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Title: Clarifying the Unique and Its Self-Creation
Author: Jason McQuinn
Date: 2012
Language: en
Topics: egoism, Max Stirner, introduction, egoist, biography
Source: Retrieved on 10/27/2020 from https://archive.org/details/StirnerStirnersCritics
Notes: Introduction anticopyright @ 2012 Jason McQuinn. This book may be freely pirated and quoted. The author and publishers would like to be informed. LBC Books. CAL Press. PO Box 24332 Oakland, CA 94623 USA http://calpress.org/

Jason McQuinn

Clarifying the Unique and Its Self-Creation

“The World has languished long enough under the tyranny of thought,

under the terrorism of ideas; she is waking from the heavy dream....” —

Max Stirner, “The Philosophical Reactionaries” (1847)

Max Stirner’s 1844 masterwork, Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum[1] (The

Unique[2] and Its Property), is one of the most subversive, radical and,

therefore, extreme texts in all of history. It can also be described as

one of the most misread, misinterpreted and misunderstood books in the

history of modern Western thought.[3] This should not be unexpected.

Subversive, radical and extreme texts will always obtain hostile

receptions from those targeted by their critiques, whether the critiques

are accurate and justified or not.

The book is rather simply—though very cleverly—written with very little

use of technical terminology. And Stirner goes out of his way in an

attempt to use common language wherever possible, though he often does

so very creatively and idiosyncratically. It is also a fairly demanding

text for anyone (including nearly every contemporary reader) who is

unfamiliar with the cultural background within which it was conceived,

written and published. It is possible for it to be read and appreciated

without knowledge of this background, however the prospect of adequate

understanding—not only of the central points but also their extensive

implications—definitely recedes the less a reader is familiar with

topics like nominalism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, analytical and

dialectical logic, and critiques of religion, ontology, epistemology,

ideology and language that were current in Stirner’s day.[4]

From the moment Stirner’s text first appeared, it directly and

fundamentally challenged every religion, philosophy and ideology. It

didn’t just politely challenge every existing historical religion,

philosophy and ideology, which would already have been enough to have

made its author many enemies. It also blatantly and scathingly

challenged every existing contemporary religion, philosophy and ideology

of the day. This, unsurprisingly, made its author persona non grata for

all theologians, philosophers and ideologists busily working to perfect

or put into practice their grand ideas and theories.[5]

Thus the stage was set for over a century and a half of (most often

successful, because most often unopposed) mystification of Stirner’s

intentions by his many critics from 1844 through the present. Even the

great majority of self-proclaimed proponents of Stirner’s work too often

tended to add to the mystification through their own misunderstandings

and unself-critical oversimplifications.[6] The most common critical

responses to Stirner’s text have probably been dismissal or evasion—to

simply disqualify it from discussion or avoid comment and change the

subject as quickly as possible. But for those few critics unafraid to

actually mention Stirner’s name and ideas, the dominant response has

been denigration and misinterpretation, often bordering on (or

including) intentional misdirection. Sometimes it can be blatantly clear

that misinterpretations are not accidental but quite deliberate,

especially with regard to the more absurd attacks of ideologues. But

often it is unclear whether Stirner’s critics are too intellectually and

emotionally challenged by his text to be held accountable for

consciously knowing what it is that they are doing. Regardless, the net

effect of the constant streams of denunciation and false portrayals—both

pro and con—has unquestionably taken its toll.

Max Stirner’s original published critics were all contemporaries writing

from within the radical literary, philosophical and political milieu of

VormÀrz Germany.[7] They included Ludwig Feuerbach (the well-known

author of The Essence of Christianity, a central founding text of modern

humanism), Moses Hess (at the time a Feuerbachian communist associate of

the young Karl Marx), Bruno Bauer (a former defender of conservative

Hegelianism turned radical critic), Szeliga (pseudonym for Franz Zychlin

von Zychlinski, a Prussian officer who was also a proponent of Bruno

Bauer’s “critical criticism”), Kuno Fischer (while still a student,

author of a vociferous pamphlet denouncing Stirner—along with other left

Hegelians—as a “new sophist,” later a respectable historian of

philosophy) and the pseudo-proletarian duo of Friedrich Engels and Karl

Marx (although Marx and Engels’ criticism wasn’t actually published

until 80 years later!). Of these, three criticisms were published soon

enough following the original issuance of his text for Stirner to

respond in Wigand’s Vierteljahrschrift in 1845, under the title of

“Recensenten Stirner’s” (“Stirner’s Critics”). Although Stirner never

replied to him in print, Bruno Bauer’s response to Stirner’s book also

appeared in that same 1845 issue. Later in 1847 Stirner (writing as G.

Edward) then responded to Kuno Fischer in the fifth volume of Wigand’s

Epigonen, under the title of “Die Philosophischen Reaktionaere” (“The

Philosophical Reactionaries”). Unfortunately, Stirner never had a chance

to dispense with Marx and Engels’ lengthy, nearly unreadable, diatribe

entitled Die Deutsche Ideologie (The German Ideology) since they were

unable to get it published either in Stirner’s or their own

lifetimes.[8]

The massive tides of historical misreading, misinterpretation and

misunderstanding have too-long tended to swamp any possibility of a

genuine popular understanding of Stirner’s work, especially in the

English language given the mistranslated titles in every edition so far

published. Along with publication of a much needed revision of the

English translation and its misleading title, probably the most

important place to begin the reinterpretation of Stirner’s work on a

much more accurate basis is with publication of this long-overdue

translation of Stirner’s responses to his initial critics.[9] But both

Stirner’s texts and his responses to his critics first need to be put in

a comprehensible context.

---

Max Stirner is the pseudonym of Johann Kaspar Schmidt, born on the

morning of October 25, 1806 in Bayreuth, Bavaria, just after the Battle

of Jena and the beginning of the Napoleonic occupation of Prussia. He

was the son of a flute-maker who died when Johann was only an infant.

Before he reached the age of three his mother remarried an older

apothecary (pharmacist) and thereafter moved with him to Kulm on the

Vistula River in West Prussia (now Poland). As soon as possible (in

1810) Johann was also brought to live in Kulm, where he spent his

boyhood. Then in 1818 Schmidt moved back to Bayreuth to live with his

uncle and godfather as he began his humanistic Christian education at

the famous gymnasium there founded in 1664. He proved to be “a good and

diligent pupil,” and left the gymnasium with high marks in September,

1826.[10] He then moved to the city of Berlin where he would continue

his education at the university until 1835, live most of his remaining

life, and finally die in 1856.

Before his unexpected book, The Unique and Its Property, briefly lit up

the literary firmament after its initial appearance in late 1844,

Stirner (as Schmidt) was most notably a respected teacher in a “Teaching

and Educational Institution for Young Ladies” from 1839 until 1844 in

Berlin. After he became infamous as the author and critic Max Stirner,

he started an ill-fated dairy business and worked as a writer and

translator, producing the most important German translations of Adam

Smith’s The Wealth of Nations and Jean-Baptiste Say’s TraitĂ© d’Économie

Politique.

Stirner studied for many years under the heavy influence of Hegelians,

both at his gymnasium and at the Universities of Berlin and Erlangen. In

Berlin he began his university studies in 1826 and ended his

institutional enrollment after several interruptions in 1834, completing

his pro facultate docendi exams in 1835.[11] In Erlangen he studied only

briefly in 1829. His Hegelian influences included the rector at the

gymnasium in Bayreuth where he had studied for eight years, Georg

Andreas Gabler. (It is important to note that it was Gabler who went on

to take over the University of Berlin chair in philosophy when Hegel

died.) They also included other prominent Hegelian professors like P.K.

Marheineke, Christian Kapp and Karl Michelet under whom Stirner studied.

Most importantly, Stirner attended the lectures of Georg Wilhelm

Friedrich Hegel himself at the University of Berlin in 1827 and 1828 at

the height of Hegel’s popularity. In addition to the Hegelians, in

Berlin Stirner also studied most notably under Friedrich Schleiermacher

(theology),[12] Heinrich Ritter (logic), and (in classical philology

studies) Philipp August Böckh and Johann August Wilhelm Neander.

Following the completion of his studies and the beginning of his career

as a teacher, Stirner began to socialize with the group of radical

intellectuals around Bruno Bauer then called die Freien (“the Free”).

This group can be considered a successor to an earlier group called the

Doktorenclub (“Doctors’ Club”), which according to one member had

consisted “of aspiring young men, most of whom had already finished

their studies” in which “reigned supreme ... idealism, the thirst for

knowledge and the liberal spirit....”[13] Aside from Bruno Bauer’s

central role, the earlier group had also been notable for the

participation of the young student, Karl Marx. However, by the time

Stirner began his long association with die Freien Marx had moved on,

rejecting any further association with most of its members. At one time

or another many of those identified as “Young Hegelians” or “Left

Hegelians”[14] seem to have shown up at meetings of either the

Doktorenclub or die Freien. Die Freien usually met in the evenings at

one or another Berlin wine bar or beer tavern—eventually settling on

Hippel’s as its most stable venue—for conversation, criticism, debate,

jokes, card-games, smoking and drinking. And it was there that Stirner

found an ever-changing group of intelligent, often challenging and

outspoken comrades with whom he could feel at home as long as he

continued living in Berlin. Amongst the more notable participants in die

Freien, Bruno Bauer became one of Stirner’s best friends (attending both

his second marriage as witness, and his funeral) and the young Prussian

officer Friedrich Engels for a time also became an enthusiastic

duzbruder with Stirner before beginning his later intense friendship

with Karl Marx.

It was during the apogee of Left Hegelian ascendance in the social and

political thought of the time, while Stirner was fully engaged with die

Freien, that Stirner began contributing to the radical press as

correspondent, reviewer and essayist. Most importantly this included his

contribution of essays entitled “The False Principle of our Education”

and “Art and Religion” to Rheinische Zeitung supplements in April and

June 1842 (both coincidentally appearing just before Karl Marx took over

as editor). Other contributions appeared elsewhere. And eventually, he

began hinting that he was even writing a book. However, none of his

comrades was prepared for the radical power and scope of The Unique and

Its Property when it actually appeared. As it turned out, Stirner had

not only been working on a critique of particular philosophical ideas or

positions, nor even a critique of the entire Hegelian philosophical

system and its own radical critics. Stirner had, instead, completed an

unprecedented critique of every possible religious, philosophical and

ideological system.

-----

It was in the fall of 1844 that the initial public copies of Stirner’s

The Unique and Its Property first appeared. Assuming the inevitable

public controversy ahead, Stirner had already given notice to quit his

teaching position as of October 1^(st). The book was initially received

with a wide range of reactions from excitement to outrage, and confusion

to consternation. A few laudatory comments were made, notably in letters

from Ludwig Feuerbach, Friedrich Engels and Arnold Ruge.[15] But, in the

most prominent cases, any initial openness to Stirner’s critique quickly

gave way to a closing of minds, superficial dismissals, and shudders of

contempt for the manifest evils Stirner was then alleged to have

unleashed on an unsuspecting world.

Max Stirner announced his intentions in the opening pages of his book.

He argued that if egoism was suitable for God, humanity or the sultan,

why not for me? Why is it always only the actually-existing, individual

egoist who is disparaged, while the imagined masters of the world are so

lauded? Why don’t we learn from these imagined masters and put ourselves

in their place as masters of our own lives? Stirner goes on to do just

this for himself, inviting us to follow his lead. The rest of the book

is an examination of the implications which follow from this change of

perspective from willing servitude to conscious self-creation.

For the vast majority of thinking human beings, it was in Stirner’s

time—and remains—God or gods, humanity, Man, society, the political

state, the economy, or particular figures like emperors, kings or

presidents who were not merely allowed, but often expected, to proclaim

their power—their egoism—without any necessity of justifying themselves.

These figures, all imaginary to one degree or another, depend for the

largest part of their existence and powers precisely on the mass belief

people have in their imagined reality and power. On its most important

level, Stirner’s masterwork is a consistent examination and critique of

this phenomenon, depicting where and how people in practice invest

aspects of their own reality and powers in these phantoms through a

process of self-alienation.[16] Stirner’s critique of this nearly

ubiquitous, but most of the time unquestioned, phenomenon is at the same

time necessarily an immanent critique. It is an immanent critique

because Stirner does not lay claim to any transcendent or absolute

Truth, Value or Reality (which would itself require the same type of

self-alienation to create) or access to any other privileged perspective

which would allow him to speak from any position beyond his own

particular, finite, unique perspective.[17] That no person before him

(nor in fact many after) had similarly made this simple observation and

critique only confirms its central importance and his original,

incredible audacity.

Despite the mightiest of efforts, once this Pandora’s box had been

opened it could not be closed. However the efforts continue every moment

of every day from theologians, philosophers, preachers, moralists,

politicians, economists, judges, police, ideologists, psychologists and

all the other technicians of sacred power. They all want each of us to

join the chorus disparaging the egoism of any and all actually-existing,

particular individuals in order to pledge our allegiance to whichever of

the imagined egoist masters we prefer to serve. Do you want to

subordinate your life and prostrate yourself to God, to Nature, to

Jesus, Ecology, Peace, Love or Science? Or to the Proletariat or

Communism, to Free Enterprise or Capitalism, to Language, Freedom or the

Void? To many people it matters much less in whom or what you believe

enough to pledge your self-enslavement than that you at least believe in

something, anything that you imagine to be greater than yourself! The

biggest tabu is non-belief.

Only immanent critique (critique from within) can hope to dislodge those

who insist on their self-enslavement to a reified or imaginary ideal (to

a “spirit,” “ghost,” conceptual “essence,” or “fixed idea” in Stirner’s

terms). Any successful transcendent critique, on the contrary, merely

removes this self-enslavement from one imaginary ideal or reification in

order to restore it to some other imaginary ideal or reification. To

remove every form of self-enslavement from any possible reification or

ideal requires not the critique of particular ideals to which people

enslave themselves, it requires the critique of the practice of

self-enslavement itself. And this is where Stirner devotes his primary

efforts. He understands that attempts from outside to liberate passive

people from one institution of slavery will usually only leave them

ready to re-enslave themselves in another form. The abolition of all

forms of slavery requires that those who are enslaved fight for their

own liberation to reclaim their own practical autonomy and

self-possession. Each of those enslaved must construct her or his own

immanent, practical critique of every form of enslavement. Or else

condemn themselves to remain enslaved.

Like anyone else, Stirner constructed his critique from within a

particular time and place, history and culture, situation and milieu.

His critique, while certainly applicable to anyone able to read, reason

and relate it to his or her own life, can appear narrower or more

particular than it actually is if those who read it do not have an

understanding of the particular context of the situation in and from

which he wrote and its relation to our contemporary situations as

readers. The relationships between particular ideas, phrases and themes

in The Unique and Its Property and understandings of our more generally

shared contemporary situation can be described from different

perspectives and more or less accurately phrased in a variety of manners

and styles. Some of the most important of these ideas, phrases and

themes include the nature of Stirner’s understanding of egoism, self,

concepts, names and language, property, alienty and ownness in relation

to his understanding of the sacred, spirit, essence, fixed ideas,

religion, language, philosophy, society, humanity and nature.

Interpretation of Stirner’s perspective on each of these most often

founders in the translation of his own words from their particular

contexts in his text into the chosen language of each individual

interpreter’s own particular context of understanding and interpretation

and, at the same time, within the more general context of prevailing

social, linguistic and cultural reifications—compulsory presuppositions

or prejudices that cannot be questioned within an imagined consensus

reality of ubiquitous self-alienation. This includes the greatest

prejudice of all (especially for all those who remain self-enslaved),

that of the impossibility of selfcreation and self-possession.

-----

One way to better understand what Stirner does in The Unique and Its

Property is to grasp his effort as an attempt to employ a particular

method to all of the general cultural phenomena of religion, philosophy,

morality, science and ideology. This method was an egoist method,

possibly modeled in part on Ludwig Feuerbach’s anthropological

method.[18] But whereas Feuerbach was concerned to reduce the imaginary

ideals of religion to the supposed reality of “Man” or the “Human,”

Stirner had a much more radical concern. His own concern, and by

implication each of our own concerns. Instead of reducing imagined

ideals into another supposedly more real conceptual ideal as does

Feuerbach, Stirner dissolves every imaginary ideal into himself and

suggests that we all choose to do likewise. What ultimately makes

Stirner’s critique so powerful and irrefutable is that it does not, like

Feuerbach’s (or any other possible) critique begin from any fixed-idea

or ideal. Not even any conceptual ideal of an “I” or an ego. Instead it

begins from his own, and by implication each individual person’s own

particular, phenomenal, uniquely lived experience.[19] Thus, Stirner’s

egoism and his egoist method do not involve any reference to any other

of the usual depictions (conceptions or representations) of these “ego”

words as aiming at self-transcendence (whether “egoistic” or

“altruistic”). They resolutely and consistently express a nominalist, or

phenomenal—and thus an immanent—understanding. This nominalist or

phenomenal or immanent egoism is purely descriptive and empirical, with

no normative or metaphysical content in itself. It is an egoism of

intentionality that cannot itself be alienated, because it is exactly

what one chooses and does, nothing more and nothing less. (It’s

definitely not an egoism of ends or goals oriented towards some

self-alienated image of self-interest.) As Stirner says, it “points” to

something which it cannot possibly explain or define in words. It is not

an ultimate reality or truth, since these concepts cannot possibly

express what it is. Stirner’s egoism points to Stirner’s figure of the

Unique, which points merely to Stirner himself.[20] Similarly, according

to Stirner’s usage, any particular person’s egoism will point to the

whole of that person’s uniquely lived experience.

That words and language—especially in their conventional usages—are

inadequate to fully convey the meaning here is obvious, and is part of

the problem of both adequately understanding Stirner and avoiding all

the (more or less easy and more or less consciously intentional)

misinterpretations of Stirner’s work. The process of self-alienation—of

separating an idea or representation of oneself from one’s living self

and then subordinating one’s living self to that image—which Stirner

describes and criticizes is so ubiquitous and fundamental to the

functioning of modern societies that it permeates nearly every aspect of

social life.[21] Enslaving oneself to a fixed idea or imaginary ideal

(or any number of them) is not a simple thing. It requires an immense

amount of effort to work itself out in practice. This effort, in large

part, it has been the primary function of all religion, philosophy and

ideology to facilitate from the earliest days of symbolic communication.

This effort also is embodied in a large number of habits, attitudes,

modes of thought, and techniques of subordination that must be and have

been learned and perfected by the masses of people in contemporary

societies. And it is enforced by the sanctions of social, economic,

political and military institutions that are constructed and maintained

through the same types of self-alienated acts en masse.

To refer to the absence of all these processes of mass self-alienation

is what Stirner intends with his figure of the Unique and the practice

of conscious egoism. That this would mean that Stirner is a mystic[22]

and that the Unique is some sort of conceptual absolute, as many suggest

(most often, it would seem, precisely for purposes of mystification or

muddling the issue), is absurd. It does not follow that Stirner is

speaking of an imaginary ideal or a fixed idea of an ineffable,

transcendental reality simply because words cannot adequately describe

the nonconceptual, self-determining figure of Stirner’s critique, his

own immanent life-experience as it is lived here and now prior to its

conceptual representation. To understand Stirner is to understand that

he refuses any and all forms of self-alienation. He refuses to separate

himself (as his nonconceptual life process) from himself in any fixed

symbolic form, while at the same time—given the nearly ubiquitous

diffusion of language into nearly every aspect of our culture—he cannot

escape expressing himself and communicating with those same symbolic

forms. But his expressions are always intended in non-fixed, atheistic,

nominalist, immanent ways that together function as a critical

self-theory.

Although Stirner himself uses few of our common contemporary theoretical

categories to express himself, the meaning and implications of his

Unique are clearly indicated in his text if we but pay close enough

attention, prefiguring to one degree or another the vocabulary of modern

hermeneutics, phenomenology and existentialism (though always in a

consistently non-fixed, atheistic, phenomenal and nominalist manner).

Stirner’s full embrace of the nonconceptual in the Unique as prior to

any conceptual understandings can be seen in particular as prefiguring

Wilhelm Dilthey’s “life as it is lived” or “Lebenskategorie” (“category

of life”), albeit in a much more radical, presuppositionless form.

Dilthey followed Stirner in abandoning the common notion of the

centrality of language for all understanding in favor of Stirner’s much

more nuanced and coherent (reversal of) perspective on language in which

conceptual understanding is seen as built upon a more fundamental level

of nonconceptual understanding (or preconceptual, bodily, perceptual or

lived understanding) as a process of that nonconceptual lived

understanding itself.[23] Similarly, Stirner’s discussion in “Stirner’s

Critics” of the “worlds” of Feuerbach, Hess and Szeliga make it clear

that he is speaking of what we would now be more likely to call

“life-worlds” after Edmund Husserl’s usage (“Lebenswelt”) introduced

nearly a hundred years later in The Crisis of the European Sciences in

1936.[24] And, not least in importance, Stirner’s Unique should

obviously be seen to prefigure Martin Heidegger’s “Dasein,” albeit, once

again, in a much more radical, presuppositionless form. While

Heidegger’s attempt, with his conception of the “preunderstanding” of

“Dasein,” to reject the Cartesian Cogito while hanging on to Being,

ultimately fails, Max Stirner’s more radical rejection of Descartes’

Cogito and his dualism of mind and body succeeds by insisting on

abandoning not only the reification involved in any fundamental concept

of an independent ego as a thinking subject, but also the reification

necessarily involved in the construction of any and all fixed ideas of

speculative ontology, including even phenomenological ontological

concepts such as Dasein.[25] Even more radically, Stirner’s

nonconceptual Unique is explicitly non-dualistic, undermining the

dualism of both Descartes’ and all of Western philosophy.[26] It is

beyond (or prior to) any subject/object dualism because both

subjectivity and objectivity are understood as merely self-created

abstractions derived from the nonconceptual totality of the Unique, and

not conceived as ontological entities with any real existence of their

own.

-----

“Both religion and philosophy,” as one of Stirner’s teachers, Philipp

August Böckh has written, “...work by a priori reasoning.”[27] This is

another way of noting that all religion and all philosophy exist only as

long as they include a dogmatic or rationalist doctrinal moment, since

unprincipled empirical investigation—conceptually presuppositionless

phenomenology—cannot qualify as either religion or philosophy.[28] Even

philosophers not generally considered counted amongst rationalists, from

Heraclitis to David Hume, among many others, dogmatically maintain

rationalist doctrinal presuppositions, though they are not always

obvious.[29]

Yet modern philosophy also always contains a restless, skeptical,

self-critical moment. The critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, by

setting limits to undisciplined flights of pure reason, aimed to deflate

the most dogmatic and illogical forms of religion and metaphysics, but

primarily served to validate what proved to be less-obvious but in many

ways even more potent forms of metaphysical dogma.[30] Georg Wilhelm

Friedrich Hegel attempted in his own novel way to advance Kant’s

critical impetus, even though Hegel’s dialectical philosophy was also at

least partly a critique of Kant’s rigid conception of the categories of

understanding and of Kant’s attempt to completely separate appearance

from things-in-themselves, as well as pure from practical reason (by way

of a partial appropriation of Fichte’s phenomenology and Schelling’s

philosophy of identity). However, Hegel’s metaphysical conception of a

transparently self-conscious dialectical logic of historical spirit once

again reinstated dogma in place of consistent critique.[31] It was at

this point that Hegel inadvertently started the reductionist process

which ultimately deconstructed his own (and all) philosophy by himself

reducing Christianity to historical Spirit.[32] It was left to the

post-Hegelians to then relentlessly carry on this critique to its end.

David Strauss next reduced the Christ figure to the concept of the human

species in his Life of Jesus, Critically Examined (1835–1836).[33] In

1841 Ludwig Feuerbach extended Strauss’ insights in his critique of

Christianity and religion as a whole, replacing them with a philosophy

of Man (”...no abstract, merely conceptual being, but a real being,” as

he said), which he then went on to suggest was actually a “negation of

philosophy.”[34] However, as Stirner easily shows, Strauss and Feuerbach

merely replaced the religion of gods with the religion of an abstract

ideal of Man or Humanity. This ultimately left Feuerbach increasingly

silent in the face of Stirner’s unanswerable critique. Around this time

Bruno Bauer also advanced a project of critical criticism, a commitment

to the critique of all transcendent universals from a perspective of

free, infinite self-consciousness, implying the individual critic’s

divestment of any and all “private” concerns—thus reducing him to a mere

shell of abstract universality.[35] Moses Hess (at the time a comrade of

Marx and Engels), in 1844, argued on the contrary that the “essence of

man is...social being,” moving further from the species to society—as

“the cooperation of various individuals for one and the same end.”[36]

Later still, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels attempted to salvage a

critical social theory from the wreckage of Hegelian dialectics and

their own by-then-discredited (by Stirner) Feuerbachian materialism.

However, this attempt at critical social theory amounted to an obviously

ideological critique of ideology, itself requiring uncritical belief in

a metaphysically materialist dialectical logic, supposedly immanent in

history. We now know from its subsequent development where that story

leads: Marx’s project of the realization of philosophy is (to paraphrase

Stirner) necessarily another form of slavery.

It was left for Max Stirner to advance his egoistic critique, a critical

self-theory which did not (unlike every religion, metaphysics or

ideology) advocate the self-alienation of anyone’s actual powers or

life-activity. Stirner’s egoistic critique has two sides. Negatively, it

is a critique of all rationalist religious, philosophical, moral and

ideological presuppositions. Positively, it provides a phenomenal

description of unalienated self-possession or completely self-determined

activity, which can also be characterized as undetermined self-creation.

(That is, self-creation undetermined by heteronomous powers.)

There are three integral moments to Stirner’s immanent, egoist critique.

Each one, without the others would leave the critique, not only

incomplete, but incoherent and ineffective. The three moments can be

characterized as nominal, phenomenal and dialectical. The nominal moment

consists in the refusal to invest symbols or concepts with any special

ontological status of their own. The phenomenal moment consists in a

presuppositionless phenomenology or empiricism (a presuppositionless—and

thus a completely non-metaphysical, non-philosophical and

non-scientific—empiricism). And the dialectical moment consists in a

perspectival, contextual and pragmatic logic that allows a completely

dynamic, fluid use of conceptual distinctions and relations (with no

necessary, a priori, fixed ideas). However, given the extreme creativity

of Stirner’s unprecedented critical synthesis of these moments,

additional explanation of each of these moments is required to avoid the

typical misinterpretations and incomprehension that too often greets

unwanted innovations which upset received dogmas and prejudices. This is

in part because, despite the relative simplicity and elegance of

presentation of Stirner’s critiques, he never speaks directly about the

nature of his methods. Like the early Taoists Lao-tsu and Chuang-tsu,

and the proto-Taoist Yang Chu (whose texts all share some notable

similarities to The Unique and Its Property[37]), Stirner leaves it up

to us—if we wish—to observe and describe the methods for ourselves.

As Stirner understood well, if the word is sacred, then I am its slave.

In The Unique and Its Property he says: “For me paltry language has no

word, and ‘the Word,’ the Logos, is to me a ‘mere word.’”[38] This means

that for Stirner a complete nominalism must be central to any consistent

critique of reification. Historically, various types of nominalism

developed through a series of critical responses to belief in the real

existence of Platonic forms, essences, universals or other abstract

concepts like Pythagorean numbers supposedly existing somewhere

independently outside of space and time. Stirner uses nominalism in its

widest possible meaning as the refusal of any belief that symbols or

concepts can be more than mere arbitrary objects used for thought and

communication. Even though there is no valid or coherent argument that

can be made for a rationalist (non-nominalist, realist) understanding of

symbols and concepts that doesn’t in some central way beg the question

(by assuming as a premise what is to be proved), most traditional and

modern forms of thought reject nominalism, anyway, out of hand.[39] And

those that do accept nominalism usually do so in only narrow or

incomplete ways, always preserving some form(s) of non-nominalist,

rationalist belief in other areas.

Phenomenology is a generic term referring to the empirical investigation

of the phenomena of experience. The philosophical use of the term was

originated by the mathematician and scientist Johann Heinrich Lambert

(Neues Organon, 1764), before being prominently used by Kant

(Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, 1786), Fichte, and Hegel

(The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807), and long before it was nearly

monopolized by Edmund Husserl and those influenced by Husserl (clearly

both Husserl’s descriptive and transcendental phenomenologies are merely

types of possible phenomenologies, not some sort of

phenomenology-in-itself, as is too often implied). Stirner’s innovation

is to insist on a completely presuppositionless phenomenology or

empiricism. Before Stirner, every attempt at empirical or

phenomenological investigation presupposed the necessary existence of a

(metaphysical or religious) conceptual context of one sort or another

(including, especially, the whole range of ontologies—dogmatic theories

of God, Being, Substance or Mind, along with a subject/object or

mind/body dualism since Descartes). Stirner dispensed with this type of

conceptual presupposition by rejecting a beginning from any conceptual

context at all, leaving only himself (as nonconceptual, lived

experience, both pre-subjective and preobjective) as foundation.[40]

Beginning from the Unique, his phenomenally-lived experience beyond

words, Stirner’s descriptive phenomenology then proceeds from the most

basic conceptual distinction between a completely insubstantial

subjectivity (“creative nothing”) and its object-world (its “property”).

Not as some sort of absolutely given metaphysical distinction, but as a

practical, finite, conceptual self-creation whose origin

(self-constructed from out of the nonconceptual Unique) is never

forgotten. Every phenomenal distinction which follows is a part of his

self-creation, a fundamentally aesthetic project pursued for his own

self-enjoyment (both appropriative and self-expressive), with no

(possible) claim to any transcendental objectivity, absolute truth or

reality beyond his own experience or power. Although often accused of

solipsism for his refusal to believe in any imaginary (rationalist)

conceptual guarantee that other individuals are somehow objectively,

absolutely or ontologically real, Stirner then goes on (in a refutation

of any possible solipsistic intention) to invite others to play the same

type of game he does. Without any rules legislated from the outside,

Stirner argues that we are each responsible for creating our own

conceptual understanding of ourselves and our world, and for

communicating as best we wish and are able with others to create our

common social world. It should be no surprise that this often seemingly

vertiginous choice of a free-falling self-creation in a world without

conceptual limits has proven to be too much for most commentators to

handle. For theologians, metaphysicians, epistemologists, moralists and

ideologists it is simply inconceivable. (They instinctually grab for the

nearest fixed idea and hang on for their lives, since they have

convinced themselves that life is impossible without fixed ideas to

guide them and anchor them in the void left if no external meanings are

given from gods or masters!)

Stirner’s logic is an analytics and dialectics released from the prison

of metaphysics—Hegelian, Aristotelian or otherwise. It is humanly

constructed rather than a priori, transcendent or absolute in any

way.[41] Analytic (or deductive) logic derives from analysis—the

derivation of conclusions according to (any accepted) rules of logical

operation from premises (including the most often ignored, but required

lived-context) within which these conclusions are already present. It

produces an endless variation of the same thing, but said in different

ways, which reveal the implications of particular symbolic relations

according to the accepted rules of operation (rules of the game).[42]

Dialectical logic, on the other hand, derives initially from dialogue,

questioning or argument, from the pragmatic play of different

perspectives encountering each other, employing distinctions and

removing contradictions, from which a larger, more encompassing

perspective can be constructed and understood.[43] The keys to Stirner’s

use of dialectic are his refusal of any rationalist metaphysical or

epistemological claim to absolute or objective Truth and his complete

openness with regard to the construction and use of categories, as long

as all of the logical implications (the currently accepted rules of the

logical game of conceptual understanding one is playing) are considered.

Traditional and modern philosophy have always been made up of (revealed

or dogmatic, sometimes unacknowledged) rationalist presuppositions,

along with phenomenal or empirical descriptions, developed analytically

to reveal their implications and dialectically (pragmatically),

according to a logic of argumentative assertion which takes a certain

consideration of perspective and context in the use of categories in

order to be convincing. Hegel’s innovation was to collapse the

rationalist premises into the phenomenological development of his

dialectical logic, identifying his dialectical logic with an historical

unfolding of Being. Stirner’s refusal of all rationalist presuppositions

including his adoption of a thoroughgoing nominalism amounts to a

refusal of philosophy. And his critical self-theory thus becomes a

presuppositionless hermeneutical phenomenology developed through

nominalist analytic and dialectical logic.

Stirner’s dialectical phenomenology of self-creation (“ownness,” “my

power”) is also a dialectical phenomenology of appropriation (“my

property”) and self-expression (“my self-enjoyment”) in association with

others (“my intercourse”). These are the remaining keys to understanding

Stirner’s critical self-theory. As Stirner puts it at one point:

“My power is my property

My power gives me property.

My power am I myself, and through it am I my property.”[44]

In his dialectical analysis of the phenomenon of the Unique, Stirner

begins by making a purely phenomenal distinction between himself as

“creative nothing” and as property as horizons of his life. The boundary

or mediating relation between the two, which is also their unity, is his

egoism or power. The conceptual distinction through which these two

opposed terms are created brings forth an entire conceptual universe of

further phenomenal distinctions and relations. Yet this entire

conceptual universe is continually and fundamentally acknowledged to be

an abstract, conceptual creation with no necessary validity beyond its

appropriative and expressive contributions to his self-enjoyment! Its

truth is always a function of its power as his self-created,

self-expressive property, the artistic self-creation of his life. The

extent to which he exercises power over and through his property is the

extent of his life. As it is for ourselves our own.

-----

Stirner already makes most of this quite clear in the text of The Unique

and Its Property, at least for any careful and perceptive readers. And

it doesn’t take all that much effort to fill in any of the few remaining

blanks he has left for us. Yet, the history of Stirner’s reception is

largely a history of the incomprehension of—and unthinking antipathy

to—his work. Where Stirner makes it clear that the “Unique” is not a

concept in The Unique and Its Property, most of his readers—and

especially his critics—insist against all evidence on interpreting him

as speaking about not just a concept, but a concept of “the ego,” or

even an “absolute ego,” at that. Where Stirner makes it clear that he

speaks of egoism as the unavoidable phenomenal experience that appears

wherever I and my world are conceptually brought into being, his critics

merely see the various forms of philosophical egoism: ethical or moral,

rational or psychological. And this, once again, despite all the

abundant evidence to the contrary. When Stirner makes it clear that the

egoism he describes is not an egoism of absolute, sacred or transcendent

(“jenseits”) interest, or an egoism involving any sort of separation of

his life and acts from any kind of imagined conceptual essence, his

critics ignore all of this and proceed to instead mindlessly attribute

various forms of isolated, anti-social, calculating, narrowly

self-serving egoism to him. Though, as Stirner makes clear, his “Egoism

... is not opposed to love nor to thought; it is no enemy of the sweet

life of love, nor of devotion and sacrifice; and it is no enemy of

intimate warmth, but it also no enemy of critique, nor of socialism,

nor, in short of any actual interest....” Instead, Stirner says, “The

‘exclusiveness’ of the egoist, which some want to pass off as isolation,

separation, loneliness, is on the contrary full participation in the

interesting by—exclusion of the uninteresting.” And, finally, despite

the fact that Stirner subverts and destroys all of the pillars of

philosophy, while only speaking of philosophy with contempt in The

Unique and Its Property, his critics usually then insist on portraying

him precisely as a philosopher!

In “Stirner’s Critics” and “The Philosophical Reactionaries” Stirner

takes these key points (with a few less key) and remakes them, at times

in more detail than he did in his original text, and restates them in

even more clear and unambiguous terms. In their critiques Szeliga,

Feuerbach and Hess each insist on mischaracterizing Stirner’s figure of

the “Unique” in various conceptual guises, which earns them in turn

well-deserved ridicule from Stirner. They each self-congratulatingly

portray their sacred conceptual ideals of the human essence as the True

and Real, apparently totally unaware of Stirner’s forceful and

categorical critique of just that sort of mistake. And they each portray

the egoist as a sinner against their preferred absolute external scales

of value. Finally, when Kuno Fischer treats Stirner as a “reactionary”

“sophist” inferior to the philosophers who have supposedly “overcome”

sophism, Stirner laughs at his preposterously “earth-shattering

thoughts.”

-----

Stirner’s critical self-theory is fundamentally a practical,

self-critical attitude towards self-understanding (which necessarily

includes understanding of others and of one’s world) and self-activity

that is adopted by anyone who refuses to be pushed around by symbolic,

conceptual or linguistic theoretical constructs or formations of any

type. He has systematized one basic approach to an attitude which itself

refuses any possible final systematizations, and has done so in a manner

which closes off no other paths to self-creation except any easy return

to the fitful, occasionally nightmarish, slumbers of religion and

rationalism and their concomitant self-alienation and

self-enslavement.[45]

We each have the power to make our own phenomenal and dialectical

distinctions and relations, in ways more or less nominal and

presuppositionless, or more or less rationalistic. We each have the

power of our own conceptual self-creation which we can use for purposes

of constructing our ownness or constructing our self-alienation, our own

self-possession or our own self-enslavement. If we refuse any and every

dogma, there is no objective, absolute or transcendent reality or truth,

beauty or morality[46] which can stop us from being who we are and

aiming at whatever we wish within the limits of our powers, including

the power of our relationships within our worlds. If we accept any

dogma, then according to that dogma we may still imagine that there is

an objective, absolute or transcendent reality, truth, beauty or

morality.[47] We can imagine and believe with all our power that we are

ruled by God or Nature, subject to laws, compelled by morals, condemned

to sin, controlled by our past, our psychic drives or our genes,

alienated from Truth, Beauty and Justice, or puppets of any other

half-plausible conceptual construction we can create. Our choice lies

between these two visions. It is our choice and, for each of us, our

choice alone: conscious self-creation or unself-conscious,

self-alienated, enslavement to fixed ideas (and to the institutions

which take advantage of them in order to aggregate and exercise people’s

self-alienated powers).

Over one hundred years following the initial publication of Steven

Byington’s English translation of Max Stirner’s Der Einzige und Sein

Eigenthum is one hundred years too long to have had to wait to be able

to read an adequate translation of Stirner’s own words in response to

the major published critics of this work in his lifetime. Let’s thank

Wolfi Landstreicher for producing this highly readable and enjoyable

translation not a moment too soon.

— Jason McQuinn (Originally written July-September 2011 and revised with

additional notes added October 2011 and December 2012.)

[1] Max Stirner’s major work appeared sometime in the second half of

1844, though the publishing date was 1845. The original title was Der

Einzige und sein Eigenthum, though at some point towards the end of the

19^(th) century the German spelling of “Eigenthum” was revised to

“Eigentum.” The English-language translation by Stephen Byington, was

published by Benjamin Tucker in 1907 under the extremely unfortunate

title of The Ego and His Own, despite the fact that a more accurate

translation would have been The Unique and Its Property, which I will

use here in accordance also with the translator’s preference. (As

indicated by the title of this introduction, I would consider The Unique

and Its Self-Creation to have been a much more meaningful choice for

Stirner’s book. But Stirner never asked me, though he does use

terminology of “self-creation” suggestively in his review of Eugùne

Sue’s Les Mystùres de Paris, 1843.) As Benjamin Tucker says in his own

introduction to the original edition, he alone is “responsible for the

admittedly erroneous rendering of the title” as The Ego and His Own.

However, little did he likely realize how much confusion and

mystification his inaccurate title would create for English-speaking

readers over the next century (even, eventually, helping to encourage

misinterpretation by later German-language readers of the original

text). This confusion and mystification has only been reinforced with

the more recent (only slightly more correct) re-translation of the title

as The Ego and Its Own, in which the possessive pronoun has been changed

to a more accurate (non-gender-specific) form. Despite the “ego” in

these titles, and interspersed occasionally in the only English-language

translation of text, Stirner never once uses the word. It is only now

that this confusion and mystification is finally being thoroughly

dispelled, by this translation of “Stirner’s Critics,” along with

publication of an edited version of the first part of my recent review

of John Clark’s Max Stirner’s Egoism (published under the editors’ title

of “John Clark’s Spook” in Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed #64,

March, 2010). The publication of my entire, unedited review under the

original title of “John Clark’s Stirner” is also planned, as well as

publication of a newly revised translation of Stirner’s The Unique and

Its Property.

[2] Following the translator’s choice (which happens to be my own as

well), I will speak of the “Unique” whenever I refer to Max Stirner’s

“Einzige.” “Einzige” can be translated from the German to English most

felicitously as “unique” or “unique one.” However, within Max Stirner’s

texts, it should be remembered at all times that he explicitly intends

to use this noun not as a typical concept (of an incomparable,

particular individual, for example), but as a name which points to the

actual, nonconceptual person’s life—that life as it is experienced prior

to any conceptual interpretation. Thus, when I speak of Stirner’s

“Einzige” I will employ “Unique” beginning with an upper-case “U” to

indicate and reinforce his intended meaning. When I speak of “unique”

entirely in the lower case, I will be intentionally employing the word

as a concept, rather than as a name.

[3] It can be plausibly argued that Stirner’s text is one of the most

misread, misinterpreted and misunderstood books in the entire history of

thought, West or East. But it certainly can be considered at least one

of the more, if not the most misunderstood in modern Western thought.

Paradoxically, as a European text it is definitely Western—though not

necessarily in its perspective and orientation (being completely

nominalistic, atheistic, anarchistic, amoral and egoistic at the same

time, counter to the major themes of Western thought). Historically,

though it falls squarely within the modern period, it is also clearly

anti-modernist to a degree only vaguely hinted by the nominally

post-modern texts of contemporary theory.

[4] I’m not speaking of particular forms of nominalism, phenomenology or

analytical and dialectical logic here, but generically. Stirner is not

merely a nominalist with regard to either essences or to universals in

particular, but a generic nominalist. Nor is he a phenomenologist in the

now predominantly understood philosophical sense of Edmund Husserl, nor

in the particular philosophical senses in which Martin Heidegger,

Maurice Merleau-Ponty or others used the term in following decades or in

the following century (although certain similarities or resemblances

will be inevitable). Remember that Husserl, Heidegger and MerleauPonty

followed earlier phenomenologists, including some like Stirner who did

not use the term, among others who did use the term like Johann Heinrich

Lambert, Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, G.W.F Hegel and Franz

Brentano. For each of them phenomenology is a method, but for the

philosophers—unlike for Stirner—it is always a method determined by

presupposed fixed ideas. Stirner is an early, generic practical

phenomenologist, developing the project of an empirical investigation

without presuppositions (thus nonphilosophically) in an unprecedented

manner which has yet to be fully appreciated. Nor—unlike Hegel, or Karl

Marx and Friedrich Engels for that matter—does Stirner employ a

metaphysical dialectic. Stirner’s analytical and dialectical logic

remains, like his nominalism and phenomenology, fully self-critical and

uncommitted to any fixed metaphysical, epistemological or normative

foundation or presupposition. It is merely an empirical method of

self-understanding, a development of the lived, practical and conceptual

logic of the immanent, phenomenal Unique. (Technically, it would be

preferable to forego even the very broad description of the Unique as

“immanent,” “phenomenal” or even “nonconceptual,” but it is very clear

that most readers require these repeated hints or they immediately fall

back into their (unthinking) habit of interpreting all names as names of

symbolic concepts rather than as possible names of nonconceptual

experiences.)

[5] Stirner’s big crime, a crime that cannot be named without calling

attention to exactly what all his enemies wish to hide, is his entirely

transparent, sarcastically brutal charge that not only the emperor, but

every empire and all emperors everywhere, have “no clothes.” Their

pretenses are all empty and cannot hide their actual nakedness. Their

powers are composed of the naked self-alienation which constitutes a

popular submission that must be continually implicitly encouraged at the

same time that it is explicitly ignored and covered-up. Religion,

philosophy and ideology are rationalist fetishizations. Their

explanatory, normative and regulative powers are all based upon

transparent lies, but lies which are for the most part welcomed,

repeated continuously and ultimately enforced with violence in order to

maintain institutional powers of every kind: religious, political,

economic, social, academic, scientific and cultural. Hans Christian

Andersen risked changing the ending of his original version of “The

Emperor’s New Clothes” just before publication to add the little child

crying out: “But he has nothing on!” However, the expectation that the

“whole people at length” would then go on to join the little child in

repeating the child’s charge is utterly fantastic. Even Andersen

afterwards made no further criticisms aimed at the court, reportedly

bought off with gifts of jewels from the king. The reception given to

Stirner’s critique is necessarily the norm for treatment of such

unwanted and unrepentent outbursts—at least as long as the institutions

of modern civilization hold sway. The second this fact changes the

entire social world will also change.

[6] Just like his critics many, if not most, of Stirner’s admirers often

seem to latch on to one, two or a few of Stirner’s concepts and

arguments or attitudes, take them as Stirner’s central message, and go

on to attempt to reinterpret all of Stirner’s work from the resulting

narrow, often very one-sided, partial perspective they have derived.

This is made all the more tempting by the lack of any genuinely

coherent, generally accepted understanding of Stirner’s work. Readers

who are already predisposed to positively employ one of the traditional

meanings of “egoism” are especially prone to then promote a

misinterpretation of Stirner based upon their preferred use of this

word, brushing aside any of the many glaring inconsistencies such

readings produce as unimportant (as yet to be understood or worked out,

as a result of one of Stirner’s supposed “idiosyncracies” of expression

or an unexplained lapse in Stirner’s logic, as a problem with

translation or the interpretation of 19^(th) century word use, etc.).

Stirner’s more superficial critics (the great majority of all his

critics) generally employ the same method, but their predisposition

toward negative evaluations of traditional meanings of “egoism” often

leads them to somewhat similar results, but with an emphasis on the

problems and evils. They then have every reason blame any

inconsistencies in their own misinterpretations on supposed lapses in

Stirner’s logic, excessively idiosyncratic modes of expression,

untrustworthiness (because he is self-serving), etc. In either case,

this is where the unfortunate English title translation and occasional

entirely inappropriate use of the word “ego” in the translation tend to

greatly reinforce erroneous tendencies in interpretation even for

readers who think they are in agreement with Stirner. Given the

contemporary denotations and connotations of the word “ego,” its use in

translating any but the most clearly critical references to a concept of

the “ego” or “the I” in Stirner’s text should be avoided, or at least

clearly explained. At this point anything less will be considered

unacceptable by any perceptive readers, commentators and critics.

[7] The VormÀrz was the period before the German Revolutionary events of

March, 1848 began.

[8] Although Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were unable to publish their

Die Deutsche Ideologie, it was apparently not for lack of trying. At any

rate, besides the problem of the apparent cluelessness of Marx and

Engels regarding the most central aspects of Stirner’s Der Einzige und

sein Eigenthum demonstrated by their flailing attacks in Die Deutsche

Ideologie, the appearance of “Recensenten Stirner’s” also completely

undermined and refuted major arguments of Marx and Engels well before

their text was even completed. Unfortunately, Marxist scholars, and even

the critics of Marxism, all appear to remain ignorant of the latter fact

to this day. So far as I have found, even those few academics who have

been aware of the content of Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum and

“Recensenten Stirner’s” have uniformly refused to follow its arguments

to their logical conclusions. In Die Deutsche Ideologie Marx and Engels

attempt to present a more sophisticated, Hegelianized, historical

version of materialist philosophy in response to Stirner’s destruction

of the foundation of their previous Feuerbachian, humanist materialism.

But the self-delusional, essentially religious, nature of their project

of rationalist realization requires a (self-negating & self-alienating)

identification with the ideological construction of a supposedly

transcendent, collective historical subject. This makes the

misinterpretation and intentional misrepresentation of Stirner’s own

immanent, intentional egoism a historical necessity for the survival of

Marxist ideology in any form. This is the pathetic secret of the Marxist

ideological critique of ideology in Die Deutsche Ideologie. In order to

maintain the survival of Marxism as an ideology, Marxists are forced to

paint the genuinely non-ideological as “ideology” even if this requires

the maintenance of a permanent, blatant lie: anarchists must all be

portrayed as bourgeois egoists from Max Stirner on. Anything less would

be an admission of the ideological, self-alienating foundation of the

Marxist “science” that perfected the mass-enslavement and genocidal

campaigns of the Soviet and Maoist collectivizations, gulags,

re-education camps, resettlements, etc., as if its obviously ideological

nature should be in need of any additional revelation.

[9] A very incomplete English translation of “Stirner’s Critics” has

long been available, “abridged and translated by” Frederick M. Gordon

and published in The Philosophical Forum, vol. viii, numbers 2-3-4;

Spring 1977, pp. 66–80. More recently, an original and complete new

translation of “The Philosophical Reactionaries” by Widukind de Ridder

was published in Max Stirner (ed. Saul Newman, Palgrave Macmillan, New

York, NY, 2011), independently of the Wolfi Landstreicher’s translation

herein, which itself was completed in 2011, following his translation of

“Stirner’s Critics.” De Ridder’s translation confirms most, though not

all, of Landstreicher’s choices in his own translation presented here.

[10] John Henry Mackay, translated by Hubert Kennedy, Max Stirner: His

Life and his Work (Peremptory Publications, Concord, CA, 2005), page 32.

[11] In 1835 he was granted qualified facultas docendi status following

extensive examinations. Stirner could have qualified for doctorate

status, but he never applied.

[12] Stirner’s studies under Friedrich Schleiermacher, although

centering on theology (philosophical, historical and practical

theology), also integrally included Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics,

criticism, ethics, and dialectics. It is likely that Stirner learned

much more from the latter four than from Schleiermacher’s presentation

of theology, with its apologetics, polemics, dogmatics, statistics and

symbolics, and in the case of practical theology, such exciting topics

as principles of church service, pastoral work, and principles of church

government. (See Friedrich Schleiermacher, revised translation of the

1811 and 1830 editions by Terrence N. Tice, Brief Outline of Theology as

a Field of Study, 3^(rd) Edition [Westminster John Knox Press,

Louisville, KY, 2011].) Although Stirner was certainly influenced by the

whole range of (especially German) Romantics, it seems likely that

Schleiermacher’s emphasis on perception and feeling—and their central

place in hermeneutics—constituted a significant influence helping

Stirner to undermine and overthrow Kantian and Hegelian rationalism,

right along with Schleiermacher’s own dogmatic Christianity.

[13] David McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought (Harper & Row, New

York, 1973) p. 32.

[14] “Left” Hegelian in this case indicated one’s stance towards

religion. Those on the left were critical of religion while those on the

“right” were supporters of a Christian interpretation of Hegelianism in

one form or another.

[15] Ludwig Feuerbach wrote about Stirner’s book in a letter that: “It

is a brilliant and ingenious work....” And after giving criticisms of

Stirner, he then went on to say that: “He is nonetheless the most

ingenious and freest writer I’ve had the opportunity to know.” In a

letter to Marx dated 19 November 1844, Friedrich Engels wrote that

“Clearly Stirner is the most talented, independent, and hard-working of

the ‘Free’....” Arnold Ruge, publisher of the Hallesche JahrbĂŒcher fĂŒr

deutsche Kunst und Wissenschaft and co-editor (with Marx) of the

Deutsch-Französische JahrbĂŒcher, announced in a letter to his mother

that it was “the first readable book in philosophy that Germany has

produced.” (Max Stirner, edited by David Leopold, The Ego and Its Own

[Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995] p. xiii. I cite David

Leopold’s Cambridge University Press edition of Stirner’s work, not

because it is adequate, but merely because it is the best of an

otherwise worse lot. The sad state of Stirner scholarship in general is

exhibited in the inadequate—and in some sections

incompetent—introduction by Leopold in this edition, although his

extensive notes and the index in this edition are themselves competent

and important achievements. All citations from the English translation

of The Ego and Its Own in this essay refer to this edition.)

[16] In his unprecedented critique of self-alienation, Stirner

ultimately focuses on the centrality of religion since, historically,

all systematic self-alienation begins with religion. Etymologically

“religion” is a “Romance word” expressing “a condition of being bound.”

(Max Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, p. 48) But, as Stirner earlier points

out in his essay on “Art and Religion,” religion is first of all “a

thing of the understanding,” which means that it is actually a

conception to which we are bound. Since there has never proven to be any

genuinely credible empirical evidence for the actual existence of any

transcendental spiritual beings, religion is in actuality a conceptual

fetishization. Phenomenally, religion is the self-alienation of one’s

own powers and activities through the imagination and belief that they

are manifestations of a (fantasized) spiritual being. However,

self-alienation is by no means confined to religion as such.

[17] The distinction and dispute between attempts to posit “transcendent

or absolute Truth, Values or Reality” that are supposed to rule over our

lives versus Stirner’s “own particular, finite, unique perspective”

comes down to whether the ultimate rationale for rationalist reification

makes any sense: the need to somehow guarantee a special status for

oneself in one’s world. A special access to nonsubjective, eternal,

transcendent Truth, Value or Reality. A version of Juvenal’s question

then always arises in one form or another: “Quis custodiet ipsos

custodes?” (“Who will guard the guardians?” Or in this case, implicitly,

“Who can know a truth is the Truth, a value is the Value, or a reality

is the Reality?”) Rather than providing a foolproof solution to one’s

problems, subjecting one’s life to a higher level of rule in order to

guarantee adoption of appropriate beliefs and actions leads to a

recursive nightmare. Instead of directly appropriate decision-making

based on the actually experienced situation here and now at hand, the

decision is in advance “kicked upstairs,” where there is no knowledge or

understanding of the particular situations in which the decisions will

actually be applied and thus no possibility of full responsibility—no

ability to respond according to one’s own felt, sensible and engaged

recognition and understanding. In this rationalist mirror-world Truth,

Value and Reality are all representations rather than lived activities

in themselves. Stirner radically reverses this perspective and admits

only his own truths, his own values and his own reality, and invites us

all to do the same. Especially since it is impossible for any

nonsubjective Truth, Value or Reality to exist for anyone in the first

place except as that person’s own imagined projections of such things.

[18] Stirner’s egoist method was possibly modeled in part on Ludwig

Feuerbach’s anthropological method, but may have been developed

independently as part of an ongoing process of which Stirner’s seminal

“Art and Religion” essay (published in early 1842, and most likely

written in late 1841) is one milestone. However, given the publication

date of Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity in 1841 and ensuing

likelihood that Stirner read it soon after, the probability that

Stirner’s egoist method was strongly influenced by Feuerbach should not

be discounted. Feuerbach’s method was in turn undoubtedly derived from

David Strauss’s earlier The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined

(1835–1836).

[19] Neither, of course, does it begin from any particular fixed idea of

what each person’s uniquely lived experience is supposed to be. It

begins from that experience as it is non-conceptually lived.

[20] As Stirner proclaims in The Unique and Its Property, the “Unique”

points to that which precedes all conceptualization. This means the

“Unique” does not point to any ideal individual person, not to a

physical person, not to some conception of a soul or a self. But to the

entire lived experience of the person. It therefore includes one’s

entire life, including both objective and subjective aspects, which must

themselves be artificially determined and separated from each other in

order to be brought into being—out of the always pre-existing

nonconceptual Unique—as concepts.

[21] The process of self-alienation—of separating an idea or

representation of oneself from one’s living self and then subordinating

one’s living self to that image—is not just the foundation of modern

life or modernity, it is also the foundation of so-called “traditional”

societies, basically from the neolithic age onwards up to modernity.

Though it appears it was precisely not the foundation for the earlier

(one could argue more aptly-named “traditional”) paleolithic and, later,

gathering and hunting societies that are now usually called “primitive.”

What distinguishes non-primitive traditional societies from modern

societies can be characterized as the intensity and ever-wider

dispersion of this self-alienation throughout all aspects of life,

including every social institution and form of social practice. Although

it is proper to call Max Stirner the most radical, coherent and

consistent critic of modernity, it would be incorrect to understand him

as defending these traditional institutions or life-ways. He is equally

a critic of premodern traditional and modern societies. (Given the

limits of archaeological and anthropological knowledge in his time, it

is not surprising that Stirner never mentions or hazards any guesses

regarding what are now called “primitive” societies.)

[22] Mysticism is derived from the Greek “mystikos,” and generally used

to indicate some claim to direct or immediate knowledge transcending

normal human experience, especially of a sacred or divine nature as in

communion with gods. Stirner, on the contrary, is completely concerned

with the here and now, the immanence of mundane, everyday experience—an

atheistic, anarchistic, egoistic immanence. Although many mystics tend

to refer to “immanence” or at least imply some form of “immanence” in

their statements, they in fact—as mystics—are always referring to

religious forms of the “immanence” of otherwise transcendent ideas or

pirits. This means that they are never speaking of any actual immanence,

but of the self-alienation of human qualities which are then re-imported

back into everyday life in some sense in which these self-alienations

are then said to lie within reality, the world, the person, etc. The

title of Leo Tolstoy’s Christian homily The Kingdom of God is within You

(based on Luke 17:21) is a typical example of this genre of religious,

if not mystical, “immanence.”

[23] Wilhelm Dilthey obtained his doctorate in philosophy in Berlin in

1864 from the same university where Stirner studied, and less than

twenty years after that university’s most radical student had published

the most outrageously notorious critique of philosophy ever written.

While there is a slight possibility that Dilthey was completely unaware

of Stirner’s work, it is much more likely that he was extremely aware of

it. Especially given the existence of other more reputable sources that

contributed to his developing understanding of understanding, if Dilthey

borrowed anything at all from an encounter with (and inevitably a

rejection of the most radical aspects of) Stirner’s work, he would not

by any means be the first to do so (both) without mentioning the debt.

(Where, for example, would Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels have ended up

without their debts to Stirner’s work—gained through its partial

appropriation while rejecting its most fundamental and radical basis? It

has only recently begun to be appreciated how much their metaphysical

dialectics of historical materialism and their ideological critique of

ideology owe to their encounter with his work—even if they never

actually understood Stirner, nor the full import of their own

rationalist metaphysics. And what about Nietzsche’s later encounter with

Stirner, which he strove so hard to hide? Instead of looking for

similarities and plagiarism, anyone who understands the shallowness of

Nietzsche’s rhetoric will realize that he didn’t steal from Stirner, so

much as he fled from the radical implications of the iron logic of

Stirner’s critique, while appropriating a few of the less central themes

from Stirner that Nietzsche was then never able to fully master). The

similarities between some of the fundamental attitudes of Dilthey’s work

(from its beginnings) and Stirner’s would be somewhat uncanny if there

is no connection. For one example, Dilthey’s critiques of Kant and Hegel

clearly echo (obviously, in a much less radical manner) Stirner’s. For

another, Jacob Owensby’s characterization of the foundation of Dilthey’s

historical understanding could almost serve as a partial (though less

than adequate) description of Stirner’s project: “...all knowledge is

rooted in life itself as it is given in lived experience. Life is not,

however, reducible to subjectivity. Rather, life is an I-world relation

prior to the subject-object distinction.” (Jacob Owensby, Dilthey and

the Narrative of History, p. ix.) What probably clinches Dilthey’s acute

awareness of Stirner’s work and the extreme danger, if not

impossibility, of his acknowledging any debt to Stirner’s work is the

fact that Dilthey’s original mentor was the same Kuno Fischer whose

attempted critique was so unceremoniously demolished by Stirner in “The

Philosophical Reactionaries.” Kuno Fischer was Dilthey’s teacher in

Heidelberg, before Dilthey began studying at the University of Berlin in

1853, itself only six years after Fischer’s antiStirner pamphlet had

been published. It is also important to note that any acknowledgment

that he borrowed anything, even critically from a hyper-radical source

like Stirner could have meant the early destruction of Dilthey’s

academic career in a potential scandal similar to the one which

temporarily derailed Kuno Fischer’s career in Heidelberg over the

latter’s alleged ties to Spinozism. On another tangent, Dilthey was also

influenced by two of the same University of Berlin professors who had

earlier taught Stirner, and from whom both undoubtedly learned much of

their philology, hermeneutics and criticism, Friedrich Schleiermacher

and Philipp August Böckh. There are other connections which could be

cited as well. For more information on Dilthey, see Jacob Owensby,

Dilthey and the Narrative of History (Cornell University Press, Ithaca,

NY, 1994).

[24] As were very probably a majority of the most noteworthy

Germanlanguage radicals, philosophers, critics and literary figures

since the mid-nineteenth century, Edmund Husserl was at least in some

fashion familiar with the nature and meaning of Stirner’s work. Bernd

Laska reports that “Edmund Husserl once warned a small audience about

the ‘seducing power’ of Der Einzige—but never mentioned it in his

writing.” (Bernd Laska, “Max Stirner, a durable dissident—in a

nutshell,” available on the internet on the lsr-projekt.de web site in a

number of languages, including English.) However Dermot Moran, in Edmund

Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology (Polity, Cambridge, 2005, p. 131.),

also reports that “...in publications from Logische Untersuchungen to

Méditations Cartésiennes, Husserl’s approach is predominantly

individualist, or ‘egological’, describing conscious life primarily in

the context of the individual self, for which he even invokes Max

Stirner’s title,... (der Einzige und sein Eigentum; 35: 94).” Husserl’s

distinction (developed from Bolzano’s distinction between subjective and

objective ideas or representations) between “noesis” (the intentional

process of consciousness) and “noema” (the object of conscious

intention) is a weak alternative (relegated only to consciousness) to

Stirner’s nominalist and non-metaphysical distinction between “egoism”

(nonconceptual or phenomenally-lived intentional activity) and

“property” (the object of egoist action, including acts of

consciousness). Similarly, Husserl’s conception of “intentionality”

(adopted from Brentano—who adapted the scholastic version of Aristotle’s

conception) is also a weak philosophical (metaphysical) alternative to

Stirner’s phenomenal “egoism.” Husserl cannot avoid reproducing most of

Stirner’s distinctions in the later phenomenology he “invented,” though

each of his inventions pale before Stirner’s creative appropriation and

synthesis of Fichtean, Hegelian and Feuerbachian phenomenological

currents.

The case of Brentano is interesting since it brings up the likelihood

that Stirner was, like Brentano (with his conception of intentionality),

also in part influenced by Aristotle’s De Anima in developing his

nominalist/phenomenal conception of egoism. Once Stirner conceived and

developed his egoist method, he undoubtedly brought it to bear in

reclaiming all of the self-alienated predicates of every major

conception of god, soul and spirit. This means that he most likely

examined the general range of results produced by applying the egoist

method to every one of the major philosophies before proceeding to

compile the first draft of what would become his magnum opus.

[25] Ultimately, Heidegger’s concepts of “Sein” and “Dasein” are highly

abstract, cognitive metaphysical categories, and as such remain

compatible with the Cartesian tradition of rationalist philosophy of

consciousness. To this type of preaching, Stirner explains: “... for

absolute or free thinking..., thinking itself is the beginning, and it

plagues itself with propounding this beginning as the extremest

‘abstraction’ (such as being). This very abstraction, or this thought,

is then spun out further.”

Absolute thinking is the affair of the human spirit, and this is a holy

spirit. Hence this thinking is an affair of the parsons, who have ‘a

sense for it,’ a sense for the ‘highest interests of mankind,’ for ‘the

spirit.’”

[26] All dualism is necessarily conceptual in nature. By starting

directly from the nonconceptual, from which subjective and objective

poles (or mind and body, or self and world) have not yet been

abstracted, Stirner deftly bypasses the most fundamental problem for all

philosophy, the metaphysical problem which actually founds and defines

philosophy. Although the attempt is often made by philosophers to avoid

conceptual dualism with the creation of monistic metaphysical systems

(for examples, Schelling’s and Hegel’s), these attempts always founder

immediately on their invariably conceptual nature. Even when they are

supposed to point to something nonconceptual (for example with

Schelling’s idea of Nature), this nonconceptual is still immediately

then metaphysically conceptualized in non-nominalist ways (as Being,

God, Nature, the Absolute, etc.), rather than simply left unaltered as

with Stirner. This always leads to the reproduction of the originally

evaded overt dualism within the monistic principle itself. Within

Kantian philosophy the metaphysical dualism is overt. Within Fichtean

philosophy the overt dualism is avoided, but then immediately reproduced

within a phenomenological subjectivity. Within Schelling’s philosophy

the overt dualism is avoided, but then immediately reproduced within

objectivity. Hegel merely retraces Fichte’s route, avoiding overt

dualism, while reproducing it within subjectivity, but a subjectivity

combining being and reason.

[27] Quoted from Böckh’s “Formal Theory of Philology” in

Mueller-Vollmer, Kurt (ed.), The Hermeneutics Reader (Continuum

Publishing Co., New York, 1997) p. 133. At the University of Berlin

Stirner studied philology and hermeneutics under Philipp August Böckh

(who, according to Mueller-Vollmer, “combined the ideas of

Schleiermacher with the exacting methods of classical philology taught

by Wolf and Ast” [p. 132]). Stirner also studied under Schleiermacher

himself. Among the other possible perspectives on his critical

self-theory expressed in The Unique and Its Property, we can also

characterize it as a practical hermeneutics of self-understanding and a

critical hermeneutics of self-alienation and self-enslavement.

[28] To my knowledge there is no significant writer or theorist in all

of history who has ever made any logically consistent claim that

completely unprincipled (in the sense of no a priori, necessary, eternal

or absolute metaphysical principles or laws) empirical investigation or

conceptually presuppositionless phenomenology could constitute what is

called religion or philosophy (or in most cases, if not all, science as

well). On the other hand, it is no problem to find explicit evidence

that every major theology, revealed religion and philosophy

fundamentally depends upon claims to such principles and

presuppositions. There have been confused claims from many recent

philosophers and scientists that they employ no metaphysical principles

or presuppositions even as they at the same time claim or assume

(sometimes apparently without realizing it) that their theories can

provide some form of (metaphysically) a priori, necessary, eternal or

absolute knowledge!

These naively self-contradictory theorists most often claim to be

empiricists, defenders of science or post-modern critics. However, one

of the more sophisticated and sometimes-influential claims in a related

but different direction is Klaus Hartmann’s quite-justifiably

controversial attempt at a non-metaphysical reading of Hegel’s

philosophy made in “Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View” (Klaus Hartmann,

Studies in Foundational Philosophy [Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1988] p.

267–287). But, as Hartmann at one point confesses, even with the

“categorial” and “systematic understanding” of Hegel that he advocates,

“we realize that the notorious transition from Idea to Nature, or from

the Logic to ‘Realphilosophie,’ can only be a metaphor.” (p. 277) Either

Hegel is read metaphysically (as Hegel explicitly asks), or his

“philosophy” or “metaphysics” can be read non-metaphysically as mere

metaphor, and any claims regarding the real world vanish, and with them

so vanishes the metaphysical claims of the Logic as well. Similarly, the

“presuppositionless” nature of Hegel’s categories in the Logic is also

hedged by Hartmann, as a mere “reconstruction,” whose “sequential

forward reading cannot be the whole story. How could a

presuppositionless beginning lead to anything....?” Only Stirner’s

nonconceptual Unique offers the genuine possibility of a conceptually

presuppositionless beginning, and does so only by intentionally

abandoning philosophy.

[29] The rationalist moment in Heraclitus was, of course and not least,

his apparently metaphysical answer to the search for the ultimate

substance of reality (the noumenon beyond the phenomenal world), which

he decided was fire, modified by stages of rarefaction and condensation.

Consistent with the unstable and transient image of fire, Heraclitis

maintained a dynamic perspective on this reality in which change or flux

is constant. But he certainly did not renounce metaphysical speculation,

portraying his views not as mere poetic art, but as a revelation of an

eternal Logos. His belief that one cannot step into the same river twice

did not stop him from believing that he had some special knowledge of

the transcendent foundations of the world.

Despite David Hume’s well known empiricism and skepticism, his

philosophical speculations (like all philosophical empiricists and

skeptics) also contain unmistakably rationalist moments, metaphysically

necessary or a priori presuppositions that remain unproven and

unprovable, but are not to be questioned or in most cases even

acknowledged. For Hume this includes the usual naive empiricist

presupposition of a metaphysical subject-object dualism, in which

atomistic sense-data or perceptions are conceived as the subjective

representations of a supposed—though not necessarily proveable—objective

world.

Despite the fact that many philosophical empiricists and skeptics have

genuinely attempted to reduce their fetishizations of reason, as long as

they fail to reject the alleged independent truth of every rationalist

presupposition they in fact invariably remain in thrall to rationalist

reification in those remaining unquestioned forms. For more examples and

detailed examination of relation of reification to empiricist

philosophy, see the longer version of note 29 in an earlier version of

this essay appearing in Modern Slavery #1/Spring-Summer 2012 (CAL Press,

POB 24332, Oakland, CA 94623;

http://modernslavery.calpress.org

).

[30] Kant himself claimed to have destroyed all previous forms of

metaphysics. He was more reticent and ambiguous regarding claims to

religious critique, though he did openly take on some of the more

obviously illogical or irrational claims like that of the supposed

ontological proof of the existence of God. In their place he elevated

the analytic and synthetic a priori, a metaphysical conception of

mathematics, fixed categories of the understanding, wiggle room for the

possibility of religion, and an intractable metaphysical dualism of

appearance and thing-in-itself. As Kant himself explains: “All pure a

priori knowledge... has in itself a peculiar unity; and metaphysics is

the philosophy which has as its task the statement of that knowledge in

this systematic unity. Its speculative part, which has especially

appropriated this name, namely, what we entitle metaphysics of

nature,...considers everything in so far as it is (not that which ought

to be) by means of a priori concepts,....” (Immanuel Kant, The Critique

of Pure Reason, A845 B873).

[31] Hegel claimed to carry on Kant’s critique in an attempt at a

presuppositionless phenomenology and logic, but in practice only begged

the question (the logical fallacy of already assuming that which is to

be proven) by implicitly presupposing his conceptual or logical

metaphysics from the beginning. For example, in his doctrines of being

and essence, Hegel always already assumes that an immediate experience

(lived experience, unmediated by conceptual thought) does not and cannot

exist, by always beginning from thinking (mediation) itself, rather than

beginning from outside of thought. He then concludes, quite logically

given his implicit presupposition, that immediacy is impossible. As

Hegel states in his Science of Logic (translated by A.V. Miller and

published by Humanity Books, 1999, p. 50.): “... what we are dealing

with ... is not a thinking about something which exists independently as

a base for our thinking and apart from it ... on the contrary, the

necessary forms and self-determinations of thought are the content and

the ultimate truth itself.”

[32] See Nicholas Lobkowicz, “Karl Marx and Max Stirner” in Frederick

Adelmann, Demythologizing Marxism (Boston College, Chestnut Hill, 1969)

pp. 64–95. (Especially relevant are pages 74–75.)

[33] Strauss was actually influenced far more by Friedrich

Schleiermacher than Hegel, but he is usually represented as the first of

the post-Hegelians, having coined the terms “right Hegelian” and “left

Hegelian” to describe more tradition-oriented Christian Hegelians (like

Bruno Bauer in 1838) and more liberal or progressive approaches to

scriptural interpretation (as was his own). Strauss wrote: “This is the

key to the whole of Christology.... In an individual, a God-man, the

properties and functions which the Church ascribes to Christ contradict

themselves; in the idea of the race, they perfectly agree.” And “By

faith in this Christ, especially in his death and resurrection, man is

justified before God; that is, by the kindling within him of the idea of

Humanity, the individual man participates in the divinely human life of

the species.” David Friedrich Strauss, translated by George Eliot, The

Life of Jesus, Critically Examined (Swan Sonnenschein, London, 1892) p.

780.

[34] See Ludwig Feuerbach, translated by George Eliot, The Essence of

Christianity (Barnes & Noble Books, New York, 2004) p. xix. Feuerbach

argues that his philosophy: “...does not rest on an Understanding per

se, on an absolute, nameless understanding, belonging one knows not to

whom, but on the understanding of man;—though not, I grant, on that of

man enervated by speculation and dogma;—and it speaks the language of

men, not an empty, unknown tongue. Yes, both in substance and in speech,

it places philosophy in the negation of philosophy, i.e., it declares

that alone to be the true philosophy which is converted in succum et

sanguinem, which is incarnate in Man;....”

[35] “Reason is the true creative power, for it produces itself as

Infinite Self-consciousness, and its ongoing creation is...world

history. As the only power that exists, Spirit can therefore be

determined by nothing other than itself, that is, its essence is

Freedom...Freedom is the infinite power of Spirit...Freedom, the only

End of Spirit, is also the only End of History, and history is nothing

other than Spirit’s becoming conscious of its Freedom, or the becoming

of Real, Free, Infinite Self-consciousness.” Bruno Bauer, “Hegel’s Lehre

von der Religion und Kunst von dem Standpunkte des Glaubens aus

Beurteilt” (1842), translated by Douglass Moggach, 2001. Anticipating

his later, more detailed arguments, Max Stirner implicitly criticized

Bauer’s “infinite self-consciousness” with his own critique of Hegel’s

teaching in an essay titled “Art and Religion,” which also appeared in

1842.

[36] “Feuerbach says that the essence of God is the transcendent essence

of man, and that the true doctrine of the divine being is the doctrine

of the human being. Theology is anthropology. This is correct, but is

not the whole truth. One must add that the essence of man (das Wesen des

Menschen) is the social being (das gesellschaftliche Wesen), the

co-operation of various individuals for one and the same end...The true

doctrine of man, true humanism, is the doctrine of human socialization,

that is, anthropology is socialism.” Moses Hess, “ ber die

sozialistische Bewegung in Deutschland,” Neue Anekdota, edited by Karl

Gr n (Darmstadt, 1845), p. 203, quoted in Nicholas Lobkowicz, “Karl Marx

and Max Stirner,” Frederick Adelmann, Demythologizing Marxism (Boston

College, Chestnut Hill, 1969) p. 75.

[37] Max Stirner was undoubtedly aware of at least the Lao-tsu—or

Tao-te-ching, since it was included in Hegel’s lectures on the History

of Religion attended by Stirner in the winter of 1827–1828. Many of the

early Taoist texts share distinct nominalist, phenomenological and

dialectical traces (in which the nonconceptual nature of the Tao is

sometimes expressed similarly to the nonconceptual nature of Stirner’s

Unique). The most remarkable for their similarities with Stirner’s

work—including their wide disrepute amongst humanists of both East and

West—may be the texts attributed to Yang Chu. The question of whether

Stirner may have had any direct familiarity with the Chuang-tsu texts or

Yang Chu texts requires further investigation. Interestingly, though, as

far as I have been able to find to date, the first published German

translation of Yang Chu’s texts was prepared by someone very familiar

with Stirner’s work, Martin Buber. Buber, who—though he was quite

(uncomprehendingly) critical of Stirner—was also a very good friend of

Gustav Landauer, whom it should be noted, was at one point enthusiastic

enough about Stirner’s work that he used Stirner’s given name for his

own pseudonym. Landauer, of course, is most widely known for a quotation

in which he paraphrases Stirner (while leaving out the mediation of

people’s belief in fixed ideas): “The state is a social relationship, a

certain way of people relating to one another. It can be destroyed by

creating new social relationships, i.e. by people relating to one

another differently.”

[38] Max Stirner, edited by David Leopold, The Ego and Its Own

(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), p. 164.

[39] Critiques of nominalism have historically relied on premises

provided by unexamined rationalist presuppositions. These

presuppositions are either smuggled in through unexamined metaphysical

or epistemological contextual assumptions, or both. Typically, for a

start, some type of ontological subjective/objective dualism and

rationalist, representational epistemology is presumed. Then nominalism

is usually rejected because it is inconsistent with or cannot provide

proofs for the presupposed rationalist forms of reality or knowledge.

That the demands imposed by adoption of rationalist presuppositions do

not and cannot logically justify any general, presuppositionless

critique of nominalism is never considered. This is a corollary of

Hume’s critique of induction and Stirner’s critique of rationalist

presuppositions, which I call “McQuinn’s Law.” (Since I’m an anarchist,

this is—at least partly—a joke!) McQuinn’s Law can be stated as: Given

any genuinely presuppositionless empiricism, there is no possible way to

prove the existence of any necessary, a priori entity. Every form of

conceptual cognition cannot be more than a hypothesis or postulate which

must be continually proven in practice. (Obviously, this also includes

McQuinn’s Law itself, which is why it actually is not a law at all! But

what did you expect from an anarchist?)

This means that, as usually conceived, there is no non-dogmatic

justification for the presumption of the existence of any natural law or

timeless or a priori universal, absolute, number, necessity, reality,

truth, value, being, beauty, gods, dogmas or any other fixed idea

(rationalist reification) which is not discovered and interpreted in

one’s particular experience as it is lived. These entities may all be

postulated, but they are never proven. Show me (I’m a Missouri

empiricist!) any a priori or timeless postulate, and I will show that it

cannot be proven to be a priori or timeless without begging the

question. This may not actually be a law, but it certainly trumps all

laws. Just as immanent, phenomenal anarchy trumps the existence of all

historical states. (What existed before the first political state was

created? Anarchy—the ground of all social existence!)

[40] Whereas most philosophers since Descartes have begun from thinking

and thought or conceptual consciousness, Max Stirner begins from

non-thought, from his nonconceptual life. Stirner calls himself “the

Unique” or “the Unique One” (“der Einzige”) to point to himself as an

“empty concept,” a concept without any content aside from the

nonconceptual experience to which it points. An “empty concept” could

also be termed a “nominal” or “nominalist concept,” a type of concept

that always necessarily corresponds perfectly to its object.

[41] As it is usually formulated, belief in any a priori is necessarily

always a belief in an unverifiable conceptual presupposition. After all,

from the instant we create a conceptual understanding of our lives

temporality in some form is already there, implied (if by nothing else)

in the very act of creation of conceptual categories (of thinking).

Prior to our memories of our own acts in the past (which are always

memories within the present) and following our current acts (in a future

which is only ever projected from the present), how can we possibly know

if any particular concept or symbol existed or will exist? Certainly not

based on any empirical, experiential evidence. The usual practice of

rationalists is to consider thinking as outside of space and time (which

is fine if you really believe you are fundamentally only a spirit or

ghost, but isn’t very convincing for those of us who empirically

consider our bodies and worlds to be nonexpendable), and therefore its

contents as somehow a priori. However, if thinking is considered from a

presuppositionless phenomenological perspective as merely an activity of

a living person, whose actual essence (as Stirner would say) is

nonconceptual, then the existence of any thoughts prior to that thinking

and outside of experience (a priori concepts) will never be found—only

asserted on no (or highly impeachable) empirical evidence. It is not

likely that Stirner would have missed (among other similar statements

from the philosophers of his time), in an introduction to his Science of

Knowledge (Nabu Press edition, 2010, p. 26), Fichte stating—as part of a

longer argument—that: “Philosophy anticipates the entirety of experience

and thinks it only as necessary, and to that extent it is, by comparison

with real experience, a priori. To the extent that it is regarded as

given, the number is a posteriori; the same number is a priori insofar

as it is derived as a product of the factors. Anyone who thinks

otherwise, simply does not know what he is talking about.” What does a

priori mean here except a statement that is already contained in some

way in its premises (factors). Stirner easily recognized that either the

premises themselves must already be a priori rather than empirical, in

which case we have a vicious circle in which we will never reach any

presuppositionless phenomenon from which we can derive an a priori (and

it is obvious that the a priori is just a baseless presupposition), or

the supposed a priori thought is really a given (an a posteriori)

phenomenon (unless thinking is metaphysically considered somehow to be

outside of experience, itself an a priori presupposition).

[42] After standing largely intact for thousands of years, Aristotle’s

analytic, or syllogistic, logic (reconstructed in the Organon) was only

replaced by modern formal deductive logics in the 19^(th) and 20^(th)

centuries, largely after Stirner’s death. During Stirner’s lifetime

there were, however, already hints at some of the major, imaginative

changes on their way. For a much more detailed discussion of the

implications of Stirner’s analytic perspective, see note 42 in the

earlier version of this essay in Modern Slavery #2/Spring-Summer 2012

(CAL Press, POB 24332, Oakland, CA 94623), pp. 177–178.

[43] Developing from its earliest practices, Aristotle’s formulation of

dialectic (also reconstructed in the Organon) operates through a limited

number of potential practical strategies of argumentation, depending

upon the type of context and audience. From its beginnings, dialectic

implied a logic of communicative (social) understanding embedded in time

and history that became, especially within Hegel’s conception of

dialectic, increasingly explicit. In fact, dialectic is composed at its

most basic phenomenal level of all the extra-analytical (contextual,

interpretive, discursive and rhetorical) aspects of logic. However,

whereas Hegel’s dialectic ultimately remains (whatever Hegel’s actual

intention) no more than a self-alienated, rationalist objectification,

Stirner’s dialectic is his own self-creation as both self-expression and

self-possession. It is a continually recreated and flexible process

whose objectifications Stirner creates and consumes at his pleasure for

his own purposes—for his self-enjoyment.

In practice, this means that since Stirner takes full responsibility for

creating all aspects of his self-expression, he also can take full

account (to the extent he wishes in any given particular instance) of

every expressive move he makes. Thus, for each distinction Stirner

employs, he always understands that it is his act of distinction, it

occurs in a particular life context (including natural, social,

historical and personal moments), and it is based upon and operates

within—but also always creatively beyond—social and historical systems

of both preconceptual and symbolic communication. For each particular

conceptual distinction he makes, then the symbolic distinction will

nominally denote (or point to) a particular indication whose content is

only part of a story that always includes its entire context. And that

context will always include everything that the indication leaves

out—its entire ground or background, all that is not indicated. This

(more narrowly) includes everything that is not conceptually indicated,

which would be the other conceptual side of any distinction (for

example, the other side of every abstract, polar evaluative distinction

like desirable/undesirable, good/bad, right/wrong, true/false,

real/unreal, beautiful/non-beautiful, spiritual/non-spiritual and

material/non-material or the other side of every particular or

universal, objective distinction like table/non-table, Joan/non-Joan,

sleep/awake, aware/unaware, eagle/non-eagle, dust mote/non-dust mote and

god/nongod or blue-flying-elephant/non-blue-flying-elephant). According

to Stirner’s critique, since only particulars actually exist in our

experiences, it becomes especially important to maintain an awareness of

what is necessarily suppressed by (left out of) every rationalist

(abstract, universal) distinction, since it is his goal to restore for

himself—and to help all of us begin to restore for ourselves—every

particular moment or aspect of life that we currently suppress through

our rationalist self-alienations.

[44] Max Stirner, edited by David Leopold, The Ego and Its Own

(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), p. 166.

[45] Stirner makes it hard to return to the self-alienating and

self-defeating incoherence of religious-rationalist thought—the

dogmatism of religion and the built-in nihilism of every form of modern

religion, philosophy and ideology (in which frustrating, unreachably

abstract Realities, Conceptions and Values are set up as the only

acceptable objects or goals of life). This is because his critique is

not only devastating for every form of religion, philosophy and ideology

themselves, but also—when properly understood through his complete

reversal of perspective—his critique reveals the path to the subversive

completion of each religiously rationalist project, through completion

of the hidden phenomenal, living core of each of these projects. This is

the case for the particular projects of ancient philosophers, the

project of Christianity, for the Cartesian project and the Kantian

project, the Fichtean and Schellingian projects, for Schleiermacher’s

project, for the Hegelian project, the various Romantic projects of

Novalis and others, all of the ideological projects the nationalists,

socialists, communists and corporativists, and all the rest of the

rationalist projects which have followed throughout the 19^(th) and

20^(th) centuries.

Taking each of these projects individually, we can—from Stirner’s

critical, egoistic perspective—trace the particular forms of religious

or rationalist dogma presupposed a priori in each case. (These

presuppositions are always centered around the choice of an initial

symbolic inversion, fetishizing a religious or rationalist

(representational) mirror-image of our phenomenally-experienced lives,

which is invested with the “reality” that is torn and self-alienated

from the nonconceptual unity of our actual lives.) These presuppositions

then logically lead further to more and more complex structures of

self-alienation, more and more intricate excuses for self-enslavement,

and more and more arcane attempts at explaining the resulting

(ultimately inexplicable) self-contradictions which result from the

assumption of the initial inversion of lived reality with its symbolic

representations.

[46] See note 41.

[47] Max Stirner’s critique of morality is one of the hardest things for

his critics to stomach. Even when they seem to understand it in theory,

his critics remain so wedded to the self-subordination of their own

activities to moral rules in practice that they are for the most part

unable to consistently step outside their own habitual commitments, even

in their imaginations. This leads to a complete inability to understand

why the fetishized belief in compulsory morality of any kind is absurd

for those who refuse to live as slaves.

Stirner’s whole critique is founded on the refusal of all forms of

self-alienation. And compulsory morality is one of the archetypal forms

of self-alienation. It involves either creating before the fact, or

(more often) claiming to find (or to have imposed on oneself),

predetermined rules of conduct that must be followed regardless of one’s

situation. The absurdity of this becomes even clearer when we read the

religious, political, economic, and social moralists, or moral

philosophers, and discover that each seeks to find some way to claim

that moral rules should always trump the existential choices of

particular individuals, though none are ever able to make a logical case

for this without introducing dogmatic presuppositions that already

contain the justifications for requiring the moral rules. As soon as we

disallow these dogmatic presuppositions, these moralists can only flop

around like dying fish out of water, rehashing their baseless arguments

but going nowhere.

Even though—with their dogmatic foundations removed—moralists can only

operate with no rational basis, they still insist on claiming that the

absence of morality either is—or else definitely leads to—the most

heinous of crimes. The typical illogical argument is that the absence of

morality means the absence of “moral responsibility,” and the absence of

moral responsibility leads to heinous behavior. Yet, when moral

responsibility is examined, it turns out that it consists of the “good

German” rule of just following orders. Of course, it is the correct

orders that are supposed to be followed, say the moralists. But few ever

agree on which are the correct orders. There can never be any

unquestionably true, universal criteria that lead us to the correct

orders for everyone to follow. And those who yell the loudest that we

need to follow their “correct” orders are usually the most ignorant and

illogical of the bunch: Marxists, liberals, Nazis, racists, Christians,

Islamics, Hindus, etc.

What is actually at stake with any submission to morality is the

necessary abdication of any directly personal responsibility for one’s

actions, instead of accepting the inevitability that one always chooses

one’s actions and cannot escape this lived fact. Moral responsibility is

an ideological mirage through which people can attempt to displace

responsibility from the actual agent—themselves—on to the set of moral

rules and its alleged source.

Genuine personal responsibility is only accepted when we make each

decision for ourselves—unavoidably in our own interests. Unless you

believe that your own interests are actually different from the

interests involved in your own actions, a highly convoluted and

illogical idea, but typical of the distorted thought processes required

for the proper functioning of compulsory morality.

Although it is often implied by his critics, it is untrue that Stirner

rejects all questions of ethics per se (or non-compulsory morality,

should one wish to use that term). If an ethical question or a

noncompulsory moral question involves determining what is the best way

(according to one’s own criteria of “best”) to achieve a particular

goal, to what would Stirner object? It is only when an ethic is fixed,

binding or compulsory in the sense in which morality is usually taken

that Stirner could be said to reject ethics.

It should be clear that Stirner’s entire argument here turns on the

refusal to subordinate his actually lived activities to any

self-alienated symbolic representations of himself and his activities.

His egoism is an immanent, phenomenal, descriptive egoism and has no

compulsory moral content. He has no desire to separate his lived

interests from some sort of supposed “actual” or “real” self-interests

that he should follow, just as he has no desire to somehow correctly

isolate some sort of supposed “actual” or “real” external or

heteronomous moral interests that he should follow. The desire to impose

some sort of reified, rationalistic compulsory-moral mechanism between

one’s otherwise felt life choices and one’s final actions functions as a

fetishized (neurotic) repetition-compulsion preventing any exit from

habitual self-alienation (see note 17, where I describe this “recursive

nightmare” further). The choice of compulsory morality is necessarily

the choice of self-enslavement to that morality—whether it is a

supposedly “altruistic” or a supposedly “egoistic” morality. Moral

altruism and moral egoism are two sides of the same phenomenon of

self-alienation that Stirner consistently and conclusively rejects.