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Title: Beyond primacy
Author: Alan Carter
Date: 2010
Language: en
Topics: Marxism, Green, Green Anarchism
Source: *Environmental Politics*, Volume 19, 2010 — Issue 6. DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2010.518683

Alan Carter

Beyond primacy

Abstract

The most sophisticated philosophical defence of Marx’s theory of

history– G.A. Cohen’s—deploys functional explanations in a manner that

accords explanatory primacy to technological development. In contrast,

an anarchist theory can be developed that accords explanatory primacy to

the state. It is, however, possible to develop a theory of history that

accords explanatory primacy neither to the development of technology nor

to the state but which nevertheless possesses the explanatory powerof

both the Marxist and the anarchist theories. Such a theory can also

provide the foundations for a radical environmentalist political theory.

Introduction

Environmentalists can be found right across the political spectrum (see

Dryzek 1997). Not surprisingly, the most politically radical

environmentalists have tended to adhere to some form of either

eco-Marxism (for example, O’Connor 1998) or eco-anarchism (for example,

Bookchin 1982). Here, I explore both Marxist and anarchist theory as a

prelude to providing a glimpse of a genuine, radical environmentalist

theory. I begin by outlining G.A. Cohen’s defence of Karl Marx’s theory

of history. I then indicate how an anarchist theory can be developed

that builds upon elements drawn from Cohen’s defence of Marx, while

nevertheless standing in contraposition to Cohen’s theory. I then show

how elements of both these approaches can be combined within a theory

that transcends both Marxist and anarchist theories. Finally, I show how

such a general theory can provide the basis for an environmentalist

political theory with truly radical implications.

Marxism and technological primacy

In numerous places, Marx appears to subscribe to a form of technological

determinism (for example, Marx 2000b, pp. 209–211, Marx, 2000k, p. 281,

Marx and Engels 2000a, pp. 177–178, and, especially, Marx 2000d, p.

425), which is, perhaps, most succinctly expressed in his dictum that

‘[t]he hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill

society with the industrial capitalist’ (Marx 2000h, pp. 219–220). In a

nutshell, Marx appears to hold that the development of the forces of

production—principally the technology that is employed in the production

of a society’s means of subsistence, along with the labour-power that is

required to operate that technology—explains the relations of production

that obtain within a society, and he further appears to hold that the

relations of production explain (what he calls) the ‘superstructure’ of

legal and political relations that also obtain within a society.

Elsewhere, however, Marx seems to hold that competition between

capitalists forces them to introduce new technologies (for example, Marx

and Engels 2000b, p. 248). In which case, the relations of production

that obtain within a society would appear to be what explains the

development of its forces of production, and this seems, prima facie at

least, to contradict technological determinism.

Can this seeming contradiction be avoided? G.A. Cohen has argued that it

can, so long as one invokes functional explanations (Cohen 1978).[1] For

the claim that the development of the forces of production possesses

explanatory primacy with respect to the nature of the relations of

production can be reconciled with the claim that the relations of

production exert a causal influence on the development of the forces of

production by arguing that the development of the forces of production

in a given society ‘selects’ relations of production within that society

that are functional for developing its forces of production. Here, the

development of the forces of production enjoys explanatory primacy

(because it is the development of the forces of production that does the

‘selecting’), while the causal influence of the relations of production

on the development of the forces of production is not merely

acknowledged but is actively employed within this particular form of

explanation; for it is precisely because of their effect on the

development of the forces of production that the latter selects those

particular relations of production. And when different relations of

production would be more functional for the development of the

productive forces, those new relations come to be selected. Thus, on

Cohen’s account, revolutionary transformations of society occur when the

relations of production become, in some sense, dysfunctional for the

further development of the forces of production (see Carter 1998).

Moreover, Cohen views the relationship between the relations of

production and the superstructure of legal and political

institutions—principally the state—also as best construed in terms of a

functional explanation. On Cohen’s account, relations of production

‘select’ a superstructure of legal and political institutions that is

suited to stabilising those relations of production. In short, the

superstructure of legal and political institutions is ‘selected’ because

it is functional for the relations of production. Thus, in a

structurally similar manner to his account of the relationship between

the forces and relations of production, Cohen argues that the relations

of production ‘select’ a superstructure of legal and political

institutions because of the latter’s effect on those relations of

production. And a revolution that brings in new relations of production,

because the old ones have become dysfunctional for the development of

the forces of production, will involve overthrowing the prevailing

superstructure of legal and political institutions, for that

superstructure is especially suited to preserving the old relations of

production.

Cohen’s defence of Marx’s theory of history is thus grounded on a

bi-directional theoretical model. The bottom level of the model, as it

were, explains the level above it, which in turn affects the level below

it. To be precise, the development of the forces of production (the

development of the economic forces, in other words) explains the

relations of production (the economic relations), and the relations of

production affect the development of the forces of production. (For

example, because capitalist economic relations develop the productive

forces faster than do feudal economic relations, the former came to

replace the latter.) Moreover, the middle level of the model, as it

were, explains the top level, which in turn affects the level below it.

To be precise, the relations of production explain the superstructure of

legal and political institutions (which are, clearly, political

relations), and the superstructure affects the relations of production.

(For example, feudal economic relations supposedly select an absolute

monarchy, which is conducive to stabilising feudal economic relations;

while ‘bourgeois’ economic relations supposedly select a modern

representative state, which is, ostensibly, especially conducive to

stabilising bourgeois economic relations.) But crucially, this is not

simply a bi-directional model. It is what we might think of as a

weighted one, for one direction of explanation possesses explanatory

primacy: the upward direction of explanation is, as it were, primary,

while the downward direction of explanation is, as it were, secondary (

Figure 1).

[Figure 1. Cohen’s technological-primacy model.]

The theoretical dispute between Marx and Bakunin

One obvious problem with a weighted bi-directional model is that it may

get the weighting the wrong way round. Perhaps what the model takes to

be primary is actually secondary, and what it takes to be secondary is,

in actual fact, primary. Indeed, it could be argued that this is what

lies behind the opposition between Marxist and anarchist theories of the

relationship between the state and the economic structure of society.

For consider how Frederick Engels (1989, pp. 306–307) characterises the

dispute between Marx and his major anarchist opponent, Mikhail Bakunin:

While the great mass of the Social Democratic workers hold our view that

state power is nothing more than the organization with which the ruling

classes—landowners and capitalists—have provided themselves in order to

protect their social privileges, Bakunin maintains that the state has

created capital, that the capitalist has his capital only by the grace

of the state. And since the state is the chief evil, the state above all

must be abolished; then capital will go to hell of itself. We, on the

contrary, say: abolish capital, the appropriation of all the means of

production by the few, and the state will fall of itself. The difference

is an essential one … [2]

Crucially, Marx’s theoretical approach generates a significant political

implication: if one correctly sorts out the economic structure of

society, then political problems will disappear. For, according to Marx,

political power is class power (see Marx and Engels 2000b, p. 262).

Hence, political power must disappear when classes disappear. So it is

not surprising that he should insist that ‘the economical subjection of

the man of labour to the monopolizer of the means of labour, that is,

the sources of life, lies at the bottom of servitude in all its forms,

of all social misery, mental degradation, and political dependence … ’

(Marx 1974, p. 82). Thus Marx concludes that all major social and

political problems will vanish once economic subjection has been removed

by means of a revolution.

But it is precisely this conclusion that anarchists have traditionally

rejected. In Bakunin’s view, for example, centralised, authoritarian

revolutionary means will inevitably lead to a centralised, authoritarian

post-revolutionary state, which is surely not implausible if the chosen

revolutionary means include the creation of coercive political

structures that will, on the morrow of the revolution, remain in place.

Hence, as Engels acknowledges, Bakunin’s fear that authoritarian

revolutionary means will produce an authoritarian, post-revolutionary

outcome has significant implications for his views regarding the

organisation of the International Workingmen’s Association: in short,

because ‘the International … was not formed for political struggle but

in order that it might at once replace the old machinery of the state

when social liquidation occurs, it follows that it must come as near as

possible to the Bakuninist ideal of future society’ (Engels 1989, p.

307).

Moreover, Bakunin (1973, pp. 281–282) appears to agree that his dispute

with Marx is roughly as Engels depicts it:

To support his programme for the conquest of political power, Marx has a

very special theory, which is but the logical consequence of [his] whole

system. He holds that the political condition of each country is always

the product and the faithful expression of its economic situation; to

change the former it is necessary only to transform the latter. Therein

lies the whole secret of historical evolution according to Marx. He

takes no account of other factors in history, such as theever-present

reaction of political, juridical, and religious institutions on the

economic situation. He says: ‘Poverty produces political slavery, the

State.’ But hedoes not allow this expression to be turned around, to

say: ‘Political slavery, the State, reproduces in its turn, and

maintains poverty as a condition for its own existence; so that to

destroy poverty, it is necessary to destroy the State!’ And strangely

enough, Marx, who forbids his disciples to consider political slavery,

the State, as a real cause of poverty, commands his disciples in the

Social Democratic party to consider the conquest of political power as

the absolutely necessary preliminary condition for economic

emancipation.

Bakunin is certainly unfair in caricaturing Marx as taking no account of

political effects on the economic sphere; but this notwithstanding, it

seems uncontroversial that Marx lays the greater explanatory weight on

the economic, while Bakunin lays it on the political.

In summary, then, because Marx assumes that political power is premised

upon inegalitarian relations of production, he concludes that political

power will disappear once the appropriate relations of production are

introduced. Consequently, because of Marx’s theory regarding the

relationship of the state to the economic structure of society, Marx

simply dismisses Bakunin’s fears regarding political centralisation

within the International. Moreover, Cohen’s weighted bi-directional

model is wholly consistent with the assumption shared by both Marx and

Engels that political power will disappear in communism. For while

inegalitarian economic relations, which manifest class conflict, seem to

require a coercive state apparatus to stabilise them, non-conflictual

egalitarian economic relations might be thought to lack any such

requirement. Thus, it might be presumed, no coercive state will be

selected by egalitarian economic relations.

A weakness in Marx’s theory of the state

But there are grounds for thinking that there is a fundamental flaw in

Marx’s assumption that the state will necessarily vanish in a communist

society. From some of his earliest writings onwards (see, especially,

Marx 2000a,c), Marx locates the explanation of the state in divisions

within civil society. Rights to private property split civil society

into discrete persons who, in becoming economically individualised, seem

to require a state above them to secure the public interest. But once

the state sees to the public interest, individuals within civil society

are free to pursue their own private interests, within the bounds of the

law legislated and enforced by the state, without regard for other

persons—thus strengthening the need for a state above them to secure the

public interest. The result is a re-enforcing spiral whereby

individualism and egoism at the level of civil society require a seeming

community at the level of the state, which, in turn, exacerbates that

individualism and egoism at the level of civil society (see ‘Thesis IV’

in Marx 2000i, p. 172; also see Marx 2000c, p. 53 and Marx 2000j, pp.

71–72).[3]

Later, Marx focuses in particular on the fact that some—the

bourgeoisie—own the means of production while others—the proletariat—own

only their ability to labour. Thus property rights divide society into

two major classes (see Marx and Engels 2000b, pp. 246–255), who stand

opposed to each other because of their conflicting interests as a result

of their differential ownership. This particular fracturing of society

along class lines is then taken by Marx to be the explanation of the

modern representative state, which, he claims, stands in a special

relation to one of those classes (see Marx and Engels 2000b, p.247)–

what he terms ‘the ruling class.’ Later still, Marx devotes more

attention to the complex relationship between classes and the state, and

between their various sub-groupings (see Marx 2000f, 2000g), but

throughout his writings there runs a common theme regarding the modern

state: it arises because of fracturing at the economic level. Moreover,

Marx never doubts that this entails that the removal of that fracturing

by the establishment of a classless society will inevitably lead to the

disappearance of the state.[4]

But that the state has arisen due to fracturing at the economic level,

even if this were uncontroversially true,[5] does not allow one simply

to conclude that removing those fractures entails the disappearance of

the state. To see this, distinguish, on the one hand, between necessary

and sufficient conditions and, on the other, between originating

conditions—those conditions that are eithernecessary or sufficient for a

state of affairs to arise—and perpetuating conditions—those conditions

that are either necessary or sufficient for a state of affairs to

continue. If fracturing within civil society is the explanation for how

it is that the modern state has arisen, then fracturing within civil

society may well only constitute a sufficient originating condition. But

for the removal of fracturing within civil society to entail the

disappearance of the state, fracturing within civil society would have

to be a necessary perpetuating condition of the state. Consider a

tumour: A toxin might cause a tumour to start developing, but later

removal of that toxin might well lead neither to the tumour’s ceasing to

grow nor to its disappearance. Similarly, the modern representative

state might possibly have arisen due to fracturing within civil society.

But even if this were so, the removal of that fracturing might well not

lead to the state’s disappearance—just as the removal of the toxin would

not suffice as a cure for the tumour it had caused. And one reason why

the removal of fractures within civil society might not lead to the

state’s disappearance is that once an authoritarian state had arisen,

even if its rise were due to fracturing within civil society, such a

state might have the power to tax those within civil society to such an

extent that it could pay for a large enough police force and standing

army to keep it in power even once that fracturing within civil society

had been removed.

Anarchism and state primacy

Perhaps, then, we should not be too quick to reduce political power to

economic power. And if we refrain from such a reduction, then the

anarchist critique of Marxist political strategy is not so easily

dismissed as Engels had presumed. And interestingly, Bakunin’s approach

might be thought to be supported to some degree by a weighted

bi-directional explanatory model that reverses the weighting found in

Cohen’s Marxist model; for recall that Bakunin (1973, p. 282) moots the

suggestion that ‘the State … maintains poverty as a condition for its

own existence; so that to destroy poverty, it is necessary to destroy

the State’—which certainly sounds like a functional explanation.

So, let us see how an anarchist might deploy a complex functional

explanation to cast doubt on the Marxist conclusion that if

revolutionaries were to ‘abolish capital, the appropriation of all the

means of production by the few,’ then ‘the state will fall of itself’

(Engels 1989, p. 307). To do so, we must first isolate an additional

element to those clarified by Cohen. In identifying economic forces (the

forces of production), economic relations (the relations of production)

and political relations (the structure of legal and political

institutions), Cohen, in effect, distinguishes between forces and

relations, on the one hand, and between the economic and the political,

on the other. But this pair of distinctions allows a fourth category to

be identified: namely, political forces.

What might constitute the political forces of a modern society? Cohen

(1978, p. 32) argues that the forces of production include the means of

production (that is, tools, machines, premises, raw materials, etc.) and

labour-power (that is, the strength, skill, knowledge, etc. of the

producing agents). If the forces of production are the principal

economic forces at play within a society, then we might suspect that the

principal political forces presently at play within any of today’s

societies are its forces of coercion. If so, then it is not simply

labour-power that industrial workers sell; rather it is economic

labour-power, for military personnel and the police sell their capacity

to labour, too. But it seems inappropriate to characterise the capacity

to labour offered by soldiers and the police as an economic force, given

that the work soldiers perform is potentially more destructive than

productive. Hence, it seems that we should distinguish between economic

and political labour-power. And we might therefore regard the forces of

coercion as including political labour-power (that is, the strength,

skill, knowledge, etc. of the coercive agents) and the means of coercion

(that is, the tools, machines, premises, etc. that are deployed in order

to maintain political control).[6]

How might these four elements—the economic forces (the forces of

production), the economic relations (the relations of production), the

political relations (the structure of legal and political institutions)

and the political forces (the forces of coercion and/or defence)—be

plausibly situated within a weighted, bi-directional, explanatory model?

Given the need that states have to develop their military capacity in

order to remain militarily competitive with other, potentially

threatening, states,[7] they need to develop the productive capacity

that allows the development of their military capacity. But in order to

develop their productive capacity, they need economic relations that are

able to drive, rather than inhibit, that development. Hence, it can be

argued that the political relations (the structure of legal and

political institutions) select and stabilise economic relations (the

relations of production) that are conducive to developing the economic

forces (the forces of production) that facilitate the development of the

political forces (the forces of coercion and/or defence), because the

development of the political forces empowers those political relations.

In short, it can be argued that political relations select and stabilise

economic relations that are functional for them ( Figure 2).

[Figure 2. A state-primacy model.]

Interestingly, an anarchist model of this general type possesses no less

explanatory power than Cohen’s Marxist model. For just as with the

Marxist model, it claims that when economic relations fail to develop

the productive forces sufficiently, they will be replaced.[8] And just

as the Marxist model can explain the development of the productive

forces, so, too, can this particular anarchist model. However, it might

be thought that the Marxist model explains the relatively laissez-faire

nature of the liberal state, while an anarchist model of this type

cannot. But such an anarchist model allows one to claim that the state

can choose to remain in the background when capitalist economic

relations are being stabilised because, due to their seemingly

voluntary, contractual nature, their stabilisation requires less overt

force than previous economic relations required. So this particular

anarchist model is, in fact, at no disadvantage with respect to

accounting for the ostensibly liberal nature of the state in capitalist

societies.[9] But unlike Cohen’s Marxist model, such an anarchist model

also allows one to understand how it is that certain economically

unprofitable technologies, such as nuclear power, might come to be

developed. Civil nuclear power programmes are required for the

development of nuclear weapons, which are functional for the state

insofar as they allow it to defend itself. But the development of such

unprofitable technologies appears to make little, if any, sense on the

Marxist model. Indeed, once it is realised that the state, directly or

indirectly, selects the development of kinds of technology that are

functional for preserving the power of the state, the core Marxist

assumption that capitalism will develop the technology required for a

communist society becomes highly implausible (see Carter 1988, passim).

What is especially important, however, is that the complex functional

explanation at the heart of this anarchist model does not support the

Marxist conclusion that if revolutionaries were to transform the

economic relations, then ‘the state will fall of itself’; for if

egalitarian relations of production proved not to be functional for the

state, then it would replace them with relations of production that

were.[10] Thus, it is in a revolution aiming to bring in communism that

this anarchist theory, which accords explanatory primacy to the state,

can be tested against the Marxist theory, which instead accords

explanatory primacy to the development of the productive forces, and

explanatory priority to the relations of production over the structure

of legal and political institutions.

Ironically, the revolution that is widely (if, perhaps, mistakenly)

viewed as archetypically Marxist is the Russian Revolution that began in

1917. During the course of that revolution, the workers set up factory

committees to run industry. But egalitarian economic relations did not

lead to the withering away of the state, as Engels (1976, p. 363) had

predicted. Instead, the factory committees were replaced by highly

inegalitarian, ‘one-man’ management. And how did Lenin justify this

authoritarian imposition upon the workers? As he wrote within a year of

coming to power: ‘All our efforts must be exerted to the utmost to …

bring about an economic revival, without which a real increase in our

country’s defence potential is inconceivable’ (Lenin 1970, p. 6). In

other words, perhaps fearing that workers’ control would be less

productive, the Marxist state imposed inegalitarian economic relations

that were functional, in offering the prospect of greater productivity,

for the state’s military requirements.

This seems to provide a clear corroboration for an anarchist

state-primacy theory, which claims that political relations choose

economic relations that are conducive to developing the economic forces,

which facilitate the development of the political forces, for the

development of the political forces maintains the empowerment of those

political relations. But it also seems, simultaneously, to falsify the

Marxist technological-primacy theory. And such an anarchist, weighted

bi-directional, explanatory model, as apparently corroborated by the

Russian Revolution, would provide theoretical justification for the

anarchist objection that, even if revolutionaries were to ‘abolish

capital,’ it cannot simply be presumed that ‘the state will fall of

itself.’

Transcending explanatory primacy

But is a theory that accords explanatory primacy to the state necessary

for upholding this principal anarchist objection to Marxist

revolutionary praxis? I shall argue that it is not. For as long as the

state is able to replace egalitarian economic relations with

inegalitarian ones, even if it is the case that the political relations

lack overall explanatory primacy, the Marxist contention that ‘the state

will fall of itself’ if revolutionaries were to abolish capital remains

mistaken.

To see this, let us consider a complex of functional explanations that

would support the anarchist objection, and which is also seemingly

corroborated by the Russian Revolution that began in 1917, but which

does not accord explanatory primacy to the state. Now, it may indeed be

the case that the political relations (the structure of legal and

political institutions) stabilise economic relations (the relations of

production) that are conducive to developing the economic forces (the

forces of production), which facilitate the development of the political

forces (the forces of coercion and/or defence), because the development

of the political forces is necessary for maintaining the empowerment of

the political relations (as in Figure 2). But it may also be the case

that the economic relations in part develop the economic forces, which

facilitate the development of the political forces that empower the

political relations, because, as those political relations are required

to stabilise those economic relations, this is functional for the

economic relations ( Figure 3). And it may also be the case that the

development of the economic forces facilitates the development of the

political forces, which, in turn, empowers the political relations which

stabilise the economic relations, in part because that is functional for

the development of the economic forces ( Figure 4). And it may also be

the case that the political forces empower the political relations which

stabilise the economic relations that develop the economic forces,

because, with the latter’s facilitating the development of the political

forces, the empowerment of the political relations is functional for the

development of those political forces ( Figure 5).

[Figure 3. A model focusing upon the explanatory role of the economic

relations.]

[Figure 4. A model focusing upon the explanatory role of the economic

forces.]

[Figure 5. A model focusing upon the explanatory role of the political

forces.]

If all of these functional explanations are combined, then what we have,

in effect, is represented by Figure 6, where each element of the model

‘acts’ or ‘behaves’ as it does because that ‘action’ or ‘behaviour’ is

functional for the element in question.

[Figure 6. A multiplex model.]

On this complex of functional explanations, there is no explanatory

primacy; hence it is not, as it stands, a weighted explanatory model.

But one could accord different weightings to each of the component

functional explanations. Nevertheless, on a basic non-weighted model

combining these four functional explanations, it remains the case that

the state can select inegalitarian economic relations should egalitarian

economic relations arise, and this seems sufficient to reject the

Marxist assumption that egalitarian economic relations will inevitably

lead to the withering away of the state. Indeed, were the economic

relations the only element to be transformed by revolutionary action,

then those relations, while having some power to transform the economic

forces, would fail to obtain support from either the political relations

or the political forces if it was not functional for the political

relations or for the political forces to stabilise those new economic

relations. But because the political relations are consistent with the

prevailing political forces, which are themselves consistent with the

prevailing economic forces, then the political relations would enjoy

support from the political forces, which themselves would enjoy support

from the economic forces. In which case, we might expect the political

relations to be far more capable of replacing the transformed economic

relations with ones more suited to the interests of those political

relations than the economic relations would be of effecting a permanent,

radical transformation of the economic forces (never mind of the whole

system).

Consequently, even without the particular anarchist model discussed

earlier, which accords explanatory primacy to the state, the principal

anarchist objection to Marxist strategy can still be upheld. Call the

new model presented here ‘a multiple functional explanatory model’ or ‘a

multiplex model,’ for short.[11] A model of this kind is all that an

anarchist needs to reject Marxist revolutionary praxis. Moreover,

Lenin’s replacement of workers’ factory committees with ‘one-man’

management serves as seeming corroboration both for a state-primacy

model and for such a multiplex model.

An environmentally hazardous dynamic

Now, while an anarchist state-primacy model is capable of grounding a

genuinely radical, green political theory,[12] the multiplex model

sketched above can equally provide such a grounding. In order for it to

do so, all that is required is a particular spelling out of the current

form of the political relations, the economic relations, the economic

forces and the political forces. For what if the political relations

actually comprise pseudo-representative, quasi-democratic,[13]

centralised, authoritarian power relations? And what if the economic

relations actually comprise competitive, inegalitarian, exploitative

production relations? And what if the economic forces actually include

highly resource-consumptive, environmentally damaging,

pollution-emitting technology? And what if the political forces actually

include nationalistic, militaristic armed forces wielding

technologically advanced, nuclear weaponry?

First, authoritarian power relations of this type would tend to

stabilise such production relations when they developed such

environmentally damaging technology (for example, nuclear power) in

order to supply their militaristic armed forces with nuclear weaponry

and to generate the surplus that would fund those armed forces, because

this is functional for such authoritarian power relations (given that

all this would be required to preserve them in a world containing

competing nuclear-armed states).

Second, such exploitative production relations would tend to develop

such environmentally damaging technology in order not only to enrich

those who exercise control within those relations but also to fund such

militaristic armed forces and supply them with their weaponry so that

they may preserve such authoritarian power relations, because this is

functional for those economic relations (given that all this is

necessary to stabilise them).

Third, the development of such environmentally damaging technology

generates the surplus that funds such militaristic armed forces, and

such technology (e.g. nuclear power) would also tend to supply them with

their weaponry so that they may preserve such authoritarian power

relations that empower such exploitative production relations, in part

because this is functional for the development of such environmentally

damaging technology.

Fourth, such militaristic armed forces, supplied with particular

weaponry, would tend to empower such authoritarian power relations which

stabilise such exploitative production relations that develop such

environmentally damaging, pollution-emitting technology, because this is

functional for those armed forces in generating the surplus that funds

them and in supplying them with their particular weaponry.[14]

If all of this is put together, as in Figure 7, then what emerges is

what we might label an environmentally hazardous dynamic.[15] Moreover,

each of the four component functional explanations reveals just how

difficult it would be to break free from such a dynamic, as we shall now

see.

[Figure 7. An environmentally hazardous dynamic.]

If one attempts merely to alter radically the economic relations (the

relations of production) in a direction that is not functional for the

political relations, then the political relations (the structure of

legal and political institutions) can be expected to introduce or

re-introduce economic relations that are more conducive to developing

the economic forces (the forces of production), which facilitate the

development of the political forces (the forces of coercion and/or

defence), because the development of the political forces maintains the

empowerment of the political relations (as in Figure 2).

But if one attempts, instead, merely to develop radically different

economic forces—ones that are not functional for the economic

relations—then the economic relations can be expected to introduce or

re-introduce economic forces which better facilitate the development of

the political forces that empower the political relations, because this

is functional for those economic relations (as in Figure 3).

Alternatively, if, instead, one attempts merely to develop radically

different political forces—ones that are not functional for the economic

forces—then the economic forces can be expected to facilitate the

introduction or re-introduction of political forces that empower the

political relations which stabilise the economic relations, because that

is functional for the development of those economic forces (as in Figure

4). For example, if a nation-state A feels threatened by the nuclear

weapons possessed by another state (say, B), then A is likely to develop

nuclear weapons itself if it has the civil nuclear power programme that

would make their development possible.[16] Indeed, should a competitor

state B have a civil nuclear power programme, but lack nuclear weapons

at this time, state B‘s civil nuclear programme, because it might result

in the development of nuclear weapons, would provide strong reason for

state A to develop nuclear weapons.

Finally, if one attempts, instead, merely to alter radically the

political relations in a direction that is not functional for the

political forces, then the political forces can be expected to introduce

or re-introduce political relations which stabilise the economic

relations that develop certain economic forces, because that is

functional for the development and maintenance of those political forces

(as in Figure 5).

An environmentally benign interrelationship

Would this render all environmentally benign change impossible? No, but

it does indicate that, if we are within such an environmentally

hazardous dynamic, any effective solution to the environmental crisis

that we face would have to be radical, indeed. For it would seem that

the only way to stand a reasonable chance of preventing the functional

explanatory components of the dynamic from inhibiting the requisite

radical change would be to alter each and every one of them. This is

because any remaining element could be expected to attempt to replace a

second with one more functional for it, and that second element can be

expected in turn to attempt to replace a third with one more functional

for it, which can be expected in turn to attempt to replace the fourth

with one more functional for that third element. And this suggests that

green political theory, as surprising as this might initially seem,

would need to be more radical than even traditional Marxist or

traditional anarchist theory. Indeed, we might also suspect that

revolutions have thus far failed not because of how radical they were,

but, rather, because they were not radical enough.

Now, were pseudo-representative, quasi-democratic, centralised,

authoritarian power relations to be replaced by a decentralised,

consensual, discursive,[17] direct participatory democracy, and were

competitive, inegalitarian, exploitative production relations to be

replaced by self-sufficient or self-reliant, cooperative, egalitarian

production relations under workers’ and community control, and were

highly resource-consumptive, environmentally damaging,

pollution-emitting technology to be replaced by environmentally benign,

convivial, alternative technologies, and were nationalistic,

militaristic armed forces to be replaced by non-aggressive social

control and nonviolent forms of defence, then, instead of the

environmentally hazardous dynamic, we may find an environmentally benign

interrelationship[18] ( Figure 8).

[Figure 8. An environmentally benign interrelationship.]

Such an interrelationship might be expected to be environmentally

benign, because a participatory democracy of this kind would lack the

pressing need for nationalistic, militaristic armed forces, and hence

competitive, inegalitarian, exploitative production relations would not

be functional for such a participatory democracy. The reason for this is

that such exploitative production relations are required for highly

resource-consumptive, environmentally damaging, pollution-emitting

technology to be developed, and that technology is required for such

militaristic armed forces to develop further. But without the need for

such armed forces, neither they nor such environmentally damaging

technology nor such exploitative production relations are functional for

such a participatory democracy. (This is not, of course, to say that a

decentralised, consensual, discursive, direct participatory democracy is

sufficient for an environmentally benign social order. But it does

strongly suggest that it might well be necessary for one.)

Moreover, such egalitarian production relations under workers’ and

community control would have no need for pseudo-representative,

quasi-democratic, centralised, authoritarian power relations, and hence

highly resource-consumptive, environmentally damaging,

pollution-emitting technology would not be functional for those

egalitarian economic relations. Such environmentally damaging technology

is required for militaristic armed forces to develop further, and those

coercive forces are required to preserve such authoritarian power

relations. But without any need for those authoritarian power relations,

neither they nor such militaristic armed forces nor such environmentally

damaging technology would be functional for self-sufficient or

self-reliant, cooperative, egalitarian production relations under

workers’ and community control.

Furthermore, the preservation[19] of environmentally benign, convivial,

alternative technologies has no need of competitive, inegalitarian,

exploitativeproduction relations. Hence, it has no need for

nationalistic, militaristic armed forces or for the

pseudo-representative, quasi-democratic, centralised, authoritarian

power relations they preserve, which in turn stabilise such exploitative

production relations. Neither such exploitative production relations nor

such militaristic armed forces nor such authoritarian power relations

are functional for the preservation of environmentally benign,

convivial, alternative technologies.

In addition, non-aggressive social control and nonviolent forms of

defence have no need for the highly resource-consumptive,

environmentally damaging, pollution-emitting technology that is needed

for nationalistic, militaristic armed forces; hence non-aggressive

social control and nonviolent forms of defence have no need for

competitive, inegalitarian, exploitative production relations to sustain

and further develop such environmentally damaging technology.

Consequently, non-aggressive social control and nonviolent forms of

defence do not require pseudo-representative, quasi-democratic,

centralised, authoritarian power relations to stabilise such

exploitative production relations. Thus, neither such authoritarian

power relations nor such exploitative production relations nor such

environmentally damaging technology are functional for non-aggressive

social control and nonviolent forms of defence.

The fundamental problem is that if we have, in fact, succeeded in

identifying the core elements of any environmentally benign society,

then none of them would be selected by any element, or combination of

elements, within an environmentally hazardous dynamic. The multiplex

model mooted here does not, of course, presume that each element of any

such dynamic is inherently stable in the long run. For it would lead us

to expect the economic relations to change if, in facilitating greater

economic development, that would be functional for the other elements.

And it would also lead us to expect the economic forces to change if, in

being more productive, that would be functional for the rest of the

dynamic. Further, it would lead us to expect the political forces to

change if, in better empowering the political relations, that would be

functional for the other elements. And it would, moreover, lead us to

expect the political relations to change if that would be more conducive

to stabilising certain economic relations, and was, thereby, functional

for the rest of the dynamic. Tragically, because of what would be

functional for the majority of the dynamic’s component elements, epochal

transformations would, on this theory, be expected to consist in

developments of new forces and relations that constitute new forms of

authoritarian, centralised, inegalitarian and environmentally

destructive societies.[20]

This means that, if a multiplex theory of this general sort were

correct, and if we are presently situated within an environmentally

hazardous dynamic, then we should rather expect that dynamic to

accelerate than to shift into reverse. Every transformation motivated

within the prevailing order that we would have reason to anticipate

would take us in the wrong direction: namely, even further away from the

environmentally benign.

Concluding remarks

Previously, I have argued that a radical green political theory can be

grounded on a state-primacy model (see Carter 1993, pp. 40–45 and p. 56,

note 16). Because economistic thinking preponderates, it is not

surprising that a political theory with such a grounding should have

appeared wholly implausible to some.[21] However, as should now be

clear, a state-primacy theory is not, in fact, a necessary grounding for

the modelling of an environmentally hazardous dynamic; for we have seen

that a multiplex theory can equally ground it. Thus, because a

state-primacy model is unnecessary for grounding a radical green

political theory, such a theory is not dependent upon the acceptance of

any such model. Consequently, an opposition to state-primacy theory is

no reason for rejecting the radical green political theory sketched

here. Furthermore, if one doubts that the elements of the

environmentally hazardous dynamic obtain in today’s world, then one

could accept a multiplex model without being committed to the radical

green political theory that it might otherwise be thought to ground.

This notwithstanding, many will recognise the elements of the

environmentally hazardous dynamic at play in today’s world. And while

the above has merely constituted the briefest of adumbrations,[22]

hopefully it will suffice to show how a truly radical, green political

theory, when it is premised upon a complex of functional explanations,

can be seen to transcend both Marxist and anarchist political theory.

And it does so in a manner that, surprising as it might initially seem,

makes it more radical than both. To be precise, Marxist theory, in

focusing on inequalities of economic power, has often served to justify

the maintenance of inequalities in political power, at least during the

course of the revolution (see Carter 1999b; also see Carter 1994). It is

this aspect of Marxist revolutionary praxis that anarchists have most

opposed. But in focusing on the exercise of political power, some

self-styled anarchists have failed to analyse inequalities in economic

power adequately. The radical green political theory proffered here

justifies a fundamental opposition to the unequal exercise of both

economic and political power, for it enables one to see both economic

and political equality as essential prerequisites of an environmentally

benign social order.

But to sidestep several objections at once, it should be noted that I

have not claimed that all existing societies display all of the features

of the environmentally hazardous dynamic to the full. Nor have I claimed

that wecan simply move immediately to a fully environmentally benign

socialorder. Both are ideal types.[23] And the environmentally hazardous

dynamic could be thought to be instantiated in different places to

different degrees. If so, the key political, economic, technological and

social challenge would be to move progressively from the more hazardous

to the more benign.

But would such a move even be possible, never mind likely? One thing is

clear: if the above argument is roughly correct, then unless the

connections between the elements of the environmentally hazardous

dynamic are understood, ineffectual policies and counter-productive

political activities will remain preponderant, and they will only serve

to distract us from the real task ahead. And it is easy to see how such

policies and political activities should have become our staple diet.

For those dominant within the political relations have thus far

benefited from their roles, as have those working as political forces.

Those dominant within the economic relations have undoubtedly benefited.

And even those working as economic forces might feel that they have done

better than they would otherwise have done had a competing state

succeeded in conquering them. So, while it might not have been wholly

irrational for societies to have developed in accord with an

environmentally hazardous dynamic up until now, the times they are

rapidly a-changing. And while it might still be rational for elderly

people in dominant positions to conduct business as usual, and while

they might be unable to step outside of the old paradigms that constrain

their thinking, if we are presently located within an environmentally

hazardous dynamic, given the environmental crises before us, then it

would now be highly irrational for the vast majority of us to remain

entrapped there. But a precondition for escape would be to understand

that dynamic’s complex nature.

So, by way of conclusion, if we are entrapped within an environmentally

hazardous dynamic, and if, therefore, the only genuine, sustainable

alternative is the environmentally benign interrelationship, then if one

is to be an effective democrat, one also needs to be a decentralist, and

if one is to be an effective decentralist, one also needs to be an

egalitarian. Moreover, if one is to be an effective egalitarian, one

also needs to be a promoter of convivial, alternative technologies. In

addition, if one is to be an effective promoter of convivial,

alternative technologies, one also needs to be a pacifist. And if one is

to be an effective pacifist, one also needs to be an advocate of direct,

participatory, discursive democracy. In a word, if the above argument is

by and large correct, then whether one is a democrat, a decentralist, an

egalitarian, a promoter of alternative technology or a pacifist, one has

reason to strive for all of the components of the environmentally benign

interrelationship. Put another way, democracy, decentralisation,

equality, alternative technology and non-violence come packaged together

or not at all.

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[1] For a discussion of this form of explanation, see Carter (1992).

[2] This view of the state is not peculiar to Engels, for it echoes what

he and Marx hadjointly written over a quarter of a century earlier. See

Marx and Engels (2000a, p. 200).

[3] The division at one level leading to the need for unity at a higher

level directly mirrors Marx’s Feuerbachian analysis of religious

alienation, of course.

[4] For a critical analysis of Marx’s theory of the state, see Carter

(1988, ch. 5).

[5] As an explanation for the rise of the modern state, this might well

be doubted. For some might argue, instead, that modern states appear, in

many cases, to be more the result of (often far earlier) conquest.

[6] See Carter (2000).

[7] And, ordinarily, modern states do find themselves situated within an

international structure of competing states. See Skocpol (1979, pp.

30–32).

[8] And it finds support in Michael Taylor’s contention that it was

state actors who selected new economic relations in France from the

fifteenth century and in Russia from the eighteenth century. Moreover,

this was, argues Taylor, because of their need to obtain increased tax

revenue as a result of ‘geopolitical-military competition.’ See Taylor

(1989), especially, pp. 124–126 and 128–132. Also see Huntington (1968,

pp. 122 and 126). Even Marx agrees that the state ‘helped to hasten’

within France ‘the decay of the feudal system.’ See Marx (2000g, p.

345).

[9] Such an anarchist model is also at no disadvantage in explaining

underdevelopment in poor countries. And there is reason for thinking

that it provides a superior account to that provided by the Marxist

model. See Carter (1995).

[10] Clearly, the state needs subordinate classes to be kept at work in

order to produce the wealth it must tax if it is to pay its personnel.

See Skocpol (1979, p. 30). Hence, it can be argued that the state has

its own interest in maintaining exploitative economic relations, and

therefore it cannot simply be reduced to the instrument of a class.

Rather, state and bourgeois interests ordinarily contingently

correspond.

[11] In having four component functional explanatory elements, we might

call this ‘a quadruplex model.’ However there is nothing, in principle,

preventing us from adding further components, such as a functional

explanation of ideology.

[12] For such an eco-anarchist theory, see Carter (1993, 1999a).

[13] For an indication of the extent to which the term ‘democracy’ has

been usurped by those opposed to genuine democracy, see Arblaster

(1987). Also see Graham (1986). For an indication of how undemocratic

and illegitimate are contemporary societies, see Singer (1973).

[14] Note that all this is neutral with respect to the debate between

explanatory collectivists and methodological individualists. On a

structuralist reading of the above four functional explanations, the

relations and forces would be construed as ‘making selections.’ But on a

more methodological individualist reading, rational actors would be

construed as engaged in the selecting. Moreover, on either approach, it

is possible to tell a Darwinian story regarding which ‘selections’

survive. For one possible Darwinian mechanism, see Carter (1999a,

§4.3.1.1).

[15] See Carter (1993).

[16] We would also expect two nuclear-armed states to pose such a threat

to each other that they will both be compulsively driven to do what is

necessary economically in order to remain militarily competitive.

[17] On discursive democracy and its appropriateness for

environmentalism, see Dryzek (1990, 1992).

[18] See Carter (1993). For classic discussions of decentralisation,

direct participatory democracy, convivial and alternative technologies,

and non-violence, see the references in ibid.

[19] ‘Preservation’ rather than ‘development’ because the

environmentally benign interrelationship, once in place, could be

expected to constitute a relatively stationary order, not a dynamic en

route to oblivion.

[20] Such a complex of functional explanations should therefore not be

confused with structural functionalism. The latter is a theory focusing

upon why societies tend to remain unchanged, while Cohen’s theory, the

state-primacy theory, and the multiplex theory are each offered as an

explanation of epochal change from one set of production relations to

another.

[21] Though it is telling how little attention green liberal critics of

the state-primacy theory have paid to the role of the military and to

its highly distorting effects. Failing to examine in any detail military

requirements within ostensibly ‘liberal democracies,’ whether existing

or imagined, is more like simply ignoring an argument rather than

answering it. See, for example, Barry (1999) and Hailwood (2004).

[22] Support for many of the claims made here, and answers to a number

of possible objections to those claims, can be found in Carter (1999a,

passim). Although the argument there rests on a state-primacy theory,

many of the rebuttals of objections to such a theory constitute equally

effective responses to objections to the multiplex theory sketched here.

[23] Although several pre-literate tribal peoples have displayed the

features of the environmentally benign interrelationship; and they also

managed to survive for a very long time compared to the short-lived,

self-destructive societies of our day.