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Title: “Destroy the Makhno movement” Author: Volodymyr Horak Date: 2 June 2009 Language: en Topics: Nestor Makhno, Makhnovists, Russian Revolution, history Source: Retrieved on 9th August 2021 from https://day.kyiv.ua/en/article/history-and-i/destroy-makhno-movement Notes: Published in The Day №16,
It is hard to say precisely what kind of relationships the well-known
peasants’ otaman Nestor Makhno had with the communists, because they
were much too complicated and contradictory. On the one hand, Makhno and
his insurgents were the Bolsheviks’ allies several times (four,
according to our estimates). On the other hand, their alliance was
inevitably replaced by the cruel bloody confrontation between the Red
Army and Makhno’s forces, which was an important element of the civil
war in Ukraine.
The history of this confrontation is familiar to our readers. But there
also was a secret war that the communists waged against Makhno and
Makhnovites that is not so well-known.
It is quite obvious that the Bolsheviks would never have started either
an open or a secret war against Makhno and his insurgents if they had
not perceived them as enemies. So let us try to answer the tough
question: When did the communists start viewing Makhno not as an ally
but an enemy that had to be removed at any cost and as soon as possible?
We know that in December of 1918, when Makhno jointly with the
Bolsheviks fought against Skoropadsky’s forces, Petliurites, and the
White Guards, some of the Bolsheviks began to view Makhno and his men as
ordinary bandits who did not care about the real interests of the
working class. However, I think that the highly familiar image of Makhno
as a counterrevolutionary began to take shape later in February–March of
1919. Ironically, it all began when Makhno’s brigade, which was a part
of the Red Army at the time and was subordinated to the division
commander Pavlo Dybenko, achieved a series of stunning victories over
the White Guards in the south-west.
In the Bolsheviks’ periodicals at that time there were many articles
about the military successes of Makhno and his army. Despite their
sincere respect for the brigade commander, the communists developed
genuine anxiety over Makhnno, who had already become a widely-known
military leader. They were primarily concerned about the fact that
neither Makhno nor the Red Army men under his command did not fit with
the state system of a new, communist Ukraine, which was being created by
the Bolsheviks.
In February 1919 in his speech at the 2^(nd) Congress of Peasants and
Insurgents Makhno plainly said that he totally accepted the communists
as allies but at the same time he rejected any of their attempts to
monopolize Ukraine, i.e., their intention to establish the dictatorship
of the Communist Party. Later on March 7, 1919, the Military
Revolutionary Council in the Makhno-controlled region clearly defined
the principles of social organization there: a multiparty system,
Cheka-free zone, and self-government. This type of approach practically
ruled out the guiding and leading role of the Communist Party in the
large territory controlled by Makhno. That was the time when the
communist leaders of Ukraine and Russia realized that Makhno was not so
much a heroic division commander as a dangerous political rival who
could cause serious trouble in the future.
One day in March 1919 in the city of Berdiansk in southern Ukraine a
meeting between the brigade commander Makhno and his immediate superior,
the division commander Dybenko, was to take place. However, a few days
before the meeting Makhno’s counterintelligence warned him that Dybenko
was going to Berdiansk to arrest and maybe even kill the commander.
Makhno heeded the warning and took every security measure. The
Makhno-controlled garrison of Berdiansk was on red alert, while Makhno’s
personal guardsmen received a special-alert order.
The meeting, however, had a peaceful and friendly mode. Makhno even held
a military parade in honor of Dybenko when he arrived. But before
Dybenko had to leave, Makhno asked him point-blank whether he had any
evil intentions against the Makhno movement. Dybenko assured Makhno that
he was his true friend and if there would be any plot against the
brigade commander and his people, he would be the first to let Makhno
know about it.
Soon after that the division commander had to go from Berdiansk and
Makhno was left with uneasy thoughts. Maybe his counterintelligence
agents had made a mistake when they reported that Dybenko conspired
against him. Or maybe the division commander indeed had such a
perfidious plan but for certain reasons he decided not to carry it out.
Makhno was unable to answer this complicated question then.
In my opinion, Dybenko indeed had this kind of intention (Makhno’s
agents were extremely good at gathering reliable information), but
decided against it when he found out through his secret agents in
Makhno’s milieu, that Makhno knew about his plan and had prepared well
for their meeting.
However, the episode with Dybenko was only the first phase of the
communists’ secret war against Makhno, which then started escalating
rapidly. Within a month a new Bolshevik plot against Makhno emerged. The
Bolshevik Padalka, a commander of one of the big Makhno-led detachments,
became the key figure of the plot. Practically all of the Bolshevik
commissars who were in Makhno’s brigade became Padalka’s fellow
conspirators.
According to their plan, Padalka’s detachment was to attack Huliai-Pole
from the side of the village of Pokrovske and rout Makhno’s forces,
which were concentrated there. At the same time, the commissars had to
strike from the rear to capture Makhno and his closest comrades-in-arms.
There is evidence that the mastermind behind this plot was the Soviet
government of Ukraine and, in particular, People’s Commissar for
Military Affairs Mykhailo Podvoisky.
When Makhno’s rivals started fulfilling their plan, Makhno was away from
Huliai-Pole, directing his soldiers’ actions on the Denikin front.
Nevertheless, his faithful counterintelligence agents again managed to
warn him about the danger. Without the slightest delay Makhno used the
airplane that he had to his disposal to get to Huliai-Pole. With his
quick response he nipped the insurgency in the bud and the commissars
were arrested. Later, however, they were released on the urgent requests
of the Soviet Army commander in Ukraine Volodymyr Antonov-Ovseienko.
Incidentally, Antonov-Ovseienko managed to stop the mechanism of the
Bolsheviks’ secret war against Makhno and his soldiers for a while. He
personally met Makhno in Huliai-Pole and after that he reported
positively on Makhno and his brigade. Lenin played a certain part of his
own in this affair, calling on his comrades-in-arms to be diplomatic
with Makhno’s army. Surely, the lull on this secret front could only be
short-lived. Soon a new player entered the anti-Makhno group — Lev
Trotsky, head of Russia’s Revolutionary Military Council.
It should be mentioned that Trotsky’s had an ambiguous attitude to the
peasant insurgent movement in general and to the Makhno movement in
particular. On the one hand, he acknowledged the revolutionary character
of the insurgent movement of the time, when insurgents fought against
various counterrevolutionary regimes. On the other hand, he made a
straightforward statement that after the working class and its party
would come to power, the insurgents and their leaders would transform
from a revolutionary into a counterrevolutionary power. Considering the
fact that by the late May 1919 the Bolsheviks controlled the greater
part of Ukraine, Makhno and his people fell into the category of
counterrevolutionaries, who had to be destroyed, the sooner the better.
As a person who is convinced that only the communist Bolsheviks were
able to represent the interests of workers and peasants, Trotsky
couldn’t think any different. The Makhno-controlled region, which was
free from the Communist Party dictatorship, surplus appropriation
system, and the Cheka, was an eyesore to the head of the Revolutionary
Military Council. In the second half of May 1919, under the influence of
Trotsky and his supporters, the Leninist leadership passed a secret
resolution to destroy the Makhno movement.
On May 25, 1919, the same kind of a resolution, also a secret one, was
adopted by the government of the Ukrainian SSR. The first paragraph
read: “liquidate the Makhno movement as soon as possible.” This required
several measures: forced icorporation of the Makhnovites into the Red
Army; immediate destruction of anyone who mounted resistance, and, above
all, Makhno’s commanders; arresting and court-martialing Makhno and his
closest aides.
It was clear that to carry out this large-scale punitive campaign, a
fairly big military force was needed. It did not take the Bolsheviks
long to realize that at time when the Red Army was fighting against
numerous enemies inside and outside the country, from Admiral Kolchak to
otaman Zeleny, they were unable to muster this kind of force. Soon, the
Red Army strategists came up with an original plan to give the leading
role in the liquidation of the Makhno movement to the White Army.
Our readers may have a reasonable question: Did the Soviet army and
division commanders realize that getting rid of Makhno’s brigade would
lead to a turnaround on the front in favor of the White Army? They were
certainly aware of this. But in order to understand the logic of the
decision they made, we need to take into account that by the time the
Bolshevik leaders and military commanders had learned to differentiate
their emenies.
Denikin’s army was, no doubt, a powerful rival, but their position of
defending the interests of landowners and capitalists would sooner or
later lead them to an utter defeat. In contrast to this, the Makhno
movement, which relied on ordinary people and became a mass movement,
was definitely socialist (this becomes clear from an unbiased study of
Makno’s political programs) and had every chance to become an
alternative to the communist power. The Makhnovites, just like the
Zaporozhian Cossacks in the past, created in southern Ukraine a social
order, which could become popular and appealing not only to the workers
in Ukraine, but also to the workers in Russia.
Trotsky and other Bolshevik military commanders, who can be called the
secret allies of the White Army, took concrete measures in order to
increase the latter’s chances of pulling off a quick and complete defeat
of the Makhno movement. Soon afterward the Soviet regiments invaded the
Makhno-controlled region from the east and the west, forcefully
incorporating the Makhnovites and shooting those who disobeyed on the
spot. Naturally, this campaign greatly weakened Makhno’s army. Moreover,
the Bolshevik authorities received the strictest order to discontinue
the weapon, ammunition, and food supplies to the Makhno brigade.
It should be added that even before the liquidation campaign started
communist were not too generous in providing Makhno’s men with
everything they needed. The Makhnovites often acquired weapons and
ammunition in battles, because they knew only too well that they could
not count on getting extra machineguns, cannons, or even rifles from the
Bolsheviks. And yet the Bolshevik command used to give the Red Army
Makhnovites at least something. Now any supplies to Makhno’s brigade
were cut off.
No matter how desperate Makhno and other leading anarchists were in
their requests for help wired to various Soviet authorities, they were
inevitably met with silence. Because of these patently treacherous
actions of the Bolsheviks Makhnovites had to fight against Denikin’s
army, which greatly surpassed them in size, ammunitions, and all the
other important aspects. This definitely sure left its mark on the
military developments.
In late May 1919 the Makhnovites began to lose one battle after another.
Thousands of them were killed, wounded, and taken prisoner. The White
Guards very quickly drove Makno’s soldiers out of Berdiansk, Hryshyno,
Huliai-Pole, and other localities. Regiments led by Shkuro, Vynohradov,
and Denikin’s other military commanders were advancing without having a
slightest idea about who helped them achieve their victories. The
Bolshevik periodicals were covering the events as if it was a blatant
treason of the Makhnovites and their commander, who opened the way for
Denikin’s Army. However, it was, in fact, opened by the Red Army
strategists and their hunchmen.
At the same time, the Bolsheviks were looking for Makhno in order to
arrest him. Kliment Voroshilov expressed a desire to be the one would
capture the counterrevolutionary Makhno and was appointed head of the
liquidation campaign on May 31, 1919. In early June 1919 he personally
came to Huliai-Pole to present Makhno with the Order of the Red Banner,
surprising as it was.
Makhno, no doubt, deserved the high Soviet reward, but Voroshilov real
mission was not to honor Makhno’s talent of a military leader and his
great personal courage. Voroshilov knew that it would be extremely hard
to capture Makhno in his headquarters, so by presenting this prestigious
decoration he hoped to win Makhno’s trust and later use it to arrest him
without much fuss.
This maneuver by Voroshilov was only partially successful. After a few
days the Bolshevik military commander invited Makhno to the station of
Haichur purportedly to discuss some urgent military issues. Makhno
decided to go there even though his counterintelligence agents warned
him about Voroshilov faul play.
When Makhno was already there, not far from the train car where the
headquarters were, a Red Army soldier, who obviously liked the
Makhnovites, told him that he and his army were essentially placed
outside the law by the Soviet government. Makhno quickly realized that
he was trapped, so he ran away from the railway station, shooting one of
the Voroshilov guards with his revolver. The members of Makhno’s staff
were less fortunate—they were soon seized by Cheka agents. Then they
were transferred to Kharkiv and, after a symbolic trial, were executed
by firing squad as “enemies of the revolution.”
Around mid-June 1919 Makhno left Red Army for good, and his people began
to fight on two fronts, against the White and Red Armies. Meanwhile, the
Bolsheviks were actively searching for Makhno. Among those who were
hunting after Makhno were the division commander Dybenko and the
experienced Cheka agent Dmitry Medvedev, who was later arrested and shot
by the Makhnovites. Dybenko found Makhno near Nikopol, where the latter
was fighting against Denikin’s army. Dybenko invited his former
subordinate to his headquarters in order to restore their alliance
against the White Army. This time Makhno was again warned by his
counterintelligence agents about Dybenko’s plan to kill him, and so he
didn’t go to meet with Dybenko, avoiding another trap.
In October 1919 the insurgent army led by Makhno reclaimed almost all of
southern Ukraine, which had been conquered by the White Guards. That was
the time when the Bolsheviks hatched one of their most powerful and
dangerous plots against Makhno and his people. The key part was played
by Mykhailo Polonsky. In autumn 1919 Makhno’s army was a political
motley crew, consisting of anarchists, Petliurites, and Red Army men,
who were all united by the common desire to fight against the Denikin
occupation. In the summer of 1919, under pressure from Denikin’s army,
entire Red Army regiments joined Makhno’s troops, which was essentially
a restoration of the alliance between the Red Army and Makhno. According
to some historians’ estimates, nearly 40,000 Red Army men, almost the
entire army, joined Makhno’s forces. Among them was the 3^(rd) Crimean
Cavalry Regiment, which was led by Polonsky. His cavalrymen were good at
fighting Denikin’s army, which is why one day Makhno personally awarded
Polonsky with a high reward—the black anarchist flag. This was why some
Bolsheviks thought that Polonsky had betrayed the proletarian revolution
and deserted to Makhno for ideological reasons. However, the ensuing
events proved these thoughts to be false.
In the autumn of 1919 many of Makhno’s friends and enemies were amazed
at the military successes of his forces. The Bolshevik newspaper Pravda
had published fairly objective accounts, and even Trotsky, an
irreconcilable opponent of the Makhno-led insurgents as he was,
acknowledged their achievements. At the same time, both Russian and
Ukrainian communists realized again that, despite all their efforts, the
Makhno movement was still there, and the Makhnovites were still serious
rivals in the fight for control over Ukraine.
In October of 1919 members of the Katerynoslav Gubernia Bolshevik
Committee, which was operating semilegally, devised with another
anti-Makhno operation. The goal was to physically destroy Makhno’s top
commanders and force the Makno-controlled detachments to join the Red
Army, which was then advancing to the south.
Polonsky, a communist and at the same time a popular commander in
Makhno’s army, was the best person to carry out this plan. Moreover, as
Makhno’s ideological opponent, he took steps of his own accord to join
the conspirators. The Bolshevik organizations in the south soon sent a
group of trustworthy people to join Makhno’s army, and then Polonsky and
his comrades-in-arms began to form Bolshevik units among the Makhnovites
in order to spread ideological and organizational influence. With time
these units were set up in the majority of Makhno’s military units
except for the cavalry led by the otaman Fedor Shchus and the machinegun
regiment headed by Foma Kozhyn, who had extreme anti-Bolshevik
sentiments.
The more communists units appeared, the greater their influence on the
insurgent masses was. Even though Makhno’s commanders knew from their
informers about nearly every step made by underground communists, they
did not do anything about it for a long time. On the one hand, Makhno
and his military commanders tried to stick to the principle of political
liberty for all left-wing political parties. On the other hand, they
clearly underrated Polonsky as their opponent. Later, in November 1919,
they began to take the communists’ activity more seriously. In order to
get more inside information about the gubernia committee’s plans, they
sent an experienced counterintelligence agent to one of the committee’s
meetings who introduced himself as a CC CP(B)U emissary Zakharov.
Unsuspecting committee members briefed Zakharov on all the details of
the anti-Makhno plot. This was a critical mistake on the part of the
communists that led to the complete failure of the entire conspiracy. A
bit later Makhno learned not only about Polonsky’s intention to make him
a general without an army, but also about their plan to poison Makhno
and his commanders at the celebration of Polonsky’s common-law wife’s
birthday in early December 1919.
The secret information gathered by Makhno’s personal agents proved to be
true. Polonsky really invited all the top commanders of Makhno’s army to
his wife’s birthday, but instead of Makhno and his commanders, Makhno’s
counterintelligence agents showed up there and arrested Polonsky and
some other participants of the conspiracy. Polonsky was taken to the
Dnipro under escort and, without any trial, was executed by a firing
squad. However, Polonsky’s efforts were not entirely fruitless. In late
1919 and early 1920 about 35,000 Makhnovites, a considerable part of the
insurgent army, joined the Red Army troops that had entered the
Makhno-controlled region.
In January 1920 Makhno let his insurgents take some rest, considering
that his army had been nearly constantly battling against various
enemies. This was when the Makhno movement, strictly speaking, came to
an end. If it had not revived, no one, of course, would have waged
either open or secret wars against Makhno, and various Bolshevik
structures would have been unlikely to plot new attempts on his life.
However, in the summer of 1920 he had a new large army that delivered
painful blows to the Bolshevik rear. N. Martynov, a top Cheka official
in Ukraine, set the task before his subordinates in Katerynoslav —
organize in the near future a terrorist act to kill Makhno. In June 1920
two young men, Yakiv Kostiukhin and Fedir Hlushchenko, left for
Huliai-Pole armed with revolvers and bombs. Nicknamed Yashka the Fool in
the criminal circles, Kostiukhin was an inveterate criminal who stepped
on this path back in tsarist times. Judging from his sobriquet, he did
not achieve much in the criminal world, although he did spend nine
months in tsarist prisons. Later he was arrested by the Cheka on
criminal charges, and agreed to work for the secret police in exchange
for a pardon. On numerous occasions Kostiukhin participated in the
destruction of anarchist organizations in various cities in Ukraine
before he was tasked with something a lot more important in June 1920.
Hlushchenko was a different person. Despite his young age, he had been
involved in the creation of Makhno’s special units but later found
himself in the Bolshevik captivity. Under the threat of death by firing
squad, he agreed to join the Cheka’s Katerynoslav branch. However, it
was unlikely that he became a true Cheka man. In my opinion, in
Katerynoslav he was the same as before — a Makhno counterintelligence
agent. Knowing the Cheka plot, he decided to thwart this attempt on
Makhno’s life. On his own initiative the Cheka appointed him one of the
two terrorists to be sent to Huliai-Pole.
Leaving Yashka the Fool near Makhno’s headquarters, Hlushchenko
immediately met with the otaman and told him everything. Makhno sent him
to Kurylenko, one of his trusted men. After a few minutes Kurylenko,
unnoticed, came up to Kostiukhin and professionally stripped him of his
weapons in the matter of seconds. The Makhno tribunal sentenced
Kostiukhin to death by firing squad. Ironically, the same sentence was
handed to Hlushchenko — Makhno did not forgive him his cooperation with
the Cheka and he died praying for the Makhnovites.
Makhno’s counterintelligence agents did not seem to know about this
plot. However, later, in November 1920, they were again on the top of
things. Following their input, the Makhnovites were able to neutralize
several groups of Cheka saboteurs numbering 50 in total. One of them had
been tasked with destroying Makhno’s headquarters using hand grenades.
The decisive role in this operation was played by the extremely
experienced counterintelligence agent and anarchist Mirsky, who had
managed to penetrate the Cheka and even become Martynov’s personal
aides.
In August 1921 the remnants of Makhno’s units under his personal command
crossed the Dniester and surrendered to the Romanian authorities. It
would seem that Makhno would have a more peaceful time abroad. But peace
was illusory, because the Bolshevik special agents were still seeking
him there, just like they had done in Ukraine. At one point, a group of
well-armed Cheka men led by Dmytro Medvedev crossed the Romanian border.
They changed into Romanian military uniforms and headed for in B l i,
where, according to their data, Makhno was in a safe apartment at the
time. They killed several Makhnovites there but failed to find the
otaman. History ordained that during their secret war against Makhno and
his followers the Bolsheviks failed to reach the set goals. The
initiators and executors of the secret plans were unable to stamp out
the Makhno movement or kill the otaman. However, in the last years of
his life Makhno was not the primary target of the Soviet secret agents,
primarily because he was no longer a serious threat to the USSR. At the
time Makno was dreaming of something else — how he would return to
Ukraine and live the peaceful life of an ordinary peasant with a young
wife. This was a different Makhno altogether.