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Title: The German revolution
Author: Andrew Flood
Date: 2001
Language: en
Topics: Germany, Left Communism, revolution
Source: Retrieved on 2nd August 2020 from https://web.archive.org/web/20070612102425/http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/history/german_rev.html

Andrew Flood

The German revolution

Looking back it is sometimes hard to realize the panic the European

ruling class was in at the end of the First World War. From 1918 to 1924

Workers councils had appeared in Germany, Russia and Hungary, factory

committees in Italy, and armed industrial war was being waged in

Barcelona. Even in Ireland the War of Independence included a massive

radical mass element with the Limerick soviet, workplace occupations a

general strike and tens of thousands taking part in May Day

demonstrations even in small rural towns. With this in mind it is

unsurprising that the British Prime Minister Lloyd George could write to

the French Premier Clemenceau saying “The whole existing order is

questioned by the masses from one end of Europe to the other”

For many, particularly on the pre-War Marxist left it was widely

expected that the German working class would initiate the world

revolution. Anarchists as it happened were correct in generally looking

to Russia but it was easy to see why many pin pointed Germany to play

this role. Germany did indeed see a revolutionary upheaval in these

years but as we shall see what many had seen as its strength, its

disciplined working class loyal to the SPD turned out to be its major

weakness.

The German Social Democratic Party (SPD) was the largest and most

influential left organisation in the world before WW1. In 1914 it had

one million members and 90 daily papers. It had hundreds of full time

officials and a huge range of social and sports clubs. It was said that

it was possible to live entirely within the party. The Erfut program of

1891 on which it was based declared it to be revolutionary with no

illusions in parliament. And as the Prussian State had never allowed it

into power it had yet to betray this trust. Indeed its members were

subject to significant repression, from 1890 — 1912 SPD members were

sentenced to a total of 1,244 years in prison.

However the party did little apart from engage in propaganda and

education of its members. Despite its revolutionary language it was

largely based around winning elections and indeed had led the push in

the 1890’s to get the anarchists physically thrown out of the second

international on just this issue. There was a low level of industrial

struggle in Germany but in any case the party didn’t intervene in such

struggles. Self-activity of the working class was never even an issue on

the agenda of the SPD or any of the loose oppositions within it. It was

firmly leadership based, seeing the introduction of socialism as being

the SPD coming to power and legislating on behalf of the workers.

In the period before World War One it vigorously opposed at least in

print and at rallies the move towards war. Tens of thousands of German

workers at mass SPD meetings voted never to fight their fellow workers

of France in the interests of German imperialism. And initially the SPD

greeted immediate preparation for war with anti-war demos, there were27

in Berlin alone. But by 4^(th) August in an atmosphere of national

hysteria all the SPD deputies voted to support it. It was not till

November/December that SPD deputy Karl Liebknect voted against war

credits, and shortly afterwards he was joined by the SPD deputy (and

later anarchist) Otto Ruhle.

The trade union bureaucracy was if anything worse. The unions declared a

‘social truce’ for the period of the war and some elements even

speculated about the advantages for German workers in German imperialism

winning additional markets for their goods. This capitulation without

significant opposition is part of the reason why many of the left came

to reject work in the unions completely.

It is important to state that in this the SPD deputies and union

bureaucrats were probably being swept along on a genuinely popular wave

of German nationalism and jingoism that swept the German working class

in the same way that it swept other European countries. In the early

days of the war to take a public stand against it was not only to

guarantee popularity but risk attacks by nationalistic mobs. However as

elsewhere in Europe as the ‘Victory by Christmas’ failed to materialize

mass enthusiasm for the war was rapidly diminished especially as its

cost began to bite not only in terms of lives lost but in real suffering

in the cities. By late 1916 the meat ration was 1/3 of the pre war

level, and the weekly diet was only 1300 calories well below that

required for even easy work. By early 1917 food distribution was in

danger of breaking down completely in the cities leading to the period

known as the Turnip winter.

The left inside the SPD that opposed the war consisted of little more

then handfuls of individuals with no public voice. Because the pre-War

left had been obsessed with the Party taking power they remained loyal

‘internal oppositions’ convinced that there was no political life

outside the mass party. This left them without the experience or

structures needed when they needed to break with the SPD and its pre-war

line. Locally groups of militants did come together leading to several

anti-war left groups mostly confined to specific geographical areas and

around particular pre-war publications

The war also rapidly undermined the organisations of the left, even of

the SPD that supported it. Military law introduced for workers in 1916

and some 66% of SPD members ended up at the front. Union membership

halved in the early war years. For the anti-war activists things were

far worse as the state conscripted their activists into the army and

commonly assigned them to punishment battalions or the most dangerous

sections of the front.

Initial nationalist enthusiasm for the war began to fade quite rapidly,

in particular when the hope of a quick victory vanished and the economic

costs began to be felt. The winter of 1915/16 saw the first bread

demonstrations and by December 1915 19 of the SPD deputies were voting

against war credits. In the summer of 1916 55,000 Berlin workers struck

when Karl Liebkencht was put on trial for his anti-war activity.

Because of the size of the pre-war left some socialists who were

conscripted started to develop underground rank and file organisations.

These were particularly strong in the fleet, which was confined to port

and where the sailors faced pretty miserable conditions while the

officers lived in luxury. In June and July of 1917 the sailors started

to demand recognition for their committees, this movement was put down,

two sailors were executed and total sentences of 360 years hard labour

given out to the ringleaders.

1917 also saw the formation of the Independent Social Democrats, who had

been expelled from the SDP for their anti-war stance. These were to be

the largest of the left groups outside the SDP but were never very

revolutionary. More importantly August 1917 saw 200,000 Metal workers

strike against cut in bread ration, large-scale strikes were to become

common over the next years and in particular under the influence of the

Russian revolution they became increasingly radicalized.

In January 1918 250,000 workers went on strike in Vienna and elected

workers councils to represent them. There were also mass strikes in

Budapest at this time as active opposition to the war spread across

Europe.

This encouraged the Spartakus League (a Berlin spilt from the SDP) to

call for a strike in Berlin. This met with some success encouraging

500,000 to strike. The strikes spread outside Berlin and were to see a

meeting of over 400 factor delegates in Berlin but the SDP was able to

use its influence amongst the workers to defuse the strike. Afterwards

the strikes 1 Berlin worker in 10 was sent to the front. Rosa Luxemburg

would become the best known of the Spartakus League leaders.

The German High Command strategy in 1918 with Russia out of the war was

to bring the war to a swift conclusion by a mass offensive, which would,

smash through the allied lines. This failed with considerable losses to

the German army. After the collapse of this Summer offensive the

military command looked for an end to the war and sought to bring the

SPD into government to ensure stability in the post war period.

However the Allied terms were considered too harsh so in a desperate

last bid the High Command ordered the mostly undamaged fleet to sea. But

the sailor’s underground organisations were prepared for this. They

responded by electing councils, taking over their ships and the

surrounding ports and barracks.

This was the November revolution, which spread rapidly all over the

country. By the 8^(th) it had reached Berlin. Mass demonstrations took

place with the left seeing an opportunity for revolution. The SDP

however succeeded in heading off this movement, although in the process

it was forced to proclaim the republic in order to forestall the

proclamation of a workers republic.

This period showed the problem that was to continue to dog and

eventually defeat the German revolution. The workers looked to ‘the

left’ parties and in particular the SPD for leadership rather then

looking to their power and carrying out the transfer of power directly

into their organisations. The popular concept of socialism for almost

all was limited to getting ‘their’ party into power. Hence it was easy

for SPD to take charge of revolt in region after region. The Spartikists

and others did not put forward a radically different strategy; they just

sought to have themselves rather then the SDP appointed as the workers

representatives.

The 10 November saw the formation of ‘revolutionary government’ but also

a meeting of delegates of workers and soldiers councils. The SDP

controlled this by setting up councils itself. It ended up that there

were more delegates who were party officials then there were delegates

who were workers! 18 of the 24 delegates on the Berlin executive of the

Councils were SDP. By mid December this led to power being handed back

to the Reichstag.

The situation in 1918 was that the SDP leaders controlled both the

government and the congress of councils. The left had significant

numbers of members, well into the hundred thousands but not the support

of masses who remained loyal to the SDP. In addition the councils were

only weakly coordinated and while some were genuine many were creations

of the various parties. Some councils in the army were even controlled

by the officer core which had decided to was better to try and

incorporate army councils by leading them rather then trying to openly

oppose them. What was lacking was a strong network of independent

councils that could have put forward an alternative to the various

schemes for party rule.

In this sort of situation the control of the military was vital to all

sides. The left set up the League of Red Soldiers to win the army rank

and file over to the side of revolution. The SDP leaders sought to

construct forces loyal to its government like the Republican soldier’s

corp. They were aided in this by foreign capital, which saw them as the

best hope of staving off revolution. However while these were based on

conservative SDP members who would suppress the left they proved to be

opposed to open counter-revolution.

The SDP need a force which could be used to roll back the revolution so

in addition they set up the Noske guard, (named after the SDP leader).

It was composed of the old officer corp and the units of Storm Troopers

(elite assault troops) from the war. However it was to be remembered in

history as the Frei Korps and was to become the direct fore runner of

the Nazis.

Nov and Dec saw many Spartakist demos in Berlin, in particular daily

demos of the Red Soldier League. The Spartakus League had 3000 members

at this stage. On Dec 23^(rd) widespread fighting broke out in Berlin.

This revealed the government had almost no reliable troops there, a

situation similar to the eve of the October revolution in Russia in

1917.

The Spartakus League and the Bremen Left Radicals met to form KPD

(German Communist Party) at end of December. Rosa warned the new party

that they must win over the masses rater then organise a putsch but she

still saw the revolution in terms of the party taking power. Rosa and

Levi argued that they should take part in elections to the national

assembly but were defeated on this indicating a large number of members

were open to a different approach.

The unions were to treble in numbers in the first year of the

revolution. Many KPD members wanted to raise the slogan ‘out of the

unions’ but no decision was made on this. The Revolutionary Shop

Stewards movement refused to join because of the Spartakus League

continued use of putchism.

As we can see politics in the KPD at this stage was very complex, but

still focused on seizing power despite some rhetoric to the contrary.

On Jan 4 1919 the Government provoked a crisis by announcing that the

revolutionary Eichorn was dismissed as police chief. They wanted to

provoke a premature rising. The KPD called a ‘peaceful demonstration’

which 100,000’s attended but a small group stormed the SDP newspaper

building and dumped copies of the paper in river.

At a meeting after this the USP, Revolutionary Shop Stewards, and

Spartakus League delegates decided it was now possible to overthrow the

government. and to put themselves in power. They called a rising. At

first things went well and they rapidly controlled the center of Berlin

but many on the Revolutionary Committee had acted without the backing of

their organisations.

In this situation the committee spent the next day and night debating

while 200,000 armed workers waited outside in the freezing streets. No

military preparations made except by isolated groups of workers. Again a

key weakness was the lack of self-organisation by the workers. In

addition many workers and soldiers took neither side, instead calling

for ‘left unity’. This shows the revolutionary left had not seriously

exposed the real role of the SDP leadership in any way.

Perhaps the revolutionary left could have seized power in Berlin if they

had acted decisively but even then without workers self activity they

could have simply created a second state capitalist regime. As it was

workers started to return home, the SPD leaders got organised and even

before the Frei Korp entered the city on the 13^(th) the revolutionary

forces had largely evaporated. The Frei Korp proceeded to massacre those

that remained including, with the support of the SPD paper, Rosa and

Liebknecht. The SDP paper ‘Vorwarts’ was the first to announce that Rosa

had been “killed by the people” (16^(th)).

Many Leninists due to their misunderstanding of the October revolution

(as a ‘planned’ event rather then the outcome of the crumbling of

support for Kerensky) see the small size and lack of discipline of the

KPD as the core weakness. In fact it was lack of self-activity of

workers that meant they waited for orders while their leaders debated

tactics. The Berlin rising was probably premature but it was also the

case at this stage that the government had very little loyal forces.

Elections were called which saw the SDP getting 11.5 million votes (of

the 30 million electorate) while the USP only got 2.3 million. The SDP

now set about using the Frei Korp to smash the workers councils, which

were the only power in many areas. Over the next few months they marched

around Germany smashing the Councils. The Frei Korp went from Bremen —

Ruhr -Central Germany — Berlin — Ruhr — Central Germany — Munich

&endash; Hamburg.

Bremen’s council declared itself an independent socialist republic on

Jan 10^(th) due to KPD influence but by 21^(st) voted to set up new

authority through ‘citizens elections’ reflecting the lack of support

from workers. On 28 Frei Korp attacked Wilmshaven and on 3^(rd) Feb

Bremen was attacked fierce fighting followed but without support from

the army the workers were defeated.

The Ruhr was dominated by SDP councils, which had used its militia

against strikers in Dec. and Jan. leading to some councils being

replaced by the left. Plans for the socialisation of mines were being

made when in February the Frei Korp arrived and began the killings. This

led to the formation of first Ruhr Red army which temporarily halted the

Frei Korps but the SDP undermined this Red Army.

Next Frei Korp went to central Germany to smash a general strike. It

returned to Berlin in March in the midst of a massive general strike

supported by the SPD rank and file. The Frei Korp crushed the pro-SPD

forces (with the backing of the SPD leaders) with 1500 to 2000 killed.

In April the Frei Korp was in the Ruhr to smash a 800,000 strong strike

for the 6-hour day.

The overall picture was of the SDP ensuring until the autumn that the

resistance was uncoordinated so that the Frei Korps could dismantle the

councils one by one. Throughout this period the revolutionary left

continued to grow in numbers.

In Bavaria on 21 Feb the assassination of Eisner led to workers and

solders dissolving the parliament and handing power to a council, but as

it was mostly SDP dominated it voted to reconvene the parliament as soon

as possible. In fact it was March before this was possible. By April

discontent had grown and government power collapsed to the point where

some anarchists and SDP members proclaimed a soviet republic. This seems

to have been putchism and lasted less then a week. In its defense

against a coup however a second KPD dominated soviet republic was

formed, this time based on armed factory committees. This 2^(nd) one was

also doomed as it to was isolated to Munich so it seems the KPD’s real

objection to the first one was that they would not control it. Due to an

economic blockade the KPD fast lost support and resigned from the

government. On the 1^(st) May the Frei Korp arrived and 600 died in the

fighting that followed and 186 executions

Although the KPD grew to 100,000 members in 1919 the USP grew much

faster. In October 1919 the KPD leadership though a carefully rigged

conference made acceptance of electoralism and the existing unions a

condition of membership and then proceeded to expel over 50% of the

local organisations. This was part of an international process led by

Moscow where local Communist Parties were forced to comply with the

Moscow line.

On the 13 March 1920 some of the military organised a putsch under Kapp

to take over from the SDP. Most of the military and parties remained

neutral but the coup was defeated by a massive general strike.

Everywhere workers armed themselves and set up councils but in

particular in the Ruhr, central Germany and northern Germany.

Although this was sometimes with the support of the local SDP leadership

for the first time it was heavily dependent on self-organisation. In the

Ruhr at least its probable that the 200,000 strong FAUD

(anarcho-syndicalist organisation) played an important role. I have

found no detailed anarchist sources in English on this though and the

various Leninist texts only hint at the role the anarchists played!

The Ruhr Red army was 50,000 strong with artillery and forced the

Reichweir (German army) to withdraw after five days. This Red army was

formed from the base up, which meant it lacked co-ordination initially.

This was to prove a disaster later as the Eastern RA negotiated a

cease-fire (and handed over much of its weapons) while the western RA

fought on and so provided the excuse to bring the troops in.

The SDP took back power and did their best to end the strike and

rehabilitated many of the coup leaders and supporters! They then offered

a ‘workers government’ of the SDP, KPD and the USP. Both the other

parties rejected this after some discussion but in a confused fashion,

which allowed the SDP back into power without needing to take specific

action against the right.

The KPD had little influence in events outside of one or two areas. In

Berlin it actually opposed the general strike for the first couple of

days. This was in fact the end of the mass period of the revolution,

however the KPD was yet to perform two additional tragedies

In April 1920 the KPAD formed with 38,000 members as a left break from

the Moscow line of the KPD, this included the council communists. Within

6 months it had lost half this membership. In the summer of 1920 at the

urging of the (Moscow based) Third International the left of the USP

expelled the right and then merged with the KPD to give it 500,000

members

The March action

In March of 1921 the KPD tried to take advantage of its much greater

size when the SPD moved against its central German strongholds. The KPD

called for workers everywhere to arm themselves and for a general strike

in Central Germany. A KPD guerilla army under Hoelz was briefly active

but the police alone managed to crushed this. When the KPD called a

general strike only 200,000 responded despite the fact that the KPD

supposedly had 400,000 members. In some places the KPD resorted to an

‘armed strike’ i.e. trying to physically intimidate and prevent workers

going to work.

This resulted in many militants being imprisoned, papers banned and half

the membership of the KPD leaving. The farcical nature of the rising

meant the KPD may simply have been acting on the orders of Moscow.

Indeed the KPAD refused to support the March action as it saw it as

being designed to take attention away from the Kronstadt rising in

Russia. In Kronstadt workers and sailors who were demanding new and free

elections to the soviets were brutally crushed by the Russian Red Army

at the behest of Lenin and Trotsky.

1923 saw the start of the great economic crisis in Germany and

hyperinflation. The French were occupying the Ruhr and the far right was

growing in the south. The KPD proposed a united front with the SPD

against the violence of the far right but the SPD leadership choose to

put their faith in the state. Nevertheless this enabled the KPD to bring

its membership up to 220.000 and for it to gain some influence in the

factory councils and the unions. In response to the far right the

‘Proletarian hundreds’ were set up linked to the factory councils but

probably under KPD control. Union membership in this period halved.

May, June and July 1923 saw a massive strike wave as inflation bit into

workers living standards. This also crippled the SPD’s network of full

timers and papers as they lost the income needed to pay for them. The

KPD began to catch up on the SDP in the union and parliamentary

elections. It also recruited another 70,000 members.

By this time the Soviet Union was helping the German army secretly

re-arm. The KPD was also coming close to supporting the German

nationalists and after June leading figures of the KPD intended to enter

into public debate with the Nazis, but the Nazis called off these

debates.

The start of August saw a massive and militant strike wave with armed

workers dragging the bosses from the factories. In Berlin the union

leadership refused to strike so on the 11 Aug some 2000 delegates from

the Berlin factory councils met calling a general strike and calling for

the downfall of the (Cuno) government. The SPD again saved the day

joining a government of national unity including the far right The

strike ended despite efforts by the KPD to keep it going.

At the point the second tragedy starts to unfold. The Moscow leadership,

in particular Trotsky, decided the moment was ripe for revolution. He

even demanded that a date be set for it to coincide with the anniversary

of the Russian revolution! Red Army officers were sent to Germany to

help prepare the ‘Proletarian hundreds’ for the rising.

In September the far right came to control Bavaria and then threatened

to march on Berlin. Moscow decided that the threatened advance of the

right on Saxony would be used to launch a revolutionary counter

offensive. This way they hoped to win over the SPD rank and file. The

3^(rd) International was told defense of the German revolution would

soon be a central task.

On Oct 21^(st), earlier then planned, the army started to enter Saxony.

The KPD tried to get a pre-arranged joint delegate conference with the

SPD to call for a general strike of all Germany. The KPD’ secret plan

was to turn this general strike into a revolution but the SPD delegates

refused to support this as they said this was the role of the Saxon

government (which the KPD had entered).

The KPD thus called off the general strike and with it the revolution

except in Hamburg where the party was never told and a few hundred

communists seized half the city center police stations. This Hamburg

rising marked the end of the revolutionary period in Germany.