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Title: Brexit means⊠what? Author: Aufheben Date: 2017 Language: en Topics: brexit, ideology Source: Retrieved on 3rd June 2021 from https://libcom.org/library/brexit-means%E2%80%A6-what-hapless-ideology-practical-consequences Notes: From Aufheben #24
We begin this article with a case dealt with by Brighton Solfed (SF) and
CASE Central social centre â the story of an EU migrant in Brighton.
At the end of 2015, L., a Spanish hospitality worker, sought help from
SF. She had worked in a restaurant for more than a year but, as soon as
she fell ill, her employer sacked her with a flimsy excuse, in order to
avoid paying Statutory Sick Pay (SSP). Receiving SSP would have been
this workerâs right under both domestic and European Union (EU)
legislation. However, the employer insisted that she left her job
voluntarily, and refused to re-employ her.
L. then claimed a sickness benefit, Employment and Support Allowance
(ESA). As an EU worker, she should have been entitled to equal rights
under EU legislation, and to ESA. However, the state refused the
benefit: they said that, due to a âgapâ between the end of her job and
her claim, she was no longer a âworkerâ when she claimed ESA. A benefits
advice group helped with an appeal, but the state refused to reconsider.
L. was in a desperate situation, with no money and far from her family,
and was tempted to move back to Spain. This would amount to economic
deportation â not imposed through physical force, but through extreme
hardship.
Back in the 1970s the UKâs membership of the European Common Market was
opposed by leftwing militants, as the Common Market was seen as a
neoliberal club designed to prevent the advance of socialism, or just
the implementation of Keynesian policies.
Yet the UK joined the EU. As a consequence of the Treaty of Maastricht
since the early 1990s one of the rules that the UK government had to
abide by was the âfree movement of labourâ. This principle obliged each
government to treat EU citizens equally as British citizens; both
workers, and, following EU Court rules, also those who entered the UK to
seek work, as long as they were âgenuine jobseekersâ. This included
giving them the rights to claim benefits and receive help with housing.
The best aspect of migration from the point of view of the individual
employer is the migrantsâ normally disadvantaged and vulnerable
position, which the imposition of equality tended to mitigate. Once
entitled to equal rights at work and to all benefits, EU migrants had
the option of refusing crap jobs. They had also the same incentive as
their British workmates to fight for better pay and working conditions
in their workplaces, side by side.
Thus since day one, the righwing press relentlessly attacked the
principle of equality underlying freedom of movement in the EU,
depicting them as âbenefit touristsâ. Sensitive to this pressure, the
Conservative government made a series of efforts to deny equal rights to
EU migrants, above all the unemployed. A âhabitual residence testâ in
the UK in order to claim many out of work benefits.[1] What this
âhabitual residenceâ meant was so vague that it was equally as easy for
the state to immediately reject a claim, as it was for claimants to
eventually win their appeals. A lengthy appeal procedure would however
prolong the wait for a hearing for months, and would oblige migrants,
through destitution, to return to their country. Only those who received
help from friends or organisations (e.g. churches, political groups,
squats), or had some savings, could persevere to the hearing.
The âhabitual residence testâ was the first challenge from the British
government against the Freedom of Movement, and was introduced with
caution and great reverence towards the newly born principle of
equality. Not to contradict this principle, the state felt obliged to
impose the test to anyone coming from abroad, including British
citizens.
In 2006, after part of Eastern Europe was allowed to âaccessâ the EU,
the government restricted the âhabitual residenceâ rules. This was
paradoxically done by exploiting a new EU law, Directive 2004/38/EC,
which had been created to clarify and strengthen the rights of EU
citizens. As the directive produced a list of âqualified personsâ who
had automatic right to residence, the government used this list to
exclude from equal treatment many thousand EU citizens who had so far
been treated equally under the âhabitual residence testâ, if they did
not match the list. For example, âWorkersâ and âSelf Employedâ had a
right to reside, but ill people who had not worked much or at all,
carers or single mothers who were not in work were excluded. A Right of
Residence test based on the directive became a prerequisite for many out
of work benefits.[2]
This new test was the UK governmentâs first challenge to the principle
of equality, as British citizens who had lived abroad were automatically
exempted from it. In May 2013 the EU Commission took this challenge to
court, but failed: the inequality of treatment of EU citizens was
approved by an EU court as âjustifiedâ by the interests of the member
state.
Since the introduction of the right of residence test in 2006, workers
who became ill, such as L. could have their claim for sickness benefit
simply denied, with any flimsy excuse, or even with no reasons at all.
Isolated and ill, they were put in the position of having to âproveâ
their Right of Residence and, to do so, wait up to nine months for a
tribunal hearing on no income.
Not happy with this, the nationalist anti-migrant lobbies continued to
pressurise the government. In 2015 unemployed migrants were stripped of
unemployment benefit (Job Seekerâs Allowance (JSA)). Following a
re-interpretation of the directive and case law that protected the right
to reside of unemployed EU citizens as long as they had âgenuine chances
of finding workâ, the state subjected EU citizens to a âGenuine Prospect
of Work Testâ. This test was as abhorrent as the trial of witches by
ducking stool: all unemployed EU citizens would lose their JSA after a
fixed 6 month period after their last job unless they got a new job
within this period. Failing this they would lose all rights of
residence, including the right to Housing Benefit and could be made
homeless. The statistical concept of âprospectâ, was then redefined as a
limitation to all benefits to a strict period of 3â6 months. At the same
time, all those who lost their status as workers were denied Housing
Benefit altogether.[3]
Still unhappy about this, and threatening to leave the EU, last year the
Tory government went for the whole hog and obtained an opt out from
paying all in-work or out-of-work benefits to all EU migrants for their
first 4 years in the UK.
Recently, the EU migrants have also started being deported, under the
allegation of not having, or âabusingâ, a Right of Residence. A pilot
scheme that begain in 2011 with the deportation of homeless and jobless
East European citizens has now been extended to all EU nationals.[4]
Activist groups such as Solfed and Brighton Benefits Campaign obviously
oppose all this. Yet when the means to tackle injustice is based on
collective solidarity there is a limit to what one can do. L. could not
get financial support from a group composed of people like herself, who
struggled to pay bills and rent. Also, direct action was precluded by
the remoteness of the decision making. Where to protest, and what office
to picket, if the decisions regarding L. were taken in Belfast and
revised in Inverness? Perhaps in better times, a network of protestors
could act nationally and reach remote offices, but at present there was
no hope to resolve L.âs problem through direct action.
In the absence of a self-sustaining alternative community, or a mass
benefits campaign, demanding that the state abide by EU law was the only
option; and after a few nasty letters from CASE, the state acknowledged
Lâs rights and paid her ESA.[5]
Of course, the laws and institutions do not act for us; we still need to
act, and even simply invoking the laws can be a mini war against the
state. CASE volunteers are now used to receiving phone calls from
government officers who try to convince them that this or that piece of
EU legislation do not mean what they say, or that there are other new
mysterious âlawsâ that contradict it. Any weak response at this stage
would encourage these bureaucrats to issue an unfavourable decision. It
is clear that the government has given guidance to its officers to deny
EU rights at all costs. This attempt to make EU laws ineffective for
benefits claimants is the frustrating experience of many benefits
advisers across the country.
Thus when, on 23 June 2016, Brexit won the plebiscite, both migrants and
those who had been involved in defending migrantsâ rights felt alarmed.
Brexit will set aside all EU rights, with no guarantee of any automatic
rights. If the same visa system that applies for non-EU migrants is
applied to current EU workers living in the UK, 9 out of 10 would no
qualify.[6] Crucially, the abolition of the rights emanating from EU
laws is not the result of our success in establishing more radical
options, but the success of nationalist lobbies.
In the following we will discuss the position of people in the radical
left, such as the political groups (SWP, etc.) or individual Bennites,
on Brexit. But before, let us ask ourselves the question: what has the
radical left done during the previous decades of attacks on EU migrants?
What did these people do while EU migrants were made penniless by the
gruelling General Prospect Tests? What have they done when workers like
L. were denied all their rights as soon as they fell ill? The answer is:
nothing. In fact, most of the groups and individuals in âthe leftâ have
never even bothered to know about these issues.
Of course, the non-EU refugees escaping from war, especially those from
Syria, have deserved a lot of interest and action. However, as we will
show later, many people in the left have been very busy with other, more
ideological, issues, such as the burkini ban in France. Similar issues
seem to deserve more enthusiasm, time and efforts than the sorts of EU
citizens reduced to homelessness and desperation. And even than the
xenophobic murder of a Polish citizen in the summer of 2016.
It was clear since the beginning that the referendum about the EU was
not about the EU as an institution at all. Previous opinion polls had
repeatedly shown that EU matters were at the bottom of a scale of
concerns for most Britons. The referendum was, in reality, the product
of an internal infight within the Conservative Party.
As David Cameron once put it, the only people that insisted on âbanging
on about Europeâ were the ânuttersâ in the United Kingdom Independence
Party (UKIP), old diehard Thatcherite Tory Party activists and a few
dozen backbench Tory MPs, cheered on by the right wing press. But
Cameronâs project of rebranding the Conservative Party as an electable,
modern, socially liberal party depended on keeping these diehard social
conservatives in the Tory Party quiet. To placate them Cameron had
repeatedly thrown them the odd euro-sceptic bone to chew on. But the
more bones he threw the hungrier they became.
Finally, encouraged by the bad publicity caused by the EUâs handling of
the Euro crisis, the Tory right became so vociferous that Cameron was
obliged to promise a referendum on Britainâs membership of the EU at
some time in the future. It was not possible right then, of course,
because his coalition LibDem partners would not go along with his
referendum plans. But this commitment was included in the Conservative
Party manifesto for the 2015 elections.
At the time this seemed quite a clever move, since it was widely
expected that there would be another hung Parliament, and any
Conservative-led Government would have to share power again with the
LibDems. Cameron would therefore be able to blame Nick Clegg for any
failure to deliver on his pledge to hold a referendum. But unfortunately
for him, the Conservatives won the election, but with a small majority.
Cameron then risked the fate of John Major in 1990s, who spent much of
his second term as Prime Minister being dogged by repreated Euro-sceptic
rebellions threatening to bring down his government.
Thus the best option was to press on with plans for a referendum. With
all three mainstream parties expected to support Remain, Brexit would be
fronted by a motley collection of minor Tory backbenchers, and by Nigel
Farage and various other UKIP ânuttersâ. Although a tiresome Referendum
would waste the governmentâs time and effort, a resounding Remain vote
would at least stop âthem banging on about Europeâ once and for all.
But Cameron made a mistake that would bring about his ignominious
political demise: he let it be known that he was considering standing
down as Prime Minister after his second term. The heir apparent, George
Osborne, was entrusted to lead the Remain campaign. Osborneâs rivals
then faced a dilemma: either support Remain or jump ship and support
Brexit, in the hope that this would win favour amongst Tory activists,
which could prove crucial in stopping Osborneâs coronation as party
leader.
Shortly before the official Referendum campaign was due to start, Boris
Johnson and Michael Gove took the plunge. Opinion polls had growing
support for Brexit and they could that a good showing for the Leave
campaign, with them at the helm, would oblige Cameron to be magnanimous
in victory. After all Cameron had suspended party discipline and
collective responsibility for the referendum. So these pro-immigration,
neoliberal internationalists made an unholy alliance with the xenophobic
little Englanders of UKIP.
On the morning of the 24 June, no one was more shocked than Johnson and
Gove.[7] It was apparent that they had expected that Remain would win,
and had no concrete plan for a Brexit â yet Johnson was appointed by new
PM Theresa May as one of the Brexit ministers, with the task of leading
the actual thing.
UKIP and its leader, Nigel Farage, were the ideological winners of
Brexit. They were able to use a populist, nationalist,
anti-establishment message which united a large number of people from
different classes: from middle class Tory voters in the south of
England, who contributed to the majority of Brexit votes, to working
class people in industrial cities of the north, disillusioned with
social democracy. In the eyes of everybody, from immigration experts to
MPs, it was clear that the campaign for Brexit boiled down to a campaign
against the Freedom of Movement. This emerged as the only consisent
message, amidst a mish-mash of half-baked issues, such as a ÂŁ350m per
week of EU fees that should rather go to the NHS or the imposition of
straight bananas by Brussels.
Part of the left and the Green Party, Trotskyist Socialist Appeal and
the Left Unity party campaigned against Brexit. Probably the age
composition of Socialist Appeal, popular among university students,
played a major role in its pro-Remain position.
But for others it was a dilemma. On the one hand Cameron and a large
part of the bourgeoisie supported Remain: the capitalist market depended
on stability and would be vulnerable in the massive economic change
created by leaving the single market. On the other hand, the Brexit
campaign had an appealing, populist, anti-establishment,
pro-working-class message. And, of course, the EU was part of the
capitalist systemâŠ
For all these reasons, supporting Remain could have come across as
supporting global capital against the British working class, and
supporting Cameron. All this could taint a leftwing soul. Assuming that
Remain would win, one can then hold a principled stand against the EU
thinking that this would have no real consequences.
For many leftists, used to decades of simplistic political common sense,
arguments that raised complex issues, such as the political meaning of a
victory for the Brexit campaign, were perhaps too difficult to take in.
Instead of struggling with the political and moral complications of the
present, it was thus easier to dust off the Eurosceptic reasons of the
70s, when the left opposed the Common Market, and to follow the ghostly
authority of Tony Benn.[8]
Yet also claiming to support âBrexitâ would taint a leftwing soul. To
get out of the dilemma, they just renamed the same thing⊠âLexitâ (i.e.
âexit from the Leftâ). Problem solved. The Lexiteersâ arguments were
packaged as ready-made slogans loaded with good left-wing values.
Questions regarding the EU protection of workersâ rights or the
environment, or migrantsâ rights, were confronted with banal answers,
such as âitâs all scaremongeringâ, âwhat about the TTIPâ, or âthe EU is
bureaucraticâ (sic). More pathetic, some Trots voted leave to support
Johnsonâs attempt to destabilise Cameron. While these people were
blinkered by ideology, the fact that Brexit would, in concrete, be a
victory for the far right was meanwhile clear to the far right across
Europe and the USA, and to Donald Trump, who all celebrated the victory
of Brexit.
Momentum, the movement which arose in support of Labour party leader
Jeremy Corbyn, and the Labour party itself, officially campaigned for
Remain. By age and affiliation, Corbyn could well have been a follower
of Eurosceptic Benn, but led the campaign â but, only two weeks before
the vote, nearly a third of Labour party members were still in the dark
about the position of their own party! But many of Corbynâs supporters
did not worry about Brexit. With Jeremy leading the opposition, and the
fantastic prospect of him leading the country, the UK could soon have
new good laws, protecting workers, migrants and the environment. Who
needs the EU?[9]
Yet a prerequisite to lead a country is that to have clear positions;
and Corbynâs positions equivocated. Interestingly, as soon as Brexit
won, âRemainerâ Corbyn stated that:
âIt was communities, often in former industrial heartleands, that had
tended to vote for BrexitâŠâ[10]
Respecting these âcommunitiesâ, Corbyn was happy to say that Parliament
should accept that Brexit would happen and âwork with itâ.[11]
On the sorts of EU migrants, Corbyn and his allies equivocated too.
Worryingly, not a comment was said on the status of the EU citizens
currently living in the UK, threatened by Theresa May. For Corbyn what
mattered was the protection of the British workersâ rights in Britain:
âThe red lines have to be: access to the European market, European
Investment Bank, protection of maternity leave, paternity leave, minimum
wage legislation. There has to be protection for people against
workplace discrimination. Those issues to me are absolutely crucialâ[12]
The rights of EU migrants to equal treatment could well slip through
Corbynâs âred linesâ. This is part of an ideology that conflates the
Freedom of Movement, a specific principle, with the general issues of
border controls and âanti-racismâ; and in turn conflates EU migrants
with refugees.[13] This conflation can well unite leftwing Remainers and
Brexiteers, by sacrificing, and forgetting about, EU migrants and their
rights.[14]
On his part, the Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, John McDonnell,
repeated that the free movement of labour would end with Brexit and that
Labour would âconsult the British peopleâ (sic) on the issue of future
migration.[15] More enlightening, Corbyn replied to a question about the
need for an upper migration limit with the following, unquestionable,
statement:
âI donât think you can have one while you have the free movement of
labourâ (sic)âŠâ[16]
a truism which even the Telegraph agreed with.[17]
At the end of September, Corbynâs refusal to make promises on migration
control under a future Labour government was generously interpreted as a
combative defence of freedom of movement by leftwing media.[18] In the
face of this devoted trust, probably Corbyn and his allies have not
clarified even to themselves what migration policy can be reasonably
envisaged in the context of leaving the EU, an action that they have
supported.
In the anarchist scene too, the referendum challenged radical purity.
Anarchist issues are normally founded on a clear-cut moral stand, where
what is bad is unquestionably bad and only needs action. As long as
issues are chosen to fit moral categories, it is all indisputable:
freedom and self determination is good, state control is bad, sexism and
patriarchy are bad, animal cruelty is bad, racism and fascism are bad.
But Brexit was a problem. On the one hand, the Brexit campaign was a
nationalist and xenophobic campaign, which could comfortably fit the
category of âfascismâ. On the other hand, the Remain campaign was
supported by Tories, politicians and experts who were part of the
establishment, and the EU is an institution embedded in global
capitalism, and controlled by bankers and international lobbies. This
many simply sat on the fence, seeing the vote as an option between two
bad authorities (the UK and the EU). A few even supported Lexit.
As a result of these moral dilemmas the campaign for Remain was left to
liberals and important reasons for opposing Brexit were not highlighted
from a radical standpoint.
In his essays on class consciousness in capitalism, Georg Lukacs said
that while past social relations were mystified by religious or other
ideological constructions, in capitalism we can clearly see economic
relations as driving society, and due to this clarity it is now possible
to transform society through a conscious movement against exploitation.
Yet, he also saw that our relations create their own mystification,
which can affect the proletariat itself; for this reason, he concluded,
a clear consciousness is only embodied by âthe partyâ.
It is indeed true that consciousness is shaped by capitalist societyâŠ
but is it true that a Leninist party or an elite of radical
intellectuals see better than the riff-raff?
It is a matter of fact that every social class system develops its
special mystification. It is easy for us to see and criticise, for
example, the religious beliefs that expressed and veiled at the same
time feudal class relations, but it is incredibly difficult to
disentangle the exploitation and unfairness of capitalism from its veils
of liberal glitter. The problem is that this is difficult for Leninist
or a radical campaigner too. In this section we will show that the
demoralising ineffectiveness of the left in front of the Brexit campaign
was rooted in the mystification of capitalism: commodity fetishism.
Commodity fetishism is an inversion of reality, where a relation among
humans appears as a relation between commodities and money. In this
inversion, capital or âthe economyâ becomes the real protagonist of
history, and dictates its needs and its rules to people â needs and
rules that are more compelling than our individual needs or desires. Our
bullying, misery and exploitation then appear as caused by objective,
almost ânaturalâ forces, not by people. The fact that our relations are
transformed into an objective âthingâ, separate from any individuals,
was called by Lukacs reification. At the same time, individuals relate
to each other as free and equal buyers and sellers â only the money we
have in our pocket dictates what we can eat, study, hope and be, and if
we need to get a job⊠and there are people who can hope and be whatever
they want, others who canât hope anything at all. Reification mystifies
the fact that we live in an unequal society, where a class of people
control all the means of production and another class of people have to
work for them day in, day out.
Reification shapes all aspects of social life. Political, economic,
cultural spheres appear too, to have a life on their own, dictating
their âobjectiveâ rules to people. The state and its laws are
objectifications too. These structures are not an illusion, but a
reality: for example, in order to make a political career one needs to
play along with the rules of electoral democracy, and navigate the
structures of unions, parties and states. Simply telling ourseleves that
these structures are âa social constructionâ or an âillusionâ wonât help
â the need remains, for making a political career, to accept them as
real and play along with them.
In this inverted relation, otherwise free and equal individuals,
ârelateâ to the state, by voting or being elected in it, and by abiding
by or opposing its laws. But even being critical of the state, however
clever our criticism is, will not abolish the state and its laws,
because they are based on actual relations among people.
Yet, we can defy this âsolidityâ, and we do it through class
struggle.[19] When workers, tenants, claimants, etc., are involved in a
struggle connected to their needs, the focus can shift from things like
money, laws, economy, to our concrete situation and experience. The
stronger we are, the more cheeky questions we ask, shaking the solidity
of capitalist constructions: âfuck the legal contract, why should we be
treated this way and paid so little?â, âfuck the Human Right to private
property, why canât I use this empty flat?â, âthere is no money my arse,
why can my bosses go on holiday to Bali?â⊠The mystification is then
unveiled and during the struggle our relations reveal themselves as what
they are: a balance of forces between people (or better, people âlike
usâ and people âlike themâ: classes).
When past struggles ended, capital re-solidified. A law forbidding
farmers to use some pesticides, or a law protecting pregnant women at
work, expresses our victory, and the redefinition of a balance of
forces, but they appear again as things: new legal rights, which
apparently emanate from something alien: a state. Those laws still
reflect our victory, and, however weak we have become, we can still use
them for our protection in our ongoing daily struggles with bosses or
the government.
However, this âsolidityâ is also challenged by the ruling class. As soon
as our capacity to fight back has shrunk, the ruling class will try to
redefine new âobjectiveâ conditions, changing the laws. The fact that
this happens through the objective realm of the state and its laws can
paralyse our radical mind. After all, a law that protects pregnant
workers or wildlife comes from the state. So why should we defend this
law when the government wants to change it? Thus when various
governments enacted attack after attack: benefit cuts, the abolition of
security of tenure, the abolition of legal aid, the privatisation of
public spaces⊠all this happened in the impotent silence of many radical
people. To be fair, we can see the material weakness of the class behind
this silence, but these unchallenged attacks have led to our increasing
weakness and impotence.
The latest attack was the campaign for Brexit. It was UKIPâs clear
intention to get rid of EU laws that impose equality at work, maternity
and paternity pay, disability rights and holiday pay; as well as laws
restricting the freedom for capitalists to pollute air, land and sea.
The fact that Brexit is the objectification of our defeat is also
apparent from the dynamics of the campaign itself. While our challenge
to capitalism involves the cheeky suspension of the âsolidâ appearance
of bourgeois structures of power, Brexit has emerged through state
institutions. It used a referendum organised through the state,
confirming the objectivity of the political sphere and of bourgeois
democracy. Also, the result of the referendum immediately appeared as a
legal mandate for the state: a âthingâ, more solid than any real people.
The migrants whose lives may be wrecked by Brexit do not count, the
democratic mandate does. The voters who ârepentedâ do not count, the
democratic mandate is more real than them. Any concrete objections do
not count. Remarkably, the relation between this âdemocratic mandateâ
and real individuals is the same as that between the state and âpeopleâ.
As the Brexit campaign played with, and reinforced, the reification of
the political sphere, the âleftâ and many radical people were caught by
the same mystification.
The retreat of the anti-cuts movement, which petered out in 2012,
following the defeat of the public pension dispute, encouraged an
ideological counter-attack from the far right, which culminated with
Brexit. Meanwhile, class struggle was substituted by its weirdest
reified surrogate in the history of the British left.[20]
Just a few months before the EU referendum, Labour party back-bencher
Jeremy Corbyn was propelled into leadership through an online vote of
leftwing supporters. All eyes and hopes then focused on this newly
elected leader and his heroic navigation through the structures of the
party and the state, and a new group, Momentum, was created to support
him. An institutional power game appeared to do the magic of advancing
the left into prominence: a success that real people had been unable to
achieve through industrial disputes and a mass movement during the
anti-cuts campaign.
In the past, the power of socialist governments or politicians had
normally emerged from the settlement of some class struggle or mass
movement into institutional shapes â the Corbyn effect appeared to have
inverted this dynamic, with an electoral victory within bourgeois
institutions leading to a movement pivoting around the electoral victory
after the actual defeat of a class struggle.
If all the leftwing eyes and hopes focused on the reified structures of
capitalist power, it is not surprising that the Trots who voted for
Brexit had no time for its consequences on migrants and workers. Whatâs
the point of considering real people, when people are eclipsed behind
the glitter of reification?
Also many radicals were caught by the same reification. If itâs all
about âusâ and solid, abstract, authorities over there, a radical
position would be to oppose both the state and the EU or even vote
against the EU, because it is a form of state. Again, any appeal for
solidarity from the real individuals threatened by Brexit was dismissed.
In the next sections, we will see how the victory for Brexit would
reinforce capitalism by dividing the working class, and that those who
are involved in however small struggles around, can see this.
Contradictions of Capitalism
Since its beginnings, capitalism has been faced by moral criticism based
on ideal positions â money is bad, the bourgeois state is bad, the
police are bad, poverty is bad, industrialization is badâŠ[21] Yet a
moralistic challenge will not destroy capital; for example, good-hearted
Christian criticism has never challenged it, but also abstract radical
moralism can be as ineffective.
The applies also to the issues of the EU. There are plenty of
moral/radical judgements that are abstractly true â the EU is a
capitalist institution; it does reflect the interests of capitalists; it
is embedded in a global economy, etc. Yet knowing and proclaiming all
this will not liberate us from capitalism or from the global economy â
let alone asking a Tory government to lead us out of the EU! Instead,
the practical actions of people who take advantage of the present,
including the EU, can be a good start.
One of these contradictions is the Freedom of Movement. It is true that
European capital uses migration to divert competition in the labour
market towards areas where labour is in demand. The unemployed
individual who is forced by his countryâs economy to move abroad for
jobs is in this sense a pawn in a machine intended to make production
efficient. Yet, at closer inspection, all the unemployed and workers who
are forced to compete against each other for jobs or careers are pawns
of the same machine, and the British workers who feel forced by these
same laws to antagonise with migrants are the best pawns of all, as this
division effectively defuses our potential for rebellion.
In fact our rebellion against capital must first of all challenge our
division along national lines, as well as along other lines such as
gender or race. In light of this, in this section we discuss the success
of a collaboration among activists from all parts of Europe and how
these protesters took advantage of the Freedom of Movement, turning it
into a motorway for solidarity and direct action.
In May 2016 social centre CASE Central gave its minibus to a group of
people from Brighton and London, composed of British and EU citizens, to
attend an international protest against a huge opencast coal mine in
Lusatia, Germany.[22] Air pollution and carbon emission is an
international issue and it is important that protests are international
â a national protest would have attracted far less people and would have
been seen as a local issue.
The participation from Brighton and London was made possible because of
the Freedom of Movement. The minibus could be driven by both a British
and a German, it crossed the English Channel, travelled through Belgium
and France, arrived in Germany, and came back. No problems with borders,
no problems with traffic wardens, no problems with the insurance: all
this because we are in the EU. The EU legislation on freedom of movement
was turned on its head to become our freedom to challenge capital around
Europe.[23]
This freedom has been already exploited by many European movements,
allowing, for example, the creation of a large European LGBT, and
allowing people to travel to France and Greece in solidarity with
workers on strike. Other examples of such international networking are
the international anti-fascist self-defence gatherings that have taken
place around Europe, last time in Poland, and which will continue in
spring 2017 with a gathering in Brighton.
It is true that people could travel around to protests before the EU
opened its borders, and that wealthy radical students can travel to
Seattle or Brazil for anti-capitalist gatherings. But the Freedom of
Movement has made connections much cheaper and accessible: just grab a
minibus and go! Together with making our connections easier, the Freedom
of Movement has created the conditions to abolish our mental divisions:
by developing concrete solidarity across borders and nationalities
against the common enemy. This is more than clear to the far right, who
would be happy to see environmental, anti-fascist and LGBT activism set
back in Europe.
Weapon of Capitalism
The Freedom of Movement is a contradiction of capitalism also in another
respect: our potential to establish solidarity in our workplaces.
We need to clarify that the Freedom of Movement of labour is not justâŠ
freedom of movement, i.e. âallowing free accessâ to migrants: it is
also, and fundamentally, a set of rules that obliges each member state
to treat all EU workers and self employed equally. Understanding this is
fundamental: without the Freedom of Movement, all EU migrants would be
desperate for any crap job, and their struggle to survive would work
more efficiently in undermining all wages and working conditions. The
principle of the Freedom of Movement were agreed to avoid the most
extreme effects of migration.
Brexit will not stop migration, whether legal or illegal. In fact the
leader of the House of Commons at the time), Chris Grayling, suggested
that EU migrants entering the UK from the Republic of Ireland would not
need a visa, but could simply be denied a National Insurance number. It
is clear that the ruling class is not interested in stopping the
movement of EU workers to the UK, but to undermine their rights and
divide them from national workers.
The separation of workers into âlegalâ and âillegalâ is already an
instrument of division which has a significanat impact on solidarity in
workplaces. In order to see how subtly this works, we will now mention a
workplace issue, which involved foreign workers.
The scenario in this case was a small food outlet run as a family
business. The owner ran the outlet with patriarchal authority, creating
a system of personal favours, hiring illegal migrants and paying them
under the counter and below the minimum wage. This created a bond
between employer and employees, based on gratitude for the favours, and
perhaps also a shared feeling of solidarity against the state, as both
the petty bourgeois employer and their employees dodged the law. Yet all
this also consolidated a very exploitative relationship, where lack of
rights made the illegal workers subject to the whims of their employer.
At the same time this situation also divided illegal and legal workers.
The employees from the EU had rights, guaranteed by the Freedom of
Movement. This meant that their entitlements did not depend on the
employerâs patriarchal good heart at all and that they could then see
themselves in antagonism with the capital that hired them. Yet, with
such a divided workforce, solidarity was impossible. In fact, the case
started when a worker from the EU fell out with an illegal workmate: the
illegal workmate stuck to the employer, and grassed the other up for
minor issues, obtaining an unfair dismissal. After a brief dispute, the
leaving worker obtained holiday pay, yet she did not, and could not,
receive support from within her workplace.
We need to add that not just âillegalâ workers, also non-EU migrants who
are granted a visa through their employers will be at their mercy, as
they can have their work permit withdrawn at the employerâs whim.
Currently, all workers from the EU are treated equally as British
workers and their status does not depend on the will of their employers.
For this reason, their loyalty can then develop along clear class lines.
For example, we know about Eastern European health and social care
workers who tried to initiate a workplace struggle in a a care home,
involving their British colleagues. By depriving EU migrants of their
rights, Brexit will undermine this potential.
Besides our solidarity against the employers, Brexit will undermine our
solidarity against the state. Currently, Polish, Italian, and German
citizens are not uncommon in protests such as anti-fascist demos or
direct actions in the UK. Less common are people from outside the EU.
This is not because of a lack of political awareness (in fact, for
example, many Iranian refugees were leftwing activists in their country)
but because of a condition of vulnerability, as non-EU migrants depend
on leaves issued by the national state. Unlike them, EU citizens feel
that they can happily antagonise the state and risk arrest, without
fearing repercussions, precisely because their right to stay is an
âauraâ that derives from EU laws and not the state.
It is true that the British government has worked hard to undermine this
aura. Following an appeal from the UK government, in January 2014, an EU
court decided that prison terms can seriously disrupt EU rights of
residence.[24] Yet, most EU citizens are still protected, and feel safe
in rebellious events, side by side with their British mates. These
rights, however, can be wiped out by Brexit. The intention is there:
Home Secretary Amber Rudd has just announced at the Conservative Party
Conference in Birmingham that even before Brexit the new government will
push to deport EU citizens found guilty of repeated minor offences.[25]
Brexit will be the victory of a system which uses borders and illegality
as a weapon to divide and weaken us. But the Lexiteers are still proud
of this. After all, their anti-racist beliefs will shine unspoiled under
the new conditions, which they have voted to have â and why not, with
migrants under threat and the far right empowered, being an anti-racist
will be even more exciting! This is, again, ineffective ideology. Our
belief that âsolidarity has no bordersâ does not stand on abstract
truths written once and for all by the Marxs and Bakunins and preserved
in formalin, but on what we are going to lose: the concrete practice of
struggle side by side.
In fact, perhaps we should not expect any exciting leftwing actions in
defence of EU citizens at all. It is indeed instructive to compare the
reaction to the banning of the Islamic âburkiniâ garment in France and
the xenophobic murder of a Polish migrant in Harlow, which both hapened
in the late summer of 2016. The search engine reveals the following
posts/entries between August and 1 October 2016 (picture below).
Significantly, the Facebook group âEU leave and remain voters united
against racism and prejudiceâ had in the same period no posts at all on
the assault in Harlow or on the vigil that followed it, which would be
expected from a group with such a name! In terms of action, while we
would expect at least a mini demo in Brighton after a murder, there was
none, while the burkini ban had a beach demo on 27 August, as well as an
emergency demo in London on 26 August.
If this happened after a murder, we wonder what level of action we are
going to see when thousands of EU citizens lose their rights. It is more
realistic to think that the left will be too busy with other, more
ideologically uncontroversial, issues.[26]
Also the loss of EU directives that protect workersâ rights (minimum
wage, pregnancy and sickness rights etc.) is not a step out of global
capitalism at all, especially in a situation, like the UK, of very low
class militancy.
Like all laws and rights, EU rights are the result of a class
settlement, but in this case the settlement has congealed the outcomes
of struggles which have taken place in Europe. While the working class
in the UK has quietly accepted to work harder on zero hour contracts
after the financial crisis, other countries still face resistance from
their working class. Although one may simplistically expect that an
institution of the ruling class should automatically be against workersâ
rights, it is in the interest of capitalism that standards achieved in
other countries, for example France or Germany, are imposed throughout
the EU in order too protect national capitals against unfair compeition.
Thus EU directives impose, at least formally, minimum standards on
British employers.
For a few years already UKIP had campaigned against rights at work,
especially those imposed by EU directives, and their Brexit campaign was
consistent with this. Attacking the EU and its âred tapeâ meant to
attack the laws that regulated work as well as the use of pesticides,
gas emissions, animal welfare, etc.
When the British people voted for Brexit, they were not told what Brexit
meant â but this question became relevant only after the vote was made.
Crucially, the question âwhat does Brexit mean for the working class?â
was not spelt out during the campaign. But something is now taking
shape, with May blatantly pushing for very rightwing changes, for
example the re-introduction of grammar schools.
The alliance of UKIP and Johnson was a winning combination. Johnson had
been pro-EU for years, even demanding that Turkey be admitted to the EU
âto reconstruct the Roman Empireâ. For the neoliberal Johnson, Brexit
means to fully expose the UK to global capitalism. More than an
opportunity, this will be a need: if the UK leaves the EU, it will be
desperate for any trade deals, and will have to negotiate these deals
with large powers and aggressive multinational corporations as a country
on its own. China is well aware of this weakness: in the aftermath of
the referendum, May was told that a refusal to go ahead with the
controversial nuclear power station at Hinkley Point would jeopardise
any future trade deals with China. A similar blackmail of the EU would
have been impossible, but the UK needs to trade with China, while China
does not need to trade with a small island.
Although UKIPâs nationalism would superficially appear to be at the
nadir of Johnsonâs globalism, the conjunction of âstarsâ Farage and
Johnson makes sense if we see Brexit, simply, as a victory of the ruling
class. If UK industry is open to global competition, as Johnson is happy
to prospect, national industry will have to adopt a new ethos of
production of the sake of international compeititon. Already in
September 2016, Brexiteer Trade minister Liam Fox said at a Conservative
âWay Forwardâ event for business leaders:
âWeâve got to change the culture in our country. People have to stop
thinking about exporting as an opportunity and start thinking about it
as a dutyâŠâ[27]
And a new ethos of work and money discipline will have to be re-imposed
after decades of âlazinessâ:
âThis country is not the free-trading nation that it once was. We have
become too lazy, and too fat on our successes in previous
generations.â[28]
What appeared to be a reproach to âlazyâ chief executives, was in fact
an appeal to make British production more efficient â after all,
efficiency of production does not depend on whether its directors play
golf, but on their capacity to squeeze their workers. In order to
survive, British industry will have to streamline production to the
standards of Jakarta, or Bangladesh â this means first of all to reduce
the costs of labour as well as environmental costs, degrading the
treatment of workers, animals, land, water and air. Thus the protection
of workers imposed by the EU, however flimsy and difficult to enforce,
will have to go, as Farage was happy to prospect.
The smaller domestic industry and petty bourgeois businesses will be
under threat from global capital, but there will be lots of illegal
migrants from the EU to squeeze.
So, all the pieces of this the Brexit puzzle fit together, suggesting
one meaning: Brexit means UKIP. The British capitalists who have been
reluctant to face dramatic changes may accept the new challenge and its
potential for extreme exploitation of the working class. All this, in
the silence and acquiescence of many British workers who think that
Brexit is a fantastic pro-working-class achievement, and in the silence
and acquiescence of a politically obtuse radical left.
In this article we have argued that the Brexit victory reflected a
victory of the far right. We have also seen that many people in the
radical left have been blinded by the ideological forms of our social
relations to the point of accepting this victory with acquiescence, or
even supporting it.
A question remains: since the mystification of capitalism acts upon
anyone, why are we able to criticise them? Have we read the right books?
Or are we more clever? Not at all. We can criticise them because we have
been involved in campaigns and direct action, supporting migrants and
casual workers in their benefits and workplace disputes. Unlike some
left wing or âpoliticalâ people who can only see the world from a secure
job and a secure home, those who have a direct experience of class
struggle for their survival are more likely to perceive the direct
relations of bullying and exploitation behind the forms of bourgeois
power â even if they have never read Marx! From this perspective, Brexit
is not an abstract issue of âglobalisationâ, or âbureaucracyâ or any
other clever, politically educated issues: it is simply, and obviously,
the ruling classâs concrete attempt to undermine our solidarity in the
workplace and in the streets.[29]
From this point of view, supporting a movement to defetishise the
âdemocraticâ results of the referendum and sabotage the Brexiteersâ
plans would make sense.
[1] The test applied to âmeans-testedâ benefits. Benefits acquired
through paying National Insurance contributions were not subject to
residence conditions.
[2] The government would also try to refuse benefits to those who had
worked, arguing that their job was not âgenuine and effectiveâ or that
they had not worked long enough, causing endless legal controversies.
[3] The only EU jobless still protected by the directive are those who
had lived in the UK for five years âlegallyâ, and, have then acquired a
permanent right of residence. âLegallyâ means: with a right of
residence.
[4] Non-EU migrants have been subject to a harsh visa scheme allowing
only those with jobs earning more than ÂŁ28,000 per year, which was
increased by Theresa May to ÂŁ35,000 from April 2016, to remain. Being
married to a British citizen would not help: husbands or wives of
British citizens are deported, and families destroyed.
[5] In âThe renewed imposition of work in the era of austerityâ,
Aufheben 19 (2011), we described the resurgence of new benefits
struggles after the financial crisis, and expected that these struggles
could grow. We were a bit too optimistic. The whole of the anti-cuts
movement, including claimant struggles, failed to take off.
[6]
[7] A journalist described Gove on the morning of the 24 June as
âsomeone who comes down from an acid trip and discovers theyâve killed
their best friendâ!
[8] The issue of the Common Market had the same contradictions as today
â indeed, leftwing Tony Benn campaigned against it alongside extreme
rightwing Tory Enoch Powell.
[9] It is not clear how many Corbyn supporters were âneutralâ on Brexit;
some polls show that most Momentum supporters (>60%) were pro-Remain;
the new people joining Labour through âthe Corbyn effectâ appear to be a
mixture of old left types coming back to Labour (and so anti-EU) and
other people who were new to politics; these latter have no prior
commitment to anti-EU Bennism and many see the EU as progressive.
[10] âJeremy Corbyn pledges to change Labourâs policy on immigration
after Brexit voteâ
The Independent, Saturday 25 June 2016,
. As we explained several times in Aufheben, this romantic idea of
âcommunitiesâ is just ideological. In fact most of those who voted to
leave were just individual tabloid or Telegraph readers.
[11] âJeremy Corbyn: Brexit is happening and Parliament must accept itâ,
The Independent, 19 September 2016,
[12] Ibid.
[13] Which is a mirror image of the ideology of the far right, as this
conflation was used during the Brexit campaign.
[14] Facing the attack from the new government on EU migrants, a
Socialist Workers Party hack stated at a public meeting that the
solution to the post-referendum racism was that to have lots of
demonstrations against⊠the EDL. This only shows how far these
ideologues are from reality.
[15] âJohn McDonnell: Brexit will end free movement of peopleâ, The
Guardian, 1 July 2016,
and BBC News, 19 June 2016, op. cit.
[16] âJeremy Corbyn says EU free movement means no immigration limitâ,
BBC News, 19 June 2016,
; and âJeremy Corbyn refuses to promise immigration cutbackâ, The Week,
28 September 2016,
.
[17] âAt least Jeremy Corbyn tells the truth: being in the EU means
unlimited immigrationâ, The Telegraph, 19 June 2016,
.
[18] âJeremy Corbynâs refusal to promise EU migration cut is wise if the
Toriesâ track record is any guideâ, The Huffington Post, 28 September
2016,
.
[19] In âReclaim the state debateâ, Aufheben #18 (2010), we discussed
excellent criticism of structuralism, which assumes that subjectivity is
shaped by such âobjectiveâ structures, in particular that of Simon
Clarke in The State Debate (edited by Simon Clarke), St Martinâs Press.
[20] For a detailed chronology and analysis of the pension dispute, see
S. Johns (2012) âThe fight of our livesâ: An analysis of the UK pensions
dispute, Libcom.
[21] E.g. Rousseau.
[22]
[23] The merits of individual actions or demos across Europe is a
separate issue. What is important is that the potential for
transnational solidarity would be affected by a clamp down on the
freedom of movement.
[24] Nnamdi Onuekwere v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[25] âEU criminals facing deportation and UK ban for up to 10 yearsâ,
Sky News, Tuesday 4 October 2016,
[26] This bankruptcy is exemplified by the action taken in July 2013 by
six senior officers of Brighton and Hove District Trades Council and
managers of the Brighton Unemployed Workersâ Centre, when a worker from
the EU who had lived, studied, and worked in the UK for 20 years,
complained about a xenophobic email sent to a British co-worker by her
manager and UNISON officer Tony Greenstein: âP. is a liar who only half
understands English Iâm not speaking 2 the bitch give me some creditâ.
The reaction was: silence â not even a single word in solidarity with
the worker, let alone a word censoring the email. In fact concrete
solidarity was better shown to the worker by the supposedly politically
illiterate proletariat of the local council estate.
[27] âNo10 distances itself from Liam Fox remarks on âlazyâ companiesâ,
The Guardian, 13 September 2016.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Analogously, it was only because of involvement in struggles with
the German proletariat that gave Marx the opportunity to see through the
veils of the capitalist forms â and not because of his philosophical
studies.