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Title: Stirner, Wittgenstein, and Anarchism Author: Rai Ling Date: 2022-02-07 Language: en Topics: egoism, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Max Stirner, philosophy Source: Retrieved 02/10/2022 from https://c4ss.org/content/56030
The work of Max Stirner is a contentious topic among anarchists, with
numerous interpretations of his work, ranging from descriptive,
presenting a certain framework of thought, to prescriptive, advocating
for anti-authoritarianism, and expressing a commitment to
“individualism.” It is my position that egoism is primarily descriptive
in nature. The key distinctions Stirner makes, those between fixed and
unfixed ideas, and conscious and unconscious egoism, do not lead us to
any normative conclusions, despite Stirner’s clear personal opposition
to the state and authority in general. Rather, many anarchists are
egoists because they find personal value in this perspective. Egoism has
both everything and nothing to do with anarchism.
In The Unique and Its Property, Stirner writes that he has “based [his]
affairs on nothing.” The nothing he refers to is the “creative nothing”
or the unique, an internal emptiness, or indeterminacy, the absence of
any rule that determines how we ought to form concepts. It is comparable
to other ineffable non-concepts like the Śūnyatā of Buddhism or the Dao
of Daoism. Stirner does not comment on what those affairs are, or what
form they should take, only what they are “based on.” Therefore, to base
one’s affairs on nothing is to consciously base one’s affairs on
emptiness, a non-concept that escapes definition, lacking in any
essential or ideal forms, or reference to any concept, including desire,
thought, mind, and so on.
The process of becoming from an underlying emptiness can be expressed as
momentary desire or will, arising from the creative nothing, forming
concepts that “please” or are useful to it. Every subject can be said to
express and act on their desires, and so Stirner would contend that
everyone is an egoist, which mirrors the theory of psychological egoism.
The individual who consciously develops out of nothing is referred to as
a conscious egoist. Stirner contrasts the conscious egoist to the
unconscious egoist, one who lacks consciousness of the unique, and
instead attributes desire to abstractions such as the self, the mind,
the brain, Platonic forms, and so on, as opposed to the creative
nothing, resulting in what Stirner calls fixed ideas, concepts that are
deemed to exist in the world, not prefigured by emptiness, but as
objective features of a predefined existence.
Stirner’s approach bears similarities to the skeptical problem
Wittgenstein expresses in Philosophical Investigations, which notes that
there is no principle “out there” that determines how we ought to form
meaning in terms of definitions, grammar, and logic, undermining any
notion of fixed meaning. Reality is defined into existence, using
language. Although Wittgenstein does not explicitly posit an “emptiness”
beneath these definitions, it is implicit in his reasoning. He notes
that every “thing” appears to lack any kind of fixed essence. Rather,
concepts are useful abstractions that dissolve when we adopt slightly
different perspectives; zooming in, zooming out, making observations
over vast time scales, etc. Insofar as these perspectives are
simplifications or generalizations, we have to ask, relative to what?
And the answer is, typically, relative to an alternative lexicon, using
particular definitions of “simplification” and “generalization.” Nothing
can be said to exist in an unchanging, discrete sense, independent of
thought; rather, concepts lack inherent existence. Moreover, existence
itself is a category we attribute to concepts, it is ultimately
ephemeral, washed away in a shifting of perspectives and constant
change. Hence, no-thing exists in itself.
Stirner’s position can be described as nihilistic, in that it denies
existence itself, along with all other fixed categories, like selfhood.
Following skeptical inquiry beyond Descartes’ cogito ergo sum simply
leads us to “thought,” subjectivity devoid of any content or further
categories. Concepts are recursively generated in thought, which assigns
itself the label of “thought,” “subjective experience,” or “being,” and
so on. The self, the object of introspection, is a formation in thought
and develops in relation to other concepts, all of which stem from the
creative nothing. There is no normative notion of how one ought to
conceptualize selfhood, or whether we should have any concept of it
whatsoever. Stirner denies the inherent existence of the self, just as
he denies the inherent or objective existence of all concepts.
Here, it’s important to note that none of this entails opposition to any
given concept, only a framework of how ideas are conceptualized, as
fixed or unfixed. That is, one can have an indeterminate, unfixed self,
generated out of utility, and a fixed self, conceptualized as static and
uniform. This framework can be extended to everything else. For example,
anarchism, the rejection of authority, can be conceptualized as a moral
duty, or a personal preference, or a desire that provides utility. This
utility shouldn’t be confused with selfishness. One can find utility in
any number of things, including altruism. Another example might be a
chair, an emergent property we affix to an assemblage of other objects,
each of which is also an assemblage, composed of different parts that
can be infinitely subdivided, which only take shape in relation to other
objects. Furthermore, as the “chair” decays, it changes from moment to
moment, until at some point we might say that it no longer “exists.” Is
the “chair” a particular orientation of the objective joints in nature,
or is it a useful concept within our frame of reference, defined in
terms of our ends, in this case, something to sit on? As the former, the
chair is a fixed idea, as the latter it is unfixed, existing for one’s
own ends.
This requires us to ask, if egoism has nothing to do with the content of
ideas, what is the point of conscious egoism? Nothing follows from
egoism, it is not authoritarian or anti-authoritarian. Rather, it
negates fixed ideas, making a distinction that puts it in a similar
position to meta-ethics in relation to ethics, a framework that does not
concern itself with the content of concepts, but the emptiness
underpinning them.
For example, take the issue of “moralism,” which many self-described
egoists oppose. For a consistent conscious egoist, morality is a fixed
idea by definition, a statement of truth, and something that objectively
exists, embedded in the structure of the brain or floating around as a
set of platonic forms. The egoist might instead express values as
personal preferences, where truth value is something attached to
expressions out of utility, forming tautologies based on the application
of logic and useful definitions. To say that “theft is wrong” is to
define theft as non-consensual appropriation, on grounds that one
opposes for their own reasons. Similarly, the statement that a “chair is
red,” is not inherently true, it is true based on one’s own definitions
of “red” and “chair,” with reference to a certain portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum, the practical utility of an object for sitting
on, and the use of logical operators to convey “truth.” Of course, this
is a matter of definition. “Morality” is not necessarily defined in
objective, fixed, or essential terms, rather, the nature of morality is
debated in the field of meta-ethics, but here I am laying out how an
anti-moralist can consistently hold this position in light of Stirner’s
main distinctions.
However, accusations of “moralism” are often employed in an inconsistent
manner, as a way to short-circuit discourse; the use of meta-ethical
claims to invalidate normative values is inconsistent because egoism
does not prescribe the content of desire. Telling someone that their
moral beliefs do not “exist” does not address the content of their
belief, in the same way that telling someone that a chair does not
“exist” will not make them stop believing in the chair. Instead, it
makes more sense to point out inconsistencies and problems in one
another’s positions based on shared axioms. For example, one can say
that “theft is wrong,” without engaging in moralism, which depends on
how one conceptualizes “wrongness” in meta-ethical terms. To take a more
controversial example, it is not necessarily moralistic to state that
“one has a duty to serve the nation,” which depends on how one
conceptualizes “duty,” and the “nation.” Granted, “duty” and the
“nation” are usually fixed ideas, but this example helps further
illustrate what exactly fixed ideas refer to, not to mention the fact
that I have encountered people in the political right with fairly
consistent interpretations of Stirner. If one experiences a “higher
calling,” what matters in terms of Stirner’s distinction is the specific
nature of the higher calling: is it a conscious expression of desire
that springs from nothingness, or does it justify itself in relation to
a network of external concepts? No word is inherently moralistic (I am
defining moralism in terms of fixed ideas here), although many are more
likely to be used in moralistic ways.
Egoism is also often likened to moral relativism and specifically used
to critique the concept of morality, which is a misreading of Stirner.
His notion of fixed ideas can be applied to all concepts. Moreover, an
egoist can consistently impose their values on others, claim their
values are more important than others, employ coercion, and even make
“universal” claims (not as a truth, but as an assertion). For example,
it is not necessarily moralistic to argue that we should be universally
anti-racist. A nihilist can hold any position they happen to desire
because nihilism does not justify or refute anything.
Now, keeping in mind these clarifications, we can go back to the
question of “what exactly is the point of conscious egoism?” There is no
point in being a conscious egoist. This too, a consistent conscious
egoist might say, boils down to one’s own desires. Perhaps they find
comfort in nothingness and flux. Stirner himself provides a reason,
suggesting that one can be ruled by fixed ideas or “absolute thought,”
that morality has “power over” the spirit, and that the “spirit of love”
can enslave a person — as if unconscious egoism is a form of
self-betrayal. Here, by “rule,” Stirner does not mean the rule of
authority, but self-denial due to unconscious egoism. One example of it
may be someone who engages in sexual abstinence out of a higher calling,
despite their desire to have sex. In a similar sense, Wittgenstein
claims that one can be “held captive by a picture,” the “picture” being
an objective framework of reality, not seen as useful, but necessary,
leading one to endlessly seek truth where there is none. Despite the
apparently prescriptive language, this is not exactly a contradiction in
Stirner’s thought, but an expression of his own preferences (not
something that follows from egoism). An unconscious egoist emerges from
nothing, albeit unconsciously, this emergence is still a function of
desire, the property of the unique.
I personally do not care if it pleases one to view anarchy as a duty, as
long as I do not disagree with the content of their actual beliefs.
Holding onto fixed ideas, like asserting that existence is more than
simply a useful concept, but an essential property of the universe, and
believing that we can know the nature of existence with absolute
certainty, are principles that many, if not most, people hold. The same
goes for ideas like nationalism, which I oppose, not because they tend
to be fixed (they aren’t necessarily), but because of their content.
Although one’s desires may change after rejecting fixed ideas, the
emergent values and ideals of the unconscious egoist can be identical to
those of the conscious egoist, who may treat existence and truth as
useful concepts that can be interacted with and formulated in different
ways, some of which are more useful to them than others.
Even if there is no central point to egoism, we can still ask why
anarchists, in particular, tend to be drawn to egoism. The first thing
that comes to mind is Stirner’s union of egoists, an anarchic
association of conscious egoists that is voided without ongoing consent.
This idea is a conjecture of what consensual interactions between
conscious egoists might resemble, people consciously cooperating with
each other in pursuit of their own desires. However, a conscious egoist
is not necessarily someone who participates in a union of egoists
because they can impose their will on others, concepts like nationalism
automatically preclude the possibility of a union of egoists because
they rely on non-consensual relations. Furthermore, one does not
necessarily have to be a conscious egoist to be an anarchist, one can
participate in consensual, non-hierarchical associations while holding
onto fixed ideas.
Another reason many anarchists seem to find value in egoism is that a
rejection of fixed ideas suggests that there is no true paradigm, only
paradigms that are useful to individuals, where everything is
subjective. From this perspective, there is no fixed basis for any
universal “ought” that can be used to legitimize rule, depriving it of
any fixed ontological and epistemological foundation. For example,
egoism invalidates stories like progress, gender, science, and nation as
absolute truths, posing them instead as useful concepts that individuals
adopt for their own reasons.
However, contrary to what many people think, the fact that egoism
invalidates the idea of philosophical foundations does not entail that
egoists are obligated to value subjectivity of others. There is no
principle that derives from egoism according to which an egoist should
not strive for epistemic and ontological authority for their own
reasons, only how they conceptualize those reasons. Rather, consistent
egoist anarchists choose to value subjectivity because it pleases them,
they prefer a union of egoists. Someone who believes in truth,
existence, and morality, may also place moral emphasis on, for example,
the subjectivity of personal identity, even in the presence of apparent
“contradictions.” I personally reject constructions that invalidate
self-expression or are historically, empirically, or intuitively wrong
or useless to me.
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says, “don’t think, but
look.” What he meant by this is that, given that all attempts to define
the world in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions are
insufficient, it might be better to describe the world as we experience
it. The nature of this “experience” may be a complex, reciprocal system
of signs, or a simple, monolithic set of definitions that does not map
onto individual subjectivity. Hence, in order for the world to be
organized according to a monolithic worldview, there would have to be
some form of top-down enforcement. However, again, someone with a
subjective theory of morality can still hold views that pave over
subjectivity, they simply do not use the language of objectivity to
express their own positions. In the same sense, someone who
conceptualizes things as objective may reject enforcing their views onto
others, while nevertheless holding them to be true. Conscious vs.
unconscious egoism is a meta-awareness of all values. One either views
values as stemming from nothing or from objective systems like natural
rights. Objectivity vs. subjectivity is a useful distinction in this
sense but does not come with any prescriptions of its own.