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Title: Voluntary Socialism Author: Francis Dashwood Tandy Date: 1896 Language: en Topics: individualist anarchism, economics Source: Retrieved on 26 January, 2019 from http://praxeology.net/FDT-VS.htm Notes: Index not included. Primary footnotes are the notes of the author. Secondary footnotes are online notes by Roderick T. Long on Praxeology.net.
“Equality if we can get it,
but liberty at any rate.”
Benj. R. Tucker.
TO
BENJAMIN R. TUCKER
EDITOR OF “LIBERTY,”
WHOSE LUCID WRITINGS AND SCATHING CRITICISMS
HAVE DONE SO MUCH TO DISPEL
THE CLOUDS OF ECONOMIC SUPERSTITION,
THIS LITTLE BOOK
IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED
BY HIS PUPIL.
“Can’t you recommend some book which will give me a brief but lucid
outline of your ideas?” is a question with which every propagandist is
familiar. In spite of the extent and excellence of the literature of
“Voluntaryism,” I have often found it difficult to supply this demand.
It was, therefore, with the idea of helping myself that I undertook to
write this sketch. But I trust that my work will not prove useless to
others.
It was my original intention to make the book so plain and simple, that
almost anyone could understand it. But the intricacies of the subject
are very great. And, while I have always aimed at simplicity of
expression, I fear that those at least who are not familiar with the
terms used in economic discussions, will find it hard to follow me in
places.
It was my original intention to make the book so plain and simple, that
almost anyone could understand it. But the intricacies of the subject
are very great. And, while I have always aimed at simplicity of
expression, I fear that those at least who are not familiar with the
terms used in economic discussions, will find it hard to follow me in
places.
I have endeavored to give a complete outline of the subject in its most
important bearings. If the reader would blame me for omitting some
phases of the question, I must inform him that the main difficulty with
which I have had to contend, has been to keep the work within small
limits. I have done this in the belief that a more lengthy document
would not serve the purpose as well. The details have been admirably
worked out by more able hands. I have merely gathered some fragments an
blended them together, in the hope that some of those into whose hands
they may fall, will investigate this much misunderstood subject more
fully, instead of condemning it unheard.
I gladly avail myself of this opportunity to thank the friends who have
helped me with my work. More especially would I thank Mr. James H.
Pershing, to whose assistance and criticism the first chapter owes
whatever merit it may possess. His kindness in rendering this assistance
is increased by the fact that he does not agree with many of the ideas
expressed in the subsequent chapters. But it is to my wife that the book
owes most of all. Without her patient encouragement it would probably
never have been written, and had I been deprived of her gentle
criticism, it would have manifested many more crudities than it now
contains.
It is not necessary in the present day to begin a book on social reform
with a long and wearying demonstration of the fact that something is
radically wrong with existing industrial conditions. The panic of 1893,
the subsequent depression of trade and the tremendous conflicts between
capital and labor have emphasized it more forcibly than the longest
array of statistics. Even the recent writings of orthodox economists,
striving as they do to bolster up the present system, admit that that
system is producing very bad results. Their sole argument seems to be
that it is better to submit to the present injustice, than to try
remedies which are likely to prove worse than the disease. Assuming,
then, that the present system is bad, it becomes important to discover
where the evil lies. When this is done, some clear idea will be gained
of the direction true reform should take, and all proposed changes can
be intelligently judged.
In order to fully understand social questions, it is necessary at the
outset to have a clear idea of the laws of development – how this world
became what it is, how human beings think and act and how society is
organized. By comparing the results of these investigations, perhaps
some guiding principle may be found, which will indicate the lines upon
which the ideal state of society must be based.
So widespread is the existence of a sickly sentimentalism, that it is
necessary for everyone to be on his guard against it, before undertaking
any sociological enquiry. A sympathy for the poverty and wretchedness of
others is a very good thing and often stimulates people to strive to
better social conditions. But it must not be permitted, as it so often
us, to influence the reasoning of the economist. Human beings are very
complex creatures, possessed of many emotions and motives for action,
all of which must be duly taken into account. But the philosopher who is
analysing human nature, must raise himself above the influence of those
emotions and regard his subjects as calmly as if he himself had not the
misfortune to be one of their number.
The etiquette of the medical profession forbids a doctor to practice on
any member of his immediate family. Perhaps the origin of this custom
may be found in the supposition that a man’s sympathies are liable to be
too active under such circumstances, and so interfere with the full play
of his reasoning faculties. What would we say of a surgeon, whose
sentimental objection to amputating an arm, cost the patient his life?
This is practically the position taken by the multitude of dilettante
reformers, who shrink from the application of scientific principles to
human society, because they appear cruel and repulsive to their narrow
vision. The true student must put all such sentimentalism from him and
approach the subject in a purely dispassionate manner.
The most generally accepted facts relating to the origin of the solar
system, point to the conclusion that it was once a vast, shapeless body
of fiery vapor.
There was, no doubt, much motion among the particles forming this vapor,
and so currents, similar to those in the oceans to-day, gradually
developed. The direction of these various currents was probably
different, but there must have been a preponderance of motion in one
direction – from West to East. This motion, gradually arresting all
counter-acting motion, caused the whole to rotate in that one direction
at ever-increasing speed.
The rapid rotation caused the nebula, as such a mass is called, to
assume a somewhat spherical form, and, acting as centrifugal force (the
force which causes a wet wheel to cast off drops of water when it is
rotating rapidly), caused it to bulge at its equator and to become
flattened at its poles. Meanwhile heat was radiating in every direction
and resulted in the contraction of the whole. The poles of the nebula
“became more and more flattened, and its equatorial zone protruded more
and more, until at last The centrifugal tendency at the equator became
greater than the force of gravity at that place. Then the bulging
equatorial zone, no longer able to keep pace with the rest of the mass
in its contraction, was left behind as a detached ring, girdling, at a
small but steadily increasing distance[,] the retreating central mass.”
(Fiske, Cosmic Philosophy, v. 1, p. 361.) [1]
The inequalities of the density if this ring caused the molecules to be
attracted to one or more centres, subsequently causing the ring to break
into several portions of unequal weight. As these revolved around the
parent mass in the same plane, the attraction of the smaller portions to
the greater ultimately formed them into one body, which continued to
revolve in its orbit as well as to rotate on its own axis.
These same forces were now at work to cause this mass in its turn to
cast off smaller rings, which followed a similar course of development.
Meanwhile the parent mass was preparing to cast another ring off into
space, to commence an individual existence of its own. In this manner
the planets and their satellites were most probably formed.
Of all the various bodies of matter floating around in space, the
smallest naturally cooled the quickest. Thus we find the suns till in a
molten condition. Jupiter and the other large planets are cooler, but
still in a partly self-luminous state. Saturn, surrounded by his rings,
and the belt of more than a hundred asteroids between the orbits of Mars
and Jupiter, show us possibly the manner in which the rings were first
cast off and afterwards broken into smaller pieces. We find the Earth
and possibly Mars sufficiently cool to be able to support life on a
hardened crust, and the Moon entirely burnt out, warning us of the
condition to which all planets will eventually come. Just as they have
evolved from the molten, gaseous condition of the nebula, gradually
cooling and developing conditions favorable to the maintenance of
teeming life, so will they probably continue to cool until they become
dead worlds on which no life can exist, each revolving in its orbit,
useless, lifeless cinders floating onward, mere monuments of departed
glory. Perchance, this solemn procession coming in collision with some
other system, will, by reason of the heat thus generated, result in the
total annihilation of both, resolving them back into their original
atoms, ready to start once more upon another cycle if development and
decay. – Such is the “Purpose of Nature!”
The gradual cooling of the Earth caused a hard crust to form and the
shrinkage of the mass crushed and crumpled that crust into the most
irregular form. This irregularity was intensified by the mass cooling
more slowly in some places than in others. Atmosphere and water, frost
and hurricane working from without, and igneous agencies operating from
within, have gradually modified the original surface. Thus were
mountains and continents raised up in some places, lakes and oceans
formed in others. Here, the land worn away and deposited in minute
particles at the bottom of rivers and seas; there, places, formerly
covered with water, upheaved and appearing as dry land once more. These
incessant conflicts between the forces of nature, have brought order out
of chaos, have evolved the Earth out of the nebula.
When, where, and how life first originated is, and perhaps ever will be,
unknown. Some say at least one hundred million years, some not more than
thirty million, have elapsed since it first appeared. Some claim that it
originated in the tropics, others in the polar regions. About all that
we do know is that it first appeared in its simplest form as a particle
of plasma. So simple is this form that it may be said to be neither
animal nor vegetable, but the parent of both. Nor is the question of how
the living actually evolved out of the non-living any more definitely
settled. Yet a belief that such a transformation actually did take
place, and that by means of purely natural agencies, is fairly prevalent
in the scientific world. Prof. Huxley says, “If it were given me to look
beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time to the still more remote
period when the Earth was passing through physical and chemical
conditions, which it can no more see again than a man can recall his
infancy, I should expect to be a witness of the evolution of the living
protoplasm from non-living matter.”[2]
So closely allied is the non-living to the living that it is often
difficult to determine to which class some forms of matter belong. Deep
sea ooze is a good example of this. Scientists have not yet discovered
positively whether it is living or not. If it is discovered to be
living, the investigations now being made may throw much light upon the
genesis of life. But “while ... the mode in which protoplasm must have
arisen may by and by be partially comprehended, it is at the same time
true that the ultimate mystery – the association of vital properties
with the enormously complex chemical compound known as protoplasm –
remains unsolved. Why the substance protoplasm should manifest sundry
properties which are not manifested by any of its constituent
substances, we do not know; and very likely we shall never know. But
whether the mystery be forever insoluble or not, it can in no wise be
regarded as a solitary mystery. It is equally mysterious that starch or
sugar or alcohol should manifest properties not displayed by their
elements, oxygen, hydrogen and carbon, when uncombined. Yet, however
mysterious, the fact remains that one result of every chemical synthesis
is the manifestation of a new set of properties. The case of living
matter or protoplasm is in no wise exceptional.”[3] (Fiske, Cosmic
Philosophy, v. 1, p. 435.)
When, in the development of any organism, the original cell grows to a
certain size “the force of cohesion is overcome by the release of energy
divided from the food, and the cell divides equally at the kernel or
nucleus.” (Clodd, Story of Creation, p. 85.) [4]
The next stage of development is reached when the two cells after
dividing remain together for their mutual advantage. Subsequently, as
the cells continue to divide, groups of four, eight, sixteen, thirty-two
are developed. And so the process continues until a large mass of
individual cells is formed. Gradually the union between these cells
becomes closer, slowly “the division of labor” among them and the
consequent arrangement of their relative locations blend the whole into
a relatively complex organism.
The history of the individual is the miniature of life history from
monera up to man.[5] It is not necessary here to trace all the steps of
this development, but rather to show the process by which that
development has been attained. Suffice it to say that while the earlier
and simpler forms are still in existence, many of the intermediate forms
have entirely disappeared, leaving no trace that has yet been found. One
by one, however, the gaps are being filled up as the palaeontologist
extends his researches further and further among the fossil-bearing
rocks of the world. So we may hope that many of the “missing links” will
ultimately be discovered.
It is not to be supposed that progress is in one straight line. On the
contrary, its directions are innumerable. Starting from a common stem,
life divides into two great branches, animal and vegetable. Each of
these divides into numerous smaller branches, which divide again and
again, forming the various genera, species and varieties which we find
to-day. We no more find that the lowest forms are developed form the
highest forms of vegetables, than we find man descended from monkeys.
What we do find is that the lowest forms of both animals and vegetables
are so nearly allied that it is often difficult to tell to which class
they belong, and that the difference between them increases the higher
they ascend in the scale of life.
In the simplest forms of life the cell divides into two as soon as it
grows to a certain size. Each of these two cells undergoes a similar
operation. So the number of cells increases in a geometrical ratio, and
would in course of time fill the whole universe if there were nothing to
prevent them from doing so. The cause of their growth is the food they
assimilate. Consequently the extent of their multiplication is limited
by the supply of food obtainable. From this it naturally follows, that
those who are able to obtain the most food will multiply the fastest.
Any characteristic which enabled the cell, or group of cells, to obtain
food to better advantage than its fellows, would naturally be manifest
in those into which it divided.
This same principle applies to higher forms of life. Those individuals
which can obtain the most food, other things being equal, will be the
strongest, live longest and beget most offspring. So also any
characteristic which enables an individual to eat and digest any form of
food which has not hitherto been utilized, will give that individual a
bteter chance of existence. It is easy to understand how, by the
preservation and accumulation of favorable variations, different
characteristics may be developed simultaneously in different individuals
and result in the existence of many various species.
While the obtaining of food is of primary importance to the preservation
of life, and consequently one of the greatest factors in evolution,
there are other factors which are scarcely less important; prominent
among these is the ability to escape from accidents and enemies. It is
difficult to fully appreciate the importance of these factors until we
realize that all nature is at war with itself. Those animals which do
not live by eating others, maintain their existence at the expense of
the vegetable kingdom, which in turn derives its nourishment from
inorganic substance. We perpetually find some species developing the
most marvelous characteristics to enable it to catch its prey, and the
prey developing characteristics no less marvelous to enable it to
escape.
Keen as is the competition between different species, it is only among
individuals and varieties of the same species that it is most intense.
This is only what might be expected when we consider the vast number of
individuals that come into existence, only a few of which can possibly
survive on account of the lack of food. This is merely the Malthusian
theory of population applied to the lower creation. Darwin tells us that
it was by reading Malthus’s work that he finally discovered the keynote
of evolution. (See Darwin’s Life and Letters, v. 1, p. 68; also Haeckel,
History of Creation, v1., p. 134.)[6] The history of development is the
history of the strong overcoming the weak, and thrusting them
remorselessly aside in the struggle for life.
When the individuals reach maturity another phase of the struggle
becomes manifest in the competition for sexual mates. Here again those
who have received most nourishment will probably be most successful.
Should the weaker secure mates at all, they will have less vitality to
impart to their offspring, who, in consequence, will be most likely to
perish in the struggle for life when their turn comes. Thus, by
perpetually weeding out those individuals who are least capable of
adapting themselves to their environment, the ability of the whole
species to adapt itself is increased each generation. It is important to
note that this end is not brought about by the individual cultivating
characteristics which are beneficial to the species, but by the
individual developing characteristics which enable him to overcome his
fellow in the struggle for existence. By the killing of the unfit and
the preservation of those who possess favorable variations, the
characteristics which have been beneficial to the individuals become of
benefit to the species. Such characteristics are, and can be, beneficial
to the species only in so far as they are beneficial to the individuals
which compose that species.
These are the factors in evolution which Darwin calls natural and sexual
selection. These terms are perfectly correct when Darwin’s explanation
of them is borne in mind. (See Origin of Species, Chap. IV.) Yet, such
is the prevalent looseness of thinking and lax use of terms that many
gather an entirely false impression from them. Darwin used these terms
in order to point out the analogy between the factors and the selection
practiced by the human breeder. But he cautions us that it is only an
analogy. Many have neglected his warning and have attached the same
meaning to the word, selection, in both cases. The human breeder often
selects one peculiarity and develops that regardless of its utility to
the individual. With natural selection such a thing is impossible.
Nothing is primarily developed except for its utility. Even a favorable
variation may be lost on account of the existence of other unfavorable
characteristics in the same individuals, thus rendering them less likely
to survive when all things are considered. On the one hand we see the
effect of an intelligent, conscious selection, on the other, nothing but
the working of a blind, purposeless force.
The term “Survival of the fittest” – first used by Spencer and
afterwards endorsed by Darwin – is in many respects more exact, but even
it is not proof against the carelessness of the untrained mind. A large
number of people think that the “fittest” are those individuals who best
conform to their standard of ethics. The word is only used to signify
those who can best adapt themselves to their environment. It is easy to
see that in a country where food is scarce those individuals who had
religious objections to killing and eating their aged parents would
stand a poorer chance of surviving than their less punctilious brethren.
In this case the cannibals would be the fittest to survive, while,
judged from our ethical standpoint, the others would probably be
considered more moral.
Though the doctrine of evolution does directly promise to produce a more
perfect adaptation of a species to its environment, it in no way assures
us of continued progress, that is an increase of complexity. Spencer
says “If in case of the living aggregates forming a species the
environing actions remain constant, the species remains constant. If
those actions change, the species change[s] until it is in adjustment
with them. But it by no means follows that this change in the species
constitutes a step in evolution.[7] (Principles of Sociology.)
Degeneration is so important a factor in evolution that Ray Lankester
has seen fit to write a book on that subject alone.[8] Evidence of it is
found in very many species and even in the human race. The Bushmen and
the Fuegians are examples of its force, as is also the Chinese Empire.
Max Nordau would have us believe that the whole human race – except of
course Max Nordau – is suffering from the same complaint.[9]
The survival of the fittest must of necessity remain inoperative until a
certain amount of variation exists. If all individuals were alike there
could be no “fittest” to survive. The smaller the amount of this
variation, the slower must the change be. Thus the species which
manifests the greatest variety among its individuals is most likely to
adapt itself quickly to changed conditions. Any species in which
variation is unknown and which has become a fixed type must suffer total
extinction if its environments change. The only reason the lowest forms
of life have continued to exist, in spite of almost universal change, is
that the changed conditions do not affect their limited environments and
so “the species remains constant.”
Selection pre-supposes variation and operates only through the most
relentless competition. By the extinction of those individuals which are
least able to adapt themselves to their environment, the species
develops those characteristics which have proved beneficial to the
surviving individuals.
Applying these conclusions to social reform, we see that permanent
improvement in human society can only be found under conditions which
are favorable to the development of different characteristics among its
members, which recognize the welfare of the individual to be of
paramount importance and which foster the freest competition in order
that that welfare may become general.
The foolish philanthropy so prevalent to-day, which would prevent the
pro-creation of the unfit and which seeks to lessen competition, must be
unqualifiedly condemned. To limit the number of births, even of
criminals, is to limit the variation of the species. Any such action
makes the perfect adaptation of us to our environments less speedy and
less sure. The wider the variation the greater chance is there for the
production of favorable types. Then competition is absolutely essential
in order to weed out the unfit and to make the variation beneficial to
the race. It is impossible for a few self-conceited lady novelists to
tell what individuals will prove the fittest, or what combination is
necessary to produce such individuals. If the teachings of evolution are
true, all external force which limits the pro-creation of any
individuals – whether good or bad – or restricts competition must result
disastrously to the human race.
From this standpoint the present social system is condemned on every
hand. It places a special premium upon one characteristic – the ability
to get money – at the expense of every other. It fosters a spirit of
self-sacrificing patriotism and so place the welfare of the country
above that of the individual. It denies the first essential of free
competition – the right of every individual to the free use of the earth
– and hedges us around with restrictions of all kinds. Unfortunately
most of the proposed reforms seek to intensify these evils instead of to
remove them.
In this outline of evolution the factor of “use-inheritance” (that is,
the transmission of acquired characteristic sto offspring) has not been
mentioned because it is still under discussion. Spencer, Darwin while he
lived, and many other biologists of note maintain that acquired
characteristics are transmitted to offspring. Weismann and many others
of prominence contend that only congenital characteristics are capable
of transmission. If the position held by Spencer is correct, the
conclusions I have reached are fully justified. If, on the other hand,
his opponents gain the day, my arguments are reinforced by their
victory. William P. Ball concludes his book on use-inheritance[10] in
the following words: “The effects of use and disuse – rightly directed
by education in its widest sense – must of course be called in to secure
the highly essential but nevertheless superficial, limited, and partly
deceptive improvement of individuals and of social manners and methods;
but as this artificial development of already existing potentialities
does not directly or readily tend to become congenital, it is evident
that some considerable amount of natural or artificial selection of the
more favorable varying individuals will still be the only means of
securing the race against the constant tendency to degeneration, which
would ultimately swallow up all the advantages of civilization. The
selective influences by which our present high level has been reached
and maintained may well be modified, but they must not be abandoned or
reversed in the rash expectation that State education, or State feeding
of children, or State housing of the poor, or any amount of State
socialism or public or private philanthropy, will prove permanently
satisfactory substitutes. If ruinous deterioration and other more
immediate evils are to be avoided, the race must still be to the swift
and the battle to the strong. The healthy individualism so earnestly
championed by Mr. Spencer must be allowed free play. Open competition,
as Darwin teaches, with its survival and multiplication of the fittest,
must be allowed to decide the battle of life independently of a foolish
benevolence that prefers the elaborate cultivation and multiplication of
weeds to growth of corn and roses. We are trustees for the countless
generations of the future. If we are wise we shall trust to the great
ruling truths that we assuredly know rather than to the seductive claims
of an alleged factor of evolution for which no satisfactory evidence can
be produced.” (Ball, Are the Effects of Use and Disuse Inherited?)
The habits of the lower animals, the growth and development of plants
and the motion of the heavenly bodies may all be generalized, and the
laws in accordance with which they act may be stated. May not the
motives of human action be also subject to generalization? This is a
question to which the old school of philosophers gives a negative, the
modern school, an affirmative answer.
The fact that a person reads or writes a book devoted to social science
pre-supposes an agreement with the modern idea. It is only when human
action is generalized that a science of society can be found possible.
Such a science must consist of generalizations of human action and
deductions form those generalizations. If men are “free moral agents,”
that is, if they can act of their own volition regardless of the rest of
the universe, any generalization of their actions is impossible. Even if
under such conditions any general statement of their past actions could
be made, it would be valueless, for there would be no guarantee that
they would again act in a similar manner under similar circumstances.
Anyone that admits the possibility of a social science is thereby
committed to the doctrine of necessity, that is, that a certain
individual, placed in certain environments, of necessity acts in a
certain manner. This being assumed, it becomes of the very first
importance to discover the fundamental law of human action, for on this
law all sound theories of social reform must depend.
The Theist declares that we should always act in accordance with the
commands of God. Admitting, for the sake of argument, the existence of
God, why should we obey Him? Immediately the answer suggests itself. God
being the supreme ruler of the universe, it is the height of folly to
antagonize Him. He can heap disasters from which there is no escape on
those who disobey Him, and is capable of rewarding with eternal joy
those who uphold His honor and glory. We must obey the commands of God
and deny ourselves in this life, in order that we may reap joys eternal.
“Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon the earth; where rust and moth
doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal: but lay up for
yourselves treasures in heaven; where neither rust nor moth do corrupt,
and where thieves do not break through and steal.” (Matthew vi., 19 and
20.) This is the essence of the Christian religion.
The Altruist maintains that we should love our fellow man and act for
his good. If we love our fellow man, the sight of pain in him will make
us unhappy and his happiness will cause us pleasure. So we proceed to
ameliorate his pain and increase his happiness in order that we
ourselves may be happy. But why should I love my fellow man? If I don’t
love him or feel badly when he suffers, I certainly will not put myself
to the trouble of helping him, unless I know that he will help me in
turn when I shall need it.
“You should act for the greatest good of the community,” says another.
Why should you except in so far as the good of the community is liable
to result in good to you? Even if you owe the community anything, why
should you pay? Still the same answer, “If you don’t it will be the
worse for you.”
But now up comes another and says, “You must act from a sense of duty.”
Duty to whom? To God? I owe Him only such obedience as He gains through
my fear of punishment or hope of reward. To my neighbor? What do I owe
him? Only that consideration which we agree to accord to each other for
our mutual good. To society? To my family? To the state? The same answer
applies. Turn which way you will, the idea of duty entirely disappears.
John Stuart Mills[11] says, “The internal sanction of duty, whatever our
standard of duty may be, is ... a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more
or less intense, attendant on violations of duty, which in properly
cultivated moral natures rises, in the most serious cases, into
shrinking from it as an impossibility. ... Its binding force, however,
consists in the existence of a mass of feelings which must be broken
through in order to do what violates our standard of right, and which,
if we do nevertheless violate that standard, will have to be encountered
afterwards in the form of remorse.” (Utilitarianism, pp. 67-68.) Thus
there are two forces which cause us to pursue a right course of action,
the external force or fear of retaliation, and the internal force or
fear of our conscience.
The conscience has been considered by many as the distinctive attribute
of man – the spark divine in the human breast. Darwin, however, found
many evidences of it in the lower animals. Really there is nothing
mysterious about it. “At the moment of action man will no doubt be apt
to follow the stronger impulse; and though this may occasionally prompt
him to the noblest deeds, it will more commonly lead him to gratify his
own desires at the expense of other men. But after their gratification,
when past and weaker impressions are judged by the ever-enduring social
instinct, and by is deep regard for the good opinion of his fellows,
retribution will surely come. He will then feel remorse, repentance,
regret or shame; this latter feeling, however, relates almost
exclusively to the judgment of others. He will consequently resolve more
or less firmly to act differently for the future; and this is
conscience; for conscience looks backward and serves as a guide for the
future. (Darwin, Descent of Man, Chap. IV.)
We must by no means underestimate the important part which this internal
force plays in deciding the happiness or unhappiness of most men. But
both the internal and the external forces, which deter us from a wrong
course of action, operate upon our knowledge that such a course will
ultimately result in unhappiness. This is the only ultimate motive of
action.
If every individual always attempts to attain the greatest amount of
happiness, the doctrine of Necessity follows as a logical deduction.
Given a complete knowledge of all the environments in which an
individual is placed and a complete knowledge of that individual’s
conception of happiness (this latter includes an exact idea of his
intelligence) and we could determine with mathematical certainty what
course of action he would pursue. That this exactness is never reached
is due to the practical impossibility of obtaining all the necessary
data. But it is surprising how accurate the keen observer of human
nature often is in forseeing the actions of another. This accuracy will
be found to increase or diminish in proportion as more or less correct
estimates if the actor’s character and environments are formed. Conan
Doyle gives us a glimpse of the possibilities in this line in his famous
Sherlock Holmes stories.
If, on the other hand, men do not always act from motives of self
interest, but sometimes from selfish and sometimes from unselfish
motives, it is impossible to generalize their conduct in the slightest.
In which case, as above stated, a science of society is absolutely
unthinkable. The absurdity of such a position need hardly be pointed
out, in spite of the voluminous works which have been written in its
defence. So we are justified in maintaining that all action resolves
itself into an attempt on the part of an organism to place itself in
harmony with its environments; that is, to increase its happiness or,
what is the same thing, to decrease its pain. Such is the philosophy of
Egoism.
This is the only theory of psychology which is in harmony with the
doctrine of evolution, for it is a sine qua non of that competition
which is so essential to natural and sexual selection.
In accordance with this principle all our actions may be divided into
two classes: those from which we expect to derive pleasure directly, and
those from which, though often unpleasant in themselves, we hope
ultimately to gain more happiness than pain. When a man goes for a walk
on a pleasant afternoon, he expects to derive pleasure form the walk.
But when, on a cold, wintry night, he walks several miles through the
snow to go to a dance, the walk becomes only a means to attain
happiness; in other words, he sacrifices his immediate pleasure for one
which is greater though more remote. The two possible courses of action
are perpetually conflicting with one another. We pursue one course or
the other, according as our experience and intelligence may prompt us.
So many of our actions are the result of sacrificing the immediate to
the remoter pleasure, that people begin to look upon that sacrifice as
something noble, forgetful of the fact that it is only a means to attain
greater happiness sin the end. Experience teaches us that it is often
advisable to sacrifice minor points for the benefit of others, in order
that we may escape either the pain of self-reproach, or that we may
reasonably expect others to help us when we shall need it. This is a
purely Egoistic course of action. We can often perform great services
for others at the cost of very little trouble to ourselves, and we often
need assistance which others can give us without much inconvenience, but
which is invaluable to us. These exchanges are for mutual benefit. When
people lose sight of that mutual benefit and say we must sacrifice
ourselves without any hope of reward, they get altogether beyond the
pale of reason.
If self-sacrifice is good, the more we have of it the better, and the
man who gives away all that he has except just enough to keep him alive
is the finest member of society. But now a paradox is manifest. If the
self-sacrificer is the noblest member of society, the one who accepts
that sacrifice is the meanest. So to manifest due humility we should
debase ourselves by permitting others to sacrifice themselves for our
good. This nice little piece of jugglery may be kept up ad infinitum. A
can sacrifice himself, by permitting B to sacrifice himself, by
condescending to allow A to sacrifice himself, and so on as long you
like.
If self-sacrifice is good, to sacrifice oneself for the benefit of the
lower animals, from whom no return of the kindness can be reasonably
expected, is still better. Since we cannot even breathe, much less eat,
drink, or be clothed, without destroying life, suicide becomes the only
moral course. Now the same old paradox confronts us again. The
fulfilment of duty is a source of happiness from which the
self-sacrificer should flee. Instead of committing suicide as in duty
bound, he should live to kill others. Mental gymnastics of this nature
may be highly amusing, but they are hardly satisfactory when offered as
a substitute for a philosophical system. Yet this is all the
self-sacrifice theory, or Altruism, as it is called, has to offer, It is
absurd whichever way it is approached.
“If a man smite thee upon one cheek, turn to him the other also,”[12] is
a very ennobling and comforting doctrine – for the man who is doing the
smiting. But the other fellow will generally find it more satidfactory
to follow the advice which Charlotte Bronte puts in the mouth of Jane
Eyre: “If people were always kind and obedient to those who are cruel
and unjust, the wicked people would have it all their own way: they
would never feel afraid, and so they would never alter but grow worse
and worse. When we are struck at without reason, we should strike back
again very hard; I am sure we should – so hard as to teach the person
who struck us never to do it again.” The Egoist does not advocate a
spirit of revenge, however, but rather a spirit of self-protection. In
some cases an apparent non-resistant attitude offers the most effectual
method of resistance. In such cases non-resistance will be the not
intelligent attitude. But these cases are few indeed. It will usually be
found that a good active show of resistance commands more respect than
all the submission in the world.
“Inquiring into the pedigree of an idea is not a bad means of roughly
estimating its value. To have come of respectable ancestry is prima
facie evidence of worth in a belief as in a person; while to be
descended from a discreditable stock is, in the one case as in the
other, an unfavorable index.” (Spencer, Nebular Hypothesis, p. 108, v. 1
of his Essays.) As soon as man began to have ideas concerning a
supernatural agent, his fear prompted him to endeavor to propitiate that
power. His worship was based on purely selfish motives. It was better to
suffer considerable pain than to incur the anger of the Gods. The
practice of self-immolation is not to be wondered at, but for its origin
“we must once more go back to the ghost theory. ... There are the
mutilations and blood-lettings at funerals; there are the fastings
consequent on sacrifices of animals and food at the grave; and in some
cases there are the deficiencies of clothing which follow the leaving of
dresses (always of the best) for the departed. Pleasing the dead is
therefore inevitably associated in thought with pain borne by the
living. ... Sufferings having been the concomitants of sacrifices made
to ghosts and gods, there grew up the notion that submission to these
concomitant sufferings was itself pleasing to ghosts and gods; and
eventually that the bearing of gratuitous sufferings was pleasing. All
over the world, ascetic practices have thus originated.” (Spencer,
Ecclesiastical Institutions, pp. 758-759.) It requires but little
imagination to trace the effect of the spirit of utilitarianism
operating upon this useless self-immolation and transforming it into the
modern idea of self-sacrifice. People often find it necessary to submit
to temporary pain in order to gain more permanent happiness. Gradually
the cake of custom hardens. The means are mistaken for the end, and the
whole trend of human thought is perverted in consequence.
Egoism, as such, does not teach us how to act. It simply states why we
act as we do. It is merely an analysis of the motives of action, but on
the result of this analysis all true ethics must rest. In declaring that
all action is the result of an attempt on the part of the individual to
secure the greatest possible happiness, the Egoist merely asserts a
fact. Having discovered this fact, he will base a theory of conduct upon
it, with the end in view of obtaining the greatest amount of happiness.
He will sacrifice an immediate pleasure for one more remote when it
seems good to him, and not otherwise. Thus he says to himself, “I will
countenance the killing of animals for my food, because the good to be
derived from so doing is greater than the disadvantage. But I will
discountenance unnecessary cruelty; first, because cruelty to animals
makes a man brutal in his nature, and such a man is liable to injure me
or some one I love; secondly, because the sight, or even the thought, of
unnecessary pain is unpleasant to me; and thirdly, because I derive no
benefit from it.
So with regard to all his actions with other men, after taking into
consideration the feelings of satisfaction or remorse he will experience
from a certain act, the chances of the action exciting the resentment or
commendation of the rest of the community, and the effect of setting an
example which is liable to be followed by someone else to-morrow and
cause a similar course of action to be applied to him, after taking all
these and similar factors into consideration, he will, if he be a wise
man, be governed by the highest expediency.
But when have we time to weigh and consider all these factors before
performing a certain action? “The answer to the objection is, that there
has been ample time, namely, the whole past duration of the human
species. During all that time mankind has been learning by experience
the tendencies of actions; on which experience all the prudence, as well
as all the morality of life, is dependent. ... Nobody argues that the
art of navigation is not founded on astronomy because sailors cannot
wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack. Being rational creatures, they
go to sea with it ready calculated; and all rational creatures go out
upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common questions of
right and wrong, as well as on the far more difficult questions of wise
and foolish.” (J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, pp. 56-58.)
So imbued do we become with the idea that certain acts are wise, and we
get so in the habit of performing them, that we often do so
unconsciously. But these reflex actions, as they are called, are really
based upon experience and habit and are the result of previous
calculation. The fact, that having calculated it so often before we know
the result at once, is merely a matter of economy.
If all our acts are attempts to gain greater happiness, it behoves us to
exert all our energies to the attainment of that end. This gives us a
direct rational basis of ethics. The idea of duty is absolutely lost.
Actions appear to be good only insofar as they minister to our
happiness, and bad insofar as they cause us pain. The term right is
synonymous with wise, and wrong, with foolish.
The highest morality is to devote all our efforts to attainment of
happiness, leaving others free to do the same. The golden rule must be
stated negatively and made to read, “Mind your own business.” As Egoists
we are bound to assume that others are seeking their own greatest
happiness, and as long as they do this, it is impertinent to interfere
with them and foolish to set an example which will probably be followed
and result in interference with our own affairs. If others attempt to
meddle with us, we are justified in acting toward them in such a manner
that they will find the pain resulting from such a course far outweighs
the pleasure and, consequently, will not be tempted to repeat the
experiment.
The Egoist should abstain from all interference with others and resent
any similar liberties they may take with him. He is not even justified
in meddling with another’’s business for his own good. He is bound to
assume that everyone is wise enough to know what constitutes his own
happiness. If he isn’t, he will suffer the consequences and know better
next time.
Every individual should be brought to understand that he is responsible
for his actions and will suffer the consequences of all his mistakes.
This is really inevitable. The attempt to evade the law of individual
responsibility invariably results disastrously. It leads people top
suppose that they can act foolishly and not suffer the consequences, and
when their folly finds them out there is no one to help them. The
doctrine of individual responsibility is a corollary of Egoism. It
teaches self-reliance instead of self-sacrifice, dependence upon self
instead of upon others. To develop this feeling it is only necessary to
give people a chance to practice it. To say that I am my brother’s
keeper, is to admit that he is also mine. Devote yourself to being happy
and I will do the same. If we all succeed the social question will be
solved. If we fail, let us try again with our intelligence improved by
past experience. “Enlightenment makes selfishness useful and this
usefulness popular.” (“Egoism,” Vol. 1, No. 1, May, 1890.)
context manifestly implies a different use, I use the word State in its
widest sense – “the body politic,” as Webster defines it. This
definition is given provisionally until its nature is further
investigated.
It often happens that men will repudiate certain theological ideas and
yet cling with great tenaciousness to corollaries of those ideas. An
excellent example of this may be found in popular ideas in regard to the
origin of the State.1
While repudiating the idea of the fall of man and even while affirming
the doctrine of progressive evolution, many men maintain that the State
was originally a voluntary association of individuals for their mutual
protection and the maintenance of personal liberty, and that it has
since degenerated into a conspiracy against the human race conducted for
the benefit of a few individuals. It would be strange indeed if
primitive man, with a degree of intelligence scarcely superior to that
of other species of the highest orders of mammals, should form a State
so far superior to any in existence to-day.
Although there are no histories of primitive man – perhaps because there
are none to mislead us – much is known of the origin and development of
the State. An investigation of the various social systems, or lack of
such systems among savages in various parts of the world, and the
discovery of many implements, monuments and other relics of races which
have ceased to exist, teach us that the State was founded in aggression.
So gradual is the process of evolution, that it is impossible to fix the
time of the birth of the human race. It is consequently impossible to
say what was the earliest form of human association. Many species of the
lower animals have regular social systems, the most complex of which are
found among the bees and ants. Some species of monkeys form groups of a
gregarious, we can scarcely call it a social, nature. A similar state of
affairs is found among some savage tribes to-day, and this was probably
the earliest form of human association. “To eat, and not to be eaten, to
satisfy their amorous passions like beasts in the thickets, as do now
the Papuans, the New Caledonians, and the Andamans; such were in this
primitive stage of social development the only objects of human life.”
(Letourneau[,] Sociology, p. 540.)[13]
With but poorly developed mental power, almost destitute of implements,
physically inferior to most wild beasts, primitive man was subject to
the keenest, and what appear[s] to us the most brutal, competition in
the struggle for existence. The incessant conflict between the members
of each of these groups resulted in the supremacy of the strongest man,
and the war between the various groups gave the victory to the strongest
and best organized group. Crude, though such organization must have
been, since it was nothing more than submission to one or more men whose
strength was their sole claim to leadership, yet that organization was
frequently of paramount importance in the struggle. Other things being
equal, the most perfectly organized group would naturally be victorious
in time of war. As the members of the defeated groups were usually
killed and eaten by their conquerors, natural selection favored the
development of organization.
With the development of human intelligence, the recollection of past
experience led men to take thought for the morrow. This became manifest
in rude attempts at agriculture and kindred occupations. Henceforth the
lives of captives were spared on condition that they performed such
labor as might be required of them. They became mere domestic animals
whose very lives were in the hands of their masters. They were spared
only because they were worth mote alive than dead. The introduction of
slavery completed the first great step in progress, and from it all
known forms of civilization have sprung.
From this on society became more complex. The smaller groups c[e]ased to
exist. Some were entirely exterminated. Others consolidated into larger
groups in order to protect themselves better and to make war upon their
neighbors with greater success. Large tribes were thus formed which
were, with very few exceptions, essentially warlike in character. In
times of peace between the tribes the warlike spirit often found vent in
severe internal dissensions. This greatly assisted the formation of
different castes and ultimately tended to complete the organization of
the tribe. It is somewhat strange that these internal struggles should,
by developing a certain organization, enable the tribe to overcome its
competitors in the struggle for existence. The religious superstitions
of primitive man began to invest the rulers with many of the attributes
of divinity. In Peru, for example, the Inca was looked upon as the son
of the supreme God. This added many powerful incentives to obedience
and, what is a pre-requisite of obedience, confidence in the commander.
As it assisted the centralization of power it may be looked upon as a
“favorable variation” and its widespread existence is only what might be
expected.
Traditions, superstitions and custom soon formed around this
organization which was founded in violence and aggression, and so the
State developed.
As the idea of private property became general, people were punished for
committing crimes against it. In early social forms the two great crimes
of this nature, theft and adultery, were punished long before crimes
against life and person. But even these crimes were seldom punished when
committed against the property of inferiors. “A man has no rights that
his superior is bound to respect,” seems to have been a fundamental
principle of jurisprudence even at that early date. It was not, as some
have imagined, the invention of the Supreme Court of the United
States.[14]
The difficulty of being able to make use of a very large number of
slaves in countries which were beginning to be relatively thickly
settled, gradually led the victors to permit the conquered people to
continue to occupy their lands, on condition that they paid an annual
tribute. It was thus that the Romans spread their dominion over the
ancient world and sowed the seeds of the Feudal System.
These earlier stages of social development form what Spencer calls the
Militant type of society – a type under which warfare is the great
element of competition. During these periods the tendency was towards
greater centralization of power in the hands of the State. Natural
selection developed organization of the non-fighting as well as of the
fighting members of the community. The former were the serfs or slaves
of the latter, and it was their duty to keep the armies well supplied
with food, clothes and impedimenta. A tribe so equipped would be far
better able to fight than their less fortunate enemies.
Under such a system the warrior was of course chief, and being chief he
soon became the richest. This again added to his power by increasing the
number of his retainers. At his death his son usually inherited this
wealth and power, which necessitated this following the occupation of
his father. These and similar forces operated to make all occupations
hereditary.
Incessant conflict between different tribes precluded the possibility of
commerce between them, so the “fostering of infant industries” and
“patronizing home production” was essential. Associations of
individuals, except such military associations as were under State
control, were injurious to the more perfect organization of the State,
and consequently were not permitted.
“The nature of the militant form of government will be further
elucidated on observing that it is both positively regulative and
negatively regulative. It does not simply restrain; it also enforces.
Besides telling the individual what he shall not do, it tells him what
he shall do.” (Spencer, Principles of Sociology, v. 2, p. 574.) The
development of the State and the restriction of individual liberty; the
growth of compulsory association and the suppression of voluntary
co-operation, coercion, aggression, regimentation, rigidity, stagnation,
these are the fruits of the militant type.
But the militant type contained within itself the germs of its own
destruction. The protection of a man’s property from the cupidity of his
inferiors begat the idea of protection of men from the rapacity of their
superiors. It took many centuries for this idea to develop, even to the
extent it is practiced to-day. Many attempts to gain freedom failed,
many pioneers lost their lives. During times of civil war opposing
factions were often desirous of adding to their strength. In order to do
this they promised greater freedom to the industrial classes. Often
these promises were violated, often they were but partly fulfilled. But
by occasional uprisings, perpetual demands and incessant supplication
the powers of the State were gradually restricted and the liberty of the
individual was increased.
With the increase of liberty, industry began to develop and commerce,
instead of warfare, gradually became the main element of competition.
This brings us down to the dawn of the Industrial type of society, which
commenced in England early in the Tudor period and has grown ever since
with varying fortunes. The great changes that have taken place have been
progressive insofar as they have tended to the development of the
industrial type. That is to say, the development of industrialism is the
decay of militancy, since the characteristics of the one are the
antithesis of the other. Future progress must be looked for in the
development of individual liberty, the removal of restrictions, the
growth of voluntary association and the decay of the State.
It is curious to note that in existing forms of society, State
regulation of the actions of individuals is greatest in the most
militant countries. In Germany we find a large standing army accompanied
by compulsory military service, compulsory insurance, compulsory
education and State regulation of all kinds. Much the same conditions
exist in Russia in a more intense form, and in a less degree in France.
England is less militant and the idea of liberty is better developed.
Switzerland manifests the highest development of any European country
and has not been engaged in war for centuries.
Sometimes State regulation is greater in any given country than it is at
other times. Close observation reveals the fact that increased
regulation almost always follows military operations. A good example of
this is found in the United States. Previous to the war of the
rebellion[15] the love of individual liberty was very great among the
white population. After the war State activities increased wonderfully.
The G.A.R., the S.O.V.[16] and similar societies have fostered this
militant spirit and red flag patriotism, until now every man who has a
grievance asks the State to interfere in his behalf. The Prohibitionist,
the Protectionist, the Greenbacker, the National banker, the Coxeyite,
the Populist and thousands of others are victims of this species of
mania. It is but natural that any manifestations of violence and force
on the part of the Sate should result in an increase if its powers. It
is founded on violence and aggression, and draws its strength from them.
The bully is always a little more arrogant after thrashing one of his
victims. Successful military operations beget a spirit of hero-worship,
pensions are freely bestowed, military men are appointed to civil
offices and all classes of society are permeated with a spirit of
militancy.
As the development of industrialism and all ideas of modern progress are
dependent upon the dissolution of the State, we must look upon that
organization as essentially anti-social. In its purity it is simply an
organization for the coercion of the many by the one, or of the minority
by the majority – it matters not which. Insifar as its power to coerce
has been restricted just insofar has it been dissolved. Further progress
is only to be found in the same line.
As I have suggested above, the State is in a large measure fostered by
the religious sentiments of the community. In most early forms the
sovereign was looked upon as the representative of God, as in China and
Ancient Mexico. In Peru and Egypt he was even regarded as a God. “The
divine right of kings to govern wroing” was almost universally
recognized in Mediaeval Europe. To-day we are taught to believe in the
divine right of the majority. “Vox populi vox Dei”[17] is still the
motto of our text books of civil government. The very attributes of
divinity are still accorded to the State. All laws for the suppression
of vice, the protective tariff and every act of our legislative
assemblies, except those for the protection of life and property,
pre-suppose that the State is infallible and omnipotent. What power but
one that lays claim to infallibility can consistently dictate to the
individual what he shall do and what he shall not do, what he shall or
what he shall not eat and drink, and the thousand and one things that
the State directly or indirectly dictates to us to-day? What power that
is not omnipotent could enforce these regulations? And if they cannot be
enforced what is the use of making them?
If not of divine origin, what is this intangible power? It does not
depend upon the existence of any one individual in a monarchy, or of any
body of legislators in a republic. When the Czar dies, or when the term
of every legislator expires, the State still lives, intangible,
inscrutable. We often find men living under a monarchy who condemn most
strongly the acts of their sovereign, and are yet stout advocates of
that form of State. So in America, we find men who condemn ever Congress
they know anything about, and yet howl lustily about the sacredness of
“our glorious institutions.” Often will a man maintain that our
legislative halls are filled with men whom he heartily despises; he will
assert that the protective tariff is a tyrannical imposition on the
people; yet he will be willing to punish the smuggler for disobeying a
bad law, enacted by a set of disreputable politicians, just because it
is necessary to obey the mandates of the State.
The State is of God or it is nothing. To deny the existence of a God who
delegates his powers to the rulers on earth, is to deny all the
pretentious claims of the State. From a very different standpoint the
“Civilta Catholica” of Rome reaches this same conclusion. “ ‘We want no
God!’ declared the men of 1789, and they pout liberty in the place of
the Creator. The motto ‘No God, no master,’ is but a natural consequence
of this.” (Translated in Literary Digest, 15th March, 1894.) This theory
is sup[p]orted by the fact that the dissolution of the State has
followed the decay of religious belief. It was not till after the
Reformation that the denial of the divine right of kings, as manifested
in the beheading of Charles I., was possible.[18] The development of
Free-thought preceded and accompanied the French and American
Revolutions.
In the higher forms of life the individuals epitomize the life history
of the species. “The higher structures passing through the same stages
as the lower structures up to the point when they are marked off from
them, yet never becoming in detail the form which they represent for the
time being.” (Clodd, Story of Creation, p. 102.) In like manner we find
that States which have recently come into existence in a complex
condition manifest many if the characteristics of lower forms. The
British colonies and the United States clung to slavery long after it
has been abandoned in every other civilized country. The great reversion
to militancy in this country, while dreictly caused by the late war,
could not have been as intense in older States under similar conditions.
In newly settled districts on the frontier of civilization the far
greater value that is placed upon property than upon human life, causing
theft to be punished with death while the murderer is permitted to go
free, is very characteristic of the earliest forms of society. As
progress is very rapid in such places these characteristics are soon
lost and a relatively high form of State is organized. But even in then
more densely settled portions of the New World many reversions towards
the militant type are found. The marvelous growth of secret societies
and the elaborate regalia worn by their members are clearly
characteristics of a militant race. Nothing seems to delight the average
American more than to strut around in a gaudy uniform. Even in
professional societies, where regalia is manifestly out of place, it
seems almost impossible for them to relinquish this custom altogether.
Instead of a uniform, large badges, made of colored ribbon, are worn
upon all great occasions. This is practiced among all classes in the
United States. In Europeans countries “playing at soldiers” is usually
left to children. Side by side with the greatest commercialism, we see a
spirit of jingoism manifested that would put a warlike European nation
to shame. In spite of the lack of a large standing army, men delight in
titles of all kinds, but military titles in particular. Glaring
absurdities and contradictions of this kind are seen on every hand, and
have puzzled nearly all our foreign critics. They are nothing but the
symptoms of national babyhood which are destined to be outgrown as
maturity is reached. While they exist they make the United States one of
the most interesting, though one of the most annoying countries to
study, and prove beyond question its kinship with older forms of State.
The State is founded in aggression. Its main function is the suppression
of individual liberty. It claims absolute jurisdiction over all within
its borders. It derives its power from the superstitious veneration of
its subjects, and governs and coerces them in proportion to the depth of
that superstition. But gradually superstitions decay. A few members of
the community demand more liberty, and they obtain it when they become
sufficiently strong to enforce their demands. The State is the machine
of the militant type and is essentially anti-social in its nature. It
must gradually dissolve as the spirit of industrialism gains strength.
Voluntary association cannot be perfected while the State exists, for
each is antagonistic to the other.
The doctrine of evolution teaches us that progress is due to the most
relentless competition, which, by destroying those indiv[i]duals who
possess u[n]favorable characteristics and preserving those whose
characteristics are better adapted to their environments, ultimately
develops in the species those favorable characteristics. So the progress
of the species is dependent upon the progress of the individuals. The
existence of different characteristics pre-supposes variation. The
greater the amount of variation, the better chance has the species of
adapting itself to its environments and of surviving in the struggle for
existence.
Permanent improvement in human society can only be found under
conditions which are in harmony with these principles; that is to say,
in a state of society which is favorable to the development of different
characteristics among its members, which recognizes the welfare of the
individual to be of paramount importance and which permits the freest
competition among its members, in order that that welfare may become
general.
The philosophy of Egoism, which is merely the doctrine of evolution
applied to psychology, teaches us that each individual always seeks his
own greatest happiness. Any interference with an individual in the
pursuit of his happiness is unwarranted, as no one can know better than
the person himself in what direction his happiness lies. Individual
freedom is necessary to the attainment of individual happiness.
Any restraint of the free activities of the individual are [sic] certain
to violate the conditions of social progress.
Every activity is either beneficial or detrimental. Surely there can be
no sense in restraining beneficial activity, so the only excuse for
restraint is that the activities restrained are detrimental, either to
the person himself, to some other person, or to society.
We have already seen that no one can be a better judge of whether a
certain course of action will result in happiness or pain to the actor,
than is that person himself. But even supposing greater experience
enables another to forsee the misery that will result from certain
actions, while the actor is blind to those results and sees only the
bright side. Shall we not permit the older and more experienced man to
restrain the impetuous youth? By no means. Apart from the possibility of
the older man being mistaken, restraint will only make the youth more
impetuous still. Even if his actions are curbed for the moment, they are
not suppressed, but will break out with greater violence as soon as an
opportunity arises. Meanwhile the youth has been fretting and chafing
under the restraint, and has probably suffered more pain from this cause
than he would have from doing as he wished. Such restraint can teach a
man nothing. If absolutely successful it stultifies his character, if
unsuccessful it only adds fuel to the fire. On the other hand, if
permitted to have his own way, at worst a man can but fail in his
attempt to gain happiness. This failure will teach him to try better
next time. Success is only achieved by constant failure. By these means
alone can men be taught to bear the responsibility of their actions, for
responsibility is ever the cost of freedom. If a man is left alone to
pursue a seemingly foolish course of action, he may succeed in making
himself happy, in which case he adds to the sum total of human wisdom. A
man of experience may often advise an impetuous youth, but he will never
restrain him, for the desire to restrain is born of inexperience.
If a man is not to be restrained for his own good, why should he be
restrained on account of another. If the happiness of one results in the
unhappiness of the other, who is to judge between then? Nearly every
action results in unhappiness to some one. Are all actions therefore to
be restrained? The success of one man depends upon the defeat of
another. To protect the weak from defeat is to prohibit success. Such a
denial of competition is at variance with our guiding principles, and is
absolutely absurd and untenable.
Now we come to those actions which are said to be detrimental to
society. How do we know that they are detrimental? With every new
development of social growth, ideas which before were considered
detrimental are found to be beneficial. The heretic of yesterday is the
hero of to-day. An infallible power might be able to tell what action s
are detrimental and what are not, but no one else can. This excuse of
social utility is invalid, because it makes the welfare of the
individual subservient to that of Society. This is contrary to the
higher law of social utility, the law of progress. Any restraint of the
activities of the individual denies free competition, is inimical to the
development of different characteristics and is consequently in direct
violation of the teachings of evolution and Egoism.
If freedom is the condition of progress, all invasion of that freedom is
bad and should be resisted, whether it is practiced by one upon another,
by one upon many, or by many upon one. In other words, individual
freedom pre-supposes the suppression of the invader, whether that
invader appears as an individual criminal or as the corporate criminal –
the State, – and whether as the Republican or as the Imperial form of
State.
The freedom of each individual denies all the freedom to invade. For
when one individual invades, the activities of another are restrained.
“If men have like claims to that freedom which is needed for the
exercise of their faculties, then must the freedom of each be bounded by
the similar freedom of all. ... Wherefore we arrive at the general
preposition, that every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise
his faculties compatible with the possession of like liberty by every
other man.” (Spencer, Social Statics, p. 36, revd. Ed.) This is the
principle of Equal Freedom, which, being derived from the conclusions of
biology and psychology, must be observed if good results are to be
expected in human society.[19]
While everyone is willing to endorse the principle of Equal Freedom, not
more than one per cent. of those individuals knows what it means. They
daily advocate measures which are diametrically opposed to it and expect
to attain good results.
The only way a man can invade the liberty of another is by doing
something. A man cannot violate another’s liberty by remaining passive,
unless by so doing he breaks the terms of a contract. So any form of
compulsion to act, or as Spencer calls it, “positive regulation,” is
contrary to Equal Freedom. “Negative regulation” is the only form which
is permissible. Nor are all acts to be subject to this negative
regulation. All our acts are either self-regarding, as Mill terms it, or
social. Self-regarding acts are those which directly concern ourselves
alone. Social acts are those which directly concern others. Eating,
drinking, sleeping, personal habits, etc., are included in the first
class, commercial and professional transactions in the second. To assume
that self-regarding acts can interfere with the liberty of others, is ti
deny that those acts are self-regarding. If an act violates the liberty
of another, it cannot concern the actor alone. Such a proposition is
absolutely absurd. This narrows the field of regulation to social acts.
It would be absurd to say that all social acts shall be regulated, for
this would certainly not be the greatest freedom compatible with
equality of freedom. Where then shall the line be drawn? Clearly only
those actions which directly interfere with the freedom of others are to
be subject to regulation. Anything short of this is less than the
maximum of freedom. If all actions which indirectly result in the
invasion of the liberty of another are to be regulated, nearly all
social acts and many which are considered as self-regarding will be
included. For example; A purchases $100 worth of goods from B instead of
from C. C is in consequence unable to dispose of his goods, and so
cannot pay his creditors. Is A to be compelled to purchase from C
instead of from B? Even if this were done, B might now be no better off
than C was before. This seems to be an extreme case, but surely it is
not half as absurd as many propositions that are heard daily. How often
has it been said, that a man should not be allowed to drink intoxicating
liquors for fear that his example would corrupt others, that these
others might drink to excess and, while in a state of intoxication,
commit some overt act? The Prohibitionists reconcile their theory with
Equal Freedom by arguments which have far less basis than this. The
reason usually given for the suppression of vice is, that if it goes
unchecked, others will become vicious from example. If the vice in the
first man is not a direct violation of Equal Freedom, how does it become
so in the case of the second? If we are not justified in protecting the
first man from the result of his folly, why are we justified in
protecting the second? If a vice does directly violate the freedom of
others, it ceases to be a vice and becomes a crime. Vices are a man’s
personal property and all interference with them is impertinent.
Every act of our lives has an indirect effect upon a very large number
of people, producing happiness in some individuals and pain in others.
These acts have a tendency to discourage one and to drive another to
despair, to accuse one to help his fellows and to produce lawlessness to
another. If any acts are to be regulated because they produce
unhappiness and often indirectly result in a violation of Equal Liberty,
then all our acts must be subject to official supervision and the
principle of Equal Freedom is but the nightmare of a disordered brain.
But even if this is admitted, it is equally fatal to this theory of
regulation, for its adherents only attempt to justify their interference
by an attempt to gain that Equal Liberty which they now deny.
The fact that an act directly, in and of itself, invades the liberty of
another is the only excuse for interference with that act. At no other
place can the line be drawn. While this line is often indefinite, it
gives us a good working basis. The experience we will gain from applying
it, will gradually teach us to discriminate in all doubtful cases.
Obscure, though it sometimes is, it is infinitely better than no guide
at all, or than any less definite, and these are all that are offered in
its stead.
The first essentials of freedom are, of course, the freedom to live
unmolested and the freedom of the producer to retain unrestricted the
full product of his toil. While there may be serious differences of
opinion in regard to the definitions of “producer” and “product,” I
think no one will deny that crimes against person and property – murder,
assault, theft, etc. – are violations of Equal Freedom.
If a man voluntarily contracts to perform certain actions, a failure on
his part to fulfil the contract must be considered in the light of an
invasion. He made the contract expecting to receive some benefit in
return for his services. If, after receiving that supposed benefit, he
refuses to pay the price agreed upon – that is what a breach of contract
virtually means – he is receiving something for nothing. To say that it
is inconsistent with Equal Freedom to compel a man to act, is, under
these circumstances, about as sensible as to say that the liberty of the
thief is invaded when he is compelled to return his plunder to its
rightful owner. If a man finds that the benefit he derives from a
contract is not as great as he supposed it would be, this is no excuse
for any violation of the contract. He should have known what he was
doing in the first place. Any mistake of his must be borne by himself.
The other party has performed his part and is justified in claiming his
reward. Even the demands of Shylock, though merciless, must be
considered as perfectly just. If Antonio was such a fool as to sign the
contract, it was the most disreputable sculduggery on his part to take
advantage of unjust and tyrannical legal technicalities. The only things
that can justify the violation of a contract are the use of force or
fraud by the other party in the procuring or execution of the contract.
These are some of the violations of liberty which are punished by our
laws. Now let us see the violations which the law commits.
Since the State is founded in aggression, and is inimical to individual
liberty, it is but natural to suppose that its very existence is
threatened by the principle of Equal Freedom. This is actually the case.
If all forms of compulsion are tyrannical, the enforced payments of
taxes is no less so. Men who pay all debts cheerfully will lie like
Waterbury watches to evade the tax collector. Why is this? Simply
because they think they gain no adequate return for the money so
invested. Whether they are right in this assumption or not is
immaterial. To compel a man to buy that which he does not want is the
grossest tyranny. If he finds that it is necessary to his happiness, he
will buy it without compulsion. If he does not find it necessary, by
what right can anyone compel him to pay for it? But taxes are the source
from which the State derives its life’s blood. So it is, as its history
would lead us to believe, essentially a tyrannical institution.
The ways in which this tyranny is exercised are too numerous to mention,
but it will be advisable to point out a few of the most important.
Prominent among these are the laws which relate to the issuance of
money. To tell a man that he shall accept a certain coin or piece of
paper in payment of all debts due to him is in the nature of positive
regulation. The laws which base the circulating medium of the country on
one or two commodities, place a premium on those commodities and
consequently destroy the possibility of free competition. A man cannot
invade the liberty of another by issuing a note or circulating medium,
provided he compels no one to accept it, or misrepresents its value. Yet
this is practically prohibited by the United States Government by the
imposition of a ten per cent. tax, and is a criminal offense in nearly
every State. By these means competition is restricted, the freedom of
contract is violated and the individual who possesses certain
characteristics is fostered at the expense of all the rest of the
community. The remedy for this cannot be given here, but will be found
in subsequent chapters.
Since labor cannot be thought of, except in connection with something to
which it can be applied, there can be no free competition in labor
unless the natural sources of wealth are free. If they are not free to
all, those who are debarred from access to them, must either starve or
pay such tribute as the other more fortunate members of the community
may demand. On these two monopolies most of the important social evils
depend.
In spite of all our vaunted freedom we are still enslaved by the State.
Even the freedoms of speech and press, which we hear glorified on every
hand, are but shams after all. You doubt it? Then go into any court room
and criticize a decision of the Judge, and see how much freedom of
speech you are allowed. Tell a lot of strikers that they will never gain
anything by peaceful methods. Publish a paper for the promotion of
suicide. Expose certain of the evils that result from the present
marriage system. Then you will see how much the liberty of the press is
respected in this “land of the free and home of the brave.” “But these
are dangerous doctrines,” it is said. How do you know they are
dangerous? Christianity was considered dangerous once. Protestantism was
considered dangerous. Free-thought was considered dangerous. That is why
stringent laws against the promulgation of such doctrines were passed.
The only freedom of speech that is worth having is the freedom to preach
dangerous doctrines. In no age, no matter how benighted, in no country,
no matter how tyrannical its form of government, has the freedom to
preach harmless doctrines ever been denied. It was for preaching
dangerous doctrines that Jesus of Nazareth was crucified, that Bruno was
burnt, that the Chicago Communists were hanged. Thousands of others have
been tortured and out to death for a similar reason. Nothing but the
freedom to preach all doctrines, no matter how dangerous they seem, is
worthy of the name of liberty.
Evidences of the tyranny of the State abound on every hand. In spite of
all our progress we have far to travel before the goal of Equal Freedom
can be reached. All the laws, which prohibit or restrict the free
exchange of commodities, or services, between individuals of the same or
different countries, are inconsistent with the fundamental law of
progress. The protective tariff, then laws prohibiting private
individuals from carrying the mails, those compelling a man to pay for
the education of another’s children, or to supply gratuitous
novel-reading for gum-chewing school girls, copyrights, patents, the
laws regulating intercourse between the sexes, all these and many other
similar forms of coercion will be found on close analysis to be
reversions to the militant type of society. But bad though such things
undoubtedly are, their removal will benefit us but little until the
freedom to issue money and to use land is gained.
The invasive acts of individual transgressors are comparatively
insignificant beside those of the State. The power of the individual for
harm is at worst limited to a short term of years. His acts are isolated
and temporary. But those of the State are organized, systematic,
universal and well nigh eternal.
In the last chapter it was shown that the State has ever been [an]
engine of militancy, and that progress towards Industrialism has been
gained only by restricting its powers. We have just seen how it violates
Equal Freedom in almost every way. So we are inevitably forced to the
conclusion that its entire abolition is necessary before a perfect
system of Industrialism is possible. “This century’s battle then is with
the State: the State, that debases man; the State, that prostitutes
woman; the State, that corrupts children; the State, that trammels love;
the State, that stifles thought; the State, that monopolizes land; the
State, that limits credit; the State, that restricts exchange; the
State, that gives idle capital the power of increase, and, through
interest, rent, profit and taxes robs industrious labor of its
product.[”] (Tucker, Instead of a Book, p. 31.) This is the Philosophy
of Anarchism – the absence of all coercion of the non-invasive
individual.
To many this doctrine will seem absurd. The idea of the State is so
firmly rooted in men’s mind that it is no light task to overthrow it.
Most people look upon it as a necessity – a necessary evil, some will
even say. The sane was said of a supreme church some 300 years ago. But
compulsion has given place to voluntary association in religion. Why may
not such a change be possible in civil affairs?
The possibility of dispensing with State interference in a few of the
most important matters is discussed in the following chapters. If we can
protect life and property, effect exchanges and carry on public business
without compulsion, the necessity for State interference in our more
personal affairs is surely disproved by implication.
Probably the first question which presents itself to the mind, when the
abolition of the State is suggested, is how crime will be suppressed. It
will be apparent to all who understood the last chapter, that actions
are only criminal insofar as they directly transgress the freedom of
others. Many people still cling to the idea that the main function of
the State is to maintain Equal Freedom, an idea which has already been
exploded, by showing that the State is the greatest violator of the law
– in other words, the greatest criminal. How then can we expect it to
protect us? True it affords us a certain security against smaller
criminals, in order that it may have an excuse for its own crimes. How
well it fills the position of criminal-in-chief may be read in the
reports of the Lexow committee. Nor is it in New York alone that such
things are carried on. Committees in nearly every other large city,
though ultimately “whitewashing” the authorities, exposed enough
rottenness to satisfy the most credulous.
“A little investigation of the yearly services of policemen in the city
of Boston affords interesting food for thought in this connection. In
this city of nearly half a million of ‘all sorts and conditions of men“
there have been no more than 508 and no less than 310 cases of breaking
and entering buildings, in any one year from 1887 to 1892. And in this
same city, within the same period, there have been no more than 140
cases of robbery in any one year and no less than 100. But the following
remarkable fact is true of each year. From 1,700 to over 2,000 innocent
persons – the majority of whom are foreigners and half of whom are
minors – are arrested without warrant, purely on suspicion, disgraced by
unjust arrest and imprisonment, and then turned loose without redress!
This happens with almost the regularity of clock works. Read the record
as found in the police reports:
“But this is not all. In the year 1890, 37,000 people (in round numbers)
were arrested with and without official warrant, only 2,000 of whom
received imprisonment after trial. In 1891, 41,000 were arrested, only
3,000 of whom received imprisonment. In 1892, 48,000 were arrested, only
7,000 of whom received imprisonment. The average yearly amount of
property stolen is $95,000. To recover this we have an expenditure of
$1,170,000 – that is, on the assumption that property protection is the
chief province of the police.
“Now, considering that there are only about 500 persons each year, in a
population of 500,000, whose property is in danger, and considering that
no one of this population of half a million can be assured that he or
she will not be one of the 500 bound to be robbed in spite of supporting
an expensive police, is it not a legitimate question whether or no
protection of property is worth paying for under present conditions?”
(Ellen Battelle Dietrick in “The Twentieth Century.”)
This statement says nothing of the blackmail collected by the police.
This item alone would swell “the cost of protection” enormously. If this
is the way the State manages things – and of this there can be no doubt
– it is surely time private enterprise had a turn. It can hardly do any
worse, and I hope to show that it will do much better.
In nearly every large city business men either employ special night
watchmen, or else subscribe to some merchants’ police company, in order
to have their stores protected. Here are men who are compelled to pay
the State for protection that is so inadequate and worthless, that they
voluntarily pay a private institution to perform the same services. The
State fails to perform its duty but still continues to collect the money
for it by force. Meanwhile private enterprise steps in and does the work
properly. Is there any danger that a community, in which the rights of
life and property are held in such high regard that men will pay twice
over for their protection rather than go without it – is there much
danger that such a community will fail to protect itself from crime if
left to do so without State intervention?
The work of insurance companies is suggestive of a method by which this
might be done. If the State collects taxes from you to save your house
when it is on fire, insurance companies will, if you pay your premiums,
reimburse you for all your loss. The former thrusts its services on you
unasked, and makes you pay for them whether you want them or not. The
latter is a purely voluntary arrangement, and is perfectly willing to
leave you alone if you do not molest it.
There are accident insurance companies which insure elevators. Should
any person get hurt while riding in an elevator so insured and sue the
owner of the building, the insurance company will settle the whole
matter and pay such damages as may be awarded. In Colorado – I don’t
know how it may be in other States – there is no State elevator
inspector, consequently insurance companies inspect the elevators
themselves and issue proper certificates. These companies have
everything depending upon the correctness of their inspection. The loss
of large sums of money and the shaking of public confidence are the
penalties they must pay for mistakes. So their certificates are far more
reliable, and command much greater public confidence, than those of
irresponsible State boiler inspectors or State inspectors of mines, who
have nothing to lose by issuing as many certificates as are demanded.
The experience of all who have had any dealings with State inspectors
teaches them that they are nearly always either dishonest or incapable
and sometimes both. If you abolish such offices, those who have a vested
interest in the inspection will have it performed to their satisfaction
and at their own cost. As soon as State protection is removed,
individual enterprise steps in and affords a better article at less
cost.
I have heard it asserted that, during the cholera scare in 1893, the
life insurance companies gave more money for the protection of the
country from that disease, than did the United States Government. I
cannot vouch for the absolute accuracy of this statement, but from the
sums given by some of the largest concerns, I should think it is not
exaggerated. One company alone gave $40,000.
Why cannot such institutions protect our persons and property from theft
and assault as well as from accidents, fires, storms, etc.? That they
are capable is clearly demonstrated by their past history. The
exorbitant prices that they charge will be curtailed as soon as the
monopolies of land and money are destroyed.
Every bicycle rider knows of insurance companies which insure people
against the loss of their wheels, and the excellent work they do in
recovering stolen property is gaining for them a widespread patronage.
Other companies insure houses against burglary. Who ever heard of a
State doing as much? At best it will watch your premises, and if you are
robbed it will try to catch the criminals. But the idea of
reimbursement! Who ever heard of such a thing? These insurance companies
sometimes rely upon the State officers for the protection of their
clients’ property but more often upon their own special watchman.
It is surprising how easily people will get what they want without State
interference if the State will only let them do it. The best way to
protect a man is to let him protect himself.
On two occasions during the police board troubles which occurred in
Denver in the Spring of 1894 (of which more will be said later), the
entire police force was suddenly called, late in the afternoon, to guard
the City Hall through the night. This left the city without any police
protection. But a demand nearly always creates a supply. A committee of
citizens, which had been organized to maintain peace, employed
Pinkertons to guard the morals of the community. Thus private enterprise
steps to the front and fills the “functions of the State” after that
decrepit old institution has failed.
Pinkerton men have a very bad name, especially among labor leaders. But
this is due to the action taken by them in labor troubles. This in turn
is due to the economic system which creates those troubles. Once solve
the economic problem and you trim the claws of private enterprise,
rendering it incapable of great evil, while retaining its good
qualities. But even now Pinkerton men are not one whit less responsible
than ignorant ward politicians in brass buttons and blue coats.
Pinkertons derive their support only from the men who employ them,
whereas policemen are paid as much by the victims of their tyranny as by
those that tyranny benefits. The ill repute in which Pinkertons are held
is in itself an argument in their favor. If a man is unjustly assaulted
by one, he has no compunction at resisting him. But if he is unjustly
clubbed by a brutal policeman, he has the glorious remembrance that he
himself is paying for the club which hits him, and so he is deterred
from resistance by a superstitious veneration for the idol of his own
creation.
Such institutions as I have suggested would derive their support, both
financial and moral, from their subscribers. Any that were unjust or
tyrannical would soon lack patronage, and so competition would give us
the best article at the lowest cost, in the administration of justice as
in everything else.
The oft quoted argument that this is merely abolishing the State in
order to establish a lot of little States is hardly worthy of comment.
These institutions lack all the elements which are essential
characteristics of the State. The State is primarily invasive, these are
defensive. The State is founded on compulsory co-operation, while these
are distinctively voluntary. The State claims absolute control over all
within its borders, while these permit the freest competition. In other
words, one is the State, and the other an honest business undertaking.
What we do demand, if you wish to put it that way, is that the State
shall restrict itself to the protection of person and property and the
maintenance of Equal Freedom, and then, in conformity with that
principle, cease to compel anyone to support it. If you wish to call
what is left “a State,” our only disagreement will be on the use of the
word.
It is highly probable that some people will, under such a system,
occasionally reap a benefit for which they do not pay. But this seems to
be the inevitable with everything we do. If I improve the lot on which I
live, I make the surrounding property more valuable. If I dress neatly I
help to make the town where I reside a more pleasant place to live in.
These benefits are purely incidental. If a protective association, by
making crime more difficult, incidentally renders the property of people
who do not subscribe to it more secure, surely no harm is done! If a man
refuses to patronize such an association he need not expect any special
service from it. If a stranger was being robbed, however, such
associations would usually find it to their advantage to render him
assistance in cases of emergency, and take chances of collecting
afterwards. If the stranger refused to pay he would be extremely
foolish, as he need then never expect any such help in future. The
protective association would “black-list” him, so to speak, and probably
notify other associations of their action. In this manner the man would
find himself abandoned, and he would soon become the prey of criminals.
But these are only very exceptional cases hardly worthy of
consideration.
Many people seem to fear that with the existence of several different
protective associations in the same city, there will be incessant
conflict between them. But as each will be endeavoring to get the
largest number of patrons, each will endeavor to follow the policy that
is most universally approved. The ordinary business man does not lie
awake in the small hours of the morning pining for civil war. So the
probabilities are that protective associations will not attempt to place
such an expensive commodity upon the market when there is no demand for
it.
“The history of Mohammed’s life shows us several instances in which a
city is inhabited by two or more independent tribes, and the different
sections of the city go to war with each other. But it does not appear
that they were more disorderly, or fought more, than the tribes of the
samne turbulent blood in other circumstances. At least, the system was
able to live, and give satisfaction to those who lived under it, till
overthrown by a power which also overthrew great empires. This ought to
be an answer to those who think that two police agencies cannot co-exist
in the same place; for there never was a people who ‘needed a strong
government’ more than these Arabs.
“But this system has been changed in the direction of greater liberty. A
man can now change his citizenship and the laws to which he is subject,
whenever he chooses – provided he will leave his country. Now, imagine
what some fine old Tory of the clan system would have said if this
change had been proposed to him. ‘How Anarchistic! A man would be able
to escape from all the laws that bind him by simply running away! Law
and order would utterly cease!’ But the world has survived it. Anarchism
proposes to increase liberty further by removing the condition that a
man must leave his country. This would introduce no difficulty, it seems
to me, that the world has not got along with fairly well in one or
another of the systems which have existed.
“But why go into ancient history? Kansas City is much handier. The State
line runs right through the edge of the city, among popular streets. Men
who live on the same street are subject to different laws, and look for
protection to different powers. Kansas has prohibition; but where the
streets run into Kansas saloons are built up to the State line. The
theoretical difficulties in the way of a Missouri policeman’s chasing a
man into Kansas are much greater than those in the way of two
Anarchistic associations exercising police power on the same ground. But
Kansas City claims to be a highly prosperous place.
“When New York and Jersey City are connected by tunnel or bridge, nearly
the same predicament will arise. The impossibilities of Anarchism are
about to be introduced in New York. Why do not the defenders of public
order protest against the improvements?
“Worse yet. Under Anarchy every man would be subject to his neighbor’s
association to this extent, that the association could punish him for
clearly invasive acts. But to-day, in every civilized country, there is
a large body of men who are under no law whatever. Envoys and consuls
are responsible to no one but the government which sends them. Cromwell
once hanged an ambassador for murder, but no one ever dared follow the
example. If a consul commits a crime here, all we can do is politely to
request the consul’s royal master to recall him as a persona non grata,
and to punish him at home in such a way as may seem adequate. This
privilege extends to the foreign representative’s retinue also,
including, I believe, even household servants.
“It is the uniform practice of Christian countries to maintain as
against non-Christian countries the ancient principle that their
subjects in a foreign country are not subject to the laws of that
country. This privilege is always provided for in treaties. Hence the
European in such a country is bound by no law but such as his consul
will enforce. In places like Cairo and Jerusalem there are considerable
colonies of at least half a dozen nationalities, each of which is
responsible solely to its consul. I never heard of a proposition to
unite all the Europeans, not to say all the city, under a single
authority.” (S. T. Byington in “Liberty,” 5 May, 1894.)
We often find that this very evil which is so feared under Anarchy is
not unknown to-day. For example: the Governor of Colorado has the right
to appoint and discharge members of the Denver Fire and Police Board.
When he determined to exercise this power in the Spring of 1894, the
members he had discharged called upon the police force to protect them
in their offices. At this the Governor called upon the State militia,
and subsequently upon the Federal troops, to execute his order. But the
Police Board was in possession of the field. On the housetops, at every
window and scattered among the spectators were men armed with revolvers,
Winchesters and dynamite ready to fight the troops. Whereupon the
Game-Warden, fearing that the rights of sportsmen might be trampled
upon, organized a small army of deputies to assist the Governor. After
three days of excitement it was decided to await the action of the
courts. The peaceable citizens had the privilege of paying the salaries
of all concerned upon both sides.
A similar trouble has recently occurred in Omaha. Another scene of the
same kind was witnessed in Topeka in 1893, when the Populists attempted
to organize a State Legislature, in order to elect a United States
Senator. Under similar circumstances the same trouble arose in Colorado
in 1891. No doubt many other instances could be given. From these facts
we find, that while in modern times there never has been any actual
conflict between different police associations, or associations under
the command of different men, operating in the same city, yet there have
been serious disagreements which almost resulted in open hostilities.
But these disagreements have in every case been due to the endeavor of
men to secure political power. This would be impossible if political
power ceased to exist owing to the abolition of the State.
“But who will perform the legislative function when the State is
abolished?” is another frequent question. “You would surely not entrust
that to Pinkerton or his fellows!” Most assuredly not. When a person
subscribes to a protective association, a clause might well be inserted
in the contract by which the subscriber agrees to serve as a juror
whenever he is called upon to do so. When a prisoner is to be tried, a
juror will then be selected by lot from among all the subscribers of the
association. This jury will then judge the facts, and if they
unanimously find the prisoner guilty, they will determine what
punishment he shall receive. Strange as such a proposition may seem, it
is by no means new. The original jury in ancient times was a means
employed by the people to guard themselves against the tyranny of the
State. The laws were enacted by the ruling powers, but when they were
transgressed, the accused was tried “by his neighbors,” who rendered a
verdict, not upon the facts alone, but also upon the law, and decided
the penalty in case of conviction. They might find that the facts proved
the prisoner guilty of the charges preferred, but that the law was
tyrannical, and therefore he was justified in violating it.
In this manner the jury practically possessed a veto power. If the
opinion of the community supported the law, the verdict would be in
accordance with it. If the people considered the law bad, they would so
express themselves by their verdict. Or they might see fit to modify the
interpretation of the law, so as to adapt it to the particular case
which they were trying. In this way the greatest flexibility can be
given to the administration of justice. With these powers the
jury-system is really a “safe-guard of freedom.” Without them, all the
true power is vested in the State. The jury was the representative of
the whole people in a truer sense than are legislative bodies to-day.
They were not elected – mere representatives of a majority – but were
taken from among the whole people, as a handful of corn is taken form
the sack as a sample of the whole.
The jury trial was really a trial by the people, as contradistinguished
from the trial by the State. That its powers were curtailed by the
perseverance in tyranny of the State is manifest all through history.
Now the jurors are fined and imprisoned for perjury, because they
rendered a verdict at variance with the wishes of the crown. Now the
selection of jurors is given to judges, sheriffs and other employes of
the king. For the State has ever held itself superior to its own
contracts, from the time King John evaded the Magna Charta, to the time
every town in this republic passes laws against carrying weapons, the
constitution of the United States notwithstanding.
This jury system practically gives the people a veto power over the acts
of the State. It fills, in a great measure, the functions of the
Referendum without the red tape of that institution. Unanimity must be
required in the verdict of the jury, or the idea of a trial by the whole
people is absolutely lost. To descend to the nose counting process in
politics is bad enough, but in the administration of justice it is awful
to contemplate. As soon as anything is left to the decision of the
majority, the minority are robbed of their individuality.
Many claim that jurors picked from the mass of the people, having no
special training in the law, would be incapable of administering it.
This rests upon the a priori assumption that the law is good, and is
really begging the question. The jury would not have to determine the
application of the law to their particular case, but the equity of the
law, especially in its bearings on the case on hand. In Illinois juries
are nominally given the power of interpreting the law as well as the
facts. What is needed is a jury which can judge the law as well as the
criminal. Should the jurors be appointed by the officers of the State,
they become the tools of the State. Should the demand for professional
jurors be put into practice, we should have the State as judge, jury,
prosecutor and tyrant-in-chief, with the people left to defend
themselves as best they could.
The way in which jurors are selected to-day is alone enough to condemn
the present system. To exclude a man because he is convinced that the
law is in error is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. It limits
the jury to a part of the people, and to that part which is prejudiced
in favor of the State. Furthermore, no man can give sociological
questions much thought without arriving at some opinions on these
questions. So to disqualify a juror because he has formed opinions of
the law, is to make intelligence a disqualification. Any personal
prejudice for or against the prisoner, which would be strong enough to
prevent a fair consideration of the facts, should of course disqualify a
juror; but not an opinion of the righteousness or iniquity of the law.
This system would limit the powers of the judge to merely presiding at
the trial, to preserve order and to keep the cross-examination from
wandering from the point at issue. He might also have power to grant a
new trial. The jury would possess the real power, and would inflict what
penalty it deemed adequate. Certainly errors would be made, but under
such a system the verdicts will coincide as nearly as possible with the
opinions of the community, and we can never hope for any more than this.
The administration of justice must ever be dependent upon the
intelligence of the people.[20]
The application of the definite principle of Equal Freedom in
determining doubtful cases, will certainly not cause more mistakes than
our present haphazard method. As that principle is applied we shall
gradually learn by experience the solution of these difficulties. The
number of doubtful cases will grow smaller as our experience of liberty
enlarges. Meanwhile I must agree with Mr. Tucker, “no force in doubtful
cases unless immediate action is imperative.”
In the absence of law – except perhaps such regulation as the protective
association may have made – the jury will practically make the law to
suit each individual case. Nor will this be such a stupendous
undertaking as would appear at first sight. Before any such system as
this could possibly come into practice, a much clearer idea of
individual liberty must be generally entertained than is current in the
present day. With the principle of Equal Freedom as a guiding maxim, and
a system of prison ethics based upon that law, the practical difficulty
of deciding the punishment for each crime is reduced to a minimum.
It is commonly asserted that the criminal has no rights that we are
bound to respect, and so we may treat him as we see fit. This idea is
radically inconsistent with Equal Freedom. If we deprive the offender of
more liberty than is necessary to secure the equal liberty of all, we
are clearly curtailing the fullest amount of liberty consistent with
equality of liberty. On the other hand, any restraint that is inadequate
to secure the liberty of others is unjust to the rest of the community.
The only just definition of the word criminal is, one who violates the
liberty of another by a crime committed on the person or property of
that other. Crimes against property can always be easily estimated in
money. While the measuring of crimes against person in the same manner
often presents difficulties, it is probably the most just manner yet
attempted of estimating the damage caused; at least the practice of
doing so would seem to justify such a conclusion. Assuming, then, that
all crimes may be approximately measured in money, Equal Freedom demands
that the criminal be compelled to make full restitution to the injured
party. Since his crime has involved the expense of capturing, trying,
and keeping him under restraint, he must also pay for all this. To
impose these charges upon someone else, is to make them pay in part for
his crime. To require more of him than this is a violation of his
liberty for which there is no excuse. There is no reason, save that of
expediency, why his jailors should provide labor for him to perform, but
that reason will be sufficient to induce them to give him such
occupation as they can, or else to help him to exchange his labor
without the outside world. The jury will merely have to determine the
extent of the damage done and the minimum period of incarceration. The
jailor will then perform his duty and assist the prisoner to exchange
his labor with the outside world. Of the product of his labor, a certain
portion will be set aside to defray the cost of the trial and the
prisoner’s board. A certain portion will be deposited for the
reimbursement of the victim, and the rest given to the prisoner for his
own use. If he so desires, any of this latter portion might be applied
to either of the other purposes, with a view to shortening the period of
his incarceration. When a sufficient amount has been saved by the
criminal to pay all the costs and damages assessed against him, he might
then be released, if he could induce anyone to give bail for his future
good behavior – a task of no great difficulty if the man was of previous
good character, but which would present serious obstacles to the
hardened criminal.
But putting aside all questions of justice to the criminal, let us see
the advantages if such a system. As necessitarians, we must lay aside
all sentimentalism as well as all idea of revenge in the treatment of
criminals. We must regard them simply as machines which do bad work. The
problem which confronts us, is how to mend the machine so that it will
do good work in future, not how to make it suffer most for past
transgressions. A systems such as that here advocated is most admirably
adapted to such a purpose. It tends to cultivate habits of industry,
thrift and honesty, and so to transform the erstwhile criminal into a
useful member of society.
While this system has never yet been tried, Spencer tells us that
wherever it has been partially attempted, the success which has attended
the experiment is sufficient to justify the whole scheme.[21]
After all this whole question of defence is relatively unimportant. I
would not have taken up so much space discussing it, did not the
opponents of Anarchism lay so much stress upon it. In all probability
police duty will be the “function” of the State which will survive the
longest. The economic question will most likely be settled long before
the policeman will relinquish his club. All authorities agree that most
crimes are, directly or indirectly, due to poverty. So we will have but
little to fear from this source under equitable economic conditions. The
establishment of such conditions, then, is of the first importance, and
now claims our attention.
Before it is possible to gain a clear idea of what constitute equitable
economic conditions, it is necessary to understand the shortcomings of
our present system. This involves analysis of the occurrences of trade
and commerce as they exist to-day.
It is not unusual to consider that value is derived from the power of
wealth to gratify desires. This is only partially true. Certainly, a
value does attach to everything on account of its utility, but this is a
very different kind of value from that which attaches to commodities
which are kept for sale. The latter are valuable, not because they are
of use to their owner, but because he can exchange them for something
else. This value is known as price, or exchange value; that is, the
value which attaches to goods from their characteristic of
exchangeability, as contradistinguished from the value which attaches to
them from the use to which they may be out. This latter is known as
utility, or use value. It will be readily seen that many things may
possess great use value, while possessing no exchange value whatsoever.
Air is absolutely essential to our existence, and consequently has a
very great use value, but as no one would ever buy or sell it, it has no
exchange value.
The term, use value, denotes the average utility to the community, not
the use a given article may be to a certain member of the community.
This latter varies with every individual. A coat is of greater use to
the man for whom it was made, than to the tailor who made it. It is upon
this varying quality of usefulness that exchange rests. Exchange only
takes place when each party to the exchange obtains, or thinks he
obtains, something which will be more useful to him, than that with
which he parts. So both parties expect to be benefited by the
transaction.
The price of goods is often said to depend upon the relation of the
supply to the demand. As the latter increases in comparison to the
former, so the price increases. As the supply increases in relation to
the demand, the price falls. If both remain stationary, or if both
increase or decrease in the same proportions, the price remains
constant.
Why is this? It has been noted above that the same commodities may be of
varying degrees of usefulness to different individuals. We can even go
farther than this. The wants of each individual are various, and the
degree of usefulness of each commodity varies in proportion as it is
applied to the gratification of a more or less pressing need. To the man
who has no clothes, one suit is absolutely necessary. After he has that
suit, it is very nice for him to have a second, so that he can change
his clothes to correspond with his occupation. But the second suit is of
less vital importance to him than the first. The same is true of all
subsequent suits. It is upon this difference in the varying usefulness
of commodities that price rests.
Every man is working for his own best interests. He always endeavors to
sell in the dearest market and buy in the cheapest. The man dying of
thirst in the desert would give everything he possessed for a glass of
water. If he could procure it, he would use it for drinking only,
because that is its highest use, being the use which is most essential
to his existence. Now suppose this same man has enough water to drink,
but none with which to wash himself. He will be willing to give a good
deal for it still, but not nearly so much as if he were dying of thirst.
If he has enough to wash himself, his next demand will probably be for
some to wash his clothes. For water for this purpose he will be willing
to pay still less. If he is where water is comparatively plentiful, he
will want some perhaps to water his lawn, or even to have a fountain in
his front yard. But as each of these needs is less imperative than the
one which precedes it, he will not be willing to pay as dearly for water
for a fountain, as hr would if there were hardly enough for him to wash
himself. If he can get enough to supply a fountain for six months for a
few dollars, he will not pay $5.00 for a glass of water to drink. He
will take some of the water from his fountain for this purpose. So while
the uses to which a man can out a commodity are manifold and of
different degrees of necessity, the price is determined by the highest
desire which the limitations of the supply leave him unable to gratify.
As the margin, or desires which are left unsatisfied, increases, the
price decreases. Thus it is the “margin of utility” which determines the
price.
The supply of raw material is, in most cases, practically unlimited. How
is it, then, that the supply is not always sufficient to gratify all
desires, and so reduce the margin, and consequently the price, to zero?
Simply because, while every man is desirous of buying in the cheapest
market, every one is also anxious to sell in the dearest.
Every commodity represents to the producer the embodiment of so much
labor, as well as the possibility of a certain utility. He certainly
will not exchange it for one which he can produce with less labor, or
for one which is less useful to him. As similar motives actuate all with
whom he comes in contact, in a free community he can only exchange his
commodity for another which cost the same to acquire, and which,
possessing greater usefulness for him, as only the same degree of social
utility.
If an article suddenly acquires an increased utility, people will be
willing to give articles which embody a great amount of labor in order
to obtain the more useful article. So the producers of that article,
will be able to reap a greater reward for their labor than the other
members of the community. This immediately causes a number of the
producers of other commodities to leave their old occupations and engage
in the one which promises higher remuneration. Thus the supply is
increased to meet the demand, until the equilibrium is once more
established. So likewise the converse holds good. If for any reason the
demand for any commodity decreases, the wages of the producers of that
commodity fall, and many of them will seek more lucrative positions.
Thus an increase in the demand is met by an increase of the supply, and
a decrease in the demand by a decrease of the supply. So while exchange
values fluctuate considerably, they always trend to remain at the cost
of acquisition. The operation of this law is often hindered by such
artificial restrictions as trusts, etc., which, by limiting the supply,
increase the margin of utility and consequently the price.
But of what does this cost of acquisition consist? If labor were the
only factor in production, no one would be able to obtain anything which
he did not produce, unless he exchanged it for some article which
embodied an equal amount of labor, or received it as a free gift. But
there are other factors which must be taken into account. In the first
place, it is necessary to apply labor to land. If this land is
monopolized, the holders of it can demand a very great portion of the
product of the labor applied to it. Under a form of complete monopoly,
the only limit tot this tribute is the portion which the laborer finds
absolutely necessary to the maintenance of life. That it does not reach
this point at present, is due to the vast areas of unoccupied land in
various parts of the world.
In order to produce anything except the very simplest forms of wealth,
money is required to effect the necessary exchange of labor. If a man
has a labor-saving machine which increases the productiveness of the
community ten-fold, and no one else can obtain that machine, or any
substitute for it, without the consent of that man, he will be able to
rent it for at least nine times the former average productiveness of
labor. By these means the producer will receive twice as much return for
his labor as before, but the owner of the machine will receive more than
four times as much as the producer. As money is the greatest of all
labor-saving machines, for it is representative of all forms of capital,
those who are able to monopolize money are able to reap the lion’s share
of all the advantages of civilization.
Thus the twin monopolies of land and money, by means of their tribute,
rent and interest, prevent an equal exchange of the products of labor.
Under free conditions A, the shoemaker, would exchange a pair of shoes
for a coat made by B, the tailor. When rent and interest exist, A has to
pay three pairs of shies for a coat, and B pays three coats for a pair
of shoes, while the capitalist and the landlord each have a pair of
shoes and a coat.
In addition to rent and interest, profit and taxes must also be added to
the actual amount of labor embodied in the commodity – which is known as
the cost, or labor value, – before the cost of acquisition is fully
accounted for.
By profit is usually meant, the difference between the price which a
merchant pays for goods, and the price at which he sells them. But this
is not a sufficiently accurate definition for economic purposes. Such
profit is composed largely of rent, interest, taxes, wages and the
necessary expenses of business. Economically speaking, profit is that
which is left between the cost and the price, after the factors above
mentioned have been deducted. Much of this is often due to some special
privilege, such as the existence of a protective tariff, patent,
copyright, or other similar form of monopoly. But it depends principally
upon the existence of rent and interest. With the elimination of these
various factors, the cost of acquisition will depend solely upon the
labor value. Free competition will then force the price down to the
actual labor value, making cost and price equal.
It should be noted that the labor value does not necessarily mean the
actual amount of labor embodied in the identical article, but the amount
of labor necessary to produce an article of exactly similar and equal
utility.
In order to be able to think of a labor value, it is necessary to treat
labor as an abstract quantity. In reality, of course, it is of various
degrees of quality. But, as in everything else, the qualitative
differences can be stated quantitatively. Foe example, we say that one
gold ring is twice as pure as another, consequently the former is worth
two of the latter. So with labor, it can all be measured by a common
standard of intensity. The mechanic, we will say, has spent five years
learning his trade. The average length of life of men engaged in the
same trade, is such as to allow a period of twenty years of usefulness.
It is no very difficult task to determine how much more wages he should
receive per day, than the man who has not spent those five years
learning the trade, and whose period of usefulnes [sic] is twenty-five
years. Other factors have to be taken into consideration, such as the
amount of money necessarily expended on education, the average length of
life in various trades, and the repulsiveness of different occupations,
which includes of course the hardness of the work. So in reality, while
the various degrees of the intensity of labor present a somewhat complex
mathematical problem, it is only a mathematical problem and perfectly
capable of solution. This is all that concerns us at present. It is not
necessary to work out all these problems in order to see that such a
thing is possible.
Exchange has here been spoken of as existing directly between commodity
and commodity. In civilized countries some medium of exchange is used to
facilitate the process, but this does not effect [sic] the principles
involved. To say that a pair of shoes is worth $4.00 and a coat is worth
$4.00, is to say that they are worth each other. Nor does it matter
whether each is worth $1.00, $4.00, or $10.00, the equality of value
between them is still maintained. The coat and shoes have remained
constant factors, while their price as mentioned in money has
fluctuated.
We value money solely for what it will purchase. We would not accept it
as money, if it was not capable of purchasing what we need. Therefore,
when anything is sold, that is, exchanged for money, it is virtually
exchanged for such other commodities as the holder of that money may
desire. This exchange is consummated when the money is exchanged for
other goods. Economically it may be said to be complete when the first
sale was made, for the same reason that a man will give a receipt for
money when he receives a note payable thirty days from date, though he
cannot collect until the note matures. Money is a lien upon all the
goods for sale in the community, and the possession of it is prima facie
evidence of some service having been rendered for it. Thus he who has
money is rich only from his stored up capacity of buying, and that
capacity becomes valuable only as it is exercised. So all exchange may
be spoken of as existing directly between commodities and commodities.
But to return to the main question. It has been shown that rent,
interest, taxes and profit are the elements which constitute the
difference between the cost of acquisition and the labor value of
commodities – the difference between the amount of labor embodied in a
commodity, and the price demanded for it. They are spoken of
collectively as usury, or surplus value. If this passed directly into
the hands of the laborers, the evil would be immaterial. But it does
not, and that is where the trouble lies, for it prevents the producers
from buying back as much as they produce. It is difficult to understand
the extent of this surplus value, until attention is drawn to the large
fortunes of many millionaires. A very large proportion of the wealth of
the country, is owned by a very small per cent. of the population, and
that small portion derives incomes from its usury which are far in
excess of its power of consumption, great as that power of consumption
is. It saves a surplus annually which is again invested. The result of
this is that surplus value has ever a tendency to increase until it
absorbs all the wealth of the country. As a result of this, wages ever
have a tendency to decrease, until they reach the lowest point at which
men will consent to work and to reproduce their kind. So great is the
amount of surplus value, that it annually exceeds the total increase of
wealth in the United States. Hence the periodical recurrence of times of
general bankruptcy is inevitable as long as surplus value exists.
Another effect of this condition of affairs is seen in this; the surplus
value collected by the capitalistic classes exceeds their power of
consumption, so the world produces more than it consumes. As this
surplus increases, a time comes when the markets of the world are
glutted, factories are shut down, laborers are thrown out of
unemployment and are unable to pay their debts, small stores fail,
wholesale merchants are affected, banks are unable to meet the sudden
demands made upon them, and confidence is destroyed. This is another
fruitful cause of the great financial panics, which sake the business
and industrial world to its centre, and leave the rich, richer and the
poor, poorer than before.
The immediate result of such panics is that all securities are called
in. Those who are unable to pay are forced to sacrifice their property
at a very low figure, and those who buy realize large profits as soon as
times get better. Thus panics have a tendency to further centralize
wealth in the hands of a few. Just after a panic, however, and owing to
the calling in of securities, large sums are found in the vaults of
capitalists. Thus the money market is glutted and interest falls for a
short time. All other forms of usury become lower, owing to the general
depression, and, by degrees, a more normal condition is reached. Thus it
is evident that surplus value is the cause of these periodic
convulsions. Abolish surplus value and they will cease to exist.
The abolition of surplus value simply means that the price of
commodities must be limited by the labor-cost of production. In other
words, that the product of an hour of A’s labor shall be able to
purchase the product of an hour of B’s labor of equal intensity – no
more and no less. This is the great Cost Principle which was first
proclaimed by Josiah Warren, and almost immediately afterwards by
Proudhon and Marx, all of whom arrived at this conclusion independently
and without any knowledge of the work of either of the others.
This cost principle is the common basis that underlies all forms of
Socialism. For “Socialism, as such implies neither liberty nor
authority. The word itself implies nothing more than a harmonious
relationship. In fact, it is so broad a term that it is difficult of
definition. ... The word Socialism having been applied for years, by
common usage and consent, as a generic term to various schools of
thought and opinion, those who try to define it are bound to seek the
common element of all these schools and make it stand for that, and have
no business to make it represent the specific nature of any one of them.
... Socialism is the belief that the next important step in progress is
a change in man’s environment of an economic character that shall
include the abolition of every privilege whereby the holder of wealth
acquires an anti-social power to compel tribute.” (Tucker, Instead of a
Book, p. 364.)
Starting from this common basis Socialists divide into two distinct
armies; State Socialists, who hope, by placing all industries under
State control, to make surplus value flow into the pockets of the
laborers; and Voluntary Socialists or Anarchists, who maintain that free
competition is the one thing needful to the establishment of the cost
principle. These are the only two consistent schools of reform. They
alone go to the bottom of the evil and suggest an adequate remedy.
As long as surplus value exists, all schemes for the amelioration of the
laboring classes must necessarily prove futile. They are merely attempts
to remove the effect, while leaving the cause untouched. It is
impossible to show here the manner in which each of them works. One or
two examples must suffice.
A scheme that is gaining much favor in certain circles, is the
organization of gigantic co-operative companies. The object of these
concerns is to abolish the profit of at least one middleman, and so
reduce the price of goods to the consumer. In order to do this
successfully, it is necessary to conduct the company on strict business
principles. This involves buying goods and labor at the best possible
figure. It is upon this principle that the Rochdale companies have been
conducted – at least so Carroll D. Wright tells us in his report on
Industrial Depressions, – and it is more than probable, that it is to
this strict adherence to business principles that they owe their
success. Consequently it is futile to expect such enterprises to
increase the wages of the laboring classes, except as they do so
indirectly by enabling them to purchase what they need at a lower
figure.
The fact that a co-operative company is selling goods below the market
price, at once affects that market price. Other dealers immediately cut
their prices so as to retain as much of the trade as possible. This in
turn necessitates a reduction of expenses, which is effected by a cut in
wages. Prices having been reduced on many staple articles, living is
much cheaper than before. So men will live on, and will accept, lower
wages than formerly. As the co-operative company is forced by
competition to buy at the most advantageous terms, it will be unable to
do anything to maintain the old rate of wages. While these concerns may
reduce the cost of goods to the consumer, they limit the purchasing
power of the producer. The saving in profit ultimately involves a
corresponding reduction in wages, leaving the position of the
wage-earners much as it was before. If any saving is effected, the
landlord and moneylender inevitably reap the benefit. The cheapening of
living at any place is liable to attract people to that place – usually
people with small but permanent incomes – and so increases the rent in
that locality.
Co-operation may be a good thing when viewed from the standpoint of
domestic economy, but it is, under existing conditions, a failure from
the social economist’s point of view. On a small scale, it may benefit a
few individuals. But as it becomes more general, it at once begets evils
that counteract the good it does.
All other schemes to cheapen the cost of living operate in the same
manner. Attempts to increase the wages of workers by artificial
restrictions can be shown, by similar reasoning, to inevitably result in
an increase in the price of commodities. If one trade succeeds in
gaining higher wages, the price of goods manufactured by the trade
increases and the consumers of these goods have to pay the increase of
wages. As the wage-earners are the principal consumers, such attempts
result in the benefit of one trade at the expense of all others. If the
same policy is pursued by all, the increased cost of living counteracts
the rise of wages. Until the cost principle is established, it is futile
for labor to waste its energies in such useless struggles.
To expect men to be satisfied with the cost of an article, when they can
get more for it, is absurd. So the cost principle will only be
established, when the conditions of commerce are such that no one will
be able to get any more.
In the Fourth Chapter it was shown, that the laws restricting the people
from issuing money and from using vacant land were incompatible with
Equal Freedom. As these laws are the cause of rent and interest (as will
be shown in the following chapters) they stand equally condemned by the
cost principle. Nor is this strange. For the cost principle is but the
economic statement of the same fundamental principle of equity, which is
stated ethically by the principle of Equal Freedom.
Men cannot be equally free when one is able to live off the toil of
another. Every product of labor is created only with the expenditure of
a certain amount of vital force. So he who robs me of the product of my
labor, robs me of a portion of my life.
“When throughout a society, the normal relation between work and benefit
is habitually broken, not only are the lives of many directly
undermined, but the lives of all are indirectly undermined by
destruction of the motive for work, and the consequent poverty. Thus to
demand that there shall be no breach of the natural sequence between
labor and the rewards obtained by labor, is to demand that the law of
life shall be respected.” (Spencer, Essays, v. 3, p. 165.)
These two principles, then – or rather, these two statements of the same
principle – are the rules by which we must be governed in our search for
better conditions. Sometimes the way will be seen more clearly when
examined from one point of view, sometimes when looked at from the
other. If either of these principles is permanently violated, the other
is set at defiance, and panics, commercial stagnation, political
corruption and social disasters are bound to result.
The statements made in regard to rent and interest in the preceding
chapters, were necessarily brief and unsatisfactory. It is now time to
analyze these matters more fully, in order that is may be shown how
surplus value can be eliminated without denying equal freedom. In order
to do this, it is necessary, first of all, to obtain a clear idea of the
nature and function of money.
Primitive man made everything he used himself. As he became civilized
labor was more and more divided, and exchange became necessary. At first
this exchange was effected by pure barter, but as the system grew more
complex, a medium of exchange became necessary. Hence, money is “any
medium of exchange devised to overcome the difficulties attending a pure
system of barter.” (H. Bilgram, Study of the Money Question, p. 17.)
At first, of course, men picked upon a certain commodity to perform this
function. In different parts of the world, at different times, many
different things have been used, but of all others gold and silver seem
to have been most universally employed. The fact that so many other
things have been used, is proof that gold and silver are not the only
things capable of performing this duty. What then are the qualities
which money must possess?
In order that anything can be satisfactorily used as a medium of
exchange, it must be capable of negotiating all kinds of exchanges. In
proportion as it does this, it is good money, and in proportion as it
fails in this respect, it is bad money. The power of money to negotiate
exchange, must necessarily be limited by the willingness of all people
to accept it in exchange for the products of their labor. That is the
best money, therefore, which will be most widely accepted.
No one will accept money which does not either possess intrinsic value
in itself, or else represent intrinsic value which can be obtained for
it. The former kind, that is, money which possesses intrinsic value in
itself to its full face value, we will call for convenience “commodity
money.” The other kind, that is, money which merely represents intrinsic
value that can be obtained for it, we will call “credit money.”
No piece of money can circulate forever. It must ultimately be redeemed
in something, or the person who last holds it must lose that which he
gave in exchange for it. Commodity money, of course, can be redeemed at
any moment, as, possessing a commodity value equal to its value as
money, it can always be used as a commodity by its possessor without
loss. But credit money is different. It must ultimately return for
redemption to the person, or corporation, which issued it. If he does
not redeem it, he will have received something for nothing, while the
last holder of the money will get nothing in exchange for the goods he
sold for it. Consequently, no one will accept credit money unless it can
be redeemed by its issuer, and unless they also know that it can be so
redeemed. For if not, how can anyone tell that he will not be the one to
lose? Thus money will not be accepted unless it is known to be based
upon value, and unless it is accepted, it cannot be used as a medium of
exchange.
One other thing is still necessary. A man must not only know that he can
get goods for the credit money he accepts, he must also know how much of
these goods he can get. But as a certain amount of a given commodity may
be worth more one day than it is the next, he will want to know, not how
much wheat, for instance, he can get for his money, but what value in
wheat he can get. Now this value must be measured in something. As all
commodities fluctuate in value more or less, it is impossible to obtain
a perfectly equitable standard of value.
From these remarks it will be seen that a standard of value and a basis
of value are two entirely different things. With commodity money, of
course, these two separate functions are performed by the commodity of
which the money is made. But this is not so of credit money. A Greenback
is based upon Government credit, that is, the willingness of the
Government to accept it in payment of all debts due to it, but it is
measured in gold. A silver dollar is based partly upon the value of the
silver and partly upon Government credit, but it is also measured in
gold.
There is no reason why any or all commodities may not be used as a basis
of value. But it would be inconvenient, though by no means impossible,
to have several standards. People get accustomed to measuring values by
a certain standard, and it would occasion a small amount of annoyance to
reckon in accordance with any other. An Englishman, who is accustomed to
reckoning values in pounds, shillings and pence, finds it a little
inconvenient to reckon in rupees until he gets used to it. But the
difficulty of measuring different money by different standards is not
very great, when it is known by what standard each piece is measured.
This is practically done every day in all business houses that have
transactions with foreign countries.
This explanation of the nature and function of money in no way explains
why interest is paid. Many theories are advanced to explain this
phenomenon. To attempt to combat any of them would be out of place in a
brief sketch of this kind. If the explanation which I shall give proves
satisfactory, all conflicting explanations are thereby disproved. So I
will rest my case with that explanation. Nor is it worth while to devote
space to ethical considerations. Every moral philosopher from the time
of Aristotle to the present day has condemned usury in every form. Even
the defenders of interest have never dared to justify their theories on
ethical grounds, but on the plea that it is unavoidable.[22] If this
proposition can be disproved, ethical considerations will hardly be
sufficient to cause men to pay interest when they can get along without
it.
When a man borrows money, he pays a premium to the lender. This is
interest. In other words, interest is “the premium paid for the loan of
money. ... This must, however, be qualified in order to eliminate the
insurance on the risk which the lender must assume. This is the only
definition of interest that does not already attempt to explain the
cause, thereby prejudicing the impartiality of the argument.” Why is it
men are willing to pay this premium?
The great function of money is to mediate exchanges. In our present
complex state of society, with its minute subdivision of labor, the
necessity of some such medium of exchange is very great. It is seldom
that a finished article is made entirely in one factory, even after the
raw material is taken from its natural source. Usually all that is done
in most factories is to advance, by one small stage, the process of
production. When this is done, the articles are sold to another
manufacturer, who advances the production another step. Even after
articles are finished, they must be distributed to those who use them
before they can finally be consumed. The greater the division of labor
in this manner, the more complex do exchanges become, and the greater is
the necessity for money. But the division of labor in the production of
all commodities is not the same. With some it is greater and with
others, less. Consequently, all exchanges are not equally complex, and
the necessity for money in some branches of commerce is greater than it
is in others. That is to say, when money is employed in certain
exchanges, the labor saved is greater than when the same amount of money
is used to negotiate other exchanges.
Let us suppose an ideal community of a thousand men engaged in different
occupations, but without any medium of exchange. Let us suppose that
each of these men produces value equal to that of 100 bushels of wheat
per month. Owing to the lack of money, labor is but little divided. If
it could be divided more minutely, some occupations would be benefited
in a greater degree than would others. Let us suppose that the greatest
benefit to be derived is equal to 200 bushels of wheat per month per
man. That is to say, certain of these thousand men can, with the aid of
money, create value equal to that of 300 bushels of wheat per month, and
without it the value of their product is only that of 100 bushels. It
will certainly pay them to give any amount less than 200 bushels of
wheat per month for money to enable them to subdivide their labor. They
would gain the difference between the amount they paid and the 200
bushels. But if there is enough money in the community to supply all
those whose power of production is increased to the extent of 150
bushels, these last would rather do without the money than pay more than
150 bushels per month for its use. For if not, their net wages would be
less than before. The owners of this extra supply of money must
consequently be content with a premium of a little less than 150
bushels. But the owners of the first sum were getting nearly 200 bushels
per month. They will now have to be content with the same amount as the
owners of the fresh supply of money, otherwise these latter will
underbid them and take their customers from them. Any further increase
in the supply of money will produce a like result. Thus we see that
money, like everything else, is applied first to the needs which are
most imperative and afterwards to those which are less so, and that the
price paid for its use is determined by the least productive use to
which it is put.
With an increase in the supply of money, it will be put to a still less
productive use, until the point of non-production is reached. So, other
things being equal, “the premium paid for the loan of money” decreases
as the supply increases, until the point is reached where that premium
is just sufficient to cover the cost of issuance and the insurance
against risk. It cannot permanently fall much below that point. If it
should, those engaged in issuing money would seek more lucrative
employment. This would restrict the supply, and the rate of interest
would increase.
The fact that after a financial panic the rate of interest is low, is in
apparent contradiction with this theory. The cause of this is that,
during the panic, large sums of money are withdrawn from circulation,
and business is brought almost to a standstill. When the panic is over,
these large sums again seek investment. But, owing to the stagnation of
business, there are fewer exchanges to be conducted. Hence the amount of
money is greater, in proportion to the demand, than at normal times. So
this fact, far from being a contradiction, is a confirmation of the
theory here advanced.
One serious objection offered to this analysis of interest is the theory
that the exchange value of money, like that of all other commodities,
decreases as its supply increases and vice versa; that the exchange
value of money is its purchasing power; and, consequently, the
purchasing power decreases as the supply increases. For example, suppose
that when there is $20 per capita in circulation, a pair of shoes cost
$4, and a coat costs $4. When the money in circulation is doubled, that
is, when there is $40 per capita in circulation, the shoes will cost $8,
and the coat will cost $8. So, though the amount of money in circulation
is doubled, its purchasing power decreases 50 per cent., and the number
of exchanges the increased volume of money is capable of mediating, is
exactly the same as the number that could be negotiated by the smaller
amount.
Sometimes it is even asserted that, if there was only one dollar in the
world it would be as capable of mediating all exchanges as is all the
money in circulation to-day, provided it was equally capable of
division.
The only conception we now have of a dollar is 25.8 grains of gold 9-10
fine. If there were only 25.8 grains of gold (one dollar) in the world
for use as money, the value of that gold must be either greater or less
than, or equal to, that of the same amount of gold to-day. That is to
say, it must be capable of purchasing, or be exchangeable for, a
greater, or less, or equal amount of commodity.
If it be assumed that, under the given conditions, the purchasing power
of the gold is equal to that of the same amount to-day, how can it be
capable of mediating all exchanges which now require so much more gold?
If the purchasing power of the gold remains constant, how can the money
based upon, measured in, and made of, that gold have an increased
purchasing power? The absurdity of such a proposition is evident.
If it were possible that the price of gold could depreciate under such
conditions, the same absurdity would be manifest in a greater degree. So
the only meaning that can be attached to the saying that one dollar
would be capable of mediating all exchanges presupposes an increase in
the purchasing power of gold, owing to the decrease in the supply. It is
only when looked at from this point of view that the proposition means
anything. If the price of gold increases as the supply decreases, the
total value of all the gold in the world remains unchanged, regardless
of the supply. For example, let us say there are at a certain time
25,000 grains in the world. This gold is capable of purchasing, say,
10,000 bushels of wheat. Suddenly the supply of gold shrinks until only
25 grains are left. These 25 grains are now 1,000 times as valuable as
they were before, other things being equal, and consequently capable of
purchasing as much as the original 25,000 grains. If this is so, the 25
grains are as good a basis of value as were the original 25,000 grains,
and consequently money with an equal purchasing power can be based upon
them. That is to say, the amount of money in circulation remains
unchanged. It is not the increase, or decrease, of the amount of money
in circulation that determines its purchasing power, but the increase,
or decrease, of the standard of value.
Practically a dollar is capable of infinite division. Instead of issuing
notes and subsidiary coin for fractions and multiples of 25.8 grains of
gold, it is just as easy to issue them for fractions and multiples of a
portion of grain. A corner lot in San Francisco cannot be moved to New
York. Yet a New Yorker can purchase a lot in San Francisco without
leaving his office. All that needs to be transferred is a title of
ownership. So, while it might be difficult to transfer one-millionth
part of a grain of gold, it is quite easy to transfer a title to the
ownership of that amount. And this is all that is necessary, if the
title be good.
Money may be said to be a title to the ownership of a certain specified
amount of commodity. If that specified amount changes, – that is, if the
standard and basis of value vary, – of course the purchasing power of
the money is affected. If the title is impaired, – that is, if the
amount specified cannot ultimately be realized for the money, – of
course it depreciates. But, if the standard of value remains constant
and the basis of value is sufficient, I fail to see how the volume of
money can affect its purchasing power. Of course, if more money is
issued on a given basis than that basis will justify, depreciation must
result.
With gold coin the gold is both the basis and the standard of value, and
the commodity is transferred, instead of a title to that commodity. From
the long-continued use of gold, which embodies these various functions,
much confusion of thought has arisen. Men are perpetually confusing the
title of ownership (that is, the money), the commodity which that title
represents (that is, the basis of value), and the terms in which it is
expressed (that is, the standard of value). These are three distinct
things. The fact that they are sometimes embodied in one article in no
wise alters the case.
Suppose all the gold in the United States was deposited in banks and all
exchanges were made by means of checks. Suppose that the aggregate
deposits amounted to $100,000,000, and the total amount of checks issued
was only $40,000,000. Now, suppose the amount of checks is suddenly
doubled, while the amount of the deposits and the value of the gold
remain unchanged. Will those checks depreciate in value? If so, why?
This is a condition in which the basis of value is always ample, the
standard of value remains unchanged, but the amount of money in
circulation is doubled. Unless it can be shown that under these
conditions the notes will depreciate, this criticism must be abandoned,
and we are justified in maintaining, that rate of interest proper will
be reduced to zero, if there is sufficient money in circulation to
negotiate all exchanges.
The great question now is, how can the volume of money be increased?
Whatever solution is offered to this question must recognize the fact
shown above, that the money must be known to represent a definite amount
of actual value or it will be no good.
The great cure-all usually prescribed for all social evils, no matter
what their nature may be, is “Pass-a-law!” In finance this generally
means a legal tender law. The very object of such a law is to compel
people to accept a certain form of money in payment of all debts due to
them. We have seen in a previous chapter, that a direct act of
aggression is the only thing which warrants any interference with the
acts of any individual. I challenge anyone to show how I can commit an
act of aggression by refusing to accept a certain form of money for my
merchandise or my labor. If I know that the money is good, I will need
no legal-tender act to make me accept it. If I do not know that it is
good, it is the most flagrant act of injustice to compel me to take it.
Edward Atkinson – and surely he is conservative enough! – in a recent
pamphlet, defines legal tender as “an act by which bad money may be
forced into use so as to drive good money out of circulation.” He quotes
numerous legal-tender acts in support of his definition.
These laws had their origin in the Middle Ages. “Kings of all countries
were habitually extravagant and always hard up. A favorite method of
raising funds with them was to abstract from coins a part of the metal
of which they were composed, and replace the amount with some base
metal. This was carried to such an extent that some of the coins
contained but a sixtieth part of their original value. People refused to
accept debased coin; so the king declared that it was a legal tender,
and the people were obliged to accept it. This was the beginning of
mandates of legal tender, and it is an absolute truth that no such
legislation was ever required except where money had been debased or had
come to be looked upon by the people with distrust. Legal-tender acts
are necessary only when there is a lack of confidence. So long as
quality is unimpaired, no artificial aid is required. Truth is always
able to commend itself without using physical force. It is also true
that but for the interference of kings in the first place, and
afterwards of other governmental agencies, with the quality of money no
legal-tender act would ever have been heard of.” (A. W. Wright, Banking
and the State, a paper read before the Single Tax Club of Chicago in the
Spring of 1894.)
To make any form of money legal tender is to give it an advantage over
other money, and so to deny free competition. Thus do all legal-tender
acts stand condemned as violations of Equal Freedom.
Any law which prohibits, or places any restriction upon, the issuance of
money is manifestly a restriction upon all who would issue or accept
such money. If A wishes to issue money a and B wishes to accept it in
exchange for his labor, it is gross injustice to both to prevent the
exchange. Interference, even on the grounds that such an exchange would
be detrimental to both, is unjustifiable. So any law, which either
creates a legal tender, or restricts the issuance of money, is
inconsistent with Equal Freedom and must be abandoned.
The only excuse that any person has for interfering with other people,
who wish to use any kind of money they see fit, is when any one of those
people violates the contract entered into when that money was issued.
Then, and not till then, is aggression committed and interference
becomes justifiable. Not only must the “Pass-a-law” idea be abandoned,
but those laws which now exist must be repealed, if the greatest
possible freedom is to be maintained.
It is all very well to prove that all laws in relation to the issuance
of many[23] are ethically unjustified, but how are we going to get along
without them? Let us examine the various methods of exchange in vogue
to-day, and see if we cannot again from them a hint of the direction we
must take, in order to provide a safe currency without recourse to law.
In mining camps, and other places where the employers of labor operate a
“truck store,” an account is commonly opened with each employe. He is
permitted to purchase goods at the store and have them charged to him,
provided, of course, the value of his purchases does not exceed the
wages due him. Here is a simple system of account fulfilling the
function of money. It often becomes a little more complex than this.
Frequently debts owed by one employe to another are paid by transferring
the amount from one account to the other in the truck store. In these
cases the exchanges are of a very simple nature and this system of
account works splendidly.[24]
There is only one reason why such a system as this might not be
elaborated so as to include all the people in the world. But that
objection is insurmountable. It is the tremendous complexity that would
be involved in debiting one person, crediting another and seeing that no
one overdrew his account. So great is this difficulty that, in order to
avoid it, even where exchanges are quite simple, an expedient is
resorted to.
During the panic of 1893 the Kuner Pickle Company, of Denver, paid its
employes, and the farmers of whom it brought its produce, in scrip; that
is, pieces of paper which stated that the Pickle Company would receive
them in payment of all debts due it. As this company was doing a large
business with grocery stores, the holders of the scrip were able to
purchase groceries with it, and the grocers used it to pay their debts
to the Pickle Company.
This is really the way in which most of the business of the country is
conducted. For example, on Saturday, Smith, a bookkeeper, receives a
check form his employer for his week’s wages. He takes this to the bank
and deposits it to his credit. When his grocer presents his bill, Smith
writes him a check. The grocer endorses this and pays it to the
commission merchant, who, in turn, deposits it in the bank. So the
transaction proceeds. At the end of the week the money may be placed to
the credit of Smith’s employer, by means of a check from a man who owed
him money. Here is the whole circle of exchange and the actual coin has
never been taken from the bank. Even if the checks are deposited in
different banks the result is practically the same. In this case the
checks go to the clearing house, and only the balances at the end of
each day are paid in cash. These balances are so small in proportion to
the business done as to scarcely affect the argument.
Surely the checks which have circulated like this are as much money as
greenbacks, or any other paper currency. They circulate because the
people who accept them have confidence, first, that that they can be
redeemed in legal money, and second, that that legal money can be
redeemed in goods which they need. Since 95 per cent. of the business of
the country is transacted in some such manner as this, and only 5 per
cent. by means of legal money – only a portion of which is coin – it is
absurd to suppose that checks can be redeemed in coin, for there is less
than $1 in coin for every $20 in checks. So the only reasonable basis of
public confidence is the ability of the drawer of the check to redeem it
in labor or in goods which are the embodiment of labor.
The idea that all money must be redeemed in gold or silver is one of the
worst of superstitions. As long as we adhere to this idea panics are
inevitable. As soon as a demand is made for the redemption of a large
amount of checks, at any one time, it is found that the supply of coin
is utterly inadequate. As people believe that checks can be redeemed in
no other manner, public confidence is destroyed. This results in forcing
a large number of checks, etc., out of circulation, and causes a greater
stringency in financial circles than the largest exports of gold. That
credit money must be redeemed, if it is to be of any value whatsoever,
has been already demonstrated, but why it should always be necessary to
redeem it in one of two commodities, is something for which all the
sophistry of modern political economists is incapable of offering even a
reasonable explanation. When a man wishes to use money he purchases
something with it, that is, he redeems it in merchandise. Coin is
sometimes melted, in which case it ceases to be coin. It has been
converted into merchandise by a different method, for gold and silver
are always merchandise though not always money. If people realized that
credit money would be good if directly redeemable in merchandise, that
is, if it had the power of purchasing the goods they require without the
intervention of coin, the solution of the financial question would be
near at hand.
When any person goes to a banker to borrow money, the banker examines
the security offered. If it is adequate the loan is made. As the
borrower usually obtains his loan from the banker with whom he deposits
his money, he often has the amount placed to his credit at the bank
subject to check. Then the circle of exchange goes on revolving, often
not a cent of the money is ever taken from the banker’s vaults. But even
if the borrower receives the amount of the loan in cash, the banker
gives him bank notes, greenbacks and other forms of credit money for the
greater part of it, and only a very small amount in coin. In other
words, as Mr. Hepburn says, “the banker merely swaps credit.”
Furthermore, the borrower probably pays away this money in a few days
and it is again deposited in the bank. So in reality the banker lends
the “borrower” absolutely nothing. He simply lets him use the bank’s
credit in exchange for his own, the soundness of which the banker has
previously examined. He examines his customer’s credit, and finding it
good, he proclaims this fact to the world, a transaction very similar to
that of certifying a depositor’s check.
If the borrower’s credit is good enough for the banker, why is it not
good enough for the people? It is. All that is necessary is to put into
operation machinery by which they can be assured that the idiudal’s
credit is good. This is the keynote to the solution of the money
question.
“Now, the whole problem of the circulation consists in generalizing the
bill of exchange; that is to say, in making the bill an anonymous title
exchangeable forever, and redeemable at sight, but only in merchandise
and services.
“Or, to speak a language more comprehensible to financial adepts, the
problem of the circulation consists in basing bank-paper, not upon
specie, nor bullion, nor immovable property, which can never produce
anything but a miserable oscillation between usury and bankruptcy,
between the five-franc piece and the assignat; but by basing it upon
products.
“I conceive this generalization of the bill of exchange as follows:
“A hundred thousand manufacturers, miners, merchants, commissioners,
public carriers, agriculturalists, etc., throughout France, unite with
each other in obedience to the summons of the government, and by simple
authentic declaration, inserted in the “Moniteur” newspaper, bind
themselves respectively and reciprocally to adhere to the statutes of
the Bank of Exchange; which shall be no other than the Bank of France
itself, with its constitution and attributes modified on the following
basis:
“1st. The Bank of France, become the Bank of Exchange, is an institution
of public interest. It is placed under the guardianship of the State,
and it is directed by delegates from all branches of industry.
“2d. Every subscriber shall have an account open at the Bank of
Exchange, for the discount of his business paper; and he shall be served
to the same extent as he would have been under the conditions of
discounting specie; that is, in the known measure of his faculties, the
business he does, the positive guaranties, the real credit he might
reasonably have enjoyed under the old system.
“3d. The discount of ordinary commercial paper, whether of drafts,
orders, bills of exchange, notes of demand, will be made in bills of the
Bank of Exchange, of denominations of twenty-five, fifty, one hundred,
and one thousand francs.
“Specie will be used in making exchange only.
“4th. The rate of discount will be fixed at ....... per cent.,
commission included, no matter how long the paper has to run. With the
Bank of Exchange, all business will be finished on the spot.
“5th. EVERY SUBSCRIBER BINDS HIMSELF TO RECEIVE IN ALL PAYMENTS, FROM
WHOMEVER IT MAY BE, AND AT PAR, THE PAPER OF THE BANK OF EXCHANGE.
“6th. Provisionally, and by way of transition, gold and silver coin will
be received in exchange for the paper of the bank, and at their nominal
value.
“Is this a paper currency?
“I answer unhesitatingly, No; it is neither paper money, nor money of
paper; it is neither government checks, nor even bank bills; it is not
in the nature of anything that has hitherto been invented to make up for
the scarcity of specie. It is the bill of exchange generalized.
“The essence of the bill of exchange is constituted, first, By its being
drawn from one place on another; second, By its representing a real
value equal to the sum it expresses; third, By the promise or obligation
on the part of the drawee to pay it when it falls due.
“In three words, that which constitutes a bill of exchange is exchange,
provision, acceptance.
“As to the date of issue, or falling due; as to the designation of the
places, persons, object – these are particular circumstances which do
not relate to the essence of the title, but which serve merely to give
it a determinate, personal, and local actuality.
“Now, what is the bank paper which I propose to create?
“It is the bill of exchange stripped of the circumstantial qualities of
date, place, person, object, term of maturity, an reduced to its
essential qualities, – exchange, acceptance, provision.
“It is, to explain myself still more clearly, the bill of exchange,
payable at sight and forever, drawn from every place in France upon
every other place in France, made by one hundred thousand drawers,
guaranteed by one hundred thousand indorsers, accepted by one hundred
thousand subscribers drawn upon; having provision made for its payment
in one hundred thousand workshops, manufactories, stores, etc., of the
same one hundred thousand subscribers.
“I say, therefore, that such a title unites every condition of solidity
and security, and that it is susceptible of no depreciation.
“It is eminently solid; since, on one side, it represents the ordinary,
local, personal, actual paper of exchange, determined in its object, and
representing a real value, a service rendered, merchandise delivered, or
guaranteed by the contract, in solido, of one hundred thousand
exchangers, who, by their mass, their independence, and at the same time
by the unity and connection of their operations, offer millions of
millions of probability of payment against one of non-payment. Gold is a
thousand times less sure.
“In fact, if, in the ordinary conditions of commerce, we may say that a
bill of exchange made by a known merchant offers two chances of payment
against one of non-payment, the same bill of exchange, if it is indorsed
by three, four, or a greater number of merchants equally well known,
there will be eight, sixteen, thirty-two, etc., to wager against one
that three, four, five, etc., know merchants will not fail at the same
time, since the favorable chances increase in geometrical proportion
with the number of indorsers. What, then, ought to be the certainty of a
bill of exchange made by one hundred thousand well-known subscribers,
who are all of them interested to promote its circulation?
“I add that this title is susceptible of no depreciation. The reason for
this is found, first, in the perfect solidity of the mass of one hundred
thousand signers. But there exists another reason, more direct, and, if
possible, more reassuring: it is that the issues of the new paper can
never be exaggerated like those of ordinary bank bills, treasury notes,
paper money, assignats, etc.; for the issues take place against good
commercial paper only, and on the regular, necessarily limited,
measured, and proportionate process of discounting.
“In the combination I propose, the paper (at once sign of credit and
instrument of circulation) grows out of the best business paper, which
itself represents products delivered, and by no means merchandise
unsold. This paper, I affirm, can never be refused in payment, since it
is subscribed beforehand by the mass of producers.
“This paper offers so much the more security and convenience, inasmuch
as it may be tried on a small scale, and with as few persons as you see
fit, and that without the least violence, without the least peril.
“Suppose the Bank of Exchange to start at first on a basis of 1,000
subscribers instead of 100,000: the amount of paper it would issue would
be in proportion to the business of these 1,000 subscribers, and
negotiable only among themselves. Afterwards, according as other persons
should adhere to the bank, the proportion of bills would be as 5,000,
10,000, 50,000, etc.; and their circulation would grow with the number
of subscribers, as a money peculiar to them. Then, when the whole of
France should have adhered to the statutes of the new bank, the issue of
paper would be equal, at every instant, to the totality of circulating
values.
“I do not conceive it necessary to insist longer. Men acquainted with
banking will understand me without difficulty and will supply from their
own minds the details of execution.
“As for the vulgar, who judge of all things by the material aspect,
nothing for them is so similar to an assignat as a bill of the Bank of
Exchange. For the economist, who searches the ides to the bottom,
nothing is so different. They are two titles, which, under the same
manner, the same form, the same denomination, are diametrically opposed
to each other.” (P. J. Proudhon, Banque d’Exchange,[25] p. 23.)
This scheme is not unlike the Sub-Treasury scheme of the Farmers’
Alliance. While I consider it to be economically correct, it possesses
on feature to which I strongly object. That feature, while considered by
many to be a source of strength, is really the rock upon which it would
surely sink, as have many similar schemes. It is the proposal to place
the whole business under the control of the State.[26]
The Rhode Island land bank, the Argentine Republic land bank, John Law’s
French land bank, the Michigan wild cat banks, all are evidences of the
corrupting influence of State interference with finance. The founders of
all these banks proposed – with various minor differences of detail –
that the State should issue legal tender notes to the extent of 50 per
cent. of the value of land, and receive a mortgage on the land in
return. But the valuation of the land was left to men who held their
offices on the strength of a political pull – not very good evidence
either of integrity or common intelligence, to say nothing of financial
ability – men who were under political obligations to some, and laboring
under a load of enmity to others. The decision of these men was final.
Their welfare never depended upon the soundness of their business
methods, nor did the customers of the bank realize that they were
individually responsible for the affairs of the enterprise. The officers
held their positions for stated periods and the people were helpless
till next election. The result was what might have been expected. Large
sums were lent on land which possessed almost no value. The money at
once depreciated in value. This depreciation was met by stricter legal
tender laws. Men were made liable to imprisonment for refusing to accept
these notes at their face value. Rather than submit to such tyranny,
merchants closed their stores and business was entirely suspended.
The scheme suggested by Col. Wm. B. Greene removes this objectionable
feature. While he here makes land the sole basis of value, this is only
done as a beginning. He proposed ultimately to extend the same privilege
to all forms of good security – machinery, buildings, grain, etc. His
idea is tabulated in a petition to the Legislature of Massachusetts,
asking for a law embracing the following provisions:
“1. The inhabitants, or any portion of the inhabitants, of any town or
city in the Commonwealth, may organize themselves into a Mutual Banking
Company.
“2. Any person may become a member of the Mutual Banking Company of any
particular town, by pledging real estate situated in that town, or in
its immediate neighborhood, to the Mutual Bank of that town.
“3. The Mutual Bank of any town may issue paper money to circulate as
currency among persons willing to employ it as such.
“4. Every member of a Mutual Banking Company shall himself, and be
bound, in due legal form, on admission, to receive in payment of debts,
at par, and from all persons, the bills issued, and to be issued, by the
particular Mutual Bank to which he may beling; but no member shall be
obliged to receive, or have in possession, bills of said Mutual Bank to
an amount exceeding the whole value of the property pledged by him.
“5. Any member may borrow the paper money of the bank to which he
belongs, on his own note running to maturity (without indorsement), to
an amount not to exceed one-half of the value of the property pledged by
him.
“6. The rate of interest at which said money shall be loaned by the bank
shall be determined by, and shall, if possible, just meet and cover the
bare expenses of the institution.
“7. No money shall be loaned by the bank to persons who do not become
members of the company by pledging real estate to the bank.
“8. Any member, by paying his debts to the Mutual Bank to which he
belongs, may have his property released from pledge, and be himself
released from all obligations to said Mutual Bank, and to holders of the
Mutual Bank money, as such.
“9. No Mutual Bank shall receive other than Mutual bank paper money in
payment of debts due to it except at a discount of one-half of one per
cent.
“10. The Mutual Banks of the several counties in the Commonwealth shall
be authorized to enter into such arrangements with each other as shall
enable them to receive each others’ bills in payment of debts; so that,
for example, a Fitchburg man may pay his debts to the Barre Bank in
Oxford money, or in such other Worcester-County money as may suit his
convenience.” (W. B. Greene, Mutual Banking, pp. 44-45.)
This money would be as nearly perfect as it is possible to make it.
Every member of the bank, being pledged to accept the notes at par,
would practically be an indorser of those notes and, as Proudhon has
shown, this would make the bank absolutely secure. Every borrower would
have a personal interest in seeing that no loans were made except upon
the best security. Should any customer find that risky loans were being
made, he would hasten to pay off his mortgage and release himself from
all further responsibility. He would then go to the opposition bank
across the street and get what money he needed from it. A bank whose
currency showed signs of depreciation would not be able to carry on
business five minutes, in which case, who would be the losers? The
holders of the bills would demand their redemption by the members of the
bank, either in goods or in the bills of more substantial banks. Failing
this, they would seize all the securities and sell them to the highest
bidder, and so redeem the notes. The only losers would be those who were
endeavoring to cheat the public by dishonest methods of banking.
It will be observed that Mutual Bank money need not necessarily be
redeemed in the property mortgaged to the bank. When any customer of a
bank receives the money for goods, he redeems the money in those goods.
When he takes this money to the bank to release his property from the
mortgage, eh cancels both the money and his obligation to the bank. The
security he gives will only be called into requisition if his other
means of redeeming the notes fail.
In order that the notes of the various banks might gain a wider
circulation, clearing-houses would be established. These clearing-houses
would stand in the same relation to the bank as the banks would to the
individuals. Each bank belonging to a clearing-house would pledge itself
to accept all notes bearing the clearing-house indorsement. So every
bank would have the same interest in stopping any lax methods in the
clearing-house, as the individual member would have in seeing that his
bank was doing business in a legitimate manner. The clearing-house would
in this manner be a source of extra security to the public, as well as a
means of extending the circulation of the notes.
Every attempt to issue money on poor security would be checked at once
by the selfish business interests of the members of the banks. By
working through the idea of individual responsibility, we make
selfishness of the greatest use.
If one of these banks were to charge interest, there being nothing to
stop other banks from opening, it would gain no patronage. When men can
use their own credit for the mere cost of bookkeeping and insurance,
they are not going to pay a banker 6 per cent. per annum to let them use
his. Thus competition, relentless and universal, may abolish interest by
giving us a sound currency, in sufficient volume to meet all
requirements.
When the present financial system broke down in 1893, recourse was had
all over the country to various modifications of this system. In nearly
every large city clearing-house certificates were issued to meet the
emergencies of the times. These certificates were based upon security
far poorer than that proposed in connection with the Mutual Banks. Yet
they performed, to a large extent, the functions of money at one of the
most critical periods of our financial history. Scrip, similar to that
mentioned as having been issued by the Kuner Pickle Co., was circulated
in many parts of the United States, and that in spite of the fact that
it was absolutely illegal for anyone to issue it. In ma[n]y cases it was
suppressed by the government, but still a large amount was in
circulation for a time, and that time, though short, was when confidence
was very much shaken and the chances of failure were a hundred times
greater than under normal conditions. Surely a system which can stand
such a test is at any rate worthy of a fair trial.
The orthodox argument against such a system, that an increase in the
volume of money necessarily necessarily causes a depreciation of its
purchasing power, has already been answered. There are only two reasons
why money depreciates in value. One is that the security on which it is
based is less than its face value. The other, a fluctuation of the value
by which the money is measured. One is a depreciation of the basis, the
other of the standard, of value.
This plan surely provides for an ample basis, as it demands that notes
shall only be issued to half the value of the property pledged. But so
far nothing has been said about the standard of value by which Mutual
Bank notes are to be measured. There is no reason why Mutual Bank notes
may not be measured by any standard whatsoever. The notes may read,
“This note will be received by the members of the First Mutual Bank in
payment of all debts due to them, to the value of 100 grains of gold,”
or “to the extent of ten pounds of steel,” or to the extend [sic] of any
certain amount of any given commodity.
The advisability of having a standard as nearly stable as possible has
already been pointed out. Under free competition there would be more
prospect of discovering what that standard is, than under our present
system, in which gold is rigidly adhered to. That gold fluctuates in
value is not denied by none. Whether it fluctuates less than any other
commodity can best be determined by a little experimenting. Such
experiments are impossible to-day, but would be easy under free
conditions.
There is nothing inconsistent between a gold standard and Mutual Banks.
If gold can hold its own, when subject to competition, it will certainly
continue to be used as a standard, but if it is unable to stand this
test, it will be immediately abandoned for something better. The
possible fluctuation from this cause could be no greater than it is
to-day, but might be far less.
Free competition having proved gold, let us say, to be the most stable
of all commodities, and so caused it to be adopted as the standard of
value, any person will accept a note, of the face value of 100 grains of
gold, at par, as long as he knows that it will be redeemed in
commodities to that extent, by the issuers of the note.
It has been shown that notes which were not based upon good and well
recognized security would be driven out of circulation at once by
competition. So the only notes which could be issued would be those
which were incapable of depreciation or fluctuation, save such as is
caused by the fluctuation in the value of the commodity in which they
are measured. Even this fluctuation would be probably less than it is
to-day. So we may say, Mutual Bank notes are practically incapable of
depreciation, no matter what their volume, because they must always be
based upon good security. Being incapable of depreciation, and the
possible supply being limited only by the total amount of wealth in the
community, these notes would form the most perfect currency the world
has ever known. Yet they are practically prohibited by the law which
says, “Every person, firm, association other than National Bank
Associations, and every corporation, State Bank, or State Banking
Association, shall pay a tax of ten per centum on the amount of their
own notes used for circulation and paid out by them.” (United States,
Act of 8th Feb., 1875, Sec. 19. See also Sec. 3412 and 3413, Revised
Statutes of the United States, 1878.) In addition to this nearly every
State has a law like the following:
“SECTION 866, GENERAL STATUTES OF COLORADO. If any person, number of
persons, or corporation in this State, without special leave form the
legislative assembly, shall emit or utter any bill of credit, make,
sign, draw, or endorse any bond, promissory note or writing, bill of
exchange or order, to be used as a general circulating medium and in,
lieu of money or other currency, every such person or persons, or
members of such corporation assenting to such proceedings, being thereof
duly convicted, shall pay a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or
be imprisoned not exceeding one year. Provided, however, That the
provisions of this section shall not apply to the issuance or
circulation of any certificate or order for the delivery of silver
bullion, signed or accepted by any reliable depositary in this State
actually having under is control the silver bullion called for in any
such certificate or order.” (Session Laws of Colorado, 1893, pp.
124-125.)
“But how will the supply of Mutual Bank notes be regulated?” asks the
captious critic. In the same manner, my dear sir, as the supply of any
other commodity. We have seen in Chapter 6, that the supply of all
commodities has a tendency under free conditions to equal the demand.
This is as true of money as of anything else. Establish free conditions
and the supply will regulate itself.
“But,” the critic again objects, “you have denied that the value of
money varies as the supply varies. It is the variation of the value in
relation to the supply that causes this equilibrium between supply and
demand.” I have said nothing of the kind. I said that the purchasing
power of money is not necessarily affected by the supply. But the supply
does directly affect the rate of interest, and the interest is the
source from which the banker – the dealer in money – derives his income.
When an extra demand for money is felt, it is manifest in an increase in
the rate of interest. This will cause the banker to put more money upon
the market, and so the arte of interest will be reduced. Similarly, when
the demand is supplied, the rate of interest will fall. As soon as it
falls below the labor cost, some bankers will seek more remunerative
occupations, the issue of money will decrease and the rate of interest
will rise. Thus the rate of interest will ever have a tendency – under
free conditions – to remain at the point which just pays the banker for
his services, and the supply of money will adapt itself to the demand.
The questions of land and rent have received so much attention lately,
that much of this chapter will appear to be very trite to anyone
familiar with recent economic literature. For example, even college
professors admit – and they seldom admit any truth until it is old
enough to become a lie, as Ibsen says[27] – even they admit that land
differs from wealth in three essential particulars:
1. All wealth is the product of labor, while land existed before wealth
was possible, and may continue to exist long after all forms of life are
extinct.
2. Land is absolutely essential to our existence, for without it we
could have no place to live nor any opportunity to produce anything to
sustain life. But wealth, being the product of labor, cannot be
essential to our existence, since life must have existed previous to its
production.
3. Land is absolutely stationary, while all forms of wealth are movable.
It is necessary to restate these facts in order to make what follows
more intelligible. Since wealth and land are so essentially different,
it is to be expected that property in the one is entirely different from
property in the other. All wealth equitably belongs to the person who
creates it. It is his to use or not to use, to consume in any manner he
sees fit, to exchange for other property, to give away if he so desire,
or to waste absolutely if the fancy strikes him. He has created it by
his labor. He has embodied in it a certain portion of his time and
energy, in short, his life. It is his because it is actually of him. But
with land this is entirely different. No one has made any portion of it.
No one has expended any vitality upon its creation. So no one is
entitled to any property right to it, For if one portion of the earth’s
surface may justly become the absolute possession of an individual, and
may be owned by him for his sole use and benefit, as a thing to which he
has an absolute and exclusive right, then other portions of the earth’s
surface may be so owned; and eventually the whole of the earth’s surface
may be so owned; and our planet may thus lapse altogether into private
hands. Observe now the dilemma to which this leads. Supposing the entire
habitable globe to be so inclosed, it follows that if the landowners
have a valid right to its surface, all who are not landowners have no
right at all to its surface. Hence, such can exist on the earth by
sufferance only. They are all trespassers. Save by permission of the
lords of the soil, they can have no room for the soles of their feet.
Nay, should the others think fit to deny them a resting place, these
landless men might equitably be expelled from the earth altogether. If,
then, the assumption that land can be held as property, involves that
the whole globe may become the private domain of a part of its
inhabitants; and if, by consequence, the rest of its inhabitants can
then exercise their faculties – can then exist even – only consent of
the landowners; it is manifest that an absolute ownership of the soil
necessitates an infringement of the law of equal freedom. For men who
cannot “live and move and have their being”[28] without the leave of
others, cannot be equally free with those others.[29]
A good example of the tyranny that may be exercised by landed
proprietors is found in Greeley, Colo. By a clause in the titles to all
the land on which this town is situated, it reverts to the heirs of the
original owners if any intoxicating liquor is sold upon it. By the fact
of his proprietary right to the soil, the landowner is able to force his
will – whether it be good or bad is immaterial – upon all who shall live
upon it for all time. Once grant a man a title to the absolute ownership
of land, and you deprive everyone else the right to object to any
condition he may make before permitting others to use it.
While there is considerable land in the world which is not yet owned by
anyone, all the best land is certainly monopolized, as is also nearly
all that is capable of affording a comfortable living. This being the
case, the holders of land are able to collect rent from all the
non-landowning classes. This rent is only limited by the difference
between the value of the product of the land each individual occupies,
and the value of that which could be produced with the same amount of
labor on the best land not yet held by anyone. For example, A can, with
a certain amount of labor, produce 100 bushels of wheat per acre upon a
certain piece of land. But that piece of land is owned by B. All land
capable of yielding over 10 bushels per acre is held by someone else.
The only alternative that A has is, to either take up land capable of
yielding but 10 bushels per acre, or else pay B, or some other landlord,
whatever he demands for the use of his land. If B asks more than 90
bushels per acre, A will pursue the former course, if less, the latter.
As B will wish to get all he can, he will not rent his land for much
less than 90 bushels, so that will be approximately the rent of the
land.
It must not be inferred that the agricultural product of land is the
only factor to be considered in in estimating the productivity of the
soil. In reality it is but a very small factor. The possibility of a
mineral or other output has to be taken into consideration. But probably
the greatest factor of all is location. It is easy to see, that if A’s
land is capable of producing 100 bushels of wheat per acre, and B’s land
is only capable of producing 90 bushels, A’s land is ten per cent. more
valuable than B’s. But if it cost B the value of 10 bushels to haul his
90 bushels of wheat to market, and it cost A 28 bushels to haul his 100
bushels, the net productivity of A’s land is only 72 bushels, while that
of B’s is 80. In other words, while A’s land is ten per cent. more
fertile than B’s, yet B’s land, owing to location, is ten per cent. more
valuable than A’s.
So likewise in other forms of industry. A few acres of land, so situated
as to be suitable for a manufactory, may be 100 times as valuable as
other land which Is only suitable for agriculture, though this latter
tract may be extremely fertile, while the former Is little more than a
barren rock. Other land, again, may be so situated as to be suitable for
a large business block, filled with offices, and so afford space for the
application of the labor of several hundred men. It will necessarily be
more valuable than the same area of agricultural land, which would
scarce suffice for the support of one.
Owing partly to the spirit of adventure, partly to a desire for
possession, and partly to the damands [sic] of landlords for higher
rent, poorer and poorer land is being pressed into service. It is
difficult to appreciate the full extent to which this is carried; until
we consider the vast areas of the most productive land which is held out
of use. Owing to its location, the land in large cities is infinitely
more productive than any farming land, yet see how much of it is held
out of use, even in densely settled cities. Thus, while the landlord
cannot actually dictate his own terms to those who own no land, he can,
owing to the comparatively small margin of unmonopolized land, demand
the greater part of the product of the toil of those who use it, and
impose many onerous conditions upon them. So the present system of land
tenure is inconsistent with the cost principle. The means by which the
present owners obtained possession is immaterial. The system is
inequitable and inimical to progress, and must be abolished. What care
we for the howl about the rights of property, unless it can be shown
that the proprietary right has been granted by the producer of the
property? When the holders of land can produce such a title I will
respect it, but not till then. It may not be out of place, however, to
review briefly the history of property in land.
Very many different systems of land tenure seem to have been in vogue
among primitive peoples. Where hunting was the means of support of the
tribe, the land was held in common. In pastoral tribes the same system
was probably in vogue. With the development of agriculture, a tenancy in
usufruct seems to have been most widely adopted. And so on. Nowhere
among uncivilized tribes do we find any trace of the payment of rent.
That is one of the proofs that they were uncivilized!
Most primitive tribes were extremely warlike, and those who were not
were soon exterminated by their more bellicose neighbors. In these times
it was usual for the victors to kill all their prisoners and eat them.
As a more advanced stage was reached and agriculture became of some
importance, it was discovered that a live man was worth more than a dead
one. The body of an enemy was capable of affording his conqueror one or
two good orgies, but his labor would help to provide food as long as he
a lived. The savage found it to his advantage to spare the life of his
enemy in order to make him a slave.
With the primitive means of production at the disposal of man in those
days, a point was soon reached, at which the further application of
labor to land did not produce sufficient to support the laborers; in
other words, the land soon became overpopulated. Then our early
ancestors found it inadvisable to own more slaves. Now it became more
advantageous to the conquerors, to let the conquered retain possession
of their land, on condition that they paid tribute. But this
necessitated excursions at regular intervals to collect this tribute by
force of arms, and so a system of dividing the soil of a conquered
country among the conquerors became more economical. This gradually
developed into the Feudal System, and it was not till that system
decayed that rent and taxes became differentiated. Up to that point both
were the same. The owners of the soil were merely collectors of taxes,
who set an example to modern politicians, to hand over to the public
treasury as little as possible.
It is no exaggeration to say that rent is a form of slavery. It is even
a form of cannibalism. An improvement on cannibalism, to be sure, but an
improvement primarily from the standpoint of the cannibal. (And the same
may be said of taxes.) Whether the present system of land tenure is
regarded from the standpoint of ethics, economics or history, it stands
unqualifiedly condemned.
While all idea of property (that is, absolute ownership) in land is
unjustifiable, some system of land tenure must he adopted. To say that
no man shall use land, is to say that no man shall live. So we are
forced to accept the opposite proposition, namely, all men may use land.
But no man should possess an absolute property right in land.
Consequently, men should be protected in the possession of land only so
long as they are occupying and using it. In other words, bona fide
occupancy and use should be the sole title to land. That such a system
is in accord with the teachings of history is shown by Letourneau[30],
who says: “The ancient system of holding property has died because of
its tyrannical character, and the general civilization has progressed
because of the degree of liberty granted to each individual. But
individual liberty cannot degenerate into an inherited privilege. A
reaction is therefore probable. In fully maintaining individual liberty
this reaction will probably bring us back, slowly and by means of a
series of graduated measures, to a life interest usufruct of land, thus
rewarding intelligence and useful work, and also the labor given.”
(Sociology, p. 439.)
Some gentlemen with tender consciences defend the present land system,
because, they allege, any change would necessitate injustice. It is
argued that all improvements on land belong to the present owners, and
it would be wrong to rob them of their property; that it is impossible
to dispossess them of the land and leave the improvements, therefore, we
must leave them both. But what care we about these fine shades of
justice? The admission that exclusive ownership to land is unjust,
places the landlords among the robber class. Why need we be so
punctilious about their feelings? If progress demands the abolition of
the present land system, is not that sufficient? Must the development of
the whole human race be retarded for fear of doing a little injustice to
a class of robbers? But we are governed, as the Editor of “Egoism” says,
by “a majority that rules without voting – The silent majority of the
graveyard. The dead past rules us with an rron hand. Its creeds, laws,
monopolies, customs, tastes, conceptions and prejudices are the tyrants
of our time. ... We are the slaves of the ghosts of dry bones and dust.”
(Egoism, Vol. 1, No. 4.)[31] So perhaps it is worth while to consider
this objection more fully.
Spencer states the case as follows: “We must admit that all which can be
claimed for the community is the surface of the country in its original
unsubdued state. To all that value given to it by clearing, breaking up,
prolonged culture, fencing, draining, making roads, farm buildings,
etc., constituting nearly all its value, the community has no claim.
This value has been given either by personal labor, or by labor paid
for, or by ancestral labor; or else the value given to it in such ways
has been purchased by legitimately earned money. All this value
artificially given vests in existing owners, and cannot without a
gigantic robbery be taken from them.” (Justice, pp. 91-92.) In an
appendix to the same work (p. 269), he goes on to show, that since A. D.
1601, the landlords of England and Wales have paid out in poor rates,
etc., about £500,000,000 or $2,400,000,000. From this, he argues, “it is
manifest that against the claim of the landless may be set off a large
claim of the landed – perhaps a larger claim.”
These landlords have had control of the land all these centuries. During
that time they have impoverished the soil. They have lived off the
product of other men’s labor. They have done but little to benefit the
human race. And they have, in most cases, ground their tenants and
laborers into poverty. Are not these factors to be considered also?
Every cent that has been invested in improvements, every cent that has
been paid in rates and taxes, and nearly every cent that the landlords
have spent upon themselves has been taken by means of rent from the
producers of wealth, except that which has been derived from the same
source by means of interest. Do you wish to go back to the past,
gentlemen? If so we will submit a bill for back rent, and, since you
believe in interest, we will compute compound interest on the money. You
will find that it would be cheaper to submit to our demands in the first
place and “let the dead past bury its dead.”[32]
While these arguments deal principally with landholding in England, they
apply with equal force to America. Here the improvements have been
largely bought with interest instead of with rent – that is all the
difference. A few cases of men saving their wages and investing in and
improving real estate are to be found. In most of such cases, however,
the investors have simply built homes for themselves. As they occupy and
use this land, they would remain in unmolested possession of it under
the system here advocated. For the few others, who have invested their
hard earned saving with a view to getting back a portion of the plunder,
I am heartily sorry. But they have placed themselves among the robber
class and they must expect to share their fate. But even so, they would
not be badly off. The increase in wages, which would result from
throwing open the land, would go far to repay them for the loss of rent.
No doubt the abolition of slavery was very hard on a number of slave
owners, but that was as nothing when compared with the misery the slaves
had endured. So with the modern form of slavery, it must be abolished,
even if it prove inconsistent[33] to those who are accustomed to live
off the toil of others. Every change involves hardship on some class. We
are fortunate indeed if that hardship falls solely upon those who have
reaped the benefit of the previous injustice.
The most serious objection to the occupancy and use system is that it
does not produce equality of opportunity. Land being of different value,
those who occupy the most valuable will be able to obtain a greater
reward for their labor than will those who occupy poorer land. This
criticism is very just indeed. If any other system can be devised, which
will remove this difficulty without rushing into greater evils, I for
one will most heartily advocate it.
The only way by which it is proposed to remedy this defect is by same
form of State ownership, either by actual State control of the land, or
by the method known as the Single Tax. The former method involves the
direct use of the land by the State, and, consequently, a complete
system of State Socialism and compulsory co-operation. It is unnecessary
to combat this idea here. This whole book is, by implication, directly
opposed to such a system. If its arguments have made no such impression
on the reader’s mind, it has been written in vain and nothing I could
say in a short space here would help matters.
The Single Tax is the theory that the State should collect the full
rental value of all land, and should spend it, or rather such portion of
it as may be left after paying current expenses, for the benefit of the
people. The method of assessment suggested is that that the land shall
be rented to the highest bidder, and if, after he has occupied it
awhile, another is willing to pay more than the original tenant, he
shall be entitled to rent the land at the advanced rate. This is the
fairest way of determining the value of the land, as it throws the whole
matter open to competition. I will go even further; it is the only
possible way of determining the value of the land under such conditions.
If the State collects the full rental value, no one will have any object
in buying or selling land. In the absence of sales there would be
nothing to guide a board of assessors in determining the value of the
land. Any assessments they might make, with absolutely nothing to guide
them in their endeavors, would be more absurdly grotesque than anything
the State has ever yet attempted.[34]
This theory plunges us into evils far greater than those involved in the
occupancy and use system. It leaves the collection and disbursement of
all this vast sum of money to our corrupt State officials. The Single
Taxer will deny this. He argues that under correct economic conditions,
all men will be honest. But he proposes to make the change now, and it
is absurd to suppose that men will become honest in anticipation of
equitable economic conditions. The most he can claim is, that after
equitable economic conditions are established, men will become honest.
Meanwhile the politicians will have collected at least the first
installment of rent. Their friends will fill all the offices created to
spend the surplus for the benefit of the people – in operating railways,
telegraphs, waterworks, electric plants, street car lines, etc. They
will have intrenched themselves behind this army of officeholders, so
that it will be impossible to dislodge them. They will then find it no
hard task to devise means, whereby they may lire at the public expense
without performing any adequate service in return. Men will not become
too honest to live off the toil of others, until it becomes more
difficult to do so than to work for a living for themselves. These
remarks are applicable to any method of spending the surplus that may be
devised. But I doubt if my serious difficulty would arise on this
account. After the funds had once passed into the hands of the
politicians, there would be mighty little surplus left for any purpose
whatsoever.
But supposing the politicians are honest, we are still no nearer the
solution of our difficulties. The Single Tax is based upon the idea that
no man has any right to hold property in land. From thls premise, the
conclusion is deduced that all men (i. e., Society) have a property
right to land. The new form of syllogism which warrants such reasoning
will, no doubt, be propounded in a forthcoming criticism of Mill by
Henry George, entitled “A Perplexed Logician.”[35] So we will submit for
the present to his conclusion that all men have a right to property in
land. From this it follows that each man has a right to an equal share
of the rent of all the land of the world, and to spend one penny of any
one man’s share without his free consent, even though he be in a
minority of one, is a violation of the first condition of liberty.
Insurmountable as these difficulties appear, they are insignificant when
compared with the next. A has rented a piece of land, let us my, for
$200 per year. He has made improvements on it to the value of $1,000.
Now B comes along and offers $250 per year for the same land. The Single
Taxer would say that if A was not willing to pay $250 per year, he must
vacate the land, but that B must pay him for the improvements. B says,
“They are not the kind of improvements I want. I need the land, not the
improvements.” All these difficulties the Single Taxer would submit to a
board of assessors. Now mark the result. If this board places the price
high enough to be fair to A, they compel B either to purchase that which
he does not want, or to relinquish his claim to the land. If they fix
the price so as to be fair to B, A is cheated out of part of the value
of his property. In any event A will be compelled to sell his property,
whether he wishes to do so or not, and B will be compelled to buy the
same, regardless of whether it will be of any use to him. If he does not
wish to do this, he will have to relinquish his equal right to the land
A is occupying, and the community will lose $50 rent per annum. No one
can expatiate more eloquently than Single Taxers upon the difficulty of
assessing the value of personal property, when the assessment is made in
order to levy a tax. And no one places more implicit confidence in the
infallibility of such an assessment, when the owner of the property is
to be compelled to sell his belongings at the assessed valuation. The
very possibility of such uncertainty in regard to the permanency of the
tenure is sufficient to deter any man from improving his land to any
great extent. “Give a man the secure possession of a bleak rock,” said
Arthur Young, “and he will turn it into a garden.”[36] The converse is
equally true. Deprive a man of that security of possession, and he will
let a garden become as barren as a rock. These arguments are valid, no
matter what system of assessing the value of the land and improvements
may be adopted. Schemes may be devised to avoid them, but the same
difficulties will recur in one form or another, for they take their root
in the essential nature of the Single Tax.
This theory, then, is radically inconsistent with Equal Freedom. It
enables the politicians to live off the toil of others. It is absurdly
illogical. It denies a man an absolute title to the product of his toil
in the form of improvements on land. And, providing no security of
tenure, it offers no incentive to economy or thrift in the use of the
land. Surely this is too high a price to pay for absolute equality of
opportunity.
The inequality of opportunity, so much feared by the opponents of the
occupancy and use system, would not be nearly as great as would appear
at first sight. Under free conditions economic rent, that is, the rent
which would attach to land in the absence of monopoly, is all that would
remain. And this economic rent would not be a tax upon the wealth
produced by another. It would merely be the advantage which one man
would have over another, owing to the greater productive power of the
land he occupied. Just as one man is able to perform certain kinds of
labor with greater ease than other men, some men would be so situated on
land, that they could produce more with lees exertion than could their
less fortunate brethren. In one case the advantage is due to the
economic rent on land, in the other, to the economic rent on intellect,
if I may use the expression.
The economic rent on land is but a small portion of that paid to-day. If
occupancy and use were the sole titles to land, the large tracts of
valuable land now held out of use would immediately be occupied and the
poorer land would be abandoned. We have seen that the rent on any piece
of land depends upon the difference between the productivity of that
land and the productivity of the best land not yet taken up.
Consequently as better and better land is abandoned, rent is reduced. To
quote the example given above; if the best available land is only
capable of producing 10 bushels of wheat per acre, and the land B has
for rent is capable of yielding 100 bushels per acre, the rent on B’s
land will be approximately 90 bushels. But if, owing to the
relinquishment of all unoccupied land, no land is held which is
incapable of yielding more than 60 bushels, B’s land will only be worth
40 bushels. When the quality, as well as the quantity, of land now held
out of use is considered, we begin to realize how small a fraction of
rent, economic rent really forms.
Under free conditions, even this economic rent would have a perpetual
tendency to grow “smaller by degrees and beautifully less.”[37] Owing to
the inequalities of the present social system, there is a tendency for
population to concentrate in large cities. This naturally increases the
rent of the city property and decreases that of agricultural soil, etc.
With the establishment of the cost principle, the farmer, the miner and
all engaged in rural occupations will be able to earn as much as those
who work in cities. So a more even distribution of population is to be
expected. Similar force will be at work in other directions. Free
competition will insure each piece of land being put to its most
productive use. Freedom of exchange will cause greater facilities for
working the poorer land. The means of transportation not being
monopolized but extended beyond their present territory, the distant
land will be more accessible. These are some of the forces which will be
at work to equalize the value of different tracts of land, and so reduce
economic rent to a minimum. In fact, so small would it ultimately
become, that it need hardly be considered in our calculations at all.
The only other objection to the occupancy and use system that is worthy
of consideration, is the difficulty of determining whether a piece of
land is in use or not. Is a man using a corner lot in a city when he has
lumber piled upon it? Is he using it when he has some old tomato cans
piled in a corner? Questions like these are asked on all sides. The only
answer to them is that they cannot well be settled beforehand, as we
have not sufficient data on which to base a conclusion. All such
difficulties and disputes will have to be settled as all other disputes
are, amicably if possible, if not by an appeal to the courts. Under our
present absurd judiciary system, some rigid rule might be necessary. For
instance, the court might rule that a residence can occupy a tract of
land 100x150 feet, a store the same area, a factory 300x150 feet, and so
on. As we get enlightened and an equitable jury system is established,
the matter will present even fewer difficulties. Twelve men, familiar
with the land under dispute and with a full knowledge of the facts of
the case, would seldom find it difficult to settle such difficulties.
This difficulty is greatly overestimated. To-day nearly all occupied
land is fenced in, and the boundaries are well marked and recorded. It
is no very difficult task to tell how much land a man’s house is
occupying. Why such difficulties should suddenly increase under an
occupancy and use system, is not apparent. This objection, like its
predecessors, is seen to be almost infinitesimal when it is carefully
examined.
Until some other system can be devised, which is free from all these
objections, occupancy and use must be considered the only equitable and
legitimate title to land.
While surplus value depends for its existence . principally upon the
monopolies of land and money, it is also increased by special
privileges. The abolition of these minor forms of monopoly, to be sure,
would be of but little avail while the all-embracing monopolies of land
and money still exist, yet they must ultimately be removed before the
cost principle can be established.
The most important forms of special privilege in vogue to-day are the
protection from competition afforded to manufacturers by the protective
tariff, the special charters granted to railroads and similar
corporations, licenses, copyrights and patents.
The various questions involved in the operation of railroads, etc., are
treated in a subsequent chapter and so they need no elaboration here.
And so much has been written in regard to the tariff, magnifying its
importance out of all proportion to other questions, that it seems
hardly worth while to give it more than passing mention. The advocates
of “tariff for revenue only” must find their answer in the chapter
dealing with Equal Freedom, in which I endeavor to prove that all forms
of compulsory taxation are unjust. But the Protectionist thinks he has
an economic principle to justify his position. He claims indulgence for
his interference with the freedom of exchange, on the grounds of social
expediency. His ideal is a tax which is sufficiently high to prohibit
the importation of goods of foreign manufacture. From such a tax no
revenue could be derived. It may be called a “tariff for protection
only.” The object of such a tariff is simply to protect the domestic
manufacturer from competition with foreign rivals, and so to enable him
to charge a higher price for his goods than he could otherwise obtain.
It will be observed that the extra price which is charged on account of
such a tariff is not a tax but simple profit. If the tariff is so
successful as to prevent all importations no tax is paid at all. The
manufacturer would still reap this extra profit if, instead of levying a
tax on imports, the government were to punish all importers as
criminals. So while this form of profit is, under existing conditions,
due to a tax, it is not itself a tax. For the arguments in favor of, or
against, the removal of this special privilege, I must refer the reader
to works which treat of it in detail.
Licenses of all kinds are of a similar nature. They are especially
designed to restrict the number of persons engaged in certain
occupations. Such restrictions, by limiting the competition, must always
enable those engaged in the licensed industry to charge prices than they
otherwise could. The excuse offered for their existence is that those
engaged in the licensed industries need special watching, either because
the nature of those industries offers extra opportunities for fraud, or
because those engaged in such industries are more than ordinarily
depraved and liable to impose upon the ignorance of their fellow mortals
– an insult at once to the intelligence of the general public, and to
the honesty of large numbers of men engaged in various professions and
callings.
The protection of ignorance is not justified by Equal Freedom and must
ever result disastrously. Experience alone can prove which is the
ignorant and which is the wise man. An attempt to protect the former
almost always results in restraining the activities of the latter. If a
man is ignorant, nothing will teach him quicker than experience. If that
experience kills him, there will be one fool less in the world, and the
human race will be purer, better and nobler for his demise.
Special privileges of this nature prevent men from engaging in certain
occupations where they might earn an honest living, and where they might
discover new methods and improvements to the benefit of the whole human
race. They prevent free competition and, by so doing, they enable the
favored few to collect larger fees from the rest of the community. The
only reason they exist is to protect and foster ignorance and stupidity.
The question of patents and copyrights requires longer notice. It is
claimed by many that these rights are not special privileges but forms
of the right of property. Herbert Spencer says, “That a man’s right to
the produce of his brain is equally valid with his right to the produce
of his hands, is a fact which has as yet obtained but a very imperfect
recognition.” (Social Statics, Revd. Ed., p. 68.) He devotes the rest of
the chapter to endeavoring to prove that a property right in ideas is
justified, nay even demanded, by the principle of Equal Freedom.
If ideas belong to whoever discovers them, it is unjust to limit that
property right in any way. My property right to a box I have made
involves my right to that box under all circumstances. It is mine. No
considerations of time or place can alter the fact. No one has any
business to interfere with it. I can do with it as I choose as long as I
live and when I die, it belongs to my heirs forever. It is mine to use
or not to use, to destroy or to preserve, just as I see fit. So, if it
be asserted that a man has a property right to ideas, the proposition
involves the same degree of proprietorship. It is absurd to say that I
have a property right in something to-day, and that to-morrow that
property right expires; or to say that something is mine on one side of
an imaginary line but not on the other. Nor is it any less absurd to
argue that I may not do as I will with my own. As soon as this is
asserted, property right is denied. If, as Alphonse Karr[38] says,
“Literary property is a property,” it is a property under all
circumstances, in every country and at all times. It is the absolute
property of its owner and his heirs forever, to do with as they please,
to use or not to use, or even to destroy. And no one may use any idea to
his advantage, without the consent of the discoverer of that idea.
Christopher Columbus had an idea one day. As a result of that idea he
discovered America. All ideas are the property of their discoverers and
their heirs for all time, and no one may take advantage of such ideas
without the consent of their owners. Therefore, no one may live in
America without the consent of the heirs of Christopher Columbus. Caxton
invented printing. Therefore, no one shall become a printer without the
consent of Caxton’s heirs. Thousands of similar cases might be quoted.
To maintain the right of an inventor or author to absolute property in
his ideas, is to give him power to say how they shall be used. A
copyright based upon this principle would not only prevent any
unauthorized person from reprinting the author’s works. it would also
prevent any purchaser of the works from lending them to anyone without
the author’s consent This may seem a little exaggerated to some people.
If so I commend to their notice the following paragraph, which was
originally printed in the Boston Advertiser some years ago: “One of the
oldest publishers in the city (Boston) is decidedly of the opinion that
public libraries are a real disadvantage to the author. While Congress
is devising means to protect authors, he contends, it would do them
great service to pass a law that no public library shall place a book
upon its shelves without the consent of the author.” (Library Journal,
May, 1892.) If such a course is justifiable in regard to public
libraries, why not prohibit private individuals lending books without
the consent of the authors? Here is another case. It is not unusual for
advertising concerns to purchase copies of illustrated papers, take them
apart, interleave them with advertisements, rebind them and distribute
them gratuitously. In consequence of this, “Judge” carries the following
warning at the head of its editorial column: “The publishers of ...
Judge notify the public that the use of Judge in local advertising
schemes, by printing and inserting advertising pages between its leaves,
is a direct violation of the publishers’ right under the copyright law.
All copies of Judge are sold upon the express condition that they will
not be used for such purposes. ... Notice is hereby given that the
United States circuit court has recently granted an injunction
restraining the use of Judge in this way.” Here is a direct recognition
by the law of the property right of the publisher in every copy of his
paper, even after that paper has been bought and paid for. These are but
logical deductions of the right to property in ideas.
Again, the absolute property right involves the right of destruction.
Suppose now the heirs of Prof. Huxley were to become bigoted Christians,
they would be entirely within their right if they suppressed all his
works, and prevented everyone from reprinting them for all time. They
could even compel all people who owned copies of his book to sell them
to them for this purpose. Such a course would not be improbable. Lady
Burton destroyed the manuscript which had cost her husband fifteen
years’ labor, because she considered it immoral.[39] Why should not any
other bigot attempt to suppress works he thought unfit for publication,
if he had the power? The natural history of the animal teaches us that
this is his overruling passion. But why continue this any longer? The
absurdity of perpetual and unlimited patents and copyrights must be
clear to everyone. Yet, since this absurdity is involved in the
hypothesis of property in ideas, that hypothesis must be declared absurd
and untenable.
But waiving all these difficulties for the present, what are ideas, to
which a property right is claimed? Did Stevenson invent the locomotive
engine unaided? Did Newton evolve the law of gravitation out of his
inner consciousness? No. Every discovery in science, every invention in
mechanical arts, every philosophical system, is but one more link in the
chain of human knowledge. We build upon the past, . and the future will
in turn take up the task where we have left off. Herbert Spencer would
have been as impossible in the eighteenth century, as would Edison have
been without Franklin. Shakspere merely rewrote a lot of ancient plays,
and Copernicus gained his idea of the revolution of the planets from a
sentence in the works of some obscure and long forgotten Greek
astronomer.[40] It is impossible to say, “This is original and that is
not.” Everything is original, or nothing is original, just which way you
choose to look at it. Certain conditions create certain needs. If those
needs are not filled in one way, they will be in another. If not by one
man, then by some one else. Darwin and Wallace both discovered the
theory of natural selection almost simultaneously. Proudhon, Marx and
Josiah Warren all worked out the cost principle, entirely independently
of each other, at very nearly the same time. Hundreds of such cases
might be quoted. “Mark Twain,” a firm believer in copyright, is
authority for the following:[41]
“The following statement, which I have clipped from a newspaper, is
true. I had the facts from Mr. Howells’ lips when the episode was new:
“‘A lady of Rochester, New York, contributed to the magazine (Atlantic)
after “Dr. Breen’s Practice” was in type, a short story which so much
resembled Mr. Howells’ that he felt it necessary to call upon her and
explain the situation of affairs in order that no charge of plagiarism
might be preferred against him.’ ...
“Here is another case. I clip it from a newspaper. ... ‘Miss Anna M.
Crane, of Baltimore, published Emily Chester, a novel which was
pronounced a very striking and strong story. A comparison of this book
with Moods showed that the two writers, though entire strangers to each
other, and living hundreds of miles apart, had both chosen the same
subject for their novels, had followed almost the same line of treatment
up to a certain point, where the parallel ceased, and the denouements
were entirely opposite. And even more curious, the leading characters in
both books had identically the same names, so that the names in Miss
Alcott’s novel had to be changed.’ ...
“Four or five times within my recollection there has been a lively
newspaper war in this country over poems whose authorship was claimed by
two or three different people at the same time. There was a war of this
kind over ‘Nothing to Wear,’ ‘Beautiful Snow,’ ‘Rock Me to Sleep,
Mother,’ and also over one of Mr. Will Carleton’s early ballads, I
think." (S. L. Clemens, Mental Telegraphy, in £1,000,000 Bank Note and
Other New Stories, pp. 56-57.)
Are we to give a man a property right in ideas he discovers to-day, and
deny it to the man who discovers the same ideas to-morrow? Both are
children of the same social system. Roth are living in a society which
has attained a certain intellectual growth. Why should we say to one
man, “These ideas are yours for a certain length of time, to do with as
you please,” and to that man, “You are too late. Your ideas have already
been monopolized.” That it is impossible, without destroying the law, to
so adjust it that both may reap an equal benefit, must be apparent to
anyone who considers the facts of the case. For example, A has a patent
right. B infringes it, either in good faith or by wilful copying. Under
the present law, A has to prove that B is manufacturing and selling
goods very similar to those protected by his patent That is all. If that
can be proved, B must be restrained. If the law were amended in any way
so as to give B the advantage of independent discovery, A would find it
impossible to protect his patent right. If independent discovery were
ever admitted, it would either have to be disproved by A or proved by B,
both of which would be impossible in nearly every case, and would
involve both parties in almost endless litigation. So it would be
practically impossible to adequately protect A without doing injustice
to B.
Spencer admits the difficulty of dealing with simultaneous, independent
discovery. He says, “In consequence of the probability, or perhaps we
may say the certainty, that causes leading to the evolution of a new
idea in our mind, will eventually produce a like result in some other
mind, the claim above set forth (for property in ideas) must not be
admitted without limitation. Many have remarked the tendency which
exists for an invention or discovery to be made by independent
investigators nearly at the same time. There is nothing really
mysterious in this. A certain state of knowledge, a recent advancement
in science, the occurrence of some new social want – these form the
conditions under which minds of similar characters are stimulated to
like trains of thought, ending, as they are prone to do, in kindred
results. Such being the fact, there arises a qualification to the right
of property in ideas; which it seems difficult and even impossible to
specify definitely. The laws of patent and copyright express this
qualification by confining the inventor’s or author’s privilege within a
certain term of years. But in what way the length of that term may be
found with correctness there is no saying.” (Social Statics, Revd. Ed.,
p. 72.)
This kind of reasoning is more picturesque than logical. Spencer here
shows us clearly that the granting of a patent to A is an infringement
of B’s liberty. But in order to even things up a little he proposes to
deprive A of the property, to which he has supposedly established A’s
claim, in order, not that B may be remunerated in particular, but that
the rest of the community may plunder the property as much as they like
after A has saved what he could during certain years. If granting a
patent to A prevents B from making similar discoveries, either
simultaneously with A or subsequently, the granting of that patent is
clearly an invasion of B’s liberty. If it is not an invasion, why limit
A’s right to his property? And if it is an invasion, what good does it
do B to limit the period of the invasion to twenty years?
It is urged by some that, while no property can equitably be held in
ideas, it is only just that people be allowed a property right in the
expression of those Ideas. But that very expression is itself an idea.
In the case of Miss Crane and Miss Alcott, above quoted, the two authors
followed the same plot and even gave their characters the same names,
without previous knowledge of each other. In this case, which is the
idea and which the expression of that idea? The two things are
inseparable, and the arguments which apply against one are valid when
directed against the other.
The hypothesis of property in ideas is absurd, so copyright and patents
are nothing but special privileges. In fact they were never designed as
anything else. A great English authority on jurisprudence tells us, “In
modern times the inventor of a new process obtains from the State, by
way of recompense for the benefit he has conferred upon society, and in
order to encourage others to follow his example, not only an exclusive
privilege of using the new process for a fixed term of years, but also
the right of letting or selling his privilege to another.” (Holland,
Jurisprudence, Ed .5, p. 179.) Many defend the existence of such
monopolies on these grounds. They claim that “they are necessary to
encourage literary industry and to foster inventive genius.” The same
old argument. Change the word “literary” to “infant” and “inventive
genius” to “domestic manufactures” and everyone will recognize the sole
intellectual stock in trade of the Protectionist. In order to protect a
certain class of men, we are to enable them to tax all the rest of the
community! But I deny this necessity. Monopoly is not necessary to
secure fair pay to authors and inventors, and to more than this they are
not entitled. Mr. Benj. R. Tucker tells us, “I deny that, in the absence
of copyright and in the presence of competition, authors will have no
earthly chance of being financially remunerated. In what I shall say
under this head, I shall speak as a book publisher and an expert, and I
claim for my statements as much authority as may rightfully be awarded
expert testimony. It is a rule, to which exceptions are very rare, that,
even in the absence of copyright, competing editions are not published
except of books the demand for which has already been large enough to
more than reasonably reward both author and publisher for their labor.
Take, for instance, a paper novel that retails at 50 cents. We will
suppose that for this book there is a demand of 10,000 copies. These
copies cost the publisher, to make and market, say 17 cents each. He
pays the author 5 cents for each copy sold – that is the customary
royalty of ten per cent. of the retail price. The total cost to the
publisher, then, is 22 cents per copy. He sells these books to the
jobbers at 25 cents each, leaving himself a profit of 3 cents a copy. He
probably has orders from the book trade for three to six thousand copies
before publication. If the final demand is not to exceed the edition of
10,000 copies, the sale of the balance will drag along slowly and more
slowly through several years. During this time the author will receive
as his royalty $500 in payment for a book which he was probably leas
than sixty days in writing. I maintain that he is more than reasonably
paid. No rival edition of his book has sprung up (we are supposing an
absence of copyright) for the reason that the demand did not prove large
enough to induce a second publisher to risk the expense of making a set
of plates. But now let us suppose that on publication so brisk a demand
had immediately arisen as to show that the sale would be 20,000 instead
of 10,000. The publisher, as before, would have sold three to six
thousand in advance, and the balance of the first 10,000 would have
disappeared before any rival publisher could have made plates and put an
edition on the market. As before, then, both author and publisher would
have been more than adequately paid. But at this point steps in a rival.
Having to pay no author and to do no advertising, he can produce the
book at say 14 cents a copy, and perhaps will sell it to the trade at 20
cents. It now becomes optional with the author and first publisher to
maintain the old price and sell perhaps one thousand of the second
10,000 or to reduce the one his royalty and the other his profit, sell
the book to the trade almost as low as the rival, and control nearly
half the subsequent market. In either case, both author and publisher
are sure to get still further pay for services that have already been
more than reasonably rewarded, and the public meanwhile benefits by the
reduction in price. Why has no competing edition of ‘The Rag Picker of
Paris’[42] been published during the six months it has been on the
market? Simply because, though a more than ordinarily successful novel,
it did not develop a sufficient demand to tempt another publisher. Yet
it has paid me more than equitably. Why, on the other hand, did two
competing editions of ‘The Kreutzer Sonata’[43] appear on the market
before mine had had the field two months? Simply because the money was
pouring into my pockets with a rapidity that nearly took my breath away.
And after my rivals took the field, it poured in faster than ever, until
I was paid nearly 60 times over for my work.”[44] (Liberty, 10th
January, 1891.)[45]
Exactly the same forces are at work in the case of inventions and often
in an intensified form, as new inventions usually require special
machinery for their manufacture. I will eyen go further than this. A
patent is often a direct disadvantage to an inventor. “When a patent has
been granted,” says Chamber’s Encyclopaedia, “if it is of such a nature
as to lead to competition, infringements are almost matters of course,
and the only mode of discovering and checking the infringement is so
tedious, costly and ineffective that inventors generally pass their
lives in constant litigation, fighting in detail a succession of
imitators who often have nothing to lose by defeat, and therefore entail
all the greater burden on the legitimate manufacturers.” Mr. Edison
seems to agree with this, and surely no one will deny that he is an
authority upon the subject. In an interview he is reported as saying:
“Our patent system puts a premium on rascality. I have taken out 700
patents for my inventions, but I have never had one minute’s protection.
... I have never made one cent out of my inventions; all I have made has
been out of manufacturing. ... I believe I would be $600,000 better off
if I had never taken out a patent What I have made has been because I
have understood the inventions better, and have been able to manipulate
the manufacturing of them better than the pirates.” (See an article by
A. L. Ballou, in “The Electrical Worker,” June, 1896.)[46]
The concerns which do reap the benefit of patents, etc., are large
corporations like the Bell Telephone Company. These concerns are often
able to carry on litigation until the owner of the patent is only too
willing to sell at their figure. It is common for these companies to buy
up all improvements on their patents. They withhold these from use until
the original monopoly expires, and then use them to prevent competition.
It is truly wise of us to foster inventions in such a manner that large
corporations can prevent us from using them as long as it suits their
convenience.
So the only excuse for these special privileges disappears as soon as it
is carefully examined. A copyright does not enable the literary men
whose labor is most intense to reap any extra reward for their labor.
Spencer himself admits that he lost about £3,250 (over $16,000) on the
compilation and publication of his Descriptive Sociology. (See prefatory
note to Descriptive Sociology, Part 8.) Yet that must have cost an
immense amount of the most severe literary labor. What copyright does is
to enable popular writers to reap a monopoly price for what is often
little better than literary garbage. It creates a spirit of
commercialism in literature, very much to the disadvantage of the
literature. One of the most common manifestations of this degrading
influence, is the way in which writers grind out sequel after sequel to
any novel that meets with popular favor. The success of the first book
is the best advertisement of its sequel, so a large sale can always be
reckoned on. In the absence of copyright, the author would know that a
competing edition would be placed upon the market at once, and so make a
sequel if anything less remunerative to him than an entirely new work.
This would cause him to stop when he had said all he had to say on any
given subject, instead of hashing and rehashing it until the public was
fairly nauseated with his inane repetitions. This is only one of many
instances which might be quoted. Whatever it may be to the author and
publisher, copyright is really a curse to literature instead of a
blessing. So as Spencer says in his plea for the other side, “in this,
as in other cases, disobedience to the moral law is ultimately
detrimental to all.” (Social Statics, Revd. Ed., p. 71.)
If a merchant is doing business with borrowed money, he has to pay
interest on that money out of the difference between the price at which
he buys, and the price at which he sells his goods. And if the money
invested in his business is his own, he will expect to receive that
interest himself. For if he could not get interest in this manner, but
could do so by lending it to another, he would most assuredly follow the
latter course.
With rent the situation is exactly similar. Whether the ground on which
the business is conducted be owned by the business man himself or by
someone else, rent has to be paid out of the margin on the sales. And
again, if the proprietor of the business cannot make as much, after
paying all the expenses of his business, as he could working on salary
as manager of a similar concern, he would rather rent his land, lend his
money on interest, and work for someone else.
Therefore, the margin between the price at which goods are bought, and
that at which they are sold, must be sufficient to cover Rent, Interest,
Wages of of superintendence, Wages of employes, Insurance and all the
incidental expenses of business. If it falls below that point, a number
of traders will go out of business, or else seek some more remunerative
occupation. This will reduce the competition among the rest so they will
be able to buy and sell to better advantage than before and the margin
will increase until it is sufficient to cover these charges.
While this margin can never permanently fall much below the point here
indicated, it can, and often does, exceed it, so making what is
technically known arc profit. For example, a man has $10,000 invested in
his business. If this was lent at 6 per cent. interest it would bring in
$600 a year. He also owns the ground on which his store is situated.
This we will say could be rented for $500. As manager of a similar
business he could command a salary of, say, $1,500. If his business is
to be profitable, it must yield not less than $600 interest, $500 rent,
$1,500 wages of superintendence, making a total of $2,600. This sum must
remain after all current expenses, such as wages of help, insurance,
allowance for bad debts, wear and tear on the property has been paid.
Instead of $2,600 the business man finds he has cleared, say, $3,000.
The difference between these sums – $400 – is clear profit.
Since the wages of the proprietor have been deducted before, and these
wages were determined by his ability to conduct such a business
satisfactorily, ample allowance had already been made for superior
executive ability. It is absurd, therefore, to claim that the profit is
the result of the way in which the business is managed, and as such,
rightfully belongs to the manager. If profit is not produced by the
labor of the proprietor (in which case it would not be profit but wages)
it must have been obtained from the labor of someone else, and so is
inconsistent with the Cost Principle.
It is easy to see how profit arises in some forms of business. Special
legislation restricting the freest competition in any branch of
industry, enables those who are engaged in that business to charge
higher prices for their goods than they otherwise could. Such things as
these are easy to deal with. Repeal the specia1 privileges and the
profit accruing from them will cease to exist. But while this would
reduce profit in certain lines. it would not abolish it altogether.
Other causes would still tend to perpetuate its existence.
When we examine the extent of profit in various lines of business, we
find that those institutions which involve the greatest amount of land
and money return the greatest profit. Large iron works, and other
institutions which need a big capital, return much higher profits than a
book bindery or a printing office. The wholesale grocer quickly amasses
a fortune, while the keeper of the little corner store finds it
difficult to keep out of the hands of the sheriff.
The rate of interest on $100,000 is no greater, in fact it is quite
often less, than the rate of interest on $100. But the number of men who
own $100,000 is very much less than the number who own $100, and
certainly hundreds could borrow the latter sum where one could borrow
the former. Consequently, the number of men who could engage in any
business, becomes more and more limited as the amount of money and land
necessary to its existence increases. In this manner the competition in
large business undertakings is very much limited, while in those in
which small capital is required it is intensified.
Once establish an equitable system of land tenure, and remove the
restriction on the use of credit and the issuance of money and all this
is immediately changed. When occupancy and use are the sole title to
land, it will not be necessary to spend vast sums of money purchasing
ground on which to start large business undertakings. The land will be
free to all, and all will be able to avail themselves of the
opportunities it offers.
When Mutual Banks are established, few people will have no credit which
they can use. Large numbers, who to-day are deterred from negotiating
loans upon the security they possess by the interest charged, will be
able to use their credit. So that, while the credit of each individual
will not be equal, there will be sufficient money in circulation to
insure the freest possible competition in all branches of production and
distribution.
The inherent selfishness, not to say laziness, of the human race prompts
a man to get all he can with as little exertion as possible.
Consequently, all men desire to exchange the product of their labor for
the greatest amount of commodities that they can get for it. If a man
finds, that by working at a certain occupation he can make more with the
same amount of exertion than he can when otherwise engaged, he will
follow that occupation. Once land and money are free, there will be
nothing to prevent most men from engaging in any occupation they see
fit.
Many men to-day have no capital, and under free conditions even, would
have nothing at first to offer as security to the mutual banks. But all
wage earners are not in this unfortunate condition. Those whose credit
is good, would be attracted to manufacturing and mercantile pursuits,
because they promise greater remuneration for the amount of labor
expended. This would at once reduce the competition among the wage
earners and increase it among the employers of labor. For every wage
earner who becomes an employer, not only decreases the number of
applicants for work, but also creates a demand for others.
Furthermore, the competition among the manufacturers and merchants would
force the price of goods down to the lowest possible point, which, since
rent, interest and taxes are abolished, would be the bare cost of
running the business, including insurance against risk and wages of
superintendence. As soon as it fell below that point the change would be
in the opposite direction. A good example of this is seen in the
building trades, especially in the Western States. Bricklayers generally
earn good wages. The amount of capital required to start as a contractor
is small, so it is not unusual to see journeymen bricklayers become
contractors. Wherever the conditions are free, it is seldom that an
ordinary contractor is able to make more than one of his journeymen. I
have often noticed in times of great activity in this trade, that quite
a considerable number of men are alternately employers and employes. The
result of such a state of affairs, is to maintain a condition of
equality between the journeymen and contractors. If this works this way
in one trade, it will do so in every trade under similar conditions.
Free competition will increase the competition among the employers and
decrease it among the wage earners. The dream of the old time labor
reformers will be realized. The job will search for the laborer, not the
laborer for the job. When this takes place wages must necessarily go up
rapidly. But the increase of competition among the manufacturers and
merchants will also reduce prices. So not only will the wages of the
workers be increased as measured in money, but the purchasing power of
that money will be increased owing to the cheapening of commodities.
How would this affect such men as farmers? In order to make the matter
plain, we must take the case of a farmer who is working on a rented farm
and with borrowed capital. For, just as in the case of the merchant
cited in the beginning of this chapter, if he owns his own farm and
capital he pays rent and interest to himself. This farmer, then, raises
sheep among other things. Out of the sale of the wool he has to pay a
certain amount of rent and interest. (If he raises nothing but wool he
has to pay all his rent and interest from this source.) So that only a
portion of the price he gets for it goes to him. The man to whom he
sells the wool pays for transporting it to the factory. Out of the sum
paid for transportation, the railroad company makes rent, interest and
profit. The dealer also adds his share of these three items to the cost
before selling the wool to the spinner. The spinner next and then the
weaver, next the wholesale merchant and then the retailer, and lastly
the boss tailor all collect rent, interest and profit before the wool
gets back to the farmer, in the shape of a suit of clothes. This is
rather understating the case than exaggerating, as, with our minute
divisions of labor, the material often passes through other hands than
those above mentioned. When we consider that goods are often transported
five or six times before they reach the customer, instead of only once,
we see how great a proportion of the total cost to the customer is paid
in the shape of usury. The reduction of the prices will be effected by
the elimination of this usury, and the same cause will raise the
original price of the raw material when sold by the farmer. The farmer,
as such, is a wage earner in spite of the fact that he is not employed
by another. His wages come out of the price of the goods he sells. As a
wage earner the same forces will be at work to increase his wages as
those mentioned above.
The extent of usury is shown in a small degree by the following example:
“A man who weaves cloth for which he receives less than four cents a
yard as a producer, may have to pay seventy-five cents a yard as a
consumer, the profit to the retailer in such case being at least
twenty-five cents a yard; that is, the retailer, for handling one yard
of goods receives twenty-five cents compensation, where the weaver, for
weaving the same yard of cloth received less than four cents
compensation. This single illustration is sufficient to show how far
distribution is at fault in matters of depression and as an obstacle to
the best interests of wage earners.” (First Annual Report of the U. S.
Commissioner of Labor – Industrial Depressions – p. 278.) It must be
recollected, however, that a certain amount of labor was embodied in the
wool before it reached the hands of the weaver. After he has woven it it
had to be distributed, which again necessitated labor. The work of
distribution may be considered a part of production, as goods are not
fully produced until they reach the consumer. The middleman is usually
as necessary to production as is the railway, and his labor must be paid
for. But, even admitting all these facts, it is absurd to say that the
retailer adds more than six times as much value to the goods by
distributing them as does the weaver by making the cloth. Under free
conditions, of course, all that the middleman would be able to obtain
would be just the market value of his labor. If he obtained more, other
men would go into that line of business and, by cutting prices, would
lower the price to the consumer and curtail their own profits. Here, as
in every other case, free competition is all that is required to
establish the cost principle.
Many writers still cling to the idea that “co-operation” will be
essential, even under free conditions. In a sense this is true.
Co-operation is always necessary in any except the most primitive state
of society. But, as Prof. F. A. Walker says, one of the greatest
difficulties which political economy encounters “arises from the use of
terms derived from the vocabulary of every-day life ... with some of
which are associated in the popular mind conceptions inconsistent with,
or, at times, perhaps, antagonistic to, those which are in the view of
the writer on economics.”[47] A striking example of this is found in the
use of the word co-operation. This word has come to be popularly
understood as implying some form of copartnership. Strictly speaking, of
course, it means only “working-together;” and, when Spencer speaks of
voluntary co-operation being a characteristic of industrialism, I take
it that he uses the word in this, its broadest sense. The wool-grower,
the spinner, the weaver, the tailor, all work together to produce a suit
of clothes,– that is, they co-operate, though there may be no kind of
communistic arrangement between them. Perhaps “the somewhat
unsatisfactory term, division of labor,” expresses the idea more clearly
in many respects. It is in this sense that Anarchists often use the
word, but, owing to the popular conception of its meaning, our position
on may [sic] important questions is misunderstood.
Under free conditions there would, in most cases, be no necessity for
co-operation as usually understood. In fact, such an arrangement would
often prove to be more of a curse than a blessing. To make this clear,
let us take an example. Suppose several men, realizing that goods can be
bought cheaper in large quantities, agree to buy their groceries
together and divide them among themselves. They will find that they
effect a saving by this arrangement But they have really performed so
much extra labor, and the pay for that labor is all they have saved.
They have performed the services of one middleman, and so save his
profit. As they go into the business more extensively, this becomes more
apparent. They will soon find that a great amount of time and labor is
requisite, if they would keep informed of the state of the market, – the
price and the quality of the various commodities. So great will this
soon become that it will more than counterbalance any saving they may
effect. It is absurd to suppose that several men, engaged in other
callings, can perform the functions of the retailer in any line as well
as men who devote their whole time to that business. To obviate this
difficulty, the co-operators must either give up their scheme, or else
employ a competent manager to take care of the business. That it will
pay them to employ the most efficient manager they can obtain is
obvious. But such a man will demand the highest wages he can get. In the
absence of rent and interest, his wages will necessarily be just what he
could get by conducting such a business for himself. So, after paying
the salary of the manager, the goods will cost the consumers as much as
if they had bought from a retailer in the first place. In addition to
this, they will have all the trouble of looking after the manager for
nothing. The ordinary retailer’s wages depend upon the success with
which he conducts his business, but the salary of the manager of a
co-operative concern is not dependent upon the results of his efforts in
anything like the same degree.
These two conceptions of the term co-operation are antagonistic to a
very great extent, for the popular conception is really a denial of the
division of labor. When a man does a little carpenter-work for himself,
he thinks he saves the amount he would otherwise have paid a carpenter.
In reality he has merely earned the carpenter’s wages. But, as he is
probably a poor carpenter, it will take him longer to do the work than
it would a good mechanic. So he will be earning lower wages. It would be
better for him to devote the same amount of time and labor to his
ordinary occupation and, out of the money so earned, pay a carpenter to
do the work for him. The same is true in regard to the retailer.
These considerations, however, may be modified by circumstances. It may
be a pleasure, for example, for a bookkeeper to do a little wood-work in
the evening. Or it may be that the conditions of a man’s business are
such that the time spent in this kind of work could not be profitably
employed at his usual occupation. But these factors in no way invalidate
the tenor of my argument. They apply only in isolated cases, and
disappear as soon as the co-operative associations are organized.
In the present day, of course, the retailer collects rent and interest
in addition to his wages. So there is a direct saving in such
co-operation when conducted on a small scale. But as soon as a regular
business is established, the rent and interest have to be paid in one
form or another, and so the benefits are neutralized as soon as they
promise to become of any importance.
To conduct such enterprises, it is necessary that all the co-operators
form an agreement. Such an agreement will often prove a hindrance to the
individual members, if they should wish to act at variance with the
policy of the association. No matter how liberal the contract might be,
it would necessarily curtail the liberty of the members more than if no
such organization existed, and each were free to purchase his goods
when, where, and how he liked, without reference to the wishes of any of
the rest of the community.. We have already seen that there would be no
economic advantages to offset this restriction of liberty; so such
associations would be a positive detriment to those concerned.
These remarks apply with just as much force to productive as to
distributive “co-operative associations.” The management of a large
factory is just as much a trade as the shoeing of horses. It will be to
the advantage of everyone concerned to attend to the business to which
he has been trained, than to attempt to meddle with that of which he
knows little or nothing.
Some few instances might be found where, from the nature of some special
business, it could be conducted more economically upon such a
co-operative plan.
But such instances are very few. I apprehend that even Mutual Banks and
Protective Associations will, in the end, be conducted by individuals,
who will cater to the wants of their customers and make what wages they
can out of the business, rather than by communistic associations of the
customers.
It must not be inferred that the conditions herein set forth would
produce an absolute equality among all kinds of laborers (I use this
word laborers in its very widest sense). Such a result would be unjust
and inharmonious with the cost principle. In the Sixth Chapter the
difference in the intensity of different forms of labor was pointed out.
This same factor must be taken into consideration here. A man will not
perform more intense labor for the same wages that he will perform that
which is less intense, if there is nothing to prevent him from changing
his occupation. He will always demand sufficient to pay him for the
extra intensity of his labor. If he does not get it he will immediately
change his occupation and apply himself to the easier work. Once the
axiom, that men seek to gratify their desires with the least exertion,
is admitted, all these propositions follow as logical deductions. It is
thus that the Cost Principle can be established and the wages of each
occupation be adapted to the intensity of the labor involved, without
the necessity of elaborate statistics and interminable and intricate
mathematical calculations necessitated by a State Socialistic regime.
Liberty works automatically. Tyranny ever has to bolster itself up with
elaborate machinery, which is always getting out of order and producing
the most unlooked for and grotesque results.
It may be objected to this, that all men cannot change their occupation
at a moment’s notice. A man who has been brought up as a bricklayer
cannot suddenly become a shoemaker. This is greatly true. Such radical
changes are rare and are not necessary to the theory. If 10 per cent. or
even 5 per cent. of the men in any given occupation, were to engage in
other kinds of work, it would very materially increase the wages in that
occupation. When we consider that many of the changes involved,, merely
mean changes from employe to employer in the same line of business, the
position does not seem at all strained. The equality of wages in the
different trades, will be maintained principally by the number of
recruits to the rank of workers. Boys choosing an occupation are
governed largely by their special tastes and by the wages paid in
various callings. Any occupation which offered special inducements would
soon be crowded with new workmen and so competition would reduce their
pay. On the other hand, any occupation promising but a poor opening
would gain few new recruits and, consequently, those engaged in it would
be able to obtain higher pay for their services.
But the difficulty of people changing their occupations is much
overestimated. Under the present system, those occupations which require
special training, are subject to much less competition than those which
require no such training. This is simply due to the fact, that thousands
of persons cannot spare the time and money necessary to special
training, and so are forced to do the commonest kind of manual labor
regardless of their adaptability to such a life. This is merely usury in
another form. Labor unions also have a decided tendency to prevent a man
from changing the occupation he has once chosen. I have no wish to decry
labor unions. They have often been labor’s only weapon of defence
against encroachments of capital. In their way they are very good
examples of voluntaryism as it exists to-day. But they must not be
regarded as anything more than mere weapons of defence, to be cast aside
as the conditions which called them into being are outgrown.
Ideas of social caste also tend to prevent the free choice of an
occupation, and many other forces are at work in a similar manner. Yet
in spite of all the rigidity of our present system, it is marvelous how
many men do change their occupation. This is especially true in the
Western States, where these forces are less felt. But even in the East
it is not unusual for a man to enter one of the professions after
devoting many years to other callings. How much more may we not expect
in this direction when these artificial barriers are removed.
One other factor still remains; that of which I have spoken in the
Chapter on Land as the “economic rent of intellect.” A man who has
special ability in any direction, will, under free competition, be able
to obtain more wages with less exertion than others engaged in the same
occupation. This is not strictly in harmony with the cost principle. But
this could not be prevented by any system other than Communism, which,
being a denial of competition, and consequently of Equal Freedom, stands
more fundamentally condemned than does this slight deviation from our
guiding principle. But even this inequality, like the economic rent on
land, would tend to decrease.
Of all the thousands of men forced by circumstances to perform the
commonest labor, many are far better equipped mentally and physically
for the professions, and would have made good doctors and lawyers
instead of inferior laborors. On the other hand, many men of a
mechanical turn of mind go into business and become unsuccessful
merchants instead of competent artizans for fear of losing social caste.
Suppose Herbert Spencer’s father had lost what money he had during this
great philosopher's infancy, where would the Synthetic Philosophy be
to-day? Mr. Spencer would have made a mighty poor hewer of wood and
drawer of water, and probably such a life would have killed him long
before he reached manhood. May it not do the same with thousands of
others? The fact that nearly all the great men have been children of
parents in comfortable circumstances seems to be in harmony with such a
conclusion. And the exceptions to this general rule form almost
conclusive evidence of the truth of such as assumption. I think I may
say, that in every case where the child of really poor parents has
become famous, he has received material assistance from those in better
circumstances. This shows that in some cases at any rate, there is much
genius among the poorer classes if conditions are favorable to its
development. The fact that at every crisis in the world’s history, men
seem to spring up who are especially fitted for such times, can only be
rationally explained on the hypothesis, that there is always a large
supply of such men awaiting such an opportunity. Thousands of them die
in obscurity where one finds himself amid the conditions which develop
his ability. From these and similar facts we may reasonably expect the
crop of men of great ability to be quite large as soon as opportunities
are favorable for each to develop his best characteristics.
Under free conditions there would be nothing to prevent every man from
engaging in the occupation for which he was best fitted. So that, guided
by self interest, nearly everyone would sooner or later find himself
engaged in the moot congenial occupation. This would inevitably result
in a great increase in the standard of ability in every occupation. Men
who are to-day considered as possessing extraordinary ability, would
find themselves but little in advance of the rank and file of men in
their vocations. The eminent success achieved by some men to-day is
largely due to the fact that they are the right men in the right place
When all artificial restrictions are removed, selfishness will impel
every man to find the right place for himself. So, while free
competition may not produce absolute equality of ability, it will tend
to reduce to a minimum the inequalities of the wages received by men of
different kinds of ability. Thus the economic rent of intellect, like
the economic rent of land, would have a perpetual tendency to decrease
under freedom, and for the same reason, namely, each individual would be
put to his highest use, thus reducing the inequality between them.
All these forces, or rather, all the manifestations of the same force –
self interest – would be just the same regardless of the productive
power of the community. Once establish free conditions, and the laborer
must inevitably reap the full product of his toil. The greater that
product is, the greater will be labor’s reward. The development of
labor-saving machinery, improved methods of production and everything
that tends to increase the total product of the community would benefit
the laborer, either by increasing his wages, decreasing his hours of
labor, or by a combination of the two.
What the average wages would be under the cost principle, I should be
afraid to say. When we consider that, at every step in its production
and distribution, every article has to pay rent, interest and taxes, we
get an idea of how enormous the sum of surplus value must be. When we
add to this the fact that those, who to-day live off the toil of others,
would have to produce for themselves, we see that the total product
would be greatly increased. And when we also take into consideration,
that the productive power of those who now labor would be tremendously
increased, as each would perform the labor best adapted to his ability,
and as the occasion for strikes being removed, men would not waste their
energies in that way, some idea of the stupendous possibilities of such
a system begins to dawn upon our intellects.
It is claimed by many that certain industries cannot be made subject to
competition, that they are in their very nature monopolies, and
consequently, the arguments introduced in the last chapter can in no
manner apply to them. It is claimed that, in spite of the abolition of
rent and interest, these industries will yield a profit which cannot be
abolished except by collective control. Railroads, telegraphs,
telephones, water-works, express companies and other similar industries
constitute this class of alleged “natural monopolies.”
With brazen effrontery, those who advocate State ownership of these
industries point to the present postal system as an example of the
beneficence of State interference. So reconciled is the average man to
the existing way of doing things, that he does not realize the evil of
it, unless he has special reason to Investigate it. This explains why
such impudent assertions about the post office pass almost unchallenged
in our midst, and also constitutes my excuse for attacking that much
praised institution before proceeding further.
We need not expect to find either good business management or common
honesty in an institution, when the head of that institution obtains his
position by pure and simple purchase. The appointment of John Wanamaker
as postmaster general should have. been enough to arouse the most
unsuspicious. The Star Route rascalities seem to be altogether
forgotten.[48] The short-comings of the system are transformed into
virtues in the eyes of its worshipers. In order to exist at all it has
to tax all competitors out of the market. But this tax, though
especially designed to prevent competition, is not always sufficient to
save it, so poor is its service in comparison to that given by private
corporations. Mr. Tucker tells us: “Some half dozen years ago,[49] when
letter postage was still three cents, Wells, Fargo & Co. were doing a
large business in carrying letters I throughout the Pacific States and
Territories. Their rate was five cents, more than three cents of which
they expended, as the legal monopoly required, in purchasing of the
United States a stamped envelope in which to carry the letter intrusted
to their care. That is to say, on every letter which they carried they
had to pay a tax of more than three cents. Exclusive of this tax, Wells,
Fargo & Co. got less than two cents for each letter which they carried,
while the government got three cents for each letter which it carried
itself, and more than three cents for each letter which Wells, Fargo &
Co. carried. On the other hand, it cost every individual five cents to
send by Wells, Fargo & Co. and only three to send by the government.
Moreover the area covered was one in which immensity of distance,
sparseness of population, and irregularities of surface made
out-of-the-way points unusually difficult of access. Still, in spite of
all the advantages on the side of the government, its patronage steadily
dwindled, while that of Wells, Fargo & Co. as steadily grew. ... The
postmaster general sent a special commissioner to investigate the
matter. He fulfilled his duty and reported to his superior that Wells,
Fargo & Co. were complying with law in every particular, and were taking
away the business of the government by furnishing a prompter and securer
mail service, not alone to the principal points, but to more points and
remoter points that[50] were included in the government list of post
offices.” (Instead of a Book, p. 121.)[51]
In Wichita, Kansas, during the boom in 1886, the postal accommodation
was very inadequate. The post office was situated in the rear of a
store. There was no free delivery and the number of boxes was very
limited. The line of people waiting for their mail often used to reach
out onto the sidewalk, and sometimes, half a block along the street.
Petition after petition was forwarded to Washington but without avail.
Finally, however, the requests were heeded. Better arrangements were
made and a free delivery system was established – three months before
the boom collapsed. The express companies, meanwhile, had enlarged their
offices and staffs of clerks as the business required it. When the
conditions changed, they transferred their employes to places where
their services were needed. The same conditions exist now in Cripple
Creek, Colorado. Owing to the mining boom, the business of this
postoffice has rapidly increased, but the facilities are so inadequate
that it is impossible to transact the business. One enterprising man has
started a delivery system on his own account and is making big money at
it. He is now hiring others to help him. How long could this last in a
business that is subject to competition? These are characteristic cases.
Private institutions are run for profit. If not conducted on business
principles, competition will force them to the wall. With a governmental
institution this is different. It is not subject to competition. It is
operated at the people’s expense, and due care must be exercised to
prevent extravagance in the use of the people’s money! But while that
care is being exercised, conditions change and the machinery of the
institution is too slow to adapt itself to them. This is no little
detail, it is a vital flaw in the system. If due care is not exercised,
the robbery will be infinitely worse than at present; if it is
exercised, the institution lacks the necessary flexibility and is unable
to readily adapt itself to changed conditions.
The express companies will deliver a package of prepaid printed matter
weighing 1 1-2 lbs. for 10 cents, in any part of the United States. The
post office charges 12 cents for the same service. Furthermore, the
express companies will give a receipt for the package and pay damages if
it is lost, which the government will not do even if the package is
registered. The manuscript of this book will weigh between 3 1-2 and 4
lbs. when it is finished – say 3 1-2 lbs. To send this by mail would
cost me two cents per ounce, that is $1.12, with 8 cents extra for
registration makes a total of $1.20. I can send this package by express
if it weighs less than 4 lbs., including full insurance against loss,
for 60 cents. Wells, Fargo & Co. have offered to carry letters for one
cent per ounce if the government will remove the tax. Yet, in spite of
the fact that the government charges twice as much as the express
companies would, it lost in 1894 over $9,200,000, which sum the working
men had to pay in taxes. How is this accounted for? Simply by the fact
that all governmental undertakings are run for boodle and not on
business principles.
One of the most glaring examples of the bribery of this institution is
seen in the regulations in regard to second class matter. Why does the
government charge me two cents per ounce for my private correspondence?
Yes, more than this, for if I write ten letters, the total weight of
which is but 4 ounces, and even if I mail them all at once, I have to
pay twenty cents for them. But a newspaper corporation can send its
payers at one cent per pound and have them all weighed in bulk. Why is
this? Because the government is afraid of the press of the country and
gives it this bribe, for which we all have to pay indirectly by taxes.
Even this is not the worst, as it does not accord this privilege to all
publications indiscriminately, but by offering it to one journal and
denying it to another, the party in power is often able to crush what it
considers objectionable sheets.
The powers of the postmaster general are greater even than this. Not
only can he exclude papers from transmission under the second class
rates, he can even exclude them from the mails alt6gether. If the matter
treated of in papers is antagonistic to popular prejudice in regard to
sexual affairs, he can even cause the person mailing the papers to be
tried on a criminal charge. By these means a regular censorship of the
press is instituted, for all other institutions, which would be willing
to carry the mails without asking any questions, are taxed out of the
field. This is the way the post office is “collectively owned by the
people!” It is run by a set of disreputable politicians in the interest
of big newspaper corporations, and labor has to foot the bill.
But, it is argued, civil service reform will mend all this. I deny this
emphatically. In England civil service reform principles are in
operation in the post office, and yet the rates there are about the same
as here. The service to the public is no better, but condition of the
employes is worse. About a year ago “The New York Sun” published the
following: “The regulations of the British post office require that
every unsound tooth shall be taken out of a man’s head before he can be
employed. An unfortunate girl, who was recently examined for promotion,
had fourteen teeth taken out at one sitting by order of the official
dentist, who explained that ‘we can’t have girls laid up with
toothache.’” What if the Western Union Telegraph Co. treated its
employes in the same way? Oh, yes! Civil service reform is a great
thing, I assure you. Its whole basis is a system of competitive
examinations, one of the greatest absurdities of modern times, well
worthy of the Chinese bureaucracy in which it originated. A knowledge of
geometry is no criterion of executive ability, nor is a smattering of
natural science, diluted with Christianity, essential to a good letter
carrier. Who ever heard of civil service reform in a private enterprise?
There is no need of it. The managers know that it is to their interests
to promote their most competent employes, and they act accordingly. But
this is not so with any governmental undertaking. There, either
political influence or ability to pass some absurd examination, are the
tests of merit. Our experience with the post office is not such as to
warrant us in experimenting any more in this line.
Apart from the post office, nearly all the administrative departments of
the government are vested in municipal corporations. In fact, municipal
governments are almost purely administrative. It would be through their
agency that most of these industries would be operated were they placed
under State control. Yet Bryce[52] tells us: “There is no denying that
the government of cities is the one conspicuous failure of the United
States.” (American Commonwealth, v. 1, p. 608.) Are we to entrust to
these monumental failures more than they already mismanage? The present
condition of affairs is bad enough. To increase the powers of the State
will only make it worse. The remedy must be sought in the opposite
direction. Much of the evil resulting from these industries is due to
the action of municipal and State governments, in granting a franchise
to one company and denying it to all competitors.
The history of the water works of Denver contains a very good lesson.
When the Denver Water Company started in business, it charged $7.00 per
season of six months for supplying water to a seven or eight room-house
(without bath). The water was taken out of the Platte river, just above
the city, and was of very poor quality. The machinery used was not equal
to the demand made upon it, and, in short, the whole system was
unsatisfactory. Fortunately the city is so situated that excellent water
can be struck in any locality at a depth of less than one hundred feet.
Taking advantage of this fact, the owners of large buildings sank
artesian wells. Owing to lack of patronage, the Denver Water Company
failed, and the business was purchased by the American Water Company.
This new company immediately cut prices twenty per cent., put in new
filters and better machinery, and commenced work to take water from
Cherry creek, where a better quality could be obtained. (This last
enterprise was abandoned, however, owing to litigation.) In about 1890,
after a long fight with the city, during which that protector of
monopolies tried to tear up its pipes, a new company managed to secure a
franchise and started a lively competition. It took its water from the
foot hills, conducted it to the city through pipes, and secured
sufficient force from gravitation to render pumping engines unnecessary.
They relied upon the superior quality of their water to defeat the
American Company. This resulted in the latter company reducing their
rates to fifty per cent. of the old schedule, instead of eighty per
cent. The cut was met by the new concern, which afterwards gave their
water free to whoever would connect with their main. The American Water
Company then cut their last rate fifty per cent. (making it only
twenty-five per cent. of the original rate). This was the condition for
over a year; one company giving water free, the other charging only
twenty-five per cent. of their original rate. The American Company
subsequently failed and went into the hands of a receiver. Then the two
companies consolidated and the rates were soon increased. One safeguard
still remains – the possibility of digging wells. But even this is in
danger of being removed by the monopoly-protecting State, for a city
ordinance is on the records which empowers the Health Department to
close up wells within the city limits. While the outcome of this is what
might be expected under the present financial system, yet the whole
business shows us what may be done with “natural monopolies” when a
little competition is permitted, even under the present system.
In this same city of Denver, two distinct street car companies are
competing with each other. While this competition has not resulted in
any reduction of fares, it has given the public better accommodation.
If such competition is possible, even in rare instances, under present
financial conditions, it cannot be said that these industries are
natural monopolies. When credit is freed from the throttling grasp of
Government, when land is open to the producers of wealth, when the
protective tariff is abolished, and patents and copyrights are things of
the past, then may we look up and lift up our heads, for our redemption
draweth nigh, even from the oppression of “natural monopolies.”[53]
Given free land and free money, and how long do you suppose the
inhabitants of any town would pay exorbitant rates for transportation?
If the railroads did not reduce their prices to cost, the inhabitants of
that town would soon organize a competing company and run the
“monopolist” out of the business. Nor would it be necessary, in most
cases, to build a competing road, the very threat of doing so would
usually be enough.
Difficulties will no doubt arise from time to time. But under free
conditions we will ever be gaining experience, which will enable us to
meet them. This experience would be impossible under our present
restricted conditions. Many failures may be made, but even they can
hardly be worse than our present system. There being no rigid system of
State control to prevent the immediate application of a remedy to those
failures, they will but prove stepping-stones to success. For success
can only be achieved by the survival of the fittest.
The objections above set forth to State control, do not, of course,
apply to the voluntary association of any number of individuals. This
voluntary cooperation will probably play an important part in the
solution of these problems. In Denver in 1893 – and no doubt similar
conditions have been experienced in other places at various times – the
City government had squandered all the money it had collected and had
nothing left to pay for street cleaning. What was the result? The
business men living in each block subscribed to have the streets
cleaned. If the men they employed did not perform the work to their
satisfaction, they got others who did. Here is another instance of
individual initiative stepping to the front and performing “the
functions of the State” after the decrepit machinery of that institution
had broken down. To be sure, in some cases, a man would not co-operate
with others, and they had to bear his share between them, or let the
street go dirty. Naturally they chose the former course. This may appear
to be a little unfair, and so it was. But not half as unfair as it was
for the City to tax them all to clean the streets, and then not do it.
Besides, in the former case they were not compelled to pay unless they
wished to do so, but in the latter case they had no choice in the matter
whatsoever.
There is still another factor which must not be overlooked; that is the
development of machinery. Owing to the difficulty of conducting steam
any great distance, this power must be used where it is generated or
great loss results. And, as small quantities cannot be generated
economically, the introduction of steam necessitated large factories.
But electricity is of a different character. Though, like steam, it can
be generated more economically in large quantities, yet, unlike steam,
it can easily be transmitted over comparatively long distances with but
little loss of power. This enables many small manufacturers to gain the
advantage of a motive power to be used in their business, and makes it
possible for them to compete with larger institutions. While steam has
had a tendency to concentrate wealth, electricity may tend to
decentralize it. This same tendency may be found in a large number of
modern inventions. For example, the bicycle is already seriously
affecting the profit of street car companies. When the tariff on them is
removed, and the monopolies of land and money are abolished, the price
of bicycles will probably be but a small portion of that demanded
to-day. This will result in a very great increase in their use. Several
different motor-cycles, or horseless carriages, propelled by oil,
compressed air, electricity, etc., and capable of traveling at the rate
of 20 or 30 miles per hour, are now on the market. These will still
further affect the street cars, when they can be made cheaply enough to
be within the reach of men in ordinary circumstances. Recent experiments
with flying machines have also met with much success, and it is no
longer doubted that aerial navigation will be an accomplished fact early
in the next century. If this is so, it will materially increase the
possibility of competition in transportation. Many large buildings are
now supplied with electrical plants, which they use for lighting and
other purposes. In some instances, as above mentioned, such buildings
even supply themselves with water. It is by no means impossible, that
before State ownership of railroads, street cars, gas and water works,
etc., becomes possible, there will be no railroads, street cars, etc.,
for the State to own.
A large number of men demand State ownership of these industries, as a
means of immediate relief from some of the social evils which beset us,
and as a stepping-stone to something better. These men are, as a rule,
fully convinced of the truth of the Socialistic theory of surplus value.
They realize that as long as rent and interest remain unmolested,
nothing can be of any but the most trifling importance. They know also
that, to-day at any rate, no matter what they may hope for in the
future, politicians are strictly dishonest, mere hirelings of capital
and “master workmen” of the brotherhood of thieves. What can they expect
from handing over “natural Monopolies” to the mercy of such an outfit?
The business will assuredly be mismanaged, and the loss made up by taxes
which must in the ultimate be paid by labor, while any advantage that
may possibly be derived will just as surely be reaped by the landlord
and money-lender. Even supposing that the postal system is all that the
State Socialists claim for it. they cannot show that it has affected
surplus value in the slightest, except as affording an opportunity for
fat contracts to railroad corporations. For what more may we hope from
similar “reforms?”
Spencer shows us what the result of such extension of State functions
must be. He sums up his case in these words: “The extent to which an
organization resists re-organization, we shall not fully appreciate
until we observe that resistance increases in a compound progression.
For while each new part is an additional obstacle to change, the
formation of it involves a deduction from the forces causing change. ...
So that, inevitably, each further growth of the instrumentalities which
control, or administer, or inspect, or in any way direct social forces,
increases the impediment to future modifications, both positively by
strengthening that which has to be modified, and negatively by weakening
the remainder; until at length the rigidity becomes so great that change
is impossible and the type becomes fixed.” (Principles of Sociology, v.
2, pp. 255-256.)
Let it further be noted that that which is thus strengthened is not the
ideal of the State Socialist, but the head centre of the present
iniquitous system. Thus the Opportunist and all his ilk are not only
hindering the Anarchists from the attainment of their ends, but are
handicapping State Socialists and other reformers in a similar manner.
These “steps forward” can do no possible good to labor, and only result
in strengthening the present State, the arch enemy of all reform. and so
we fight them to the last.
Others, again, urge State ownership as a means of preventing strikes.
But these gentlemen seem to be ignorant of the fact that in July, 1890,
the postmen of London went on strike. It was not for any paltry raise of
wages, either, but for the right to organize. The secretary of the
Postmen’s Union gives his side of the story in “The Nineteenth Century”
for July, 1890. He says: “In the opinion of Mr. Raikes (then postmaster
general) the postmen may have a union on condition that its secretary is
appointed by the department, that it holds no meetings, that it makes no
appeal to the public, and that it makes no attempt to better the
condition of its members.” The attitude assumed by Col. Waring, who at
present has control of the street cleaning department in New York, seems
to be modeled on the same plan, if the current reports of his utterances
are correct. What would our labor union friends say if Pullman or
Carnegie wanted to appoint the secretaries of their employes’ unions?
During the same month (July, 1890,) the policemen at the Bow Street
police station and the Grenadier Guards, in London, and the teamsters in
the street cleaning department, in New York, also went on strike; but in
each case, the “disturbance” was quelled in a few days, and any
organization of the men nipped in the bud. Oh, yes, State ownership will
certainly prevent strikes! The workers then won’t have even that chance,
poor as it is, of bettering their conditions. See how the State
ownership of the postoffice offered an excuse for calling out the
Federal troops to suppress the A. R. U. strike in 1894. Will the wage
earners never learn anything from experience? Surely the spoils system
is elaborate enough already, without any further extension of its
tyranny!
Once settle the land and money questions, and all these minor problems
will adjust themselves, Until these two monopolies are abolished, all
tinkering I these minor problems will adjust themselves. Until with
these questions can be of little avail and may result in grievous and
permanent harm.
Many and various as are the different ideas in regard to what are the
best social conditions, the opinions held concerning the best methods of
attaining the desired end, are no less so. That different conditions may
be brought about by different means is to be expected, but that so many
entirely different methods are proposed as likely to produce the same
results, is indicative of the loose thinking that is prevalent upon all
subjects.
A correct idea of what we wish to attain is essential before we are
capable of discussing how we can best attain it. Usually a thorough
understanding of the first problem is a sure guide to the solution of
the second. Having seen that the abolition of the State is necessary to
progress, and that private enterprise is perfectly capable of performing
the duties for which the State is said to be necessary, it is now in
order to discuss how this end can be achieved. One thing should be borne
in mind from the start. It has been shown that the State is essentially
an invasive institution. Since the person of the invader is not sacred,
there is no ethical reason why we may not use any means in our power to
achieve the result we desire. The State is founded in force. Therefore,
there is no good reason why it should not be abolished by force if
necessary. The whole field is open to us. All we are bound to consider
is, which method will be most likely to meet with success.
Where is the State? What is it? How are we to attack it? We see its
agents around us every day. They are not the State and do not pretend to
be. Where is the State from which these agents derive their authority?
It only exists in men’s minds. Karl Marx says: “One man is king only
because other men stand in the relation of subjects to him. They, on the
contrary, imagine that they are subjects because he is king."[54] The
officers of the State derive their authority simply and solely from the
submission of its citizens. When it is said that the State is the main
cause of our social evils, it must not be forgotten that the State is
but a crude expression of the average intelligence of the community.
Every law is practically inoperative that is very different from the
general consensus of opinion in the community. The position of the State
seldom exactly coincides with public opinion in regard to new measures,
because it moves much slower than individuals. But it follows slowly in
the wake of new ideas, and when it lags much behind its power is
weakened. These facts are seen very plainly in prohibition States. They
would be apparent to everyone, were it not for the superstition that we
must obey the law because it is the law. It is said that our
representatives are our servants. These servants make laws which we
consider bad, yet, because they are our servants, we must obey the laws
they make! The State is king only because we are fools enough to stand
in the relation of subjects to it. When we cease to stand in the
relation of subjects to it, it will cease to be king. So that, in order
to abolish the State, it is necessary to change people’s ideas in regard
to it. This means a long campaign of education.
These means are too slow to suit many who want to inaugurate a new
social system at once. They cannot hasten matters a bit too much to suit
me. The sooner the “new order” comes, the better I shall like it. But
often “the shortest cut home is the longest way round.” Ill-advised
haste is disastrous. By all means let us hasten the progress of the
race, but let us also use care lest our zeal upset our reason and cause
us to hinder, instead of help, the re-adjustment of social forces.
A favorite method of reform, with those whose impatience with the
present system is very great, is a violent revolution. If the State is
purely an idea, how can we attack it with force? True, its agents use
force to compel us to support it, and we might oppose them with force,
but unfortunately we are not yet strong enough. As far as morality is
concerned, it is, of course, justifiable to meet force by force. But, as
an Egoist, the only morality I recognize is the highest expediency. So
it would be highly immoral to attempt a revolution which would be
foredoomed to failure. When a large minority have a clear idea of the
nature of the State and an earnest desire to abolish it, such a
revolution might be successful. But then it would be unnecessary, for
people having refused to stand in the relation of subjects to it, the
State would be no longer king. Till then it must inevitably be a fearful
failure, no matter which side was actually successful in the battles.
Under the existing state of affairs, when even those who are considered
leaders in the reform movement have but a very indefinite idea of what
they really want, such an outbreak can bring no good. At best it would
be a fight between ignorance and cupidity, on the one hand, and
stupidity and rage on the other. What good can we expect from a conflict
between such forces?
Spencer has pointed out how any increase in military activities
invariably produces an increase in the powers of the governing classes,
supported as they are by the blind patriotism of those who fought and
bled for their country. With the example of the G. A. R.[55] as a result
of the late civil war before our eyes, it seems hardly necessary to
emphasize this point. If such an uprising were successful, it would mean
the creation of a new race of revolutionary fathers, whose power would
dominate all the interest of the community. A system of State Socialism
would be inaugurated under the leadership of these quondam military
officers – men accustomed to implicit obedience and who expect their
words to be obeyed as law. They would ever be ready to enforce their
commands at the point of the bayonet and to check all murmurs of
discontent with powder and shot.
If, on the other hand, the plutocrats came out victorious, it would
establish the system of modern capitalism more firmly than ever. It
would give the powers that be an excuse for extreme vigilance in the
suppression of discontent, and add to their present arrogance the
consciousness of having successfully conquered all opposition.
In any event such an appeal to force must prove detrimental. It would
stir up class hatred to an enormous extent and so hinder, if not
altogether prevent, all rational consideration of social problems. It
would hand the government over to the military classes, as no man who
could not show a good “war record” would have any chance of election.
Add to all this an increase of sickening patriotism and glorification of
“the men who saved the Union,” and we get some idea of the national
degradation which would result from such a civil war.
Acts of terrorism, such as bomb-throwing, etc., stand condemned by the
same line of reasoning. Every such manifestation causes a reaction in
favor of more stringent police regulation. This effect was very
noticeable after the dynamite explosions in Europe during 1893-’94. They
resulted in stricter laws the world over. Reactionary “anti-Anarchist
bills,” limiting freedom of speech and giving more absolute powers to
the upholders of the present condition of affairs, were passed in almost
every country in the world.[56]
These methods can only be justified in extremely exceptional cases. A
revolution may be of advantage if the people demand an extension of
their liberties and really know what they want, while the governing
classes insist upon restraining their activities. But under such
conditions, force is used as a defensive weapon only. Even then it would
be well to postpone the actual conflict till success was assured. So
with terrorism. It is only when all other means of expression are denied
that bomb-throwers can hope to do any good. If public meetings are
prohibited, if all freedom of speech is restrained and the conditions
can hardly be made worse, then terrorism may become useful as the only
means of propaganda that is possible.
Political methods must be condemned without even these qualifications.
The ballot is only a bullet in another form. An appeal to the majority
is an appeal to brute force. It is assumed that, since all men are on
the average equally able to carry a musket, the side which has the
largest number of adherents would probably conquer in case of war. So,
instead of actually fighting over questions, it is more economical to
count noses and see which side would probably win. The political method
is a form of revolution, and most of the arguments directed against the
latter are valid when applied to the former. The result shown at the
polls indicates a certain stage of mental development in the community.
As that mental development is changed, the political manifestations of
it change also. So we are brought back to the original starting point.
If we wish to effect the abolition of the State through politics, we
must first teach people how we can get along without it. When that is
done, no political action will be necessary. The people will have
outgrown the State and will no longer submit to its tyranny. It may
still exist and pass laws, but people will no longer obey them, for its
power over them will be broken. Political action can never be successful
until it is unnecessary.
But let us look at the more practical side of the question. It sometimes
seems that some small advantage might be gained by political action.
Some of “the very elect” were deceived[57] by the promise of the
Democratic party in 1892 to repeal the ten per cent. tax on the issue of
bank notes. How badly they were duped became apparent when the repeal
bill was introduced. It was hardly discussed at all, and was practically
killed in committee. Its defeat was largely due to the action of Tom L.
Johnson[58] – a man, by the way, who claims to be a Single Taxer, and is
thereby pledged to the repeal of all taxes except that on land values –
a Free Trader who believes in removing the tariff restrictions of trade
between individuals of different counntries, while supporting a far
greater restriction of trade between all individuals, whether of the
same or of different countries.
Does the history of politics teach us nothing? What have we ever gained
by such means? The Republican party has robbed us by taxes. It has
robbed us still worse by its financial legislation, its national bank
laws and its depreciated greenbacks. It has given our lands to its
servants and sold our birthright to corporations. Yet this was the
reform party of half a century ago. As soon as it gained power, it
kicked the men – and deservedly, too – who were fools enough to support
it. Nor is the record of the Democratic party – which but a few years
since claimed to be the only true reform party in the country – one whit
better. For two years it had full control of every branch of the Federal
government, and what did it do? It violated every pledge made before
gaining power. It turned its back on those it promised to help. It
originated a new weapon of tyranny – government by injunction. And it
crushed the demands of labor beneath the heels of the –Communism of
Pelf.–[59] In despair we turn to the People’s Party, and what do we
find? Not quite so much corruption, to be sure, because it has not yet
had the chance, but from the samples it has already given it has proved
itself a very apt pupil. Should it ever gain control of Federal affairs,
there is every indication that it will follow the examples of its
predecessors.
As soon as a new party springs up and begins to show signs of success, a
lot of political tramps are immediately attracted to its ranks. These
men possess a certain amount of influence. They are trained politicians,
well versed in the art of packing conventions and proficient at counting
the ballots. When they come to the new party with crocodile tears of
repentance coursing down their cheeks, it is too weak to refuse their
aid. It opens its arms and kissing away their repentant tears, places
them in the front rank where glory awaits them. The result of this is a
large gain in votes and sometimes success at the polls. But this victory
is only gained at the expense of principle, and the last state of that
party is worse than the first.[60]
In order to show how far this is true of the People’s Party, I quote the
following from a Populist organ of national reputation: “We all know
that shameful bribery was practiced by the sugar trust last year –
Senator Hunton declared that he had $75,000 offered for his vote, and
others &36;15,000. Even Populist members are accused of standing in with
the rest. On the sugar duty question it is well known that Kyle, of
South Dakota, Allen, of Nebraska, and Peffer, all voted to continue the
Sugar Trust’s license to rob the people who use sugar. Senator Peffer,
who is looked up to as one of the leaders of the Populist party, is
accused by the ‘Star and Kansan’ of having accepted a good position for
his son from the Sugar Trust last winter.” And in a footnote the author
adds: “No man was more trusted among Californian Populists than Marion
Cannon, President of the Farmers’ Alliance, and yet as soon as he got to
Washington he earned the execrations of his supporters by voting to
reduce the people’s money supply – the Sherman repeal bill.” (F. A.
Binney, Abolish Money, in Twentieth Century, 4th April, 1895.) Defeat,
crushing defeat, is all that can purge a party of such political
parasites.
This is ever the result of political action. As long as the movement is
unsuccessful, the energy expended is wasted, and success can only be
purchased at the expense of principle and reform.
Any one who has had any experience in practical politics must know how
hopeless it is to attempt to effect any reform – especially any reform
in the direction of freedom – by that means. Platforms are adopted to
get elected on, not to be carried out in legislation. The real position
of a party depends, not upon the justness or unjustness of measures, but
upon the probabilities of reelection. Scheming and “diplomacy” are the
methods of the candidates for public office. Reasoning and honest
conviction do not concern them in the least.
The whole political machine is a very complex affair. Wheels within
wheels have to be kept in motion, secret orders have to be manipulated,
committees have to be worked and a thousand and one details looked after
if any measure of success is to be gained. At present there are the A.
P. A., the Women’s A. P. A., the P. O. S. of A.,[61] the Junior Order of
American Mechanics, the Loyal Legion, the Veteran Legion, the Sons of
Veterans, the G. A. R. and other “patriotic” orders, besides a host of
others, which have to be controlled by the politician. All political
parties have to truckle to these orders or fail. How can we expect any
progress towards freedom from such a source.
These facts give us a glimpse of the intricacies of politics. How can
the reformer or business man who has to earn his living hope to cope
with the professional politician while this is the case? The politician
is in possession of the field. He is able to devote his whole time to
studying the situation and to heading off any move to oust him. What can
you do about it? You can give the matter a little attention after
business hours and think you grasp the situation. You can vote once a
year or so for a different set of thieves. If you are very enterprising
you can go to the primaries and think you are spoiling the politician’s
little game. What do you think the politician has been doing since last
election? Instead of going to the primaries you might as well go to –
another place which politics more nearly resembles than anything on this
earth. Perhaps better, for a spook devil would probably be an easier
task-master than a politician in flesh and blood. You can do what you
please, the politician is dealing from a stacked deck and has the best
of the bunco game all the time.
At its very best, an election is merely an attempt to obtain the opinion
of the majority upon a given subject, with the intention of making the
minority submit to that opinion. This is in itself a radical wrong. The
majority has no more right, under Equal Freedom, to compel the minority,
than has the minority to compel the majority. When a man votes he
submits to the whole business. By the act of casting his ballot, he
shows that he wishes to coerce the other side, if he is in the majority.
He has, consequently, no cause for complaint if he is coerced himself.
He has submitted in advance to the tribunal, he must not protest If the
verdict is given against him. If every individual is a sovereign, when
he votes he abdicates. Since I deny the right of the majority to
interfere in my affairs, it would be absurd for me to vote and thereby
submit myself to the will of the majority.
Some people tell us, “If you don’t like this country, why don’t you go
off and leave us?” Actually a number of reformers take them at their
word, and go off into the wilderness and start colonies. They think that
the object lesson of a colony will have a great effect. So it does, but
it has taught a moral far different from that intended by the founders
of such concerns. The Mormons followed this foolish advice. They didn’t
like this country. They went off into the wilderness. They worked hard
and transformed the desert into a garden. And then? Well, then this
country discovered that the Mormons were very wicked, and that the Lord
never intended such wicked men to possess so much wealth. So dear old
Uncle Sam, being a humble servant of the Lord, determined to repair his
Master’s oversight and deprive those wicked men of their power and
money. Uncle Sam is a religious old man withal, especially if he can
pocket a few dollars by his piety!
Others again assure us that the only way to get a bad law repealed is to
enforce it. But as long as a bad law is not enforced it does no harm. To
be sure, as long as it is on the statute books it may be enforced at any
time, and so do mischief. But it is the enforcing of it that does the
harm, not the fact that it exists. The protective tariff is a bad law,
and if enforcing it would repeal it, it would have been dead years ago.
The same may be said of nearly all the laws. They are nearly every one
of them bad, and most of them are enforced, but they seem to thrive on
that method of repeal. Our salvation must be sought in other directions.
Must we then sit still and let our enemies do as they please? By no
means. Three alternatives offer themselves, active resistance, passive
resistance and non-resistance. The folly of the first has already been
demonstrated. Non-resistance is just as bad. Unless we resist tyranny,
we encourage it and become tyrants by tacitly consenting to it. But
passive resistance still remains. The most perfect passive resistance
has often been practiced by the Quakers. During the Civil War the
Quakers all absolutely refused to serve in the army. In European
countries they have resisted conscription in the same manner. What could
be done about it? A few were imprisoned, but they stood firm, and
finally, by passive resistance, they have gained immunity from this
particular form of tyranny.
The history of the Irish agitation is another example. As all familiar
with the situation know, the Irish question is essentially an agrarian
question. The howl for Home Rule is purely incidental and secondary. For
some time passive resistance was the leading feature of the movement.
The no-rent agitation was essentially of this nature. Tenants refused to
pay any rent. They refused to have any dealings with landlords, or with
those who helped them in any way or who paid any rent. They were
evicted, but they went back onto the land again. The British government
was nonplussed. The boycott was a force that it could not crush with an
army, because it was passive, not active resistance. The authorities
resembled men who were attempting to chop their way through a river with
an axe. Every time they hit the water, they got splashed until they were
drenched, but the river was unaffected. But while this was going on the
leaders were urging political action. Some of the more hot-headed
resorted to active resistance, which culminated in the murder of
Cavendish and Burke.[62] This demoralized the Land League and the
leaders gained their point. Passive resistance was abandoned and
politics was adopted in its stead. From an energetic and vigorous fight
for a well defined object, the Irish movement began to fizzle out as a
decrepit political issue. The recent elections in England, resulting as
they did in the overwhelming defeat of the Home Rule party, may be the
means of opening the eyes of the Irish people to the folly of attempting
to gain anything by politics, and it is possible that the Land League
may once more become a power in the question.
Some claim that the boycott is invasive and cannot be consistently used
as a weapon of passive resistance. What care I whether it is invasive or
not, so long as it accomplishes my purpose? The upholders of the present
invasive system must not tell me not to use invasive weapons to
overthrow it. Let them abandon invasion first, and then I will not need
to use such weapons against it. If the boycott is invasive, it is active
instead of passive resistance and its power is in no wise weakened. But
for the sake of consistency let us see to which category it belongs.
The boycott is an agreement entered into by several individuals to leave
some other person or persons severely alone – to refuse to have any
connection with them in a social, business or any other manner. It is a
conspiracy to do nothing. In Chapter IV. it was shown that a passive
condition can never be invasive. If it is non-invasive for one
individual to refuse to have anything to do with another, how does it
become invasive when several men refuse to have anything to do with him?
Surely I am within my right under Equal Freedom if I refuse to patronize
a certain grocer. I am also within my right if I persuade others to
pursue the same line of conduct. To deny this is to say that I must
patronize the grocer in question, or if I do not patronize him I must
not persuade others to leave him alone, in short, I must not criticize
his actions in the slightest. How can it be invasive for me to persuade
another to pursue a non-invasive course of action? Such a proposition is
absurd. An action that is noninvasive when performed by one person,
cannot become invasive by being performed by more than one. The
invasiveness of a conspiracy[63] depends, not upon the number of the
conspirators, but upon the invasiveness of the act which they agree to
perform.
A boycott may necessitate a man removing from a certain place, but it
does not in any way deprive him of his liberty of action. He can go
elsewhere if he sees fit. His person is unmolested and his property is
still at his disposal. Where, then, is invasion committed? It is often
asserted that by means of the boycott a man may be compelled to act in a
way he does not like. True. But that is not the question. It is the
means, not the end, that are under discussion. Some people can see no
difference between killing a man and refusing to prevent him from
committing suicide. To such as these the distinction between invasion
and non-invasion does not exist. They are morally color blind. But to
well-balanced minds the difference between doing something and remaining
passive must be apparent.
To gain anything by political methods, it is first necessary to gain a
majority of the votes cast, and even then you have to trust to the
integrity of the men elected to office. But with passive resistance this
is unnecessary. A good strong minority is all that is needed. It has
been shown that the attitude of the State is merely a crude expression
of the general consensus of the opinion of its subjects. In determining
this consensus, quality must be taken into consideration as well as
quantity. The opinion of one determined and intelligent man may far
outweigh that of twenty lukewarm followers of the opposition. “To apply
this consideration to practical politics, it may be true that the
majority in this country are favorable, say, to universal vaccination.
It does not follow that a compulsory law embodies the will of the
people; because every man who is opposed to that law is at least ten
times more anxious to gain his end than his adversaries are to gain
theirs. He is ready to make far greater sacrifices to attain it. One man
rather wishes for what he regards as a slight sanitary safeguard; the
other is determined not to submit to a gross violation of his liberty.
How differently the two are actuated! One man is willing to pay a
farthing in the pound for a desirable object; the other is ready to risk
property and perhaps life, to defeat that object. In such cases as this
it is sheer folly to pretend that counting heads is a fair indication of
the forces behind.[”] (Donisthorpe, Law in a Free State, pp. 123-124.) A
strong, determined and intelligent minority, employing methods of
passive resistance, would be able to carry all before it. But the same
men, being in a numerical minority, would be powerless to elect a single
man to office.
Another thing must be remembered. Passive resistance can never pass a
law. It can only nullify laws. Consequently it can never be used as a
means of coercion and is particularly adapted to the attainment of
Anarchy. All other schools of reform propose to compel people to do
something. For this they must resort to force, usually by passing laws.
These laws depend upon political action for their inauguration and
physical violence for their enforcement. Anarchists are the only
reformers who do not advocate physical violence. Tyranny must ever
depend upon the weapon of tyranny, but Freedom can be inaugurated only
by means of Freedom.
The first thing that is necessary, to institute the changes outlined in
this book, is to convince people of the benefit to be derived from them.
This means simply a campaign of education. As converts are gradually
gained, passive resistance will grow stronger. At first it must be very
slight, but still it has its effect. Even the refusal to vote does more
than is often supposed. In some States the number of persons who, from
lethargy or from principle, refuse to vote is large enough to alarm the
politicians. They actually talk at times of compulsory voting. This
shows how much even such a small amount of passive resistance is feared.
As the cause gains converts and strength, this passive resistance can
assume a wider field. The more it is practiced greater attention will be
drawn to underlying principles. Thus education and passive resistance go
hand in hand and help each other, step by step, towards the goal of
human Freedom.
State Socialists are always claiming that the system they advocate will
soon be adopted in all the leading countries in the world, and so seldom
has anyone protested, that it is beginning to be received as an
indisputable fact. Laurence Gronlund even goes so far as to maintain,
“Collectivism is coming. It is coming whether you like it or not. Do
what you will it is coming, because it is the will of God.” When Mr.
Gronlund became the confidential adviser of that inscrutable power he
does not tell us. It may be well, therefore, to enquire into the general
trend of modern thought and see if this claim is well grounded, for
coming reforms always cast their shadows before them. By gaining a clear
idea of the principal forces at work in the reconstruction of society,
we may be able to form some estimate of the probability of the reforms I
advocate.
To the superficial observer the claims of the State Socialist seem to be
warranted. He sees a strong tendency in this direction and thinks that
State Socialism is about to be adopted. But life is full of tendencies
which are never completed. The tendency of the incoming tide is to
submerge the earth. The tendency of the growing tree is to reach the
sky. The tendency of nearly everything is to do something it never does,
and the tendency towards State Socialism is no stronger than many of
these, and may result in a similar manner.
Not many years ago there were but a few State Socialists in America. Now
they are numbered by thousands. But the more recent converts are of far
different material from the older exponents of this system. The latter
were men who braved public opinion, sacrificed the much prized bauble –
respectability, and often endangered their chances of making a living,
in order to have the satisfaction of expressing their Socialistic ideas.
But they were so enthusiastic that they were willing to hail everyone as
converts. Let a man express sympathy with some strikers, deplore the
greed of capitalists or lament the existence of slums in our large
cities, and the first State Socialist he met would fall on his neck and
call him “Comrade."[64] assisted this kind of propaganda and it
progressed rapidly. Thus, by degrees, the State Socialistic agitation
degenerated from definite movement for the collective ownership of
surplus value, to a sentimental Sunday-school gospel of free rides, free
novels and free lunches. It was A, alive and aggressive, it has become
respectable. It is no exaggeration to say, that at least fifty per cent.
of those who to-day call themselves State Socialists, have no clear idea
of what surplus value is or how it is created, and most of the other
half have but little better mental equipment.
Let some event happen to bring State Socialism into disrepute and the
truth of these statements would be demonstrated. The bomb which exploded
in Chicago on the 4th of May, 1886, reduced the number of professed
Communists from thousands to a few scattered groups. A large multitude
escorted the Nazarene reformer into Jerusalem, with shouts of honor and
rejoicing. Where were they three days afterwards? This is ever the
result of such a form of propaganda. Numbers are not always strength, as
our State Socialistic friends will some day discover. The mental calibre
of the Neo State Socialists may be judged from their demands. Their
energies are bent on gaining governmental control of “natural
monopolies,” free coinage of silver and other “reforms” which even
consistent State Socialists must consider reactionary. These men may be
considered as State Socialists with the Socialism left out. Fortunately
their ignorance is likely to prove a serious bar to the extent of their
mischief. It is liable to disgust the more intelligent members of their
school, and to show them the danger of putting full State Socialistic
powers into such hands. They may effect a few minor changes, such as
those above mentioned, but the adoption of those very measures will
block the way to further developments. They will result in placing a
very great number of new offices in the gift of the State, which will
inevitably lead, as shown above, to a strengthening of the powers that
be and to perpetuating the statu quo.
With the exception of a few revolutionists, nearly all State Socialists
rely upon political methods to inaugurate their system. This is almost
essential. They have a system to force upon people, and they cannot
institute it without force. I have already pointed out the inadequacy of
political methods and, since those are the means by which State
Socialism is to be adopted, I think we are fairly safe for a number of
years.
The existing discontent with present social conditions is very great.
This must find an outlet in some direction. If not in a move towards
Socialism, then in a move Libertywards. When men find they cannot adopt
their own pet hobby they often take a substitute. Many of the
substitutes for State Socialism are entirely voluntary, and the
be-clouded State Socialists cannot see the difference. A little pamphlet
entitled “Universal Prosperity,” by Edward Wenning, is a good example of
this. In the beginning of his book the author points out the
hopelessness of expecting anything from the government. Then he proposes
a gigantic co-operative company. This company would be a purely
voluntary concern, and, though it could never accomplish the results for
which the author proposes to organize it, it shows a tendency to resort
to voluntaryism when compulsion fails. But this is not all. Mr. Wenning
actually proposes to issue a currency based upon, and redeemable in, the
goods of the company. Several companies are being started by other State
Socialists upon similar plans, and many of them are adopting Mr.
Wenning’s currency idea. When State Socialists are engaged in this kind
of work, we need not be very much afraid of them. They have so poor a
conception of the logic of their position, that they find themselves
fighting in behalf of Liberty instead of for an extension of the powers
of the State.
The free silver craze has drawn especial attention to the money
question. The governmental plans of the Populists have gained a number
of supporters in the Western States. But these very men are most active
in starting the co-operative money schemes just mentioned. The
bitterness with which they have been fighting has caused the orthodox
economists to assume a marvelously individualistic position. Political
economists are saying that a legal tender law is a relic of barbarism.
College professors are now teaching that over 90 per cent. of the
business of the country is done without the use of government money.
Bankers are advocating a removal of restrictions on the issue of money.
The Democratic party thinks it can catch votes by proposing to repeal
the 10 per cent. banknote tax. And Cleveland advocates “the absolute
divorcement of the government from the circulation of the currency of
the country.” (See Message, 3d Dec., ’94.)
I think these facts show that there is a strong feeling in the community
that Liberty is the one thing needful. The tendency on the surface may
appear to be towards State Socialism, but there undoubtedly is a very
strong undercurrent in the direction of Freedom and it probably will, if
given time, entirely change the direction of legislation.
One very good indication of the tendency of the times is found in the
recent action of the American Federation of Labor. For several years the
State Socialists have been endeavoring to capture that organization. At
Chicago, in 1893, they succeeded in getting it to tabulate the following
platform, to be submitted for a referendum vote to all the affiliated
organizations:
Whereas, The Trade Unionists of Great Britain have by the light of
experience and logic of progress, adopted the principle of independent
labor politics as an auxiliary to their economic action, and
Whereas, such action has resulted in the most gratifying success, and
Whereas, such independent labor politics are based upon the following
programme, to-wit:
1. Compulsory education.
2. Direct legislation.
3. A legal eight hour work-day.
4. Sanitary inspection of workshops, mine and home.
5. Liability of employers for injury to health, body or life.
6. The abolition of contract system.
7. The abolition of the sweating system.
8. Municipal ownership of street cars, and gas and electric plants for
public distribution of light, heat and power.
9. The nationalization of telegraphs, telephones, railroads and mines.
10. The collective ownership by the people of all means of production
and distribution.
11. The principle of referendum in all legislation.
Therefore,
Resolved, that the convention hereby indorse this political action of
our British comrades, and
Resolved, that this program and basis of a political labor movement be
and is hereby submitted for the consideration of the labor organizations
of America, with the request that the delegates to the next annual
convention of the American Federation of Labor, be instructed on this
most important subject.
A full year’s time was allowed for the various unions to consider this
question. Most of the delegates who attended the convention held at
Denver in 1894, had received instructions from their unions, so we must
consider that their act was taken with deliberation. The political
platform was considered plank by plank, and was amended to read as
follows:
“1. Compulsory education.
“2. Direct legislation, through the initiative and the referendum.
“3. A legal work-day of not more than eight hours.
“4. Sanitary inspection of workshop, mine and home.
”5. Liability of employers for injury to health, body or life.
“6. The abolition of contract system in all public work.
“7. The abolition of the sweating system.
”8. The municipal ownership of street cars, water works and gas and
electric plants for public distribution of light, heat and power.
“9. The nationalization of telegraphs, telephones, railroads and mines.
“10. The abolition of the monopoly system of land holding, and
substituting therefor a title of occupancy and use only.
“11. Repeal all conspiracy and penal laws, affecting seamen and other
workmen, incorporated in the federal and State laws of the United
States.
“12. The abolition of the monopoly privilege of issuing money, and
substituting therefor a system of direct issuance to and by the people.”
With the very slight exception of the demand for municipal ownership of
water works, every change in this platform is indicative of an increased
desire for Liberty. The preamble was defeated bodily. The first nine
planks were adopted substantially as they stood, except the addition of
“water works” to No. 8 and the consolidation of No. 11 with No. 2.
Perhaps all these nine planks would not have been passed so easily, had
it not been for the sweeping nature of plank 10. That was the point
around which the whole fight raged. It seemed to be recognized by both
sides as the final test of their relative strength. Resolutions in favor
of free land had come in from all over the country. Many delegates had
received instructions to vote against the original plank. So, when the
substitute demanding free land came to a vote, it was carried by 1217 to
913.
The new eleventh plank is clearly a demand for more freedom from State
interference. And while plank 12 is rather ambiguous it is conspicuous
for the demand for an issuance by the people instead of by the
government. This point assumes greater importance when it is considered
that the plank in question was submitted by Delegate McCraith, an
acknowledged Individualist, and the one who led the fight for the
substitute to plank 10.[65] I am also informed that this money plank was
originally drawn up by one, who is a recognized leader among free-money
advocates, and whose name is known and respected by Anarchists the wide
world over.[66]
Another plank, demanding “The national and State destruction of the
liquor traffic,” was introduced. It was killed almost before it was
born, so great was the opposition to it.
When the motion to adopt the planks as a whole was put to the vote, it
was defeated by 1,173 to 735. Thus ended the attempt of the State
Socialists to capture the American Federation of Labor, and to use it as
a political machine for the furtherance of their own ends. No, not
ended, for the action of the convention has brought up the whole
question of Free Land and Free Money for discussions before the Labor
Unions of the United States. Hardly an issue of any of the leading labor
papers of the country is now to be found which does not contain at least
one article on one of these topics. Yes, Mr. Gronlund, “Collectivism is
coming, because it is the will of God!!” At least, that seems to be
about the only argument left to those who believe in the inevitableness
of State Socialism. The facts of the case seem to point in another
direction.
Several of the leaders in the Woman Suffrage movement are adopting far
more libertarian views than was ever expected from this source. At the
last triennial meeting of the National Council of Women Mrs. Ellen B.
Dietrick championed the principle of Equal Freedom in unmistakable
terms. Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton declared for Free Land, and others
present manifested a feeling in the same direction.
Even the conservative law courts seem to be infected in a slight degree,
with the spirit of modern progress. My legal friends inform me, that it
is more and more becoming the custom to plead the equity of a case at
the same time that the legal points are under discussion. As courts are
at present constituted this places very great, and possibly dangerous,
powers in the hands of the judge, but it also curtails to the same
degree the power of the legislature. The main gain from this, is that it
allows greater flexibility in the administration of the laws. If the
power to decide the law and equity, as well as the facts, was vested in
a properly constituted jury, the gain to Liberty would be very
important. But failing this, it is better to have a flexible system that
can be adapted to the especial needs of each case, rather than a rigid
law to which all cases must be made to conform. Probably the most
notable example of this tendency that has recently occurred is the
income tax decision of the United States Supreme Court. Neither side
attempted to make their case good on constitutional grounds. They did
not take any clause in the constitution, and by a process of deductive
reasoning, show wherein the income tax law was, or was not, consistent
with that clause. The whole fight turned upon the question of the
justice or injustice of the law. As long as all questions of natural
science have to be squared with the Bible, true progress in thought is
impossible. Science can only be based upon observed phenomena if it is
to be worth anything. So in Sociology, as long as every proposition has
to be in harmony with a document that was written over a century ago,
when nearly all the truths of science were unknown, true progress in
society is impossible. It is only when each question can be referred to
the highest social expediency, that social growth is possible. In
proportion as we attain correct ideas of what that highest social
expediency is, and its application to each question, in that degree do
we really develop.
It must not be inferred from these remarks, that I look for any
immediate adoption of the views set forth in this book. I merely mention
these facts to show that the tendency of the times is far stronger in
the direction of Liberty than is usually supposed. One great danger,
however, threatens to overthrow much of our labor for Freedom. Whether
that can be averted or not, facts alone can show. I allude to the
prospect of a violent revolution. Agitation is often necessary to stir
up discontent. But agitation must be followed by education in order to
make it intelligent and serviceable. The agitation that is now being
carried on by the State Socialists is so extensive, and is reaching such
ignorant classes, that the necessary education is left a long way
behind. Thus a class of people, who daily see the power of physical
force in all their occupations and surroundings, and who are too often
incapable of appreciating the power of intellect, is awakening to the
social injustice which crushes it to earth. The great question is, can
these people be induced to remain peaceful until they can be educated to
know what will relieve their distress.
The most unfavorable sign is the attitude of the bourgeoisie. It seems
to be impossible for them to realize that the time has gone by, when
platitudes, on the one hand, and bayonets, on the other, will check the
growing discontent. They are unconsciously doing all in their power to
precipitate an outbreak, when they might, by conceding a little to
public opinion, manage to avert a crisis: The imprisonment of Debs has
done more to precipitate a revolution, than would inflammatory speeches
by all the Socialists in the United States. What the result of such a
revolution must inevitably be was shown in the last chapter.
It is often asserted, that such a social system as I advocate is ideal
but eminently impractical. No social system is practicable until people
are convinced of its merits. A constitutional monarchy is impracticable
in Russia to-day. Is that any reason why those who believe in it should
not do all in their power to make it an accomplished fact? The ideal
must be made practicable. This can only be done by convincing people
that it is the ideal. Everyone who really believes that a certain system
is the highest ideal, and who is anxious to better the existing
conditions, will keep that ideal constantly in mind. Everything that is
in the direction of that ideal will be helped. Everything that is
opposed to it will be fought bitterly. As the number of those who
believe in the ideal increases, the practicability of the system
increases also, and the attainment of the end becomes more sure. We are
willing to go step by step if needs be, provided that each step be on
the road to Freedom. But not one step will we move in the opposite
direction, for we believe with John Morley that “a small and temporary
improvement may really be the worst enemy of a great and permanent
improvement. ... The small reform, if it be not made with reference to
some large progressive principle, and with a view to further extension
of its scope, makes it all the more difficult to return to the right
line and direction when improvement is again demanded.” (On Compromise,
p. 230.)
Then let every proposed reform be judged by this one principle, is it an
extension of individual liberty? On the answer to this should its fate
depend. And gradually will Freedom be attained. How long the adoption of
such a system will take it is impossible to say. But we know that
progress advances with ever increasing rapidity, so perhaps we may hope
for a relatively speedy betterment of our condition.
In the lists of books here given, I have endeavored to select some of
the best and most elementary works upon each subject. I have confined
myself to works in the English language. With the exception of “Social
Statics,” I have omitted all books which are out of print. It is hardly
necessary to add that, though I recommend these books, I do not thereby
indorse every statement made in any one of them.
GENERAL WORKS
ANDREWS, STEPHEN PEARL, Science of society; Part I. True constitution of
government in the sovereignty of the individual. Part 2. Cost the limit
of price. Bost., 1888. 165p., 8vo. S. E. Holmes. Cloth, $1.00; paper,
50c.
”This work is an elaborate exposition of the teachings of Josiah Warren
by one of his foremost disciples.”
MACKAY, JOHN HENRY, The anarchists; a picture of civilization at the
close of the 19th century. Trans. from the German by George Schumm.
Bost., 1891. 315p., 12mo. Tucker. Cloth, $1.00; paper, 50c.
While cast in the form of a story, this book contains many excellent
economic arguments, directed principally against the communists.
PROUDHON, PIERRE JOSEPH, System of economical contradictions; or,
Philosophy of misery. Trans from the French by Benj. R. Tucker. v. I. N.
Y., 469p., 8vo. Humboldt. Cloth, $2.00; paper, $1.20.
“It discusses in a style as novel as profound, the problems of Value,
Division of Labor, Machinery, Competition, Monopoly, Taxation and
Providence, showing that economic progress is achieved by the appearance
of a succession of economic forces, each of which counteracts the evils
developed by its predecessor, and then, by developing evils of its own,
necessitates its successor, the process to continue until a final force,
corrective of the whole, shall establish a stable economic equilibrium.”
PROUDHON, PIERRE JOSEPH, What is property? an enquiry into the
principles of right and government; prefaced by a sketch of Proudhon’s
life and works. Trans. from the French by Benj. R. Tucker. N. Y., 498p ,
8vo. Humboldt. Cloth, $2.00; paper, $1.20. (Humboldt Library Nos.
172-175.)
“A systematic, thorough and radical discussion of the institution of
property – its basis, its history, its present status and its destiny –
together with a detailed and startling expose of the crimes which it
commits, and the evils which it engenders.”
TUCKER, BENJAMIN R., Instead of a book; by a man too busy to write one.
A fragmentary exposition of Philosophical Anarchism. N. Y., 1893. 522
p., 8vo. Tucker. Cloth, $1.00; paper, 50c.
Principally composed of discussions reprinted from the file of
“Liberty.” In this way the objections of all classes of opponents are
met and answered and many obscure points are made clear. The best book
for anyone who wishes to gain a clear idea of the principles of
Anarchism.
In addition to these works the following papers are very valuable:
“LIBERTY.” A fortnightly journal of Philosophical Anarchism. Edited by
Benj. R. Tucker. 8 pages. $2.00 per year. P. O. Box 1312, New York.
The pioneer of Anarchism in America. Commands articles from the pens of
the best writers upon the subject and contains interesting discussions
upon the various applications of its philosophy.
EGOISM. A fortnightly Anarchistic paper. 4 pages. 50c per year. P. O.
Box 366, Oakland, Cala.
A lighter and more humorous paper than “Liberty,” but advocating the
same general principles.
EVOLUTION.
CLODD, EDWARD, Story of creation; a plain account of evolution. N. Y.,
129p., 8vo. Humboldt. Paper, 15c. (Humboldt Library, No. 110. )
The best short account of evolution for popular reading yet published.
CLODD, EDWARD, Story of primitive man. N. Y., 1895. 190p., il. 16mo.
Appleton. Cloth, 40c. (Library of Useful Stories, No. I .)
An excellent outline of the subject.
HUXLEY, THOMAS HENRY, Evidences as to man’s place in nature. N. Y.,
62p., 8vo. Humboldt Paper, 15c. (Humboldt Library, No. 4.)
HUXLEY, THOMAS HENRY, On the origin of Species; or Causes of the
phenomena of organic nature. N. Y., 49p., 8vo. Humboldt. Paper, 15c.
(Humboldt Library, No. 16.)
Prof. Huxley’s works need no recommendation from any source.
ROMANES, GEORGE JOHN, Scientific evidence of organic evolution. N. Y.,
55p. 8vo. Humboldt. Paper. 15c. (Humboldt Library No. 40.)
An excellent plea for evolution as opposed to special creation.
EGOISM.
BADCOCK, JOHN, Jr. Slaves to duty; a lecture delivered before the South
Place Junior Ethical Society, 29th Jan., 1894. Lond., 1894. 33p., 12mo.
Reeves. Paper, 6d.
“A unique addition to the pamphlet literature of Anarchism in that it
assails the morality superstition as the foundation of the various
schemes for the exploitation of mankind. Max Stirner himself does not
expound the doctrine of Egoism in bolder fashion.”
MILL, JOHN STUART. Utilitarianism. Lond. 1891. 96p., 8vo. Longman.
Cloth, 5s.
SHAW, GEORGE BERNARD, Quintessence of Ibsenism. Bost., 18gr. 170p.,
12mo. Tucker. Paper, 25c.
Pronounced by the London Saturday Review a “most diverting Book” and by
the author, “the most complete assertion of the validity of the human
will as against all laws, institutions, isms, and the like, now
procurable for a quarter.”
“TAK KAK,” Philosophy of Egoism. A series of fifteen articles which
appeared in “Egoism,” from May, 1890, to Dec. 1891.
These form the most complete exposition of Egoism that has ever been
published in English.
Macmillan & Co adverti-e [sic] “The Works of Friedrich Nietzsche” in 11
vols. to appear in the spring of 1896. These will be invaluable to the
deep student of Egoism.
THE STATE.
BAKOUNINE, MICHAEL, God and the State. Trans. from the French by Benj.
R. Tucker. Ed. 7. Bost., 1890. 52p, 8vo. Tucker. Paper, 15c.
“One of the most eloquent pleas for liberty ever written. Paine’s “Age
of Reason” and “Rights of Man” consolidated and improved. It stirs the
pulse like a trumpet call.”
LETOURNEAU, CHARLES, Sociology; based upon ethnography. Trans. from the
French by H. M. Trollope. New ed. Lond., 1893. 634p., 8vo. Chapman,
Hall. Cloth. 3s, 6d.
In many respects the best outline of the development of human society.
It is a perfect mine of information, and is written in a very readable
manner.
SPENCER, HERBERT, Principles of Sociology. N. Y., 1888. 2 vols., 8vo.
Appleton. Cloth, $4.00.
Mr. Spencer stands unequalled as a writer upon such subjects. The depth
of his research is marvelous. His philosophic conception of the relation
of one fact to another has placed him in the front rank among
philosophers of all ages. Important though all his works are, perhaps
the Principles of Sociology transcends all the others in usefulness.
Part of the third volume is now appearing serially in “The Popular
Science Monthly.”
EQUAL FREEDOM.
FOWLER, C. T., Prohibition, or Relation of government to temperance.
Kansas City. 1885. 28p. 12 mo. Fowler. Paper, 6c.
This pamphlet shows “that prohibition cannot prohibit and would be
unnecessary if it could.”
HERBERT, AUBERON, Politician in sight of haven; being a protest against
government of man by man. N. Y. Tucker. Paper, 10c.
SPENCER, HERBERT, Social statics; or, Conditions essential to human
happiness specified, and the first of them developed. With a notice of
the author. N. Y., 1862. 533p., 8vo. Appleton. Cloth, $2.00.
One of Spencer’s earliest works. The principle of equal freedom is
deduced and explained. This edition is now out of print, but several
pirate editions are on the market. The Revised edition is very much
abridged and greatly inferior to this.
SPENCER, HERBERT, Prison ethics; in, Essays, scientific, political and
speculative, v. 3, p 152-191. (Also in, British Quarterly Review, July,
1860.)
A plea for the application of the principle of equal freedom to the
treatment of criminals.
SPOONER, LYSANDER, Free political institutions; their nature, essence
and maintenance. An abridgement and rearrangement of “Trial by Jury.” by
Victor Yarros. Bost, 1890. 47p., 8vo. Tucker. Paper, 25c.
An historical review of the jury system. It claims for the jury the
right to judge the law as well as the prisoner. A strong protest against
the tyranny of the State, of particular value in these days of
“government by injunction.”
SPOONER, LYSANDER, Illegality of the trial of John W. Webster. Bost.,
1850. 16p., 8vo. Tucker. Paper, 10c.
A legal protest against packing juries by selecting jurors and rejecting
all who are opposed to the law involved.
VALUE AND SURPLUS VALUE.
BOEHM-BAWERK, EUGENE VON, Positive theory of capital. Trans. with a
preface by Wm. Smart. Lond., 1891. 468p., 8vo. Macmillan. Cloth, $4.00.
A profound analysis of value. The original exposition of the “Marginal
utility theory.”
FOWLER, C. T., Co-operation; its laws and principles. Kansas City, 1885.
28p., 12mo. Fowler. Paper, 6c.
“An essay showing Liberty and Equity as the only conditions of true
co-operation, and exposing the violations of these conditions by Rent,
Interest, Profit, and Majority Rule.”
FOWLER, C. T., Reorganization of business. Kansas City, 1885. 28p.,
12mo. Fowler. Paper, 6c.
“An essay showing how the principles of co-operation may be realized in
the store, bank and factory.”
The Chapter on Value in Proudhon’s System of economical Contradictions,
and Part 2 of Andrew’s [sic] Science of Society are very valuable in
this connection.
MONEY AND INTEREST.
BILGRAM, Hugo, Involuntary idleness; an exposition of the cause of the
discrepancy existing between the supply of, and the demand for, labor
and its products. Philadelphia, 1889. 119., 16mo. Lippincott. Cloth,
50c.
A remarkably fine analysis of interest showing that it is due to the
scarcity of money. It also shows the evil results of usury.
GREENE, WILLIAM B., Mutual banking; showing the radical deficiency of
the present circulating medium and the advantages of a free currency.
New ed. with a preface by Henry Cohen. Denver, 1896. 78p., 12 mo. Cohen.
Paper, 10c.
A wonderfully clear exposition of the theory of Mutual Banks by its
originator, showing how interest can be abolished.
FREE LAND.
FOWLER, C. T., Land tenure. Kansas City, 1885. 26p., 12mo. Fowler.
Paper, 6c.
“An essay showing the governmental basis of land monopoly, the futility
of governmental remedies and a natural and peaceful way of starving out
the landlords.”
INGALLS, J. K., Work and wealth. Bost., 1881. 13p., 8vo. Tucker. Paper,
15c.
A demand for free land as a basis for industrial prosperity.
SPECIAL PRIVILEGES.
GEORGE, HENRY, Protection and free trade. N. Y., 1891. 216p., 12mo.
George. Paper, 25c.
This has also been printed as part of the “Congressional Record.” A good
plea for free trade.
TUCKER, BENJAMIN R., et al., Discussion of the question of copyright.
Appeared in “Liberty” and was continued for several months, commencing
13th Dec., 1890.
TRANSPORTATION, ETC.
FOWLER, C. T., Corporations. Kansas City, 1885. 28p., 12mo. Fowler.
Paper, 6c.
“An essay showing how the monopoly of railroads, telegraphs, etc., may
be abolished without the intervention of the state.”
METHODS.
DONISTHORPE, WORDSWORTH, Law in a free State. Lond., 1895. 324p., 8vo.
Macmillan. Cloth, $2.50.
“Is offered to the public as the best ‘nut-crackers” the Author is able
to turn out of the workshop,” wherewith to “crack” the “nuts” that many
find so hard.
MORLEY, JOHN, On compromise. Lond., 1891. 296p, 12mo. Macmillan. Cloth,
$1.50.
Devoted to considering “some of the limits that are set by sound reason
to the practice of the various arts of accommodation, economy,
management, conformity or compromise.”
[1] American philosopher and historian John Fiske (1842-1901); in
Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy (1874) and other works he sought to
reconcile Spencerian evolutionism with neo-Augustinian theology.
[2] English biologist Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895), in “Biogenesis
and Abiogenesis” (1870).
[3] The old idea of the existence of a distinct “vital force” has long
been abandoned by the scientific world. Now, however, there seems to be
a tendency to recognize what may be termed “a theory of neo-vitalism.”
[4] Edward Clodd (1840-1930), English populariser of Darwinism; The
Story of Creation: A Plain Account of Evolution (1888).
[5] "monera,” a term roughly though not precisely synonymous with
“prokaryotes,” refers to a class of mostly unicellular microorganisms
lacking a cell nucleus.
[6] German biologist Ernst (Heinrich Philipp August von) Haeckel,
1834-1919.
[7] The first part of this quotation is possibly open to criticism. The
followers of Weismann[67], who are now carrying on such an animated
controversy with Spencer, assert that no forms of life except the very
lowest can “remain constant.” If they do not progress they must
degenerate. But as Spencer’s position is the more conservative, it is
safe to use this quotation in this connection.
[8] English zoologist Sir Edwin Ray Lankester (1847-1929), a leading
Darwinian, in Degeneration: A Chapter in Darwinism (1880).
[9] Hungarian Zionist Maximilian Simon Südfeld Nordau (1849-1923), in
Degeneration (1892).
[10] William Platt Ball (1844-1917); Are the Effects of Use and Disuse
Inherited? (1890).
[11] sic.
[12] Matthew 5:39; cf. Luke 6:29.
[13] French Fourierite anthropologist Charles Letourneau (1831-1902), in
Sociology Based Upon Ethnography (1880).
[14] A reference to the infamous 1856 Dred Scott decision, ruling that
blacks were “beings of an inferior order” with “no rights which the
white man was bound to respect.”
[15] This is actually the official legal designation of what is more
usually called the U.S. Civil War or the War Between the States,
1861-65.
[16] “Grand Army of the Republic” and “Sons of Veterans,” popular Union
veteran groups.
[17] “The voice of the people [is] the voice of God.”
[18] Actually the right to resist or overthrow unjust monarchs was
well-established in pre-Reformation political theory.
[19] It should not be forgotten that Sociology is not an exact science,
and consequently any generalizations that may be made for the guidance
of society, cannot be absolutely perfect. Human happiness is the aim of
all social reform. Such generalizations as may be made to guide us on
the road to happiness, are valuable only insofar as they contribute to
that end. This is true of the principle of Equal Freedom. Exceptional
cases may arise, when a strict adherence to this principle would result
in greater misery than would a violation of it. For example, it may be
necessary to violate the right of property by blowing up houses to
prevent the spread of a conflagration, as was done at the Chicago fire,
or it may be advisable to violate the personal liberty of infected
persons to prevent the spread of cholera. But these cases are very
exceptional, and, under such circumstances, a violation of Equal Freedom
is fully justified. Yet so trustworthy a guide is this principle, that
unless the wisdom of violating it is almost absolutely certain, it would
be better to follow it wherever it may lead us. As a general working
principle it cannot be too strongly insisted on. In spite of such
exceptions as those above cited, I believe that an unflinching adherence
to the principle in all cases, no matter who might suffer, would, in the
long run, be less harmful than a very lax application of it. If we start
in to follow it blindly, the few exceptions that are necessary will
become apparent as they arise, and as there is nothing sacred about any
such generalization, we should soon learn how to adapt it to such
emergencies. But to say that it is an absolute law, which all
individuals and associations of individuals are bound to observe,
whatever may befall, is to deny that self-preservation is the first law
of nature.
[20] The preceding seven paragraphs are heavily dependent on Lysander
Spooner’s 1852 Essay on the Trial by Jury.
[21] a reference to Herbert Spencer’s article “Prison-Ethics” (British
Quarterly Review, July 1860).
[22] This is a puzzling claim. Bastiat, to name just one of many,
defends interest on ethical as well as economic grounds.
[23] Sic, presumably for “money.”
[24] I trust no one will misunderstand me by supposing that I defend the
“truck-system.” I am merely using it as an example, in order to point
out some economic truths.
[25] Sic, for “Échange.”
[26] I am informed by those who have studied Proudhon’s untranslated
works, that he was not really in favor of placing the Bank of Exchange
under State control. He merely tabulated the scheme given above for
educational purposes during a political campaign. He afterwards started
a similar bank without State aid, but this was stopped, almost before it
was organized, by the imprisonment of its founder.[68]
[27] Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906), in his 1882 play
Enemy of the People, Act IV; Ibsen was a favourite of the Liberty
circle.
[28] St. Paul in Acts 17:28, in turn paraphrasing the hymn to Zeus in
Epimenides’ Cretica.
[29] To avoid a possible charge of plagiarism, it is necessary to state
that much of this paragraph has been copied, with a few alterations,
from Chapter IX. of Social Statics (First Ed.), which Mr. Spencer has
lately repudiated. It is not printed in quotation marks, because of the
alterations which I have made.
[30] French sociologist Charles-Jean Letourneau (1831-1902), author of
Sociology Based Upon Ethnography (1892).
[31] Perhaps American egoist-anarchist and sometime contributor to
Liberty James L. Walker (1845-1904), who wrote under the pseudonym “Tak
Kak” (a Russian conjunction meaning “because” or “since”), and who
published his Philosophy of Egoism serially in Egoism, though the
publishers were Georgia and Henry Replogle and so Tandy may be referring
to one of them.
[32] A reference to a line in “A Psalm of Life” (1838) by American poet
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1807-1882), in turn paraphrasing Matthew
8:22 and Luke 9:60.
[33] Does Tandy mean “inconvenient”?
[34] Tandy here seems to anticipate the central idea of Mises’s
calculation argument.
[35] George’s critique of Spencer was titled A Perplexed Philosopher;
Mill, as the author of A System of Logic, is here a stand-in for
logicians in general.
[36] English agricultural economist Arthur Young (1741-1820), in Travels
in France (1794).
[37] An expression in frequent use in the late 19th century, but I have
not yet discovered its source.
[38] French journalist Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr (1808-1890), editor
of Le Figaro.
[39] English writer Isabel Arundell Burton (1831-1896), wife of explorer
Richard Francis Burton (1821-1890); after her husband’s death she burned
the manuscript of his second, fuller translation of the 15th-century
Arabic sex manual The Perfumed Garden. Since he appears to have
conceived the project only after the publication of his first
translation (1886), and since he died in 1890, Tandy’s “fifteen years”
is an exaggeration.
[40] Tandy presumably means either Philolaus or Aristarchus (though
these names are hardly “obscure and long forgotten” to classical
scholars or to historians of science); he also presumably means the
revolution of the Earth.
[41] In a prefatory note to the article quoted, the author states that
it was written in all seriousness and not as a satire. So it must be
accepted as a true statement. I quote these cases merely to illustrate
my point, and do not in any way bind myself to accept Mark Twain’s
explanation of them.[69]
[42] An 1890 novel by French playwright and political activist Felix
Pyat (1810-1889), translated and published by Tucker himself.
[43] An 1889 novella by Tolstoj, likewise translated and published by
Tucker.
[44] It should be remembered that Mr. Tucker here refers to his work as
translator, as well as that of publisher.
[45] This passage appears not to be in the issue that Tandy cites; if
you find the correct issue, please drop me a line.
[46] Presumably not Christian anarchist Adin Ballou (1803-1890), who was
dead by 1896, but perhaps a relative. I know that an A. L. Ballou was a
contributor to Liberty but haven’s investigated thoroughly.
[47] American economist Francis Amasa Walker (1840-1897), in his 1883
Political Economy.
[48] Wealthy businessman and union-buster John Wanamaker (1838-1922);
during his term as Postmaster General (1889-1893) he protected the
public from receiving lottery tickets or Tolstoj’s Kreutzer Sonata in
the mail. The Star Routes scandal involved the awarding of government
contracts in exchange for bribes.
[49] This was written in 1887.
[50] Tandy’s error for “than.”
[51] It’s surprising that Tandy makes no mention of Spooner and the
American Letter Mail Company.
[52] British jurist and historian James Bryce (1838-1922).
[53] Paraphrase of Luke 21:28.
[54] Capital, I.1.3.A.3, n. 22; for the same idea see La Boétie, Hume,
Godwin, Gandhi, Traven, Rand, and Russell.
[55] Grand Army of the Republic, an organisation of Union Army veterans,
formed in 1866.
[56] This was also an accurate prediction of what would indeed happen in
the U.S. five years later in the wake of the McKinley assassination.
[57] A reference to Matthew 24:24.
[58] Tom Loftin Johnson (1854-1911), Democratic Congressman (1891-1895).
[59] Grover Cleveland’s expression for pro-business interventionist
legislation.
[60] A reference to Luke 11:26.
[61] The American Protective Association and the Patriotic Order Sons of
America (both founded as anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant organisations).
[62] Irish politician Thomas Henry Burke (1829-1882), Permanent Under
Secretary at the Irish Office, was assassinated by a Fenian splinter
group for being, in their eyes, a British collaborator; English
politician Frederick Charles Cavendish (1836-1882), Chief Secretary for
Ireland, had the bad fortune to be standing next to him.
[63] I use the word conspiracy advisedly. It originally meant any
agreement, and not till recently has its meaning been restricted to
agreements to invade.
[64] American state-socialist Edward Bellamy (1850-1898), author of the
utopian novel Looking Backward (1888).
[65] An August McCraith, a sometime contributor to Liberty, was active
in the AFL. An Augustine McCraith was active in the AFL. An Augustine
McCraith was born in Prince Edward Island in 1864 and died in New York
City some time before 1920. An Augustine McCraith, this one a publisher
and a member of the Typographical Union, was born in Ireland, and died
in Brooklyn in 1909. These are quite possibly all the same person (with
’Ireland” perhaps a mistake for “the Island,” as Prince Edward Island’s
inhabitants call it). Or perhaps not.
[66] I wonder whether this might be Dyer Lum?