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Title: Against Pacifist Linearity Author: Tom Nomad Date: August 15, 2011 Language: en Topics: anti-pacifism Source: Retrieved on September 1, 2011 from https://web.archive.org/web/20110901194608/[[https://zinelibrary.info/against-pacifist-linearit][zinelibrary.info]]y
One of the most played out and trite debates within âactivistâ movements
is the debate about âviolentâ vs ânonviolentâ tactical sets. For
numerous reasons this debate has gone nowhere for quite some time. In
many instances both sides of this debate make sweeping generalizations
about the otherâs tactics, which engage tactics on the level of
effectiveness without examining the very constructed abstractions
inherent in either approach. Yet this debate has gained some energy once
again with the success of insurrectionary anarchist tactics at the
IMF/World Bank demonstrations in the Fall of 2007, the Republican
National Convention in 2008, and the recent uprising in Greece, all at a
time when the mainstream pacifist antiwar movement has been relegated to
the dustbin of ineffective social movements and many in the âofficialâ
Left defecting in droves to join in with the âObamanation. But many in
social âmovementsâ have to come to grips with one stunning fact that
many of us seem to forget: none of the tactical sets that we have
employed have resulted in a substantial victory over the moves of
capital and state.
We cannot count how many times we have been subjected to a lecture from
an old pacifist, claiming, âWell, these are the tactics that we have
always used and they have worked so farâ. Well, if this current social
and political condition is what results from nonviolence working, we
would hate to see what happens when it fails. What this all comes down
to is that nonviolence has not worked as a force of social change, and
the historical precedent of a tactic does not guarantee its legitimacy.
Rather, we would like to suggest that this is the very reason that
nonviolent paradigms of action need to be rejected. This historical
precedent is just another glaring example of the almost total inability
of pacifists to make sweeping social upheaval a possibility. In short,
nonviolence has become accepted by the state as an acceptable and
generally harmless form of action at best and is used as a necessary
pressure valve by the feds (just read the COINTELPRO Papers for more on
this) at worst.
The classic example of nonviolent action is an action done in front of
the White House on September 26, 2005. Over 150 people, including the
quintessential activist celebrity Cindy Sheehan, sat down in front of
the gate of the White House to wait to be arrested. Now, outside of the
complete pointlessness of this action, like the US State cares if people
get locked up in prison for political actions in the age of vast prison
expansion, there were details that a lot of the observers of this action
were unaware of. The organizers of the action had told the police that
they were doing the action and entered into a process of negotiation
with the police a month beforehand. They agreed that people would be
arrested and not cuffed, walked over to a processing van which would be
on site, and asked to pay $50, at which point they would be released. So
in essence, the organizers negotiated with the police an agreement to
make the action the least disruptive that it possibly could be. Now,
this is where nonviolent paradigms of action have led, the question is
why. We would like to suggest that this is a mentality which is inherent
to the nonviolent perspective.
Rather than a debate about the effectiveness of tactical sets, which is
an issue that we will engage with at the end of this text, we need to
begin to examine the ontological assumptions that structure the kernel
of nonviolence. Here we want to examine two pieces of writing
representing the two most common arguments for nonviolence, outside of
religious jibber jabber and new ageism which are based on the mass
authoritarian imposition of religious norms over movements (the
rejection of this from my perspective should be obvious). The first
piece is âThe Politics of Nonviolent Actionâ by Gene Sharp. Sharp is a
well known and often cited theorist and historian of nonviolence. Now he
has come under scrutiny for writing often selective histories of
movements to back up his positions, famously claiming that the
anti-colonial movement in India was a nonviolent movement and claiming
that the movement in Russia in 1917 had a significant nonviolent
character (Russia was an armed revolution after all). Yet his selective
reading of history is not what is at issue here. Sharp articulates a
common position to back up nonviolence: that nonviolent struggle is
necessary to create a nonviolent world. He bases this theory around an
articulation of a networked idea of political power, that states persist
in their actions because of a structuring of social consent, and that
nonviolent action presents a mechanism to stop and hinder undesirable
actions by the state while constructing the basis for a new political
paradigm through the exercise of popular or constituent power.
The second argument that we want to examine, and this is an argument
that is only important to engage with in the framework of
anti-authoritarian movements, is the argument presented in the pamphlet
âYou Canât Blow Up A Social Relationshipâ. The central argument made in
the pamphlet is that revolutionary violence is a âstrategy of
impatienceâ (12), that it presents a vanguardist tactical set that
presents nothing but authoritarian possibilities.
Obviously these two arguments are not separate, they mutually reinforce
each other in interesting ways, but also have two characteristics in
common. Both approaches assume the legitimacy of mass politics and the
pure ideality of the state. This is the basis of their failure. Most
other arguments for nonviolence are based on religious or moral
rejections of violence, as was mentioned before, yet all of these
theological approaches take these to arguments as their basis in the
revolutionary context. In order for nonviolence to be more than a
self-discovery quest this would have to be the case, and this is the
pivot point of the latent authoritarianism of nonviolence.
The next aspect of this question that needs to be engaged with is if
nonviolence is even possible. All revolutionary struggle occurs on a
plane of engagement with the state. Now, we am not claiming that Sharp
is wrong, the state is a collection of acts solicited and enacted on a
micropolitical level, but this is only half of the picture. The state
has very physical manifestations, even if these manifestations are just
apparatuses of acts and equivalences. The ideality of the state takes on
physical characteristics, just ask anyone in prison or in a black bloc.
The state constitutes a condition of possibility for everyday life, yet
the categories of equivalence have changed. In the age of globalization
and cybernetics the ethnic âpurityâ of the nation has broken down,
forcing the state to change form from state qua ethnos to state qua
demos. The state qua ethnos was the state of projection, a state which
projected an ethnic control outside of the ethnic border. The state qua
demos is the state of armed inclusion, the state of generalized war. The
state in a certain sense has abolished the border, no longer able to
claim the representation of a certain identity. The identity itself,
embodied in the founding principles of the state, has escaped the border
in the form of a universal declaration. All subjects, all agents, become
part of the Subject, the expression of these âuniversalâ principles, or
a citizen; all must become One, it is the only way that something like
political hierarchy can be justified. The so-called âWar on Terrorismâ
shows this clearly, the fight is not about the imposition of âdemocracyâ
in âforeignâ spaces, rather the imposition of âdemocracyâ is seen as the
liberation of some inherent human essence embodied in the âdemocraticâ
state. This is the abolition of the battlefield in the generation of war
as becoming-social, or becoming universal and this imposition, or armed
forced inclusion, is exactly that, it is armed, it is physical, not just
in the minds of bureaucrats.
At this point it does become important to address effectiveness, to
address the engagement with this physical manifestation. If the goal of
nonviolence is to institute a new form of power, can it accomplish this
within the framework of total war? Rather that the state being the
determination of actions, it sets an enforced framework for the
constitution of the possibilities of actions. In liberal-democratic
regimes the concept of political âfreedomâ is held to be
unchallengeable, even if it is an impossibility within political
hierarchies. As Hobbes will explain, the state does not prevent actions,
(this would be completely impossible unless we were all the state
itself, and the state is not a physical entity in this sense) rather the
state sanctions actions that have already occurred. In short, the state
generates a framework of acceptability through its ontological
equivalence of turning multitudes into the Subject, turning the dynamic
multiplicity of everyday life into a governable and abstractable social.
In order to maintain this equivalence the state must eliminate or
otherwise neutralize destabilizing elements.
Interestingly enough, this is very similar to the language used in
various police and military crowd control manuals. Field Manual 3â19.15,
the US Military Civil Disturbance Manual, incorporates a structuring of
the limit of âacceptableâ acts in the interest of maintaining political
stability. Now, like the inherent equivalences posited as the condition
of possibility for the state as such, the manual states that the police
need to generalize and categorize any action into a set of abstractable
categories of analysis before strategies of action can be conceived.
Much of this is based on the identification of the tactical set of the
group at issue. For this frame of analysis to function the mass group
needs to be present and centered around a universality of tactics and
goals. The category defined by the pigs needs to operate as a One or the
analysis fails and therefore their tactical framework fails. Nonviolence
makes this calculation all to easy. In the elimination of the
possibilities of certain forms of action there is a framework of
acceptability which escapes the dynamics of everyday life and situation
and comes to operate as a framework of equivalence for actions. By
generating its own equivalences of situation, by generating its own sets
of equivalences, the tactics of nonviolence can only be mass tactics, or
tactics that possess their own form of stability.
This shortcoming of nonviolence has been illustrated in all too many
completely pointless actions and this failure allows total war to
continue unabated. In short, all nonviolence can accomplish in the
framework of the police crowd control apparatus, or the apparatus of the
state channeling of conflict, is to reinforce the myth of freedom in the
state. The statement, âwell, I donât agree with them but I will always
fight wars to preserve their right to do itâ become possible. This
possibility is a statement of the acceptability of nonviolent actions,
they are accepted and dealt with by the police in the most passive way
possible to the degree that they pose no threat to the stability
apparatus of the state itself, nonviolence becomes political action
emptied of risk, emptied of danger, and thus emptied of any form of
effectiveness. The limitation on the possibility of tactics of
intervention become the institution of a revolutionary politics with no
potential.
But here the answer runs into a wall, and this is the point of the text
in which we would like to focus much attention. If nonviolence, in its
positing of a generalized equivalence, creates another form of stability
and a space for negotiation, that does not mean that one can generate
the ideology of violence.
This was tried by Nechaev already. Violence, if it is to maintain the
potential for destabilization of the political apparatus, cannot become
another form of equivalence. Not all violences are the same, a point
missed by many pacifists.
War machines and their reappropraition are different moves. Yet it is
problematic to begin to argue for the tactical universality of violence
without also generating a negotiable equivalence. Recent approaches to
this problem have come up in the discourse of diversity of tactics.
Employing a diversity of tactics creates the space for agency to be
situationally, politically and positionally dependent; one engages in
the tactics that they have a desire to engage with. This has never
functioned flawlessly as of yet, still pacifists denounce anarchists in
the press for being too violent. With the practical failures aside the
approach is worth a look. We want to end this text with a discussion of
the St. Paul Principles developed to facilitate actions at the
Republican National Convention protests. Since that point the St Paul
Principles have become the standard point of departure for the
discussion and deployment of a diversity of tactics and have led to the
development of the Pittsburgh Principles around the G20 meetings.
To begin this discussion of the two arguments for nonviolence that we
want to outline we need to begin by making a distinction. Many
nonviolent actions are carried out for reformist goals, for example in
the antiwar movement. These actions are not what we are going to be
addressing here. For many of us engaged in political movements it has
become plainly obvious that putting makeup on a pig still makes it a
pig. Or, for instance, putting restrictions on police violence still
makes it police violence, or making capital âethicalâ (which is a
complete impossibility) still preserves the forced equivalence and
channeling of everyday life through the commodity form as condition of
possibility. Reformist movements are worth even less than all the paper
used for their flyers and all the money and gas wasted mobilizing huge
spectacles of conformity. What we are dealing with here is the
destabilizing potentiality of the tactics and ontological frameworks of
nonviolence. So, to put it another way, the only paradigm of nonviolence
that is even worth considering is ârevolutionary nonviolenceâ, the type
expressed by Sharp or the War Resisters League. All other forms of
nonviolence, because they do not even maintain the illusion of
attempting to combat the violence endemic in capitalism, is nothing but
a lifestyle choice.
The position of a revolutionary nonviolence has been argued by such
widely divergent people as Catholic Workers and Einstein. Many of the
positions of nonviolence hold religious or moral considerations at their
core but these are not the considerations that we are interested in
here. Rather we will be engaging with the framework of deployment for
these principles of nonviolence, whatever they happen to be. Or in other
words, we will be engaging with the modes of action of revolutionary
nonviolence. It is also worth noting that there have been some awesome
ânonviolentâ actions (nonviolent in quotes because of the vast
disagreement over the terming of violence, an issue that will be engaged
with later). âNonviolentâ activists have broken into draft offices and
set draft records on fire by the thousands, sawed down telephone poles
at NORAD which connected global positioning satellite dishes from the
central computer infrastructure, hacked the US military missile
targeting system which delayed the invasion of Iraq by 2 full days. In
other words, nonviolent actions can be effective given the right
circumstances and effective and clandestine planning and strategic
structuring. But the question here is the possibility of nonviolent acts
to smash the state apparatus.
The modern American pacifist tactical framework derives from the studies
of Gene Sharp. Sharp was a leading historian, theorist, and tactician on
a series of ânonviolentâ campaigns. There is debate within pacifist
circles as to the pacifism of Sharp, who at many points described
himself as a âtactical pacifistâ (a pacifist not on principle but out of
necessity), but none-the-less he is a guiding light for nonviolence
trainers all around the world. What is interesting about Sharp, and why
he cannot just be written off as a religious fundamentalist, is that his
version of nonviolence departs from a discussion on the functionings of
political power. âBasically there appear to be two views of the nature
of power. One can see people as dependent upon good will, the decisions
and the support of their government, or any other hierarchical system to
which they belong. Or, conversely, one can see that government or system
dependent on the peopleâs good will, decisions and supportâ (Sharp, 8).
The division here is between understanding the state as an entity as
such which controls and oppresses the actions within its area of
control, or understanding the state as the structuring of consent. Sharp
then goes on to argue that the structuring of political violence is the
structuring of violence to combat the state qua Monolith or system. If
This view, for Sharp, and we would agree with him here, is too narrow.
âThat theory can only alter reality when both the subjects and opponents
of the regime presenting this monolithic image of itself can be induced
to believe the theoryâ (Sharp, 9). In another light, if the generation
of the act is based in a continuity of discontinuity, in other words if
we depart from the conditions of possibility for the act itself while
generating a futurity as the possibility for the act itself, then the
act presents a rupture in the continuity of temporality. It generates an
act which is a break with all that is past, the act itself presumes that
there is a space which is not accounted for in the act itself, and the
act is act to the degree that it is based on a necessary destabilization
of the circular inertia of history in the linearity of the succession of
acts, and then the state cannot act. In other words, each and every
action, even something as simple as being alive, changes the conditions
that existed before that act, each act destabilizes history and presents
a series of effects as possibilities for this rupture.
Like Spinozaâs God, the state is a vast apparatus of equivalence and in
its universality it cannot generate discontinuities within its
equivalence or it threatens to abolish itself, so the state cannot act
as an entity as such. The state must be stabile, it presents a framework
which is static, immobile. Yet acts themselves move, they destabilize.
The elimination of the possibility of acts and in its impossibility,
impossible because the state is enacted through actions themselves,
means that the state must posit a framework of acceptable
destabilizations, or stabilized destabilizations by generating a
framework outside of acts themselves, a framework which judges acts
through making them all equivalent and in this the state remains
immobile. Yet if acts present nothing but effects, or possibilities in a
context, then all acts are singularities, unable to be compared to other
acts. Within the Newtonian assumption of equivalence the equivalence
posited is an ontological determination, a determination of the
necessary equivalence of like and like. In other words, the positing of
the Newtonian move, the generation of the frozen temporality of the
equivalence, in being ontological is a claim on space-time generally. As
such the apparatus which forms the condition of possibility cannot act
as such, so the state cannot be an entity in itself. This is borne out
in practical experience. The state is an apparatus which frames, limits,
and channels actions into acceptable forms, legalistic or informal.
Everyday over a million people get up, put on uniforms, and go to work
in the bureaucracies and control mechanisms of the state, every cop
makes a decision every day to be a cop.
âThe only way to erect such a Common PowerâŠis, to conferre all their
power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may
reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, onto one Will: which is
as much as to say, to appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to beare
their PersonâŠThis is more than Consent or Concord; it is a reall Unitie
of them all, in one and the same PersonâŠThis done, the Multitude so
united in one Person, is called a Common-wealthâŠâ(Hobbes, 227)
The state is the generation of the Subject from the multitude of
discontinuous acts, it forms the conditions of possibility for the act
by structuring the continuity which the act occurs within. So in this
sense Sharp is correct, the state is not a monolith. This becomes
important because he goes on to claim that nonviolence gains legitimacy
because it deals with power âat its sourceâ (Sharp, 10). In short, Sharp
is making the claim that nonviolence, in being absent of coercion,
builds the basis of a new, presumably nonhierarchical form of power,
through the absence of the act qua coercion. Now, Sharp claims that
nonviolence can be deployed as a form of non-cooperation. Noncooperation
for Sharp attacks power at its base, the very structuring of consent
necessary for the state to function (Sharp, 36). This concept of
nonviolence begins to sketch out a concept of revolutionary nonviolence
based around the generation of mass no cooperation. In essence, he is
attempting to construct a concept of nonviolence as war machine. The
nonviolent war machine is a tactic of refusal based in a destabilization
concept. If the state is the structuring of consent for the state, then
refusal of the mandates of the state undermines its ability to implement
equivalences. In a sense it is the theory of nonviolence as virus, the
hope being that noncooperation will spread. In this sense nonviolence
for Sharp is a defensive move, defending an already present human
condition from encroachment by the state, the nonviolent activist is
exercising an ability that is always already latent. But because of this
defensive character, the nonviolent act must always already be the mass
act. Everyone in the factory needs to seize the factory or strike, all
people need to march to the sea to pound salt, etc. In this sense the
nonviolence of Sharp is the generation of a form of alternate stability
formed around the maxim to not impose.
The other basis for nonviolence in an anarchist context that needs to be
engaged with is the argument presented in âYou Canât Blow Up A Social
Relationshipâ about what a series of Australian anarchists saw as the
inherent authoritarian vanguardism in the act of violent insurrection.
This argument is not important in authoritarian circles, which already
accept the authoritarian vanguard role, hell, this essay may just
encourage them. âA democracy can only be produced if a majority movement
is built. The guerilla strategy depends on a collapse of will in the
ruling class to produce the social crisis out of which the revolution
occurs, whether the majority favors it or not. Any reading of guerilla
strategists reveals that it is a philosophy of impatienceâ (12). The
argument here is important, though every example that is used is an
example from guerilla movements that unapologetically assume an
authoritarian character. What the authors of this pamphlet, and their
names have been lost in the dustbin of anarchist history, are arguing is
that the move of the violent revolution is not a populist move. In the
structuring of the concept of revolutionary violence around impatience
they have equated all violent action to vanguardism. In essence the
claim is that the violent insurrection generates its own structuring of
authority around the revolutionary act, a âyour either with us or
against usâ mentality. In choosing to act before waiting for the
âmassesâ, the insurrectionist is unilaterally defining the conditions of
action within the plane of resistance. âConcentrating on the supposed
insanity of the guerillas or terrorists is an attempt to provide a
justification for murderousness towards them and for the introduction of
general repressionâ (16).
Now this is not incorrect. Violent actions do draw an increase in
repression from the state. Yet this is problematic in a very basic way.
The claim is that the acts of the insurrectionists are the cause of
political repression by the state. Yet is it not the existence of the
equivalent Subject qua state that is the condition of possibility for
generalized repression. Now there are practical examples that back this
up. In Italy over the course of the 20^(th) century it was standard for
fascists to bomb a target and blame it on the anarchists to draw state
repression onto anarchist militants. But they have the process
backwards, it is not the insurrectionists that generate the repression,
rather it is the state reaction that generates repression. The state is
a posited equivalence which has exceeded everyday life and become
condition of possibility for everyday life. Whether we like it or not,
the cops think that they control the streets. In the generation of the
Newtonian equivalence all outlying variables need to be eliminated, all
destabilizations to the framework stabilized or eliminated. Like the
airstream pattern studies that generated the basis for chaos theory, as
an equivalence progresses it needs to either freeze time, which is
impossible, or reincorporate or eliminate potentially destabilizing
elements in order to maintain its coherence (Gleick, 15) . But if all
acts present a destabilization in continuity, if acts form a continuity
of discontinuity, what we call history, then acts are reincorporated or
repressed due to the threat of entropy which they pose to the
abstracting machine. So it is not the act that generates repression, it
is the existence of the abstracting apparatus of the state that
generates repression in an attempt to maintain coherence, and all
effective insurrectionary events will draw repression by the state to
the degree that they are potentially destabilizing.
This is why we hate it when anarchists complain about police brutality
after actions. Isnât this the point, we reject the state because it can
employ violence to prevent us from living our desires, because it makes
us all equivalent? If we are serious about this we have to expect that
the state will attack with everything they have, within the social
limits of acceptability. For instance in the US pigs do not use water
cannons because it hearkens back to images of white pigs firing water
cannons on black civil rights demonstrators, but do not think for a
second that they will hesitate to use a water cannon if they had to,
they were on the streets of St Paul during the RNC awaiting deployment.
Both of these arguments make a similar set of assumptions that construct
a framework for nonviolent action. Both of these pieces depart from the
idea that violence is used against the state in order to âsever the head
of stateâ and impose a new form of organization. They are both correct
to argue that this is completely vanguardist and does not engage with
power on the level of deployment. This approach has been the downfall of
both authoritarian communism, which took power in certain sites and left
the general social structuring of power untouched while imposing another
structure to control those flows, and anarchist assassinations, which
caused a general amount of chaos in the ruling structures of the West in
the early 20^(th) century, but failed to accomplish its goals.
In a sense both pieces reject the imposition of a mass political
solution imposed by a minority group only to rebuild the idea of mass
politics. In both pieces the argument is that noncoercive nonviolent
acts attack power at the level of deployment, everyday life, by opening
up a non-authoritarian social refusal. Yet both pieces rely on the
construction of the nonviolent equivalence. Rather than the mass Subject
imposed by the violent imposition of social order through violent
action, they both construct the Subject of mass action based in a
definitionality of nonviolence. This imposes the restriction on
temporality and action through the assertion of an inherent nonviolent
noncooperation. The argument is that we always have the ability to
withdraw consent from the state through mass nonviolent action. Yet if
violence is considered as inherently authoritarian, then nonviolence
becomes the condition of possibility for action.
A practical example of this occurred in Seattle during the WTO
demonstrations in 1999, where pacifists pepper sprayed anarchists
attempting to smash windows on Nike Town. Here, an axiom of nonviolence
was violently imposed. Like the state apparatus, nonviolence generates a
Newtonian equivalence. Once a certain tactical set is rejected
absolutely, all attempts at this can be repressed to preserve the
nonviolent aspects of the act.
Both pieces also assume that the state is a pure ideality. It is true on
a certain level that the state is a structuring of consent, but ask
anyone in prison or under FBI investigation if this is a sufficient
framework of analysis. Every tear gas canister and taser, every
battalion of pigs that occupy our streets, every person killed in cold
blood by the pigs, proves this concept of the state as pure ideality
incorrect. The plain fact is that if the state decides that an action
presents a threat to stability it will be repressed. That is the point
of having an armed gang employed by the state which they call police.
The point here is that the everyday life in contemporary society is
structured on violence. We live on land stolen and cultivated by
massacring one group of people and enslaving another. The market is
based on measuring how many trees can be cut, mountain tops blown off to
mine for coal, sweatshops opened, wages driven down, environmental laws
abolished, infrastructure sold off, people downsized, and wars started.
The generalization of the commodity form is the structuring of the
equivalence of violence and coercion in the form of profit. The more
that can be taken from us and sold to the highest bidder, the more
profit is generated, all while we slave away to get back the things
which are already ours outside of the apparatus of commodification.
As Ernst Junger began to discuss, the borders of the battlefield have
been abolished into total war. The change in state form from state qua
ethnos to state qua demos has been the germination point of this
generalization of violence. âThe symptoms of the impasse in which the
problematic of sovereignty in Europe is caught is encountered every day;
in the final analysis they all refer to the absolute blockage of the
question of the âpeopleâ understood not as ethnos or âcommunal identityâ
but as demos or âconstituent political identityââ (Balibar 157). The age
of globalization has brought about a lot of changes to the general
structuring of social apparatuses, the most stark shift has been the
increased flow of people over borders. There are 200,000 ethnic Tamils
living in Toronto and almost as many Indian restaurants in London than
in Bombay. The state as the expression of an ethnic Subject has broken
down and been replaced by the state as political construction. No longer
are states determined by ethnic make up, rather they are separated
through a process of political differentiation, and with the institution
of the European Union and the âWar on Terrorismâ, even that distinction
is beginning to break down. Rather the state is presented as the
expression of an inherent human essence.
âAmerica will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are
right and true andunchanging for all people everywhere. No nation owns
these aspirations, and no nation is exemptfrom them. We have no
intention of imposing our culture â but America will always stand firm
for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law ...
limits on the power of the state ... respect for women ... private
property ... free speech ... equal justice ... and religious tolerance.
â(Bush, 1/29/2002)
The structuring of the state qua ethnos was the structuring of the state
around a necessary exclusion and projection. The war of the state qua
ethnos is the war of projection and conquering, recently this was the
case in Bosnia, for example.
The ethnic war is the war of subjectification or cleansing, but that war
is localized. The state qua demos is the state of armed inclusion. The
imperatives of the Subject, or the stability of the state qua apparatus,
are expressed as inherent human characteristics which can be realized or
not through political structuring. This is the logic of the humanitarian
intervention and international policing structures. This inclusion is
the territorialization of the Newtonian move of the state in a
generalized form. The battlefield is no longer contained, now every act
is subject to violent response by the state regardless of positionality.
In this sense the state qua demos becomes the condition of possibility
for the act generally, and each act can be considered an act of war. In
other words, the state qua ethnos was still a state of contestation,
outside of the anti-statist move (although still subject to repression,
again, isnât this the point of the state), the ethnic form can take on a
variety of appropriations, while the state qua demos is the state of
technique. While the state qua ethnos can take on a variety of forms,
stalinist nationalism and fascism for example, the state qua demos is
the state of technocracy, the form is already given and the only debates
exist around the content of this form. The conclusions of the form of
organization are taken as latent in the construction of the Subject as
such, the state qua demos is the state of stability, the state of
security where the form must be secured and the content allowed to shift
within given confines. The primary goal of the political state is to
secure borders and stabilize political forms to preserve the limits
posited and in order to do this they are willing to carry out a constant
security operation, one called national security or just security.
Nonviolent revolution is an impossibility. We will engage with two
discussions as to why this is the case. Firstly, we will look at crowd
control procedures outlined in âField Manual 3â19.15: Civil Disturbance
Operationsâ issued by the US military to National Guard forces and
police departments. The reason that this manual has been chosen, and
there are a lot of manuals which address civil disturbance operations,
is that most police civil disturbance operations manuals are tightly
based on the procedures outlined in this manual, for a good example look
at the recently released RNC Civil Disturbance Manual released by the St
Paul Police Department. The main goal of the procedures outlined in the
manual are based on the generation of equivalences in order to respond
to a situation in order to maintain stability, but not necessarily to
end all political acts. The second discussion that we will engage in is
a discussion of the inherently stabilizing elements in the theories of
nonviolence outlined above.
Field Manual 3â19.15 is the standard operations manual for the US
military in crowd control situations. It has been repeatedly cited and
mimicked by pigs all over the country in learning how to deal with the
rise in political demonstrations.
The manual proceeds by generating a series of categories of analysis.
Firstly, the crowd is analyzed and positioned into three classes: public
disorder is when a small crowd is gathering, public disturbance is when
a crowd begins to chant or engage in mild actions like marching or
nonviolently blocking a road, riot is when the crowd begins to engage in
property destruction or other forms of violence (1â5). âCommanders must
be aware of the possibility that some individuals or groups within an
organized demonstration may have the intent to cause disruption, incite
violence, destroy property, and provoke authoritiesâ (1â3). Their
pre-action preparation lays out a series of considerations for the pigs
to take into account. They are advised to avoid confrontation, focus on
prevention, and define goals beforehand. âCrowd situations are highly
unpredictable, but one thing seems certain- confrontation will likely
cause crowd resistance. When pushed, people tend to resist opposition to
the realization of their purposeâ (2â5).
It goes on to recommend that the pigs communicate with the âleadersâ of
the protest (which in the context of anarchist blocs has led to some
really funny situations with very confused pigs, especially in DC) in
order to form a working relationship which results in âprotest groups
largely policing themselvesâ (2â7).
If this fails the pigs then move into what they call scaleable effects.
In other words, they will attempt to develop a matrix of escalation,
moving from warnings to disperse to shows of force and finally
escalating force (2â13).
âCurrent crowd control doctrine places an emphasis on crowd dispersal.
Forced dispersal may result in a crowd breaking up into multiple groups
that scatter over a large area. This may pose even greater public order
problems and may pose a continued threat to control forces. A crowd is
often controlled better by means of containment (confining its
activities to a given area). A crowd has limited duration, and its
numbers are likely to diminish as individual needs take precedence over
those of the crowdâ (2â22).
This manual is quite possibly one of the best illustrations of the
mindset of the pigs within the state qua demos. What is interesting here
is that the goal of the pigs is not to prevent actions, or to put a
blanket level of force around the action itself. Rather the goal is to
respond to destabilization with increasing armed stability. The main
variable within the approaches laid out here is that the pigs need to
have a situation which they can generalize and respond to. It is
expressed in the quote from page 2â22, âForced dispersal may result in a
crowd breaking up into multiple groups scattered over a large area. This
may pose even greater public order problems and may pose a continued
threat to control forcesâ. In other words, the decentralization of
insurrectionary violence generates a potential entropy within their
strategic framework. The concern of the pigs is to contain and
de-escalate the situation, by force if necessary. The state tolerates
and even solicits certain political acts, in order to maintain the myth
of political freedom within the state apparatus, to the degree that
these acts are emptied of their destabilizing and entropic properties.
Nonviolence plays into this strategy completely, and that is why
pacifists pose no threat. We laid out earlier that the two fundamental
characteristics of the nonviolence discourses analyzed earlier were that
they both approach the state as a pure ideality which, and this is the
second point of agreement, can be combatted through mass noncooperation.
The state qua demos as the state of technique and stabilization responds
to acts of destabilization to the degree that they are potentially
entropic. This leads our nonviolence proponents into a little bit of a
trap. The mass Subject of nonviolence is the Subject of necessary mass
action, or unified and striated action, based in the definitionality of
nonviolence.
So they become presented with a choice. The Subject of nonviolence,
always already generated as an equivalence, can engage in acts, but acts
that are always limited in the potential for potential. If the action
carried out is not effective, if it fails to generate a potential
destabilization (and most nonviolent actions fall into this category),
then the action defeats itself. If the action does become effective then
the violence of the state, which forms the condition of possibility for
the state qua demos, goes unopposed. The nice pacifists sit in the road
till they either get bored with the police escort or get dispersed
through the use of force.
The posited equivalence of the Subject qua nonviolence is, like all
Newtonian moves, an equivalence of frozen temporality, making it
impossible to act situationally. It is no wonder that the pacifists
almost never achieve anything.
The ineffectiveness and technocratic aspects of nonviolence manifest
most practically in the sets of nonviolence guidelines that many of us
have grown to be completely sick of getting handed on small fliers
before every mass demonstration that we choose to attend. A good example
of these types of guidelines, and many of them tend to be very similar,
is the guidelines set by the Declaration of Peace. This is a campaign
which at a certain point had some potential, yet got leached of all its
content through the unilateral institution of nonviolence guidelines by
the organizing group. The original idea was that we should set a date
for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, or a wave of direct
action would be launched across the US. The nonviolence guidelines set
the parameters which actions will be carried out:
all we encounter.
consequences of our actions.
will not bring or use alcohol or drugs (except for medical purposes).
(
http://declarationofpeace.org/nonviolence-guidelines
)
So under these guidelines any participant cannot be stoned, hostile
towards the pigs, smash windows, and must voluntarily allow themselves
to be arrested.
Need we say more? The very framework prevents confrontation or any
attempt to destabilize a situation. The goal of these actions is to
âinvite the majority in this country to take steps to call for an end to
the US war in Iraqâ. So, as we talked about earlier, the goal of the
nonviolent action is to encourage the building of the mass nonviolent
Subject, the subject of nonconfrontation. The generation of the Subject
qua nonviolence exceeds and limits the potential for action, and thus
the constitution and potential for the constitution of agency, and thus
limits the agent. We like to call this âPeace Police Syndromeâ. In many
of these events there are people in orange or green vests who have the
task of preventing people from violating these guidelines and serve as a
buffer between the crowd and the pigs, using tactics of de-escalation.
In essence the nonviolence organizers attempt to prevent as much
destabilization as possible by forcibly limiting the actions of the more
insurrectionary among us, preventing us from manifesting a resistance
that departs from our lives and contexts by substituting our
positionality for one within an abstracted nonviolent Subject.
For example, in the first major antiwar march in DC after the start of
this most recent phase of the genocide of Iraq, the pigs attacked the
black bloc while still on the permitted march route and instead of
allowing space for self-defense and tactical fluidity the âpeace policeâ
physically prevented the bloc from leaving the permitted route to get to
a space that was more easily defensible. This resulted in a shouting
match and eventually one of the âpeace policeâ punched an anarchist in
the face, setting off a fist fight between anarchists and âpeace
policeâ, while we were still attempting to repel a police assault. At
the end of this march the police decided to launch smoke or tear gas
grenades at the bloc and charge the crowd, most of the pacifists ran,
leaving the bloc to defend 35,000 people trapped in a park. While the
bloc prevented the pigs from entering the park, giving everyone else
space to rest and recover while resulting in a series of blocers
suffering broken bones and arrest, we again had to fend off the âpeace
policeâ who were attempting to de-escalate the situation by physically
attempting to push us off the street from behind while the pigs attacked
from the front. Is this not the very form of action which the state
treats as its limit before attempting to control a situation by force,
usually allowing the participants to police themselves, sometimes in a
very literal sense?
In another instance we personally witnessed one of these Declaration of
Peace actions go down at the Hart Senate Office Building and the
participants negotiated with the pigs to be able to enter the building.
All their signs and banners were taken, and they were told that if they
talked they would be arrested. So a mass of 50 or so people stood in the
lobby of the building silently without signs until they were all
arrested one by one and put on a bus to be dropped in another area of
town, and after the action the organizers presented this as a victory.
Again, if this is victory we would hate to see defeat. The question
becomes, how do we effectively resist without constructing just another
mass Subject based in institutionalized ineffectiveness.
It should be plainly obvious that, like the Subject qua nonviolence,
there is an impossibility for the Subject qua violence. Now it is also
plainly obvious that violence and total war are conditions of
possibility for everyday life in the age of globalization. What we mean
by this is that while violence is endemic to all relations of power, the
construction of a Subject around the definitionality of tactical
violence recreates the problematic equivalence of the Subject qua
nonviolence. One approach to moving beyond this impasse, outside of
agreeing to disagree, is the discourse of a diversity of tactics. This
has been expressed in the St Paul Principles, an agreement between
various groups and collectivities around tactical limits to the
demonstrations at the RNC. The idea is that this framework is a fluid
and dynamic way of making sure that all groups, regardless of tactics,
have space for their own desires, regardless of how totally ineffective
many of these forms are.
âThe principles are: 1) Our solidarity will be based on a respect for a
diversity of tactics and the plans of other groups, 2) The actions and
tactics used will be organized to maintain a separation of time or
space, 3) Any debates or criticisms will stay internal to the movement,
avoiding any public or media denunciations of fellow activists and
events, 4) We oppose any state repression of dissent, including
surveillance, infiltration, disruption and violence. We agree not to
assist law enforcement actions against activists and othersâ
(
)
Diversity of tactics theory is an interesting approach to this problem.
It at once rejects the equivalence of all acts by generating an
âecosystem of resistanceâ (a term used a lot on the ground in St Paul)
which knows no limitations. This move away from the essentialized act
creates a space which is always already destabilized to the degree that
there is a multiplicity of actions, either announced publicly or not
(and much more destabilized if they are not announced), while still
making sure that there is a support infrastructure in place for legal
and medic support. It generates an environment of potential
non-reducability, an environment which rejects the equivalence of
situations posited by the state and its civil disturbance approaches.
The practical meaning of the tactical impasse of nonviolence is that the
Subject qua nonviolence frames and limits acts through the
definitionality of a fluid nonviolence immobilized in the nonviolence
guideline. In other words, the adherence to an abstract nonviolence
supersedes the tactical necessities of the situation itself; it is
nothing but institutionalized ineffectiveness. There are a series of
equivalences made in the calculations of the nonviolent action. First,
the guidelines are determined through the naming and defining of the
concept of nonviolence which comes to supersede the act and agents
themselves, substituting the equivalence for the actual participants and
situation. This is nothing but the very same move made by the state,
just in a microcosm.
Secondly, the Subject qua state is taken as the plane of engagement,
they are the Subject of consent, doing nothing but reinforcing the
Newtonian equivalence of the state as such and generating another
appropriation of mass politics, negating the actual existence of actual
agents. In positing this series of equivalences the defining of
nonviolence comes to supersede the actual goals of the action itself in
favor of building mass consent and support for nonviolent tactics and
politics.
Can someone explain to me how this is different than the Leninist or
political party assumption?
Nonviolence refuses to engage in tactics that would be effective, in the
interest of preserving the mass image of nonviolence. But how is
nonviolence possible in an apparatus that has formed us in the image of
total war? To define nonviolence means to section it off from violence,
but if everything is saturated with violence, if the battlefield has
been abolished, then this form of definitionality becomes pure
simulacra, a generated construct that by design exceeds everyday life
and forms its Subject in the cryogenic time of Newtonian equivalence.
This becoming-cryogenic prevents any form of nonviolence from responding
to attempts by the forces of the state to enforce stability over a
situation, the tactics are set, the participants are âresponsibleâ and
harmless, and the action becomes nothing but theatre, and ineffective
theatre at that.
June 2009
You Canât Blow Up A Social Relationship. anonymous. 1979
Politics of Nonviolence. Sharp, Gene. Boston. Porter Sargent. 1973
Leviathan. Hobbes, Thomas. New York. Penguin Classic. 1982
Grammar of the Multitude. Virno, Paolo. New York. Semiotexte. 2004
Chaos: Making a New Science. Gleick, James. New York. Penguin. 2008
We, The People of Europe. Balibar, Etienne. Trans. Swenson, James.
Princeton, NJ. Princeton Press. 2004
State of The Union Address. 1/29/2002. Bush, George W
Field Manual 3â19.15: Civil Disturbance Operations. United States Army.
2005
St Paul Principles. retrieved 1/30/2009.
www.nornc.org/st-paul-principles
Declaration of Peace Nonviolent Guidelines. retrieved 1/31/2009.