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Title: Insurrection in Omelas
Author: William Gillis
Date: April 3rd, 2019
Language: en
Topics: Ursula K. Le Guin, book review, insurrection
Source: https://c4ss.org/content/51849

William Gillis

Insurrection in Omelas

In Ursula K Le Guin’s classic short “The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas”

she considers a prosperous and happy society whose success is somehow

purchased through a dark bargain — the torture and abject immiseration

of a single child. Despite the positive good won for the many, a few

starry-eyed children of Omelas refuse to temper their hunger for a

better deal, and reject this otherwise utopian society, albeit with no

alternative blueprint in hand. Simply insisting that there must be

something better, or that their lives should be devoted to at least

searching for it.

To opponents of markets they pose an equivalent faustian bargain; no

measure of background wealth and technological advancement is worth the

price of social hierarchies of wealth or even a single person in

poverty. Many would rather live in an “equality of the mud” with no

economic benefits beyond subsistence farming if it avoided even a single

person, disabled and without friends, starving or being forced to

prostrate themselves before a charity. Never mind the feasibility of

their alternate proposals, I am deeply sympathetic to this evaluation.

In fact I have always been more of the mind that those merely walking

away are abdicating a moral responsibility to do more. Mere exit is no

more than the gutless wiping of one’s own hands. The anarchist cry is

that so long as even a single person in the universe is oppressed we owe

them active resistance. And oppression can obviously look like

impoverishment in material freedoms, as well as severe differences in

relative capacity or status.

The central problem with liberalism is that it constructs “good enough”

societies, so locally optimal that no easy transition can be undertaken

to improve them except through titanic catastrophe. To secure some

advances or benefits, liberalism builds up walls against future

improvements, a tradeoff it calls pragmatism. And inevitably these walls

allow what positives it secures to be eroded away internally.

So how would we avoid Omelas situations in some utopian anarchist

market? If we were able to equalize wealth in some magical revolution

and for the first time launch an actual freed market, how might we avoid

getting accidentally locked in at some stable point — some local optimum

— with an underclass? There are many norms and institutional

configurations or distributions possible in a market. Path dependence

might be a thing and, by quirk of random trajectories, we might end up

in a decidedly less than egalitarian configuration. Perhaps even one

where the immiseration of a few is quite sharp, and yet the whole

economy “pareto optimal.” Even if a situation is not technically pareto

optimal a market may have such a warped ecosystem as to make the gradual

resolution of this inefficient satiation of desire involve prohibitively

long timescales. What does it matter to the de facto slaves in a company

town that they could slowly save enough over centuries to eventually

liberate themselves and compete against the company enslaving them?

Well I think the answer depends on going back to the differences between

market prescriptions and non market prescriptions and analytically

extending our existing solutions to certain problems.

Part of the anarchist argument for markets is that they provide a

counterpressure to a persistent problem of oppression in non-market

societies. In a gift economy your social standing and ties play a

critical role in determining your livelihood. Embedded in a community or

social landscape you are at risk of being dependent upon games of social

capital. To be a pariah, to have a different brain architecture, or even

to simply be less gregarious than others, could mean death or exclusion

from the means of production or basic needs. Whatever egalitarian values

an institution or community might proclaim, there’s nothing objectively

forcing them to stick to such. Small towns and hippie communes often end

up looking a lot like Omelas. Further, even if no one denies you food,

the implicit status hierarchies of charity can be all the more

pernicious in a society where they constitute the final word on

everything — whether through the centralized commune or a decentralized

web of friends you are expected to maintain.

To resolve this issue we can expand what is possible in our anarchist

economy by permitting people to make spot transactions, that is to say

exchanges, thus facilitating collaboration between strangers or

untrusting associates. You may become a pariah in the neighborhood

association/commune for your fashion sense or uncut lawn but you will

still be able to benefit from economic collaboration/competition on the

market, the network of exchanges, thus providing a pressure valve to

check the pernicious abuses of social capital(ism).

It’s important to note here that a gift economy can be considered a

market — albeit deformed from its full potential — limited to a stark

subset of possible feedback loops and information flows. Proponents of

gift economies often object to exchange itself as unethical because it

arguably allows, encourages, or fundamentally involves competition,

something seen as less than “friendly” and thus objectively unethical.

One common refrain from the Graeberians is, “If you fully trusted one

another there’d be no point to do a spot transaction.”

What’s fascinating to me is the degree to which most anarcho-capitalist

“walmart minus the state” models of a supposedly ideal market themselves

depend upon cutting out a vast variety of possible feedback loops on

ultimately similar rationales.

By taking property titles as a given — as an objective ethical reality,

as natural law — they suppress the haggling over which titles people

feel inclined to respect.

Just as the advocates of gift economies would suppress the autonomous

emergence of exchange, the advocates of “walmart minus the state”

markets require the suppression of theft, sabotage, assassination, etc.

That is to say issues emerging from contested claims. The polycentric

legal system of such ancaps is just assumed to reach and maintain a near

perfect equilibrium (heeding closely to some supposed “natural law”).

But it is in fact an important component of austrian arguments that,

while markets have equilibrating tendencies, they are never in

equilibrium. And things like theft and sabotage can themselves be

critical market functions — in the more primordial reputation market

prior to the emergence of any consensus on titles. There will probably

always be a few people on the margins who see little or no reason for

mutually beneficial detentes to recognize the claimed titles of certain

other people, or even their lives.

While there are reasons we should expect and encourage broad settlement

on market norms and peaceful cohabitation — and thus impede some of

these reputational dynamics to some degree — to exclude them entirely is

to remove feedback mechanisms by which the market can course-correct

itself. Just as accepting at least some measure of trade and rivalrous

competition allows for greater prosperity (and thus the capacity to gift

more), so to does accepting some measure of theft, sabotage,

assassination, etc allow for greater prosperity by tearing down and

disincentivizing centralized cancerous monopolies of wealth, power, etc,

thus allowing the broader economy to run smoother.

If even one person is truly trapped and immiserated in Omelas there is a

pressure valve: they can revolt. The destitute can steal from the rich.

Those subject to negative environmental externalities can sabotage the

factories of those responsible. The oppressed can eliminate those

holding power. If, despite the best intentions of anarchists, a freed

market goes awry for some reason and starts to develop cancerous

accumulations of wealth and power, or just the catastrophic immiseration

of a few, as a solution we would not require some binary revolution,

some universally disruptive jubilee that once again resets the playing

field to try a freed market again, rather resistance can be much more

nuanced and gradual. Rather than a “permanent revolution” a permanent

insurrection, at least at the margins.

It’s worth noting how much smoother this is than conflicts within

communes, or the “townships” that Kropotkin said would be able to

somehow collectively decide to deny specific people food, etc. If a

single person starts monopolizing title over a resource to the detriment

of everyone, other individuals can start autonomously disregarding their

claimed title. Insurrectionary forms of resistance thus remain an

option, and are likely to smoothly increase in frequency and strength as

a concentration grows more pernicious. This individual-to-individual

resistance is much more gradual and fluid than the resistance necessary

to overcome the edicts of a collective entity.

Mild perturbations of wealth are not objective, because value is not

objective, especially in an actually-existing market that never

perfectly clears and/or a freed market that doesn’t collapse its

transmitted information to prices in a single universal currency. It’s

thus a bad idea for those around the median wealth to disrespect each

others’ property claims. General upheaval or contestation of titles

doesn’t benefit anyone, even if your house is somewhat smaller than your

neighbors. The risk is too high, the possible payout too small,

stability a general good. And thus profit signals can actually work,

exchange happen, etc. But in the face of severe inequality the

cost-benefit ratio changes.

Note that this puts caps on maximum wealth without turning to the

arbitrary and dangerous means of the state. No state planner can know

what the maximum wealth should be, or how hard to disincentivize wealth

accumulation past a certain point, but the market can know. The

aggregate knowledge and needs of poor thieves being yet another market

pressure, far more dexterous than some central planner. And note also

that this would enforce a cap on wealth, not really a cap on income. An

insightful but poor entrepreneur would have more to gain than a

similarly insightful entrepreneur quite comfortably situated, thus

further encouraging a churn of wealth. After all it is typically those

on the bottom who have more insightful entrepreneurial ideas, being

closer to the particulars that need solving.

Marxists have long sneered that anarchism is an alliance between the

petite bourgeoisie and the lumpenproletariat, and so it is with some

relish that I have long noted this notion of a freed market that

embraces insurrection constitutes their worst nightmare. Of course I

doubt any petite bourgeoisie would accept such an expanded market,

giving relative license to the poor to raid the coffers of the rich so

long as the “middle classes” are left alone, and a few class war

ideologues in anarchist circles have derided me a lumpen and traitor for

not wanting to cleave the heads off middle class snots, but I’m

uninterested in the paroxysms of full revolutionary violence and think

this proposal strikes a fair balance.

Beyond irritating marxists, it is also here that the two most common

libertarian arguments radically break with one another. The

consequentialist argument that the decentralization and feedback

channels provided by markets (leveraging the accuracy of revealed

preference through exchange) assures greater dexterity and wealth for

all than centralized systems grinds into conflict with the deontological

argument for respecting property as some kind of a priori “natural law.”

I’ve argued this position several times before, underlining that

reputation and interpersonal relationships are inalienable to minds in a

way that physical goods are not, but it’s also worth emphasizing the

unity this offers between the two historical branches of individualist

anarchism: insurrectionary and market.

Many anarchist admirers of markets for their dynamism have long also

admired the dynamism at play in insurrection and fourth generation

warfare, but the theoretical synergy on this front is insufficiently

examined. It may even be the case that in an anarchist society some

background measure of “theft” may come to serve as an indicator of the

health of our economy, in the same way that certain neoclassicals think

some measure of unemployment secures the health of (the capitalist class

in) a capitalist economy.

Today’s neoreactionaries fetishize the notion of “exit” from a society,

playing the “if things get bad enough you can always just leave” card,

and many anarchists advocating strong and persistent collective bodies

have the same flippancy to concerns about what to do if things start to

go bad in their utopias. But not only is such “exit” all or nothing, it

implicitly accepts the legitimacy of those collective entities, or at

least certain “democratic processes” for appealing against capricious or

oppressive collective edicts. But why should you have to leave? They’re

the assholes. Similarly if there are just a few things going wrong in

ways unfixable through the collective process, why should you have no

choice besides tolerance or total cataclysmic revolution?

Markets provide much more fluid means of detaching yourself from

dependence, and the union of insurrectionary and market anarchist

insights provides much smoother and less destructive means to rectify

any creeping accumulations of power.

If in an anarchistic society a Robber Baron tyrant or similar instance

of oppression were to somehow start to emerge without the helping hand

of state power as all prior have, we need not give up and flee, and

indeed should not.