism is the only true form of anarchism and speculative

Daoism is the only pure form of metaphysics (p. 50). Hall’s purpose is

to show how Daoist metaphysics suits anarchist political thought. As he

says, any pure anarchist theory has five criteria and certain

fundamental Daoist notions can be understood in terms of these criteria

(p. 56). The five criteria are as following: (1) the totality is without

a ‘beginning’; (2) the totality is a ‘many’; (3) ontological parity; (4)

the denial of principles as transcendent determining sources of order;

(5) creativity as self-creative action (pp. 56–60). In the discussion

how Daoist thought satisfies these criteria, Hall mostly relies on

Zhuangzi’s and Guoxiang’s transformation of Daoist thought, but among it

we can distinguish three points relevant to the Laozi.

First, Hall claims, the cosmogonical explanation, ‘Being and nonbeing

produce each other’ (Ch. 2), qualifies the understanding of ‘All things

in the world come from being and being comes from nonbeing’ (Ch. 40).

From here, he immediately goes to Zhuangzi and explains that Dao is That

Which is and is-not. Thus, as That Which is, Dao is nameable, and as

That Which is-not, Dao is nameless. Both nameless and nameable are

abstractions from Dao as the pure process of becoming. There is no

single creative act and creativity is defined as a thing becoming itself

by moving from non-being to being, from indeterminacy to determinacy (p.

56). According to Hall, this kind of world view is close to anarchism.

But, if the statement in Chapter 2 qualifies the understanding of the

statement in Chapter 40, then how are we supposed to understand the

words ‘beginning’ or ‘origin’ and ‘mother’ in the following statements:

Or how should we understand the statement that the Dao is ‘the ancestor

of all things’? (Ch. 4) The beginning, the mother, and the ancestor off

course denote neither creator nor creation in time, but at least

indicate logical priority, or a kind of central hierarchical system

expanding from top down. Hence, according to my understanding, the

explanation Hall offers does not necessarily show that the political

philosophy of the Laozi contains anarchist sentiments.

Next, Hall points out that in Daoist philosophy there is no transcendent

principle; the Dao is immanent and expressed through the De of things

(p. 58). If we apply this statement to the metaphysics of the Laozi we

can see that it is an oversimplification. The Dao in the Laozi is

understood as both transcendent and immanent at the same time, thus if

we say that the Dao is immanent, that does not mean that at the same

time it is not transcendent. According to one of the first commentators

on the Laozi, Hanfeizi, Dao is principle, so Dao determines all things,

that is, all things follow the principle that comes from the Dao, hence

Hanfeizi says that everything’s ‘life and death depend on the endowment

of material force by Tao. Countless wisdom depends on it for

consideration. And the rise and fall of all things are because of it’

(Chan, 1963, pp. 260–261). If we accept Hanfeizi’s explanation, then the

Laozi recognizes a transcendent principle which at the same time is

immanent. Moreover, the sage in the Laozi says:

James Legge’s (1962) translation of this passage goes straight to the

point:

Thus, it is obvious that the sage in his or her deeds follows a higher

principle which is the source and origin of heaven, earth and all

things—that is, the Dao itself. Thus the ruler of the Laozi takes the

higher and transcendent principle and transforms it into his or her own

immanent principle.

Lastly, Hall claims that the so-called wu-forms of social

interaction—wuzhi (unprincipled knowing), wuwei (non-assertive action),

and wuyu (objectless desire)—can eliminate the differentiation between

rulers and ruled (p. 59). Hence, wuzhi is knowledge of the De of things

and does not permit the imposition of principles or forms of

organization; wuwei is action in accordance with the nature of things;

and wuyu is objectless desire that permits enjoyment without attachment.

Therefore, Hall concludes: ‘It is at the level of the wu-forms of social

interaction that Taoism expresses its character as social anarchism’ (p.

60). Now wuwei is the main concept of the political philosophy of the

Laozi, so it is the ruler’s basic principle of action, and it is not

something that is demanded from the ordinary people (Liu, 1997, p. 40).

Hence, we can say that wuzhi and wuyu are things that are demanded from

the people, as it is stated in the Laozi:

The conclusion from this is that, according to the Laozi, wuwei means

the expansion of order from top down and people’s wuzhi and wuyu are

result of the wuwei conduct of the ruler. Thus, the wu-forms of the

Laozi do not actually express a character of social anarchism.

John Clark (1983) believes that the Laozi is ‘one of the great anarchist

classics’ and claims that ‘no important philosophical work of either

East or West has ever been so thoroughly pervaded by the anarchistic

spirit’ so that none of the Western major anarchists ‘has been nearly as

consistent in drawing out the implications of the anarchist

perspective’. The reasons are because the Laozi ‘deals with all the

dimensions of domination’ and ‘subjects them to thoroughgoing criticism’

(p. 65). Another point, according to Clark, is that essential to this

critique of domination is the positive view that underlies it. As

significance to this negation of domination is ‘a vision of the self,

society and nature that can give direction to the project of social

transformation: in short, there must be a coherent metaphysics of

anarchism’ (p. 66). Actually, Clark puts aside classical anarchism and

stresses that the political philosophy of the Laozi is in accord with

the more recent organicist anarchism (p. 67). In order to support this

standpoint, he first shows that the ultimate reality of the Laozi, the

Dao, is organic, that is, a unity-in-diversity, and that it is the ideal

course of development inherent in all things.

At this organicist interpretation of the political philosophy of the

Laozi, Clark believes that this kind of organicism eliminates all

coercive and authoritative forms of governing, that is, this

unity-in-diversity means that there is no coercive authority, and thus

on the political level gives rise to anarchist sentiments. However,

whether the organicist worldview brings to anarchist conclusions is a

big question. I will agree with Feldt who points out that ‘this does not

necessarily generate a noncoercive relationship between ruler and ruled.

That the ruler and ruled are understood as mutually determining and

defining is not inconsistent with coercion. Mutual determination may

well include coercion’ (p. 329). If one system is harmonious, unified,

it means that there is no conflict between the parts of the system, that

is, as Clarks notes, ‘each being strives only to reach its own natural

perfection, and refrains from seeking to dominate others’ (p. 71).

Although there is no intention of ruling among things, it does not mean

that there is no higher ruler that controls this situation. But Clark

believes that, for the Laozi, attempts to control lead to disorder and

says: ‘Spontaneity and order are not opposites, but rather are

identical. If each being is permitted to follow its Tao, the needs of

all will be fulfilled without coercion and domination’ (pp. 71–72).

Nevertheless, a concept such as Dao that is inherent in the organicist

system and is in charge of the order, is still not contrary to

coerciveness, and can involve coerciveness. As Feldt again says:

‘Coercion can only be understood through a two-place relation. In its

simplest form, it is the power of one entity to force some specific

action from another entity’ (p. 329). Hence, although Dao is inherent in

things, the two-place relation, that is, the imposition of order form

top down in the organicist system is not necessarily eliminated.

According to Clark, the political message of the Laozi is that the

government is the source of disorder (p. 81). In support he quotes from

Chapter 75:

Other examples of the banishment of government can be seen, says Clark,

in Chapters 57 and 58, so ‘every expansion of political control for the

sake of maintaining order has only further destroyed the organic

structure of society, thus advancing social disintegration and producing

more deeply rooted disorder’ (p. 82). But Chapter 75 does not oppose

government as such, it only opposes government’s use of youwei; and the

other two chapters also do not oppose government as such: Chapter 57

explains which kind of government’s actions will bring to disorder, and

Chapter 58 points out which kind of government’s attitude will make

people unhappy, that is, lose their natural simplistic character. Thus,

the Laozi does not oppose government itself, but only the government

which is not in accord with the standard of the Dao (Hsiao, 1979, p.

299). Or, as Ames puts it, an important difference between Daoist

political thought and Western anarchist theory is that Daoism ‘does not

reject the state as an artificial structure, but rather sees the state

as a natural institution, analogous perhaps to the family’ (p. 35). In

sum, the statement that the governments are the source of disorder

should be qualified with the statement that all existing governments are

the source of disorder, and the reason why they are the source of

disorder is not because they are governments but because they use youwei

to govern. Hence, the Laozi does not reject government as such, but only

the government with youwei consciousness.

Clark also points out that authority in primitive society differs

radically from that of political society, that is, the ‘chief’ is

actually not a political ruler but a primarily ritual figure with

carefully delineated, non-coercive functions dealing with specific areas

of group life (p. 82). Clark carefully notes that to say that such

societies have existed is certainly not to say that they fully embody

the anti-authoritarian ideal of anarchism. But Daoism suggests

non-coercive authority, and this authority is even closer to the

anarchist ideal than that of the tribal chief or elder. This is because,

as Clark explains, these figures often have no personal power and serve

as vehicles through whom the restrictive force of tradition is

transmitted. The Daoist ruler, on the other hand, ‘imposes nothing on

others, and refuses to legitimate his or her authority through the

external supports of either law or tradition’ (p. 83). According to this

view, the ruler of the Laozi is not a typical ruler but a model or

example of personal development. However, although the ruler of the

Laozi does not transmit the restrictive force of tradition, in fact,

what the ruler rather transmits is a tradition of another kind of

authority, that is, the tradition of the authority that comes from the

natural and simplistic force of the Dao. In other words, the political

authority of the ruler of the Laozi does not follow any acts of coercive

law but still follows or models on the principles that come from the

Dao. As the Laozi says:

Thus, the ruler has to model after the naturalness, the spontaneous law

that comes from the Dao.

The insistence on identifying the political philosophy of the Laozi as

an anarchist theory continues until the very present moment. According

to John Rapp (1998), since Daoism advocates for rulers to use wuwei,

which for him is to do nothing, it is obvious that Daoism is an

anarchist theory similar to Western anarchism. The main support of this

view is that wuwei is seen as non-action or as absolutely negative

concept, so it is easy to mistakenly conclude that the Laozi recommends

an ideal with no ruler at all. Ames and Hall have continued to stress

the anarchist interpretation of the political philosophy of the Laozi

(Ames, 1994, p. 41; Ames & Hall, 2003, pp. 102–103, 166), as if it was

an unquestionable fact, but they have also noticed that the Laozi

‘assumes the need for a hierarchical political structure, with rulers

above and the common people below’ (2003, p. 102). The fact just

mentioned may cause difficulties to those who believe that the political

philosophy of the Laozi is an anarchist theory. Ames and Hall have made

an attempt to overcome this difficulty by commenting on Chapter 57 in

which, according to them, we can see the rejection of ‘a top-down and

impositional attitude toward governing’, and the acceptance of ‘a

bottom-up and emergent approach in which the people themselves define

the terms of order’ (p. 166). However, I would like to remind the reader

that although the Laozi recommends expansion of the order from bottom

up, it also appears to accept hierarchical political structure, and this

structure only means imposition of the order from top down. Hence,

according to the Laozi, the top and the bottom are in a relation of

mutual interaction, and this is not the anarchist ideal.

In the above, I have presented and tried to object the most detailed

arguments of the anarchist interpretation of the political philosophy of

the Laozi. In the following I will give a positive account of the

political philosophy of the book and argue for the non-anarchist

interpretation.

Non-Anarchist Interpretation of the Political Philosophy of the

Laozi

Although we may say that today the anarchist interpretation of the Laozi

prevails, that is, it is undoubtedly believed that the Laozi is a work

on anarchism, there are still some who believe the opposite. We can see

that as early as in the mid-twentieth century, Xiao Gongquan (Hsiao,

1979) refutes the anarchist interpretation and states that the political

philosophy of inaction of the Laozi bears some resemblance to the

European laissez faire doctrine, but in the last analysis it differs

from anarchism. This is because ‘what Lao Tzu attacked was not

government in and of itself, but was any kind of government which did

not conform to “Taoistic” standards’ (p. 299), that is, the standards of

the Dao and its spontaneous workings, or De. Xiao finds a strong

metaphysical support to his statement; Dao produces things and De

nurtures them, in governing the sage-ruler follows the operation of Dao

and De. In order to prove his point he quotes from the Laozi:

We can see that in governing the sage uses the order expanded from the

Dao—a kind of top-down imposed order of a centralized government.

It is interesting that Schwartz was one of the commentators at the

above-mentioned symposium, and it is in light of his and others’

suggestions that the papers were revised and published, but he was still

not convinced by the arguments of these authors. Just few years after

the symposium, he writes:

In the text of the Lao-tzu, we find the universal kingship (wang)

mentioned as one of the four fundamental components of the cosmos—the

tao, heaven, earth, and the kingship…. Lao-tzu, indeed, offers his

advice not only to potential ‘universal kings’ but even to the princes

of states of his own time…. Humankind may possibly be returned to the

unreflective, innocent state of nature, but people are not, it would

appear, themselves capable of achieving the higher gnosis of the sage.

It is the Taoist sage who is alone able to put an end to the artificial

projects of civilization and make it possible for the majority of men to

return to a state of wu-wei. (1985, p. 211)

We can see from this that in the political structure that the Laozi

recommends the hierarchical role of the ruler cannot be neglected; the

people indeed are themselves incapable of achieving the higher state of

consciousness, but need the guidance of the sage ruler.

Going back to the above-mentioned symposium, Frederick Bender (1983)

looks for the differences between Daoist thought and anarchism in order

to claim that Daoism is not entirely an anarchist theory. According to

him, in Chapter 18 of the Laozi we can see that ‘disorder in human

affairs is attributed to the “casting aside” of the eternal Tao, the

destruction of the natural order. There thus arises the need for an

artificial order in human affairs, an “order” which is truly a

dis-order’ (pp. 8–9). Under such conditions egoistic selfhood thrives,

so the Daoist solution is the ruler’s cultivation of the self, that is,

the transformation of ruler’s self into a realized, non-egoistic self

which ‘will be the necessary and sufficient condition for corresponding

transformations of his subject’s selves and thereby the restoration of

harmonious social order’ (p. 9). The Laozi says:

Thus, according to Bender, it is the transformation of the self, at

least at the level of the ruler, which is the starting point of the

Daoist political philosophy. This is not the case with Western anarchist

theories because they lack a clearly worked out and articulated

conception of self (p. 10). It seems that Bender wants to point out that

although Western anarchism wants to banish the coercive ruler, it still

accepts the conception of the egoistic self, whereas Daoism accepts the

conception of non-egoistic self of the ruler and the people. But here we

need to clarify Bender’s claim: the Laozi accepts the conception of

egoistic self that comes from the spontaneous function of the Dao, that

is, the natural desires; what it rejects is the egoistic self that

emerges from the unnatural selfish desires.

According to Bender, the fact that Daoism accepts the existence of the

ruler indicates an important difference with anarchism. He says: ‘While

Taoism has the conception of an ideal, naturally harmonious society, its

acceptance of the continued existence of a ruler as the locus of

political change is hardly anarchistic in the Western sense, since it

retains, albeit in improved form, ruler, rule, and the means of rule;

the state’ (p. 12). Therefore, for the Laozi the ruler is a legitimate

institution of authority, whereas for anarchism all forms of ruling are

illegitimate. The Laozi makes clear distinction between the correct and

incorrect action, or the correct or incorrect grounds for action, while

for anarchism there can be no correct or legitimate authority (pp.

12–13). Thus, while the Laozi ‘recognizes the wrong of imposing

illegitimate authority, it also recognizes as legitimate the authority

of action, or better “non-action” [wuwei], in accordance with the Way

[Dao]’ (p. 13). In so far as Daoism banishes illegitimate exercise of

authority as counter to Dao and harmful to the people, Bender concludes,

it approaches anarchism, but since it does not regard rulership as such

as evil, it is not strictly anarchistic (p. 15).

What Bender wants to point out is that the ruler follows the Dao in

governing, that is, has a non-egoistic self, so the rulership of the

Daoist ruler lacks the coerciveness anarchism attempts to reject, but

just because there is the institution of the ruler, Daoist thought, and

the political philosophy of the Laozi, is not strictly speaking an

anarchist theory. This view may need additional argumentation, because,

as stated above, the anarchist theory does not necessarily want to

eliminate the government and the state, it just wants to eliminate the

coerciveness of the central political authority. In order to reinforce

Bender’s discussion, we have to say that the political philosophy of the

Laozi does not only recognize the existence of the ruler and the state

but also recognizes the central and hierarchical political authority

which is the point in which it disagrees with Western anarchism.

Alex Feldt (2010) has given so far the most thoroughgoing objections to

the anarchist interpretation of the Laozi offering a positive account of

the political philosophy of the Laozi (including the concept of wuwei).

According to him, if the political philosophy of the Laozi is an

anarchist theory, at the most it is a diluted anarchism. He offers three

theoretical reasons for skepticism: (1) the fact that the Laozi is

clearly a political treatise addressed to the ruler and providing him

with a philosophy of governance; (2) the Chinese conception of

personhood, which creates a problem for traditional anarchist arguments

that utilize a notion of the atomistic individual; and (3) the fact that

the skepticism of the Laozi is aimed at a different target than that of

anarchism (p. 327).

Today there is a common view among the scholars that the Laozi is a work

on the art of government. Among the first who pointed out this view is

D. C. Lau (1963, pp. xxviii–xxix), and so far the tendency grows toward

wide acceptance of it. Thus, even those who argue for the anarchist

interpretation would agree to it, such as Ames (1994) who says that the

Laozi ‘is primarily a political treatise directed at the ruler already

in power’ (p. 38). This kind of statements may often counter the

metaphysical thought of the Laozi, that is, they clearly state that the

main purpose of the text is to develop specific political thought and

concrete advice to the ruler. Thus, Chad Hansen (1992) points out: ‘If

the central doctrine is mystical metaphysics, what is all this political

advice doing?’ (p. 222). There are also similar views in the Chinese

literature, such as the one of He (1988), who at the beginning of his

book says: ‘Laozi is a person who has a political ideal, his Daode Jing

is written exactly for the purpose of delivering his political view and

theory’ (p. 1). This kind of understanding made Bender believe that by

means of the fact that there is a ruler can be shown that the Laozi is

not an anarchist work.[4] According to Feldt, if we accept that the

purpose of the text is to deliver its art of government, it still does

not decisively reject the anarchist conclusion, but it ought to arouse

our skepticism. ‘The Laozi does not merely appear to accept the

existence of a legitimate state; it accepts a state that is hierarchical

and autocratic in nature. Hence the Laozi accepts the very thing

rejected by anarchists: a centralized political authority’ (p. 329).

Next, Feldt discusses the different views on the person by Daoist

philosophy and anarchism. We already saw that Ames talked about this,

and Feldt accepts his argument but offers another interpretation. The

main point is that anarchism sees the person as autonomous, discrete,

and atomistic, and there is a tension between individual liberty and the

collective will, but in Daoism there is no such tension because Daoism

sees the person as interdependent and contextualized. Nevertheless,

according to Feldt, in this interdependent relationship of the people

there is still the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, and the

ruling entails that there is someone who forces people to act and this

ability to force people to act is nothing but coercive force. The

ruler–ruled relationship would not exist without the ability to coerce

and force action. This is not to say that the ruler will always be

actively engaged in forcing the ruled to act, it simply means that

mechanisms must be in place to allow the ruler to exercise his or her

power. Thus, Feldt concludes: ‘Once we grant that the Laozi accepts the

existence of a legitimate ruler of the state and the Daoist conception

of the person as interdependent, the text must allow for some coercive

institutional element’ (p. 330). Otherwise, the mutually determining

relationship between the ruler and the ruled would not make much sense,

so, according to Feldt, the existence of this coercion makes the

political philosophy of the Laozi different from anarchism.

Lastly, and the most important, Feldt points out that the skepticism in

the Laozi takes a very different target than the skepticism of

anarchism. Anarchism’s skepticism is directed solely toward political

authority, while the skepticism of the Laozi is focused solely on social

norms and culture, particularly Confucian social norms. We can see this

skepticism in Chapters 18 and 19. Apart from the skepticism of Confucian

norms these passages do not mention any other target and avoid saying

something anarchistic. For Feldt, the only place the skepticism of the

text enters into the political realm is in Chapter 17 where it says that

the Confucian ruler is the one whom the people ‘love and praise’ but is

not the worst; the Confucian ruler is just less desirable that the

Daoist ruler. So the conclusion is that ‘there is no rejection or

skepticism of the ruler or political authority generally, only a

skepticism and disagreement about the worth of certain types of rulers’

(p. 331). It appears that the skepticism of the Laozi is directed toward

different target than that of anarchism.

In sum, we can conclude that the political philosophy of the Laozi does

not entirely conform to the principles of Western anarchism. In Chapter

17 of the Laozi we can see the recognition of the central political

authority and hierarchical system. The beginning and ending of this

Chapter are of great importance:

The people think there is no ruler, there is no order imposed from

above, but this feeling of theirs is because the ruler uses wuwei in

governing and does not interfere with people’s natural and simplistic

character. As can also be seen from Chapter 28, there is a need of a

leading official in the system imagined by the Laozi, that is, there is

a need of an institution of leadership. This kind of structure of the

society is not an anarchist ideal.

At the end, I will add that there are two important differences between

the political philosophy of the Laozi and anarchism. First, the

philosophy of the Laozi works out a metaphysical thought, especially

ontology, whereas anarchism lacks discussion on ontology. This is the

main theoretical difference and can be a starting point in opposing the

anarchist interpretation of the political philosophy of the Laozi.

Metaphysics is the basis to the political philosophy of the Laozi, while

anarchism, apart from its discussion on human nature, cannot ground its

political theory on a deeper metaphysical or ontological basis. In other

words, anarchism starts directly from its conception of the person and

grounds its political theory on the right of individual freedom, thus

not being able to find out deeper metaphysical or ontological grounds to

this right of freedom.[5] Due to this important difference, the

political philosophy of the Laozi and anarchism developed differing

views on the ruler and individual freedom, which is already discussed

above.

Second, as is known, the main concept of the political philosophy of the

Laozi is wuwei, and just because wuwei can be mistakenly understood as

‘no action’ at all, the political philosophy of the Laozi can also be

seen as an anarchist theory. But, I have argued above that wuwei has a

positive role which does not entirely satisfy the principles of

anarchism. This is because wuwei is also a kind of action, that is, the

governing through wuwei (wuwei er zhi) does not demand from the ruler to

do nothing, but to govern in accordance to the natural law that comes

from the Dao. Thus, the governing through wuwei means governing

according to the standard of the Dao. Furthermore, wuwei is deeply

rooted in the metaphysical thought of the Laozi, so although we say it

is a political concept it also has metaphysical implications, that is,

it is an implementation into life and politics of the self-so (ziran) of

the Dao. Therefore, to emphasize again, the main characteristic of wuwei

is opposition to youwei, hence the governing through wuwei opposes the

governing through youwei. Wuwei is a unique and peculiar concept of the

philosophy of the Laozi and Daoism in general whereas the other schools

of thought lack this kind of understanding of wuwei. To get to the

point, Western political philosophy completely lacks the concept of

wuwei and anarchism is no exception.[6] This is the main principal

difference between the political philosophy of the Laozi, including

Daoism in general, and Western anarchism. A Daoist familiar with the

views of the anarchists might agree that in some aspects they probably

approach Daoist political philosophy, but the Daoist will immediately

comment that they still float in the youwei consciousness. Hence, to say

that the Laozi expounds a thoroughgoing anarchism, similar to Western

anarchism, would mean to accuse the author of the book of accepting the

very thing he tries to reject—the governing through youwei.

Conclusion

In the above, I have discussed and tried to refute the anarchist

interpretation of the political philosophy of the Laozi and have offered

an acceptable non-anarchist interpretation of it. Things are not simple

from the very beginning because anarchism itself manifests in many forms

so that we have to construct a broader idea of it, that is, we have to

consider it in a broader context. Actually, this situation gives the

possibility of anarchist interpretation of the Laozi.

The Laozi can undergo multiple readings so if the anarchist reading is

possible the non-anarchist reading is equally possible and this is not

only because the text allows these possibilities but also because

anarchism itself allows them. Things are really delicate and if the

interpretations are consistent with the text, then we can say that both

anarchist and non-anarchist interpretations are right, or at least,

acceptable. I believe that the non-anarchist interpretation I have

argued for above conforms to the context of the book. We saw that others

also believe in the acceptable non-anarchist interpretation, and among

them Feldt sets the limits to how far can the anarchist interpretation

go and claims that if the Laozi propounds an anarchist theory, the most

we can say is that it is a form of diluted anarchism. We do not know

what the future development of anarchism will be, but due to the

appearance of the recent organicist anarchism we can only anticipate

that some future types of anarchism can very easily remind us on the

political philosophy of the Laozi. However, we live in a world in which

we can fast and easily exchange information and knowledge, so if such a

type of anarchism appears it would seem almost impossible that it is not

widely informed by Eastern, Chinese, or Daoist philosophy in particular.

If there is a strong insistence to accept the anarchist interpretation,

the most we can say is that the political philosophy of the Laozi is a

peculiar anarchist theory that does not entirely conform to the

principles of Western anarchism, but the least we can say is that there

are theoretical and principal differences between the political

philosophy of the Laozi and Western anarchism.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my special gratitude to my former supervisor at

the National Central University in Taiwan, Prof. Jenn-Bang Shiau, for

his useful comments and suggestions.

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[1] According to Robert Nozick (1974), anarchy can exist for a limited

time before the minimal state emerges.

[2] One thing is possible: even if we agree that the Zhuangzi and the

Huainanzi, and even Neo-Daoist thought developed one or another kind of

anarchist theory—similar to Western anarchism—not necessarily will

include the Laozi, because although the Zhuangzi, the Huainanzi, and

Neo-Daoism are greatly inspired by the Laozi, the philosophies they have

developed are their own, different from the philosophy of the Laozi. The

other way around, if we offer a non-anarchist interpretation of the

Laozi, it will not necessarily include the later developments of Daoist

philosophy.

[3] All quotations from the Laozi are from Chan (1963, pp. 139–176).

[4] Jonh Clark (1983), however, is an exception. According to him,

‘applying “understanding of Tao” to government means not governing.

Attempts to interpret the Lao Tzu as a manual of strategy in the “art of

governing” inevitably fail’ (p. 84). But this is a misunderstanding of

the context of the political spirit of the text. According to the

political philosophy of the Laozi, applying understanding of Dao to

government means to govern with wuwei.

[5] Maybe an exception is the so-called organicist anarchism, because it

finds the grounds of individual freedom in a system of interrelatedness,

which would seem to go beyond the atomistic view on the person, and

believes that the world is a harmony in diversity so that the person can

only be understood through this harmony. Anyhow, in the above I have

already showed the differences of this kind of anarchism with the

political philosophy of the Laozi, and moreover, the organicist view is

not a representative of the anarchist view of the person, so there is no

ground to claim that, in general, the metaphysical thought of the Laozi

approaches the anarchist metaphysical thought.

[6] That Western political philosophies lack the concept of wuwei is a

point also stressed by others, such as, Huang Yong. (Feldt, 2010, p.

336, f).