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Title: Review: Low intensity Democracy Author: Kevin Doyle Date: 1995 Language: en Topics: book review, democracy, Red & Black Revolution Source: Retrieved on 8th August 2021 from http://struggle.ws/rbr/rbr1_rbdem.html Notes: This article first appeared in Red & Black Revolution No 1.
Any discussion on the subject of democracy faces a critical problem
early on — a problem of definition. In his contribution to Low Intensity
Democracy, Noam Chomsky notes the essential modus operandi of
conservative forces in society today and in times past when he states
that the guardians of world order have sought to establish democracy in
one sense of the term while blocking it in another.
The preferred sense of democracy, also known as parliamentary democracy
or Western democracy, is relatively well known to many on the left
today. Chomsky himself has done immeasurable work in recent years in
further highlighting the undemocratic nature of parliamentary based
societies — countries such as Ireland, Britain and the USA being cases
in point.
Even so, there is still considerable debate and disagreement on the
merits of fighting for the establishment of parliamentary democracy in
societies where this form of political structure is not already in
place. Broadly speaking, the debate often centres on whether the
establishment of parliamentary democracy acts as a stimulus to a further
democratisation of society or as a brake.
In past times the debate may have seemed marginal. Few, apart from those
influenced by anarchism, questioned their involvement with the
parliamentary process. But this has changed. Across the world today
there are a greater number of countries in the throes of testing the
debate out in practice than at any other time in recent history. Not
just countries belonging to the former Soviet block — Ukraine, Russia,
Poland, Belarus — but also others such as South Africa, El Salvador, and
Thailand to name but a few.
In Low Intensity Democracy, four countries are examined in reasonable
depth by the contributors. These are South Korea, Argentina, Guatemala
and the Philippines. All differ in the manner by which parliamentary
democracy arrived at their doorsteps. Both S. Korea and the Philippines
conceded parliamentary democratic regimes under the pressure of popular
mass action; Argentina and Guatemala, less so.
In Argentina the current democratic turn began in 1983 when the military
stepped down in disgrace, having mismanaged both the economy and the
Malvinas war. Significant opposition to continued military rule was
growing but at the time of the transfer of power to a civilian
administration it was not the decisive element in forcing change.
Similarly, Guatemala’s democracy came on foot of negotiations between
the military and the guerrilla opposition, following a prolonged period
of war and repression; broader civilian society was not directly
involved in events.
South Korea and the Philippines were markedly different. For the
purposes of this review the case of S. Korea will be looked at more
closely:
Background — The democratic struggles that shook S. Korea in 1987/88
emerged from a growing resistance to the dictatorship that was installed
in S. Korea in 1961, after a military coup. In the early sixties S.
Korea was less industrialised than N. Korea. With the military in the
driving seat, after the coup, rapid economic growth became a regime
obsession. Authoritarianism in S. Korea reached a peak in the 70s. At
the juridical core were the national security laws and the
anti-Communist laws, the so-called bad laws that effectively banned any
political activity outside the consensus of the establishment. Giant
conglomerates, known as chaebol, were the main beneficiaries of military
largesse. The chaebol were distinctive in their own right in that they
were family owned and usually family managed.
By 1985, S. Korea had one of the highest concentrations of capital in
the world. The top 10 chaebol accounted for one-third of total exports
and one third of total GNP. The low cost of labour underpinned rapid
accumulation by the business class via export-oriented
industrialisation. This strategy required political control over labour
by the state and by employers... “By law, organised labour was forbidden
to have any political or financial ties to any political parties.”
Nevertheless, the authoritarian regime could not entirely ignore the
political interests of labour ”..Therefore the state allowed the real
wages to rise slowly and steadily behind increased productivity and
spurts of economic growth.”
Crisis — Despite recent economic success, S. Korea has been rocked by
crisis at periodic intervals. This reflects a tradition of popular
resistance to authoritarianism that is a constant in Korean politics.
But, also, it is a reflection of economic realities. The crisis of
1986–88 that heralded in the current democratic regime was no different
in this respect. Its immediate background lay in the popular perception
that S. Korea had finally arrived at the promised land of economic
success. The period 85–87 was one of economic boom — a fact reflected in
a substantial trade surplus which had not been previously achieved in S.
Korea. A number of ancillary factors tied into the mood of optimism:
The Chun presidential term, in effect a dictatorship, was to be the
last. Both domestic and international interests had been promised a
peaceful transfer of power.
Macros in the Philippines had been overthrown in the popular upsurge
known as people’s power in 1986. This encouraged anti-dictatorship
forces in S. Korea.
The impending Seoul Olympics constrained the options of the military
with regard to outright repression of any challenge to its authority.
President Chun effectively announced in April 87 that military rule
under his presidency would not end, after all, as had been promised. A
popular uprising in June 87 followed. Massive demonstrations occurred,
lasting 18 days. Over 120,000 combat police were called in to contain
the upsurge. Nevertheless, the democracy movement was overwhelming in
nature, linking both workers and middle-class in opposition to continued
military rule.
Concession — A number of possible options were considered. Pragmatists
within the military regime understood the futility of using military
force to repress the uprising. As importantly, the U.S. signalled its
opposition to martial law, or a new coup to replace Chun. Concessions to
democratic forces were the favoured option to contain a further
escalation. An Eight Point Plan for reform was announced which included:
direct presidential elections, freedom for political prisoners, ”... an
end to press censorship, local government autonomy and guarantees on
human rights.” However, there was no concession or promise on economic
reform.
Restoration — Economic reform and some, even minor, redistribution of
wealth was the ultimate goal of the democratic upsurge of 87. Could the
Eight Point Plan deliver this, even indirectly? As the author Barry
Gills notes, “the democratisation that occurred in 87/88 set in motion a
re-alignment of political forces..” But, he continues ”... it would be
an error to mistake this as the genuine substance of democracy.” Popular
input into the new S. Korea was to be channelled into three legitimate
avenues — presidential elections; parliamentary elections and local
elections.
In regard to parliament and local authorities, the options open to the
S. Korean electorate were limited, to say the least. Parliament in
particular, but also the local authorities, had little power in the new
order; executive power remained with the presidency. Gills notes that
the political parties remained vehicles for leadership cliques and
bastions of regionalism rather than true parties based on platform,
principle or accountability to constituency. No effective say in South
Korean society could be garnered by the public from either of these
avenues. What about the presidential office?
The first direct and free presidential elections returned Noh Tae Woo as
the first post-Chun president of S. Korea. Noh’s success, on only
one-third of all votes cast, followed on from the fragmentation of the
anti-dictatorship movement in the immediate aftermath of the Eight Point
Plan. Noh, billed as an ordinary man, was a former general and the
candidate of the dictatorship. In the period up to and including the
Seoul Olympics he played a populist front — but the eventual fate of
these inclinations, indicate how limited the new democracy in S. Korea
was. Noh appointed Cho Soon, a well-known liberal and economics
professor to address a number of issues for economic reform — including
the possible provision of social welfare to S. Korean society. In fact,
Cho Soon never even got around to making proposals in this area.
Initially, he concerned himself with introducing a more competitive
domestic economic environment. Essentially he wanted to curb the power
of the chaebol in the domestic market where it had a stranglehold on
investment funds and resources. He introduced two key proposals — the
Real Name System and the Public Concept of Land. Both proposals involved
minor constraints on the chaebol: the former would require all financial
transactions to include the names of all those actually involved in the
deals; the latter was intended to curb rampant land speculation and
irresponsible development. Both proposals, however, were ditched in 1989
since they were considered too controversial — Cho Soon lost his job and
was later replaced with a pro-chaebol appointee. Proposals on social
welfare never saw the light of day.
In the aftermath of the Seoul Olympics, the new democratic regime
dropped its more populist pretensions and moved against the only other
force in society had maintained a momentum of struggle against the
ruling interests of the chaebol. This was organised labour. Strikes and
wage settlements had been at their highest in 1987 — 88 and had caused
record damage in production and export loss. Hyundai were particularly
hard hit. Demands by labour went well beyond the traditional areas of
concern for workers and called for the democratisation process to be
brought into the arena of industrial relations. This was not acceptable.
The perceived necessity for the political defeat of organised labour was
at the heart of conservative restoration. The Noh regime moved
decisively against the workers’ movement in the Spring of 1989. An
active policy of strike breaking was resumed, along with the arrest of
union leaders, using the full force of the state combat police. A ban on
public sector unions was enforced — culminating in the break-up of the
newly formed National Teacher Union and the sacking of over 1,500 for
participating in illegal union activities.
Conclusion — The democratisation process in Korea came full circle.
Authoritarianism was challenged by a mass movement for democratisation
in 1987. This produced a period of rapid change in which corporatism was
weakened and civil society gained more autonomy from the state. However,
elites adjusted by forming a broader coalition of the military, business
and the middle-class in order to restore conservative hegemony.
Therefore, the fundamental nature of the system remained unchanged.
Broadly speaking then, the movement for democracy achieved minimal
success in S. Korea. Minor, let alone fundamental, economic redress in
favour of the mass of S. Korean society did not occur. The regime
liberalised when it had to, but later it clawed back these gains made by
wider society and the workers’ movement in particular.
In looking at the overall developments of events in S. Korea, two other
factors are also worth noting. These are the role played by the United
States and secondly, the subsequent fragmentation of the pro-democracy
movement in the face of some concession from the dictatorship. In regard
to the U.S. role, the central point is that on this occasion the U.S.
sided with the pragmatic wing of the dictatorship and came out in favour
of democratic reforms as outlined in the Eight Point Plan. This reflects
a significant shift in the assessment of U.S. strategic interests, a
process begun under the Reagan regime (Crusade for Democracy, 1982, p9).
Secondly, in the face of concessions from the regime — the Eight Point
Plan — the pro-democracy movement split on its response and future
direction. The particular concession of new local, parliamentary and
presidential elections succeeded in divesting the movement of its unity
and single-mindedness. As Gills states (p249), “the radical wing of the
democratisation movement also fragmented ... Much of this debate
revolved around the question of whether to participate in the electoral
arena or remain underground. Among those supporting electoral
participation there was a further split between those favouring support
for one mainstream opposition party and those wanting to form a separate
left-wing party.”
Any assessment of the success or failure of any particular democracy
movement must base itself on the potential possible as well as the
practical results achieved. This can be put another way. To what extent
has the removal of dictatorship simply led to the replacement of the old
order with a newer, more sophisticated form of neo-authoritarianism? As
indeed happened in S. Korea. Today, the chaebol conduct their business
and exploitation under the cover of being a free democratic society.
Concluding then on S. Korea: social and economic oppression has
stabilised since the pro-democracy struggles of the mid to late
eighties. A result that U.S. interests would, no doubt, be very
satisfied with.
This is a central theme emerging from Low Intensity Democracy. The
debate on parliamentary democracy has moved on from the stagnant format
of past times when only the anarchists had serious reservations about
parliamentary democracy. Democracy, that is parliamentary democracy, is
now sponsored by U.S. and international business interests — IMF and
World Bank — to the extent that it does provide a better cover than any
other political system for the ”... generalised offensive for the
liberation of market forces .” In past times it was reasonable to expect
a modicum of social reform during a transition from dictatorship to
parliamentary democracy. Indeed this was the central basis for
supporting such transitions. Not so any more.
The wave of parliamentary democracies that have emerged in past decades
have done so under the aegis of a growing domination of all national
interests by the interests of international free market politics or, in
other words, that system which seeks the ideological rehabilitation of
the absolute superiority of private property, legitimisation of social
inequalities and anti-statism of all kinds. There are now a significant
number of examples of where the onset of parliamentary democracy has
actually increased inequality or stabilised it at current levels,
particularly where it has caused, as it did in S. Korea, a fragmentation
of the pro-democracy movement.
This raises a key problem. The role played by parliamentary democracy in
demobilising struggles for fundamental change has generally been
underplayed. In part this has reflected an enduring weakness in that
section of the left that has derived the greater proportion of its
politics from formal Marxism.
Here the arguments in favour of participation, whether this is on the
basis of existing parties or by the creation of a new workers party,
rest centrally on pragmatism but also on naiveté. On the one hand it is
said the arena of parliamentary democracy is too large and too central
to much of political discourse to be ignored. To leave the field of
parliament to the political parties of the moderate left, centre and
right is to abandon one’s constituency. Or, so the argument goes.
But, on the other hand, there is delusion about what is possible. The
comments of Frederick Engels back in 1895 as he observed the electoral
growth of the German socialist party, the SDP, being a case in point :
“Its growth proceeds as spontaneously , as steadily , as irrepressibly ,
and at times as tranquilly as a natural process. All Government
intervention has proved powerless against it ...If it continues in this
fashion, by the end of the century we shall ...grow into the decisive
power in the land, before which all powers will have to bow, whether
they like it or not.”
But, pragmatism and naiveté aside, there is also a weakness of critique
on the left that centres on the problem of definition and what democracy
involves. Many on the left equate parliament with democracy. Few enough,
in fact, have criticised the parliamentary road from the perspective of
content. Instead they have accepted it and its methodology. Yet, how
much progress is achievable through parliament? What level of
participation does it even allow? Most importantly, what effect does
opting for the parliamentary road have on the broader movement for
social change? Particularly on grass root organisations, which are,
after all, the bedrock of any pro-democracy movement?
In recent years, there has been a more far searching examination on the
left of its history and traditions than at any time previous.
Circumstances and the apperance of failure have prompted this. But how
far is that re-examination going to go?
One thing is clear. There is a deeper realignment underway than is
currently being imagined. And the debate on the nature of democracy and
the part it plays in social change is part of this. But, one is not
talking about parliamentary democracy here. There is a tradition of
democratic struggle on the left that eschewed any involvement with the
parliamentary method. This was for clear, practical reasons. Democracy,
in this tradition, centred on the union, on the process of struggle and
on participation. It was not about representing the ideas of others. It
was about building up experience and confidence in the grass-roots on
the method of democracy so that, when the time came and inequality was
confronted, workers could proceed immediately to the socialisation of
production. Centrally, it was about building up a counter-power in
society to the power of the state. But importantly, a democratic,
grass-roots counter-power.
The editors of Low Intensity Democracy note the importance of this other
tradition when they say that the example of the Spanish anarchists
earlier in the twentieth century should now be examined as an
alternative model of revolutionary social transformation. From this
perspective democracy must be painstakingly built up and constantly
defended through concrete popular organisations embedded in the
workplace and the community.
It is a measure of how times are changing that anarchists get a fair
hearing in this area that is central to real change.