💾 Archived View for library.inu.red › file › a-j-baker-sydney-libertarianism.gmi captured on 2023-01-29 at 07:10:40. Gemini links have been rewritten to link to archived content
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Title: Sydney Libertarianism Author: A.J. Baker Date: March 1960 Language: en Topics: Australia, diversity, ideology Source: http://www.takver.com/history/sydney/baker1.htm Notes: (Based on a paper given to the London Anarchist Group in March 1960)
In explaining their position Sydney libertarians often refer to their
interest in social theory. But this phrase, “social theory,” can
suggest, not only empirical study, but also the making of certain
criticisms; and at the same time, the question may be asked: How are
these connected with the attitudes and sympathies libertarians have,
with their support for particular social causes? Thus (1) we should
expect social theory to be concerned with developing true views about
the nature and interconnection of social phenomena, and the position of
libertarians does depend partly on what they take to be certain facts
about how society operates.
But (2) this almost always gets connected with criticism and argument,
for the social theorist is led to demolish certain fallacious arguments
he encounters. For example, libertarians take the important thing about
religion to be the actual, earthly role of religious institutions, but
they are also led to attack the theological and moral views of religious
people. Or, as a different example, libertarians regard some of Marx’s
work as an important contribution to the study of society, but in view
of misunderstandings about Marxism and the deification of Marx by some,
clarity also demands that the predominant anti-empirical, metaphysical
part of Marxism be revealed and criticised.
It is easy to see why (1) comes to be accompanied by (2). In any subject
matter there are forces obstructing knowledge (cf. Copernicus, Galileo,
Darwin), but the obstructions are all the more powerful in the social
field. There, recognition of how things are cuts too deep and injures
personal hopes and illusions as well as offending influential social
groups. As a result, examination of concepts and criticism of beliefs
are imperative; people have little chance of becoming aware of truths
about society unless at the same time they come to see through
prevailing false or absurd beliefs about human conduct and social
affairs.
(3) Social theorists have preferences or policies of their own. (Of
course, to be a social theorist is not necessarily to be partial or
one-sided in a crude sense — Lenin’s dictum “all theory is partisan,” in
the crude way he meant it, illogically denies any distinction between
truth and falsity. But the academic notion of complete detachment or
disinterestedness wrongly treats the social theorist as a mere external
spectator with no social existence and interests of his own.) In the
case of libertarians, their social theory is accompanied and stimulated
by the interest they have in struggling against authoritarian forces and
ideas. And, as a matter of fact, those people who combine (1) and (2)
above, i.e.. who are not mere uncritical collectors of “facts,” usually
do take an anti-authoritarian stand. There can be exceptions; an example
of particular interest to libertarians being Pareto, for he presented an
account of society much of which libertarians can accept and yet had
some authoritarian preferences. But this is rare. Nearly always what
passes for social theory amongst supporters of various kinds of
authoritarianism are ideology and false belief.
In other words, recognising how society goes on, criticising widespread
but mistaken beliefs, and having the interests they have or the
particular causes they support, together make up the libertarian
position. (As will emerge, it is the anti-authoritarian sympathies they
share with them which give libertarians their affinity with, but their
social theory which distinguishes them from, classical anarchists.)
What social beliefs do libertarians reject as uncritical? What account
do they give of society? An indication may be given if I say something
about two categories or concepts which appear indispensable to social
theory — those which can be labeled “pluralism” and “ideology.”
(‘a) Social pluralism is roughly the view that society is not a single
thing but a diversity of different and often competing activities and
interests. A popular way of bringing this out is by exposing appeals to
the“common good”, “the welfare of the people,” etc. These phrases
suggest unanimity and singleness of interest , but in fact receive
emphasis only when there is variety and conflict — i.e., they enable a
particular group to masquerade as representative of all, and so to
advance its own particular policies in a covert way. (Note that this is
true not only in the case of attempted justifications of censorship,
Crimes Acts, the illegalisation of abortion, and so on, it is also true
of such things as an interest in good health, fresh air, etc., which,
being favoured by most members of society, may appear to be more
plausible examples of the common interests of society. These rarely
become social or political issues; when they do, however, as with issues
about national health services, compulsory T.B. tests, the eradication
of smog, and so on, it is quite clear that to refer to them as “the
interests of all” is to conceal genuine conflicts of interest.) Contrary
to the unitary view of society — which would make past history and
present day-to-day politics inexplicable — there are in society many
different interests. some of which are simply irreconcilable and remain
in permanent conflict.
(b) Libertarians emphasise what is one of Marx’s most defensible
concepts, that of ideology. Of course, everyone uses the word “ideology”
today: Russian and American politicians and all the newspapers, and in
relation to Marx’s original meaning they all use it wrongly — i.e., they
use it to refer to any set of ideas which is taken to support a
political interest. Now there were ambiguities in what Marx himself
said, and Lenin and the other Russian Communists were mainly responsible
for the wrong use current to-day, but what I have in mind is Marx’s use
of the word “ideology” to describe theories or beliefs which are
unconscious expressions of something else or camouflage the promotion of
special interests. Compare Marx’s own best example: that in 1848 the
bourgeoisie spoke of Liberty, Fraternity, Equality, but what they really
meant were Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery. (Note the ironic truth which
results when we translate into Marx’s use references by Khrushchev to
“our Communist ideology” or by Eisenhower to “our Christian ideology”.)
It is convenient, though not essential, to bring out the nature of
ideologies by referring to Marx. Pareto, for instance, drew attention to
the same type of thing in a different, more ramified way by emphasising
the fact that throughout history there have been myths, superstitions,
religious views, moral theories, and so on, which taken at their face
value are empty of content and. indeed, meaningless, and yet have had
immense influence in history. For that matter, if we make even a cursory
study of moral justifications, it is easy to detect the presence of
ideological processes. Almost every group speaks in the name of the
good, right, justice, natural law, progress, happiness, and so on, but
it is usually transparent that these are unconscious covers for the
promotion of certain policies or interests at the expense of others.
(The reference to unconscious covers is to be stressed. Using ideology
is quite different from being a cynical or unscrupulous Machiavellian —
when people say they are furthering the good, etc., they usually
sincerely believe what they say.) It is as if individuals and groups
have a blockage, they cannot face up to the unpleasant fact that there
are conflicts and differences of interest in society. Hence arises the
tendency they have, to use ideology to disguise from themselves and
others what their policies really are.
To sum up: An ideology is a belief (or set of beliefs) which (I)
masquerades as a true belief and is taken by its believers simply to be
a true belief, (ii) in fact, taken literally, is neither true nor false,
but instead is absurd or meaningless, (iii) has the actual social role
of covertly assisting special interests. Such beliefs or theories,
libertarians point out, are not expendable extras which are occasionally
let loose on society; on the contrary, they are exceedingly prevalent
and influential: it is a rare social or political controversy which is
not marked by liberal use of ideological concepts and beliefs. From this
arises the importance libertarians attach to criticising ideologies and
bringing out their real social roles.
Given this type of social theory, Sydney libertarians point out that
although they share the anti-authoritarian interests of classical
anarchists they cannot help but be critical of utopian anarchism — i.e.,
of the kind of anarchism which fixes its sights on the future and
contends that the main thing is to work for the achievement of the
future “free society.” Such a view is open to criticism (a) because it
involves a false social theory and (b) because its emphasis on the
future obscures what has always been the most important feature of
anarchist and libertarian activity, being anarchist or libertarian here
and now.
Thus the problem for the utopian anarchist is to explain how the passage
from an unfree to a free society is going to take place.But the solution
offered (e.g., by Kropotkin) greatly over-emphasises the part that can
be played by co-operation and rational persuasion. The ideas and
practices which prevail in existing society, it is claimed; are so
obviously vicious and illogical that they cannot persist. With the
spread of education and the growth of a saner attitude to political and
social questions we must expect the gradual triumph of the rational and
freedom-loving outlook.
The trouble with this belief is that it assumes education and persuasion
occur in a social vacuum, when in fact they occur under definite social
conditions, and we can by no means alter these conditions at will. It is
likewise assumed that the rational decisions of men have an immense
influence on the course of events, when the social facts go against this
assumption. Thus, take the operation of social institutions like the
State, Churches, the army, universities, and so on. These don’t arise
because (or just because) certain people get together and decide to
create them nor do they continue to exist because certain people have
decided to prolong their existence. Institutions are usually there,
going on in certain specifiable ways, irrespective of what rational
decisions individuals make or fail to make. Anarchists have always been
the first to point this out in regard to the State -e.g., that those
like the Bolsheviks, who think they capture or control the State are, in
fact, captured or controlled by the State; hence the continuity of the
State machine and its manner of working from Tsarist to Soviet times.
But the same is true of other institutions. Imagine a revolutionary
minded bank manager trying to reform the activities of a bank. It is
obvious that banking activities have ways of going on, which set severe
limits to what individuals can do -e.g., if the manager started giving
unlimited overdrafts the bank would collapse; and there is also a second
kind of limit: the training, outlook, etc., usually required for a man
to become a bank manager. So, the general conclusion we have to draw is
this: far from the ideas and decisions of men controlling social
activities and institutions, it is much more the other way round. Parts
of State apparatus such as the army and public service are not just
instruments of the politicians, let alone of “the people”; like
newspaper organisations, trade union secretariats, and so on, they have
a “life” of their own, and largely shape the outlook of the men who work
in them.
All this conflicts with the hopeful belief of the utopian anarchist that
by education and rational persuasion men can be led to decide on the
formation of a free society. (In this respect, Syndicalists and the
I.W.W. — “a new society within the shell of the old” — had a more
defensible, though still utopian, position.)
To take concrete case: consider the type of sexually free society
Wilhelm Reich advocated. In existing society we have what Reich called
the “authoritarian sexual morality,” i.e., the denial of adolescent
sexuality, emphasis on compulsive monogamy, and so on, which means that
the great mass of the people, even jealousy or other disturbances to
their sexualities. But, in contrast with this, when they are married,
are subject to guilt feelings, possessive, Reich argued, it is
biologically perfectly possible for people to have non-authoritarian,
orgiastically much more satisfactory, sexual relationships.Well, then,
suppose we want to bring about a society in which this kind of sexual
freedom prevails. It is highly utopian to think that people could be
rationally educated into this, even if many of them would gain from
doing so. For sexual freedom to occur on a large scale, two things would
have to be achieved: first, a negative requirement, the power of
religious and other moralistic forces in society would have to be
destroyed; and, secondly, on the positive side, new social conditions
would have to arise or be brought about in which it would be possible
for straightforward and non-guilt ridden sexual relationships to become
widespread. But a policy of rational argument and good wishes would not
achieve these results. Thus, to bring about the second, not only would
there need to be such obvious conditions as the availability of
contraception and abortion, there would also have to be the absence of
neurosis and guilt feelings in the people themselves. But these guilt
feelings -or, as Reich says, the incapacity of people for orgastic
satisfaction — are mainly derived from childhood training and from the
guilts and prohibitions instilled by the existing educational system.
But how do we, the would-be revolutionaries, change the existing
educational system? By educating the existing educators? But in that
case we should need to be already running the educational system! In
other words, it is one thing to know how the prevailing sexual ideology
affects the sexual life of most people and a quite different thing to
bring about a significant disappearance of that ideology.
For reasons of this kind, then, Sydney libertarians are wary of talking
about reforming society or about future freedom. Instead they use such
phrases as “anarchism without ends.” “pessimistic anarchism,” “permanent
protest”. “Anarchism without ends” indicates that there are
anarchist-like activities such as criticising the views of
authoritarians, resisting the pressure towards servility and conformity,
having unauthoritarian sexual relationships, which can be carried on for
their own sake, here and now, without any reference to supposed future
ends. Similarly, the label, “pessimistic anarchism.” indicates that you
can expect authoritarian forces in any society whatever, that freedom is
something you always have to struggle for, and is not something which
can be guaranteed in some future society. (“Pessimistic anarchism” also
hits off the fact that libertarians have many of the sympathies:and
interests of the classical anarchists, but have views about the nature
of society more akin to those of the “pessimistic sociologists,” Pareto,
Mosca and Michels.) Then there is the slogan, “permanent protest,” which
has been borrowed from Max Nomad, who also refers to “permanent
revolution” and “perpetual opposition.” (Compare, e.g., his books,
Rebels and Renegades and Apostles of Revolution.) The libertarian use of
the phrase, “permanent protest,” has some differences from Nomad’s use,
for he has more in mind mass revolutionary movements and argues that the
underdog is born to be betrayed by all of his would be emancipators, but
that the only thing for the underdog to do is to go on protesting.
(Compare Albert Camus in The Rebel: “The historic mission of the
proletariat is to be betrayed;” and his distinction between (constant)
rebellion which he supports and (final) revolution which he opposes
because it merely introduces a new form of tyranny.) But while Nomad
refers particularly to protest against the social structure as a whole
(the overall distribution of power and privilege), libertarians in
speaking of “permanent protest” wish rather to stress the carrying on of
particular libertarian activities within existing society (i.e., in a
country like Australia which has social conditions rather different from
those, e.g., in Bulgaria, Spain or Cuba).
What are examples of these activities? A very obvious one is the work of
criticism carried on by the Libertarian Society. There are various false
theories, metaphysical views, overt and concealed moral and political
assumptions that have wide influence in society; the role of the critic
is to expose these as illusions or ideologies, and this is a permanent
job which has to be carried on from generation to generation.
Politicians, priests and policemen don’t change just because their
justifications of themselves are shown to be illogical or absurd.
Similarly, other libertarian activities are carried on here and now and
not with an eye to some future state of affairs when they will cease to
exist. The utopian picture of a future free society would not even be
intelligible to us if we were not already acquainted with examples of
unauthoritarian activities in our present society. Contrary to the
utopian, the libertarian looks not to some future society in which
authoritarianism will have been got rid of and freedom supposedly
brought into existence for the first time. Instead, he takes it to be a
matter of keeping alive what already exists, of keeping up protest,
keeping on struggling to emancipate himself from myths and illusions,
and of keeping going his own positive activities. You don’t have to
reform or overthrow the State before you can carry on libertarian
activities. You don’t have to wait hopefully for the destruction of
religion; you can, here and now, with your children and your friends,
resist the pressure from Christian forces. You don’t have to try to make
the world safe for sexual freedom of the Reichian kind, but you can here
and now fight against guilts and ideology and, at least to some extent,
live a straightforward, uncompulsive sexual life. In other words, free
or unauthoritarian activities are not future rewards, but are activities
carried on by anarchist or libertarian- minded groups, here and now, in
spite of authoritarian forces.