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Title: Operation Sold Out II Author: Paul Finch Date: 2005 Language: en Topics: Northeastern Anarchist, Canada, general strike Source: Retrieved on March 8, 2017 from https://web.archive.org/web/20170308015029/http://nefac.net/node/1947 Notes: Written by Paul Finch, external secretary of Northwestern Anarchist Federation, formerly FNAC. Published in The Northeastern Anarchist Issue #10, Spring/Summer 2005.
The most significant period of labor unrest in British Columbia since
1983 took place in late April and early May of 2004, as a result of the
failed province-wide “General Strike” movement. During this period,
dissatisfaction with government policies and ensuing legislation
escalated into wildcat strikes, walkouts, and significant mass public
support for the actions of labor unions, community groups, and students
in opposition to the government.
Very little has been written on the attempted general strike from the
perspective of those in British Columbia, and even less from those who
were actually involved in the actions that took place around May Day of
2004. The lack of critical theory and analysis of what happened is
unacceptable in light of the current situation, and the challenges faced
not just by working people throughout the province, but also across the
country. Without a thorough understanding of how the general strike
movement operated, and how it failed, the labor movement in British
Columbia will be sentenced to continual failure and decline.
Even worse, it would be a tragedy if the Quebec workers, who even now
are wrestling with the neo-liberal reforms of the Charest Liberal
regime, were not to draw solid lessons from the general strike movement.
This critical account of the failed general strike movement in British
Columbia is written from an anarchist perspective within the events, as
both a participant and observer. Analysis of the event is firmly rooted
not only in experience of the events at their epicentre in Victoria, but
also from the perspective of an anarchist-communist and student union
organizer involved in labor and community struggles. It is therefore
necessary that the content of this account focus on the events in
Victoria, the most central area, both because it is the provincial seat
of governance, and because the city experienced the sharpest expression
of class conflict.
There are four general sections to this account: a brief introduction to
the history of labor unrest leading up to failed general strike, a
precise description of those events, a critical analysis of the
situation as it emerged, and some conclusions for the labor movement in
general and revolutionary left in particular.
British Columbia has traditionally held one of the strongest labor
movements in North America. This may seem to be a surprising and
controversial contention at the outset, but to those well versed in
labor and radical history, the conclusion is not without merit. Many US
trade unions found their origins in the Pacific west above their
borders, the Industrial Workers of the World established a stronghold
prior to their suppression following the first world war, and the
solidly resource-based economy has long been a bastion of unionism, in
both the public and private sectors. Although these foundations have
continually been eroded, their legacy still remains in the unique
manifestations of the labor movement today.
It was during the late reign of the conservative Social Credit
government, prior to the accession to power of the social-democratic New
Democratic Party (NDP), that the labor movement found expression in the
1983 “Operation Solidarity” movement. The culmination of radical
organizing throughout the late 60’s and 70’s, Operation Solidarity saw
labor, community, environmental, and radical militants attempt a general
strike to force the hand of the provincial government. This was the
first crucial battle between the introduction of neo-liberal
privatization, and a labor movement divided between reformism and
radical opposition. Operation Solidarity later earned the title
“Operation Sold Out”, as the powerful anti-communist labor bureaucracy
ceded into a deal with the government on unfavourable terms, ending the
mass labor dispute.
With the fall of the NDP in the election of 2001, in which it lost all
but two of the seventy-nine electoral seats up for contest, a radically
right-wing regime under the BC Liberals took power provincially. The
effects were immediate and striking. Where the NDP has eroded the
foundations of the welfare state and enacted policies aimed at
privatization and liberalization of industry, the BC Liberals outright
crippled and destroyed the social order that had existed during the
previous social democratic government. The terms of labor contracts
concluded by mutual parties were openly altered by legislation, unions
who expressed contempt through labor action were legislated back to
work, and social welfare services were slashed as massive tax cuts for
the wealthiest citizens came hand in hand with the privatization of
public assets.
In January of 2002, the provincial government introduced legislation
specifically aimed at provoking the British Columbia Teachers Federation
(BCTF) into open conflict, and breaking the Hospital Employees Union
(HEU). The legislation “renegotiated” existing contracts into unilateral
documents based solely upon the will and discretion of the government.
Other unions, such as the British Columbia Government Employees Union
(BCGEU), faced massive wage and benefit cuts in addition to the layoffs
experienced as a result of broad public-sector privatization. In all
cases, the leadership of the unions ceded to government demands without
a fight, relying primarily on mass one-off publicity demonstrations of
public displeasure.
It was in this climate of social tension and defeatism amongst the union
bureaucracy that substantial radical elements began to take more
definite form and express themselves popularly. During large
anti-government demonstrations, anarchists and assorted radicals began
to distribute literature and carry banners calling for a general strike,
demanding measures aimed at rolling back the provincial government’s
policies. Community coalitions that served as alliances between labor
and community militants were formed, often as small directorships
unaccountable to broader external or internal social forces, to carry
out social agitation the British Columbia Federation of Labour (BCFed)
refused to sanction. Consistent polarization within the people’s
opposition to the government ensued as the BCFed and affiliates adopted
a position of waiting for the upcoming provincial elections to alter
government policies through election of a social democratic alternative.
Recalling the openly neo-liberal policies of the prior social democratic
government, radicals broadly rejected the NDP and BCFed’s line and
continued to push for a general strike movement.
The provincial government decided to launch an intensified attack on the
HEU early in 2004, announcing privatization of over 1,000 positions on
Vancouver Island alone. The largest private sector union in the
province, the Industrial, Wood and Allied Workers of America (IWA),
backed up the privatization schemes by unionizing the employees hired by
companies who were recipients of the privatization contracts. With no
legal recourse, since the “new” workers (in reality, primarily the old
employees forced to take the same jobs at lower pay and benefits) were
covered by labor law as belonging to the IWA, over 10,000 HEU workers
were about to or had already lost their jobs.
On February 23^(rd), the Communities Solidarity Coalition of Victoria
(CSC) supported a wildcat strike action by many of the HEU workers whose
jobs were slated to be privatized. Student union militants played a
sizable role in supporting the wildcat. The CSC, which had previously
focused on mass demonstrations and social actions, now focused itself on
supporting HEU workers who were under attack. The CSC was itself at the
time a loose coalition of labor, student, and community activists led by
a small group of organizers.
The health employers, backed by the provincial government, took an
aggressive position in ensuing contract negotiations with the HEU.
Confidently backed by the government, the employers demanded severe cuts
in benefits and pay that were rejected outright by the HEU’s membership.
The result was that in April, contract negotiations failed, and on
Monday, April 26^(th) the HEU went on strike at approximately 340 care
facilities around the province. The union took a steadfast position in
maintaining essential service levels at all health care facilities,
allowing for required treatments to continue and necessary shifts to be
staffed by its membership. From the outset of the strike, public opinion
was mobilized in favour of the HEU workers, with labor and community
activists actively joining the picket lines.
The government’s response was swift, and after just two days into the
strike, they crafted Bill 37 to legislate the HEU workers back to work.
In addition to ordering strikers back to work, the legislation fixed a
contract for the union that allowed for open-ended privatization, and
imposed a 15% wage cut retroactive to April 1^(st). Supporters of the
HEU rallied to the picket lines in indignation, and labor and community
activists began to encourage wildcat pickets in support of the striking
workers, urging the union not to give in to the government’s position.
The labor movement was deeply divided on the legislation: while all
opposed it, some prominent unions and labor leaders refused to support
the HEU. Jim Sinclair, president of the BCFed, held back from advising
labor unions to join the HEU on the picket lines, and the head of the
BCGEU did likewise. During the morning of Thursday April 29^(th), before
Bill 37 had been given royal assent and passed into law, shop stewards
for the BC Nurses Union (BCNU) and Health Employees Association (HEA, a
loose BCGEU affiliate) were ordering their members to cross HEU picket
lines. The HEU executive itself didn’t issue a decision on the
government’s ruling until over a full five hours after it had been made
law, eventually declaring they would continue the strike in defiance of
the government.
To provide some context, the BCFed is the overarching labor federation
that unites the majority of public and private sector unions in the
province. The BCGEU is a smaller yet influential public sector union
within the BCFed. Lacking clout at local levels (and even within the
Victoria labor movement), the BCGEU holds considerable power within the
BCFed and was responsible for many of the conservative directions taken
by the organization.
The decision by the HEU, under strong pressure from its members, to defy
the government’s back to work legislation was both a controversial and
popular one. While many unions such as the BCGEU and BCNU distanced
themselves from the HEU and ordered members to cross picket lines,
workers across British Columbia began to decide otherwise. Over 100 BC
Hydro workers in Prince George and Revelstoke went on a wildcat strike,
shutting down the three largest hydroelectric dams in the province.
Several union locals across the province followed suit and went on
strike in support of healthcare workers, and HEU picket lines were
flooded with supporters from the community and other labor unions. CUPE
locals started repeating the call for the general strike, by this time a
common slogan, and the BC Teacher’s Federation (BCTF) declared their
members would respect any and all CUPE picket lines around public
schools. Support from CUPE locals in Victoria was especially critical,
as many defied ordered delays and went on wildcat strike immediately.
The morning of Friday, April 30^(th) started with a bold action by the
CSC, pre-empting a labor board ruling deeming the strike illegal.
Leading militants from the BCGEU, CUPE, HEU, and student unions staged a
flying picket of the Victoria Swartz Bay BC Ferries terminal,
effectively shutting down the main conduit of travel between Vancouver
Island—the capital of the province being located on the Island—and the
mainland between 5:30am and 7:20am, disrupting sailings for the rest of
the day. Although the action itself was minor, the BC Ferry workers
themselves enthusiastically supported the picket lines, and news of a
flying picket shutting down a crucial transport corridor spread quickly
throughout the province.
Throughout Friday, union locals across the province continued to wildcat
in support of the defiant HEU workers. In Victoria, almost every CUPE
local went out in support of the HEU, with the exception of the
University workers. Largely, CUPE workers were enacting a solidarity
“Action Plan” of cascading strikes should any of its subsidiary locals
be targeted. While HEU wasn’t affiliated with CUPE provincially, it was
nationally, and therefore many individual locals interpreted the “Action
Plan” liberally and enacted solidarity strikes. CUPE’s leadership, which
hadn’t yet issued a strong position on the strikes, came out in support
of them and announced that all of the union’s 70,000 workers in the
province would be out on the picket lines by Monday at the latest.
The BCFed, meanwhile, had scheduled a meeting with the government’s
Labour Minister. The talks were short, with the BCFed pulling out
quickly to caucus internally. The rest of the day was consumed by
internal meetings of the BCFed, where the organization secretly decided
not to authorize a general strike, the executive voting against the
measure by a small but safe margin. The BCFed’s decision was impacted by
a serious problem: the general strike movement which was building steam
had not been initiated or planned by the organization itself, whose
leadership was clearly in the passenger seat. Over 800 BC Hydro workers
joined their brothers and sisters on the picket line, and all across the
province the movement for a general strike was gaining steam.
Saturday was May 1^(st), International Workers’ Day. Demonstrations in
commemoration of the eight-hour-day struggle and international labor
solidarity flared around the globe, as they do every year on that day.
In Victoria, over a thousand striking workers and militants took to the
streets, periodically interrupting speakers with chants of “General
Strike now!” and marching directly to picket lines in support of
striking HEU workers. Thousands of leaflets denouncing the government
and distributing demands were issued under the banner of the Federation
of Northwest Anarchist-Communists (FNAC). The leaflets, the only broad
propaganda issued during the May Day demonstrations, featured common
demands such as repealing back to work legislation and calling for a
general strike. In population-dense Vancouver, a hastily put together
May Day demonstration attracted over ten thousand marching in support of
the general strike movement.
Labor unrest around the province increased. More and more unions
continued to wildcat off the job, in a seemingly endless cascade. Over
24,000 students were unable to attend the schools which had been shut
down by CUPE pickets, and flying squads in Victoria picketed several
sympathetic union locals. The provincial government was appealing for
unions to “respect the rule of law” and continued to seek a court
injunction against the strike, which had been deemed illegal. In
addition, plans were set into motion to conduct mass arrests, and
holding facilities were emptied in expectation of striking workers being
rounded up. It was in this climate that the BCFed, still reeling from
its membership rejecting appeasement tactics, decided to convene further
negotiations with the government.
The expected “calm before the storm” arrived on Sunday, May 2^(nd),
after a series of May Day demonstrations that had buoyed striking
workers and left the government and BCFed alienated from the events
taking place. Provincial courts declared the HEU strike illegal, and
levelled severe fines against the union in excess of $400,000 a day.
Despite the stiff penalties, the HEU stood firm and refused to remove
its picket lines. The United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) had by
this time served strike notice, threatening to take down large sectors
of commercial food distribution services. Private sectors unions,
including progressive locals of the IWA, announced they would walk out
on Monday. Transit workers across the province also stated their
intentions to go on strike in support of the HEU.
The BCFed sought to regain composure and announced to leading labor and
community militants a plan of action for the anticipated province-wide
general strike on Monday, refusing to acknowledge the organization’s
executive had already decided against calling a general strike. In
Victoria, a meeting was arranged between local BCFed affiliates and
local militants, primarily from the CSC, outlining which locals could
and could not be picketed down on Monday. Meanwhile, closed door
negotiations between the government and labor leaders continued.
By Sunday night the CSC had grouped labor and community militants
together in Victoria for a planning session to work out details of the
following day’s activity. The session quickly began to unravel as news
reports of an agreement reached by the highest echelons of organized
labor had been accepted. The BCFed, it appeared, was using its chain of
command to dismantle preparations before negotiations with the
government had produced any results. It appeared to all observers that
the BCFed had no intention of allowing its affiliate membership to
strike, a suspicion that was confirmed with the cessation of approval
for the CSC in Victoria to cross-picket an extensive list of sympathetic
work sites.
After 10:00pm, news of the sellout by labor leadership was announced: a
deal had been reached between the HEU management and the government,
brokered by the heads of the BCFed and BCGEU. CUPE quickly ordered its
membership to stand down, and the BCTF followed suit, along with the
other public and private sector unions. Amongst the general confusion of
the ensuing series of pronouncements by labor leaders, HEU workers at
locals across the province denounced their executive, openly accusing
the leadership of “selling out”. Indeed, the “deal” negotiated with the
government merely reduced pay cuts to 10% while adding 2.5 hours to the
work week, limiting privatization of positions to “only” an additional
three hundred. Visibly defiant, HEU workers across the province
announced to live television crews their intention to stay on the picket
line, and pickets were quickly erected around HEU headquarters by a
dissatisfied membership.
The morning of Monday, May 3^(rd) saw HEU pickets remain steadfast at
the major health care facilities across the province. In Victoria, over
400 FNAC posters were plastered across the city demanding the repeal of
Bill 37 and cessation of privatization of public services and assets.
Flying pickets shut down transit services, and CSC flying squads were
centrally coordinated around the city. In Nanaimo and Quesnel, labor
unrest continued throughout the day. Despite this strong show of forces
on Vancouver Island, the mainland remained relatively quiet. Business as
usual resumed in Vancouver, where no CSC-like group was able to
coordinate cross pickets or flying squads, and the labor movement obeyed
the back-to-work orders. Even in Victoria, it was clear by the end of
the day that the general strike movement had been crushed. The unions
had backed down, some publicly denouncing the deal with the government,
others sheepishly claiming it as a “victory”. The HEU, betrayed by its
own leadership, soon caved and found itself engaged in pitted internal
battles. The general strike movement was, for all intents and purposes,
over.
It is exceedingly difficult to arrive at a coherent, systemic analysis
of the failed general strike movement in British Columbia. There is an
intersection between reality and ideological interpretation that blurs
lines, and leads to false motivations being ascribed to various parties.
The tendency to describe complex socio-economic forces in simple,
dogmatic stereotypes is all too common amongst the revolutionary left.
In much of the material that has already been published, “big labor” is
accused of selling out “the rank and file,” without any further
exploration of the issue, or clarification of what those two terms
really mean. Rather than using facts to justify an ideological
explanation of the situation, the following analysis of the general
strike movement attempts to use ideological conventions to illuminate
the currents of factual understanding.
First and foremost, the single greatest reason for the failure of the
general strike movement was a lack of organization. The most glaring,
obvious deficiency in the way in which the rolling wildcat strikes were
conducted was the fact that the various locals going on strike were
rarely in communication with one another. Since the structures of the
formal labor movement across the province were unable to provide
leadership or coordination, labor and community militants were left to
their own devices, along with whatever smaller coalitions they had
formed in the previous months of struggle. This level of organization
was, by itself, insufficient to coordinate and provide leadership for
the broad elements calling for a general strike. In the absence of
organically developed leadership, many elements looking to
underdeveloped and unaccountable formations with little in the way of
developing political stance, or worse yet put radical aspirations in the
hands of the conservative BCFed.
There were no common organizations in which labor and community
militants could come together to confide in one another in a time of
crisis. The leadership that arose throughout the April and May events
was accountable in a very loose way in several instances, and completely
unaccountable in several more. The groups of militants who could, and
should, have been issuing demands and organizing increased strike action
were paralysed by inaction, and found themselves swept up in the events
that unfolded before them. When the need for greater organization became
apparent, it was already too late.
There is a continual tendency among radicals to create social movements
that are inherited by reformists, and either crushed entirely or used
for the ends of the latter. This is precisely the case with the general
strike movement. The loss of these movements to reformist elements is
never intentional, nor is it the result of indecisive elements within
the radical tendencies; rather, it is the natural result of radicals not
being engaged in specific political organizations. The CSC is a perfect
example of this: while many of its leading militants identified with
revolutionary traditions, including anarchism, few of them were engaged
in any specific political organizations. The task of building a culture
of resistance among common radicals was ignored in favour of exclusive
work on mass political formations, brought together around a simple
basis of unity. Formations of this type lack a basic understanding of
the environment in which they operate, and fail to differentiate between
experienced militants and casual participants. While these mass
formations are necessary, and indeed crucial to any social movement, by
themselves they lack the sophistication to develop beyond mere reformist
agitation.
Nowhere in the province was a single political organization or alliance
of organizations able to broadly influence the course of events, with
the result that a series of competing organizations exercised slight
influence over small factions within the broader movement. The movement
itself, based on a loose notion of defending the HEU by wielding the
tool of a general strike, was unable to shift tactically or even
strategically. While militants had, through their agitation, shaped the
desire for a general strike and brought it to the forefront of public
consciousness, they had simultaneously failed to create organizations
that could ensure the practical application of the principles from which
the desire for a general strike stemmed.
The membership of several local unions after the fact would complain
that because of a lack of organization, and as a result a lack of
communication, they were unaware of the extent of resistance to the
BCFed-brokered “deal”. They contended that, had they only been informed
of the ongoing resistance and its depth, they would have rallied harder
around the need to continue the strike. The lack of counter-structures
being developed to spread information allowed for the default
organizational structures of the BCFed and affiliate unions to take over
processes that had, for the duration of the General Strike movement,
been suspended by the self-activity of the strikers and their nominally
militant leadership.
The role of flying squads was critical in shaping the character and
direction of the strike movement. In many union locals, there exists a
tension between the reformist and more radical elements. Flying squads
allowed the radical elements to unite and draw out the reformist
elements with them, by changing the dynamic from “should we walk out?”
to “should we respect an existing picket line preventing us from going
to work?”. While a “yes” to the former question was often indefensible
in the face of strong reformist control of a local, a “yes” to the
latter was resisted by only the most conservative elements.
The main lesson that can be drawn from the failure of the General Strike
movement in BC is the need for a coherent revolutionary organization
with a solid theoretical and practical base. It is the theoretical
wealth of an organization, especially a revolutionary organization, that
determines its ability to influence militants and provide a common
vision and direction that can be followed by a broad number of people.
It is the practical base of an organization, and the connection of its
membership to the struggles they are attempting to influence, that form
the ability of the aforementioned theoretical analysis to permeate and
gain popularity among existing militants (while in its propagation
awakening new ones).
If the revolutionary anarchist-communist movement is to learn anything
from the failure of the General Strike movement in BC, it should be the
need for solid theoretical analysis that lays out the path before those
involved in agitation, and provides a common basis for militants from
all ideological tendencies to unite under. Agitation in a given area of
struggle – be it based in the community, industrial, or service sectors
– by itself does not produce the required level of communication and
organization to build a movement that can truly make itself independent
from the reformist structures it arises within. The level of
organization needs to come from militants grouped together around a
common analysis of the situation, who work out their respective
ideological positions on the basis of the analysis being put forward.
Concretely, in any future general strike situation in BC or Quebec, the
immediate task of a revolutionary organization can be characterized in
three main areas. The first is to carry out broad and systematic
propaganda campaigns on behalf of the labor agitation, which FNAC did
during the BC movement and NEFAC has apparently done during the Quebec
labor disputes. The second is to form a theoretical analysis of the
situation, to provide a vision of where the movement should go based on
that analysis, and to propagate both the vision and analysis broadly
throughout the movement. The third area of intervention is to develop
and raise existing organs of struggle to an appropriate level where they
do exist, and to build and maintain them where they do not. Integral to
this process is identifying a community organization which can be
developed to serve as a conduit for communication between existing labor
unions, and facilitating meeting between the leadership from various
community groups and labor unions that emerges, organically, over the
course of struggle.
During the general strike movement in BC, no revolutionary organization
was able to characterize the events taking place and make demands based
on them, save for ancillary propaganda produced by FNAC in the course of
struggle, and distributed through May Day speeches, posters, and
leaflets. In the absence of a revolutionary organization carrying out
intervention in all three of main areas listed previously, striking
workers and those supporting them had little alternative but to fall
back on the political and labor organizations that were already familiar
to them. Due to the failure of revolutionaries to provide accountable
leadership based on articulating a shared vision and demands, the
workers in struggle were forced to turn to an unaccountable leadership,
which based its power on existing institutions and structures. It is
essential for anarchist-communists to put forward accountable and
revolutionary leadership based on a common analysis and direction put
forward by militants and endorsed by those involved in the struggle.