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Title: Left divergence, Right convergence Author: Volodymyr Ishchenko Date: 2020 Language: en Topics: Ukraine, nationalism, the Left Source: Retrieved on 16th May 2022 from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14747731.2020.1722495 Notes: Published in Globalizations.
The article traces nationalist polarization and divergence within the
Ukrainian new left in response to the Maidan and Anti-Maidan protests in
2013â2014, and the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The ideological
left-wing groups in the protests were too weak to push forward any
independent progressive agenda. Instead of moving the respective
campaigns to the left, they were increasingly converging with the right
themselves and degraded into marginal supporters of either pro-Ukrainian
or pro-Russian camps in the conflict. The liberal and libertarian left
supported the Maidan movement on the basis of abstract
self-organization, liberal values and anti-authoritarianism. In
contrast, the Marxist-Leninists attempted to seize political
opportunities from supporting more plebeian and decentralized
Anti-Maidan protests and reacting to the far-right threat after the
Maidan victory. They deluded themselves that Russian nationalists were
not as reactionary as their Ukrainian counterparts and that the
world-system crisis allowed them to exploit Russian anti-American
politics for progressive purposes.
Recent discussions around left-wing convergence (e.g. Prichard & Worth,
2016; Prichard, Kinna, Pinta, & Berry, 2017) have paid surprisingly
little attention to the question of internationalism, arguably one of
the most basic unifying positions for most branches of the left.
Moreover, left unity was expected to be an important factor in resisting
the escalation of nationalist and imperialist conflicts. Yet left
internationalism has failed too often and sometimes with disastrous
consequences as exemplified by a classic case of left support for the
imperialist powers in the World War I. Discussion of potential left
convergence must, therefore, take into account the potential of
exacerbating great powers conflicts. Indeed, it is not obvious that the
left will be able to present an internationalist position instead of
converging with nationalist movements and imperialist powers. This
article raises this question by analysing nationalist polarization among
Ukrainian anarchists and Marxists in response to the Maidan and
Anti-Maidan protests in 2013â2014, and the military conflict in Eastern
Ukraine.
The protests, change of government and the armed conflict in Ukraine
since the fall of 2013 posed a difficult problem for Ukrainian and
international left as well as for progressive academics. The socalled
EuroMaidan or simply Maidan[1] protests, which after their repression
turned into an uprising against the corrupt president Viktor Yanukovych,
were triggered by the governmentâs decision to postpone the signing of
the treaty on Ukraineâs EU association. The main part of the treaty was
the agreement on a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA)
between Ukraine and the EU. These kinds of agreements that benefit
richer countries at the poorer countriesâ expense used to be a typical
target of left criticism. At the same time, the right-wing opposition
parties were the political representatives of Maidan movement; a large
number of protesters shared anti-Communist attitudes; the neoliberal
Western-funded NGOs were working on its publicity and Ukrainian radical
nationalists were among the most active participants, especially in the
violent protest stage (de Ploeg, 2017; Ishchenko, 2014a, 2016a). The
overthrow of Yanukovych provoked Russiaâs annexation of Crimea and a
mass Anti-Maidan counter-mobilization in southern and eastern Ukrainian
cities where pro-Russian attitudes were widespread and Maidan did not
have the majority support.
Although the left â particularly the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU)
and Borotba (âStruggleâ) organization â were active in Anti-Maidan
protests, the local elites and Russian right-wing nationalists had
played the major role. The latter led the separatist uprising in Donbass
(Shekhovtsov, 2017) â the region in the east of Ukraine dominated by
heavy Soviet-time industry and with a large proportion of ethnic Russian
population â which was allegedly instigated but undoubtedly supported by
the Russian government (Robinson, 2016).
At the time of writing the low-intensity conflict is still ongoing in
Ukraine between the two sides, both of them problematic from an
internationalist left perspective. Western-dependent hybrid
neopatrimonial regime in Ukraine (Matsiyevsky, 2018), that has been
radicalizing neoliberal and nationalist policies, institutionalizing
anti-Communism and curtailing political freedoms (Chemerys, 2016;
Ishchenko, 2018a),[2] on the one side, against the puppet-states of
Donetsk and Lugansk Peopleâs Republics (DPR and LPR) that are lacking
political pluralism, incapable of pursuing progressive policies,
violating civil rights and are overwhelmingly dependent on Russia, on
the other side (Malyarenko & Wolff, 2018).
Both Maidan and Anti-Maidan movements combined some progressive elements
and mass grassroots mobilization with the political hegemony of various
kinds of right-wingers, an active role of rivalling Ukrainian and
Russian nationalists and some influence on competing foreign powers.[3]
But the Ukrainian left failed to present a politically relevant
alternative to destructive Maidan/ Anti-Maidan polarization. Instead,
most of the Ukrainian left joined either one or another movement,
usually without any significant impact on the course of events. Most of
the liberal and libertarian left supported the Maidan movement, while
the left coming from Marxist tradition typically supported the
Anti-Maidan. Moreover, many Ukrainian leftists were diving more and more
into the logic of nationalist polarization. Instead of moving their
respective campaigns to the left, they were increasingly moving to the
right themselves and despite superficial adherence to internationalism,
they degraded into marginal supporters of either pro-Ukrainian or
pro-Russian camps in the conflict. Some of the left went so far as to
support militaristic and repressive actions on their side of the
conflict and even joined the war to fight alongside respective radical
nationalists against former comrades.
The article traces how the Ukrainian new left movement â actively
cooperating with each other before 2014 â diverged with the start of
Maidan protests and converged with the opposing nationalist camps. The
ânew leftâ used to be a heterogeneous but regularly cooperating network
of organizations, labour and student unions, proto-parties and informal
initiatives of a variety of ideological currents that included
anarchists, revolutionary Marxists, the left-liberal, and the social
democrats. I am focusing on the ânewâ part of the Ukrainian left instead
of KPU because among them the ideological arguments were taken more
seriously and appeals to anarchism or Marxism mattered in actual
politics much more than for the KPU. Furthermore, the postmodern,
anti-communist, or anti-imperialist sources of these arguments have a
wider relevance for understanding the recent convergence of some parts
of the international left with right-wing camps.
I start by reviewing the arguments from left-leaning scholars that
either Maidan, or Anti-Maidan were left or at least progressive
movements. I contribute to the debate by showing that the ideological
left-wing groups in Maidan and Anti-Maidan protests were too weak and
marginal to push forward any independent progressive agenda in order to
challenge right-wing hegemony in the movements. Rather, they tended to
converge with nationalist camps. After reviewing the state of the new
left movement before the start of Maidan protests I focus on the
diverging participation of liberal/libertarian left groups in Maidan and
a Marxist-Leninist group Borotba in Anti-Maidan movements respectively
in the period of intensive mobilizations between November 2013 and May
2014. Basing on ethnographic evidence, the activistsâ publications of
that period and their recent self-reflections[4] I analyse actions and
immediate motivations of the new left intervening into the massive yet
contradictory movements under right-wing hegemony. In the last section,
I focus on the later ideological development in the period of left
marginalization after 2014 and analyse further right-wing convergence in
the most elaborate attempts to theorize an anarchist position in defense
of post-Maidan Ukraine against Russia and pro-Russian separatists, and
on the other side â a Marxist position in defense of the separatist
âpeopleâs republicsâ against the Ukrainian government and Western
imperialism.
Despite the most heated polemics being focused on the âdark sideâ of the
movements â the role of the radical nationalists and foreign
interference â the âleftâ, progressive elements were also regularly
emphasized by engaged academics from both sides as a means to justify
solidarity with respective movements for the Western liberal-progressive
or radical left publics.
Timothy Snyderâs writings are, perhaps, the most prominent example of an
argument for a âleftistâ Maidan. â[T]he revolution in Ukraine [Maidan]
came from the Left. Its enemy was an authoritarian kleptocrat, and its
central program was social justice and the rule of law,â he argued
(Snyder, 2014). As the story goes, Maidan also united people of
different ethnic origins, while the language cleavage, prominent for
Ukrainian politics, was allegedly irrelevant in the movement. Most
importantly, large scale self-organization and grassroots initiatives
independent of the right-wing opposition political parties created a
âgift economyâ and a âspontaneous welfare stateâ in the Maidan camp in
Kiev, exemplified with extensive crowdfunding by regular citizens to
support numerous everyday needs of the protesters (Snyder, 2018, ch. 4).
âFor Katia Mishchenko, a young leftist, this was the communist dream
fulfilled: âFrom each according to his ability, to each according to his
needââ, cites Marci Shore (2018, pp. 44â45) in another enthusiastic
account of the Maidan camp relying on conversations with a rather narrow
group of young and mostly liberal intellectuals.
A case for a âleftâ or at least a progressive Anti-Maidan movement was
built on different arguments. Boris Kagarlitsky, perhaps, the most
prominent author on this side of the debate, notes that the regional
political cleavage in Ukraine originates not only from cultural
differences but also from economic and, therefore, class structure
(2016, pp. 515â516). Most of the Soviet heavy industry and industrial
proletariat was concentrated in the south-eastern regions of Ukraine.
The DCFTA agreement with the EU threatened industries that were still
mostly working for Russian export and, therefore, workersâ jobs. Hence,
the stronger articulation of working-class socio-economic grievances was
in Anti-Maidan rather than in Maidan. Mirroring Snyderâs arguments about
âmulticulturalâ Maidan, some authors supporting Anti-Maidan argued that
ethnicity was allegedly not important in the latter movement, as it was
the regional Donbass identity that always prevailed over Ukrainian or
Russian identities and that it already contained a strong
internationalist element (Clarke, 2016, p. 538). Moreover, the
âantifascistâ rhetoric and references to the WWII victory were prevalent
in Anti-Maidan, mainly in response to the prominence of Ukrainian
radical nationalists in Maidan protests. In contrast to Maidanâs
anti-Communism, Soviet symbolism was welcome in Anti-Maidan, opening
opportunities for leftist political intervention. In the end, according
to Kagarlitsky, it was primarily because of the elitism of progressive
middle-class intellectuals towards âthe real working class â crude,
muddle headed, and devoid of political correctnessâ (2016, p. 520) that
the movement was left to Russian nationalist or simply adventurist
leaders.
These arguments for progressiveness of either Maidan or Anti-Maidan are
exaggerated and ultimately very weak. For example, the self-organization
of Maidan camps was not unique in scale when comparing to other
contemporary uprisings or Occupy-style campaigns (see Feigenbaum,
Frenzel, & McCurdy, 2013). Maidan camps lacked inclusive deliberation on
a significant scale, while grassroots initiatives co-existed with
hierarchical strategic decision-making by the right-wing opposition
parties and âcivil societyâ leaders whose critical contribution to
maintaining expensive camping infrastructure for three months is often
underestimated (Ishchenko, 2015, p. 154, 2018b). On the other hand, the
working-class base of Anti-Maidan protests is as exaggerated by
Kagarlitsky as Snyderâs fetishization of self-organization in Maidan.
The participation of the working class was massive in the Maidan
protests (despite probably fewer industrial workers), but labour unions
played an equally marginal role in both campaigns.
Yet even if the arguments were all factually correct, neither
self-organization, nor working-class base on their own do not make any
movement left-wing or even progressive. Civil society and
selforganization were also crucial elements of fascist and even
genocidal movements (Mann, 2005; Riley, 2010) and the working-class is a
major base for contemporary right-wing populist movements too (Kalb &
Halmai, 2011). Facing the fact of reactionary developments in Ukraine
under the governmental control and in the separatist republics since
2014, both pro-Maidan and anti-Maidan authors surprisingly rely on the
same argument â blaming Russia. For Snyder (2018) the Russian military
interventions in Crimea and Donbass hindered progressive development of
Maidanâs âdemocratic revolutionâ, while for Kagarlitsky (2016) Russia
aborted the Anti-Maidan âworkers uprisingâ in order to prevent further
escalation with the West.
In the following discussion, I show that both the Maidan and Anti-Maidan
protests initially lacked any political agent capable of left-wing
articulation of social injustice and grievances, and of organizing
progressive elements in the respective movements into political action
that would be independent of the dominant right-wing forces. This was
the missing ingredient for any meaningful attempts to challenge
right-wing hegemony within the respective movements.
The new left in Ukraine has been emerging since the perestroika years in
parallel and in opposition to the Communist party of the Soviet Union
and to the Communist-successor parties later. KPU used to be the major
one among such successors until it was banned in 2015. It tended to be
culturally conservative and uncritical towards Russian nationalism. Like
many other Ukrainian parties, KPU effectively sold MP offices to
opportunistic business people and likely received support from
oligarchs. Since 2006, it was a minor partner in the coalitions led by
the right-wing oligarchic Party of Regions of ex-president Viktor
Yanukovych. KPU leadershipâs politics in 2014 were very inconsistent,
combining radical anti-Maidan rhetoric with lack of real resistance and
disbandment of local party organizations that supported the separatist
uprising.[5]
Yet, the new left failed to build any alternative organization that
would be relevant in nationalscale politics. The whole field hardly
united more than 1000 activists around the country at any point in time.
Most of the groups were very fragile and did not survive more than a few
years, frequently splitting and re-uniting in a different configuration.
The causes for this were largely the same as for the general weakness of
post-Soviet civil society. The latter paradoxically combined a large
number of small local dispersed grassroots initiatives and usually split
off from them predominantly oligarchic-controlled political parties and
NGOs financially dependent on Western foundations (Ishchenko, 2011a, pp.
372���375, 2017, pp. 216â218). But for the new left the generally
unfavourable conditions of Ukrainian civil society were even more
aggravated by KPUâs domination in the left movement, exploiting
pro-Soviet attitudes of a segment of Ukrainian society, the strong
anti-Communism of Ukrainian intelligentsia, cultural conservatism of the
majority of Ukrainians, the new leftâs inability to rely on the national
identity-driven mobilization (like Ukrainian nationalists) or to benefit
from generous support from Western donors (like liberal NGOs)
(Ishchenko, 2011b, 2018a).
By the time Maidan protests erupted, the most important organization on
the Marxist side of the new left was Borotba (âStruggleâ). It had
developed from radical wings of KPU-affiliated organizations, aspiring
to build a new radical left party which would unite all revolutionary
Marxist-Leninists regardless of their specific tendency â Stalinist,
Trotskyist, Maoist etc. A much smaller âLeft Oppositionâ (LO) group
united some former Trotskyist activists and left-liberal intellectuals.
The Visual Culture Research Center (VCRC) was an important hub for left
and liberal intellectuals, cultural events, and was politically and
ideologically close to the Polish liberal magazine Krytyka Polityczna,
but was not a political organization. On the anarchist side the most
important organization was the Priama Diya (âDirect Actionâ) student
union. In 2009â2010, it was able to lead rather numerous and successful
student mobilizations (Ishchenko, 2017), although by the end of 2013 it
had become less active. Unlike the diverse and amorphous
left-libertarian âDirect Actionâ, the Autonomous Workersâ Union (AWU)
was the most ideologically coherent anarchist organization, aspiring to
build an anarcho-syndicalist union. But it is worth mentioning that it
was more successful in promoting culturally liberal agenda within the
new left rather than in labour organizing.
Despite all the conflicts, ideological and tactical differences, these
groups usually perceived each other as parts of the same âgenuineâ left
field and in opposition to the bureaucratic, âStalinistâ, âsoldoutâ âold
leftâ parties. They frequently cooperated and intersected with each
other in protest campaigns and public discussions. Also, despite the
diversity of new left initiatives, they converged in their strong
opposition to both Ukrainian and Russian nationalism.[6]
In 2004 the future activist core of Borotba split with KPU because of a
perceived surrender of KPU to a pro-Russian position and support for an
oligarchic candidate Viktor Yanukovych during the so-called Orange
revolution. The liberal and libertarian left were primarily hostile to
the culturally conservative tendencies among both Ukrainian and Russian
nationalists, as well as within old left parties. In 2013 the AWU
consistently denied any liberationist agenda in Ukrainian nationalism
and some AWU activists regarded post-Soviet Ukraine as a sub-imperialist
state (Gorbach, 2014). Many new left activists perceived Ukraineâs
geopolitical orientation between EU/NATO and Russia as a false problem.
Like the status of the Russian language in Ukraine, the memory of
conflicts between nationalists and communists, or other issues that were
provoking deeply opposing attitudes between mostly Ukrainian-speaking
western/central regions and mostly Russian-speaking eastern/ southern
regions, it was argued that these issues were exploited by the Ukrainian
elite in order to split Ukrainian working people from the West and from
the East of the country and to distract them from their common
social-economic exploitation by the ruling class.[7]
However, confronted with escalating nationalist and imperialist conflict
in 2014 the Ukrainian new left succumbed to nationalist polarization. As
I am showing below, almost all of the new left groups mentioned above
supported Maidan protests. Later, many of their activists took a hostile
position towards Anti-Maidan and supported the Anti-Terrorist Operation
(ATO) against the separatist uprising in Donbass. However, Borotba
distanced themselves from the Maidan uprising and later actively joined
Anti-Maidan protests and eventually supported the pro-Russian
separatists. Their anti-nationalist position proved to be superficial
and lacking a serious analysis of the national, identity, and
geopolitical problems of Ukrainian society. Without substantive left
internationalist answers to the very real, even if divisive issues, many
ultimately accepted right-wing hegemonic explanations.
For many pro-Maidan left-wing activists the economic criticism of the
DCFTA treaty with the EU had not been articulated before the protests
erupted. The question of EU integration had never been a focus of the
Ukrainian new left discussions and polemics, with the exception of some
sporadic and inconsequential articles (Gorbach, 2009). Among the new
left groups only Borotba had published an extended critical analysis of
the EU association agreement before the Maidan protests erupted and had
organized a small campaign against the treaty (Kirichuk, 2013).[8]
Moreover, the majority of the new left active in 2013 joined the
movement on the wave of disappointment with the âOrange revolutionâ
(late 2000s) and were thus too young to have participated in the global
justice movement of the early 2000s, and lacked familiarity with the
left criticism of free trade and neoliberal integration projects. They
were simply not prepared and largely ignorant of the debates on the
DCFTA with the EU and the Customs Union with Russia.[9]
At the same time, the left had no realistic prospects of shifting Maidan
towards a more progressive agenda or to get any other significant
political achievements. The problems started with the scale of the
protests: millions of people in various forms participated in Maidan
through different activities, while the new left were merely groups of a
few dozen activists in the largest cities. The three main opposition
parties â the right-wing oligarchic âFatherlandâ, UDAR and the far right
Svoboda â were crucial in sustaining the infrastructure of the multiple
protest camps for three months and were unchallenged as political
representatives of the movement in negotiations with the government. It
was clear that it was precisely these parties that would take power
after the overthrow of Yanukovych (Ishchenko, 2014b). Moreover, unlike
the radical nationalists that played a role disproportionate to their
relative numbers, the new left did not have a national party structure
like Svoboda, well-known and represented in the parliament, with
numerous local cells of ideological activists ready to participate
intensely in protests across the country. Equally, they were also not
able to unite into an umbrella coalition such as the Right Sector, which
gained prominence during the violent escalation (Ishchenko, 2016a).
While the far right were preparing for radical confrontation with the
government for years before Maidan, the new left were hardly involved in
any earlier violent protest actions (Ishchenko, 2016b, p. 24). In Kiev,
where the main events happened, the new left participation in Maidan
protests was unsystematic and only loosely coordinated between different
groups (Popovych, 2015, p. 106; Salamaniuk, 2015, p. 128). Moreover, the
left activists were attacked several times by the far right in the very
beginning of the protests when attempting small interventions into the
rallies with the message of reframing âEuropean valuesâ into an
egalitarian and feminist direction (Channell-Justice, 2016, pp. 118â119;
Kravchuk, 2013). The crucial problems of the left political
interventions into Maidan were not only the drastic disparity in
resources, organizational strength, and coordination capacity between
the right and the new left, but also the anti-communist attitudes and
outright repression of the left which was usually tolerated by other
protesters.
Nevertheless, there were three main points of convergence between
liberal and libertarian new left and the Maidan protesters that both
motivated the activists and which they tried to emphasize in the
movement (while they were less inspiring and dubious for class-centric
Marxists). Firstly, the new left hoped to articulate gender equality,
minority rights and other libertarian principles under the popular frame
of âEuropean valuesâ and in contrast to the Russian governmentâs
conservative turn (Channell-Justice, 2016, pp. 191â195), while the
problematic nature of the EU and the economic consequences of the DCFTA
for Ukraine were misunderstood or perceived as less important. However,
there was a large gap between interpretation of âEuropean valuesâ by
left-liberal feminists and that of the majority of protesters:
Whereas feminists felt that their association of tolerance and equality
with Europe was a more accurate picture of how Europeanization would
look, these discourses were not part of the idea of Europe that was
dominant during the protests. For most protesters, European âvaluesâ
meant respect for the sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation, however the
nationsâ citizens defined it. (Channel-Justice, 2016, p. 194)
Secondly, the important point of convergence with Maidan movement was
opposition to police violence and, in particular, repressive laws
against protesters and NGOs passed by the parliament with procedural
violations on January 16, 2014. A systemic curtailment of political
freedoms pushed previously skeptical left groups and activists to
critically support the Maidan protests (AWU-Kyiv, 2014a). Even outright
anti-Maidan Borotba condemned the laws and organized some symbolic
actions against the threat of âcivil warâ, though separately from Maidan
protests (Borotba, 2014a).
Last but not least, Channell-Justiceâs (2016, p. 108) ethnographic study
of small left-libertarian and feminist groups in Kiev Maidan protests,
points out, âself-organizationâ was central to the new left activists in
Maidan. Dozens of grassroots self-organized initiatives appeared within
Maidan movement: for protest mobilization, self-defense, humanitarian
initiatives, education, media engagement, and many other aims. The
liberal and libertarian left had apparently emotional attraction to
âspontaneous anarchismâ of âthe biggest and the most radical social
protest in post-Soviet Ukraineâ (AST-Kharkov, 2014). However, the
self-organized initiatives did not constitute any autonomous political
agent independent from the right-wing opposition during Maidan protests
and had failed to institutionalize politically. As Oleg Zhuravlev argues
(2015), based on in-depth interviews with a large number of regular
âapoliticalâ Maidan protesters, the latter lacked its own political
language to formulate their social grievances into clear political
demands and as a result could propose no alternative or a more radical
programme to the narrow anti-Yanukovych and constitutional reform
demands of the political opposition, the nationalist agenda promoted by
the far right, or the neoliberal agenda of Western-oriented NGOs. Snyder
and likeminded liberal protagonists of Maidan are right to claim that
there were plenty of self-organized initiatives at the movement.
However, they are clearly wrong in exaggerating their progressive
political impact and ignoring their failure to institutionalize as an
independent political force. This seemingly strong self-organized
movement with little trust towards the opposition partiesâ leaders very
easily conceded power to them after Yanukovychâs escape from Kiev.
The new left could potentially propose an alternative programme for
progressive elements in Maidan by articulating social justice demands.
However, as a result of their own very weak resources and organizations,
lack of independent strategy and independent analysis and repression
from the far right, the liberal and libertarian new left did not
constitute any autonomous political subject in the Maidan protests
themselves. The new left rather adapted to the right-wing hegemony in
the Maidan movement, often completely avoiding self-presentation as the
left (Salamaniuk, 2015, p. 129). Their own activities were limited to
support of humanitarian, educational, feminist and student initiatives
that did not have any explicitly left-wing political agenda and in the
same time did not allow systematic promotion of anything beyond the
agenda of anti-governmental and anti-police self-organization. For
example, the activists of the left-libertarian âDirect Actionâ student
union played an important role in some of the self-organized student
initiatives during the Kiev protests. They imported the idea of regular
horizontal assembly from Western progressive movements and conducted
their meetings in a building occupied by the protesters (Khodorivska,
2015). However, they did not transcend the (neo)liberal agenda of
university autonomy and anti-corruption, and did not institutionalize
the student assembly for continuous control over education policies
(Slukvin, 2015, pp. 150â152). A post-Trotskyist group âLeft Oppositionâ
formulated a 10-point left-wing economic programme and tried to
propagate it among Maidan protesters, however, without any obvious
success. Even in Lviv and Kharkov, where the local political
conjunctures were somewhat more favourable and the left nationalists
from the âAutonomous Resistanceâ and anarchists from the AWU
participated in a more organized way, their political achievements were
limited to increased recognition, gaining some resources and connections
with other activist groups, however, not shifting the protestâs agenda
to the left (Salamaniuk, 2015, pp. 131â133).
The new left faced a difficult dilemma about Maidan: either participate
in the campaign with an alien agenda and even anti-left attitudes, or
ignore the most important political events in the whole post-Soviet
history of Ukraine (Salamaniuk, 2015; Viedrov, 2015). Indeed, all
initiatives for a âthird campâ â both against the government and the
right-wing opposition â remained marginal. However, predictable lack of
any political prospects and gains for the new left from participating in
the protests where the various oligarchic, radical nationalist,
neoliberal right-wing organizations were so much stronger, made joining
Maidan a doubtful virtue. At the same time, it carried the risk for
progressive activists of turning into a âleft wingâ for Ukrainian
national-liberals. As I am showing below, being forced to defend their
dubious choice and uneasy compromises the proMaidan left slid into
justification of the new neoliberal-nationalist government and further
nationalist developments in the Maidan movement after the Russian
annexation of Crimea and the start of Anti-Maidan protests in southern
and eastern regions. Meanwhile, the earlier divisions between
Marxist-Leninist and liberal/libertarian left have deepened, which made
the left weaker in confronting the nationalist polarization.
In parallel to Maidan protests the pro-Yanukovych Party of Regions
mobilized Anti-Maidan rallies and paid camps that were organized in a
top-down way. However, after Yanukovychâs overthrow Anti-Maidan turned
into a grassroots movement in major cities of mostly Russian-speaking
southern and eastern regions. The movement voiced not only pro-Russian
demands but also socio-economic grievances of the industrial working
class (PS.Lab, 2015, pp. 94â95).[10]
Instead of bridging progressive elements from Maidan and Anti-Maidan
movements and articulating an internationalist alternative to the
nationalist polarization, most of the pro-Maidan new left ignored the
demands of Anti-Maidan for social justice. Only in part was it a result
of escalating violence between the two movements, which ended up hurting
some of the pro-Maidan left as well. Switching power to Russian
authorities or separatists threatened jobs, lifestyle and freedom of
expression for creative workers that were over-represented among the new
left and often employed in NGOs supported by Western donors. The
class-blind, politically naive, and wishful thinking embrace of
self-organization, âEuropean valuesâ, and anti-police authoritarianism
in Maidan protests by the liberal and libertarian new left structured
ideological justification of the opposition to AntiMaidan. A known
anarchist blogger Alexander Wolodarskij (2014) compared Maidan to
Anti-Maidan in a typically orientalist way:
If the majority of Maidan protesters had spontaneous aspirations for
freedom, distrust for politicians, a kind of unreflected ârawâ
anarchism, while in Anti-Maidan all social protest potential flowed into
a reactionary channel â the slaves demanded a harder lash and shackles.
At least Maidan naively desired a European carrot. Anti-Maidan
hysterically demands a Eurasian stick.
Pro-Maidan left usually underestimated the grassroots component of the
Anti-Maidan mobilization, emphasizing the influence of Russia and of the
former ruling Party of Regions instead. Although the role of right-wing
oligarchic parties and Western influence was not a reason to distance
from Maidan protests before. The pro-Maidan left called the emerging DPR
and LPR âjuntasâ because many local law-enforcement joined the emerging
separatist authorities and militias (AWU-Kyiv, 2014b). Yet, at the same
time, pro-Maidan left supported the so-called Anti-Terrorist operation
of the new Ukrainian government against the separatist rebels in
Donbass. They argued that conservative values of Russian nationalists
among Anti-Maidan leaders made it impossible to support the movement
(Mrachnik, 2014). Yet radical Ukrainian nationalists in the violent
vanguard and among political representatives of Maidan was not a reason
to withdraw the left support from the movement but rather to downplay
far-right significance in a typical for Ukrainian liberals way
(Ishchenko, 2014c, 2018b). Socio-economic grievances were more saliently
articulated by Anti-Maidan than by Maidan protesters, yet the pro-Maidan
left mocked them as insufficiently radical and anti-capitalist, even
drawing a parallel with the Nazis (Shiitman, 2014).
The pro-Maidan logic of the liberal and libertarian left pushed them
away from the Anti-Maidan despite their typical emphasis in the past on
social-economic issues common for the East and the West of the country,
despite all the geopolitical, historical and cultural cleavages. On the
other hand, the Marxist supporters of Anti-Maidan from Borotba were
unexpectedly pushed into downplaying the influence of Russia and Russian
nationalists in the conflict, despite their rather strong criticism of
neoliberal and imperialist Russian government before. The idea that
Anti-Maidan resisted the âfascist coup dâĂŠtatâ in Kiev and hopes for a
progressive development of the âanti-capitalistâ elements in the
movement justified such unholy alliance with conservative Russian
nationalists, even if recognizing their harmful influence (Borotba,
2014b, 2014d, 2014e).
Fear of Ukrainian radical nationalism after Maidanâs victory was indeed
a major motive for AntiMaidan protests and a separatist uprising in
Donbass (Giuliano, 2018, pp. 168â169). âFascist juntaâ was a typical
trope in Russian criticism of the new post-Maidan government in Ukraine
(Gaufman, 2015), particularly referring to the inclusion of far-right
representatives into the new government, its nationalist initiatives and
broken constitutional procedures in the course of power transfer from
expresident Yanukovych. However, the widespread âantifascistâ symbolism
and rhetoric was not necessarily progressive in this context. The
victory in WWII, a crucial element of Soviet patriotism, had been
increasingly mythologized and instrumentalized to legitimate Putinâs
political regime and had become an important part of a new conservative
Russian nationalism. Yanukovych in Ukraine also instrumentalized
âantifascistâ rhetoric against the opposition parties (Kuzio, 2015, p.
161). In contrast to them, Borotba activists compared the post-Maidan
Ukraine rather with pro-American authoritarian regimes in the Third
World than with Nazi Germany (Borotba, 2014c). Yet, due to Borotbaâs
relative weakness, they were not able to re-frame âantifascistâ rhetoric
into a more adequate and progressive form, while their reiteration of
the âfascist juntaâ term â an overkill in the system of post-Soviet
cultural references â played into the Russian nationalist/Soviet
patriotic narrative.
Besides, Borotba tried to articulate anti-oligarchic attitudes and
socio-economic grievances of Anti-Maidan protesters as âanti-capitalistâ
and âworking classâ (Kirichuk, 2014; Levin, 2015, p. 117; Serhiienko,
2014; Shapinov, 2014b). Lacking systematic comparison of the class base
of Maidan and Anti-Maidan protests, one may assume from the regional
distribution of support a stronger presence of industrial workers in
Anti-Maidan. However, they did not constitute an organized force:
âworker activists ... acted as individuals, or as members of groups
without specific relation to local workplacesâ (Clarke, 2016, p. 542).
The leadership of the major confederation of independent labour unions
supported Maidan and was hostile to Anti-Maidan protests.
Both, the working class and (especially) the anti-capitalist identities
were far less salient in AntiMaidan mobilization than Soviet identity â
also often mentioned by Borotba activists themselves (Levin, 2015, p.
116; Serhiienko, 2014; Shapinov, 2015b). The âSoviet peopleâ was a
political nation-building project that was supposed to transcend ethnic
identities in the USSR. Soviet identity was still strong in Donbass,
however, it did not necessarily mean progressive anti-capitalism.
Nostalgic sentiments about the USSR were regularly combined, even before
Maidan, with Russian nationalist and conservative claims and symbols:
traditional patriarchal values, religious mobilization, sometimes even
monarchist sympathies (Laruelle, 2016). Borotba also often resorted to
the Soviet identity in order to criticize âneoliberal reforms and the
general post-Soviet collapse of the economy, social welfare sphere,
marketization, which so strongly affected Soviet workersâ (Levin, 2015,
p. 121). Similar to the pro-Maidan left, Borotba adapted itself to
hegemonic Anti-Maidan discourses and the dominant demands for
self-determination referenda, regional autonomy, Russian language
status, adding progressive interpretations only unsystematically.
However, even if Anti-Maidan was not a proletarian anti-capitalist
movement and the government in Kiev was not exactly âfascistâ, the
threat for the communist (KPU and Borotba) left was real and justified
counter-mobilization. The new government and the victorious pro-Maidan
public were in their majority explicitly anti-communist and indulged
far-right violence (Ishchenko, 2016b, pp. 84â86). Moreover, in contrast
to Maidan â where the left activists and symbols were attacked, while
the right-wing opposition parties were political representatives of the
protests and coordinated decision-making â Anti-Maidan presented a
better opportunity for leftist intervention. Not only did it lack
anti-communist attitudes, but also an obvious political leadership (at
least before the start of the separatist armed revolt in Donbass) and
was quite decentralized, thus opening space for small new left groups.
Indeed, Borotba tried to exploit this opportunity by organizing a
systematic agitation and joining the coordination of protests in Kharkov
and Odessa. In Odessa, a Borotba activist was nominated as a candidate
for the position of city mayor from Anti-Maidan (Borotba, 2014f).
Borotba was more active and visible in Anti-Maidan protests than any
other new left groups in Maidan. In FebruaryâApril, 2014 the left-wing
organizations, including Borotba and the old left parties, were reported
in 19% of the total Anti-Maidan protest events. This was still far below
the activity of Russian nationalist groups (reported in almost half of
Anti-Maidan protest events around the country). Yet, in certain cities
like Kharkov, Nikolaiev, and Dnepropetrovsk the left activity was more
intense or on a par with Russian nationalists (Ishchenko, 2016b, pp.
54â57).
Even though violent confrontations sometimes broke out between pro and
anti-Maidan activists, before the beginning of April 2014, Anti-Maidan
protesters generally mirrored non-violent Maidan rallies, camps, and the
occupation of administrative buildings. However, the separatist armed
insurrection that was started on 12 April 2014 by a group of Russian
nationalist volunteers under the command of a former colonel in the
Russian security service Igor âStrelkovâ Girkin, changed things
drastically. Unlike the careful and opportunist KPU leadership, Borotba
spoke openly (even if critically) in defense of the separatist republics
DPR and LPR (Borotba, 2014g, 2014h). Borotba hoped, however, not for
small Russian puppet states, but for the start of democratic and social
transformation of the whole Ukraine (Albu, 2014; Zelenskii, 2015).
However, like other new left groups Borotba had neither resources, nor
experience in organized violence to play any substantial role in the
separatist revolt or in the emerging unrecognized states. Even if they
had, they would probably follow the unenviable fate of other warlords
who were killed or tightly integrated into DPR and LPR structures, while
Russian government took them under strict control and closed space for
any independent politics (Clarke, 2016). The organization was
effectively split on the issue of unquestionable support for pro-Russian
insurrection; only a few Borotba activists actually joined the
separatist militia.
Even though Borotba was more visible and active than pro-Maidan new left
groups, its political impact was also ultimately insignificant,
especially after the armed insurrection started. The argument about a
progressive âworkersâ uprisingâ in Donbass that was gradually aborted by
the Russian government seeking a compromise with the West (Clarke, 2016;
Kagarlitsky, 2016) is wrong as there were little progressive
developments to be aborted in the first place. In reality, it was a
chance to develop a peaceful protest opposition against the post-Maidan
neoliberal-nationalist government that was aborted by the armed uprising
in April 2014. Though working-class socio-economic grievances were a
major factor of mobilization, Anti-Maidan only developed a nationalist,
not a social alternative. Like in Maidan protests before, here too the
progressive elements lacked organized political representation to
articulate a clear agenda for social change. The new left (Borotba) were
too weak (especially when the initiative was seized by Russian
nationalist rebels) and the old left (KPU) was too opportunistic and
even ideologically incapable of doing this. Borotba made a suicidal
political mistake of not distancing itself clearly from the separatist
uprising, while also not having any capacity to occupy an independent
space in the structures of the pro-Russian puppet states. Exaggerating
the âfascistâ danger of Ukrainian nationalism and wishful thinking about
the prospects of progressive elements within the Anti-Maidan movement
while downplaying the increasing Russian influence over the movement
contributed further to this mistake.
Since summer 2014 Ukrainian left has marginalized even more as a result
of the polarized nationalist climate in the public sphere, squabbling
and splits among the new left groups, political repression, intensified
far-right violence. Many dropped all political activism and cooperation
with left groups; many others concentrated on small-scale local activism
and tried to avoid divisive and dangerous questions of Maidan and the
war in Donbass. Those political groups that tried not to ignore the
pressing questions and give answers to them were further converging with
pro-nationalist and pro-imperialist positions rather than formulating an
internationalist alternative. Below I am analysing the most elaborate
ideological justifications among the new left groups in the period when
it was becoming increasingly evident that Maidan did not turn into a
democratic anti-authoritarian revolution but had brought to power one of
the most neoliberal and nationalist governments in Europe dependent on
the US support. On the other side, there had been already enough
evidence that the new separatist entities in Donbass were not the
workersâ states building socialism but Russian puppet-states without any
progressive prospects. Despite disappointing political developments on
both sides of the frontline, many of the left remained committed to the
nationalist camp that they chose in 2014 and have been developing
theoretical rationalizations of their position. They expose certain
arguments and their ideological/theoretical sources that have some
general relevance to understand the convergence of parts of the left
with right-wing camps in the growing great power rivalry between the
Western states and Russia.
The anarchist theorization was most systematically expounded in the
âProgram of the revolutionâs first dayâ document prepared by the
Autonomous Workersâ Union (2016) and the writings on Nihilist (
), a website of âanarchists and anti-authoritarian radical leftâ close
to the AWU. Maidan was presented as a revolution against the tightly
interconnected classes of state bureaucracy and grand bourgeoisie
(notorious post-Soviet âoligarchsâ). They parasitically extracted
Ukraineâs resources in the form of âcorruption rentâ that was syphoned
to offshore accounts and property abroad without productive reinvestment
into the Ukrainian economy. On the political level this parasitic
structure was supported and defended by the competing clientelist
networks (âclansâ) built around every other âoligarchâ. Maidan prevented
Yanukovychâs âFamilyâ clan from monopolizing power and allegedly
restored bourgeois pluralism. However, the âcounter-revolutionaryâ
intervention of the Russian regime, which is close to âfascistâ and
supports âclerical-conservativeâ and âtotalitarian nationalistâ reaction
in Donbass, precluded from fully accomplishing the âbourgeois
revolutionâ in Ukraine (Zadiraka, 2017a). The new Ukrainian revolutionâs
tasks are to continue what the Maidan failed to achieve: the ultimate
dismantling of the Ukrainian state as a base for big capital
accumulation. The deepening of the revolution is supposed to lead to a
decentralized system of self-government with a dominant socialized (but
not state-owned) economy that is cohabiting with small private producers
(AWU, 2016). In practice the Nihilistâs support for radical cuts to the
âhypercentralizedâ state â allegedly the major obstacle on the way to
Ukraineâs âmodernizationâ â without challenging capitalism first
(Zadiraka, 2014) turned into support for neoliberal reforms of
post-Maidan government including the most unpopular ones in Ukrainian
society, such as the reform that cuts free medical services in state
clinics (Zadiraka, 2017b).
There are three main sources of this position. Firstly, the idea that
bourgeois revolutions are allegedly still possible and even progressive
in the twenty-first century is an uncritical application of Soviet
Marxist-Leninist templates about linear sequence of social formations.
It is paradoxical for anarchists but understandable in post-Soviet
context with little knowledge about the advances and discussions in
Western Marxist theory of the twentieth century. A Nihilist author even
proposed to analyse the USSR as a âfeudal-absolutist socialismâ (Kutnii,
2017), implicitly suggesting that people who reside in contemporary
Ukraine had been living under fundamentally the same formation at least
since mediaeval Kievan Rus and which was challenged only by the
âbourgeois revolutionâ in 2014.
Secondly, anarchist anti-Bolshevism helped to interpret nationalist and
imperialist conflict in Ukraine in terms of ârevolutionâ and
âcounter-revolutionâ denying any progressive meaning in defense of
Soviet achievements or symbolism spread among Donbass separatists
(Shiitman, 2015a).
The final source is the postmodernist turn of the left to the politics
of identity, reconciling symbolic emancipation of the minorities with
the unchallenged basis of the globalizing neoliberal capitalism. The
agenda-setting article titled âCosmopolitanism against the Russian
Worldâ by Alexander Wolodarskij (Shiitman, 2015b) firmly takes the side
of progressive globalization against the conservative Russian
nationalist project. Indeed, within the âbourgeois revolutionâ narrative
about Ukrainian conflict, (neo)liberals and the global capital are not
the enemies of the left. Instead, they are allies against the local
conservative reactionaries. A recurring interpretation of the conflict
in Ukraine appeared in the texts of Nihilist authors, claiming it as a
conflict of values â of the progressive Western world against
reactionary Russian world â essentializing conservatism up to
antiRussian xenophobia and reminding orientalist âclash of
civilizationsâ arguments.[11] While regularly attacking Russian
imperialism, Nihilist texts often basically dismissed the problem of
Western imperialism and US-dependence of post-Maidan Ukraine as hardly
anything more than a Russian propaganda conspiracy theory that provided
a common ground of âanti-imperialismâ for the âauthoritarianâ left
convergence with pro-Russian far right. It is particularly noteworthy
that any discussion of capitalismâs crisis reaching the limits was
lacking from the Nihilistâs writings. The whole âmodernizingâ agenda in
alliance with transnational capital for Ukraine could only be based on
the assumption of a progressive development potential in the capitalist
system. Moreover, any defense of national sovereignty and the state role
in the economy could be interpreted as a concession to reactionaries.
The very opposite assumption of a critical capitalist crisis was crucial
for Borotbaâs Marxist theorization of support for the pro-Russian camp.
A programmatic article âMarxism and the war in Donbassâ by Borotbaâs
ideological leader Viktor Shapinov (2015a) provides a good example. He
argues that âantifascistâ, âinternationalistâ, âanti-oligarchicâ
rhetoric as well as âanti-neoliberal policiesâ of DPR and LPR prove that
they are a progressive side in the war in contrast to post-Maidan
Ukrainian government. Yet, his arguments are weak and prone to demagogy.
The Donbass separatistsâ âantifascismâ and âinternationalismâ targets
Ukrainian nationalism yet is usually blind to Russian nationalism. The
criticism of oligarchs is an empty signifier in Ukrainian politics that
is exploited even by prominent Ukrainian oligarchs themselves
(Oleksiyenko, 2015). The only examples of âanti-neoliberalismâ Shapinov
provides are the âtentative stepsâ to nationalization of the property of
some pro-Ukrainian oligarchs or even of the property abandoned by owners
because of war. However, any strategic anti-neoliberal transformations
lack both economic basis and any significant progressive political force
to push them forward. At the end, Shapinov himself is forced to
acknowledge that â[O]f course, this policy is not socialist. But it
leaves room for the left, the communists, to participate in such a
movement under their own banner, with their own ideas and slogans,
without abandoning their own views and programâ (Shapinov, 2015a).
Indeed, the pro-separatist left would not be allowed to pursue political
activity in Ukraine but the tightly controlled regimes of separatist
âpeopleâs republicsâ did not allow any political opposition at all,
while even loyal Communist left activities were reduced to ritualistic
and cultural actions (Ishchenko, 2016b, pp. 90â91). At the start of the
conflict Shapinov forecasted that âthe very logic of the struggle pushes
the leaders of the DPR and LPR toward anti-oligarchic, if not
anti-capitalist, politicsâ (Shapinov, 2014a), yet these hopes have
evidently stayed unfulfilled so far.
The theoretical sources of this position are a specific interpretation
of Leninâs imperialism theory influenced by Wallersteinâs world-systems
analysis. Shapinov argues that the global order today is not built on
rival imperialisms any more like before the First World War. It is a
US-led hierarchical system, which is now falling apart because some
states (particularly, Russia) or transnational formations aspire to
challenge the order while others are resisting them to maintain the
status quo. During the crisis progressive movements may benefit from
support by anti-American rivals that may not necessarily be progressive.
Here Shapinov places Donbass separatists alongside Irish republicans
(assisted by Germans), Spanish republicans, and Rojava Kurds. However,
he fails to compare the balance of internal progressive forces in DPR
and LPR vs external support with these iconic examples. The case of
Donbass revolt rather proves that the left and progressive movements,
now much weaker than in the XX century, are much more likely to be
exploited by the reactionary states challenging US hegemony rather than
otherwise.
Both in the form of the âbourgeois revolutionâ narrative or in the form
of the world-system crisis, these are theorizations of the left
convergence with right-wing pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian camps.
Alignment with the transnational capital or with Russian anti-American
politics was supposed to help âmodernizeâ Ukraine either to the
âprogressiveâ global capitalism future, or to defend Soviet
modernization achievements from colonizing integration as a poor
periphery of the EU. Ukrainian anarchists and Marxists had to silence
internationalism, construct sophisticated explanations why Russian
nationalists are less dangerous than Ukrainian nationalists or why
Western states and capital are more progressive than Russian,
interiorize propaganda myths of competing nationalist and imperialist
camps. Both AWU/Nihilist and Borotba politics were detrimental not only
for the prospects of independent left in Ukraine but also for the groups
themselves. AWU has been losing activists, particularly, because of the
leadershipâs position, perceived by many as implicitly ânationalistâ and
âmilitaristâ, and at the moment of writing is not an active organization
anymore, while Nihilist functions only as a media team. Some of the
leaders have renounced any left or even anarchist identity (Wolodarskij,
2015), which is indeed hardly compatible with cheerleading for
globalized capitalism. Meanwhile, Borotba became better known and
visible, yet at the same time associated with the separatists. Facing
repressions, the organization stopped any public activity in Ukraine.
The key activists emigrated also not finding themselves in the enclosed
politics of the DPR/LPR outside of educational activities.[12]
The lack of progressive developments in Ukraine or in separatist
republics of Donbass since 2014, anticipated by the cheerleaders of
Maidan and Anti-Maidan protests, are not only the result of external
âcounter-revolutionaryâ interventions but primarily of the political
structure and hegemonic ideologies of the respective movements. Neither
the progressive elements in Maidan nor in AntiMaidan protests ever
constituted themselves into independent political agents capable of
challenging the hegemonic right-wing forces in both movements. The new
left groups were too weak, unable to contribute any crucial resources
for success of the movements and (especially in Kiev Maidan) lacking
coordination and strategic vision to articulate social injustice
grievances in an egalitarian progressive agenda, unite self-organized
initiatives in Maidan or fragmented working class in Anti-Maidan for
politically autonomous action. Instead, the left adapted to the
hegemonic rightwing discourses and followed the logic of nationalist
polarization instead of proposing an internationalist class alternative
to it.
The article traced nationalist polarization dynamics within the
Ukrainian new left. After choosing to support the Maidan movement the
liberal and libertarian left were only able to find a small common
denominator on the basis of abstract self-organization, liberal values,
and anti-authoritarianism. At the same time, it made the liberal and
libertarian left less capable of resisting the polarization dynamics
when the Anti-Maidan protests started; it structured their denial of any
progressive elements in the counter-movement. Some of the anarchist
groups rationalized continuing support for more and more problematic
developments of the post-Maidan regime in Ukraine in the form of the
âbourgeois revolutionâ theory, anticipating progressive Ukraineâs
modernization from closer integration into global capitalism and
essentializing Russian conservatism. In contrast, the Marxist-Leninist
Borotba organization attempted to seize political opportunities by
supporting the more plebeian and decentralized Anti-Maidan protests and
reacting to the far-right threat after the Maidan victory. In the course
of events Borotba activists had to delude themselves into thinking that
Russian nationalists were not as reactionary as Ukrainian nationalists
and that the world-system crisis would allow exploiting Russian
anti-Western politics for progressive purposes rather than the opposite.
In the process of the Maidan/Anti-Maidan polarization the heterogeneous
but mutually cooperating ânew leftâ milieu greatly diverged from each
other, converging with respective nationalist camps as their minor
supporters.
Since the start of the global economic crisis in 2007â2008 radical mass
movements and uprisings have been spreading around the globe together
with enthusiastic anticipations among the left. However, many of the
recent protest waves produced very little progressive developments, some
had disastrous consequences for the people in their respective countries
(e.g. Syria and Libya). The Ukrainian conflict is another case that
warns against wishful thinking and uncritical support of movements even
if with significant self-organized elements and working-class base but
without prospects for any independent left politics under the
overwhelming predominance of the hegemonic nationalist, religious, or
neoliberal right-wingers.
Besides, the analysis of pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian theoretical
rationalizations developed by Ukrainian (ex-)left activists contributes
to understanding the convergence of some parts of the left with
right-wing camps, failing to produce an internationalist class
alternative at the time of a growing great power rivalry and tensions
within the global neoliberal order. Appeals to the necessity of
defending liberal values against conservative nationalist encroachment,
or to stand by the workers against the neoliberal establishment, or to
support the rising BRICS powers against US unipolar world are recurrent
in the recent cases of siding with neoliberal candidates against
right-wing populists in the West or with anti-American authoritarians in
the East. It is also noteworthy that divisions in the left polemics
around different cases often correlate with each other (e.g. positions
on Ukrainian conflict and on Syrian war) pointing to a possible major
re-alignment within the left.
Today, some of Ukrainian new left are converging back on a ânon-campistâ
position critical of both sides of the conflict and their foreign
supporters. The failure of authoritarian nationalist consolidation of
Petro Poroshenkoâs regime after 2019 elections may open political
opportunities for a new internationalist left. However, these primarily
intellectual initiatives, small media and NGOs are yet to make gains in
the social mobilizations that could resist nationalist polarization and
put forward common class interests of the oppressed. Furthermore, they
are yet to find progressive solutions to allegedly âfalseâ issues of
national identity and geopolitical alignment that became so real and
easy to exploit by competing and mutually reinforcing nationalists and
rivalling great powers.
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[1] âMaidanâ literally means the central square of the city. Since 1990
Kievâs central square was the starting spot for several mass campaigns
ending in a change of the government. Because of this, âmaidanâ acquired
a meaning of a large anti-governmental protest campaign usually with
nationalist-liberal pro-Western agenda.
[2] At least up until president Petro Poroshenkoâs devastating defeat in
2019 elections. Rhetoric of the new president Volodymyr Zelenskyi is
less nationalist and polarizing, yet the direction of his policies is
still not clear at the moment of writing.
[3] For extended analysis of the events in Ukraine in 2013â2014, from
leftist perspectives, and their historical, political economy, and
international contexts see, especially, de Ploeg (2017); Ishchenko
(2014a, 2015); Ishchenko & Yurchenko (2019); Yurchenko (2018).
[4] I also draw on my earlier research (Ishchenko, 2011a, 2011b, 2016b,
2017) together with my personal participation in the movement since 2001
and multiple discussions with the activists.
[5] See more on KPU and for the general mapping of Ukrainian left
movement on the eve of Maidan events in Ishchenko (2016b, in press).
[6] The only exception was the âAutonomous Resistanceâ (Avtonomnyi Opir)
organization, which originated in the extreme right milieu but
completely transformed itself into a kind of left anti-authoritarian
Ukrainian nationalism and used to be the most important group close to
the ânew leftâ in the largest western Ukrainian city of Lviv.
Noteworthy, cooperation with the âAutonomous Resistanceâ used to be a
very controversial issue among the new left before Maidan.
[7] See analysis of Ukrainian new left discussions on
nationalism-related issues during various campaigns in Ishchenko (2011a,
2011b, 2017).
[8] The main points of criticism by the Anti-Maidan left were related to
the immediate consequences for Ukrainian workers, futility of
integration into the crisis-burdened EU, and the destruction of the
economic basis for independent development. Analysis of the DCFTA
consequences for Ukraineâs economy in 2016 largely confirmed these
predictions (Kravchuk, 2016).
[9] A group of Marxist economists started to publish a serious critical
analysis of the EU association agreement with Ukraine but only since
2015 when the issue had been already decided (Kravchuk, 2015, 2016;
Kravchuk, Popovych, Knottnerus, & van Heijningen, 2016).
[10] According to Zhukovâs modelling (2016) economic factors were
stronger predictors of separatist violence in Donbass than ethnic or
cultural factors.
[11] A very telling example are typical accusations of Ukrainian radical
nationalists for allegedly professing âRussian worldâ ideology only
because Ukrainian far right are also conservative, sexist, and illiberal
like Russian government, e.g. (AK19, 2018; Mrachnik, 2018).
[12] For example, educational Marxist-feminist club Avrora organised by
ex-Borotba activists in Donetsk.