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Title: Kropotkin and Huxley
Author: Ruth Kinna
Date: 1992
Language: en
Topics: Pëtr Kropotkin, mutual aid, evolution, science
Source: Retrieved on 10th November 2021 from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467–9256.1992.tb00214.x
Notes: Published in Politics 12(2), 42–47. doi:10.1111/j.1467–9256.1992.tb00214.x

Ruth Kinna

Kropotkin and Huxley

Introduction

In September 1890 the anarchist Peter Kropotkin issued the first of a

series of articles investigating the principles of Darwinian evolution.

Later supplemented by two other sets of essays this series was published

under the tide of Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution.[1]

In his introduction to Mutual Aid, Kropotkin identifies the Russian

biologist, Kessler, as the inspiration for the development of his

evolutionary theory. It was Kessler, he claims, who impressed upon him

the symbiotic aspects of natural selection and who alerted him to the

‘corruption’ of Darwin’s hypothesis by Victorian ‘social darwinists’.

Kropotkin‘s elaboration of Kessler’s thesis begins with a refutation of

social darwinism and T.H. Huxley serves as the target of his attack.

Kropotkin devotes little space to the discussion of Huxley’s ideas. Yet

his dispute with Huxley has played a central role in modem evaluations

of Kropotkin‘s theory of mutual aid. Most contemporary writers

understand his assault on Huxley as a

signal of his desire to bridge the gap between moral development and

natural evolution.[2] This essay examines the cogency of this view and

argues that it fails to make sense of Kropotkin‘s work. The paper

divides into four parts: it begins with an outline of Kropotkin’s

critique of Huxley and then discusses various modem assessments of

Kropotkin‘s work The third section examines Kropotkin‘s rejection of

Hwrley in the context of these assessments. The final part demonstrates

the weakness of the existing interpretations and suggests an alternative

read of Kropotkin’s dispute with Huxley.

Kropotkin’s Refutation of Huxley

Kropotkin’s critique of Huxley focuses on the essay, ‘The struggle for

existence’ (Huxley, 1888). Quoting selectively from this article,

Kropotkin accuses Huxley of reducing Darwin’s notion of the struggle ‘to

its narrowest limits’. As one of the ‘ablest exponents of the theory of

evolution’ Huxley conceives ‘the animal world as a world of perpetual

struggle among half-starved individuals, thirsting for one another’s

blood’. Huxley and his cohorts have, Kropotkin continues:

... made modem literature resound with the warcry ofwoe to the

vanquished, as ifit were the last word ofmodern biology. They raised the

’pltiless’ struggle for personal advantages to the height of a

biological principle which m a n must submit to as well, under the

menace of otherwise succumbing in a world based upon mutual

extermination (Kropotkin, 1890a, p.338).

Kropotkin compares ths representation of nature with Rousseau’s

portrayal of the primitive state and finds that Hwrley’s image is an

scientifically groundless as former’s hypothetical state of nature

(Kropotkin, 1890a, p.339). But it is also charmless: Hwrley’s vision,

Kropotkin suggests, is simply a restatement of the Hobbesian w a r of

each against all CKropotlun, 1891, p.539).

Kropotkin traces the source of Huxley’s error to his failure to

appreciate the fullness of Darwin’s conception of the ‘struggle for

existence’. In the Origin of Species, Kropotkin pointa out, Darwin

specifically widened this notion beyond the competitive individual fight

and describes the term as a metaphor. For Darwin, Kropotkin contents,

‘the struggle’ is one experienced by groups or species against the

ravages of nature. whilst in later editions of his work Darwin accepted

the applicability of Spencer’s epithet, Kropotkin argues that he never

congidered that the biologically ‘fittest’ were the most cunning or pow&

individuals. Contrary to Huxley, Darwin identified the fittest to be the

most sociable and cooperative groups (Kropotkin, 1890a, pp. 337–42.)

Implicitly recognising the contentiousness of his claims Kropotkin

explains the popular appeal of Huxley’s social darwinism by pointing to

the shortcominga of Darwin’s onginal work. Unfortunately, Kmpotkin

explains, Darwin was so eager to impress his general theory of natural

selection on his readers that he neglected to emphasise the importance

of his metaphorical conception of the ‘struggle’. Even more

unfortunately, Kropotkin adds, Darwin laboured at atime when the

biological proofs that he required to sustain his argument were lacking.

Moreover, though his work progressed to encompass a more co-operative

image of nature, Darwin himself became too ill to complete his

researches. Thus, Kropotkin argues, in order to provide his hypothesis

of natural selection with some theoretical backing Darwin was initially

forced to posit the Malthusian assumption of scarcity and he did not

live long enough to correct his mistake (Kropotkin, 1989a 1910).

Huxley’s representation of Darwin is not, Kropotkin concedes, without

foundation. But as an exposition based on the deficiencies of Darwin’s

work it is irredeemably flawed. In elaborating the theory of mutual aid,

Kropotkin assumes the Darwinian mantel in an effort to redress the

balance.

Assessments of Mutual Aid

Mutual Aid advances a simple thesis of natural cooperation. The theory

does not deny the existence of competition within groups or species but

dectively ignores it. Kropotkin’s theory of mutual aid also diminishes

the importance of inter-species struggle (though, Kropotkin acknowledges

mankind’s aggressiveness to other animal life). Where Kropotkin allows

competition between groups he usually writea in favour of nature’s

‘underdogs’, showing how bands of the most feeble creatures can

effectively right off the fiercest predator, in order to reifmate the

importance of common action (Kropotkin, 1890b, pp.669–701)

Kropotkin sustains his argument with an intricately interwoven tapestry

of biological, anthropological, historical and sociological data. The

book divides into four sections. It begins with an account of animal

life. The Kropotkin presents studies of various ancient and modern

‘barbarian’ and ‘savage’ societies. In the third section he examines the

organisation of the medieval city-states. He concludes the study with an

account of the practice of mutual aid in the modern world.

Kropotkin’s layering of information is typical — works falling within

both the sociological and more strictly scientific traditions of the

Victorian era were classically interdisciplinary, fusing metaphysical

and political questions with scientific argument — though his message is

specifically anarchist. Modern authors have not ignored this interplay

between Kropotkin‘8 science and his politics but emphasis has been

placed on the work‘s biological underpinning.

Kropotkin’s theory has not been treated uncritically by modem writers

but it has enjoyed a generally warm reception. Criticism attaches to

Kropotkin‘s method and to the objectivity of his research (Baldwin,

1970; Woodcock and Avakumovic, 1950; Martin Miller, 1976). Kropotkin’s

fiercest critics also attack the naturalism of his approach (David

Miller, 1983; Walter, 1971). In spite of these acknowledged flaws the

theory of mutual aid is still regarded as being ‘scientific’ and

Kropotkin is widely feted for his achievement in estabhhmg anarchism on

a scientific basis (Mondolfo, 1930; G.D.H. Cole, 1954; Avrich, 1988).

Whilst Baldwin, for example, judges that ‘preconceptions’ colour large

parts of Mutual Aid he does not query the scientific value of the work

(Baldwin, pp.6–7). Woodcock‘s attitude is equally paradoxical: again

questioning Kropotkin’s objectivity he argues that his findmgs have been

validated by most modem biology and sociology (Woodcock, 1979, p.201).

Critics of anarchism similarly accord Kropotkin‘s work scientific

status, comparing the soundness of his reasoning to the apparently

muddleheaded rambling of Bakunin (Kelly, 1982, p.158). Avrich’s concise

assessment of Mutual Aid reflects the consensus:

Mutual Aid has become a classic. With the exception of his memoirs it is

his best known work and is widely regarded as his masterpiece... The

reasons are not hard to find. Mutual Aid is more than a contribution to

the theory of evolution ... it was his most successful attempt to

provide anarchist theory with a scientific foundation (Avrich, 1988,

p.59).

The Role of Kropotkin’s Dispute with Huxley in the Assessment of

Mutual Aid

The good reputation that Mutual Aid enjoys cannot be explained with

reference to Kropotkin‘s dispute with Huxley alone. Some writers stress

the importance of Kropotkin‘s geographical training and his fieldwork in

Siberia in evaluating his work (Cole, 1954; Avrich, 19881, but in

estimating the scientific worth of Mutual Aid the overwhelming majority

of writers do comment on what they see as Kropotkin‘s successful

demolition of Huxley’s apparent vulgarisation of Darwinism.

Significantly, studies which take Kropotkin‘s rejection of Huxley’s

observed social darwinism as a starting point for their assessments have

blindly followed his misrepresentation of Huxley’s point (David Miller,

1976; 1983). More damningly, whilst Kropotkin eventually corrects his

error, admitting Huxley’s wider ethical concerns, (Kropotkin, 1968,

p.49) modem writers have exacerbated the original distortion and have

portrayed Huxley as an unrepentant defender of unfettered laissez-faire

liberalism (Martin Miller, 1976; Montague, 1976; Marshall, 1992). The

charge is unfounded. As Darwin’s ‘bulldog‘, Huxley used the concept of

evolution as a stick with which to beat the Church but he did not

recommend the ‘survival of the fittest’ as a model for human morality.

In his later essays he specifically advocated that a distinction be

drawn between human ethics and what he considered to be the ugly reality

of the natural world (Huxley, 1888; 1893).

This misrepresentation of Hwdey’s work by modem authors is surprising in

view of the stir that was caused by the publication in 1893 of Huxley’s

Romanes Lecture: amazed contemporaries understood his discussion of

natural and ethical evolution to mark a return to theological

principles. Yet the oversight may be explained in terms of the

opportunity that Kropotkin‘s refutation of Hwdey provides to present the

anarchist case in ‘scientific’ terms. Focusing attention on the

Hobbesian’ aspects of Kropotkin‘s argument (notwithstanding his later

developments of the theory) recent authors have presented Mutual Aid as

the most forceful statement of two anarchist ’truths’: that society is

possible in the absence of the State and that mankind is naturally

adapted to living in such a society without additional law (Woodcock,

1979, p.201). In spite of the crudeness of the Hobbesian defence, this

interpretation of Kropotkin‘s intentions has persuaded even the critics

(David Miller, 1983).

In so far as the theory of mutual aid is interpreted in this way, the

general impact of Kropotkin‘s rebuttal of Huxley has been to limit

debate about Mutual Aid. But in some cases, the injustice of the

judgement passed by modem authors on Huxley‘s work has given rise to a

more distorted reading of Kropotkin‘s theory. As Huxley is portrayed as

an advocate ofthe ‘survival of the fittest’ the theory of mutual aid is

alternatively represented a thesis of natural moral development This

interpretation is advanced in Peter Marshall’s recent analysis:

According to Kmpotkin, evolutionary theory... will demonstrate the

poesibility of anarchism rather than justit;, the capitalist system.

Anarchism as social philosophy is... in keeping with evolving human

nature. Kropotkin not only argues that this is an accurate and true

description of nature and the human species, but sees it aa pmviding the

ground for morality... Human beings are therefore naturally moral

(Marahall, 1989, p. 136)

In related arguments other writers have interpreted Mutual Aid as

examination of developing moral consciousness (Reichert, 1967; Read,

1968; Ward, 1982; Ad&, 1988). But Marshall’s argument may be pursued for

the weakness shared by all these positions is apparent in his own

discussion.

Marshall identifies the problem to be Kropotkin‘s: how, he asks, can the

theory of mutual aid explain the existence of the State and the failure

of human ethical evolution? If human beings are naturally moral, how

does Kropotkin explain what he condemns as the rampant individualism of

the capitalist world? The question ignores the possibility that in

Kropotkin‘s o w n work this difEculty does not arise.

For Kropotkin, there is no necessary evolution of morality. There is

only a potential It is precisely this point he wants to make in Mutual

Aid: ’true’ morality, he explains, will not simply emerge, it must be

willed back into existence. The apirit of mutual aid may have progressed

from the clan, to the tribe and to the village community. It may also

have received its most deliberate and perfect expression in the

organisation of the medieval cities. But the practice of mutual aid has

been always imperfect. Thus, in his discussion of primitive societies

Kropotkin points to the restrictions that are placed on the practice of

mutual aid outside the immediate clan or tribal group (Kropotkin, 1891,

pp.558–9). In his examination of medieval society Kropotkin similarly

argues that it was the weakness of the principle of mutual aid which led

to the decline of the city-states and to the rise of the modern

centralised State (Kropotkin, 1894, pp.404–17).

Rather than showing the natural moral progression of mankind the theory

of mutual aid explains the rise of individualism whilst denying it a

basis in science. Moreover, in this and in his later discussions of the

theory of mutual aid Kropotkin demonstrates that his primary target is

not Huxley, but Malthus. For it is Malthus’ work, not Huxley’s, that

establishes the existence of competition in nature and which denies the

theoretical possibility of ethical perfectibility and ultimately

anarchy.

In Darwin’s work, Malthus’ theory of population increase provides the

basis on which to explain chance variation by natural selection. In

social darwinian thinking (accepting the validity of the distinction

Kropotkin draws between the political and the scientific) Kropotkin

perceives that competition has been raised to the height of a moral

precept (Desmond and Moore, 1991, pp.262–69). Responding to both

arguments at once he denies Darwin’s hypothesis of natural selection in

order to refute the political value of competition. Kropotkin readily

admits that the competitive struggle exists; the charge constitutes one

of the major lines of his attack on capitalism But, he argues, it can be

overcome. The key to success lies in effective organisation: if species

co-operate and maximise their natural developmental potential they will

be able to surmount the hindrancea of the natural environment and ensure

their future survival.

In Mutual Aid, Kropotkin attempts to write Darwin’s premises out of the

evolutionary scheme by postulating the effectiveness of natural checks

to population growth as an alternative to the assumption of geometric

increase (Kropotkin, 1890a, pp.717–17). Yet the problem posed by Malthus

continues to wony him In 1910 he openly admits the inadequacy of his

original exposition and suggests an outright rejection of Malthus in

favour of a synthesis of Darwin with Lamarck (Kropotkin, 1910, pp.86–7).

pursuing this line of argument Kropotkin develops his theory to

distinguish between two concepts: biological and ethical mutual aid. The

first is an adaptation of Darwinian ideas and refers to an instinctual

desire to co-operate, common to all species. In the second Kropotkin

introduces the Lamarckian factor to suggest that the spirit of mutual

aid becomes habitual in certain environments (the autonomous federated

anarchist commune being the most conducive environment for the ethical

spirit). As it does so the biological impulse gives rise to particular

ethical sentiments. He describes these sentiments in terms of a

threefold progression &om mutual aid to justice and ultimately to

morality (Kropotkin, 1904; 1905; 1910). Between 1912 and 1919 Kropotkin

firrther elaborates his ideas, presenting the final statement of his

thesis in Ethics (Kropotkin, 1968, chs. 1–3).

Conclusion

It cannot be denied that Kropotkin intended to defend anarchism against

Hwley’s Hobbesian image of the natural world. The description of nature

as ‘red in tooth and claw’ and his explicit identification of anarchy

with the violence of this natural world seriously undermined the

anarchuk case. But Kropotkin‘s rejection of Huxley is only the starting

point for a much wider ranging discussion — a discussion which ended,

unfinished, at his death As they have concentrated so heavily on

Kropotkin’s challenge to social darwinism, modem writers have lost the

sense of this progression and have focused their attention on the

biologicalevolutionary aspects of Kropotkin‘s theory. To this extent,

Kropotkin’s defence of anarchism against Huxley has served to highlight

the scientific credibility of the anarchist position. In the context of

a discussion of evolution, Kropotkin’s defence has also been extended

and used as a basis on which to construct an anarchist theory of human

nature. Portrayed as Hobbesian and as social darwinian Huxley has

inadvertently served to narrow the parameters of the debate about the

theory of mutual aid in the same way that Kropotkin claims he

deliberately constricted Darwin’s conception of the struggle for

existence.

By acknowledgmg the breadth of Kropotkin’s argument it is possible to

tie up what are otherwise theoretical loose ends. Recognising that

Kropotkin‘s target was Malthus rather than Huxley also alters the

political gloss of Mutual Aid. Accordmg to this reading, Mutual Aid is

not a text designed to promote consciousness-raising but a demand for

the restructuring of society in accordance with the hitherto ‘natural’

development of history. In overcoming Malthus and synthesising Darwinian

and Lamarkian ideas Kropotkin clears the way for a renewed discussion of

the possibility of anarcho-communism. In the fist place the theory of

mutual aid promises, in the proper environment, the creation of amoral

spirit equal to the task of regulating social relations in the absence

of the State. Second, Kropowin’s conception of evolution indicates that

the way forward lies in following the organisational patterns worked out

in the past: in decentralisation and in the re-creation of community.

Third, in demolishing the competitive basis of Darwinian evolution,

Kropotlun surmounts the major objections to his anarchist plan: the

problem of scarcity. He thus secures a ‘scientific’ basis for the

realisation of communal self-sufficiency and, in tun, the principle of

dutribution according to need. Finally, by placing anarchist principles

of organisation on a natural foundation Kropotkin provides a rallying

cry for anarchist change by calling for the demolition of institutions

unfavourable to the expression of the ‘natural’ co-operative spirit.

References

Avrich, P. (1988) Anarchist portraits. New Jersey Princeton University

Press.

Baldwin, R N . (1970) Kropotkin’s Revolutionary Pamphlets. New York

Dover.

Cole, GD.H (1951) A History of Socialist Thought: Marxism and Anarchism

1850–1890. London:

Desmond, A and Meore, J. (1991) Darwin. London: Michael Joseph.

Huxley, T.H. (1888) ‘The struggle for existence’, The Nineteenth

Century, 23 February.

Kelly, A. (1982) Mikhail Bukunin: A Study in the Psychology and Politics

of Utopianism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kropotkin, P, (1890a) ‘Mutual aid among animals’, The Nineteenth

Century, 28, September.

Kropotkin, P. (1890b) ‘Mutual aid among animals’, The Ninefeenth

Century, 28, November.

Kropotkin, P. (1891) ‘Mutual aid among savages’, The Nineteenth Century,

29, April.

Kmpotldn, P. (1894) ‘Mutual aid in the mediaeval city’, The Nineteenth

Century, 36, April.

Kropotkin, P. (1904) ‘The ethical need of the present day’, The

Nineteenth Century, 56, August.

Kropotkin, P. (1905) ‘The morality of nature’, The Nineteenth Century,

57, March.

Kropotkin, P. (1910) ‘Evolution and mutual aid’, The Nineteenth Century,

36, April.

Kropotkin, P. (1968) Ethics: Origin and Development. L.S. Friedland &

J.R. Prioshnikoff (trans.).

Marshall, P. (1989) ‘Human nature and anarchism’ in Goodway, D. (ed.)

For Anarchism: History, Theory and Practice,

Marshall, P. (1992) Demanding the Impossible. London: Harper Collins.

Miller, D. (1979) Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Miller, D. (1984) Anarchism. London: JM Dent & Sons.

Miller, M A (1976) Kropotkin. Chicago & London: Univelsity of Chicago

Press.

Mondolfo, R. (1930) ‘Kropotkin, Prince Petr Alexeyevich’ in Seligman,

E.R.A (ed.) Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. London: Macmillan.

Montague, A. (1976) The Nature of Human Aggression. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Read, H (1968) ‘Pragmatic Anarchism’, Encounter, 30, January.

Reichert, W.O. (1967) ‘Towards a New Understanding Of Anarchism’,

Western Political Quarterly, 20, December.

Walter, N. (1971) ‘The scientific revolutionary’, New Society, 17

February.

Ward, C. (1982) Anarchy in Action. London: Freedom Press.

Woodcock, G. (1979) Anarchism. (Harmondsworth: Penguin).

Woodcock, G. and Avakmovic, I. (1950) The Anarchist Prince. London: T.V.

Boardman & Co.

[1] All the articles were published in The Nineteenth Century. The first

set appeared between 1890 and 1896; the seoondbetween 1904 and 1905; and

the final set between 1910 and 1919.

[2] With significant differences on the details and validity of

Kropotldn’s theory of mutual aid, this view has been advanced by writers

including George Woodcock, Paul Avrich, William Reichert, Herbert Read,

and David Miller. See references for details of publications.