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Title: The Question of Neoplatformism Author: Roi Ferreiro Date: September 2008 Language: en Topics: platformism, criticism and critique Source: Retrieved on 10th December 2021 from https://libcom.org/library/question-neoplatformism-critiques-mystifications-solutions-roi-ferreiro Notes: Written between September 7 and 10, 2008. Appended after is a Synopsis of the Text written by Ricardo Fuego on September 19. Translated from the Spanish original at: http://cai.xtreemhost.com/cica/indice.htm
Having recently read the last part of the article, âBetween Platform and
Partyâ [1] by Patrick Rossineri, recently published by the comrades of
the Grupo Libertad [2] in Buenos Aires, I felt the need to air some
opinions that, like the conclusions and essays referred to at the end of
Rossineriâs text [3], must be viewed primarily in the context of
contemporary platformism or, more strictly speaking, neoplatformism.
I think that the texts referred to above merit serious consideration on
the political plane, since they naturally affectânow and perhaps also
over the long termârelations between groups. Such a careful reading is
surely an obvious task for those situated specifically within the
anarchist movement, especially for those who identify with the two
opposite extremes mentioned in the articleâs title, but it should also
be read by all those who understand the need for revolutionary
regroupment. Neither the problems and solutions posed by platformism,
nor the discussions within organized anarchism, are processes or events
that can be explained by ideological or party reasons, but must be
understood as elements of the historical movement of the class struggle
and of the attempts on the part of the proletariat to constitute itself
as an autonomous subject.
The current members of the ICAC (International Circle of Anti-Bolshevik
Communists)âRicardo Fuego and myselfâhave maintained or are now
maintaining relations with two groups that support platformism, but
whose positions and attitudes are strikingly distinct: the Libertarian
Communist Alliance of Mexico, with whom we have engaged in a heated
polemic exchange over the issue of the party [4], and the Libertarian
Socialist Group of Mexico [5], with whom we have had good relations for
some time (although this has not caused us to overlook our political and
theoretical differences). Our differences with respect to the question
of autonomous proletarian liberation, which has been a major part of the
polemic within the anarchist movement since the publication of the
Platform, were addressed some time ago in an appendix to my article,
âAgainst Political Fetishismâ, published in October 2006. In that
article, however, I approached the problem more from a theoretical and
historical than from a political and contemporary perspective, and when
I did refer to the latter point of view I took as my reference point
what may be called dogmatic, conservative and regressive neoplatformism,
like that of the Mexican Libertarian Communist Alliance and similar
groups. I will therefore now attempt to correct this shortcoming. I
shall also devote some attention to an error that I think Patrickâs
article also exhibits, that is, an identification of the original
platformism with neoplatformism.
Doctrinal unanimity has never defined the politics of any movement or
current. This was even true of Leninism, where doctrinal uniformity was
considered to be an essential value and its preservation was frequently
the object of disciplinary measures. Despite all efforts to the
contrary, each individual or collective of the proletarian class
develops his or its consciousness on the basis of practical experience
rather than programmatic documents or intellectual works, which can only
give shape to and orient reflection and the mental representation of
experience, which always contains all kinds of unique aspects. We must
therefore constantly take into account the distance that always stands
between theoretical generalizations and concrete historical praxis.
It is upon the basis of the last-mentioned perspective that I believe
contemporary platformism must be understood. Therefore, although I
concur with the most widely shared critiques of platformism, I think
that the articles referred to above (Patrick, Daniel and Gustavo) adopt
a predominantly abstract approach. This prevents them from recognizing
the positive historical reasons behind the re-emergence of platformism
as well as concentrating on the search for solutions to the practical
problems at hand. I did not specifically address these problems in
âAgainst Political Fetishismâ, but this was primarily because these
problems were essentially the same ones that were identified and dealt
with long before in relation to the supersession of the forms of the
traditional workers movement (including the still dominant anarchism and
bolshevism). This has already been done in specific documents [6], so I
saw no reason to spend more time on that topic in that article. It was,
however, pointed out that, at a historical-political level:
âthe current existence of certain platformist nuclei in some Latin
American countries is linked to the reductionist and backward character
of the platformist positions on the vanguard-masses relation and on the
organization of the vanguard, which fits in well with a historically
less mature workers movement and a situation of a heightening of class
conflict on an underdeveloped capitalist base.â
One may or may not agree with this analysis, but it has nothing
whatsoever to do with Eurocentrism. It suffices to say that the national
context of my country, Galicia, is not above that level, as well as that
my experience gives me a pretty practical and vivid idea of what I am
talking about. So, elaborating on an implicit aspect of this assessment,
I think that it is erroneous to compare the Latin American situation
with that of Europe, such as implicitly takes place when one reports on
the presence of neoplatformist groups in the world. A different social
situation must lead to groups of distinct character, despite doctrinal
similarities. And although the highly developed countries of Europe may
have a context characterized by the more advanced development of the
subsumption of life to capital, and thus a more subtle and profound
degree of alienation and the rule of capital over the proletariat, it
must also be pointed out that relatively less degrading exploitation and
material living conditions still give the ruling class a good cushion
against social rebellions. The example of France and Alternative
Libertaire cited by Patrick seems apt to me. [7] Either this group is of
the moral witness type and has no political presence, or it does have a
political presence because its real praxis is subsumed in reformism. The
Latin American case is totally different. Although social experience
takes place there in the context of a less mature capitalism with
respect to its forms of alienation and dominationâit is nonetheless true
that these tendencies are perceptible in every country today, at least
for the urban population, thanks to the internationalization of capital,
and class conflict is generally much more intense and lively, due to the
more dependent nature of their economies, the damage caused by the
international division of labor and its combination with the tendency
towards decline of capitalism on a world scale. This is why
neoplatformism has emerged there as a force to reckon with and,
furthermore, whatever it may mean, it cannot be interpreted in an
ideological manner. To insist on doing so would imply a general lack of
understanding of the tendencies or currents of proletarian praxis as
historical expressions of a determinate social-material context.
Although I could certainly indulge in a good old-fashioned lambasting of
the semi-bolshevik notions of platformism, this does not lead me to
overlook the fact that the greater part of todayâs anarchist movement is
dominated by currents of reformist praxis, however much its habitual
ideological radicalism may at times conceal this. For the most part it
presents a conservative character, manifested for example by the fact
that the more active radical currents sustain a minority or isolated
status (which is in turn obscured by the apparent diversity of the
tendencies that claim to be anarchist [8]). It could not be otherwise:
the majority tendencies of a social or social-political movement, in a
situation that is neither revolutionary nor pre-revolutionaryâand is not
even close to such a situationâare always reformists. In such a context,
where radical tendencies have relevance it is only in isolated
circumstances or amidst an emerging conflict favorable to a general
radicalization. And such a context inhibits its development and
maturation, which explains why they can retain superannuated forms.
Therefore, my statement quoted above does not mean that neoplatformism
is âin and of itselfâ absolutely regressiveâeven if, in the abstract, we
presuppose an absolute identity between original doctrine and concrete
praxis. The progressive or regressive nature of a current or group must
be evaluated on the basis of the way it inserts itself into the concrete
historical-social dynamicâwhich also obliges one to consider national or
local differences:
âFaced with a more powerful and resistant rule, faced with a class
composition that is vastly more complex than it was only 30 years ago,
faced with a whole series of practical and theoretical incoherencies, as
well as gaps, within their own groups, the forms of activity and thought
of the past are totally impotent, and the best proof of this is the fact
that they do not succeed in growing even when favorable conditions
obtain, or when they do grow, they do so at the cost of a progressive
renunciation of their original revolutionary intentions. It is true that
this intellectual and practical legacy is a starting point for
revolutionary thought, but it cannot be either the point from which its
attacks are launched against capitalist power or its crowning
achievement. To treat it in this manner would amount to a practical
demonstration that we are not dealing with effectively revolutionary
thinking, but conservative thinking. It would in addition be idealist
thinking by adopting the belief that certain forms from the past could
preserve their revolutionary essence in an abstract way, as if it was an
immanent quality of ideas to represent such forms and that it is through
ideas that these forms have been passed down to us today. With this
fetishistic transposition one immediately loses sight of the perspective
of concrete analysis and one falls back into the practical idealism
that, unlike and in opposition to theoretical idealism, proclaims as a
mystifying justification a materialist perspective. And as if this were
not enough, by doing all these things, a group, a fraction, or an
organization thereby demonstrates that it has not emerged as an
expression of the vanguard, that is, as a sector in advance of the rest
of the class movement which is capable of driving the latter forward,
but is a regressive sector, which has arisen not from the most mature
and profound creativity of the class as a whole, but from desperation
and confusion, and that it is not the bearer of new energies for
progress.â
âThe case could also arise, however, of a real expression of the
vanguard which is still immature in a context of major generalized
retreat, whose theoretical, organizational and practical forms of
activity still assume characteristics from the past; this would then
bear contradictions that would have to be overcome in order to be able
to act as a revolutionary vanguard and not, in every case, as a
reformist vanguard.â
This was directed against those who hold any kind of fetishist adherence
to the ideological perspective of history. As I said, any emerging
current, whether or not it starts from the basis of a very precise prior
inheritance, can stagnate and ossify, or it can even go backwards. In
the case of neoplatformism as in others, the distinction between
regressive and progressive currents or groups is what is pertinent for
us when it comes to assessing their role with respect to the general
revolutionary progress. On this plane, I think that the categorization
of neoplatformist groups with respect to their proximity to Leninism is
superfluous. This is because, first, it ignores the developmental
tendency of these groups, which is the most important thing. Second, it
appears to presuppose that the non-platformist groups represent a more
progressive force, which I doubt and will try to explain why in detail
below.
As I pointed out in the first paragraph of the long quotation above,
from my point of view those who continue to uphold positions identical
to those of a past era may appear to be more or less advanced when
subjected to an abstract comparison of positions with existing groups or
organizations. But this does not tell us where they stand in the context
of historical development, because it does not take into account the
effective historical coherence of those groups and organizations in
question. Thus, upon a more backward doctrinal foundation and a less
coherent internal praxis, a collective may engage in activity which
responds much better to historical necessities than another collective
which, in comparison, starts from a more advanced doctrinal basis and
enjoys a more coherent internal praxis. In Spain we have abundant
examples of this kind. For example, no one doubts that the CNT is a very
assemblyist trade union, but it is also true that there can be no doubt
that its actions are not oriented by a revolutionary program and
strategyâwhich is the reason why it still exists within the current
socio-political framework and is also the reason why it was not
liquidated by the State during the transition from Francoâs dictatorship
to the parliamentary monarchy.
When it is a matter of discussing newly emerging or dynamic rather than
stagnant groups, their progressive or regressive nature is not directly
correlated with their doctrinal points of reference. As I said above,
theories provide means of expression for experience; but time, effort
and study are required in order to undertake the historical adaptation
of an inherited theoretical form and effective practical experience. The
choice of one or another theory obviously depends on
practical-historical consciousness, that is, on the practical criteria
and goals deduced from social experience. For this reason, the formal
acceptance of a concrete theory has a great deal to do with the level of
social-historical development. But this question of form has no direct
relation to the quality of practical consciousness, with what is
essential, in the case of the truth of the revolutionary aspiration.
Despite the distortions rooted in inadequate representations and forms
of thought, I have no doubt that the workers who, through their example,
have been historically defining revolutionary praxis by trying to
appropriate their conditions of life, had a true consciousness of what
their liberation consisted in, even if the latter was not sufficiently
concretized and their praxis, consequently, was not sufficiently
coherent and effective. There is an important difference between knowing
what one wants and knowing how to achieve it in a given context.
It is therefore normal for people to start by first supporting those
theories that give them practical solutions that conform to their praxis
within the present situation. Then, from this starting point they will
tend to move forward from one theory to another as their experience is
enriched and the latter enables them to make distinctions between
greater or lesser degrees of effectiveness in relation to practical
problems, until they reach a higher level where they recognize that the
most relevant quality of a theory is its intellectual effectiveness
(representational, analytic and prospective) because this developmental
journey that I have schematically described will have made it possible
for them to evaluate and organize in advance all the contributions of
lesser theories. [9] In this way, support for a more or less specific
theoretical current does not mean, for those who think for themselves,
that this current is always or necessarily the most true such as it has
existed until now, but only that it is the one that has proven to be
most useful to them for expressing and developing rational
understanding. Thus, the polemics for and against Marxism or Anarchism,
or in this case platformismâthat is, the polemics that reduce the
question to âyes or noâ, âpro or conââassume a false starting point,
they are self-referential, instead of focusing on promoting the
historical-material coherence of praxis with the social context within
which it is developing.
Today it is erroneous and impoverishing not only to proclaim the
Marxism-anarchism opposition in the abstract, but also to maintain a
fundamentalist doctrinal and political distinction between them. History
took on the responsibility for liquidating the former abstract
opposition, from the moment when the question ceased to be about which
theoretical current is to exercise hegemony over the proletarian
movement, but what we can do to build a revolutionary movement, for the
purposes of which the recipes and analyses of the past carried out by
the two great currents of revolutionary thought have proven to be
insufficient. It is still useful to discuss their differences and
connections, their errors and their virtues, because an acknowledged
unitary theory has yet to be developed; but it is an obstacle to this
effort to think that either of them can by itself contribute the
sufficient foundations for conceiving current praxis. The latter has
been made obvious by the spontaneous historical process of the entire
20^(th) century. Anarchism and Marxism have mutually permeated one
another, a fact that is more evident in their more consistently
revolutionary tendencies. It is, of course, true that this has also
presupposed an admixture with the historical interpretations dominant at
any particular time. This explains the Leninist influence present in
platformism, but also the spontaneist and educationist influence that is
so evident in the autonomist Marxist milieu.
These defects can be completely overcome by way of historical
development. But the âideological guardiansâ of either camp or their
subdivisions, have always sought to deny the spontaneous and enriching
character of the above-mentioned doctrinal interpenetration and to
discredit those who support it. In the case of the platformist current,
the problem is exacerbated because in this case it lays claim to
Bakunin, not as a representative of a âpureâ anarchism, but as the
integrator of elements of Marxist thought and Proudhonian conceptions.
This is by no means an invention; it is documented. Nor is it an
invention that Marx was also influenced by anti-statist currents and had
already developed anti-bureaucratic positions in his youth. [10]
Furthermore, in both theoretical instances there are unresolved
contradictions, which has allowed these âideological guardiansâ to
transform the incoherencies, tensions and reciprocal critiques into the
well-known conflicting fetishes of the âidealist Bakuninâ and the
âauthoritarian Marxâ, which they then utilize as a measuring rod to
distinguish between followers and opponents, conduct that has done
everything imaginable to make it harder to achieve proletarian unity and
has proven to be much more sectarian than enlightening.
Attempts to safeguard the ârevolutionary purityâ of theory by preventing
its âcontaminationâ by outside ideas reflect a situation of political
weakness and a quasi-mythological mentality. According to this view, it
is ideas and not living activity that determine the revolutionary
character of the proletarian movement or its organizationsâa concept
against which Bakunin warned insistently, having seen precisely an
incoherence of this type in the political praxis of the Marxists. Purity
of thought, in whatever manner it is conceived, does not guarantee an
answer for how to address practical problems, nor is it even any sort of
criterion for evaluating a change of course in thought, except in
religious thinking. In the latter the criterion for truth is not praxis,
but specific orthodoxy in contrast to which diverging opinions are
presented as âheterodoxâ, as counter-assertions, which the former
consigns to the category of âsinâ while the orthodox postulates are
identified with âpurityâ or âgoodnessâ.
All of this may seem to be mere foolishness, and that is just what it
is. Such views are expressions of alienated thought, thought that is
subordinated to political interests that have become autonomous, that
is, party interests rather than class interests. âContaminationâ has
always been a result of the fact that distinct revolutionary currents
form part of the same general social movement. This âcontaminationâ does
not represent desires for intellectual eclecticism, but the needs of the
masses who, by approaching doctrines from a practical point of view,
have naturally tended to recast them. It is true that the product of
this operation may be progressive or regressive, but those who
invariably categorize this phenomenon as regressive have usually not
distinguished themselves by serious historical-practical analysis and
also often hold on to conservative perspectives that are opposed to
efforts to actualize revolutionary praxis on the theoretical plane and
on that of theoretical activity. To summarize, revolutionary theory
cannot preserve its revolutionary effectiveness unless it connects with
practical efforts to develop revolutionary praxis in the given
historical context; the efforts of the purists only impede this process
and therefore also hinder the historical maturation of thought as well
as action.
For my part, I have preferred to define myself as a communist rather
than an anarchist because I view the capital-labor opposition at the
economic level as the primary form of the spontaneous conflict that
could impel a revolutionary process on a mass scale. I have also
referred to myself as being within the council communist tradition,
because I consider that it has represented the most advanced theoretical
understanding of the most important problems we have to face today.
Besides this, however, I have never partaken of any doctrinal uniformity
nor has it been my opinion that the defense of such uniformity has
anything progressive about it. It seems to me that to criticize
platformism for including Marxist ideasâor, rather, for doing so
explicitlyâis a sectarian error and the debate must be oriented around
the Leninist or social democratic features of those ideas. Nor does it
seem correct to use Bakuninâs arguments against Marxâs theories in order
to oppose the inclusion of such ideas without at the same time making an
effort of critical reevaluation, above all if one refers, as Patrick
does, to the fragmentary and even âconfusedâ character of Bakuninâs
theoretical reflections in order to refute the platformist concept of
the âanarchist partyâ.
Nor is there any attempt in the three articles under discussion
(Patrick, Barret and RodrĂguez) to distinguish between the original
Marxist theories and their Leninist interpretations. This could have
been accomplished simply by referring to the non-Leninist Marxist
revolutionaries of the first half of the 20^(th) century, not to mention
precursors such as William Morris in Britain. Such an effort would allow
for expanding horizons beyond the reductionism and the unilateral
declarations regarding the âorthodoxâ Leninist. I assume the failure to
do so can be explained by a lack of interest. It is still thought that
âMarxismâ is not the affair of anarchists, except when it threatens
their particular âbailiwickâ (and most Marxists do likewise).
However, from the moment that Leninism began to constitute (and to a
certain degree it still does) a dominant influence on the extreme left,
the task of freeing the Marxist revolutionary theorizations from
subsequent ideological deformations and clarifying its true meaning and
intent, is no longer a question of intellectuals or sects: it becomes a
basic political task for all those who fight for autonomous proletarian
liberation. In the case of platformism, its supersession requires a
deeper scrutiny of the contradictions posed by its political praxis not
only by contrasting it with other concepts of anarchist practice, but
also by contrasting those Marxist elements that may be present with the
anti-Leninist interpretation of Marxist thought. This would allow many
points to become clear, and would create more favorable conditions for
fruitful discussion.
Since Leninism not merely falsifies but distorts the Marxist categories,
it bequeathed to neoplatformism a progressive side that most other
currents of anarchism lack, which could be the main source of its
appeal. More precisely, it actively combines progressive elements of
Marxism and anarchism in a more coherent way than the prevailing
anarchism, which renounces or marginalizes Marxism. The reaffirmation of
the class struggle, historical materialism, class organization and class
unity, is a progressive attitude because these are values [11] that
underwent a crisis in the general defeat of the 1970s and were diluted
in the ocean of postmodernismâalthough to some âexpertsâ, who confuse
books with reality, it seems that this never happened, which is why they
want to convince people that neoplatformism is rooted in a âjuvenileâ
paucity (which curiously brings us back to Leninâs thesis of the
âinfantile disorderâ and reestablishes it as an analytical criterion).
It is in this sense that Gustavo RodrĂguez points out that:
âWe are witnessingâin Latin Americaâa basically juvenile anarchist
âmovementâ which lacks a model of organization and action and which is
shot through with a certain ideological confusion; or, more precisely,
with an ideological elaboration that is considerably retrograde with
respect to our current needs.â
He says more or less the same thing in connection with the movementâs
naiveté. [12] The culminating point of his critique of neoplatformism,
by referring to âblind alleysâ and âdeviations of thoughtâ reflects the
same logic that characterizes Leninâs famous pamphlet. For those of us
who perceive the need for a long-lasting revolutionary regroupment, and
understand that todayâs revolutionary groups are tiny minorities or
groupuscules and are geographically dispersed (since we do not confuse
ideological fictions or the âfictitious movementâ with real historical
praxis), it is hard not to see that the classical issues upon which
neoplatformism was founded are primordial questions of revolutionary
praxis, for which the other anarchist currents have failed to provide
satisfactory answers/solutions. In addition, the latter have promoted a
distancing, and even an animosity, with respect to Marxism in general,
which contributes to the inhibition of any effort to advance toward
better solutions. Of course, none of these problems can be resolved with
abstract declarations about the need for new forms of organization and
action that do not transcend the framework of debate and incipient
formulaic apologetics, as Gustavo attempts to do.
As for naiveté, this could very well be a higher expression of
revolutionary sincerity. Both can be present at the same time. And if I
have to choose between mistaken innocents and coarse salesmen smelling
of tradition, I prefer the former, because at least they represent a
living movement. It would be helpful if the authors quoted above would
clarify this politically. A progressive tradition is preferable to a
regressive one, and in this sense I have no doubt that platformism is,
theoretically, regressive with respect to traditional anarchism and its
syncretic focus, which platformism brands as reactionary and false. But
I also think that a progressive naiveté, draped in a regressive
tradition, is preferable to any traditionalism, which is conservative by
definition although, in relative terms, it can temporarily serve the
task of recovering lost or marginalized lessons and theories.
The authentic neoplatformists, that is, those who were attracted to
platformism as a result of their experience over the last few decades
rather than for reactionary reasonsâdespair over the fiasco of
traditional anarchism and more generally over the historical defeat of
the old workers movementâare correct to seek and to demand a precise
social focus, theoretical method and organizational formula. Even the
insurrectionists, who may have until now been the most politically
advanced current within anarchism (despite serious blind spots), were
trying to move in the same direction, although they obviously underrated
the methodological dimension. They, too, insisted on a class
perspective, although not in a fetishistic way, and developed their own
organizational positions, putting the emphasis on âinformalityâ. The
rest of anarchism has instead remained in a kind of stagnant condition
(or has fallen prey to postmodernist detours of decomposition), which is
explained by its practical character as a reformist movement which
expresses aspirations for freedom, but does not feel the need for a
revolutionary struggle in the here and now, viewing the latter as a
future âutopiaâ.
From the point of view of the attempt to provide solutions for the three
fundamental questions mentioned above, Patrickâs article is very good as
critical historiography, but does not contribute solutions relevant for
our time. It does not attempt to combine criticism with positive
creativity. It furthermore implies, either by omission or intentionally,
that he thinks that the traditional schemas, or the precarious formulas
that have been able to emerge empirically in the present era, continue
to be or have now become a sufficient basis for current progress:
whether it is the Iberian model of the CNT-FAI or the Argentine FORA, or
other models with less historical evidence for their generative or
auxiliary role in mass movements, such as âcoordinadorasâ, networks,
âblack blocsâ, etc. For example, Gustavo clearly states his opposition
to anarchosyndicalism and âespecifismoâ and appears to declare his
support for the latter, more recently evolved type of model
(âcoordinadorasâ, etc.). But he does not bother to analyze the close
bond that exists between the historical situation of weakness, the
fleeting nature and the structural paucity of this kind of model, and
the more or less ephemeral or sporadic purposes of the struggles for
which its various manifestations were designed.
Naturally, âpragmaticâ people always do things with the thought of what
it is that they concretely want to achieve. But we cannot think in this
manner, because what we want to achieve cannot be predicted in advance
except along basic and general lines. We cannot say at this time what
kind of society we are going to build, reducing it to a recipe or a list
of social measures. Therefore, for us organization does not possess a
merely pragmatic value, but a constituent one: it allows for the
preservation and extension of cooperation and the subjective processes
that will concretely determine the realization of our goals. More
generally, one must not confuse the less permanent and less cohesive
organization characteristic of a state of weakness, as formally
manifested today in the form of âcoordinadorasâ of independent groups or
ânetworksâ that engage in sporadic joint activities, with a solution of
the problems we have posed.
Much the same is true if we consider questions relating to social focus
and theoretical methodologyâin other words, our theoretical worldview.
The need for a theoretical worldview that is logically consistent and
precise at the level of intellectual categories is not a mere whim. We
are not talking about inventing a jargon that the masses will find hard
to understand. The only jargon that the masses understand âa prioriâ is
the language of domination, whose categories exclude the antagonistic
articulation of thought. A quite obvious example, one that is
unfortunately still relevant, is the superficial understanding of the
problem of proletarian liberation that lacks the category of
self-alienation, which leads to all kinds of false views about the
question of why the proletarian movement is the way it is, among which
we can distinguish the following two extreme examples:
1) Denial of the formal freedom of individuals that characterizes mature
capitalist society, consequently imputing the responsibility for the
internal problems of the class movement to autonomous external causes
(the power of the enemy, the obstacles posed by and the manipulative
activities of the traditional bureaucratic organizations, etc.);
2) The view that this formal individual freedom is not only real at a
formal level, but also at an effective level, thereby leading to the
interpretation that holds that the absence of a revolutionary dynamic or
radicalization can only be due to a failure of the will, which is
explained by mere ignorance or by the disinformation peddled by the
systemâs cultural apparatus.
Both viewpoints initially favor the implementation of elitist practices,
and their subsequent failure elicits demoralization. For both, the root
problem, concerning how the proletariat is ruled by the products of its
activityâwhich are transformed into a hostile force that rules itâboth
at the level of society as a whole as well as at the level of its own
class movement, and concerning why propaganda cannot alter this general
dynamic except during certain moments of particular conflicts, is simply
ignored. And if this is not understood it is impossible to understand
how to develop organizational forms that can overcome this
self-alienation, and allow for the constitution of the proletarians as
autonomous subjects, which is the key to the whole revolutionary process
and its preparation.
Considering the root problem from the perspective I have outlined, it
can be said that the platformist response is erroneous, but the same is
true of traditional anarchism. Platformism sacrifices freedom for
efficiency (as in Case No. 1), while traditional anarchism sacrifices
efficiency for freedom (as in Case No. 2). In both instances there is a
serious unilateral dimension, and the fact that they are still utilized
is not due to stupidity, but to the fact that they subscribe to a
reductionist concept of the power against which we are fighting and of
the human needs that are the beginning, the middle, and the basic end of
the struggle. [13]
Both efficiency as well as freedom (freedom in the ordinary, external,
volitional meaning of the word, i.e., doing what one wishes) refer to
the immediate present. They are conceived as means to alter the present,
whether by planning mechanisms in the case of efficiency, or by
non-planning mechanisms in the case of immediate freedom. But the
problem of revolutionary praxis does not consist solely of the capacity
for action affecting the present, but of its continuity and extension
into the future. Therefore, what matters is not efficiency (the ability
to attain certain effects in a certain period of time) but historical
effectiveness (the production of real effects that allow for
revolutionary development to proceed towards its full maturation at an
unknown future time). Nor is external freedom in and of itself
determinant, a freedom that can up to a certain point be measured by
ârightsâ, but autonomy, that is, the ability to consciously make use of
oneâs own energies and resources (including external freedom) in
accordance with oneâs own existence. This autonomy presupposes, in
reality, external freedom in order to develop, but is not a simple
result of the latterâs existence. Autonomy is directly related to how we
conceive of ourselves, how we conceive of our needs and abilities, our
nature; in short, it is itself the effective power that allows the
self-constitution of the revolutionary subject, surpassing the stage of
mere negative rebellion and converting the experience of passive and
active antagonism into the inspirational source of a different kind of
life.
These points are key issues that must be resolved by way of concrete
practical proposals. But I know this problem has not yet been seriously
addressed in the anarchist movement in general. This deficiency is
exemplified quite well by the topic of organizational forms because,
whether we are speaking of functionality (or internal regimen), or of
the types of organization with respect to their internal forms
(pyramidal or network, rigid or flexible, levels of activity at the base
or in delegative structures) or with respect to their social
functionality (permanent or temporary in character, field of activity,
type of objectives), there has been no advance beyond the
insurrectionist proposals of the late 1970s. Needless to say, other
experiences have not been considered, like the German Workers Unions of
the 1920s, in which elements of the (anarchosyndicalist) FAUD
participated, probably due to their obsession with the idea of
ârevolutionary trade unionismâ (sic).
For those of us who understand that creativity, the unfolding of
transformative capacity, is the basis of all revolutionary praxis, the
questions, the critiques, and the answers that neoplatformism can
provide must proceed in the direction of liberating and developing the
progressive elements present within it. But to do this a point of view
superior to the one that led to this division in anarchism, which seems
to be constitutive for the latter (the theme of the efficiency-freedom
conflict is clearly pertinent) must be developed. It does not appear to
be appropriate to analyze the conflict in terms of an antagonism between
types of subjectivity because, except for the explicit philo-Leninists,
it seems to me that the neoplatformist comrades sincerely support
anarchist-communist goals. The issue cannot be approached using the
reductionist and abstract key of: âwhat is authoritarian is
counterrevolutionary, what is anti-authoritarian is revolutionaryâ. The
problems of praxis that lie at the root of the reemergence of
platformism require concrete proposals for their resolution, and it does
not seem to me that those who criticize it have shown much interest in
this factor. If they hold that the solutions to this problem already
exist (theoretical solutions on the methodological plane, and practices
on that of the organizational question and relations with the masses),
they will have to prove this concretely. I am not aware of any other
serious proposal that, since âstraightâ anarchism, has confronted these
issues in depth, even on the organizational plane alone. Even classical
council communism itself suffers from a similar shortcoming with respect
to the concrete, because all there is to it is a series of general
orientations that, at the hour of truth, do not clarify a multitude of
questions that must be confronted in organizational life. [14]
Concerning this last-mentioned topic I would like to call attention to
one point in particular. The revolutionary organization, and every
non-alienating organization more generally, must be based on the
integral and fullest possible participation of its members. How can this
be established in organizational practice? My efforts in this direction
were initially characterized by an overwhelmingly formalist approach,
which was insufficient. I agree with the idea of requiring of the
members of an organization a certain level of commitment to the life of
the organization, which must of course be based on their
self-determination when they join it. That is, they are there to work on
a collective project, not to make use of that project for utilitarian
ends or to satisfy their needs for identity and a sense of belonging.
The problem resides in the fact that the revolutionary project is
essentially a project of self-liberation. The concept of self-liberation
as a representation of a process combines the unity of
principles-means-ends in a holistic way. And there is no individual
self-liberation by collective impositions, but it is also impossible
without collective cooperation towards common goals; nor is collective
self-liberation possible without the autonomous development of
individuals that enables them to carry out collective tasks, the tasks
of the revolutionary transformation of society, with their own hands and
brains, not the tasks of attending assemblies, voting and distributing
leaflets, etc. Looking at it another way, the absence of committed and
conscious participation is the ultimate reason for the emergence of
hierarchies and bureaucratization and therefore of a weakening of the
organization in quantitative and qualitative terms, which finally
presents us with the outcome we know all too well: reformist
bureaucratic organizations integrated into the legal margins of the
system.
It is within this practical frame of reference that the controversial
issue of âcollective responsibilityâ must be settled. For me,
responsibility is imminently individual, as it was for Malatesta. But
this does not mean that each individual has no responsibility vis-Ă -vis
others, not only for consensual activities or those to which he has made
a commitment, but also, within certain parameters of coherence, for the
project in whose development he participates, parameters that could be
established in founding guidelines and in some criteria affecting the
purview of the members to act on their own account without prejudice to
the organizationâs goals. It is true that any such limitations could
lead to splits, which is why it cannot be âtotalitarianâ, nor can it
become an artificial discipline imposed on individuals. But it does not
make sense either to avoid splits to the detriment of the will of the
majority, by seeking compulsory consensus that would favor inactivity,
sporadic or irregular actions or concentration on factional struggles.
Such outcomes are even less libertarian than the establishment of
collective rules.
There must therefore be a collective form of responsibility, although it
must not be autonomous and reified as a property of the organization and
its structures (rank and file or delegates) and thus transformed into
the impersonal repository of the real power of the associated
individuals. Collective responsibility must be an effect of the
collective commitment of cooperation, as a democratic sum of individual
responsibilities that, to advance their goals, have the right to project
a collective identity and to take the necessary and coherent measures to
avoid deviations, and to demand from each individual a minimum of
coherence and responsibility, both within and without organized
activity. For me this includes the particular point that each member has
the right to demand explanations from other membersâand not only those
who are involved with particular tasksâfor what they may view as
shortcomings with respect to collective commitment. Also, it would not
be convenient to establish artificial mechanisms of discipline, or ones
that would permit harassment of that kind. Obviously, however, a person
who repeatedly fails to fulfill the commitments he agreed to must be
subject to collective scrutiny. Limits could be established that would
be indispensable in order to determine when collective intervention is
necessary, first with warnings, and then, if necessary, with sanctions
or even expulsion. It is clear that if an attempt is made to resolve
problems that are rooted in alienated subjectivity by means of strict
formalities and a rigid disciplinary regime it will be a bitter failure
as the organization grows, or else only non-revolutionary individuals
will be accepted. But as is evident in the case of insurrectionism,
excessive informality is just as harmful as an excess of formalism. In
general, authoritarianism and liberal permissiveness are only the two
opposite poles of self-alienation.
Of course, every law is a convention, a kind of arbitrariness, but it is
no less true that democracy and its system of rights is an expression of
the dissolution of the human community in a society divided into classes
and, in capitalism, highly atomized individually. Since we start from
this basis we have to assume democracy and particular rules as a normal
procedure for decision-making and organizing activity, although we
understand that majority rule is arbitraryânonetheless, to transform
consensus into a norm is no less arbitrary. Otherwise, what we would
have is not an advance towards communist anarchy, but a retreat towards
the capitalist anarchy of private individuals.
The only possible solution for the problem of organizational freedom
consists in establishing a balance between rights and responsibilities,
freedom of movement and commitment to participation, cooperation and
individual self-realization. âNo responsibilities without rights, no
rights without responsibilitiesâ (AIT). In other words, what we need is
a type of organization that would be strict and explicit in its basic
orientations that would generate obligations for its members, but at the
same time would be flexible and open in its everyday activity, which
generates freedom. But this type of organization demands much more from
individuals than previous forms of organization; it demands their
constant commitment to practical tasks and to their self-development as
conscious subjects. It represents a higher level of proletarian
autonomous activity than traditional forms of organization. The
organization itself must assume the fundamental goal of promoting the
self-development of its members as autonomous subjects and must not be
conceived as a mere âinstrument of struggleâ. Therefore, it cannot
develop by means of impositions of any kind, but it must emerge, as was
true of its historical precursors, from the consciousness of the need
for participation and self-determination on the part of the
proletarians, in such a way that the objective form of the organization
finds its counterpart in subjectivity.
This issue, in turn, leads us to a blind spot in the vision of the
revolutionary transformation of society that derives from the bourgeois
revolutionary era. Revolutionary transformation is still considered as a
process that is based upon, or develops, predominantly at the level of
the social structure as such, external to the subjectivity of its
agents. This presupposes a separation of transformation and
self-transformation and the reduction of the development of
revolutionary consciousness to a process of the assimilation or
elaboration of ideas, without affecting psychology as a whole, that is,
the whole constitution of subjectivity, or personal (âprivateâ) and
everyday life, or individualsâ ordinary behavior. The prevalent type of
anarchism has little to say about such matters, except to repeat what
was already said more than a century ago. The libertarian ethos that has
always been a characteristic of anarchism has little to contribute in
this regard.
As I said above, I have not found satisfactory answers to the basic
problems that confront us today in the prevailing form of anarchism,
which is why I doubt that the neoplatformist comrades can provide them.
Their doctrinal corpus and their organizational practical dynamics are
not exactly suitable for resolving these problems. It appears that their
followers have not even addressed the issue and the well-known
assemblyist-spontaneist fetishism continues to run rampant despite
having failed on thousands of occasions as an organizational basis for
the social struggle. Not to mention the fact that not even once have
they successfully prevented any of the evils in response to which their
organizational formulations were designed (hierarchies, bureaucracy,
minority manipulations, sectarianism....).
There are no real solutions with regard to the topic of party and trade
union type organizational forms within the anarchist tradition.
Insurrectionism placed sufficient emphasis on this, under some
councilist influence, but in my judgment did not do so as successfully
as council communism. The model of the Workers Unions was an object
lesson that illustrated what was to be understood by the phrase,
âsupersession of trade unionismâ. The insurrectionist concept of
âautonomous nucleusâ is very abstract and in its formulations from the
1970s seemed to have been functionally designed to serve the point of
view of the anarchist minority, as a transmission belt. Furthermore,
despite all their polemics against the âpartyâ concept of the
platformists, traditional anarchism and its postmodern deviations have
never overcome the party form; they have only changed the name or
adopted a nihilist stance. The only difference between anarchist
affinity groups and the explicitly constituted political party is that
the former lack disciplinary mechanisms and may evince greater degrees
of heterogeneity, while the explicit political party possesses such
mechanisms and exercises them in order to reduce heterogeneity. But in
both cases the community of ideas is the basis of the organization,
which may be no more than a creed among the affinity groups, while in
the party form this demands a minimum of programmatic development and,
therefore, a certain explicit elaboration of the collective
consciousness. Affinity groups are, historically speaking, an
underdeveloped party form, halfway between the sects of the 19^(th)
century and modern parties. Their libertarian ideology does not alter
this characterization. Platformism, viewed within this framework, only
represents a maturation of this contradictory reality. To mention only
one relevant example, the Iberian Anarchist Federation (the FAI), while
confronting the situation of war and revolution in 1936â39, and clearly
without any influence from the âPlatformâ, developed positions very
similar to the latter, although the model of the FAI was more that of a
âmass partyâ than that of a âvanguard partyââor at least it was
something located between these two forms. It is also absolutely true
that Bakuninâs concept of the Alliance for Social Democracy found a
coherent expression in the FAIâs development (which is not to say that
it was the most coherent such expression, if we note the proclaimed
goals). To deny all this in the name of the inconsistencies of Bakuninâs
writings, as Patrick implicitly does, seems to me to be a totally lame
excuse. Likewise, to replace this development with a turn towards
dispersion into small affinity groups, which are only sporadically
coordinated and are structurally incapable of constituting a necessary
socio-political and intellectual reference point within the class
struggle, appears to me to be a totally false solution, which reminds me
of the theme of sectarian involution addressed by Marx and Engels in
opposition to Bakunin:
âThe first phase of the proletariatâs struggle against the bourgeoisie
is marked by a sectarian movement. That is logical at a time when the
proletariat has not yet developed sufficiently to act as a class.
Certain thinkers criticize social antagonisms and suggest fantastic
solutions thereof, which the mass of workers is left to accept, preach,
and put into practice.... These sects act as levers of the movement in
the beginning, but become an obstruction as soon as the movement
outgrows them; after which they became reactionary.... To sum up, we
have here the infancy of the proletarian movement, just as astrology and
alchemy are the infancy of science. If the International were to be
founded, it was necessary that the proletariat go through this phase.â
[15]
Sects are not defined by their size, but by their relations with the
proletarian movement. From this perspective most of todayâs affinity
groups and micro-parties (whether under the anarchist, the Marxist, or
any other label) are nothing but sects. Their existence on the margins
of social struggles effectively presupposes a situation where they can
bring about a germination of anti-capitalist consciousness, but they are
incapable of contributing to the development of a concrete global
alternative. [16] Furthermore, at the present the problem is no longer
the proletariatâs ability to act as a class, but the development of that
ability on a scale sufficient to confront the more amplified level of
development reached by capitalist ruleâthe Global Factory-State [17]âand
to smash the equally amplified self-alienation that characterizes the
society of the spectacle in its latest phase (oneiric, or dreamlike
existence, the confusion of the real and the virtual in life). Since the
sects are impotent in the face of these historical-material challenges,
because the only thing that can be done to escape from the dynamic of
permanent defeat must be directly based on a historical-materialist
understanding of the social totality and must refer to a proletarian
mass movement, the very existence of the sects is reactionary and can no
longer make any meaningful contributions. Today this role could be
played by ascendant movements that still adopt traditional-modern forms,
but which are simultaneously propelled by a dynamic of class
confrontations to go beyond those forms during the unfolding of the
struggle and to consider the radical and total transformation of
society.
Sectarian forms thus constitute a dead end, just like the rigid parties
or trade unions and every form that reproduces the manual-intellectual
division of labor. What the situation calls for is a determined and
creative view towards the future, without fear of posing solutions that,
although now seemingly unrealizable, may allow for the elaboration of
proposals that through the test of history and in the hands of the
proletarian class, will make a decisive contribution to the task of
resolving the historical problems that we shall face.
The historical crossroads at which we stand requires from us a more
complex understanding of society, of life, of the struggle movement, and
of the process of socio-historical transformation. As long as this is
not addressed, the revolutionary movement will remain atomized and
underdeveloped, or else it will degenerate along the way, extinguishing
its initial spirit in favor of the alienating dynamics rooted in todayâs
society which are constantly being renewed in individualsâ everyday
lives.
In conclusion, neoplatformism can only be superseded by means of a more
complex and profound development of revolutionary thought, and I do not
see any reason to think that those who oppose neoplatformism from
traditionalist or postmodernist positions are any more likely to attain
this goal than the neoplatformists themselves. Only the advance towards
real freedom, towards the concrete consciousness of how to free
ourselves from capitalism, will allow us to make the revolutionary
project relevant for the 21^(st) century.
The entire article entitled âContra el fetichismo politicoâ addresses
general questions relating to the supersession of the fetishism of
leadership and organizational formalities. See also the series of
articles, âAgainst Democracyâ where, in a polemic with the International
Communist Group, theoretical-practical tactical questions are addressed
(see the ICACâs archives, in the section entitled âOur Textsâ).
---
by Ricardo Fuego
In the text below I specify my criticisms of what I consider to be the
current position of revolutionary anarchism on fundamental issues.
programmatic proposals rather than their concrete praxis within a
concrete socio-historical context. The progressive or regressive
character of groups that claim to be revolutionary cannot be judged
solely on the basis of their relation or adherence to one or another
historical current, but on the basis of what concrete contributions they
make to the autonomous development of the class movement.
of certain âfalseâ ideas which must be refuted. Once again, this implies
a diversion of attention from the material and subjective conditions
that lead to a certain hegemony of ideas and forms of praxis. If
platformist ideas still exercise influence among the exploited this is
not due to mere unawareness of the âtrue ideasâ or the fact that the
libertarian milieuâs critique of platformism is not accurate enough, but
to the fact that platformist ideas correspond to the present state of
historical development of some sectors of the exploited.
Practice. Our consciousness is fundamentally determined by our
experience and our capability to perceive that experience (sensitivity),
and it is therefore natural that the ideas we adopt are those which
mentally express our consciousness of our experience (and thus it is
also natural that our mind is more âpermeableâ to some ideas than to
others). This does not mean that debate and propaganda of ideas are
useless or that they have no effect on consciousness, but only that
their effect is dependent on their ability to offer a rational form by
which individuals can express the new experiences they have perceived,
experiences that the old ideas are unable to express or which express
them in a contradictory way. [18]
4.The Marxism/Anarchism dichotomy and the reactionary concept of
âcontaminationâ. If what is aimed at is building a revolutionary
movement, this cannot be done from a group- or party-based point of view
(in the sense of a historical current), but only from a class point of
view. The historical experience of radical proletarian praxisâthat is,
the experience of its defeatsâhas shown that neither of the two currents
is âsufficient on its ownâ. To the contrary, it has demonstrated the
serious limitations of both currents when they had to confront a
capitalism that was much more mature than the capitalism of the era when
they originated. If the party spirit is an obstacle to the construction
of an autonomous class movement, since it tends to identify the general
development of the movement with the struggle for hegemony among
different currents (the party struggle), so too is doctrinal âpurismâ
because, by prioritizing the destruction of âthe competitionâ it remains
in a self-referential and therefore conservative dynamic, which blocks
not only self-criticism but also the effort to make revolutionary
thought relevant for our times.
self-liberation. By not taking into consideration the fact that the
structures that oppress and condition the proletariat are the products
of the latterâs own alienated self-activity (self-alienation), one ends
up explaining the current situation by the extraordinary attributes of
the âenemyâ or by the stupidity, cowardice and ignorance of the masses.
Both interpretations, separately or in combination, favor elitist
approaches (even if, formally, they are not authoritarian approaches)
and do not take into account the process of self-liberation in all its
necessary complexity. This has two possible results: the promotion of
actions to âattack the enemyâ which are disconnected from the mass
movement, carried out by groups of specialists, or the opportunist
adaptation to the backward consciousness of the masses and a
semi-conscious subordination (with quite a bit of self-deception) to the
current reformist dynamic.
want) and efficacy (subordinating action to the achievement of results
in the short-term) are notions limited to the immediate present, and are
thus useless for the purposes of establishing a coherent praxis that
extends from the present into the future. What must be opposed to a
praxis based on efficacy is a practice focused on historical
effectiveness, that is, one that is oriented to developing our
autonomous abilities (including our will) in accordance with our real
needs.
extends the dichotomy between efficacy and free will to that between an
organizational form that subordinates individuals to a praxis focused on
efficacy and an organizational form that subordinates collective
interests to the individual will. It opposes the organization as an
end-in-itself where individuals are means of the organization, to the
organization as a means of the individual will. There is no way that an
organization can be a means for the permanent cooperation among
individuals unless there is a balance struck between responsibilities
and rights, between individual will and the collective goal pursued by
way of cooperation. The individualâs participation in organizational
life must be an active and conscious commitment for the individualâs own
self-development and also involves the individualâs responsibility
towards freely assumed collective goals, rather than a mere means to
satisfy egotistic needs. This must be made explicit in the form of
guidelines that are voluntarily and consciously assumed by the
organizationâs members because, if formalism leads to the development of
an organizationâs impersonal power over individuals, informalismâs
effect is no less alienating in that it reproduces the atomization
characteristic of individuals in capitalist society.
[1] Patrick Rossineri, âEntre la Plataforma y el Partido: las tendencias
autoritarias y el anarquismoâ [âBetween the Platform and the Party:
Authoritarian Tendencies and Anarchismâ]. Published in Libertad!, a
publication of the Grupo Anarquista Libertad, Buenos Aires, Nos. 45
(Nov.-Dec. 2007) to 49 (Sept.-Oct. 2008).
[2]
libertad@yahoo.com.ar
[3] I am referring to Algunas reflexiones sobre el extravio teĂłrico
ideolĂłgico en el pensamiento acrata contemporĂĄneo, by Gustavo RodrĂguez
(Dec. 2007) and Los sediciosos despertares de la anarquĂa, by Daniel
Barret.
[4] See: Roi Ferreiro, âContra todos los partidos, por la
autoemancipaciĂłn de la claseâ [âAgainst All Parties, For the
Self-Emancipation of the Classâ], August 2005.
[5]
[6] For precise contributions on this topic, see: CooperaciĂłn Obreira,
Proyecto de programa, 2001â2003; Grupo de Comunistas de Consejos de
Galiza, La Red de Grupos Obreros (R-GGOO), 2006; R. Ferreiro/R. Fuego,
El reagrupamiento revolucionario hoy, 2006. Or, the Propuesta PrĂĄctica,
by the International Circle of Anti-Bolshevik Communists.
[7] Generally speaking, the situation of the French working class,
including the marginalized immigrant sectors, is comparatively better
than, for example, that of the average worker in Spain.
[8] Some of which are not an active part of the proletarian movement and
are disconnected from the class struggle. Others are only superficially
different and their praxis totally converges with the prevailing model.
[9] I am referring to the instrumental value of theory, to theory as a
methodology, which does not have a direct relation with the particular
representations for which it is put to use, because the creation of
representations is determined by practical consciousness. As for the
proposed schema which proceeds from lower to higher theoretical forms,
to affirm this I base myself on my experience and my development, which
has led me to plunge deep into Marxist thought and its later coherent
elaborations.
[10] Which is why his arguments in favor of the Commune as a
revolutionary political form were already prefigured in his writings of
1844, which makes it clear that the Marxist theory of the extinction of
the State was no mere rhetorical device. To acquire a more profound
grasp of this issue one may consult a notebook I assembled consisting of
a very extensive selection of quotations from Marx and Engels: Una
revoluciĂłn contra el estado mismo [A Revolution against the State
Itself].
[11] By saying that this reaffirmation is progressive I am not claiming
that the form in which it is carried out is also progressive. In many
respects the neoplatformist formulations are also a reprise of the
leftist worldview of the 60s-70s which must be overcome.
[12] âIn the first groupâthe one that is most removed from Leninismâare
the European organizations like the Italians of the Federazione de
Comunisti Anarchici, the French comrades of Alternative Libertaire, the
almost unknown Spaniards of the OrganizaciĂłn Anarco-Comunista Andaluza,
the U.S. and Canadian anarchists of the Northeastern Federation of
Anarchist Communists (NEFAC), the English Anarchist Communist Federation
(ACF), the Mexicans of the Grupo Socialista Libertario (GSL) and the
above-mentioned Workers Solidarity Movement (WSM) in Ireland.... Here,
it is necessary to make it clear that I do not think that any of the
groups that fit into this first âcircuitâ have been infiltrated or are
âdiabolicallyâ inspired but, quite simply, that they are naĂŻve in their
formulations and are guided by a yearning for alliances which do not
have much of a basis for a long term project; although I must also
stress that this does not exonerate them from criticism. Their tacit
disagreement with the postulates and principles of the anarchist project
situates them as well on the terrain of âdeviationâ.â (Gustavo
RodrĂguez)
[13] This is because it is through unsatisfied needs, through becoming
aware of the former and the effort to provide them with a possible
objectification or a partial realization, that revolutionary
subjectivity has been constituted historically. Without this, any
discussion of social needs as a revolutionary goal is pure abstraction.
[14] I am referring to the critiques of trade unionism and parties.
Although the classic councilists based themselves on concrete
experiences, such as the German Workers Unions and other subsequent
efforts (KAUD, GIKH), they left a blind spot with regard to many
problems that were not posed in their era, as in the case of the problem
of militant commitment to the organization. Naturally, an organization
that arises from the revolutionary dynamic is an organization based on
conscious cooperation rather than economic or ideological bonds like
trade unions or parties. At the present time, it is evident that the
concrete form of confronting the problem of commitment to participation
is crucial, because âdirect democracyâ can have little value and cannot
last longâor have any real existenceâunless a majority of individuals
directly and consciously exercise their power constantly in all the
activities of the organization, and are not merely âshowâ members or
utilitarian members or mere passive attendees at assemblies, who are not
involved in the organizationâs tasks and their own education and who are
completely susceptible to keeping themselves in a subordinate relation
to minority factions to which they grant moral or intellectual
authority.
[15] The Alleged Splits in the International, a private circular of the
General Council of the International Workingmenâs Association, 1872.
[Available online at:
[16] In each case different reasons for this predominate. The rigidity
and narrowness of theoretical thought in general, reductionist notions
concerning autonomous proletarian cooperation and especially its
international articulation (localist or anti-national positions),
pretensions to possessing the truth about principles, program, etc., are
examples of the ways the sectarian phenomenon is manifested today. We
must set aside the vulgar conceptions of sect and sectarianism as they
have been passed down to us from the end of the 19^(th) century and
direct our attention, in this case, more to the utopian and messianic
sects of the more distant past. Utopianism and messianism still exist,
and the fact that they justify themselves with pseudo-scientific
ideologies or project themselves upon an unreal proletariat does not
alter their character. To overcome this it is necessary to bring the
model of scientific thought to its logical conclusion, where there is no
more room for superstitions, pseudo-rational theories or confusion of
desires with reality, where empirical study is always the reference
point and practical solutions are sought for practical problems.
[17] See the Provisional Program of CooperaciĂłn Obreira.
[18] If an individual has reformist ideas, this is not because he is not
familiar with revolutionary ideas or does not understand their logic,
but because his practice is reformist. In order for revolutionary ideas
to get his practical attention, contradictions must emerge not within
his ideas but between his ideas and his practical consciousness. And
this takes place when the individual has, and successfully perceives,
new experiences that his theory cannot explain, and not before this
occurs. Then it is not a matter of contrasting one idea with another,
but of trying to harmoniously move to the next level on the terrains of
experience, perception and consciousness. A particular experience leads
to a particular perception which leads to a particular consciousness,
but each develops at its own pace and may enter into contradiction with
the others. Propaganda and theoretical debate must be directed towards
clarifying these contradictions between experience, perception and
consciousness, because otherwise everything is limited to the logical
opposition between ideas, as if human activity was basically rational
and theory was the precondition for practice.