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Title: Anarchism as Extreme Democracy Author: Wayne Price Date: 2000 Language: en Topics: democracy, introductory Source: Retrieved on 2017-02-08 from https://web.archive.org/web/20170208133932/http://www.utopianmag.com/files/in/1000000006/anarchism_extreme.pdf Notes: Published in The Utopian, Volume 1.
As Marxism, and state-socialism in general, have increasingly been
discredited, there has been a tendency for leftists to turn to another
tradition, that of the democratic revolution.Democracy can be seen as a
ground for opposition to the authoritarianisms of capitalist society
(Morrison, 1995; Mouffe, 1992; Trend, 1996; Wood, 1995). One influential
work concludes, “The task of the Left, therefore, cannot be to renounce
liberal democratic ideology, but, on the contrary, to deepen and expand
it in the direction of a radical and plural democracy.... [S]ocialism is
one of the components of a project for radical democracy, not vice
versa” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, pp. 176, 178).
“Democracy” has two contradictory meanings today: the justification of
the existing state versus a tradition of revolutionary popular
liberation. It is the ideological support of the existing “democratic”
states of the West and elsewhere—precisely because democratic ideals are
so attractive. Periodical elections and (relative) freedom of expression
and association are used to justify a society where a few really rule
over the majority. Capitalist democracy is used by competing factions of
rulers to settle their disputes without (much) bloodshed. It serves to
coopt rebellious popular forces.
But democracy is also the cry of the oppressed against ruling elites—the
idea that ordinary people should participate in, and control, the
institutions which make up their society. This idea of democracy goes
back to tribal councils, to classical Athens,to the great bourgeois
revolutions of England, the U.S., and France, to the U.S. abolitionists,
and, today, to ideals loved by millions. It is rights torn from rulers
by the struggle and blood of the people. It is the standard for judging
the state—and for condemning it. As such, it may not yet have lost its
revolutionary potential.
This theoretical development is interesting to those of us who see
socialist-anarchism as nothing but the most extreme, consistent, and
thorough-going democracy. Writers such as Paul Goodman (1965) and Noam
Chomsky(1994), have claimed their versions of anarchism as extensions of
the democratic tradition from Jefferson to John Dewey. Benjamin Tucker,
the nineteenth century U.S.anarchist, wrote, “The anarchists are simply
unterrified Jeffersonian democrats” (1888; p. 11). The contemporary
anarchist Murray Bookchin writes, “...A free society will either be
democratic or it will not be achieved at all” (1995; p. 17).
Yet the historical relation between anarchism and democracy is highly
ambiguous. This should not be surprising, considering how vague and
open-ended have been both terms. Like “socialism” or “freedom,” they
have meant many different things to many different people.
In What is Property?, the first work to claim the term “anarchist,”
Pierre Joseph Proudhon explicitly counterposed it to “democrat”: “I hear
some of my readers reply: ...‘You are a democrat.’ No... ‘Then what are
you? ’‘I am an anarchist’” (quoted in Woodcock, 1962,p. 12). But years
later, Proudhon advocated the replacement of the state by a democracy of
voluntary producers’ associations, “a vast federation of associations
and groups united in the common bond of the democratic and social
republic” (quoted in Guerin, 1970; p. 45).
Anarchism may offer a unique perspective on democracy’s two meanings.
Liberals and social democrats believe in democracy and may call
themselves “democratic socialists.”But while highly critical of aspects
of the system, ultimately they succumb to the mystifying aspect of
democratic theory. They accept the existing state as undemocratic, but
hope to modify it, to make it “even more democratic.” On the other hand,
authoritarian revolutionaries—Stalinists,radical nationalists, etc.—do
not fall for the democratic obfuscations of U.S. imperialism. But they
intend to replace this state with a new state, one in which they are the
new rulers. They reject the ideal of popular self-management.
Anarchists, however, can reject the claim that existing states should be
supported because they are democratic, while continuing to hold up
democracy as a liberating vision. But to do this, anarchism and
democracy must be accepted as compatible. To clarify this issue, I will
first discuss a criticism of anarchism from the standpoint of democracy,
and then a criticism of democracy from the standpoint of anarchism.
Robert Dahl’s Democracy and Its Critics (1989) is a major statement of
the case for democracy, clearly written and thoughtful. Before plunging
into his argument, Dahl discusses two fundamental “objections” to
democracy, namely anarchism and “guardianship.” He defines anarchism,
fairly enough, as “a society consisting only of purely voluntary
associations, a society without the state” (p. 37). He quickly adds,
“Because democracy might well be the most desirable process for
governing these associations, it might also be the prevalent form of
government in an anarchist society” (p. 37). This makes clear that
anarchism is not opposed to democracy but to the “democratic state.”
Unfortunately, he does not go on to explain what he means by “the
state.”“I do not pro-pose to define the term ‘state’ rigorously” (p.
359). He uses it, apparently, to mean “the major means of organized
coercion” (p. 43, see also p. 359).
Dahl goes on to make an argument that some coercion is necessary and
that anarchists are wrong to absolutely oppose all social coercion. The
goal should be to “...minimize coercion and maximize consent” (p. 51).
Essentially I agree with his argument. Whatever may be the case after
centuries of anarchist freedom, a newly-anarchist society will need some
way to control individual psychopathic killers or violent organized
counterrevolutionaries.However, Dahl seems to assume that coercion means
a state. He admits that preliterate peoples, such as the Inuit (Eskimo),
lived satisfactorily for centuries or millennia without states,but he
does not consider how they dealt with the social need for coercion. They
had coercion, whether by public opinion or organized violence—every
male, at least, was armed and organized by the tribal council. What they
did not have was a state.
Kropotkin defined the state: “The State idea...includes the existence of
a power situated above society...the concentration in the hands of a few
of many functions in the life of society.... A whole mechanism of
legislation and of policing has to be developed in order to subject some
classes to the domination of others” (1993; p. 160). Comparable ideas
were expressed by Engels: “...[T]his power, arisen out of society but
placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is
the state....[I]t consists not merely of armed men but also of material
adjuncts, prisons, and institutions of coercion of all kinds...” (quoted
by Lenin, 1970; pp. 290, 292).
The argument of anarchists is not that it is possible to immediately
abolish all coercion (although some may have posed it that way). It is
that it is possible to abolish the bureaucratic, socially-alienated
institution of the state. The “democratic state” is to be condemned, not
because it is still coercive, but because it cannot be truly democratic.
By its very nature,this instrument of coercion which stands above and
against society must serve a ruling minority against an oppressed
majority.
Dahl does not deal with this issue directly, but it relates to a major
point of his book. Modern society, he says, is too large and complex to
be based on the face-to-face, direct democracy of the preliterate tribes
or later city-states. For democracy to exist on a large scale, it needed
the “invention” of representation. Only representative government (by
implication, a state) could have brought democracy to the modern world,
he claims.
But this has two sides. Representation made a sort-of-democracy possible
on the large scale of modern nations,but that large scale made it
possible to create a form of elite rule which could still be called
democracy. Instead of direct,participatory democracy, we have a layer of
elected politicians and government bureaucrats who stand between the
people and the actual making of decisions. From time to time, the
passive citizens elect these “representatives” to be political for them.
Wood (1995) cites the views of leading figures among the U.S. Founding
Fathers, “Their argument was not that representation is necessary in a
large republic,but, on the contrary, that a large republic is desirable
so that representation is unavoidable.... Representation...is intend-ed
to act as a filter” (p. 216).
Undoubtedly, some degree of representation or delegation,from lower to
higher bodies, is necessary. As federalists,anarchists have generally
agreed with this. But the meaning of representation, and all other
aspects of democracy, would change drastically in a different social
context. The anarchists’ proposed changes in society might be summarized
in two concepts:
First, the creation of an egalitarian society in which separate groups
of oppressors and oppressed either do not exist any longer (capitalists
and workers) or have redefined their relationships as equals (men and
women, European-Americans and African-Americans, North Americans and
Latin Americans). Where wealth is evenly distributed and no oppression
exists, society is no longer pulled in different directions by competing
and hostile forces. It does not need a state to hold things together; it
is easier to maximize con-sent and minimize coercion.
Second (and here most Marxists disagree), anarchists want a society
based in direct democracy through popular assemblies—at the workplace,
in the community, and in many voluntary associations. The more decisions
are made locally,then the fewer are made centrally. The more people
experience face-to-face democracy as a vibrant, daily way of life, the
more they will really control any representatives sent to delegated
assemblies. The police and army would be replaced by a militia—the
people armed. “If the entire people were truly sovereign, there would no
longer be either government or governed...the State...would be identical
to society and disappear into industrial [and other—WP]organization”
(Guerin, 1970; p. 17).
Dahl is aware of these arguments and agrees with them to a point. He
seeks to decrease social and political inequalities. He advocates
greatly increasing participation and decision-making at the local
community level. He supports a democratic socialism where the economy is
socially owned and regulated but firms compete with each other. Unlike
most sup-porters of “market socialism,” he advocates that the firms be
democratically managed by their employees, like producer cooperatives or
the previous Yugoslavian system. “...[I]t would be a mistake to
underestimate the importance of authoritarian institutions in the daily
lives of working people and the consequences of introducing a more
democratic system in the governing of economic enterprises” (p. 332).
Yet he does underestimate the consequences of such decentralized
democratization on the more centralized, national and international,
institutions of society. He dismisses the idea of a drastic
transformation of society raised by either Marxists or anarchists.
“Market socialism” itself suggests that, even under “socialism,” the
economy will not be run overall by democratic decision-making but by the
market. While agreeing that our society is highly unequal, he denies
that there is minority rule (because there are competing elites). This
society—which he calls “polyarchy”—is imperfect, but he argues that it
is still democratic and worthy of support. In practice, if not in
intention, he is one of those who accept the role of democracy as
justifying the existing patriarchal capitalist state.
Part of the problem is that, whenever Dahl backs up theory by referring
to practice, he always turns to existing democratic capitalist states.
Using these as models produces a rather limited view of what democracy
is capable of being. Anarchists, in contrast, focus on the historical
revolutions (for example, Dolgoff, 1974; Kropotkin, 1986; Voline, 1974).
The lessons which anarchists draw from these revolutions are summarized
by Bookchin(1996): “From the largely medieval peasant wars of the
sixteenth century Reformation to the modern uprisings of industrial
workers and peasants, oppressed people have created their own popular
forms of community association...to replace the oppressive states....
[T]hese associations took the institutional form of local
assemblies...or representative councils of mandated recallable deputies”
(p. 4). These historical examples cannot “prove” the validity of a
radically democratic society, but they provide ample evidence of its
possibility.
The relation of anarchism and democracy has been raised from the other
side, by Errico Malatesta, the great Italian anarchist (active from the
1870s to the 1930s). Unlike the individualist, anti-organizational
tendency within anarchism, Malatesta advocated that anarchists organize
themselves and promote the self-organization of working people. In
the1920s, he wrote two brief pieces on our topic, with the theme
summarized in the title of one,“Neither Democrats nor Dictators:
Anarchists” (Malatesta, 1995; pp. 73–76 and 76–79).
He believed that the capitalist democratic state was preferable to a
dictatorship, if only because anarchists could use its ideology against
it. “...[T]he worst of democracies is always preferable, if only from
the educational point of view, than [sic] the best of
dictatorships....Democracy is a lie, it...is, in reality, oligarchy,
that is, government by the few to the advantage of a privileged class.
But we can still fight it in the name of freedom and equality...”(p.
77).
As can be seen from this, much of Malatesta’s opposition to democracy is
really directed against democratic ideology as a rationalization for
capitalism and the state. But he mixes this up with a denunciation of
the very concept of majority rule. “...[W]e are neither for a majority
nor for a minority government; neither for democracy nor for
dictatorship.... We are...for free agreement.... We are for anarchy” (p.
76).
The democratic concept is “the rule of the majority, with respect for
the rights of the minority.” Under patriarchal capitalism, “majority
rule” has meant the rule of the dominant minority which shapes majority
public opinion through the control of media and in other ways. “Minority
rights” have often been called on against any attempt by the majority to
take any of the wealth of the rich. But “majority rule” and “minority
rights” have also been rallying cries against ruling minorities and the
prejudiced mass which follows them.
Malatesta points out that the majority is often wrong, compared to the
most enlightened minority. If the majority rules, he argues, it must
dictate to the minority, forcing its will on the minority. This is just
as bad as minority rule. How can the majority be trusted to respect
minority rights if the majority rules over the minority? For these
reasons, Malatesta rejects majority rule in principle. Such views must
be responded to.
Civil libertarians have long argued that there are many areas of life
where collective decision-making is not necessary. In these areas, such
as sexual orientation, the majority have no right to dictate to the
minority. Large numbers of people today would respect the rights of
“consenting adults” to engage in minority sexual practices. As Thomas
Jefferson argued for religious freedom, “...[I]t does me no injury for
my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no God. It neither picks my
pocket nor breaks my leg” (Dewey, 1957; p. 111). Anarchists seek to
vastly expand the range of voluntary association for such self-chosen
activities,activities outside the realm of majority rule.
However, there will still be areas which require collective
decision-making. For example, a community may need to decide whether to
build a new road. Consensus would be best, but people often disagree. A
majority and a minority may polarize about this issue. This can-not be
treated as a matter of voluntary association (although dissidents are
always free to pick up and go elsewhere—but other communities also must
decide whether to build roads). Either the road is built or it is not.
If a majority forms for road-building, then the anti-builder minority
may be asked to participate, to give their share of the labor or social
wealth.In any case, they will have to live in the community with a new
road, unwanted by them.
This is not coercion by the police but by reality. A decision had to be
made collectively. If not determined by majority vote, then how? A
community may decide that such decisions must be unanimous. But what if
everyone cannot agree? Perhaps the minority gets to veto the proposal,
since it is not unanimous. Then it is the minority which rules,
preventing the majority from getting its road. Alternately, the minority
agrees to keep quiet, so as to “not block consensus.” This denies them
the right to be openly counted as disagreeing. I am not denying the
right of any community or association to decide to rely on consensus,
just arguing that majority rule is not authoritarian in principle.
Malatesta asks what rights the minority has under majority rule. People
with minority views have the right to participate in all decision
making. They have the right to try to win a majority to their views. If
they lose one vote, they may continue to participate and to seek to
become the new majority. Perhaps in the future they will persuade enough
community members that the new road was a mistake and to tear it down,
or, at least, not tobuild new ones. They may be in the majority on other
issues.
Minority rights is an essential part of majority rule. If the members of
a community do not have the chance to hear all opinions, including
minority ones, then they cannot be said to really decide the issues. The
suppression of minority views in capitalist democracy (by force or just
by lack of money or lack of coverage in the media) is one way the ruling
minority creates the illusion that the majority is governing.
At the same time, minority rights are safest when the majority rules, as
opposed to any minority dictatorship. Majority rule and minority rights
are not opposites but require each other.
To democracy, Malatesta counterposes “free agreement.” But there is no
such opposition.People may freely agree to form voluntary
associations—whether to trade stamps or to produce shoes. But then how
will they run the associations? Presumably people will not agree
completely on everything. There must be some process other than
dissolving the associations each time everyone fails to agree. That
process is democracy. Anarchists are not fora democratic state but can
be for a democratic society, for democracy as a “way of life.” Anarchism
is democracy without the state.
Why is this important? We can see what happens when radicals try to
develop democratic theory without incorporating anarchism. Often it is
little more than “democratic socialism” restated, that is, reformist
state socialism. For example, David Trend’s Radical Democracy (1996) is
mostly articles by members of Democratic Socialists of America. They are
somewhat embarrassed by the identification of their socialism with
statism, but they still have no alternative to using the existing state
to intervene in the economy.
A democratic theory which is really radical would strongly deny that the
existing patriarchal/racist capitalist state is truly democratic, would
oppose the whole socially-alienated, bureaucratic-military state
machine, and would propose instead a democratic federation of assemblies
and associations. Anything less will gloss over the
undemocratic—anti-democratic—nature of our society and its state.
A significant attempt to develop a radical democratic theory which
includes socialism has been made by Chantal Mouffe and those associated
with her. She is quite clear that her “radical democracy” is not an
alternative to the existing state but an extension of it. “What we
advocate is a kind of ‘radical liberal democracy’—we do not present it
as a rejection of the liberal democratic regime or the institution of a
new political form of society” (1996; p.20). Her aim is “...extending
democracy within the framework of a liberal-democratic regime” (1992; p.
3). She is critical of direct democracy or community as goals.
In fact the only time she seems to directly deal with the state is in a
discussion of those who oppose “civil society” to “the state” (in Laclau
and Mouffe, 1985). It is not hard to show that “civil society”—the realm
of capitalism, patriarchy, and racism—is not the ground for salvation
from the state. But “civil society” is internally antagonistic, based on
the tensions between oppressed and oppressors, including the struggles
of classes, genders, and races,among others. This pressure from below
for freedom is the source of all social progress.
Mouffe claims that the state also has internal antagonisms, therefore
implying that it is wrong to reject the state as such. She notes, for
example, that the state may pass legislation against gender
discrimination or in defense of peasants against landlords in poor
countries. This is true, but these are like raises which the management
of a business may offer its workers. It may do this because the workers
force it to or because it is far-sighted and provides benefits before
the workers form a union—but whatever the reason, management remains
capitalist and the enemy of the workers. There are divisions within
management,as within the state, but they are over how best to suppress
and/or coopt the oppressed.Neither management nor the state is the
friend of workers or women or peasants.
Laclau and Mouffe add that there are times when the state is opposed to
“civil society.”“...[T]his is what happens when the state has been
transformed into a bureaucratic excrescence imposed by force upon the
rest of society, as in Eastern Europe, or in the Nicaragua of the
Somozas...” (p. 180). That is, in countries, such as the U.S., where the
majority do support the regime, the state is not, they claim, a
bureaucratic-military excrescence upon society. This is an opinion held
by many people, including that U.S. majority. It can be argued for, but
I do not see how it can be called “radical.”
If democratic theory needs anarchism, so anarchism needs democracy.
There is an authoritarian trend within the history of anarchism. It
begins with Proudhon, who was racist,anti-Semitic, patriarchal, and who
imagined himself ruling France as dictator over his federation of
associations (Draper, 1970). Bakunin, the second “father of anarchism,”
kept on trying to organize secret societies which would manipulate mass
organizations from behind the scenes (Guerin, 1970; Woodcock, 1962).
Anarchist terrorists and bomb throwers(including the Unabomber) acted as
elite heroes without (or against) the people.
From then until now, anarchists have often capitulated either to
reformism (support of the current state) or to revolutionary
dictatorships. Proudhon ended up getting elected to the French
parliament. Kropotkin, the third “father of anarchism,” became an
enthusiastic supporter of the Western imperialist states in World War I.
Goodman (1965) and Chomsky (1994) could fairly be called reformists.
This anarchist support for reformism became a serious matter when the
Spanish anarchists of the 1930s, faced with a revolutionary situation,
became ministers in the liberal capitalist government. On the other
side, many anarchists joined with the Bolsheviks after the Russian
Revolution. In the 1960s, the anarchist-pacifists of Liberation magazine
became apologists for Castro and Ho Chi Minh. Further examples are
easily found.
The Marxist Hal Draper has argued that the basic problem with anarchism
is its supposed rejection of democracy. “...[A]narchist
‘libertarianism’...is not concerned with the winning of democratic
control-from-below, but with the destruction of ‘authority’ over the
individual ego, even the most extremely democratic version of authority
imaginable” (1969; p. 93). He quotes Proudhon, “Any man who cannot do
what he wants and anything he wants has the right to revolt, even alone,
against the government, even if the government were everybody else”
(same). Draper comments, “The only man who can enjoy this ‘freedom’
unlimited by society is a despot” (same).
While there is an authoritarian side of the anarchist tradition, it
would be ridiculous to deny that there is also a libertarian-democratic
side, in both theory and practice. Whether or not they used the word
“democracy,” socialist-anarchists have long advocated replacing
bureaucratic institutions by self-governing associations, that is, by
democracy (and, as I have argued, a strong defense of individual and
minority rights does not necessarily contradict democracy or majority
rule). Anarchists have organized mass democratic, labor unions, popular
armies,and self-managed peasant collectives and worker cooperatives.
Marxism too has both democratic and authoritarian sides, but the
dominant tendency of its main wings,social democracy and Stalinism, has
been authoritarian statism (as Draper would agree). Between Marxism and
anarchism, it is anarchism which has the more democratic and
freedom-loving theory and tradition.
Also, anarchists have a different relation to their theoreticians.
Unlike Marxism and Leninism, anarchism is not named after its historic
figures. It has no sacred writings comparable to Capital or State and
Revolution. It has no problem rejecting the errors of its founders.
However, Draper has a major point. Anarchism, if not inherently hostile
to democracy, has had a contradictory relationship with it. The
individualist tendencies are the worst in that regard, as has been
recognized by socialist-anarchists. What is needed is for anarchists to
identify anarchism as extreme, revolutionary democracy. The weaknesses
of anarchism are real,but they can be corrected from within the
anarchist tradition.
The program of anarchism is to replace the bureaucratic-military state
machine with a federation of popular assemblies and associations, as
decentralized as is practically possible. This is democracy without the
state. Any other program, such as staying within the limits of the
existing state but making it “more democratic” (“democratic socialism”
or “radical-liberal democracy”) falls for “democracy” as an ideological
cover of the rule of a minority—of patriarchal/racist capitalism and its
bureaucratic state.
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