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Title: Symbiogenetic Desire Author: Bellamy Fitzpatrick Language: en Topics: egoism, ecology, desire, anti-civ, phenomenology, biology Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/338450206/Symbiogenetic-Desire
Egoist anarchism has regularly had criticism leveled against it for its
relative silence on issues of ecology. This criticism is well-placed:
other than a few references to how non-human animals are exemplars of
egoism due to their seemingly unalienated relationship with their
desires[1], egoist literature is sorely lacking in this regard. This
lamentable absence likely has to do with the proclivities of its
authorship more than anything else, as an egoist analysis is readily
applicable to ecology.
The identity eliminativism â the denial of oneself as having an
essential self, a perspective that will be defined and developed further
in this piece â implied by egoism is the basis of this ecological
worldview, as oneâs sense of self expands to subsume and be subsumed by
oneâs habitat and symbiotes. Through such an analysis, one steers clear
of the twin alienations of, on the one hand, the tiny self, that is, the
self as an independent, enclosed, free-willed subject who remains
relatively stable through space and time and who interacts with a world
of objects; and, on the other hand, the reification of the nonhuman
world, that is, the construal of nonhuman organisms as a more or less
unified whole that acts collectively for the Good and into which one can
dissolve oneself or to which one can swear allegiance. Eschewing both of
these alienations, one finds oneself able to experience a symbiogenetic
desire that unites a love of oneself with a love of oneâs ecosystem.
An egoist conception of ecology begins with the notion of the expansive
self. The expansive self regards the inner world, our thoughts and
emotions, and the outer world, our phenomenality or sensory experience,
as inseparable, as each reciprocally informs and defines the other.
Insofar as identity can be said to exist, it is our perceptual totality,
shifting from moment to moment. When we walk through the world, all that
we touch and perceive is an extension of ourselves; conversely, there is
no I that exists separately from our phenomenal experience. Thus, the
self subsumes and is subsumed by the world, annihilating this
subject/object dichotomy that alienates us from other beings and places.
If our language sounds strange here, it is because we are trying to talk
about the ineffable. Perception is the basis of existence, but it is
also profoundly difficult to describe with words: the qualitative always
eludes the symbolic; however circumspect and technical or poetic and
pithy the phrase, it can never completely capture the real of our
experience. The phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty, while not an anarchist
egoist (actually, for at least part of his life, a Marxist! gasp),
nonetheless beautifully described how perception is neither subjective
nor objective but a gestalt from which the two are artificially
rendered:
âThe visible about us seems to rest in itself. It is as though our
vision were formed in the heart of the visible, or as though there were
between it and us an intimacy as close as between the sea and the strand
[...] What there is then are not things first identical with themselves,
which would then offer themselves to the seer, nor is there a seer who
is first empty and who, afterward, would open himself to them â but
something to which we could not be closer than by palpating it with our
look, things we could not dream of seeing âall nakedâ because the gaze
itself envelops them, clothes them with its own flesh.â[2]
What is traditionally called the object of perception, then, is as much
a part of ourselves as what is traditionally called the subject of
perception â we are so accustomed to think only of the latter as being
truly ourselves. With the dissolution of transitivity of identity, the
importance of perception to identity becomes clearer still. David Hume
is instructive on the point of identity eliminativism, when he observes
that there is no essential substrate, no fixed and quintessential I,
that exists behind his phenomenality or the thoughts and feelings he has
about it; instead, his sensory experience and his reflections of that
experience are the whole of his being. We are not merely a body, which
is only part of our perception, but instead everything we perceive,
everything with which we interact. And among that with which we interact
are of course other beings, meaning that our consciousnesses are
inextricably intertwined.
We are therefore experiencing at all times the ultimately ineffable
phenomenon of nigh-infinitely many mutually co-created consciousnesses.
When we encounter one another, human or nonhuman, being or place, each
becomes forever a part of the other - whatever beauty, strangeness, or
upset that encounter might bring, we know, as those feelings pass from
immediate intensity yet leave us permanently changed, that we have only
encountered a new and stimulating aspect of ourselves with which we were
previously unfamiliar.
To highlight my meaning with a foil, opposite to the expansive self are
various conceptions of what Jason McQuinn has taken to calling âthe tiny
selfâ[3] â the self as mere body, the self as the free-willed bourgeois
economic agent, the self as social role or identity, and so forth. Each
of these is a reified self, an idea of who and what we are that comes
from giving undue weight to one aspect of ourselves, to hypostatizing
one part of our experience and imagining that it is all that we are.
The expansive self is diametrically opposed to these conceptions of self
that characterize the dominant culture: the Cartesian self that sees its
distinctiveness as self- evident or the bourgeois self that imagines a
separable entity that is self-willed and therefore morally entitled to
and responsible for its economic success.
To take just one case here, as I have discussed this issue at greater
length[4] elsewhere , Descartesâ cogito ergo sum (âI think; therefore, I
amâ) contains, like every ideology of domination, a subtle
presupposition: âIâ. Stirner rejects out of hand the Cartesian split by
describing himself as âcreator and creature [Schöpfer und Geschöpf] in
one.â[5] â he does not presuppose himself as a separate entity of his
phenomenal perception but instead recognizes that subjectivity and
objectivity are simply synthetic conceptual frameworks, sometimes useful
instrumental constructions that have no existence beyond our
moment-to-moment imagination of them. Nietzsche similarly repudiated
this atomized self as a linguistic fiction, a mode of thinking imposed
on us by the subject-verb-object structure of our language.[6]
Yet the expansive self is also the very antithesis of any conception of
Mother Nature, Gaia perspective[7], or other reification of the nonhuman
â it is not advancing the notion that there is some transcendental whole
we could call Life that we might dissolve ourselves into or act on the
behalf of for the Greater Good. While there is certainly a great deal to
draw from the observation that organisms often are deeply enmeshed
symbiotically, that the niches in ecosystems are often mutually
reinforcing; these phenomena are counterposed by the fact that, at
times, organisms also demonstrably act inimically to the stability of
the biosphere: take cyanobacteria, photosynthetic microorganisms whose
evolution might have annihilated most life on Earth 2.3 billion years
ago by filling the atmosphere with oxygen that was toxic to the
anaerobic majority of life. Considering contradictions like this one,
what can it mean to act in accordance with the biosphere?
Even were this not the case, the identification of a Gaia or Life would
be yet another case of self-alienation â we do not experience a
biotic/abiotic totality except in cases of adventurous imagining; and,
to whatever extent there is one, we are surely as much a part of it as
anything else, meaning our desires are its desires. It thus cannot grant
to us any metric of value. Unfortunately, a pernicious desire to
recapitulate this reification of the nonhuman, for "life [to be] about
something bigger than ourselves",[8] persists in anti-civilization
theory today.
The Platonic urge is strong: insofar as we put our weight in recent
archaeological findings[9], the very beginnings of Civilization may be
characterized by believing in things âbigger than ourselvesâ, things
greater than actual and particular beings or events, things vast and
eternal. Whether it can be said to be an essential human characteristic
is unclear, but it is certainly an urge of present human beings to reify
aspects of their lives, perhaps due to a relationship with
enslavement[10] or depression[11]. Though some seem to think an
ecological perspective entails reifying something great and beautiful
and leaping into it with outstretched arms; an alternative lies in
persistently refusing reification, rather than simply choosing which is
ostensibly the right one.
Biologists, most famously Lynn Margulis[12], employ the beautiful term
symbiogenesis (etymologically meaning something like origin of life
together) to describe the phenomenon in which two or more ostensibly
distinct organisms become so closely intertwined in their lifeways that
they more or less merge into one creature.
By way of example, certain termites are able to digest wood through
having their guts inhabited by protist (complex single-celled organisms)
symbiotes who, in turn, are inhabited by bacterial symbiotes; up to
one-third of a termiteâs weight can consist of these creatures, each of
which is dependent on the others for survival. Other species of termites
have their massive nests inhabited by a fungus that acts as a kind of
external stomach for the insects, enabling enhanced digestion. The
fungus occupies a larger volume of the nest and possesses a greater
metabolism than the termites themselves, and it possibly influences the
behavior of the insects through chemical signaling not unlike the kind
that happens among differing organs of the same body.
In the same vein, an immensely distant ancestor of our cells may have
been formed similarly, through smaller and simpler cells fusing into
larger and more complex ones. Margulisâ Symbiogenetic Hypothesis posits
that at least some eukaryotic cells â the complex cells that, in this
case, make up plants and animals â came about through larger cells
engulfing smaller cells, the latter becoming organelles of the former.
A parallel, then, can be drawn between this biological understanding of
inseparability and emergence in the organic and the gestalt sense of
identity - or, perhaps better, lack of identity - described above.
Recognition that each of us is constituted by every other being we
encounter entails a perspective of intimacy, a desire to live as deeply
and vivaciously as possible. As an ecological perspective, then, reveals
itself as one that treats all organisms, humans and nonhuman, as
potential symbiotes, cocreators with whom we can have various
relationships.
Just as one might have a close and intimate, a friendly, a cordial, a
neutral, an antagonistic, or a hostile relationship with a human, one
might have any of those relationships with a non-human. One might
therefore strive toward unions of egoists among the organisms in oneâs
habitat, maximizing mutualistic interactions and minimizing antagonistic
ones through Stirnerâs understanding of infinitely revisable
collaborations among beings who combine their powers toward the pursuit
of cooperatively achieved, but individually recognized, values. Even
non-animals, surely, experience something, possess a phenomenality, and
have some notion of value, one we can often infer through interspecies
communication; though surely their experience of value is unspeakable
and ultimately incomprehensible to us. Through such unions, we become
symbiotes of one another; our sense of self expands to encompass the
bodies, lives, and values of others through symbiogenetic desire.
Practically, an interspecies union of egoists would surely entail the
abandonment of agriculture, a thoroughly stultifying practice that
homogenizes experience and squelches the diversity of mutually
co-created consciousnesses. Subsistence through some combination,
varying with bioregion, of foraging and horticulture/permaculture would
mean not only a richer and more diverse habitat; but also would entail
an intimate relationship with it through regular interaction. In this
way, we truly inhabit our ecosystem, enriching ourselves as well as our
symbiotes from whom we are inseparable. Similarly, the abolition and
destruction of the homogenizing and toxifying institutions and
infrastructure characterizing civilization follow from such a
perspective, as they could only limit and stultify ourselves and our
connections.
The gaze of the rapacious capitalist objectifies the biosphere, treating
it as an object to be plundered by whoever has the tenacity and guile to
best exploit it. The paleoconservative or libertarian gaze romanticizes
it, regarding it as the wide-open terrain of rugged individualism on
which one might live off the fat of the land. The liberal or
conservationist gaze spectacularizes it, transforms it into a thing that
should be cherished and preserved for its beauty. Again, all of these
perspectives are iterations of alienation predicated on reifying the
subject/object dichotomy; they merely dress it in different skins. As M.
Kat Anderson writes, âThese seemingly contradictory attitudesâto
idealize nature or commodify itâare really two sides of the same coin,
what the restoration ecologist William Jordan terms the âcoin of
alienationâ [...] Both positions treat nature as an abstractionâseparate
from humans and not understood, not real.â[13]
But the egoist perspective dissolves this alienation. It refuses the
notion that our selves are limited to this little bag of skin; it
insists that we extend our bodies to encompass our perceptual horizons.
I am every person I have met, however fleetingly; every river I have
swum in lovingly or passed by, barely noticing; every mountain I have
climbed or merely glanced upon while driving; every intoxicant I have
consumed; every advertisement to which I have been subjected. The
habitat in which we choose to live thus becomes not merely a
logistical-economical choice, but instead one of whom we fundamentally
want to be.
The anti-civilization insurgency thus takes on an irredeemably personal
character. We do not resist civilization because it is âinnately
wrongâ[14] or because it is âthe domination of natureâ[15], we resist it
because it is an absolute assault on ourselves. There is no need to
mediate such a desire through an unfounded claim about transcendental
goods and evils or a conceptualization of the nonhuman; it is one
immediately felt.
The flattening of living ground into dead, uniform parking plots is the
flattening of our affect. The mediation of our lives through
representations is a stifling of creativity and dreams. The denuding and
toxification of the biosphere is the restriction of our lives and the
narrowing of possibilities. Our sorrow and rage is not directed at some
essential metaphysical Other that attacks Nature; it is directed at an
immediate mutilation of our experience, of ourselves.
[1] Stirner writes, for instance, when imagining a conversation with
people who feel they need absolute values to guide them lest they merely
follow their instincts and passions and thus âdo the most senseless
thing possible. â Thus each deems himself the â devil; for, if, so far
as he is unconcerned about religion, he only deemed himself a beast, he
would easily find that the beast, which does follow only its impulse (as
it were, its advice), does not advise and impel itself to do the âmost
senselessâ things, but takes very correct steps.â Stirner, Max. The Ego
and His Own, trans. Steven T. Byington, ed. Benjamin R. Tucker, pref.
James L. Walker. New York: Benjamin R. Tucker 1907.
[2] Merlau-Ponty, Maurice. âThe Visible and the Invisible: The
IntertwiningâThe Chiasmâ.
[3] âInterview with Jason McQuinn on Critical Self-Theoryâ, Free Radical
Radio, 02/27/2015.
[4] See my âIn Defense of the Creative Nothingâ at
bellamy.anarchyplanet.org
[5] The Ego and His Own
[6] Nietzsche, Friedrich. âOn the Prejudices of Philosophersâ, Beyond
Good and Evil.
[7] Note that by Gaia Perspective, I do not mean to refer to the Gaia
Hypothesis advanced by James Lovelock
[8] Hayes, Cliff. âSlaves to Our Own Creationsâ, Black And Green Review,
vol. 1.
[9] Consider the recent claims by archaeologist Klaus Schmidt â leader
of the excavation of Goebekli Tepe, the earliest known human monument â
that a human turn toward religion was the beginning of Civilization as
its construction precipitated, perhaps necessitated, the domestication
of plants and animals in order to furnish the sedentary lifestyle
dictated by the construction, maintenance, and worship of the monuments.
The monuments themselves display symbols that might be interpreted as
the human domination of the nonhuman (humans holding, perhaps
controlling, various animals that might be considered dangerous) and the
triumph of patriarchy (phallocentrism).
[10] Rosset, ClĂ©ment. âThe Cruelty Principleâ. Joyful Cruelty.
[11] Real, Terrence. I Donât Want to Talk About It: Overcoming the
Secret Legacy of Male Depression.
[12] A number of biologists dating back to the early 1900s have
discussed variants of this theory. Margulis put forth the modern
version, still controversial but widely accepted, arguing that animal
and plant cells first formed through the unification of simpler cells.
She has since argued, more controversially, that symbiogenesis ought to
be considered a major factor of evolution, influential on a par with
selection by competition.
[13] Anderson, M. Kat. Tending the Wild: Native American Knowledge and
the Management of California's Natural Resources.
[14] Tucker, Kevin, Black And Green Forum.
[15] Zerzan, John, âPatriarchy, Civilization, And The Origins Of
Genderâ.