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Title: From One Vulnerability, Another Author: Anonymous Date: Summer 2021 Language: en Topics: technology, collapsism, energy, sabotage, data centers, Avis de Tempêtes, The Local Kids, The Local Kids #7 Source: Translated for The Local Kids, Issue 7 Notes: Previously published as D’une vulnérabilité l’autre in Avis de tempêtes (Bulletin anarchiste pour la guerre sociale), Issue 39, March 2021
On the microscopic scale, the destruction of autonomy (the reduction of
spaces to determine your life) through the introduction of evermore
technological prostheses can only give way to a biting despair. A
sensation that correlates with the degree of depreciation and abrasion
that you’re subjected to. The wheel of progress turns ever faster.
Before, broad transformations in society could span several generations.
Today, inside the space of one generation it sometimes seems that you’re
not born in the same world. This explosion of speed requires an
extraordinary capacity of human beings to adapt. In response there’s a
whole range of functional “defects” towards the world’s conduct. For
example this can be manifested in neurotic or bodily illnesses. Human
beings don’t live isolated in outer space but indeed inhabit this
planet. Every adjustment to their “habitat” influences their
possibilities and capacities to reflect, but also to feel and act. This
is of course not a privilege of the hyper-technological society that we
know today. We could say that every civilization works in this way. Thus
the question acquires more depth; from which point on does a sharp
adjustment in the habitat leads to a loss of autonomy, a suppression of
freedom? If every adjustment is not in itself contrary to freedom? But
these are questions that by far surpass the modest reflection of this
article.
Let’s take a bit of distance from daily life and let’s try to think on a
macroscopic level. The expansion of the techno-industrial Moloch – which
we could call the “megamachine”, following Lewis Mumford – seems also to
go together with an increase in its vulnerability. If the systems are
more complex and the techniques become complicated, they are also more
vulnerable to a simple breakdown, an incident, an unforeseen event.
Because it doesn’t effect only an isolated component but the whole
system. Or as Günther Anders summarized it; “The bigger the machine, the
more seriously endangered are its parts, which had operated individually
before their merger into the larger machine.” And he logically concluded
that “the larger the machine complex, the greater is the catastrophe if
the complex breaks down.” Of course this is a theory – or rather, an
observation – that has been taken to heart by the system engineers since
a long time. The fragility of data networks, the dependence on a
centralized electrical grid, the just-in-time production which aims to
limit stocks, the interconnection of systems (even the most “vital” ones
as the drinking water distribution which depends on the proper
functioning of electric pumps); all this keeps on inspiring thousands of
studies, projects and strategies to raise the “resilience” of systems.
But not without bitterly noting that faced with technological progress,
it’s like fixing a leak by opening the tap.
This fragility of the megamachine is now part of a discourse surrounding
“collapse”. The hypothesis is that the technological system is going
towards a total failure because of several reasons ranging from a
shortage of energy resources to climate changes. We don’t want to
support a “catastrophic” version which, barring some exceptions, shows
itself to be a useful defence of the actual system. Because it only
promotes preparations for survival while waiting for the floods to come,
instead of focusing on attacks or insurrection (including in its most
anti-authoritarian forms). Nevertheless, all the elements have to be
taken into account. It is by considering the world in its entirety that
our perspectives can become relevant and not by only building castles in
the air or by being content with our daydreams of eternal rebels. To say
the least it would seem ridiculous to consider insurrection without
taking into account the question of the metropolis, of climate change,
of cultural flattening, of sectarian hate or of social cannibalism that
is brewing, etc. The reflection of anarchist critiques of power –
whatever they might be – can take an unexpected depth on the question of
autonomy or liberty when faced with the acceleration of devastating
climatic events and the frenetic race of a ravaging industrialism. On
the condition that it gets rid of the skeletons that still clutter
anarchy; programmatism, fear of the unknown, victimism borrowed from the
left, determinism borrowed from Marxist materialism, etc. There’s still
a long way in front of us.
“We need not be surprised, then, that in more than one area the Power
Complex has been undergoing severe strain. Though immune to any frontal
assault except by another power system of equal size, these giants are
particularly vulnerable to localized guerrilla assaults and raids,
against which their mass formations are as helpless as was heavily
armored Goliath against a nimble David who did not choose to use the
same weapons or attack the same part of the anatomy.” - Lewis Mumford,
The Pentagon of Power (2nd volume of “The Myth of the Machine”), 1970
So what about this vulnerability of the megamachine? Is it real or is it
one of the many ghosts that have been the travel companions of
revolutionaries? There have been the tales of the historical mission of
the proletariat, the inherent contradictions of capitalism, the coming
awakening of the still dormant masses, the revolution conceived as a
Grand Soir, the progressive disappearance of massacres and hatred in
humanity, the catharsis caused by wars and catastrophes. Enough reasons
to be cautious. A far-flung revolt as the one in Chile in 2019 didn’t
lead up to an open insurrection. The uprisings in the Arab world have
been drowned in blood and gave way to other horrible monsters. The
multiplication of the sabotage of cell towers or fibre optics didn’t
cause an institutional or economical breakdown. This is not to deny that
blows have been dealt. Certainly, they weren’t deadly but they
demonstrated their potential at the same time as their shortcomings. So
let’s evaluate that fragility, which is here not synonymous with “social
revolution” but rather with possibilities of liberty or an extension of
chaos from where the unknown can emerge, “good” or “bad”. And to that
end, let’s look closer at one of the backbones of the megamachine: the
electrical grid.
On 8 January 2021 at 14:04 CET, the alarm systems turn red when the
European electrical grid sees a sharp drop in frequency of the
alternating current supply (50 Hertz) [in the North-West Area, the
opposite occurred in the South-East]. The cause of this frequency
deviation is still not certain but probably it was due to the tripping
of a circuit breaker (incident, failure, sabotage… no clarifications on
that matter) in a substation in Croatia. The European electrical grid is
connected from Warsaw to Paris and from Istanbul to Copenhagen. And for
this network to function it needs a stable frequency. The equilibrium
between supply and demand of electrical energy has to be guaranteed at
all times. The grid deals with fluctuations by [either temporarily
reducing the production of electricity or] temporarily supplying
additional electricity and reducing the consumption of electricity,
specifically of major customers. To stabilise the grid in January 2021,
several big industrial sites are disconnected as a matter of urgency
(specifically in Italy, France, Austria, Romania, etc.). But also
several high voltage lines are cut off (14 in total) because when they
cannot maintain the right electric pressure, the electric current will
fast find another way (to other lines) which then can result in
overcurrent. Thus the totality of lines of the electrical grid is at
risk of a snowball effect.
On the Austrian side, the spokesperson of the electricity network
operator EVN speaks of an “almost blackout”. The incident achieves the
third of four warning levels in the European ENTSO-E classification
(“Emergency – Deteriorated situation, including a network split at a
large scale. Higher risk for neighbouring systems. Security principles
are not fulfilled. Global security is endangered”). From their side, the
French network operator RTE boasts about their “defence barriers”
consisting of disconnecting major industrial zones and supplying more
electricity through gas power plants or hydroelectric dams. What is
certain, is that the European grid – a giant that merits the
“megamachine” qualification – is vulnerable, especially because of its
size and centralisation.
Let’s mention also that new electricity sources (wind and solar), by
definition intermittent, cannot manage all these fluctuations in
frequency and cannot respond to sudden demands. They cannot function
without the support of a more “conventional” electricity production
(like coal or gas power plants). Their multiplication on the territory
constitutes another element of instability and fragility to the
electrical grid. To amend this, mega-batteries are being built a bit
everywhere. They would be capable of storing electricity to be supplied
to the grid in case of need. But their efficiency is still questionable.
In France, RTE started building these mega-batteries on sites in
Vingeanne (Côte d’Or), Bellac (Haute-Vienne) and Ventavon (Hautes-Alpes)
in the summer of 2020, in addition to their project for a hydroelectric
power station for producing and storing energy in Fos-sur-Mer (Bouches
du RhĂ´ne).
This “incident” in a simple local transformation substation but with
serious consequences, reminds us of another rather resounding fact on
the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. On 17 April 2013 around 1 o’clock
in the morning, someone opens a technical vault next to the electrical
substation of Coyote (California) and cuts fibre optic cables. It takes
a moment before the operator notices. Ten minutes later, another set of
cables is cut in a manhole close-by. Thirty minutes pass before the
surveillance cameras of the substation register a faraway trail of
lights. The investigators believe this to be a signal coming from a
flash light. Shortly after, at 1:31 a.m., the cameras register flashes
from a rifle and sparks coming off the fence when bullets touch it. At
1:41 a.m. the Sheriff’s department receives a call from an operator at
the energy centre who heard the shots. The police arrive 10 minutes
later, but everything is already back to normal. They arrived one minute
after another signal with a flash light marks the end of the attack.
On what were these mysterious attackers firing? On the big transformers
of this substation. These are simple things, being nothing more than
spirals of copper wire inside metal cages. They also have reservoirs
with cooling liquid because of the heat they produce. It was exactly
these reservoirs that the shots were aimed at. After being riddled with
hundreds of holes, the precious liquid began leaking away. The cops
didn’t notice that 200 000 litres of oil were slowly being drained.
After a short while, the transformers overheated and exploded. 17 out of
21 transformers at the substation were knocked out. One or two more
would have immediately put California in the dark. At this occasion, the
electricity company could quickly reroute power around the substation.
Silicon Valley continued to receive electricity but was asked to limit
its power consumption for that day. The damage took 27 days to be
repaired. As the FBI itself admitted; “It doesn't take a very high
degree of training or access to technology to carry out this attack.” If
several substations would be targeted during the same period, thus
preventing a rerouting, it would have been a different story.
On the subject of a “black-out”, engineers and officers warned against
the fragility of the grid in a recent special report in the Revue
Militaire Suisse (Issue 5, 2018). They developed several hypothetical
scenarios; their conclusions? Setting aside the cause of the breakdown
of the electrical grid, in broad strokes it goes like this: if the
black-out doesn’t last more than a day, restoration goes quickly. If it
lasts more than 48 hours, restoring the grid becomes less likely or even
impossible. All the instruments that control the networks are powered
themselves by electricity and only have an autonomy of 2 to 5 days. Once
they run out of battery, someone has to be dispatched to restart them at
the same time as the rest of the network. Thus external support is
necessary if the network is not restored after 5 days. In case the
black-out is only regional, emergency and repair teams can be dispatched
on site. If it is national or continental, the situation can last or
even be fatal for the whole grid.
Another example, this time from the digital world. On 10 March 2021, a
fire erupts in the data centre of OVH in Strasbourg. The private company
OVH has the biggest web hosting service of France. The fire allegedly
starts at the base of the building where the electrical supply
facilities are. That’s what the company points to as being the cause; an
inverter (changing the electrical frequency) would have caught fire.
This explanation sounds reasonable, except that according to reports of
employees and firefighters the fire spread extremely rapid. This could
indicate several points of origin. Everyone can speculate on the origins
of this fire, the authorities can communicate what suits them (it’s
after all the most important host of France, spearheading the data
centres) but a rather less “accidental” cause stays plausible. Moreover
because there are worldwide very few examples of data centres that
perish in flames due to a technical fault. That said, failure or
something else, the result is very “tangible” (our apologies for using
this obsolete term in this virtual world). Hundreds of thousands of
websites went offline, huge sets of data were lost for companies and
institutions. Like a mini-apocalypse in the cloud. It isn’t even
necessary to go into detail to be able to grasp the vulnerability of the
digital megamachine. A significant part depends on a single, physical
structure. This depends itself on an uninterrupted connection by fibre
optic cables and a constant supply of electricity (because the emergency
circuits cannot completely replace the grid).
Recent months have shown us many more examples of the vulnerability of
the digital networks. We can think of the cell towers and the
transmitters that cut off the communications of millions (as in the case
of the fire at the Marseille transmitter in December 2020 or the Limoges
one in January 2021), of the sabotage of fibre optic connections (as in
the attack in Crest in February), of the manual cuts or burning of fibre
optic cables (as in Pierrellat during the same month). Let’s bet that
the same vulnerability can be found in all networks, including the
electrical that feeds everything that exploits, destroys and controls.
For understanding to become incisive action, we certainly have to get
rid of the ghosts that haunt our spirits and understand, with all it
entails, that we’re in hostile territory and we have to act accordingly.
With joy in our bodies and liberty in our hearts.